EDITED BY

RALPH M. ROSEN AND JOSEPH FARRELL

# NOMODEIKTES

## GREEK STUDIES IN HONOR OF MARTIN OSTWALD

MICHIGAN

# Nomodeiktes

## Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald

*Edited by*
Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell

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# Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Preface xi

Abbreviations xix

1. HISTORIANS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

1. The *Histor* in History 3
   W. R. CONNOR
2. The Meaning of Material Culture:
   Herodotus, Thucydides, and Their Sources 17
   CHARLES W. HEDRICK, JR.
3. Three Aspects of Spartan Kingship in Herodotus 39
   ROSARIA VIGNOLO MUNSON
4. Reading the World:
   The Interpretation of Objects in Herodotus' *Histories* 55
   CAROLYN DEWALD
5. Thucydides' Birth Date 71
   CHARLES W. FORNARA
6. Thucydides' Criticism of Democratic Knowledge 81
   JOSIAH OBER
7. Archidamus and the Question of
   Characterization in Thucydides 99
   DANIEL P. TOMPKINS
8. The Death of Thucydides
   and the Motif of "Land on Sea" 113
   STEWART FLORY
9. The Silent Women of Thucydides: 2.45.2 Re-viewed 125
   PAUL CARTLEDGE

10. Thucydides 2.45.2 and the Status of War Widows in Periclean Athens 133
LISA KALLET-MARX
11. "Here the Lion Smiled": A Note on Thucydides 1.127–38 145
CYNTHIA PATTERSON

## 2. POLITICS AND SOCIETY

12. Buphonia and Goring Ox: Homicide, Animal Sacrifice, and Judicial Process 155
MARILYN A. KATZ
13. The Perception of Deception and Gullibility in Specialists of the Supernatural (Primarily) in Athenian Literature 179
DONALD LATEINER
14. The Athenian Economy 197
EDWARD E. COHEN
15. Oligarchic Thinking in the Late Fifth Century 207
DAVID M. LEWIS
16. From Athena's Owl to the Owl of Athens 213
H. A. SHAPIRO
17. Land Ownership, Territorial Possession, Hero Cults, and Scholarly Theory 225
IRAD MALKIN
18. *Knemides* in the East? Some Observations on the Impact of Greek Body Armor on "Barbarian" Tribes 235
ELFRIEDE R. KNAUER
19. Andocides' *On the Mysteries* and the Theme of the Father in Late Fifth-Century Athens 255
BARRY S. STRAUSS
20. Aristotelian Politeiai and *Athenaion Politeia* 4 269
ROBERT W. WALLACE
21. The Strange Death of Draco on Aegina 287
THOMAS J. FIGUEIRA
22. Tyranny and Outlawry: *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10 305
EDWIN M. CARAWAN
23. Samian Autonomy 321
DAVID WHITEHEAD

24. A Dedication from the Chersonese at Olympia 331
A. J. GRAHAM
25. The Polis in the Hellenistic World 339
ERICH S. GRUEN
26. Paean and Paeanists of Serapis and the Flavian Emperors 355
ROBERT E. A. PALMER

## 3. PHILOSOPHY

27. Plato's *Ion* and the Problem of *Techne* 369
CHARLES H. KAHN
28. The Place of *Phthonos* in the Argument of Plato's *Phaedrus* 379
MATTHEW W. DICKIE
29. Out of the Cave: What Socrates Learned from Diotima 397
DOROTHEA FREDE
30. The Acropolis of the Soul 423
HELEN F. NORTH
31. Plato's Magnesia 435
DISKIN CLAY
32. Theophrastus on Law, Virtue, and the Particular Situation 447
WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH

## 4. LITERATURE

33. *Lipous' androteta*, Elision, and Prosody 459
HENRY M. HOENIGSWALD
34. On Critically Looking into Snell's Homer 467
ELIOT WIRSHBO
35. Into the Midpoint of Things: Aristotle, Bartlett, and the Memory of a Poet 479
JAMES TATUM
36. *Atê* Reconsidered 491
MATT NEUBURG
37. Aeschylus' Politics and the Theme of the *Oresteia* 505
DAVID M. SCHAPS

38. The *Prometheis* in Vase Painting and on the Stage 517
KEITH DEVRIES
39. Oedipus as *Pharmakos* 525
HELENE PEET FOLEY
40. What Do You Know? The End of Oedipus 539
RACHEL KITZINGER
41. Elusory Voices:
Thoughts about the Sophoclean Chorus 557
THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER
42. The Frustrated Mourner:
Strategies of Closure in Greek Tragedy 573
DEBORAH ROBERTS
43. Problems in Greek Literary History:
The Case of Aristophanes' *Clouds* 591
JEFFREY HENDERSON
44. Alcibiades in Cloudedoverland 603
MICHAEL VICKERS
45. The *Bios*-Tradition and Poets' Lives
in Hellenistic Poetry 619
PETER BING
46. Corinna and Pindar 633
DEE CLAYMAN

Appendix: Bibliography of Martin Ostwald 643

Bibliography 647

Index locorum 699

Index 715

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Ralph M. Rosen Joseph Farrell

# Preface

IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR *FESTSCHRIFTEN* to begin with a list of reasons why the honorand deserves one in the first place. The following pages will, we hope, show that Martin Ostwald's accomplishments and the awards they have garnered him justify such an honor. We will also try, to the extent that we can, to explain what made Martin the gifted scholar and teacher, the wonderful colleague and friend that so many know him to be, by setting some of the events of Martin's life and career into a context that may help to enhance all of our appreciation of what he has meant to so many of us as individuals and to our profession as a whole.

The impact of refugee scholars from central Europe on the British classical scene has been remarked upon many times. Less celebrated, perhaps, but no less important has been the influx of foreign scholars to the United States during the same period. While some institutions benefited from the arrival of scholars who represented a tangible link with Prussian scholarship at its height—Harvard, for instance, from Werner Jaeger, Cornell and Wisconsin from Friedrich Solmsen, both men former students of Wilamowitz—an arguably greater impact on classical studies in this country has been made by a later generation that arrived here with years of traditional education in Greek and Latin behind them, but with the more adaptable attitudes of young people who had lived through violent and bewildering events.

Martin Ostwald was born in Dortmund, Germany, in 1922. He was educated, according to the peculiar mix of state and religion that then prevailed in that country, in a Jewish elementary school and in the Städtisches Gymnasium, a distinguished classical academy founded in 1543. From an early age, encouraged no doubt by similar interests of his father, a classically educated lawyer, Martin took to classics, and especially to Greek literature.

In 1933 the Städtisches Gymnasium changed its name to Hitler Gymnasium. Ironically, it remained one of the few schools in Germany, and the only one in Dortmund, to continue to teach Jewish students. Thus was Martin able to pursue his classical education; but his

expectation of continuing this pursuit into a teaching career was cut off by legislation which closed German universities to Jews. He then began to plan a somewhat different career combining teaching with scholarship: the rabbinate.

The night of November 10, 1938—Kristallnacht—changed everything: Martin, together with his father and younger brother Ernest, was arrested and sent to a concentration camp, putting an end to his schooling in Germany.

Biographers too easily fall victim to the conceit of the telling anecdote that sums up or explains a person's character or motivation, as if something so complex and multifarious could be so easily contained in a single brief story. Yet one episode in particular seems to us so important that it would be a kind of distortion not to relate it. When Martin saw his father for the last time—it was in the camp—Max Ostwald's final words to his sons were these:

> ἔσσεται ἦμαρ ὅτ' ἄν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἰρὴ
> καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐυμελίω Πριάμοιο.
>
> *Iliad* 6.448-49

The impression that his father's words must have made on the young man in that time and in that place lies beyond our power to comment upon adequately.

Together with his brother, Martin escaped from Germany by a "children's transport" to Holland—they were just young enough—and set out on a series of almost picaresque adventures that would eventually bring him to the United States. His first stop after Holland was England, where he attempted, among other things, to join the fight against Hitler as soon as World War II broke out. The British, however, were not prepared to trust any German national, even a young Jewish refugee, with a weapon. Initially supported by refugee committees, Martin was working as a waiter in a hotel in Bournemouth, when fear of an imminent German invasion after the defeat at Dunkirk made the British intern him along with many other German Jewish refugees. Eventually this group was sent to internment camps in Canada, in which he spent the next two and a half years. The history of this episode in the war has been written and it is a fascinating story.[1] It is impossible not to admire and to be amused by the

1. See, e.g., Koch 1980.

resourcefulness and spirit of these men, many of whom had expected to enter professions like law, civil service, or academics, finding themselves stranded behind barbed wire in the woods of Canada at the mercy of Commonwealth bureaucrats. In addition to duty as lumberjacks, not only did they arrange a series of cultural events, concerts, lectures, discussion groups and the like, they organized a secondary school to enable those desiring to do so to complete their high-school education in a formal and accredited way and so to prepare themselves for admission to colleges and universities. In doing so they hoped to earn the diplomas they all expected they would need when the time came to resume the pursuit of a normal career. At the age of nineteen, Martin was perhaps one of the youngest assistant school principals in Canada—although of a very unusual school system. He also taught Latin and English literature.

This improvised high school is more than an amusing and unexpected episode in the career of a distinguished scholar, it was also a decisive event in Martin's intellectual development. It is not entirely fanciful to see in the way Martin and his comrades obtained their diplomas a distinctive blend of Teutonic discipline and an improvisational, pioneering attitude entirely appropriate to the new world. In more practical terms, official recognition of these diplomas admitted those who had earned them to further study in a Canadian university. Thus Martin's higher education was to take on a character that could not have been foreseen. Through the efforts of the Canadian National Committee on Refugees and the Canadian Jewish Congress, private sponsors were found to fund the expenses of a university education for Martin and many like him, and so he matriculated in University College of the University of Toronto in 1942.

Toronto at that time was full of classicists who had trained in England, and classical education there was organized on a largely Oxbridge model. It was here, then, that Martin began to acquire his familiarity with the British classical idiom, a crucial element in what was to become his personal and professional style. The early training in the German *Gymnasium* tradition was the first element in the philological foundation on which Martin's approach to research is based, and this element was to be reinforced later at Columbia University under the tutelage of his elder countrymen Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. There is no doubt that the influence on Martin of these representatives of the famous generation of German emigré scholars was different than on a typical American graduate student. But before Columbia, Martin had

begun to identify with two other traditions. The Anglo-Canadian tradition of Toronto represented a philosophy of education that was even then perhaps somewhat dated, but that had a breadth and humanity which the more strictly analytical German tradition perhaps lacked. These years in Toronto must have helped prepare Martin temperamentally for his future relationship with the University of Oxford, which eventually became Martin's favorite venue for research leaves from his regular duties at Swarthmore and Penn. But the third equally important tradition inaugurated in the do-it-yourself internment camp high school is the openness to experiment and innovation that seems quintessentially American but may be simply a fundamental aspect of Martin's own personality. Whatever it is, it showed itself again when Martin, right after Toronto, enrolled in the graduate program of the then-fledgling and basically unprecedented Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago.

Having obtained an M.A. with a thesis on the treatment of the Orestes myth by the three great Greek tragedians, Martin decided to move to Columbia University to complete his doctorate. Before finishing his Ph.D. there in 1952, he taught Classics and Humanities at Wesleyan University for one year, after which he returned to Columbia as a faculty member and stayed for seven years. It was at Columbia that he developed serious historical interests when, upon the departure of the ancient historian, it fell to him to teach Greek History.

In many ways perhaps the most crucial moment in Martin's professional career came in 1958, when Helen North, for many years afterwards chair of the Classics department at Swarthmore College, persuaded Martin to join her department. Martin's move to Swarthmore allowed him to settle down into a routine of teaching and research that generated a special synergy of its own. Together, Martin and Helen constructed a curriculum, augmented library holdings, and launched the careers of future scholars (some of whom are represented in this volume) on a scale virtually unique for an American liberal arts college. At the time Swarthmore could already boast an uncommonly strong commitment to Classics for a college its size, but the peculiar symbiosis between Helen North and Martin Ostwald was destined to become legendary. During Martin's three decades at Swarthmore he honed his trademark pedagogical style—a combination of Germanic philological rigor and the more relaxed give-and-take of the American college classroom—in Swarthmore's famed "honors seminars," a system imported from Oxford

in the 'thirties by then president Frank Aydelotte. The three-to-five-hour format of these seminars might have been tailor-made for Martin. It gave him the leisure to expatiate on just about anything that came to mind, and the time to bring everything together into a cohesive whole at the end. For instance, Martin has always loved to tell how he once spent an entire afternoon on the first three lines of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*—an afternoon that witnessed discussion of many topics that his unsuspecting students had never dreamed were related to Aeschylus. Many of us once probably wondered whether the story was apocryphal, but we soon learned that it was certainly plausible, and it became part of a mythology that many of his students aspired to reenact.

Unlike those scholars who often sense a great gulf between their research and their teaching, Martin seems to have transformed this traditional dichotomy into a seamless continuum of intellectual activity. In a totally unselfconscious way, he would patiently explain to a group of undergraduates sprawled unceremoniously on threadbare college couches the intricacies of Athenian social organization, the reforms of Cleisthenes, or prevailing scholarly opinions about Alcibiades, with the same detail he would use in speaking to a colleague. He had an extraordinary ability to sense just exactly what was needed to make an unadulterated scholarly argument accessible to an eager neophyte. At least some of this ability stems from a principle that guides Martin's entire being, summed up in one of his favorite apophthegms: "The word *interesting* ought to be banished from the English language, since *everything* is interesting at some level." When Martin uttered this in class, his students could tell that he felt it deeply to be true, and his classes demonstrated effortlessly how it was indeed possible for everything—and not only everything classical—to be interesting.

Swarthmore offered an almost idyllic setting in those days for an energetic professor: superb students, a liberal leave policy, a beautiful town in which to live comfortably with colleagues and to raise a young family. But despite these attractions, by the 'sixties Martin began to feel the urge to take his students a bit more deeply into scholarly issues than could be expected of undergraduates. As fortune would have it, the University of Pennsylvania invited Martin just at this moment to join its graduate program in Classical Studies for one third of his time without giving up his position at Swarthmore. This arrangement gave Martin the best of both worlds and rounded out happily the last two decades of his teaching career. During his years on the graduate faculty at Penn, Martin

covered a remarkable range of subjects and authors in his advanced seminars—in history, poetry, and philosophy alike— reflecting his apparently limitless range of interests and expertise.

In the 'seventies the graduate school at Penn reorganized itself into "groups" defined by subject matter rather than strictly by department, and Martin soon found an important niche in the fledgling graduate group in Ancient History, formed under the leadership of Michael Jameson. The graduate group system as a whole, quite innovative at the time, anticipated in many respects the growing interdisciplinary trend in the humanities today. The group in Ancient History was certainly one of the first programs to re-evaluate the epistemological parameters of the discipline and to begin thinking more in terms of "Mediterranean" than simply "Greek" or "Roman" culture. At the same time, in the best Penn tradition, Martin has always been a full participant in the Classical Studies graduate group, which meant teaching, administering examinations, and supervising dissertations on literary topics as well. Shortly before his retirement he was one of the driving forces behind the creation of a new graduate program in Classical Philosophy, which is administered jointly by the graduate groups in Classical Studies and Philosophy. It was in this setting of intense professionalism and interdisciplinary research that Martin came fully into his own; for here he could regularly teach to a stellar group of advanced students some of the subjects that gave him particular delight, among them Herodotus, Plato, Athenian constitutional history, Pindar—and, of course, his beloved Thucydides.

For Martin there is no question that Thucydides is a captivating and transcendental thinker. His eyes sparkle and his smile broadens at the mere mention of Thucydides' name, and it is clear that for years he has carried on in his mind a personal dialogue with the historian. Indeed, to his uninitiated students and no doubt to many of his colleagues Martin's passion for Thucydides seems to border on the fanatical. It is so easy to see why Thucydides holds Martin so tenaciously in his thrall, for, like Thucydides, Martin too is intensely rational in his analysis of human behavior, attuned to the sensuality and power of language, realistic about human potential, and compassionate in the face of human limitations.

Long before it became a vital necessity for the classical profession to articulate defensively just how the study of antiquity can be considered a relevant or useful pursuit in the modern world, Martin unassumingly and unwittingly, both in and out of class, showed how the Greek culture that he loved so much for its own sake, could (and should) also help us

confront our own responsibilities in our own global, national, and local communities. No doubt because in his youth he had experienced so painfully a perverted *politeia* and the corruption of an entire nation's psyche, Martin's every discourse is in some profound sense directed by a concern for the perennial problems of social interaction and the tension between personal and political *eudaimonia*. It seems only natural, therefore, that he became particularly attracted to the Greek authors who shared a similarly engaged political and philosophical orientation.

In his published work as well, Martin's enduring interest in the complex, often uneasy, relationship in fifth-century Athens between polis and citizen and his fascination with the mechanism of democracy at the time, are evident at every turn. While there is no need to offer here a running commentary on his complete bibliography (which we print at the end of this volume), it is worth mentioning at least the two milestones in Martin's scholarly career: his first book, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1969), and *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (Berkeley, 1986). The first of these books has been universally hailed, even by those who are not persuaded by its central thesis, as a masterpiece of cultural and historical exegesis based on meticulous philology. Those who know Martin even casually recognize in this book the sort of questions he routinely asks: What does a given word or technical term mean in a given context? How can a precise understanding of words and phrases illuminate the institutions and ideologies of the period? Starting with these sorts of question, Martin constructed in *Nomos* a penetrating and detailed analysis of Athenian attitudes toward law, statute, and democracy that has become a landmark in Athenian social and political history.

*Popular Sovereignty* reflects all the signature traits of Martin's methodology—a strong philological orientation, an unflagging pursuit of detail, and a rigid adherence to logical analysis—yet the scope is much more comprehensive than that of *Nomos*. It is an elegant compendium of more than three decades of thought about fifth-century Athens, focusing in particular on the central political and social tensions within a putatively democratic society. Virtually no other book dealing with similar issues manages to offer such a full and passionate account of the entire political and intellectual milieu of the period, and few other scholars have been able to combine such erudition with an ability to synthesize into a coherent (and readable) whole. For anyone studying fifth-century Athens,

whether scholar or young student, this book will become a central guide for years to come.

The list of honors that have accrued to Martin over the years is long and continues to grow. He has held virtually every major grant and fellowship in existence: NEH (1970-71, 1990-91), Guggenheim (1977-78), member of the Institute for Advanced Study (1974-75, 1981-82; visitor 1990-91), Visiting Fellow at Balliol College (1970-71), to name only a few. In 1987 he was president of the American Philological Association. Election to this office is often the climax of a scholar's career, but for Martin it was only the first in an extraordinary string of awards that continue to follow in rapid succession. In 1990 his magnum opus, *Popular Sovereignty*, won the APA's Goodwin Award of Merit, the Association's only award for scholarly achievement, which is awarded once each year. In 1991 he was Directeur d'Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris; in the same year he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 1993 he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society. Each of these awards is in recognition of an extraordinary academic career. But the number of lives and careers Martin had touched over forty years as a *teaching* scholar are as important as the testimonials to his published work. It is in the nature of things that relationships of this sort are more difficult to honor than are tangible products like books and articles. But our hope is that this book will be a monument to the many ways in which Martin has given of himself and shaped the lives of students, colleagues, chance acquaintances, of anyone who has the eyes and ears to appreciate this inexhaustible fund of learning and humanity. Many are represented in these pages, and we speak for many more besides, as we humbly offer this wholly inadequate token of all that we owe to Martin Ostwald.

# Abbreviations

Ancient works are cited as in LSJ or *OLD*, with occasional modifications for the sake of clarity. Modern secondary works are cited by the author's last name and the date of publication; titles and publication information is given in the Bibliography. A few standard works are cited by abbreviations that are in common use; these are listed below.

*AE* = *L'Année épigraphique*, ed. R. Cagnat et al. (Paris, 1888– )
*ARV* = J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vases*, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1963)
*CIG* = *Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. A. Boeckh (Berlin, 1828–77)
*CIL* = *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin, 1863–)
Daremberg-Saglio = C. Daremberg and E. Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines d'aprés les textes et les monuments* (Paris, 1877–1919)
DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., 3 vols. Berlin, [1951–52] 1966–67
*EAACO* = *Enciclopedia dell' arte antica classica e orientale* (Rome, 1958– )
*FGrH* = *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby, 3 vols. in 15 (Berlin and Leiden, [1923–58] 1954–60)
*FHG* = *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, ed. C. Müller, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841–70)
*FIRA* = *Fontes iuris Romani antejustiniani*, ed. V. Arangio-Ruiz, 2d ed., part 3, (Florence, 1969)
*GGM* = *Geographi Graeci minores*, ed. C. Mueller, 2 vols. + tabulae ([Paris, 1855–61] Hildesheim, 1965)
*IG* = *Inscriptiones Graecae*, ed. A. Kirchoff et al. (Berlin, 1873– )
*IGCH* = *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, ed. O. Merkhølm and C. M. Kraay (New York, 1973)
*IGRom* = *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*, ed. R. Cagnat et al., 3 vols. ([Paris, 1906–27] Chicago, 1975)
*IGUR* = *Inscriptiones Gracae urbis Romae*, ed. L. Moretti, 3 vols. (Rome, 1968–79)
*ILLRP* = *Inscriptiones Italiae liberae rei publicae*, ed. A. Degrassi, 2 vols., Biblioteca di studi superiori 23, 40 (Florence, [1963–65] 1972)
*ILS* = *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*, ed. Hermannus Dessau, 3 vols. in 5 parts (Berlin, 1892–1916)
*Inscr. Cret.* = *Inscriptiones Creticae*, ed. F. Halbherr et al., 4 vols. (Rome, 1935–50)
*Inscr. Délos* = *Inscriptions de Délos*, ed. F. Durrbach et al., 7 vols. (Paris, 1926–72)
*Inscr. It.* = *Inscriptiones Italiae* (Rome, 1931– )
*Inscr. Lampsac.* = *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos*, ed. Peter Frisch, Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 6 (Bonn, 1978)
*Inscr. Magn.* = *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*, ed. O. Kern (Berlin, 1900)

*Inscr. Prien.* = *Die Inschriften von Priene*, ed. F. Hiller von Gaertringen (Berlin, 1906)

*ISE* = *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche*, ed. L. Moretti, 2 vols., Biblioteca di studi superiori 53 (Florence, 1967–76)

KA = R. Kassell and C. Austin, eds., *Poetae comici Graeci*, (Berlin and New York, 1983–)

KG = Raphael Kühner and Bernhard Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, zweiter Teil: Satzlehre, 3d ed., 2 vols. ([Hannover and Leipzig, 1898] Darmstadt, 1966)

*KP* = *Der kleine Pauly: Lexicon der Antike*, ed. K. Ziegler and W. Sontheimer, 5 vols. (Stuttgart, 1964–75)

LSJ = H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. (Oxford, 1940)

*OGIS* = *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae*, ed. W. Dittenberger, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–5)

*OLD* = *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P. G. W. Glare (Oxford, 1968–82)

ML = R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, eds., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century* B.C. (Oxford 1969)

*PG* = *Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 161 vols. in 166 (Paris, 1857–66)

*PL* = *Patrologiae cursus, series Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844–64)

*PMG* = *Poetae melici Graeci*, ed. D. L. Page (Oxford, 1962)

*RE* = *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 2d ed., ed. G. Wissowa et al. (Stuttgartt/Munich, 1894–)

Σ = scholia

*SEG* = *Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum* (Leiden, 1923–71; Amsterdam, 1979– )

*SH* = *Supplementum hellenisticum*, ed. H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons (Berlin, 1983)

*SIG* =*Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. W. Dittenberger, 4 vols., 3d ed. (Leipzig, [1915–24] 1960)

*Stv* = *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, ed. Hermann Bengtson, 3 vols., 2d ed. (Berlin, 1975)

Tod = M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1946–48)

# 1
# Historians and Historiography

*1*

# The *Histor* in History

W. R. Connor

MARTIN OSTWALD HAS EXCELLED in his ability to bring together philology, social institutions, and literary texts to their mutual illumination. Perhaps he will not object then if one who has learned so much from him imitates his approach, beginning with one of his favorite passages, the opening words of Herodotus' *Histories:*

> This is the setting forth of the *historie* [ἱστορίη] of Herodotus of Halicarnassus....

Other nations, some well before Herodotus wrote these words, practiced the craft of historical writing. It is Herodotus' word ἱστορίη, however, that has provided the common term for nonfictional narrative about the past. Yet if we ask what the Greeks understood by this term, we do not readily find a satisfactory answer. The most widely proposed etymology is from the root **wid-*, denoting both vision and knowledge, hence perhaps a kind of knowledge that results from "looking into things."[1] The word ἱστορίη (or ἰστορίη; the presence of the initial aspiration depends on the dialect) and its relatives in Greek texts clearly establish the general translation "inquiry" or

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1. For example, Chantraine (1968–74, 3:779 s.v. οἶδα) comments on the related personal noun: "ἵστωρ se rattache à οἶδα plus qu'à ἰδεῖν, c'est 'celui qui sait pour avoir vu ou appris'." Chantraine notes that there are two principal uses of the noun, one "témoin," the other "arbitre." See also Benveniste 1969, 2:173. Floyd (1990), however, argues for an etymology from ἵζειν, "to seat, to sit."

"investigation."[2] The range of meaning is broad: In Herodotus, for example, it can include a careful examination of a dispute such as that over the causes of the annual flooding of the Nile (2.19), intense questioning of what an individual might know about a crime (3.50–51), or thorough collection of evidence on the animals of wild Libya (4.192.3), as well as the investigation of military and political events. The word was also used, it would appear, to refer to the investigations of the pre-Socratic philosophers.[3]

Over time words related to this root take on varied connotations. One, already evident in the fifth century, emphasizes the examination of an issue by rigorous questioning. In other cases such words would seem at first glance a rather bland way to refer to investigation. Yet caution is in order. In Herodotus and other early authors, such terms must be seen as part of a complex linguistic field in which other words such as μανθάνω (learn), πυνθάνομαι (get an answer to a question), and their cognates also have an important role to play. If we examine the verb forms in Herodotus, for example, ἱστορέω occupies only a small part of the field: μανθάνω occurs 149 times, πυνθάνομαι 277 times, and the verb ἱστορέω only 17 times.[4] One would suspect then some specialization of meaning for the rarer term.

In determining the special signification of the word from which we have derived *history*, one consideration has perhaps been insufficiently weighed. It has often been noted that in some Greek cities individuals called ἵστορες performed an important social role. The suggestion has been made, but promptly dismissed, that words such as ἱστορέω and ἱστορίη reflect this social institution.[5] A closer examination of this institution and a more careful examination of the use of the word in Herodotus suggest that when Herodotus struggles to find ways of describing the literary task he has set for himself, he sometimes derives a metaphor from this institution to suggest both the rigorous questioning behind his narrative and his role as adjudicator among conflicting versions and differing assessments of blame.[6]

2. Some translators and commentators use "research" or "Forschung" as equivalents. Such terms invite confusion with modern academic research.

3. By Socrates' day there was a recognized branch of knowledge called περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία: Pl. *Phd.* 96a8 (cf. Eur. fr. 910 Nauck; Hippocr. *De arte* 1, *Praec.* 13, *VM* 20). The terminology may be as early as Heraclitus (fr. 22 B 35 DK), but many uses of the word in such contexts derive from paraphrases of early philosophers by authors of later antiquity: Heraclit. 22 B 129 DK; Democr. 68 A 33 DK; Acus. 9 B 21 DK = *FGrH* 2 F 22; cf. Xenoph. 21 A 31.2 DK.

4. The figures are drawn from J. E. Powell [1938] 1960. Compounds of the verbs do not significantly change the situation, nor do other related forms. There are, for example, only 23 occurrences of ἵστωρ and its immediate relatives in Herodotus. Another verb in this linguistic field is παραλαμβάνω, on which see note 29 below.

5. Evans (1990, 95) assesses Dewald's (1987) use of the term. Evans' dismissal derives from his extension of the meaning of the term to "an expert who mediates among competing traditions to produce an acceptable version of the past."

6. Cf. the views of Nagy (1990a).

The evidence concerning ἴστορες is peculiar and scattered; perhaps that explains why its full significance has not been recognized. The earliest evidence is from the Homeric poems, which twice allude to the settlement of disputes by referral to an ἴστωρ. In one of these passages a dispute arises at the funeral games for Patroclus; Aias and Idomeneus grow angry as they argue about which horses are in the lead. Idomeneus then says:

> Aias, surpassing in abuse, yet stupid, in all else
> you are worst of the Argives with that stubborn mind of yours. Come then,
> let us put up a wager of a tripod or cauldron
> and make Agamemnon, son of Atreus, witness [ἴστωρ] between us
> as to which horses lead. And when you pay, you will find out.
>
> (*Il.* 23.483–87, tr. Lattimore)

Idomeneus' proposal attests the existence of the ἴστωρ in the earliest Greek literature. Similar patterns are found today in Crete and other parts of Greece, sometimes in cases of bets or wagers, sometimes in issues in which life or honor is at stake. The arbitrator whose judgment is accepted by both parties prevents violence, may turn animosity into alliance, and gains considerable status himself.[7]

In modern Greece such arbitration often comes into conflict with the law of the state and with official systems of justice. Among the ancient Greeks voluntary arbitration often tended to merge with civic justice, as can already be seen in *Iliad* 18, in Homer's description of a scene on the shield of Achilles:

> The people were assembled in the market place, where a quarrel
> had arisen, and two men were disputing over the blood price
> for a man who had been killed. One man promised full restitution
> in a public statement, but the other refused and would accept nothing.
> Both then made for an arbitrator [ἴστωρ], to have a decision;
> and people were speaking up on either side, to help both men.
> But the heralds kept the people in hand, as meantime the elders
> were in session on benches of polished stone in the sacred circle
> and held in their hands the staves of the heralds who lift their voices.
> The two men rushed before these, and took turns speaking their cases,

7. Cf. Herzfeld 1985, 74–78 et passim.

> and between them lay on the ground two talents of gold, to be given to that judge who in this case spoke the straightest opinion.
>
> (*Il.* 18.497–508, tr. Lattimore)

This passage has been discussed with special cogency by H. J. Wolff, who showed the interaction between individual self-help and elements of civic regulation in Homer's description of the case.[8] Thanks to Wolff's explication, the passage can be recognized as a description of a real-life situation and fitted into a coherent picture of the evolution of judicial litigation among the early Greeks. There remains, however, the question of the exact role of the ἴστωρ. Wolff argued that the ἴστωρ is identical with that elder whose judgment is deemed "straightest."[9]

Wolff's explication of this point is neither the simplest nor the most persuasive. Another possibility demands attention: The ἴστωρ could be a person to whom the parties initially turn for the resolution of the dispute but who, perhaps after initial investigation, recognizes the difficulty of the issue and convenes the elders of the community, turning the matter over to them for decision. Walter Leaf long ago noted this possibility and its resemblance to a famous passage in Aeschylus.[10] In the *Eumenides* both Orestes and the Furies accept Athena's intervention in the dispute between them. Her role resembles that of the ἴστωρ in the Homeric passages. But Athena, well aware of the special difficulty of this case, decides that it is best to bring it before a group of the best of her citizens (line 487). She convokes a court on the Areopagus:

8. Wolff (1946) provides an explanation that is on the whole decisive. But on one point there remain grounds for doubt. The issue in dispute between the two men is not entirely clear. Is it simply a question of fact—whether the first man has indeed paid an agreed upon amount? This is Wolff's view. But the issue may be more complex—whether the second man will accept what has been offered to him, whether it is an appropriate ποινή, and whether he feels right in settling his dispute in this way. Much turns on the word ἀναίνετο in line 500. If the dispute is about a question of fact, whether the blood price has been paid, then ἀναίνετο should mean "denied"; but as Leaf ([1902] 1960, ad loc.) pointed out, "the regular Homeric sense of the verb is *refuse*." Thus it is likely that the issue is the willingness to accept the payment that has been offered. The intensity of the argument and the fact that the first man can show to the demos what he has offered, also point in this direction—a payment has been offered, the question is whether the second man will accept it. This also explains their decision to go to a ἴστωρ. The potential for violence and protracted feuding provides a strong incentive toward a settlement, but the second man needs to be assured that the community will regard his decision as appropriate. For that reason both parties have an incentive to go to a public forum. See also Murray 1980, 61–62.

9. For other views see the summary in Bonner and Smith (1930–38, 1:35–36). Wolff (1946) suggests a connection to the Solonian εὐθυντήρ: see Ruschenbusch 1966.

10. Leaf 1892, app. 1, sec. 26. Wolff (1946) recognized this possibility but rejected it.

The matter is too big for any mortal man
who thinks he can judge it—Even I have not the right
to analyze cases of murder where wrath's edge is sharp....
Here is dilemma—Whether I let them [the Furies] stay or drive
them off, it is a hard course and will hurt. Then, since
the burden of the case is here, and rests on me,
I shall select judges of manslaughter, and swear
them in, establish a court in all time to come.
Litigants, call your witnesses, have ready your proofs
as evidence under bond to keep this case secure.
I will pick the finest of my citizens, and come
back—They shall swear to make no judgement that is not
just, and make clear where in this action the truth lies.

(Aesch. *Eum.* 470–89, tr. Lattimore)

This passage parallels *Iliad* 18 in the decision of the parties to submit their dispute to a third party. Yet the *Eumenides* envisions, indeed provides the aetiology for, a more formal system based on the counting of ballots rather than the emergence of a consensus around the *sententia* of one spokesman.

The terminology used to describe such arbitration varied from place to place and time to time.[11] Although the word ἴστωρ was widely understood, thanks to its use in the *Iliad*,[12] Attic texts never use it when describing such mediation.[13] They prefer διαιτητής or διαλλακτής, as when Solon was asked to settle the disputes that were dividing the society.[14]

Athens later institutionalized a formal process of arbitration. Murder and other major cases were in classical times decided by a court system. But as the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* (chap. 53) indicates, in fourth-century Athens what we might call "civil" cases, in which sums greater than ten drachmae were at issue, were commonly submitted to διαιτηταί, who would

11. For example, the arbitrators who were called in from Paros to settle a dispute on Miletus were apparently called καταρτιστῆρες (Hdt. 5.28–29).

12. Such an individual would need special sagacity and diplomacy. This is probably the correct explication of Hes. *Op.* 792; contrast West 1978 ad loc. In other early passages, ἴστωρ and its cognates are used in the sense of "knowledgeable about" or "skilled in." See Hom. *Od.* 21.26, for Heracles' skill at killing, or *h. Hom.* 32.2 (to Selene), for the Muses who know or are skilled in ᾠδή: cf. the proper name in *Il.* 16.695 and Bacchyl. 9.44.

13. The judges in certain murder cases, however, were called ἰδνῖοι, to judge from Hsych. ι 243 and a few other passages.

14. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 5.2: "When the civil discord had become violent and the two opposing parties had been set against each other for a long time, they chose, by mutual agreement, Solon as their mediator (διαλλακτής) and Archon and entrusted the state to him" (tr. von Fritz and Kapp). Cf. Plut. *Sol.*14.3; Plut. *Mor.* 763d. See also the discussion by Murray (1980, 173–74), who draws a distinction between mediator and arbitrator.

hear the parties and pronounce a judgment that, if accepted by both sides, would resolve the case. If the two parties did not accept their verdict, the matter could then be turned over to a court (δικαστήριον) for trial.[15]

Although such patterns were surely common in the Greek world,[16] the system described in Aristotle, quite unlike the more rough-hewn arrangements of archaic times, is probably a relatively late development.[17] Through its integration into the Attic judicial system, it avoided the difficulty that many arbitration systems confront: How is the arbitration judgment to be enforced? In other settings the arbitrator might bind the parties in advance by requiring a heavy deposit; hence perhaps the deposit of a talent of silver alluded to in the Shield of Achilles. Social pressure might also be brought to bear if one party resisted a reasonable verdict. Alternatively the arbitrator might exact in advance an oath that the parties would accept his verdict.[18]

This hypothetical use of the oath helps to explain a further peculiarity in our evidence. Although the term ἴστωρ in the sense of "arbitrator" gradually disappears, it persists in contexts that have to do with oaths and witnesses.[19] If we assume that the ἴστωρ sometimes bound the disputing parties with an oath and was himself the principal witness of that oath, we will not be surprised to find the word in such documents as the oath sworn by Athenian ephebes[20] and that sworn by Hippocratic doctors.[21] The figures named in such documents are, to be sure, divinities, but cognates of the

15. See Harrell 1936, 1–40. On the evolution of legal processes in Attica see Humphreys 1983a.

16. Herodotus speaks of interstate arbitrators in 5.95.2, Periander's arbitration of the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeum; in 4.161 the Delphic oracle is said to have enjoined the Cyreneans to bring a καταρτιστήρ from Mantinea. Demonax then restructured the city's tribal pattern and certain cult arrangements. The word used for Demonax' role also occurs in 5.28 of a Parian mediation in Miletus. Plutarch (*Sol.* 10) refers to five Lacedaemonian διαλλακτὰς καὶ δικαστάς who adjudicated a dispute between Athens and Megara. On interstate arbitration in Greece see the useful bibliography by M. N. Tod (*OCD* s.v. "arbitration").

17. On the date of the Athenian διαιηταί system see Humphreys (1983a, 240), who argues for a Cleisthenic date against the *communis opinio* of 403/2 or 399. Cf. Rhodes 1980, 315.

18. Oaths have multiple functions in early Greek judicial contexts as Humphreys (1983a, 232) points out. Oaths were sometimes exacted from one of the parties to a dispute as a way of establishing their innocence. Under such circumstances the ἴστωρ might be a witness to the oath; hence one possible connection between the use of the term as "arbitrator" and that as "witness."

19. There are scattered signs of the persistence of the term. A coin from Thurii, for example, indicates the use of Istor as a personal name around 400 B.C. See *RE* suppl. 4:799 s.v. ἴστωρ.

20. The word occurs in the Ephebic oath for the divinities who serve as witnesses to and enforcers of the oath. See Lycurg. *In Leoc.* 77; the epigraphical text is conveniently available in Tod 1948, no. 204. The oath is probably quite an early document, as Siewert (1977) argues.

21. Edelstein (1943) suggested Pythagorean influence on the Hippocratic oath. Fourth-century Thebes would be a very likely setting for such influence and terminology.

word sometimes bracket human and divine agents. The word ξυνίστωρ, for example, can be used to indicate the shared activity of human and divine beings as the witnesses and supporters involved in an oath or more generally as the persons to whom one may under special circumstances appeal for assistance or support.[22] A similar pattern appears in the use of the word ἵστωρ in several Boeotian texts, mostly manumission inscriptions, from the third and second centuries B.C. Here the word refers to individuals, whether human or divine, who are in effect witnesses of the decision to free the slave, not in the sense of passive, objective observers, but as potential enforcers if the agreement were to be in some way violated.[23] The social practices and concerns behind these texts are, as we might expect after so many years, quite remote from those reflected in the *Iliad*, yet the evolution in the use of this word is fully intelligible. With these patterns in mind we can now examine what Herodotus understands by the term ἱστορίη and its cognates.

The patterns of arbitration associated with the word ἵστωρ provide a powerful metaphor for intellectual activities including the rigorous examination of evidence, choosing between conflicting claims and versions, assessing responsibility, and the consequent building of a consensus within a community. Hence cognates of ἵστωρ, such as the verb ἱστορέω and its compounds and the noun ἱστορίη, could readily be applied to investigating and deciding among conflicting views and interpretations. It is not surprising, then, to find Herodotus using this terminology. To be sure, he never calls himself—or anyone else for that matter—a ἵστωρ, but from time to time his narrative shows a remarkable similarity to the way ἵστορες functioned in early Greek society. He often shapes his narrative by presenting two conflicting accounts (λόγοι), regularly in third-person narrative, with the advocates of each position normally named or otherwise identified. Behind the presentation of these views stand careful inquiry and rigorous questioning. Each account is usually rounded off with a formula like "Such

22. It is commonly assumed that ξυνίστωρ is restricted to divinities, but the exchange at Eur. *Supp.* 1165–76 suggests that humans and divinities can be referred to together by this term. Theseus urges Adrastus and the Argive women to honor Athens for the service he has rendered them and then adds that Zeus is the ξυνίστωρ, along with the other gods in heaven, of the generosity they have received. Taken alone Theseus' words could simply refer to Zeus and the Olympian divinities, but since Adrastus applies the cognate verb ξύνισμεν to the Argives, it seems more likely that line 1174 means that Zeus and the gods in heaven share with the Argives the knowledge of Theseus' generosity. A similar usage is likely in Soph. *Ant.* 542 (in effect, "my supporters are Hades and the divinities of the underworld") and possible in Thuc. 2.74.

23. These texts are *IG* 7:1779; Schwyzer 1923, 491, 523.64. On μάρτυς as a supporter, "character witness," or ally see Osborne (1985b); cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 55.3.

is the account given by...." There may then be some report of witnesses or discussion of supporting evidence.[24] Although he may decide to allow the reader to form his or her own opinion, he usually gives his own judgment, expressing his degree of certainty with well-calibrated phrases, from the cautious indication he is "inclined" to one side or the other[25] to strong affirmations of certainty expressed by οἶδα, "I know."

This pattern is well illustrated in book 8, in the account of Xerxes' flight after the battle of Salamis. After narrating that Xerxes fled by land as far as the Hellespont, Herodotus reports a variant: "There is likewise another tale told of the return of the king" (8.118.1). In this version Xerxes travels by land to Eion and then travels by a Phoenician ship to Asia. A storm compels him to require certain Persians to sacrifice themselves in an effort to lighten the endangered ship. The end of this story is marked with the formulaic phrase "Such is the other account that is given of the return of Xerxes" (8.119.1). Herodotus then gives his own opinion ("but it seems to me quite unworthy of belief") and sets forth the reasons for his conclusion ("not one man in ten thousand would believe Xerxes sacrificed Persians rather than Phoenicians").[26]

Readers of Herodotus will recognize the pattern, but also note that Herodotus' practice varies. The pattern occurs with special frequency in the first few books and even there is used with great flexibility.[27] For example, at the very outset of his work, Herodotus begins to investigate who was responsible (*αἰτίους γενέσθαι*) for the hostility between the Greeks and the barbarians. He proceeds to summarize a version given by certain Persians (chaps. 1–4), incorporating a variant account given by the Phoenicians. The Greek position on the matter—that the abduction of Io, the daughter of Inachus, was the cause of the hostility between Greeks and easterners—is not developed, probably because it would be quite evident to his audience. At the end of this presentation, Herodotus pronounces his own judgment, but it redefines rather than resolves the dispute: "Which of these accounts is true I shall not trouble to decide. I shall proceed at once to point out the person who first within my own knowledge [οἶδα] commenced aggressions on the Greeks" (1.5.3, tr. Rawlinson).

24. E.g., in 8.94 the citation of the other Greeks as witnesses is sufficient to refute the Athenian tale (*φάτις*) accusing the Corinthians of cowardice. Cf. 8.118–21.

25. *τῷ [λόγῳ] πρόσκειμαι*, 4.11.1; *δοκέω*, 4.155.1; *προστίθεμαι*, 2.120.1, cf. 5.86.

26. For a critique of Herodotus' analysis see Flory 1987, 56–57.

27. By "first" I simply mean occurring first in our manuscripts, not necessarily composed first. Lattimore (1958), however, makes a plausible case that Herodotus wrote the work in the order in which we find it.

Two examples in book 2 indicate that Herodotus sometimes uses a similar technique when he investigates mythological and geographical topics. These examples are of special importance for our investigation because Herodotus specifically marks them as instances of his ἱστορίη.[28] These are his investigations into the reasons for the flooding of the Nile (2.19–27) and of the whereabouts of Helen during the Trojan War (2.113–20).

In the first of these, the cause of the annual flooding of the Nile, Herodotus constructs his narrative by first noting that the Egyptians themselves did not offer explanations of the phenomenon.[29] Their silence may have posed a problem for Herodotus, who at this point in the work seems to prefer to pronounce judgment only when there are conflicting authorities. But Greek theorizing amply made up for the lack of Egyptian accounts. Herodotus notes that three principal theories have been put forward by the Greeks. Each of these theories, summarized and criticized in chapters 20–23, is found deficient. Herodotus then momentarily hesitates whether he need pronounce his own verdict, but then swiftly proceeds to tell what seems to him to be the reason.[30] His own explanation, given in summary form in 2.24.2 and more fully in chapters 25–27, is that in the winter, storms drive the Sun from his usual course, and as a result the feeder streams of the Nile are dried up. The personification of the sun turns the question from an investigation of abstract cause into one of responsibility.

Suspicions that the role of the ἵστωρ in Greek society provides a model for such narratives are strengthened in the next example, the investigation of Helen's alleged stay in Egypt. As in the first chapters of book 1, the common Greek version—that Paris took Helen directly from Sparta to Troy—is too well known to require elaborate presentation. Herodotus concentrates instead on the version of the Egyptian priests, summarizing carefully what he learned there: "The priests, in answer to my inquiries [μοι...ἱστορέοντι] on the subject of Helen informed me of the following particulars" (2.113.1).

Their story is initially reported without apparent criticism. In chapters 116 and 117, however, he notes that Homer knew, but for poetic reasons

28. 2.19.3, 2.113.1; cf. 2.99.1.

29. "On none of these points could I obtain any explanation from the inhabitants, though I made every inquiry, wishing to know what was commonly reported" (2.19.3). The verb that Rawlinson renders "obtain any explanation" is a form of παραλαμβάνω, a word often rendered "learn" (Powell [1938] 1960, 1d); but it more precisely means "receive from an informant a story or a custom that may or may not prove true or acceptable" (cf. 2.51, 2.148.6, 5.58.2, etc.).

30. 2.24.1. Why should he hesitate to pronounce his verdict (γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι)? He feels that on an obscure matter (περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων), it may be sufficient to criticize existing theories. Cf. his hesitation in 7.152.

rejected, a similar version. After a rather circuitous investigation of the legends concerning the Trojan War, Herodotus pronounces judgment on the entire question of Helen's sojourn in Egypt. Here Rawlinson mistranslates. Herodotus' comment is not "I am myself inclined to regard as true all that they say of Helen" but "I agree with the story the Egyptians tell about Helen."[31] In this case Herodotus agrees unreservedly with those on one side of the argument. Naturally such a decisive verdict requires justification—the elaborate statement of reasons that follows. But Herodotus is prepared to go one step further. Using the language of public deliberation, he declares his opinion that there was divine cause for the Greeks' protracted refusal to recognize that Helen was not in the city they were attacking: The gods wished to demonstrate that great injustices result in great punishments.[32]

The pattern examined above is not the only approach to the historian's work that can be detected in Herodotus,[33] nor are words such as ἱστορέω restricted to the historian himself.[34] It is, however, a powerful and recurrent way of speaking about his activities, which are deeply rooted in Greek social institutions, and as will be seen, it has important implications for the understanding of Herodotus.

A historian who approaches his work through analogy to a ἵστωρ has ample justification for pronouncing judgment and entering into controversy. Paul Veyne's comment, "For them history is born not out of controversy—as it is with us—but from inquiry (and that is precisely the meaning of the Greek word ἱστορία)" seems very strange indeed.[35] The historian, if this is the origin of the enterprise, is not a mere antiquarian or ethnographer but a person who plays a crucial social role, the development of fair judgments and the formation of social consensus.

Yet the model also imposed limits, ones that ultimately were far too confining for such an intellectually robust activity. If a historian were to fol-

31. 2.120.1. For the verb προστίθημι used of accepting without modification a view or proposal of another see 1.109.2, 3.83.1, 6.109.6, and cf. 2.160.4.

32. 2.120.5. On Herodotus' willingness to go out of his way to make a pronouncement on questions of theology or theodicy cf. 4.20.5.

33. Among the other important metaphors for historical activity in Herodotus are (1) traveling along a road (e.g., 1.5.3; 2.20.1, 2.22.1, 2.99.1, 2.115.3; 4.82; 5.52, 5.62.1); (2) consulting an oracle, including uses of the root διζ-, etc. (e.g., 1.95.1, 1.139; 5.30.1); and (3) engaging in a battle (e.g., 7.54.3, 7.239.1; 8.77.1; cf. 4.64.1 and 7.211.3). The metaphors are not mutually exclusive. The road metaphor, for example, coincides with ἵστωρ terminology in 2.34.1 and 4.192.3. It is interesting, however, to note that metaphors drawn from the recital of epic poetry by rhapsodes, which we might expect to be prominent, are by no means conspicuous in the work.

34. E.g., 1.24.7, 1.56.1, 1.61.2, 1.122.1, etc.

35. Veyne 1988, 9.

low strictly the pattern of the ἵστωρ, he would be under no obligation to give his opinion unless there were some disagreement among his sources.[36] Implausibilities in the accounts, however striking, would call forth no assessment or criticism unless they had been challenged in some way.

A tendency in this direction may help account for some of the apparent naïveté and gullibility ascribed to Herodotus. In book 3, for example, he reports the Persians' stories about how the Indians acquire their gold—giant ants dig up the gold as they make their anthills and then race after the Indians who come and steal it (3.105). Equally implausible stories are told about the acquisition of cinnamon in 3.111 and the extraction of gold in 4.195, where Herodotus remarks, "If this be true I know not; but I write what is said." Such a response is most likely if Herodotus saw himself as an arbitrator among conflicting traditions, under no obligation to criticize unless there were disagreement.

This disclaimer, however, betrays some uneasiness about the mere reporting of uncontested stories. He goes on to try to assess the tale: "It may be even so, however, since I myself have seen pitch drawn up out of water from a lake in Zacynthus..." (4.195.2). Such comments suggest that Herodotus found the model based on the social role of the ἵστωρ convenient but confining. Perhaps this is also the reason why his successors avoided the term ἱστορία for their works.[37] If we look closely at his narrative, there are signs not only of creative adaptation of this model but of a progressive departure from it.[38] Much of book 3, for example, is concerned with Cambyses and his strange actions. At the outset Herodotus seems to be using the familiar model—a Persian version of Cambyses' parentage, for example, is juxtaposed to an Egyptian version. He then gives his own view, exactly as we would expect.

Almost immediately, however, complications are evident. In chapter 3, Herodotus volunteers that he himself does not believe a story he has just told. This is a minor, perhaps trivial, departure from the pattern we have been investigating, but further deviations are soon evident. The issue underlying much of the next section of the narrative is not the fact but the cause of Cambyses' assumed madness. The Egyptians felt the insanity was a

36. Herodotus is not under some obligation to report every story he has heard. But in a dispute, he appears to feel obliged to report both sides, and normally he does this quite fairly. Sometimes he lets it be known at the outset that one side is less plausible; see 3.9.2, and cf. Flory 1987, 62–63.

37. On the avoidance of the term by Thucydides, Xenophon, and others see Hornblower 1987, 8–11.

38. This may be reflected in the distribution of the word ἱστορίη and its relatives throughout the work (1:6, 2:9, 3:5, 4:1, 5:0, 6:0, 7:2, 8:0, 9:0).

punishment for his impiety toward Apis (chap. 33); the Persians alleged that he was subject to the seizures of the Sacred Disease.

Given such a disagreement between his sources, we might expect that Herodotus would pause to pronounce his own judgment on the matter. Herodotus, however, now seems more concerned to affirm the more fundamental point, that Cambyses was in fact insane: "Thus it appears certain to me, by a great variety of proofs, that Cambyses was raving mad."[39] It is as if Herodotus were tacitly assessing an alternative claim—that Cambyses' behavior could better be explained by some other hypothesis than madness—and rejecting the case of a hypothetical spokesman for this position.[40]

In such passages, the pattern that we have suggested might be based on the social role of the ἵστωρ is modified and adapted. Other portions of the work adopt quite a different approach. It is perhaps significant that in the ethnographic and geographical sections of books 4 and 5 Herodotus seems to feel free to express his opinion even when he does not report contrary accounts.[41] Perhaps models of ethnographic writing permitted greater authorial intervention. He also from time to time volunteers comments about morality, theodicy, or the meaning of history.[42] Here too he may have drawn on other models and felt correspondingly greater latitude.

In the last few books, Herodotus spends much less time reporting contrary versions and adjudicating between them and much more commemorating brave (or cowardly) deeds and commending those who contributed most to the outcome of the war.[43] Although this too can be associated with ἱστορίη,[44] the word and its cognates become far less frequent after the first three books and disappear entirely in the last two. As we have noted, his immediate successors avoid the term ἱστορία for their works.

39. 3.38.1; cf. his interventions in 3.35, 3.29, 3.66.1.

40. There is also a variant from the model we have been discussing in chap. 32, where Herodotus cites a Greek version and an Egyptian version on why and how Cambyses put his sister to death. He gives no assessment of his own.

41. E.g., 4.5, 4.15, 4.25, 4.29–31, 4.42, 4.45, 4.87, 4.140, 4.188–89, 4.205; 5.9–10, 5.22, 5.57, 5.59, 5.66–67, 5.69, 5.73. Similar examples can be adduced from most other books.

42. E.g., 4.205, 5.78, 6.27.1.

43. For persons distinguished for special bravery see 7.226–27, 8.93, 9.71; for persons distinguished for perfidy see 7.214. In 7.26 Herodotus clearly feels frustrated not to be able to specify which Persian leaders contributed the finest contingents to Xerxes' invasion. This does not, however, lead him to name the commanders of the subject nations that contributed to the Persian force; see 7.96.1; cf. 7.99. Herodotus is also willing to leave disputes among his informants unresolved; e.g., 9.73–74, 9.95.

44. See 7.96.1, a difficult passage. It is perhaps better to have Herodotus say that he "is not constrained to relate what was learned by inquiry" (Drews 1973, 185 n. 154) than to make the word ἱστορίη into a quasi-technical term for the work as a whole, as Rawlinson does: "it is not necessary for the course of my history."

As the narrative progresses, Herodotus puts the limitations of his initial metaphor behind him and becomes far more ambitious than the analogy to the ἵστωρ might suggest. The historian asserts the right to investigate topics that he knows are important for the proper memorialization of his subject. From time to time this leads him to volunteer opinions without any indication that he is resolving an existing debate or conflict. The most famous of these comments concerns the contribution of the Athenians to the Greek victory in the Persian Wars: "Here I am constrained by a necessity to render a judgment that may be unwelcome to most people, but, nevertheless, since it seems to me to be true, I will not suppress it (7.139).[45] Herodotus then gives his verdict that the Athenians were the saviors of Greece at that time. This comment utilizes some of the language associated with the ἵστωρ model,[46] but the historian is now a free agent, the creator of an interpretive issue within his narrative and the spokesman entitled to pronounce upon it. If we conclude from this and other passages that Herodotus has transcended a model that he ultimately found confining, its influence was surely a profound one on his work and on that of his successors. History still proclaims its debt to the ἵστωρ.

45. The issue is likely to have been raised by contemporary Athenian propaganda, e.g., the self-presentation in the Funeral Orations. The point in the text is simply that Herodotus does not feel constrained to follow the formulaic pattern of setting forth each side of the dispute before going on to express his own judgment (γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι).

46. Cf. 2.120.5, discussed at n. 32 above.

2

# The Meaning of Material Culture: Herodotus, Thucydides, and Their Sources

Charles W. Hedrick, Jr.

THIS CHAPTER ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN a central problem of historical methodology, the relationship of the history to the source, with particular reference to the practices of Herodotus and Thucydides. I confess that I have always been confused by the problem, particularly as Thucydides explains it. His methodological chapters seem hopelessly mired in contradiction and inconsistency. Most modern commentators have attempted to reconcile the paradoxes, to make Thucydides' methodology consistent with itself and so with the ideals of the empirical, positivist historiography he is thought to exemplify.[1] I do not think that such a strategy can cope with Thucydides' history, because the methodology of the history is indeed inconsistent. I hope to show that this inconsistency reflects a coherent and sophisticated attitude toward history and its sources. I do not attempt to explain away Thucydides' self-contradictions; I attempt rather toemphasize them, to try to find a logic in them, and to explain a consistency that underlies and unites the inconsistencies. I suggest that Thucydides is struggling with contradictions that necessarily underlie any descriptive or historical text—whether that of his predecessor and source, Herodotus, or those of moderns who take Thucydides himself as a source.

In one of his essays, Nietzsche remarks that if there is a justification for preferring Greek and Latin to other languages, it is that they are the only languages anyone bothers to read closely anymore. Martin Ostwald is one of those who taught me how to read Greek. I hope that he will find something worthwhile in this essay.

1. For the scholarly picture of Thucydides as an objective, "scientific" historian see Connor 1984, introd.; Badian 1990.

## Reference and "Reality"

Since the Greeks, history (or any realistic description) has longed for the finality of the fact, for the objective, irreducible atoms of reality.[2] This nostalgia is illusory, because the referent of history, the historical "source," is never the real, but always only another, text. "If interpretation can never be completed, this is quite simply because there is nothing to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs."[3] History, in other words, is composed by rewriting other texts, which, like the history, refer in their turn to other texts, and so on into infinity. No historical source is primary, in the sense that no source is final, produced outside of a historical consciousness and sensibility. Sofar as any source tells a story, it is itself a kind of history, which defers that ultimate historical objective, the "real," elsewhere.

There is a traditional opposition between source and history, which is justified and manifested through other habitual dichotomies, such as fact versus interpretation or evidence versus models.[4] At its most basic, the discrimination involves the opposition of the autonomous and objective, that is, the "final," to the contingent and subjective, that is, the "referential." This opposition is an alibi for a more complex and ambiguous relationship—history and source share in the same nature and are mutually dependent. On the one hand, any history that claims to be true must defer to the authority of sources to verify its account. In this sense it is subordinate to its sources. The sources therefore must be at least in some respect true, or there would be no possibility of writing the history. On the other hand, the history must add something to the account of its sources. In this sense it is independent of its sources. The sources therefore must be incomplete or mistaken in certain details, or there would be no point in writing the history.

2. The strategy of interpretation I have adopted derives primarily from the work of Jacques Derrida and the deconstructionists. Although I focus on Herodotus and Thucydides in this chapter, I am making broad claims about the nature of referential language (including history), and I hope to show that the reading of ancient Greek historians can make some contribution to current debates about the formal nature of history.

3. Foucault 1986, 3. The quotation is disputed by Gutting (1989, 273–74), who argues (with unconscious irony?) that Foucault is here describing the position of Nietzsche, not his own.

4. Of ancient historians, M. I. Finley (1986) provides the clearest statement of this position known to me. Generally on the nature of evidence see Konstan (1988), who provides a thorough critique in his review of Finley's book.

The referential, realistic history "harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary."[5] This paradoxical relationship of history and sources places the historian in an ambivalent position. The history must rely on the essential truth of the sources while it also modifies them.[6] So far as the history is composed of its sources, it is complicit in their flaws. So far as the history adds to the sources, it discredits them. The historian, then, might appropriately be described by the same oxymoronic term anthropologists use of themselves when they examine foreign cultures—a participant observer.[7]

Most historical sources are linguistic, that is, written. These texts are commonly distinguished by historians as either primary or secondary. Primary sources are those that are more or less contemporary to the phenomena they describe. Secondary sources are those composed somewhat later. As the names imply, the former is privileged against the latter.[8] The logic underlying this principle is metonymic: Sources that have been physically juxtaposed with the events described are seen as superior, more reliable. This contact, this physical link, unites event and symbolic expression and provides a guarantee that the text's account is objective, accurate, and real. The event is seen as the final end of the historical trail of sources, the objective grail of the historian's quest. There is an unquestioning faith here in the truth of the senses, eye and ear. When the principles of Quellenforschung are applied brutally, there is no recognition that the event, even for the contemporary observer, is itself a kind of multivalent text that cannot be seen without being read and interpreted differently by different observers. There is no cognizance, in other words, that there is no final historical reality that is not filtered through a text.

These distinctions are chiefly used in discussing verbal or documentary sources. Linguistic sources in general, however, may be contrasted with another broad category of documentation—physical objects, or material

5. Derrida 1974, 104. Avatars of deconstruction call this relationship "supplementarity."

6. Modern histories of the latter half of the fifth century B.C., and in particular of the Pentecontaetia, provide unsurpassable examples of this dilemma. Thucydides must, of course, be relatively accurate about the events between Persian and Peloponnesian wars, or there would be no history of the period. But is he entirely right? The famous controversies ultimately concern the supplementation or correction of Thucydides, his omissions and mistakes, not the events themselves.

7. In recent years, anthropologists have been more and more concerned with the contradictions attendent in the practice of observation. See Geertz 1988, and cf. the remarks of Bourdieu 1977, 1–2.

8. Some ancient historians apply this principle in a perverse (but very revealing) manner, when they distinguish primary and secondary as synonyms for ancient and modern; see M. I. Finley 1986, 7–26.

culture.[9] Certainly the classical Greek historians tended to privilege the object against the word. In modern times, at least since the antiquarians of the seventeenth century, historians have also tended to regard the material record as more reliable than the literary; it has often, in fact, been used as a means to verify the literary record, as a kind of antidote for historicizing skepticism about the reliability of the word.[10] The relationship, however, between thing and word, like that between history and source, is not so straightforward as a symmetrical dichotomy. Though conceived as opposites, they are mutually dependent.

Words have always been, overwhelmingly, the chief source of history. Histories (and, for that matter, archaeologies) are themselves verbal accounts. Things are used to verify words because they are conceived as truer, more real. Paradoxically, though, objects can only serve as a supplement; they do not speak and so can never supplant words as the basic constituent stuff of history. Words are unfailingly used to explain things.

By virtue of their materiality, objects are often thought to stand outside the problems of subjectivity and reading that are so often associated with linguistic texts. Unlike words, they seem not to defer a meaning but "to be only what they are." So they come to be the tautological signs of the actual, and their qualities the characteristics of the real itself.[11] Things are real because they are tangible and visible, because they are "there," and in the western world, at least since the Greeks, two leading criteria of the real are tangibility and visibility.[12] Things are real because they have duration, and again, duration is a quality of the real. Things are real because they are unique, existing someplace, and this specificity in turn becomes a sign of the authentic and real.[13]

Such qualities contribute to the prestige of the thing as opposed to the word with historians. Hence the tangible and visible is preferred to the ideal

9. In recent years the realm of the material source has become more and more the preserve of archaeology. There has also been, at least in America, a reactionary attempt to ally archaeology more closely with anthropology than with history. Some would even claim that history and archaeology may be distinguished by their sources, history being concerned with verbal documents, archaeology with material objects. For a summary account of such posturing see Hodder 1986, 9–11, 77–102.

10. See Momigliano 1984, 253–69, esp. 254–55. Momigliano wrote this article specifically as a critique of modern "historicists" such as Hayden White.

11. On such "connotations of the thing" cf. Barthes (1988); see also Jacobson (1987, 466–73).

12. Examination of the western metaphysics of presence has been an ongoing concern of Derrida in many of his works; see, e.g., the summary provided by Culler (1982, 92–96, et passim).

13. The classic case for the importance of uniqueness versus the modern standard of reproduction was made by Benjamin in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1969, 217–51).

and audible. Words are not really there as are things. The enduring monument is more to be trusted than the fleeting word, because it is present to the historian as it was to the maker. It is presumed to provide a physical and permanent link to the transitory world of the past. The uniqueness of the thing, too, contributes to the impression of its reality. In contrast words are infinitely iterable, replaceable, and hence, not real.[14]

The traditional preference of the material over the verbal complicates further the position of the historian. Histories are manifestly literary products. Sources, too, are overwhelmingly verbal in character. History and source are bound together by their similar natures. Any critique of the sources immediately rebounds on the history itself, while histories are unfailingly composed in the very linguistic medium mistrusted in the sources.

## Herodotus and Material Culture

The prestige accorded the visible, the tangible, the material—that is, the "real"—is not original to modern times.[15] Since ancient Greece, philosophers have been concerned with objects as vehicles of meaning and have privileged the information conveyed by these objects over and against traditions preserved by linguistic means. This contrast is often expressed in sensory terms as one of ear versus eye, sight versus hearing. So, for example, Heraclitus remarks that "eyes are more precise witnesses than ears" (DK B 101a). This philosophical attitude doubtless was typical of popular Greek attitudes. Herodotus, for example, has one of his characters remark, "Ears are less trustworthy for men than eyes" (1.8.2).[16]

14. In these remarks and the following discussion, I am chiefly concerned with words as oral expressions. Writing occupies a special, ambivalent position in this dichotomy, because it is regarded as both visual and verbal, permanent and fleeting, at the same time. The ambivalence of writing, though, is a product of the opposition I am discussing, and so I choose to regard it as a subordinate (though related and significant) problem. Furthermore, as will be seen, Herodotus and Thucydides do not consistently differentiate between oral and written expression, and when opposed to "things," writing is regularly grouped with oral forms of expression.

15. All of the passages from Herodotus and Thucydides that I discuss in the following pages are famous and controversial. It would be pointless, and in the space I have, impossible, to provide anything like an exhaustive bibliography. I cite only recent, representative summaries of scholarship and those specific works that document my contentions. In arguing for a particular meaning of a word or phrase, I do not wish to suggest that a given word may not have a variety of simultaneous meanings. Nor do I want to fall into the common trap of listing the possible connotations of a word and passing the list off as an explanation. Connotations are always limited by context, and context is itself produced by interpretation. Any connotation will not do; without an interpretative context, the word is meaningless.

16. On ancient philosophical theories of cognition see Beare 1906; Van Hoorn 1972. For the eye/ear opposition in Herodotus and his predecessors see above all Hartog 1988,

The first extant Greek historian, Herodotus, already distinguishes the categories of the seen (ὄψις) and the heard (ἀκοή). All sources of his history are pressed into one or the other of these two categories. Accounts offered by "native informants" (e.g., οἱ λόγιοι) are "heard."[17] Any information derived from or buttressed by visual evidence, for example, geography or monuments, is "seen" (cf. 2.29, 2.99). Herodotus' sources also include written texts, such as inscriptions. Written texts, in the context of the distinction between ὄψις and ἀκοή, are ambivalent because they are at the same time words and enduring things. Herodotus nevertheless treats them as oral. Thus, in Herodotus, inscriptions and other written texts "speak" (see 1.124.1, 4.13.1, 4.91, 6.137.1).[18]

As is well known, Herodotus believes that sight is more reliable than hearing. The opposition and priority of the categories is clear in many places, notably in 2.99:

> Thus far I have spoken of Egypt from my own observation, relating what I myself saw [ὄψις], the ideas that I formed [γνώμη], and the results of my own researches [ἱστορίη]. What follows rests on the accounts given me by the Egyptians [λόγους ἐρέων κατὰ τὰ ἤκουον], which I shall now repeat, supplementing [προσέσται] them with what I saw [τι τῆς ἐμῆς ὄψιος].

Here the visual takes precedence over and verifies the verbal. This hierarchy of visual over verbal implies, for Herodotus, a number of related dichotomies: enduring versus evanescent, real versus apparent, and so forth.[19]

Herodotus notes at the end of this passage that what follows in his Egyptian λόγος is based on ἀκοή supplemented by ὄψις. He has already claimed that, in contrast, the earlier part of the λόγος was based on his own ὄψις, γνώμη, and ἱστορίη. It is, of course, ludicrous that the first part of the Egyptian λόγος is in some way independent of verbal sources. The claim is an alibi that conceals the ambivalent position of ὄψις relative to ἀκοή. Whether Herodotus speaks of geography, customs, animals, or objects he

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260–309. Hartog notably does more justice to the ambiguous role of writing in the opposition than I have been able to here. For the general distinction in Thucydides and Herodotus see Veyne 1984, particularly chap. 10. For discussion and bibliography of most methodological problems in Herodotus see Lateiner 1989; Dewald and Marincola 1987, 9–40.

17. For a recent discussion of λόγιοι, with bibliography, see Nagy 1990a, 221–24.

18. For a subtle evaluation of the relationship between writing and saying in Herodotus see Hartog 1988, 273–94.

19. See Hartog 1988, 261–73.

has seen, that account is based on words, not on simple autopsy. Herodotus protests this point, but in doing so, admits it:

> Anyone who sees [ἰδόντι] Egypt, without having heard a word about it before [μὴ προακούσαντι], must perceive, if he has only common powers of observation, that...it is an acquired country, the gift of the river. (2.5)

By means of the quotation "gift of the river," Herodotus is certainly taking a swipe at an earlier writer, Hecataeus. It is, though, a comment that ricochets back against him. Even as he claims the sufficiency and independence of sight, he reveals, by his quotation, his reliance on a verbal account. The Egyptian λόγος is littered with such unattributed quotations, which pose as Herodotus' independent observations.[20]

Even a casual reading of these chapters will multiply the number of examples. Herodotus' assessment of the latter part of the Egyptian history is accurate for the whole: ὄψις always supplements ἀκοή. Certainly Herodotus understands the visible and material as more trustworthy, more reliable, and more real than verbal sources; this is why he represents it as primary. Even so, the object can never be understood or explained alone, independent of the word. Things can only be used to verify and supplement verbal accounts. When Herodotus mentions objects, he usually cites them as assurances of the reliability of a story he has been told.[21] When he relies chiefly on accounts told him, he uses them (paradoxically) as a supplement and verification of the material.

In the histories, the word most commonly used to describe the relationship between verbal story and physical verification is ἀποδείκνυμι. This word, of course, may have a variety of contextual meanings.[22] Notably, though, Herodotus uses it in the sense of "call to witness" or "point to as evidence." For example, Herodotus remarks that the Egyptian priests refuted Hecataeus, "showing as proof" (ἀποδείκνυσαν, ἀπέδεξαν) a series of statues at Memphis (2.143.3–4), and that the people of Croton and Sybaris "show as proof [ἀποδεικνύουσι, ἀποδεικνῦσι] of what they say, the following objects" (5.45.1–2).[23] The force of the term clarifies the relationship

20. For Hecataeus see *FGrH* 1 F 301. Some have even suggested that in spite of his claims, Herodotus bases his entire Egyptian narrative on other historians, not on his own witness at all; see Fehling (1989).

21. For Herodotus' uses of objects see especially Immerwahr (1960, 261–90).

22. Lateiner (1989) provides a list (7–9) and discusses the sense to which I refer (50–51). See also Powell [1938] 1960, 268–69, with n. 17.

23. The word is used unambiguously and often in this sense, notably at 1.171.6; 2.15.1, 2.16.1, 2.18.1, 2.142.1, 2.143.3, 2.144.1; 3.122.4; 4.8.2; 8.35.2; 9.80.3. See further Lateiner

between words and things; they do not exclude, but complement, one another.

It is an obvious, but essential, paradox that though Herodotus privileges visual sources in his history, his own history is itself (necessarily) an avowedly verbal production. Description and reality are incommensurable. Herodotus refers to his history in its entirety as a λόγος and to its constituent parts as λόγοι.[24] He is, in other words, turning the prioritized criteria of his sources inside out by his own practice.

Herodotus seldom explicitly discusses this inconsistency between his standards of source criticism and his textual practice. In the proem, however, he steps back from the history itself and speaks generally about it and its relation to the sources.[25] He claims to write

> so that occurrences due to men [τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων] may not become evanescent [ἐξίτηλα] in time and so that great and marvelous monuments [ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά], some called to witness [or performed, ἀποδεχθέντα] by Greeks, some by barbarians, should not lose their renown [become ἀκλεᾶ], and specifically for what cause [αἰτίη] they fought one another. (proem. 1–4)

He then proceeds to outline in detail the causes of the war (1.1–5.3), finally returning to the evanescence of ἔργα and τὰ γενόμενα at the end of the proem (1.5.3–4): he will proceed "treating [or listing, ἐπεξιών] small and great cities of men alike. For those that were great long ago, many of them have become small; and those that in my time were great, before were small." As everybody knows, scarcely a word in this passage is not debatable (and indeed debated). Nevertheless, I think it is possible to make some relatively unexceptionable observations, at a very general level—observations about the sense, based chiefly on the rhetorical oppositions Herodotus uses.

There is a general contrast between ἔργα and τὰ γενόμενα on the one hand and τὰ ἄλλα and αἰτίαι on the other. The contrast is manifested in the constructions used (ὡς μήτε...μήτε versus τε...καί) and by the subsequent discussion and contrast of complaints (1.1–5.3) versus mutable cities (1.5.3–4). This contrast is again one of word and thing, the verbal and the

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1989, 50–51; Powell [1938] 1960 s.v.; Nagy (1990a, 217–24) provides further reflections on the meaning of the word.

24. For the units of Herodotus' history see Immerwahr 1966, 14–15. For some specific examples see 1.184, 2.16.3, 5.36.4.

25. The standard essay on the proem is by Krischer (1965, 159–67), who discusses structure and vocabulary. Cf. Lateiner 1989, 13–17, 40–43. For the general structure of the proem and its relation to the preface I follow Immerwahr (1966, 17–19, 80–81).

seen. The complaints of Greeks and barbarians are accessible only through the verbal accounts of the actors. So Herodotus' narrative of the complaints is composed entirely of quotation: "the λόγιοι of the Persians say" (1.1.1), "the Greeks say" (1.1.3), "the Persians, unlike the Greeks, claim" (2.1.1), and so on. The ἔργα and γενόμενα, on the other hand, like cities great and small, seem to be considered immediately accessible to the senses without an intervening verbal account.

There is another dichotomy in the proem, that between τὰ γενόμενα and ἔργα. Because of the rigidly paralleled clauses, the contrast is beyond dispute. Both terms have many possible meanings, and their usage in the proem has long been debated. While I do not minimize the range of possible connotations, in the context of my interpretation I am inclined to emphasize the immediate reference of ἔργα to "monuments" and τὰ γενόμενα to "events."[26] The principle of the opposition here is one of the permanent versus the transitory.

Not the least important aspect of the context here is the contrast of the two terms, which, like any structured difference, serves to define and limit the possible meanings of both. The γενόμενα are described by the word ἐξίτηλα, "evanescent." This is a rare word in Herodotus, used only one other time, to describe the extinction of a family (5.39.2). These γενόμενα are accessible to sight, but transient; like the generations of man, they will fade. Monuments are also accessible to sight, but they last. The ἔργα are described as great and marvelous (μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά). These words are often used in the history to describe material things.[27] Herodotus specifies further: The ἔργα are used as proofs (ἀποδεχθέντα).

Herodotus' history, like any history, is at least in part a repetition of his sources, a regurgitation of other histories. His dealings with the sources constitute his own history. These ἔργα, γενόμενα, and αἰτίαι are the constituent sources and objects of Herodotus' history. For the most part the distinction between sight and sound is as rigidly maintained in the proem as in the history. The mutual dependence of these source categories is rigidly

26. This interpretation was a virtual commonplace in the older commentaries on Herodotus. Since Immerwahr's article (1960), however, a consensus seems to have developed that ἔργον here in the proem must mean both monument and abstract deed. It is indisputable that the word ἔργον is used in various contexts in Herodotus to mean either or both. It is not clear to me, though, what is gained for an understanding of the proem or Herodotus' methodology by proposing that the word must have both meanings simultaneously here. Nor do I think such an interpretation can account for the contrast with γενόμενα. For an account of the earlier scholarship on ἔργον, a survey of the range of meanings of the word in Herodotus, and arguments against my contentions see Immerwahr 1960, esp. 264, 270; cf. Lateiner 1989, 15–17.

27. See Hartog 1988, 230–37.

suppressed except for one allusion: Herodotus writes "so that ἔργα may not lose renown [become ἀκλεᾶ]." The word κλέος, renown, is not often used in Herodotus' history. It has epic connotations and refers to oral fame.[28] To describe mute ἔργα as "lacking in fame" is slightly oxymoronic. The oxymoron, however, accurately represents the necessarily ambivalent relationship between verbal and material sources. The thing is conceived as more real than the word, but it also must be supplemented by the word to have meaning.

At the beginning of the proem, Herodotus takes a step back from his sources to describe his history. He calls it an ἀπόδεξις ἱστορίης. The term ἱστορίη had yet to acquire its later generic meaning of "history." Herodotus uses it to mean rather "inquiry" or "investigation." He often associates the word with visual investigation (e.g., 2.99).[29] The word ἀπόδεξις is more difficult. It had yet to acquire its later meaning of "rhetorical display piece."[30] Many maintain that the word here means "performance" or "presentation" in the sense of "publication."[31] I would emphasize its common sense of "witness" or "proof." This meaning usually occurs in the context of material things (e.g., 2.101.1, 2.148.2; cf. 1.207). Herodotus, in other words, is alluding (on at least one level) to the practice of explicating objects.

The Herodotean critique of sources then involves a prioritization of the visual over the linguistic. But Herodotus' history is itself a linguistic product. Herodotus nevertheless maintains and protests the dichotomy in his history as far as possible. It is only in the proem, where he speaks explicitly about his history, as though it were itself a source, that he is forced to deal explicitly with the contradictions of mimetic representation. Here he equivocates, unwilling for once to name his history a λόγος. Instead he chooses a more ambiguous name, which alludes not to a referential text (such as a history or source) or to the hermeneutic finality of a real object (such as his ideal sources, monuments), but to the mediating historical practice of "calling the object to witness;" the history is, in other words, a verification. Paradoxically, the meaning of permanent things is preserved by means of this verbal verification.

28. Nagy (1990a, 221–27) discusses Herodotus' use of κλέος at length, providing many parallels from earlier poetry.

29. On ἱστορίη see Hartog 1988, 261, 265, 315, 365–66. More recently see Nagy 1990a, 250–73, and W. R. Connor's contribution to this volume (chap. 1).

30. Some years ago in a graduate seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, Martin Ostwald convinced me that such a meaning would be anachronistic in Herodotus.

31. Hartog (1988, 276), following Havelock (1963, 54 n. 8), takes the word as implying "oral publication." Nagy (1990a, 220–24) opts for "public performance." Cf. the meanings discussed by Lateiner (1989, 7–9, 50–51).

## Thucydides and Material Culture

Thucydides deals much more explicitly than Herodotus with the contradictions of history and source, of the verbal and the visual.[32] He rationalizes these contradictions by means of the idea of exaggeration, an idea that corresponds closely to that of the supplement. His reasoning is expressed most clearly in the methodological chapters.

It is most appropriate to begin with a famous passage from the archaeology, the contrast of Athens and Sparta (1.10). Thucydides here distinguishes between oral (or even literary) sources and the material record. He also makes certain programmatic claims about the nature of the relationship between the perception of power and material culture. The passage might easily be construed as a critique and response to the proem of Herodotus (i.e., 1.5.4), given their similar focus on the physical appearance of ancient cities.[33]

The passage is long and well known. Thucydides observes that though ancient towns are small by contemporary standards,

> no one who examines the indications precisely [ἀκριβεῖ σημείῳ χρώμενος] would for that reason mistrust [ἀπιστοίη] the estimate of the size of the expedition against Troy provided by the poets [ποιηταί] and story [λόγος]. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians were to be deserted, and only the sanctuaries and the foundations of buildings [τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη] were to be left, I imagine that, after a long period of time, some future generation would have great mistrust [ἀπιστία] of their power in relation to their reputation [κλέος].

He goes on to note contemporary Spartan political power and explain the paltry appearance of the state: "The state has not been consolidated or outfitted with expensive shrines and buildings [ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης] but is settled in scattered villages in the ancient manner of Greece." Thucydides proceeds to contrast the city of Athens: "One would infer from the visible appearance [φανερᾶς ὄψεως] of the city that its power is double what it is." Finally Thucydides provides the moral of the story: "It is not reasonable to be mistrustful [ἀπιστεῖν] or to look at the appearances [ὄψεις] of cities rather than at their powers [δυνάμεις]." The

32. Although I have not cited the standard commentaries on Thucydides at every turn, I have nevertheless found them most useful and here acknowledge my debt to them: Poppo and Stahl 1882–88; Classen and Steup [1892–1922] 1963; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81.

33. See Immerwahr 1960, 280–81. Hornblower (1987, 29–33, 91–93) comments perceptively on the passage and provides a good sampling of the bibliography.

Trojan expedition, Thucydides concludes, was the greatest up to that time but fell short of the standards of contemporary warfare "if it is necessary in this to trust the epic [ποιήσει] of Homer, which, being a poet, he is likely to have exaggerated [ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμῆσαι]."

This passage is based on the same distinction between the verbal and visual that is so common in Herodotus.[34] Thucydides claims, however, that in this case one should believe the oral record of the poets (exaggerated though it may be) and should mistrust the material evidence. This claim is remarkable not only because it contradicts contemporary Greek thought but because it seems so counterintuitive from a modern perspective. The opposition here, however, is not a simple one. Though Thucydides gives poets more credit than he does the material record, he does not regard them as completely trustworthy, admitting that they have a tendency to exaggerate.

Disquiet about the relationship between word and thing emerges in another passage (1.11.2). Thucydides remarks that, on the basis of what it accomplished, the Trojan War was clearly "inferior [ὑποδεέστερα] to the rumor [φήμη] and current opinion [λόγου] about it formed under the tuition of the poets." But how does Thucydides know about the Trojan War if not from the poets? If he believes that the war was "inferior" to the tales, then surely the tales again must be, not false, but exaggerated.[35]

The same uneasy principle underlies a passage at the end of the methodology (1.21). Thucydides once more criticizes oral sources as exaggerated, but now he opposes his own history to them:

> One would not err believing the conclusions I have drawn on the basis of the indications quoted [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων], not preferring to trust the exaggerated [ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες] lays of the poets [ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι] or the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive to hear at truth's expense [ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον].

Such stories, Thucydides claims, are untrustworthy or legendary, because of the antiquity of the events related. Nevertheless, he maintains that he reaches conclusions from the "clearest indications" (ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων).

34. Hartog (1988, 264–65, 272) contrasts the attitudes of Thucydides and Herodotus toward ear and eye. For more detailed discussion and bibliography see Schepens 1980.

35. For the attitude of Thucydides toward Homer and epic poetry see Veyne (1988), who remarks on the ambiguous status of myth in history. For further bibliography, cf. Hornblower 1987, 86–88.

Doubtless every historian is familiar with the process of discrediting sources that Thucydides uses here. The reflexive nature of source criticism sometimes, however, passes unnoticed; the standards applied to the sources must also apply to the history. Thucydides seems to be aware that his critique is a two-edged sword, and contradictions are apparent, even emphasized, in several passages. He remarks that

> though men always judge the present war [τὸν παρόντα] in which they fight to be the greatest, and once they stop fighting return to their admiration of earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it [this war] was much greater than the wars that preceded it. (1.21)

This passage is scandalous. Thucydides claims that, on principle, people tend to exaggerate the importance of contemporary wars, and when a war is finished, they return to admiration of earlier wars. He makes this claim after demolishing the claims of a number of earlier writers who tell of "the greatest war of all time until now." He himself, however, is giving an account of a contemporary war, which he claims is much greater than any preceding. He is explicitly writing for "future generations" (cf. 1.10 and 1.22), who will presumably read his work from the same perspective as he reads the work of earlier authors. His history, then, is subject to precisely the critique he applies to his own sources. Thucydides here, by the juxtaposition of critique and claim, by the obvious contradiction between the two, is inviting a comparison of himself with his sources.

The paradox Thucydides expresses here lurks in any realistic history. Like other historians, Thucydides must rely on sources, which he cannot wholly dismiss without destroying his own history. At the same time as he accepts his sources as true, he must also discredit them in some way. Homer cannot be a complete lie, or Thucydides could write nothing about the Trojan War. On the other hand, Homer cannot be the complete truth, or Thucydides could write nothing about the Trojan War. The source must somehow be both false and true at the same time, either incomplete or excessively complete. So Thucydides characterizes his sources as exaggerated. He thus is able to alter his sources without falsifying them. The supplement he brings is negative; he verifies by deletion. This idea of exaggeration is used throughout the history as a means of criticizing the sources and establishing the position of the historian against them.[36] Thucydides, like any historian, must both rely on his sources and transcend them.

36. Cf. 2.40, 2.62; 5.68; 6.17. I have not found a study devoted to boasting and exaggeration in Thucydides. For citations see Bétant 1969, s.vv. κόμπος, κοσμεῖν, et sim.

The ambiguities and contradictions inherent in historical practice reach a kind of climax in Thucydides' remarks about the sources for his speeches and for his narrative of events (1.22). There is again a queasiness, an implicit, backhanded acknowledgment of the disjuncture and unity of source and history. He begins (1.22.1) by describing the sources for the speeches:

> It was difficult to remember precisely what was said [*τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων*], both for me, even when I heard it myself, and for those informing me from various locations. I have made each speaker say what I thought [*ἐδόκουν*] was lacking [or "necessary," *τὰ δέοντα*] regarding the specific circumstances [*τὰ πάροντα*], staying as close as possible to the general sense of what was really said [*τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων*].[37]

Here, as elsewhere, Thucydides has it both ways. He begins by explicitly linking himself with his informants. For him hearing as for his sources reporting, there is the same difficulty of recalling with precision the words spoken. What Thucydides singles out as lacking and needful of correction in his reporters is also admittedly missing in his own account. The nature of the speeches too is ambiguous. They are regarded as objective historical facts, which must be recorded verbatim, or at least as accurately as possible (*ἀκρίβεια*), and at the same time, because of an essential lack, they are necessarily vehicles of historical interpretation and must be modified by Thucydides' reason (*δόξα*). The author of any speech must be both Thucydides and someone else, a historical agent. The speeches, in other words, like other historical sources, are both the objective record and historical interpretation of the event. They are both final and referential at the same time. The essential truth of the speeches cannot be abandoned without invalidating the history that is being written; Thucydides cannot simply fabricate them. The speeches are also, however, incomplete and modified in accordance with the historian's reason.[38]

Similar and explicitly parallel contradictions arise in the subsequent discussion of the sources for the narrative of events:

37. For a review of the massive bibliography on this passage see Ostwald 1988, 24 n. 10. Hornblower (1987, chap. 3 and esp. 45–47) provides a good summary of some of these interpretations.

38. Modern historians are drawn into the paradox when they treat Thucydides' speeches as "more or less authentic." Some might object that Thucydides only supplements the speeches because it is impossible to give them verbatim, since "it was difficult to remember them precisely." This is an alibi. If the issue were only one of precise recollection, Thucydides might simply have claimed to give the gist, without adding the supplement.

> I did not think it right [ἠξίωσα] to write the account of the deeds either on the basis of what I learned from the first person I ran into [ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος], or as it seemed best to me [or "in accordance with my opinion," ἐδόκει], but rather by reviewing what I myself was present at [παρῆν], and what I heard from others, insofar as possible with precision [ἀκριβείᾳ] regarding each event. This was difficult to discover, because those present [οἱ παρόντες] at various events do not usually say the same things about them, but [different things] according as they may be biased for one side or the other, or may recollect. (1.22.2–3)[39]

In the case of the speeches, Thucydides remarks that his own memory is no better than that of his informants. Here again he links himself explicitly with his sources, noting that those present at any given event (οἱ παρόντες) "do not usually say the same things," whether because of prejudice or faulty memory. He has just said, however, that he bases his account on events at which he himself was present (παρῆν) and on what he learned from others. The juxtaposition of these inconsistencies is monstrous. Again, in practically the same breath, he criticizes his sources and admits complicity in their flaws.

In his discussion of the narrative of events, Thucydides confronts the same problems as in his discussion of the speeches. The two passages are closely paralleled and contrasted, even to the point of using the same critical vocabulary. The primary contrast is one of word (λόγος) versus deed (ἔργον). In both passages, the object of the critique is precision (ἀκρίβεια). In both, Thucydides pairs his own apprehension with that of his sources. In the case of the speeches, however, Thucydides is willing to make modifications according to his own reason (ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοί). In the case of the events, he explicitly contrasts his practice and refuses to make such supplements (οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει). The event, unlike the speech, will not be subjected to his supplementary reason (δόξα) because it is final. Precision, Thucydides admits, is impossible. Even so, he opts to present facts as autonomous. Thus the tension between history and source is replicated at the level of the sources themselves, in the opposition between speech and event, word and thing, heard and seen, referential and final, λόγος and ἔργον.[40]

39. For this famous passage, cf. the remarks of Ostwald (1988, 22–23) and Hornblower (1987, 77–82).

40. On the distinction, the standard work is by Parry (1981). Again, there has been a tendency to follow Thucydides' lead among modern scholars, who treat the narrative of events as factual and the speeches as interpretation.

## Histories within Histories: The Funeral Oration

Thucydides contrives that the speaker of the funeral oration, Pericles, is overtly concerned with the same issues of source criticism as Thucydides himself. This is entirely appropriate for a speaker whose express purpose is to memorialize those who had fallen in battle. Pericles is accordingly preoccupied with the nature of the speech he is about to inscribe (orally) in the Athenian tradition. He contemplates the historical record, that is, from the point of view of one who is about to add to it. The standard of commemoration that Pericles espouses corresponds generally to the traditional Greek ideal of historical sources. The ephemeral tales of poets are less trustworthy than the permanent, concrete record. These criteria are opposed precisely, almost verbatim, to the standards of source criticism that Thucydides himself recommends in his methodology.

While Thucydides accepts *ipsissima voce* the evidence preserved in the oral traditions of the poets (making allowance only for exaggeration), the speaker of the funeral oration explicitly excludes these as unreliable and ephemeral. The material remains, which Thucydides took such trouble to discredit in his methodological chapters, are accepted in the funeral oration (2.41.1) as the ideal, lasting records of the deeds of man:

> Since we have demonstrated our power with great indications [*μεγάλων σημείων*] and not left it unwitnessed, we shall be admired [*θαυμασθησόμεθα*] by current and future generations; and we do not need a Homer to sing our praises [*ἐπαινετοῦ*], or another who will delight with verse for the moment, though the truth will harm their interpretation of the deeds; we have forced every land and sea to give access to our daring, and everywhere we have founded imperishable monuments of our successes and failures [*μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες*].[41]

The priority of sources of the funeral oration is thus precisely opposed to that of Thucydides' own history.

The familiar opposition between report and fact, word and deed, heard and seen, turns up repeatedly in the funeral oration. Again words are seen as inferior to deeds. As might be expected, the pair is often linked by the idea

41. For a different and very interesting view of the opposition of *λόγος* and *ἔργον*, monument and speech, in Thucydides' funeral oration, see Loraux 1986, 232–36 et passim. For the passages in the funeral oration relating to monuments see also Immerwahr 1960, 285–90. For a different emphasis of interpretation see Ostwald 1988, 38, 58.

of exaggeration. In contrast to Thucydides' methodology, however, the speaker of the funeral oration insists that his account and his sources either are not subject to the failing of exaggeration or even suffer from the contrary, that is, from an inability to express the facts adequately in words. For instance, Pericles claims that his oration "is no mere boast of words thrown out for the present occasion [οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος] rather than the plain truth of the facts [ἔργων ἀλήθεια]" (2.41.2). Embellish as he may, he cannot exaggerate the glory of Athens, or even do it justice: "Athens alone today proves upon examination [ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται] greater than her reputation [ἀκοῆς κρείσσων]" (2.41.3).

These remarks are entirely consistent with the philosophy expressed in the funeral oration but utterly opposed to the opinions expressed in the methodology. Thucydides claimed a universal tendency of individuals to exaggerate. The author of the funeral oration claims that it is human nature to minimize: "The knowledgeable and well-disposed auditor [ἀκροατής] will probably think the account is lacking in some respect [τι ἐνδεεστέρως δηλοῦσθαι], in relation to what he desires and knows" (2.35.2). The account given, in other words, will be inadequate—a fact known to those with insight.

> But he who is inexperienced will probably think this same account is exaggerated [πλεονάζεσθαι] if he hears anything beyond his own ability [φύσιν]; for praises [ἔπαινοι] of others are tolerable only to the point where each can imagine himself sufficient to do what he has heard. People are envious and mistrust [ἀπιστοῦσιν] one who surpasses them.

The point expressed here by Pericles not only is inconsistent with that expressed by Thucydides in the methodology but seems to be explicitly directed against the author of the methodology. Thucydides says that the events recounted by the poets are exaggerated and not so great as current events; the author of the funeral oration says that people who think such things are inexperienced and envious.

As in the methodology, there is an uneasiness in the funeral oration about the relationship between source and history, a simultaneous opposition and identification of the two. The cause of this discomfort is in both places the same: the history is itself a kind of source and is subject to the same criticisms that its author directs against its constituent texts. The elements of the discrimination in the history and in the speech, however, are mirror images of each other. Thucydides accepted the accounts of the poets and excluded the material remains as untrustworthy; Pericles does the

reverse. So, he claims, Athens "needs no Homer to sing its praises," since it has left "imperishable monuments" (2.41.4). This priority, though, is reversed in the actions of Pericles himself. The normal practice of those who deliver such orations is to pronounce "praise" (ἐπαινοῦσι, 2.35.1). Pericles constantly describes his own actions as verbal, even poetic.[42] He proceeds to praise (εἶμι ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον, 2.36.4), and gives an εὐλογία (2.42.1). In a startling passage (2.42.2), he notes that "the praises I have sung [ὕμνησα] with regard to the city are the ornaments that the virtues of these men and those like them have provided [ἐκόσμησαν]." Pericles here equates his account with the deed recounted, claiming to transcend the usual distinction between words and things. At the same time, he is himself plying the trade of the poet, a practice that he himself claims is unnecessary, and that Thucydides, in the methodology, describes in no uncertain terms as objectionable (cf. 1.21.1, ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι). The verb κοσμέω, on the other hand, is used in the methodology to describe the exaggerated descriptions of the poets (cf. 1.10, ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμῆσαι). We have here, in other words, an equation of a verbal epic description with a factual epic event.

The grand finale of the funeral oration is in part a remarkable description of the process of elucidating the meaning of physical monuments (2.43.2–3).[43] Men who have sacrificed their bodies, it is said, earn both "unaging praise [ἀγήρων ἔπαινον] and a distinguished tomb [τάφον ἐπισημότατον]." Here we see the customary distinction of word and thing. Pericles goes on to specify, however, the means and process through which mute monuments are able to signify. The tomb is

> not so much the thing in which they lie [ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται], but that in which is preserved their renown [δόξα], to be eternally remembered [ἀείμνηστος] on every occasion in word and deed [παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι ἀεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ]. For the entire earth is the tomb of renowned men, and not only the inscription on the stones in their homeland indicates [στηλῶν σημαίνει ἐπιγραφή], but also abroad an unwritten memorial resides [ἄγραφος μνήμη ἐνδιαιτᾶται] in everyone, a memorial more of the meaning [γνώμης] than of the monument [ἔργου].

There is a distinction here between the mute finality of the thing (ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται, ἔργον) and the referential meaning of the object (δόξα, γνώμη). The link between the two is secured by a regular practice of word and deed.[44]

42. See Loraux 1986, 50–51.
43. See Loraux 1986, 230–35.
44. It is interesting to contrast here Bourdieu's (1977) notion of habitus.

Any speech, any representation, is referential in the sense that it defers the actuality of its meaning somewhere else. Since everything has meaning, the actuality of the referent is inaccessible.[45] Had Thucydides claimed his speeches were exact replications of "what was actually said," historians would doubtless be tempted to sidestep the issue of meaning in the context of the history and regard the speeches as summary speech-events, actualities that defuse the paradoxical scandals of meaning by appeal to the hermeneutic finality of being. It is much more reassuring to parrot "what Alcibiades actually said and did," to reduce symbols to the dead ends of use, function, and present existence, than it is to throw oneself into the infinite chains of possibilities and deferrals that lurk in "what Alcibiades meant." Although history inescapably defers meaning to the inaccessible ultimate sources (or events) it recounts, many historians would like to end the chain at this remove by means of the alibi of objectivity, which claims that the event, or even the word, does not signify; it simply is. In the proem, Thucydides says that he has reproduced the speeches as precisely as possible, adding what he thinks necessary (just as he has subtracted what is unnecessary from the narrative of events). Though the speeches adhere to standards of historical accuracy, it is impossible to regard them as facts. They are both composed and not composed by Thucydides. They are final historical objects, but at the same time are meaningful and referential. In sum, they are like Thucydides' history itself, "histories within a history." The funeral oration is a self-conscious record of the achievements of the Athenians in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. It is defined precisely as a history (i.e., as a product analogous to Thucydides' history) by the verbs that the speaker, Pericles, uses and by the critical relationship of account to sources.

## Thucydides' History

In the funeral oration, Thucydides has the speaker, Pericles, discuss the speech's sources. The oppositions with which this Pericles works, verbal and concrete, are the same as those used by Thucydides in his methodological chapters. Pericles, however, espouses the thing against the word, the monument against the poet. This position, however, belies its very representation. Pericles denounces poetry in words that are themselves explicitly poetic. In the methodology, on the other hand, Thucydides accepts the testimony of the poets as exaggerated but essentially reliable and denounces material culture at length as untrustworthy. So the poetic words of Pericles

45. To put it generally and as explicitly as possible, I am claiming that a signifier does not lead to a stable, present signified, but only to another signifier, so opening up an infinite chain of deferrals.

are reliable (though exaggerated) from the point of view of the Thucydidean methodology but are paradoxically discredited by the speaker himself.

Thucydides takes one last step outward in this Chinese puzzle of boxes within boxes within boxes. He has his sources discuss their sources; he discusses his own sources; and finally he treats the history itself as a source. At the end of his methodological section (1.22), he remarks of his composition that

> the absence of stories [τὸ μὴ μυθώδες] may perhaps make for less delight in the hearing [ἐς ἀκρόασιν]; if it is judged useful by those who will desire an exact knowledge of what has happened and what may happen again, which, insofar as human nature is constant, will be similar and comparable, it will be enough. It is composed [ξυγκεῖται] as a possession forever [κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί], rather than as an entry in a contest, to be heard only at the present instant [ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν].[46]

Here we have an opposition between the history as evanescent oral product and the history as permanent κτῆμα, "possession." The word κτῆμα is rare in Thucydides, appearing only one other time: "the powerful had lost fine properties [κτήματα] in the country and buildings [οἰκοδομίαις] and expensive furnishings [πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς]" (2.65.2; cf. 2.62). Here κτήματα are juxtaposed with a series of physical objects, much like those that were insufficient to immortalize Lacedaemonian power: ἱερά and τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδαφή (1.10.2). In other words, Thucydides here suggests by κτῆμα a physical object, like those that serve as memorials, μνημεῖα, of men's deeds (cf. the μνημεῖα ἀίδια of the funeral oration, 2.41.4). This claim (like that of Pericles in the funeral oration) is discredited by the critique of the sources. Thucydides accepts the claims of the poets, while rejecting the evidence of objects.

Stories within objects within stories, histories within sources within histories—the consistent inconsistency of alternation emphasizes the oppositions between word and thing, history and source. At the same time it leads to a virtual equilibrium of these oppositions. Through these oppositions and inconsistencies, Thucydides' history oscillates between subject and object. Is the methodology a critique of the funeral oration, or is the funeral oration a critique of the methodology? Do the inconsistent critiques of the methodology discredit Thucydides' sources or the history itself?

46. See Havelock 1982, 147–48; Connor 1984, 29–32; Ostwald 1988, 63–66; Euben 1990, 169–74.

Sources and history revolve around each other; now one is the history, now the source.

Thucydides, I think, is attempting to place his history in an intermediary position between description and source. He insists that those who read and write history must join him in this precarious and ambiguous situation. Certainly as future generations of historians use Thucydides' history as their source, their histories will be, *κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον*, very much like that of Thucydides, and if not precisely the same, certainly comparable.

3

# Three Aspects of Spartan Kingship in Herodotus

Rosaria Vignolo Munson

HERODOTUS' *HISTORIES* ARE GOVERNED by the rule of resemblance: they explain the nature of a given historical phenomenon by suggesting similarities to unrelated phenomena entirely different in other respects.[1] We may safely state, in particular, that Herodotus' analysis of any form of personal power is inseparable from his representation of monarchical rule. This was an essential feature of the foreign culture that threatened the integrity of Hellas at the time of the Persian wars, and it provided the Greeks with a foil for self-definition.

The components of the monarchical model in Herodotus have often been discussed,[2] and I need only to recall a few points. The speech of Otanes in the Constitutional Debate is the basic theoretical document (3.80). The monarch is here defined as an individual who "can do what he wants without being accountable" (*ἀνευθύνῳ ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται*). When placed in such a position, even the best of men finds himself outside the normal way of thinking (*καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων στάντα ἐς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων νοημάτων στήσειε*) and commits many unbearable things (*πολλὰ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα*) out of *ὕβρις* and *φθόνος*. Typically, the monarch subverts ancestral laws (*πάτρια νόμαια*), he does violence to women, and he puts people to death without trial.

I am happy to dedicate this chapter to Martin Ostwald with gratitude and admiration.

1. The importance of analogical thought in Herodotus is widely recognized. See especially the work of Immerwahr (1966) and Lateiner (1989, 191–96).

2. Immerwahr 1966, 154–88; Lateiner 1984; Lateiner 1989, 163–85; Gammie 1986; Hartog 1988, 331–34. The existence of such a model in Herodotus has been denied by Waters (1971, 7 et passim).

The other narrative elements that contribute to the representation of monarchy in the *Histories*—the factual evidence Herodotus has collected, his own authorial glosses, and the reported statements of different characters—encourage a more complex view of reality and sometimes contradict the words of Otanes.[3] On the whole, however, Herodotus' λόγος confirms his assessment, and it does so especially through the narrative of certain types of actions. Mutilations throughout the *Histories* symbolize the king's relentless assertion of power over all others—subjects, foreigners, family members, and women—which reduces them to the status of possessions, that is, slaves.[4] The elements of excess, transgression, and desire to rule are often signified through the crossing of physical boundaries (rivers and seas) into a forbidden space, which the king nevertheless claims as his own.[5]

These symbolic actions, sometimes in combination, also help to convey another feature of despotic behavior that Otanes does not explicitly mention—the wretched deeds of the ruler include direct challenges against the divine. The conquering king does not merely cross rivers in order to get to the other side. He harnesses them with cables, flogs them, destroys their potency by dividing them up into streams, brands them as slaves, curses them, and shoots them with arrows. Burning temples and destroying statues of the gods are defacements of the sacred, and Cambyses cuts up an Egyptian divinity, the Apis bull.[6] The despot's denial of the divine—or at least of some of its manifestations—combines with his need to rival and to subject it.[7]

Otanes' indictment of monarchical power has the effect of establishing absolute monarchy per se as a negative model, wherever and under whatever circumstances it may come into being.[8] The rest of the λόγος treats

3. E.g., Croesus' piety and generosity balance his negative side; see Nagy 1990a, 274–78. See also the narrator's positive assessment of the rule of the tyrant Peisistratus at 1.59.6. In other respects Peisistratus conforms to Otanes' description; for example, he does violence to women and violates customs at 1.61.1. Otanes loses the debate, and his evaluation is to some extent undermined by the view, expressed by Darius (3.82) and confirmed by the narrative of the *Histories*, that monarchy has been a source of power and freedom for the Persians.

4. See Hartog 1988, 331–34, for a catalogue of royal mutilations, including whipping, in Herodotus.

5. On the metaphor of crossing see especially Lateiner 1989, 126–35.

6. For physical aggressions against rivers see 1.75, 1.189; 2.111; 7.34–35. For the destruction of temples see 6.101, 8.53. For the destruction of statues of the gods see 3.37. For the Apis bull see 3.29.

7. Cambyses, for example, is jealous of Apis as well as incredulous about his divinity (3.27–3.29.2). See Munson 1991, 59; Hartog 1988, 331. For monarchical claims to equal the divine see 1.99, 1.204; 3. 35; 7.8 γ 1, 7.56.

8. Cf. the evaluation of the Corinthian Socles specifically in reference to Greek tyrants (5.92 α 1).

absolute monarchy—characterized by unaccountability—not as separate and unique, but rather as a limiting status. The narrative concerning all individuals whose will can to some degree determine history explores whether their will to power leads them to ὕβρις and φθόνος and to those actions that the words of Otanes and the evidence of history identify as despotic. In this way not only such monarchical rulers as barbarian kings and the last century's Greek tyrants but also such non-hereditary constitutional leaders as generals and politicians are measured by the standard of the Persian monarchy,[9] as the representation of a barbarian reality meshes with the warning on the dangers of individual prominence among the Greeks.

In this general context, Spartan kings play an especially important role because they represent a rare survival of true royalty within the Greek world of the city-states.[10] Their constitutional position in no way resembles that of the kings of Persia. They are diarchs, not monarchs, and Herodotus clearly shows that they limit each other's power and are each accountable to the other constitutional bodies of the Spartan state.[11] As kings, however, to some extent they are like other, monarchical, kings.

On the other hand, the monarchical model is in direct antithesis to anything Spartan. If monarchy—including the tyrannical regimes the Greeks have experienced—is essentially un-Hellenic,[12] Dorian Sparta is for Herodotus the city-state that provides the fullest illustration of what it means to be Greek. Sparta has never known a tyrannical regime, and from the beginning of the *Histories* is recognized as the most important city of Greece, almost the representative of all the Greeks.[13]

9. E.g., Miltiades, who dies of a leg wound as a result of an impious action perpetrated during his imperialistic attack on Paros (6.133–36), is somewhat analogous to Cambyses (3.64.3). For the high-handedness of Themistocles see Munson 1988, 98.

10. The kingships of Macedon and Cyrene (4.159–67, 4.200–205; 5.18–22) are of course marginal to that world. The king of fifth-century Argos mentioned at 7.149.2, must have been a disempowered religious official; see How and Wells [1928] 1964, 2:189. The Bacchiads of Corinth are called μούναρχοι by the Pythia (5.92 β 2), but they constitute an oligarchy. Other prominent Greek monarchs who figure in the *Histories*, including those of Asia and the West (especially Gelon), are tyrants. The distinction, which is not clearly reflected in Herodotus' use of the Greek words τύραννος and βασιλεύς, has to do with the legitimacy and antiquity of the royal dynastic line. For the problems in the terminology see Ferrill 1978.

11. For mutual limitation of power see 5.75; 6.63–66, 6.73. Two kings in Herodotus are deposed by judicial bodies, Demaratus for illegitimacy, and Leotychides for bribery (6.65–66, 6.72). King Cleomenes is prosecuted before the ephors on a charge of bribery (6.82). King Anaxandridas is practically forced by the ephors and gerontes to take a second wife under a veiled threat of deposition (5.40). See Cragg 1976, 90–91.

12. The connection between tyranny and barbarism in fifth-century Greek thought has been recently discussed by Hall 1989, 58–59.

13. For the narrative of the alliance with Croesus and Croesus' evaluation, see 1.6.2,

While trespassing of proper boundaries is a characteristic of monarchical powers, respect of geographical limits is typical of Sparta.[14] Monarchical rulers tend to challenge the gods; Sparta's behavior is utterly conditioned by the divine.[15] Most important, monarchies constitute a threat to the laws, but since the reforms of Lycurgus—says the narrator—Sparta has been the land of εὐνομίη (1.65).[16] The Spartan position in the fundamental antithesis between the rule of one man versus the rule of law is expressed through the statement of King Demaratus to Xerxes that the Spartans have νόμος (law and order) as their only master. In the particular sphere of warfare, Demaratus says, this master bids them "not to flee from a host in battle, no matter how large, and to stay in their station and either to conquer or die."[17]

This famous passage, which we may regard as the theoretical document for the Spartan model and the reverse of the speech of Otanes on monarchy, should be taken in conjunction with the words by which Demaratus describes all the Greeks when he praises them for their ἀρετή "produced by wisdom and strong law."[18] Spartan virtues are all Hellenic features that only

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1.53.3, 1.56.1–2, 1.69. For the narrative of the Ionian embassy to Sparta, see 1.141.4, 1.152–53.2. For Sparta's inexperience of tyranny (Corinthian evaluation), see 5.92 α 1–2.

14. See especially the narrative at 1.66–67 and Immerwahr 1966, 202–6. Spartan reluctance to cooperate with other Greek states north of the Isthmus during Xerxes' invasion is partially due to a reluctance to go beyond the Peloponnese.

15. Immerwahr 1966, 201–2. The Spartans consult Delphi more frequently than anyone else in the *Histories* (1.65.2–4, 1.66–67, 5.63, 6.52, 6.66, 6.76, 7.220, 8.114). Sparta enjoys the protection of the hero Orestes after finding his bones and moving them within its territory (1.68). When Delphi bids the Spartans to free Athens from the tyrants, they do so, even though the Peisistratids are their friends. The narrator's gloss explains the action by generalizing that the Spartans "consider divine things more important than human affairs" (5.63.1–2). Spartan delay and inadequate presence at Marathon and Thermopylae respectively are due to the celebration of religious festivals (6.106, 7.206). Similarly, the story of the consequences of the killing of Persian heralds at 7.139 and the narrator's gloss about apparent Athenian impunity for the same crime attest to Sparta's special closeness to the divine.

16. Herodotus makes Lycurgus the uncle of king Leobotes, dating him to about 1000 B.C., earlier than all other sources (How and Wells [1928] 1964, 1:88). Ostwald (1969, 70, 75–78) gives as one of the meanings of εὐνομία a condition characterizing "a state which is well governed and in which justice, peace, and order prevail," and this is the meaning the term has in this passage, with no necessary connection to the specific Lycurgan κόσμος.

17. ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστιν γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ· ἀνώγει δὲ τωὐτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι (7.104.4–5). Since the meaning of νόμος as subject of ἔπεστιν is "law and order" (see Ostwald 1969, 31), I think we must assume an ellipsis yielding the sense "They have a master, law and order, which bids them to obey all their laws. And in war the law is always not to flee from the battlefield." For illustrations in the narrative of courageous behavior in obedience to the law see especially 7.134–36, 7.208–33 (with the epigram at 7.228.2).

18. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός ἐστι, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἔπακτός ἐστι, ἀπό τε σοφίης κατεργασμένη καὶ νόμου ἰσχυροῦ· τῇ διαχρεωμένη ἡ Ἑλλὰς τήν τε πενίην ἀπαμύνεται καὶ τὴν

manifest themselves to a greater degree and more consistently in the Spartans than in anyone else. Herodotus does not represent Sparta as peculiar vis-à-vis other groups of Greeks,[19] but rather as the fullest representative of Hellenic culture. The only essential characteristic that makes Sparta qualitatively different from other Greek city-states is its kingship.[20]

In the narrative of book 6, Herodotus inserts a description of various privileges (γέρεα) that the Spartans have conferred upon their kings (chaps. 56–59). This idea conforms to a Hellenic model,[21] and the section partially represents the diarchy as an institution integrated in the constitutional system (e.g., the kings are ex officio members of the γερουσία, 57.5) and reflecting the values of the city-state (the kings must be the first to march and the last to retreat in war, 56). The religious functions of the kings are greatly emphasized, above all the two priesthoods of Zeus (56). Some of the honors listed are relatively modest (e.g., the right of receiving double rations of food at banquets, 57.3). Others are suited to the position of a high state official (e.g., the right to occupy the front seats at athletic contests, 57.2; and the jurisdiction over the marriage of heiresses, 57.4).

One of the first γέρεα mentioned, however, points in the opposite direction. Herodotus states that the kings have the right to bring war against any country they wish, with the penalty of a curse on any Spartan who tries to prevent them (56). The provision is ambiguous and possibly anachronistic.[22] Nevertheless, the phrase πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ' ἣν ἂν βούλωνται χώρην recalls the monarch's power in Otanes' description (ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται, 3.80.3), and the notion of unaccountability in one sphere of power is here, at least in principle, connected with the Spartan kingship.

The suggestion of barbarism also intrudes in this account. The presence of an ethnography in itself implies something foreign to be described. In the second part of the list—devoted to the honors Spartan kings receive after their death (58–59)—the parallel with non-Greek cultures is in fact made explicit in the narrator's glosses: "The custom of the Lacedaemonians concerning the death of their kings is the same as among all the barbarians of Asia; most of the barbarians follow the same custom when their kings

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δεσποσύνην (7.102.1). In 7.102.1–2, Demaratus' focus progressively narrows from the Greeks in general, to the Dorians, to the Lacedaemonians.

19. As fourth-century sources will do; see M. I. Finley 1968b, 156–57.

20. Demaratus, speaking to Xerxes, calls Sparta a "kingdom" (βασιληίη, 7.209.4).

21. Barbarian monarchs do not receive γέρεα from their subjects/slaves, but see the kings of the Greek colony of Cyrene (4.162.2, 4.165.1), as well as the Homeric representation of kingship (e.g., *Il.* 12.310–21). See Carlier 1977, 74 n. 37.

22. Carlier 1977, 72. It is not clear whether the power to declare war or strategical power is meant and whether it was attributed to the kings individually or collegially.

die" (6.58.2).[23] "Also in this other thing they resemble the Persians" (6.59).[24] These evaluations cooperate with the narrative of the actions: People are *compelled* (*ἀνάγκη*, 6.58.1), a term that elsewhere regularly describes the compulsion of monarchical rule)[25] to go to the king's funeral; free men and women are *compelled* (*ἀναγκαστούς*, 6.58.2) to befoul themselves in mourning (a reminder of monarchical mutilations).[26] The suspension of all commercial and political activity during ten days of mourning after the death of a king (58.3) signifies that the city itself is dead when the king is dead. As in a monarchical system, where there are no citizens, the king is the commonwealth and no one else counts.[27]

The coexistence of the Spartan and the monarchical models emerges in Herodotus' representation of the behavior of individual kings. At one end of the spectrum we find Leonidas, the perfect embodiment of the Spartan model. In contrast with several Spartans in the *Histories* who chose to leave the city because they would not be simple citizens and could not be kings,[28] Leonidas is the citizen who became king by chance.[29] At Thermopylae he

23. See the excellent analysis of this passage by Hartog (1988, 152–56) in the context of a discussion of "otherness," especially in reference to Herodotus' representation of the Scythians and their kings.

24. The custom so introduced is the incoming king's remission of debts owed to one of the kings or to the state. Cf. Smerdis' remission of tribute to the subject nations (3.67).

25. Munson 1988, 95, n. 18.

26. For self-mutilation of a subject of the Great King see 3.153–59. Are Spartiates included or excluded in the provision about compulsory presence at the funeral? The text is ambiguous. How and Wells ([1928] 1964, 2:87–88) and Hartog (1988, 153) mention the Solonian and the Lycurgan provisions about moderate funerals for the citizens as a counterpart to the extravagant rituals described here (Plut. *Sol.* 12, *Lyc.* 27, *Mor.* 238d). They also draw attention to the reference to a partial form of embalming—an additional barbaric feature—in Herodotus' description at 6.58.3.

27. Cf. 8.102 on the importance of Xerxes' survival. The barbaric identification of king and city is expressed in Aesch. *Supp.* 370–75.

28. Theras, after being regent for the twins Eurysthenes and Procles, went off to found a colony, "considering it a terrible thing to be ruled over by others" (*δεινὸν ποιούμενος ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων, ἐπείτε ἐγεύσατο ἀρχῆς*, 4.147.3). Dorieus, who had hoped to become king on the basis of his merit, left Sparta when his half brother was chosen on account of seniority, "considering it terrible and unfair to be subjected to the kingly power of Cleomenes" (*δεινὸν ποιούμενος καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶν ὑπὸ Κλεομένεος βασιλεύσασθαι*, 5.42.2); his alienation from the community is illustrated by his failure to consult Delphi as to where he should found his colony and to do "any of the customary things" (*ποιήσας οὐδὲν τῶν νομιζομένων*). After being deposed from the kingship on the grounds that he was not the legitimate son of Ariston, Demaratus held an unspecified public office but was mocked by Leotychides, who sent a servant to ask him how he liked being a magistrate after being king (*ὁκοῖόν τι εἴη ἄρχειν μετὰ βασιλεύειν*, 6.67.2). This mockery recalls the question of Harpagus to Astyages after the latter had been conquered by Cyrus: "How did he like his slavery in place of kingship?" (*ὅ τι εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου δουλοσύνη ἀντὶ τῆς βασιληίης*, 1.129.1). Demaratus replied with a threat, veiled his head in sign of withdrawal, and finally left Sparta for the Persian court.

29. He could not foresee that both his two older brothers would die without heirs, and "the thought of kingship was far from his mind" (7.205.1).

decides to remain with his three hundred Spartiates and hold the pass against an overwhelming Persian force because "he did not think it was seemly for them to leave their post" (7.220.1). In other words, Leonidas as an individual professes in action the principles that in the theoretical formulation of the Spartan model voiced by Demaratus apply to the collective body of Spartan citizens.[30] Reversing the terms of the monarchical equivalence between king and city, his death entails not the death of the commonwealth but its survival.[31]

Almost at the other extreme is Cleomenes, whose defacements of the divine, drunkenness, and—most especially—clinical madness, make him the Greek counterpart of the Persian despot Cambyses.[32] Cleomenes is, however, a mixed figure. Made king "by inheritance and not because of merit"[33] and represented as occupying an almost monarchical position,[34] he takes separate "monarchical" initiatives, often to the detriment of the commonwealth.[35] Yet he sometimes appears conspicuously in harmony with the ethos of the city.[36] He is both Spartan and "foreign"—he rejects the bribes and expansionistic enticements of two Asiatic tyrants[37] but adopts barbaric drinking customs from some Scythian guests (6.84).

30. Boedeker 1987, 198.

31. Compare the notice at 6.58.3 about burial and mourning in the list of honors due to a Spartan king after his death (*ἐπεὰν δὲ θάψωσι, ἀγορὴ δέκα ἡμερέων οὐκ ἵσταταί σφι οὐδ' ἀρχαιρεσίη συνίζει, ἀλλὰ πενθέουσι ταύτας τὰς ἡμέρας*) with the oracle mentioned at 7.220.3–4 in connection with the death of Leonidas (*ἢ μέγα ἄστυ ἐρικυδὲς ὑπ' ἀνδράσι Περσείδῃσι/πέρθεται, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐχί, ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους δὲ γενέθλης/πενθήσει βασιλῆ φθίμενον Λακεδαίμονος οὖρος*).

32. See 3.16, 3.27–29, 3.37 (Cambyses' sacrilegious actions); 3.34–35 (Cambyses' drunkenness). Cambyses and Cleomenes are the only two individuals the narrator in his own voice describes as mad. The verbal correspondence is remarkable. Cambyses: *ὑπομαργότερος* (3.29); *αὐτίκα ἐμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρης* (3.30.1). Cleomenes: *οὐ φρενήρης ἀκρομανής τε* (5.42); *αὐτίκα ὑπέλαβε μανίη νοῦσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ὑπομαργότερον* (5.75.1). See Griffiths 1988, 70–71; Munson 1991, 50.

33. *οὐ κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην...ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος* (narrator's evaluation, 5.39.1). Cleomenes is here being compared to his half brother Dorieus, whose overall portrayal is however also ambiguous; Herodotus' praise of him here contrasts with the narrative of his actions at 5.39.2 (see n. 28 above).

34. See 5.49.1, *Κλεομένεος ἔχων τὴν ἀρχήν* ("at the time when Cleomenes held *the* power"), noted by Carlier (1977, 77).

35. Cleomenes intervenes in Athens to set up his friend Isagoras as tyrant (5.70, 5.72, 5.74.1), attempts to collect hostages from Aegina "without the authorization of the Spartan commonwealth" (*ἄνευ...Σπαρτιητέων τοῦ κοινοῦ*, 6.50; words of the Aeginetans), contrives the deposition of his Eurypontid colleague Demaratus (6.61.2, 6.65–66), and stirs up rebellion against Sparta in Arcadia, binding the people there with oaths of allegiance to himself (6.74).

36. See especially the narrator's evaluations: *κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον* (6.61.1); *δικαιότατος ἀνδρῶν γίνεται* (3.148.2).

37. 3.148 (Maeandrius of Samos); 5.50–51 (Aristagoras of Miletus). Aristagoras also promises the opportunity to "rival with Zeus in wealth" (5.49.7)—a typical tyrannical wish (cf. 7.8 γ 2). For the Persian king's love of money and anything quantifiable see Konstan 1987, 61–70.

Most astounding is Cleomenes' ambivalence in matters of religion.[38] He relies on Delphic prescriptions (6.76, 6.82), and before pursuing a military attack, he asks for permission from a divine statue (6.82). During a campaign, he declines the opportunity to cross a river because he has not obtained favorable omens from the customary sacrifice (6.76). At the same time, Cleomenes' appropriation of Athenian oracles illustrates his tyrannical eagerness to control divine things (5.90.2).[39] He enters temples he is not supposed to enter (5.72.3) and whips a priest who tries to prevent him from performing a sacrifice (6.81). He kills fifty Argives who seek refuge in the grove of the hero Argos by treacherously making them come out, and then kills the rest who are still there by setting fire to the sacred grove itself (6.79).[40] He bribes the prophetess of Apollo at Delphi in order to have the other king Demaratus deposed (6.66.2–3) and chops down the sacred trees in the precinct of the two goddesses at Eleusis (6.73.3).

Cleomenes' end is a mark of his ambivalence. In a fit of madness, he starts smashing his scepter in the face of any Spartiate he happens to meet (6.75.1)—that is, he treats Spartan citizens as slaves. When his relatives restrain him and put him in prison, he obtains a knife from the guard and cuts himself into lengthwise strips from his shins to his belly until he dies (6.65.2–3). He is at the same time the despot who marks the body of his subjects and the Spartan mutilated and turned into a slave by the despot.

Between Leonidas and Cleomenes there stands a whole series of ambivalent kingly figures who in different ways partake of both the Spartan and the monarchical models. Leotychides, who cooperates with Cleomenes in the dishonest deposition of Demaratus and is later caught sitting on the silver he took from the Thessalians as a bribe (6.72), preaches on the sanctity of oaths (6.86).[41] The regent Pausanias is, in the words of the narrator, the author of the "fairest victory of any we have ever known" in the battle of Plataea (9.64.1; cf. 9.78). He himself declares that his only desire is "to please the Spartans by pious deeds and pious words" (9.79.2). The narrative of his actions illustrates how he does not mutilate corpses, he does not know

38. Griffiths 1988, 58–70.

39. See Nagy 1990a, 159–68. Herodotus specifies that the responses taken by Cleomenes from the Acropolis had previously belonged to the Peisistratids, on whose control of oracles see 7.6.3–4.

40. Of seven other holocausts reported by Herodotus, four are the work of monarchical rulers: Pheros (2.111), Polycrates (3.45), Arcesilaus of Cyrene (4.164), and Periander (5.92 η). See Griffiths 1988, 57, n. 9.

41. The Glaucus of the parable in Leotychides' speech, who is punished for his greed by the obliteration of his entire household (86 δ), is analogous to Leotychides himself, whose house is razed to the ground (6.72). The material razing of the house, however, is a specific punishment meted out by the polis against people guilty of basic crimes against the social order, including treason and tyranny. See Connor 1985, 83, 89, 93.

the luxuries of Eastern kings, and he does not—to borrow from Otanes' formulation—"do violence to women."[42] These episodes, however, capitalize on the common knowledge of his later destiny and clash with Herodotus' own two references to it, one mentioning his alleged betrothal to a Persian princess and his desire (ἔρως) to become tyrant of Greece (5.32),[43] and the other qualifying his behavior toward the Greek allies as ὕβρις (8.3.2).[44]

The most important of the intermediate royal figures is Demaratus, the Eurypontid king who is deposed thanks to the machinations of Cleomenes, after "acting out of envy and hatred" toward him (φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος, narrator's gloss at 6.61.1).[45] In the conclusion of the narrative of his deposition and exile, the narrator praises him as "many times illustrious according to the Lacedaemonians in deeds and counsels" (6.70.3). Mentioned at this point is the unique fact that he once obtained an Olympic victory in the chariot race but conferred the honor on the Spartans—in other words, he renounced a personal distinction that was almost a mark of tyrannical status within the polis.[46] In the same chapter the deposed Demaratus crosses over into the monarchical space, the East, as Hippias and several other tyrannical types in the *Histories* have done before him (6.70.1–2).[47] At the Persian court, on the one hand he cooperates with the Great King,[48] while on the other hand he becomes the expounder of the Spartan way to Xerxes. His are the words we have used as the theoretical description of the Spartan model. The mysterious message by which

42. Pausanias rejects as barbaric the invitation of an Aeginetan to defile the body of Mardonius as vengeance for Xerxes' mutilation of Leonidas' corpse at Thermopylae (9.78–79). He marvels at the furnishings of the Persian camp and compares a Persian and a Spartan dinner (9.82). And he graciously entrusts to the protection of the ephors the former Greek concubine of a rich Persian (9.76).

43. For ἔρως of tyranny see 1.96, 3.53. Herodotus refuses to vouch for the veracity of the story about Pausanias' marriage ("if indeed that story is true"). It is part of the thesis of this chapter, however, that Herodotean representations are made up of partial truths expressed by different voices. According to Evans (1991, 94–103, esp. 101), Herodotus' disclaimers are a sign of his impartial stance as an itinerant oral performer.

44. Cf. Thuc. 1.77, 1.94–96, 1.128–34. The irony in Herodotus' narrative about Pausanias is emphasized by Fornara (1971, 63–66).

45. A different view of Demaratus' ambivalence is expressed by Boedeker (1987b), whose discussion has greatly influenced the thesis of this chapter.

46. For the significance of the Olympic victories, especially in the chariot race, see 5.47, 5.71; 6.103, 6.36, 6.122, 6.125–26. The connection with tyranny is underlined by Nagy (1990a, 186–87).

47. For other departures from Sparta over the question of kingship see n. 28 above. Boedeker (1987, 191–92) identifies a special narrative pattern "of the exiled or alienated Greek who, for his or her own purposes, induces Persian incursions against fellow citizens," and gives a complete list.

48. By helping Xerxes to obtain the throne (7.3) and by advising a Persian attack on Cythera (7.235).

Demaratus announced to the Spartans the imminent Persian invasion, in order "either to do them a favor or to gloat" (narrator's evaluation, 7.239), is another sign of ambivalence.[49]

The behavior of the typical monarch, according to Otanes' description, includes actions of "violence to women." To the despot's desire for power (ἔρως)[50] corresponds his sexual desire, and indulging either one is part of his general tendency to "do what he wants." Herodotus' conception of history precludes a clear-cut separation between the public and the private spheres, which are represented as either parallel or intertwined.[51] In the context of the *Histories*, "doing violence to women" comes to signify interference in the basic unit of any society, the family.[52]

Spartan kings are not immune from this monarchical feature. Cleomenes has dealings with the wife of his guest-friend Isagoras (5.70.1). The kings Demaratus and Ariston are wife-stealers. A particularly interesting Spartan variation on the theme of irregular royal marriages is the story of Anaxandridas (5.39–41). Anaxandridas was happily married but had no heirs. Since he refused to replace his current wife, to whom he was attached, the ephors and gerontes insisted that he must at least take another wife in addition to the one he already had; otherwise the Spartans might decide to depose him. Anaxandridas complied with this second solution, and so he lived having two wives and two households, which was not at all a Spartan thing to do.[53] This violation of custom in the domestic sphere is not caused by unbridled lust and is certainly not the result of the king's being able to do whatever he wants. It is nevertheless the result of kingship and its imperfect integration within the commonwealth. The unsatisfactory compromise between the will of the king and the requirements of the state's constitution produces an irregular marriage in the style of the East, the issue of which is in turn the mad and monarchical Cleomenes.[54]

49. The conveyance of the message itself is in the style of Eastern tyrants and power-seekers. Cf. the secret messages at 1.123.3–4 (Harpagus to Cyrus) and 5.35.3–4 (Histiaeus to Aristagoras). As Nagy (1990a, 169) points out, "in the *Histories* of Herodotus, the very act of writing letters is typical of tyrants and the kind of power they exercise."

50. See n. 43 above; Hartog 1988, 330.

51. Parallel: Croesus' domestic tragedy (1.34–45) anticipates his political downfall. Intertwined: Candaules' violation of his own marriage leads to a change of dynasty (1.8–13).

52. Dewald 1981, 109. For instances of monarchical "violence to women" see (beside Candaules, n. 51 above) 1.61 (Peisistratus), 2.121 (Rhampsinitus), 2.126 (Cheops), 3.31 (Cambyses), 3.50 and 5.92 η 3 (Periander), 9.108–13 (Xerxes). The parallelism between this final instance and the story of Candaules' wife in book 1 (a strong structural indication that wives and marriage connections will figure prominently in the *Histories*) has been discussed by E. Wolff (1964).

53. ποιέων οὐδαμῶς Σπαρτιητικά (5.40.2, narrator's gloss).

54. Causality at some level is merely suggested: The narrative of Anaxandridas' marriage

The third component in Herodotus' representation of Spartan kings is the heroic model, which intensifies the contradiction created by the coexistence of the other two but also helps to explain it. The heroic model is brought to bear first of all through genealogy. In the narrative of Herodotus, as in Spartan tradition, the institution of kingship in Sparta precedes the κόσμος of Lycurgus and the consequent transition to εὐνομίη (1.65). In fact it precedes the foundation of Sparta as a Dorian state. Spartan history, as opposed to the heroic age, begins after the Dorian invasion. The Dorians are a people of pure Hellenic stock, who about two generations after the Trojan War swept down from Northern Greece into the Peloponnese and settled in a large part of it, including Sparta, having subjected the previous population (1.56).[55]

The leaders of these Dorians, from whom the Spartan kings descend, were not themselves considered Dorian. According to a story reported by Herodotus, Cleomenes, during one of his interventions in Athens, went into the inner shrine of the goddess Athena on the acropolis. There he was met by the priestess, who stopped him at the door saying "Stranger from Sparta, do not come into this temple because it is not lawful for Dorians to be here." To this Cleomenes answered: "But I am not Dorian, I am Achaean" (5.72).

Cleomenes is Achaean, not Dorian, because the leaders of the Dorians, ancestors of all Spartan kings, were the great-great-great-grandchildren of the Achaean hero Heracles. Heracles had claims of kingship in the Peloponnese, but he was excluded from it throughout his life by his father's cousin, the Perseid Eurystheus, who ruled in Mycenae. When Heracles died, his sons, persecuted by Eurystheus, fled from the Peloponnese. After three generations and some failed attempts, the descendants of Heracles' son Hyllus managed to return at the head of the Dorians.[56] As descendants of Heracles, the Spartan kings are ethnically different from the Spartan people. Again, just before the section on royal privileges, Herodotus makes a point of remarking that through the mother of Perseus, Danae, daughter of Acrisius, the Spartan kings are Egyptian.[57]

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against custom is shortly followed by that of the birth of Cleomenes (5.41) and by the narrator's first gloss on Cleomenes' madness (5.42.1).

55. See Tigerstedt 1965, 28–36 for the sources and form of the tradition about the Dorians before Herodotus.

56. For Heracles and Eurystheus see *Il.* 19.95–133. For the story of the exile and return see especially Apollod. 2.8 and D.S. 4.57–58. Herodotus mentions the exile of the Heraclids (9.27), their first attempt to conquer the Peloponnese, at which time Hyllus the son of Heracles was killed (9.26), and their final return (1.56). The political importance of Achaean mythology at Sparta is discussed by Huxley (1983, 6–9).

57. 6.53 (cf. 2.91). Perseus was the grandfather of Heracles' mortal father Amphitryon.

Other passages in the *Histories* reveal that the Spartan kings have various other connections with the East and Eastern dynasties.[58] The mythical genealogy, in other words, here cooperates with the monarchical model. It does so, however, by referring the kings of Sparta to a more or less undifferentiated heroic world in which the big ethnic and cultural divide between East and West is either nonexistent or problematic, since heroes move freely between these two spaces, begetting descendants on either side.[59] Moreover, Sparta's close connection with its heroic ancestors through its kings is an aspect of its religiosity and adherence to *νόμος*. Through Heracles and Perseus the ultimate ancestor of the Spartan kings is Zeus, the protector of all kings.[60] As we have already noted, Herodotus emphasizes that the kings in historical Sparta are also priests of Zeus (6.56.1).

The mythical genealogy produces a heroic model, by which the actions of the historical kings want to be interpreted in terms of heroic behavior. The narrative encourages us to do so by stressing, sometimes in explicit terms, the continuity and analogy between historical times and the heroic age. In his account of the quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus, the narrator inserts the Spartan tradition of the beginning of the dual kingship with the twins Eurysthenes and Procles, the sons of Aristodemus, the Heraclid who led the Dorians to Laconia (6.52). Following the Delphic prescription, the Spartans made both brothers kings but gave greater honor to

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Herodotus also adds that according to the Persians, Perseus himself was an Assyrian who became Greek (6.54). Herodotus' narrative implies that the Egyptian origin of the kings partially accounts for the similarities between Spartan and Egyptian customs mentioned at 6.60 and perhaps also for the similarities to other non-Greek cultures noted at 6.58–59. How and Wells ([1928] 1964, 2:87) remark that the extravagant signs of mourning at the funeral of a Spartan king are a vestige of barbarism or a survival from heroic times, and cite *Il.* 18.23 ff. With Hall (1989, 44, 83, 131), we may add the heroic mourning at *Il.* 2.700, 11.393, and 19.284–86, side by side with tragic passages meaning to represent not heroic but Asiatic grief: Aesch. *Pers.* 121–24, 537–83, 909–1077; *Ch.* 23–31, 425–28.

58. Heracles is the eponymous ancestor of the Heraclids of Lydia (1.7) and the genealogical ancestor of the Scythians (4.8–10). Perses, the eponym of the Persians, is the son of Perseus (7.61.3, 7.150.1–2). The origins as well as the cultural and political significance of these myths of foreign ancestry are discussed by Nagy (1990a, 292–303).

59. In the Homeric and archaic traditions, the heroic world appears generally homogeneous. In tragedy, at a time when the Greek-barbarian polarity has become central, the Homeric Trojans tend to be represented as barbarians along with Thracian, Asiatic, and Egyptian mythical figures, including the foreign ancestors of Greek heroes (Cadmus, Pelops, etc.). Greek heroes always count as Greeks, though occasionally their ethnic identity is called into question on the basis of their foreign descent (e.g., Soph. *Aj.* 1228–97). On this question I am much indebted to Hall (1989, esp. 13–14, 19–47, 165–75). Herodotus displays interest in the remote foreign origins of historical Greeks (e.g., 5.57, 5.66.1), but at the same time he declines opportunities to apply contemporary Greek and barbarian ethnic stereotypes to the heroic world (1.1–4; 2.113–15, 2.118–20; 5.58–59).

60. Vernant 1988a, 106.

the one they discovered to be the elder, whom they named Eurysthenes (52.4–7). The narrative ends in a gloss: "Once the children grew to manhood, although they were brothers they quarrelled with one another their whole lives, and those who descend from them continue to do the same" (52.8). The aetiological myth accounts for the institution of the diarchy and the relative prominence of the Agiad king Cleomenes in the sixth century (6.51). It also provides a mythical archetype that explains the behavior of the historical kings, and specifically the quarrel of Cleomenes and Demaratus.[61]

The heroic background of the diarchs does not include only Perseids and Heraclids. The Spartan kings are also genealogically connected with the mythical royal dynasty of Thebes because the mother of Eurysthenes and Procles descended from Polyneices, son of Oedipus (6.52.2). More important, they are the heirs of the other royal family that held the hegemonic kingship in the Peloponnese after the death of the Perseid Eurystheus, the Pelopids from Phrygia (7.8 γ 1, 7.11.4),[62] and of an autochthonous Laconian dynasty whose last exponent is Tyndareus. The Pelopids will replace the line of Tyndareus on the throne of Sparta when Menelaus marries the daughter of Tyndareus, Helen.[63] The brothers of Helen—the two famous twins Castor and Polydeuces—are mythical representatives of the Spartan kings. Herodotus says that when the quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus broke out, the Spartans made a law that from then on only one king would lead expeditions abroad while the other would remain in the city, and that "one of the Tyndarids would also be left behind; before that time they both followed the kings on campaign, being summoned for assistance" (5.75.2). Spartan history reproduces myth and affects cult.[64]

That the mythical background produces at the same time a heroic biographical pattern emerges unequivocally in the story of King Demaratus.[65] The mythical Helen is explicitly mentioned in connection with Demaratus' mother, who according to the tradition reported by Herodotus, was so ugly

61. Boedeker 1987, 188. The political motives for the mythical elements in the local Spartan traditions about Cleomenes and Demaratus have been discussed in detail by Ellen S. Greenstein in a paper written for a graduate seminar at the University of Pennsylvania in 1989, "Herodotus and the Creation of Spartan 'Eunomia'."

62. Cf. 7.159. Sparta's claim to the right of leadership in the Peloponnese is partially founded on its kings' being heirs of the Pelopids (see 1.68–69). Although Herodotus does not mention a genealogical connection between Perseids-Heraclids and Pelopids, tradition regarded Pelops as the father of Amphitryon's mother (Hes. fr. 190.6–8 MW; see Nagy 1990a, 119, 299). For the change of dynasty from Perseids to Pelopids (Atreus and Thyestes) in Mycenae see Thuc. 1.9.2; Apollod. 2.11.

63. The traditional genealogy of Tyndareus, not mentioned by Herodotus, is discussed by Calame (1987).

64. Parker 1989, 146–47.

65. Boedeker 1987, 187–88.

as a baby that her nurse would take her every day to the shrine of Helen at Therapne and pray to the goddess to improve her looks. After meeting one day with a mysterious apparition in the neighborhood of the temple, the child started to change and eventually became the most beautiful woman in Sparta (6.61.2–4). She went in marriage to a noble Spartan named Agetus, close friend of king Ariston, but Ariston fell in love with her and took her away from her husband using deception (6.62). In the mythical context in which it appears, this case of irregular marriage, which we would otherwise interpret only on the basis of the monarchical model as "violence done to women," also becomes a reenactment of the abduction of Helen. When we learn a little later (6.65) that the son from this marriage, Demaratus, abducted the bride of his cousin Leotychides—Percalus was her name—we see that action in the same light. The heroic model is superimposed on the monarchical model and competes with it.

The heroic model transforms the story of Demaratus' deposition as well. Cleomenes manages to have Demaratus deposed from the kingship by exploiting the uncertainty of his birth—whether he was the son of king Ariston or of his mother's first husband, the Spartiate Agetus (6.64–66). But through hearsay and reported tales, the narrative proposes other options. There is gossip in Sparta that Demaratus is the son of a servant, the guardian of the mules (6.68), while Demaratus' mother claims that when she became the bride of Ariston, she was visited by the local hero Astrabacus and by her husband on the same night. Like his ancestor Heracles, Demaratus may have an immortal father (6.69). The initial dynastic controversy has been stretched at both ends, and Demaratus' identity is put into question in a fundamental way.[66] As a true heroic figure, he partakes of both the lowest and the highest.[67]

Generalized mythical antecedents and existential paradigms shed a different light on those royal figures that we have examined so far only through the Spartan and monarchical models. They translate the opposing concepts of citizen valor and piety on the one hand and despotic hybris on the other into terms that Greek thought is accustomed to regard as coexisting—heroic excellence and excess. Taken together, the almost antithetical Cleomenes

66. See Burkert 1965 for the political uses of this story, and Nagy 1990a, 336–37, for the mule's connotation of illegitimacy. The name Astrabacus is connected with the term ἀστράβη, "mule saddle," and at the same time the hero is himself a Heraclid of the Agiad family (Paus. 3.16.9). The mysterious status of Spartan royal figures also emerges from the episode in which the identity of Lycurgus is questioned by the Delphic oracle: "I wonder if in prophecy I shall call you a god or a man. But I think rather a god, Lycurgus" (1.65.3).

67. Cf. the Sophoclean Oedipus, who is "equal to the gods" and "equal to nothing" (*OT* 31, 1187–88).

and Leonidas embody these heroic extremes. Cleomenes relives the ambivalence of Heracles, the savior and a follower of the laws of the gods, to whom tradition from Homer to Sophocles also attributes such "unbearable deeds"[68] as defiance against the divine, violence, drunkenness, madness, and finally an excruciating death in which—as in the case of Cleomenes—physical mutilation and disfigurement symbolize a diseased self.[69]

As far as Leonidas is concerned, his heroic descent is emphasized three times in the account of the battle of Thermopylae—once with full genealogy.[70] In this narrative, what starts out as a hoplite battle becomes a heroic battle (7.223–25).[71] Commentators have often observed that Herodotus' notice of the furious melee that raged over the body of Leonidas after his death is a Homeric reference, recalling as it does the fight over the body of Patroclus in the *Iliad*.[72] Leonidas' achievement is κλέος (7.220.2, 7.220.4). This word, otherwise rare in the *Histories*,[73] is almost a technical term in the poetic tradition for the glory of heroes, especially in death. Establishing a connection that is again traditional in Achaean epic, the two occurrences of κλέος in this chapter frame the reference to πένθος in the oracle's prediction that the city shall mourn the death of a king from the stock of Heracles.[74]

To a great extent the heroic analogy we find in the Spartan λόγοι of the *Histories* was already a part of the local traditional stories that Herodotus learned from his oral sources. It derives from the Spartans' view of themselves and from their eagerness to glamorize even discreditable events in their history or camouflage factional interests.[75] But separated from the

68. πολλὰ...ἀτάσθαλα (*h Hom* 15.6 [to Heracles]). This term is used by the Herodotean Otanes for the monarch (3.80.4) but traditionally describes heroic acts of hubris (Nagy 1979, 163).

69. For this tradition see Galinsky 1972, 10–56. According to Myres (1953, 77), Cleomenes in Herodotus is "a pendant to the Sophoclean Ajax."

70. 7.204 (genealogy); 7.208.1, 7.220.4 (oracle). See also the references to events in the life of Heracles connected with the topographical setting of the battle (7.193.2, 7.198.2, 7.216).

71. Loraux 1977, 116.

72. Cf. 7.225.1; *Il.* 17.274–87. See How and Wells [1928] 1964, 2:230.

73. Powell 1938, s.vv. κλέος (four occurrences, of which two refer to Leonidas and one, 9.78.2, to Pausanias' victory at Plataea), ἀκλεής (one occurrence, in the first sentence), ἀκλεῶς (one occurrence, 5.77.1, in reference to Cleomenes' failed expedition to Attica).

74. Nagy 1979, 16–18, 94–103. Nagy shows how κλέος and πένθος occur together in different types of opposition in several passages of the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Theogony*. In this Herodotean context, the κλέος that Leonidas achieves for the Spartans, as well as the preservation of Spartan εὐδαιμονίη (7.220.2), compensate for the πένθος of his death (see n. 31 above for the wording of the oracle). Κλέος is specifically the glory conferred by poets and masters of tradition in prose, including Herodotus, as the first sentence of the *Histories* shows. See Nagy 1990a, 221–27.

75. Tigerstedt 1965, 33, 88–92 et passim. Herodotus' sources for Spartan history are surveyed by Jacoby in *RE* suppl. 2:421, 429, 436, 442–43, 456–57, 462–64. For a recent discussion see Evans 1991, 123–26.

purposes for which it was intended and adapted to a Panhellenic context, the heroization of Spartan kings plays a role in Herodotus' interpretation of history. It has the effect of overruling the otherwise assumed antithesis between Greek and non-Greek in the discussion of individual power in the polis. Irrationality and violence undermine the most Hellenic of cities because they are not the exclusive prerogatives of foreigners; they do not come from the outside any more than those virtues that protect the εὐδαιμονίη of the state in times of danger.[76] The contradiction between order and disorder, which the Greek-barbarian polarity serves to express, maintains its validity but is moved within the polis and the individual himself and is reinterpreted as the survival of the remote, preconstitutional past of the Greeks. For Herodotus, the Spartans, whose politeia has preserved a role for their Heraclid kings, show that Greece must live with that legacy, exploit it and control it—a cause of disruption and a source of excellence.

76. In spite of the promising title of its epilogue ("The Polarity Deconstructed"), Hall's study does not explore the consequences of her own observations that "the Greek view of their own distant past had many points of contact with their perception of barbarians" (Hall 1989, 191–92) or the significance of the fact that what she calls "the vocabulary of barbarism" was applied to the representation of Greeks (203–4). The chauvinistic belief of the Greeks in their own superiority goes hand in hand with a profound tendency to self-criticism, and those features they disowned as belonging to the outside, they at the same time also recognized as part of their own temperament. In Herodotus the Greek-barbarian antithesis is several times put into question through the attribution of "Hellenic" attitudes to barbarians and of barbaric actions to Greeks (e.g., 3.80.1–6, 7.136.2, 8.105–6, 9.120.4).

4

# Reading the World: The Interpretation of Objects in Herodotus' *Histories*

Carolyn Dewald

NEAR THE END of the ethnographic survey of Scythia and the Scythians in book 4, Herodotus considers the question of the Scythian population. It is difficult to determine how many Scythians there are because the population is nomad. Herodotus comments,

> The quantity of Scythians I was not able accurately to learn, but I heard differing accounts concerning the number, that there are a great number of them and, alternatively, that there are few genuine Scythians. So much [the inhabitants] disclosed to me visually. There is between the Borysthenes river and the Hypanis a place, and its name is Exampaeus.... In this place is located a bronze vessel, in size six times larger than the crater at the mouth of the Pontus, which Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus set up.... Now the locals said that it was made from arrowheads. For [they said that] their king, by name Ariantas, wanting to know the quantity of Scythians, ordered each Scythian to bring him one arrowhead, and he threatened with death anyone who did not. And a great sum of arrowheads was brought, and it seemed a good idea to him to make a memorial of them and leave it. From the

I hope this chapter will stand as an object too, a token—and not in this instance an ambiguous or misleading one—of my admiration for the scholarship, integrity, and warmth of Martin Ostwald, who taught me Greek and first introduced me to Herodotus' remarkable capacity to be both artist and historian simultaneously. I would like to thank the members of the Classics research seminar of the CUNY Graduate Center and Professors W. G. Thalmann and D. Lateiner for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

> arrowheads he made this bronze vessel and set it up at Exampaeus. This is what I heard about the number of the Scythians. (4.81.1–6)

The giant bronze vessel, supposedly holding 600 amphorae or about 5,000 gallons, is not something Herodotus explicitly identifies as a θῶμα or wonder; directly after this passage Herodotus goes on to say that there are no θωμάσια in Scythia, unless you count the number of rivers, the expanse of the plains, and the giant footprint of Heracles found by the river Tyras. He rather mentions the bowl because it embodies, in its peculiar way, the number of Scythians.[1] The giant bowl at Exampaeus points to a widespread pattern in Herodotus—the vivid but highly ambiguous relationship between material, tangible things and their meanings within the larger narrative.[2]

Immerwahr has successfully argued that the ἔργα mentioned in the first chapter of the *Histories* as worthy of remembrance include things: monuments, tombs, roads, canals, temples, and the like.[3] Certainly Herodotus spends a great deal of energy commenting on noteworthy physical traces of past achievement. And he does not limit his attention to major tourist attractions. The *Histories* are full of objects to which he points in passing, like the chains hanging on the wall of the Acropolis in Athens that had been

1. Even though Herodotus does not explicitly say so, the bowl as he describes it would fit one of his working definitions of a θῶμα: Barth 1968, 98–104. Significant objects are for Herodotus closely connected both with "sight" (ὄψις) and "wonder" (θῶμα). As an artifact, the Scythian bowl has presented some problems for scholars interested in Herodotus' accuracy (Armayor 1978, 57; Fehling 1989, 223); see, however, Pritchett 1982, 245–55, for a more optimistic view of Herodotus' powers of observation and care as an investigator. Macan ([1895] 1973, 56) comments that, strictly speaking, Herodotus does not commit himself to personal autopsy in this passage.

2. For a brief discussion of this phenomenon see Dewald 1985, 51 as well as the larger group of "articulate objects" studied by Lateiner (1987, esp. 96–100 and app. 2.5). Earlier Herodotean scholarship already recognized Herodotus' strong pictorial and visual quality, his *Bildlichkeit*, as an essential part of his narrative technique; for instance Reinhardt [1940] 1982, 322: Herodotus' "Geschichtsschreibung" is "so bildlich, daß sie sich fast nur von bildlicher, lebendig gegenwärtiger 'Erinnerung' nährt; die zur 'Erinnerung' noch nicht kritisch auflösend, rekonstruierend sich verhält, wohl aber mit Bewußtsein doch schon deutend, auswählend, verwerfend, ordnend." Cf. Freyer [1954] 1982, esp. 162. Traditionally, however, this dimension of Herodotus' writing is linked, as in Reinhardt, with an archaic sensibility that to modern scholars does not yet seem fully critical or historical. I argue in the conclusion below that Herodotus' emphasis on external, objective appearances is tied to very basic aspects of his critical, investigative procedures and is part of a larger set of interpretive techniques that were very likely self-consciously chosen. For the role of significant objects in other archaic and classical genres see, e.g., Gernet 1981, 77–78, 104–6 (on magical objects and ἀγάλματα); Griffin 1980, 1–49, Lateiner 1987, 112, and Nagy 1990b, 202–22 (for significant objects in Homer); Dingel 1971 and Taplin 1978, 77–100 (on visible objects and their meanings on the tragic stage).

3. Immerwahr 1960, 262–65. Echoing Stein (1883, 2), Jacoby ([1913] 1956, 334) had argued less successfully that thè ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά of Herodotus' proem were only "große, staunenswerte Bauwerke."

used to shackle the Chalcidians once in the late sixth century (5.77.3). Such objects provide some of Herodotus' most reliable evidence in reconstructing past events. Much of his own energy as an investigator goes into assessing the nature of such evidence. He makes it clear that objects do not always mean what they seem at first glance to mean; tombs are sometimes cenotaphs, bowls have misleading and flattering inscriptions engraved later upon them, and statues and pyramids collect about themselves lurid and highly misleading explanatory stories that cursory investigation can sometimes easily expose (1.51; 2.131, 2.134; 9.85). In Herodotus, the world in its empirical immanence is full of meaning, even multiple meanings. One of the tasks he sets for himself (and it is often a difficult one) is to try to read correctly the traces of meaning contained in tangible things.[4] But even when, as in the Exampaeus passage, the tangible phenomenon is not completely articulate (Herodotus cannot reduce the huge bronze bowl to a precise number), he still chooses to point to the artifact itself because it is, in its way, a *σημήϊον*, or even a *τεκμήριον*, indicating how many Scythians there are. There exists for the historian a direct but charged and ambiguous relationship between such objects and their interpretation.

Further and more complex tensions between things and their meanings exist for the characters inside the narrative of events. A large number of the accounts in Herodotus are structured around a character's interpretation and decision, followed by action: People first assess their situations and then apply their understanding to the solution of their current dilemmas.[5] Such narratives frequently highlight the existence of a thing like the Exampaeus bowl discussed above, the physical presence of which would, if correctly understood, convey useful information. The object's prominence gives the narrative a peculiar dynamic, because it carries a double hermeneutic. The characters in the account judge and act in one way; at the same time, the tangible object is prominently presented to the mind's eye of the reader as a silent witness to facts that most or all of the actors in the account ignore, but that are relevant to the story's outcome. Only the historian and his readers see the object as the charged and potent conveyor of meaning that it is.

The frequency with which such objects occur in Herodotean narratives points to the opacity or thickness of the world that Herodotus delineates in his text. For Herodotus the empirical world is not merely a malleable field on which important actors exercise their will. He thinks of it instead as an

4. For the use of objects as historical evidence see Immerwahr 1960, 269–71; Müller 1981, 313–15; Dewald 1987, 155–59; Marincola 1987, 125 n. 12; Lateiner 1987, 96 n. 11.

5. On the sequence of deliberation and action in Herodotean narrative see Montgomery 1965, 20–30.

interlocking series of objects that are often difficult to interpret and manipulate. By looking at some of the ways people within the narrative deal with the significant objects they encounter, we can more concretely understand some aspects of Herodotus' conception of his role as a researcher of *τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων* and the difficulties and dangers inherent in the task of interpretation.

The simplest type of significant objects that figure within the narratives of Herodotus' *Histories* are those that are used self-consciously by someone for their symbolic value, as part of a communication with someone else.[6] Euelthon of Cypriot Salamis gives Pheretime a golden spindle in order to suggest that she should turn her attention away from military conquest and vengeance to more feminine pursuits (4.162.5); she ignores his advice and eventually dies a horrible death. The Scythians send Darius a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows, to warn him that he cannot escape from Scythia, no matter what medium of escape he chooses (4.131.1). Darius misinterprets the objects sent by the Scythians, because he does not want to hear their message; not until events have confirmed that the Scythians do not take the Persians seriously does he finally accept the correct interpretation of the objects given him. Sometimes, though more rarely, people read such object-tokens correctly, and even more astutely than the donor intends. Thus the Ethiopian king to whom the Persians send a purple cloak, gold chains, an alabaster box of myrrh, and a jar of palm wine correctly interprets these tokens as marks of a Persian intent to enslave the Ethiopians. He sends back to Cambyses a giant bow and orders the Persians to think of conquest once they can draw it easily (3.21.3). Cleomenes the Spartan is also a good reader of objects. He sees that the cups brandished by Maeandrius of Samos are really bribes, and so that neither he nor any other Spartiate can be corrupted, he tells the ephors that the Samian should leave the country (3.148.2).[7] Xerxes' wife, Amestris, has no trouble at all reading the message implicit in the magnificent shawl that Xerxes gives his daughter-in-law. Amestris herself wove the shawl as a gift for her royal husband, and when she sees the girl triumphantly wearing it, she realizes that Xerxes has been having an affair. Amestris is wrong about the woman involved (she thinks it is the girl's mother), but her revenge succeeds by its very excess, since the girl's

6. Cf. Lateiner 1987, 98–99, 115 app. 2.5.

7. Cleomenes is also bribed by Aristagoras of Miletus, and here his daughter Gorgo points the moral (5.51.2); see n. 16 below for Cleomenes' ability to interpret the *πίναξ* of Aristagoras earlier in the same episode. A certain skill at reading objects seems to run in the family, at least in the tradition Herodotus draws on. Gorgo literally reads an object by deconstructing it. In a passage of disputed authenticity (7.239.4), she reads a blank tablet by scraping off the wax and reading the writing hidden on the tablet itself. Cf. Amasis' behavior in melting down the footbath in 2.172.

whole family is eventually destroyed in exchange for the insult offered by the wearing of Xerxes' impolitic gift (9.109–13).

Amestris' skill as a reader shows that prominent objects do not have to be conspicuously and formally identified as tokens in order to work as potent acts of communication. Sometimes an actor in the account takes an ordinary object and spontaneously exploits its symbolic properties. The Egyptians clap a helmet on Amasis' head, whereupon he abandons his previous attempt to make them loyal to Apries, the king from whom they are in revolt, and sets out to become king himself (2.162.1). Stories about objects accrue around Amasis (and around other trickster figures as well).[8] In the most famous of these, Amasis counsels his friend Polycrates of Samos to throw away his most precious possession to avoid the fate of having too much good fortune. Polycrates chooses to throw his favorite ring into the sea. The gods turn the ring's meaning to their own ends, however, by sending it back to Polycrates inside the belly of a fish. Amasis correctly interprets the ring's reappearance as a symbol of Polycrates' impending doom and drops him as a friend (3.43).

Objects can change their meanings over time, and Amasis knows both how to read such changes and how to manipulate them in order to use them symbolically for his own purposes. When his new subjects despise him for being insufficiently royal (δημότην τὸ πρὶν ἐόντα καὶ οἰκίης οὐκ ἐπιφανέος), he takes an old gold bowl that had earlier served as an all-purpose basin for footwashing and has it made into an ἄγαλμα, a cult statue (2.172.2–3). His subjects venerate the statue, whereupon he tells them what he has done. Amasis points out that even though earlier they had vomited, urinated, and washed their feet in this object, now they revere it as sacred; similarly, he argues, they need to honor the recent transformation that has taken place in him, their king. Amasis plays on the ability of the transformed footbath to mislead its audience. He uses its ambiguities educationally to teach his subjects that they should honor him in the same way they honor the gold ἄγαλμα, now that he is king. Amasis uses the example of the footbath's transmutation to point out that things change over time and that one should not confuse what was with what is. The footbath has really become an ἄγαλμα, just as he has really become king. Meaning, in this story, is fully contextual.

8. The ability to read objects is one of the distinguishing marks of a trickster figure; see, e.g., 1.20–23; 2.121; 3.85–87; 5.49, 5.92 ζ–η; 7.143, 7.239. See Camerer (1965) for the larger issue of practical cleverness, with particular attention to the concepts of μηχανή, τέχνη, and σοφίη in Herodotus' treatment of invention/discovery, military strategy, political craft, and popular culture. Nine of the twenty-two passages discussed in this chapter contain some form of one of her three terms (1.9.1, 1.21.2; 2.172.2, 2.100.3; 4.201.1, 4.131.2; 5.21.2; 5.50.2; 8.106.3).

Amasis the trickster king and reformed rake understands this and knows how to manipulate the phenomenon to his own advantage. Herodotus considers the process significant enough to show Amasis doing so.

Amasis' cleverness in refashioning his footbath is benign, but sometimes an individual intends an object to mislead in more sinister ways. Such treachery in the short term generally succeeds, and it shows the dangerousness with which objects can be invested. Another Amasis, a Persian general entrusted with the conquest of Libya, tricks the Barcaeans by digging a hidden trench, over which they unwittingly stand and swear an oath that the treaty they are making will last "as long as this earth thus abides" (4.201.2). Once the Barcaeans have opened the city gates, Amasis reveals that the ground on which they stood to swear their oaths was no ground at all. He breaks down the bridge across the trench and, no longer bound by the oath, treacherously takes the city. The extensiveness of Amasis' manipulation of appearances reminds one, in its thoroughness, of theater. A misleading stage set is constructed, and it beguiles its victims into misunderstanding. Similarly both Thrasybulus of Miletus and the Egyptian queen Nitocris construct the appearance of festivities—food, goblets, dishes, and the rest—in order to trick someone: Thrasybulus to make Alyattes abandon his determination to reduce Miletus by siege (1.21.2); Nitocris to trap her brother's slayers at supper in an underground room and drown them all (2.100.3). Both ruses succeed.[9]

Sometimes the object invested with a misleading appearance is a human body; the theatrical analogy is again relevant, because someone uses his own body or that of others to play misleading roles. Thus Alexander of Macedon, faced with seven new Persian overlords bent on raping the wives and mothers of their Macedonian hosts, dresses up Macedonian young men in women's clothing (5.20.3). When the Persians advance on these beguiling creatures, the young men pull out their knives and murder them all. Zopyrus the Persian succeeds in reducing Babylon for his master Darius by disfiguring himself so badly that the Babylonians believe him when he supposedly defects to them, claiming that Darius has mistreated him (3.157.1). They eventually entrust him with the gates of the city; Zopyrus opens the city to Darius and is rewarded with its satrapy. His severed nose and ears are all too vividly full of meaning, but it is not the meaning that the Babylonians assume they contain. Zopyrus' brutal mutilation is actually not a sign of Darius' cruelty, as the Babylonians think, but of Zopyrus' own single-minded ambition and dedication to his master (3.154).

9. See Lateiner 1990, 231–34, for a larger survey of moments of deceit; also the preceding note and Camerer 1965, 37, 72 for the use of μηχανᾶσθαι in both 1.21.2 and 2.100.3.

In these two examples, the appearance of the body is designed to mislead. The young men are meant to look like young women. Zopyrus intends to look like a savagely mistreated victim of the Persian king. Sometimes, however, the appearance of the body in question is not initially intended to mislead. The misunderstanding comes about spontaneously but then is exploited, generally by the owner of the body in question. One of the most striking examples of a human body misunderstood or misinterpreted occurs in the first episode of the *Histories* proper, in the story of Candaules, the king of Lydia, his wife the queen, and his spear carrier, Gyges (1.8–14).[10] The plot initially unfolds around the body of the queen of Lydia and what this body means to Candaules and to the queen herself, to Gyges the guard, and finally, to us as readers of the whole episode, looking back five generations and more from a narrative focused on Croesus, king of Lydia and descendant of the queen and Gyges.

The story has a doubled narrative structure since it is really a single plot repeated twice. Twice a ruler commands Gyges, and twice he refuses but is finally forced to obey. First the king commands him to look at the queen naked; then the queen commands him to kill the king.[11] The crossover from the first to the second repetition of the plot occurs as Gyges peeks out from his post behind the bedroom door and sees the queen naked, right at the hinge between the two halves of the story. The difference between the first and second versions of the plot is that the queen's command is more serious and is meant to have more lasting consequences—Gyges carries out her command, kills the king, who has outraged her sense of honor, and becomes her husband and the ruler of Lydia.

Candaules has made an error of judgment. He looks at his wife and sees only a body that he considers physically attractive. He has forgotten the range of other meanings the body of the queen contains apart from its physical beauty. As readers we learn this in the second half of the episode, where we see the queen rather didactically justifying her decision that either Candaules or Gyges must die (1.11.2). The queen does not use her body to trick the king. But once she perceives that he has abused her sense of its integrity, she pretends ignorance of what has happened, in order to take her revenge. Moreover the end of the story reveals a crucial hidden meaning inherent in the body the king wants only to see and be seen. The departure point of this story is the dynastic antecedents of Croesus, the sixth-century king of Lydia. In changing husbands, the queen also changes the royal

10. See Long 1986, 14–38, with important bibliography in nn. 14, 15.

11. Long 1986, 27. See Benardete 1969, 11–14, for the motif of "looking at what is not one's own" as both Gyges and Herodotus himself exemplify it. I argue that it is Candaules who is looking unintelligently here.

dynasty of Lydia. Her capacity to bear royal heirs, not her beauty, is the ultimate point of her body for the story.

Book 8 contains another episode with a similarly theatrical structure, in which a character exploits aspects of his own appearance and persona in order to avenge a wrong committed against his person. After the debacle at Salamis, Hermotimus the eunuch is entrusted with escorting Xerxes' children home from Greece (8.104). Herodotus comments that Hermotimus achieved, when wronged (ἀδικηθέντι), the μεγίστη τίσις, the greatest revenge of all we know. Hermotimus had much earlier in life been captured and bought by Panionius, a Chian. Panionius had castrated Hermotimus and sold him to the barbarians, whence he came eventually into Xerxes' service and high favor. One day Hermotimus, now busy on Xerxes' business in Mysia, meets his castrator, Panionius. Citing his own spectacular success as a reason for gratitude, Hermotimus convinces Panionius to move to Mysia with all his family, promising to give Panionius "as many benefits" (ὅσα...ἀγαθά) as Panionius had conferred on him. Persuaded by Hermotimus' speech, Panionius moves to Mysia. It is significant that Hermotimus can trick Panionius in this way; clearly Panionius has been misled by Hermotimus' appearance as a eunuch into accepting the otherwise improbable supposition that Hermotimus would retain no normal, manly sense of outrage, and that he has forgiven the loss of homeland and manhood, thinking oriental riches an adequate substitute. But Panionius turns out to have miscalculated. Despite his castration, Hermotimus' values have remained those of a normal Greek male. Exacting vengeance for the outrage done to him earlier, he forces Panionius to castrate his own four sons, and the sons in turn to castrate their father. The story ends, Πανιώνιον μέν νυν οὕτω περιῆλθε ἥ τε τίσις καὶ Ἑρμότιμος ("thus both vengeance and Hermotimus overtook Panionius").

The τίσις Panionius receives takes the extreme archaic form of the talion, and an even more delicately exact readjustment of the appearance of things to their realities than that in the Candaules episode. Hermotimus brings it about that the man who thinks, as a eunuch might, that money matters more than family is transformed into a eunuch himself, along with all his sons, while the man who has inadvertently suffered the loss of his manhood achieves a manly vengeance. Hermotimus the eunuch exploits Panionius' misreading of the surface characteristics of eunuchs just as Candaules' wife exploits her husband's misreading of the meaning of her beautiful body.

So far we have considered misleading appearances that form part of stories in which an individual either constructs or manipulates physical appearances in order to achieve a desired result of his own. Thrasybulus

mounts his banquet to convince Alyattes that Miletus cannot be reduced by siege; Amasis makes his footbath into a gold statue to show his subjects that a public and secular object can be transformed into something to be reverenced; Zopyrus cuts off his nose and ears to make the Babylonians believe he is at odds with Darius; Hermotimus acts like the stereotyped version of a passive, unmanly eunuch to seduce his enemy into his power and to take a Greek male's revenge. Part of the danger objects pose in the *Histories* is that their appearance is frequently manipulated by someone in ways that disguise their true meaning. The ambiguities and dangers are particularly pronounced when the object is a human body and when its appearance is manipulated by the human mind that is inside it. What happens comes very close to theater, with the same individual often playing the part of both actor and director.

If these were the only roles played by misleading objects in the *Histories*, one might dismiss them as phenomena associated with the trickster figure, and as results of Herodotus' penchant for an "habileté, même associée à l'indélicatesse," that is, for noting less than honorable and even sneaky behavior on the part of important actors in the *Histories*.[12] This is a longstanding criticism leveled against Herodotus. Part of Plutarch's charge in his treatise on Herodotus' κακοήθεια is that Herodotus depicts noble heroes of the Greek war effort behaving in ignoble ways that do not sufficiently exalt the narration of one of the greatest moments of Greek history.[13] Modern interpreters, too, often consider misleading surface appearances part of Herodotus' storytelling habits, remnants of his oral and folktale heritage, and useful only for their entertainment value.[14] But stratagems and exploitations of surface appearances of objects in Herodotus serve a more serious purpose than either Plutarch or those who depict Herodotus as an amiable and amusing raconteur have recognized. People in the *Histories* use objects symbolically, whether to communicate or to mislead, because objects communicate in any case. They come equipped with meanings in their contexts, and very often their meaning-making capacities backfire on those who would exploit them. This is part of a larger pattern: objects in Herodotus often mislead because it is inherent in the nature of things that they do so. As the world is put together in his text, there is often an uncertain fit between the causal connections that prevail in shaping the

12. Legrand 1966, 125.

13. Plut. *Mor.* 855c, 858d, 861d, 868a. See Legrand 1932; Legrand 1966, 126; Pearson in Pearson and Sandbach 1965, 5.

14. The best current assessment of Herodotus' use of anecdote and the art of storytelling is that of J. Gould (1989, 19–41, 112–20). See also Evans 1991, 89–146 and Thomas 1989 for important discussions of Greek oral tradition in comparative terms.

way that "big becomes small and small big" and the intellectual comprehension of the actors caught in a given chain of unfolding events. The manipulation of objects accomplished by trickster figures forms only a small part of this larger pattern.

Some of the plots we have already looked at backfire on their perpetrators, although they are apparently successful at first. Superficially Amasis' trick with the hidden trench succeeds, and he takes Barca by treachery (4.201). But his army flees in panic at Cyrene, and Pheretime, the queen of Cyrene, who has called in the Persians in the first place, dies a horribly lingering death, living but "boiling over," Herodotus says, with maggots (4.205).[15] Elsewhere Herodotus allows himself overt amusement as narrator, when the attempted manipulation of an object fails to work as the manipulator had initially intended. Aristagoras the Milesian comes on his travels to Sparta carrying a bronze πίναξ, or map of the world (5.49.1).[16] He uses it to try to persuade Cleomenes, king of Sparta, to march to Asia and liberate the Ionians from Persia. But Cleomenes does not read in the map the message of spatial contiguity and symmetry suggesting proximity that Aristagoras intends it to convey—the message, for instance, that Strepsiades thinks he sees in Socrates' map of Greece in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Instead, Cleomenes asks for a verbal translation of the object. How many days, he inquires, would it take to make the journey that Aristagoras is pointing at, from the Ionian sea to the Persian king at Susa? Here, Herodotus says, Aristagoras takes a fall (ἐν τούτῳ ἐσφάλη, 5.50.2). Replying straightforwardly, he tells Cleomenes that the journey will take three months, and Cleomenes gives him till sundown to get out of town. Aristagoras' πίναξ, unlike the Scythian bowl at Exampaeus, is translated into a number, and Herodotus finds it amusing that its interpreter is the very man who should have been most interested in keeping the object suggestively silent.

The humor is more subtle when the manipulation of the object backfires because the would-be trickster does not correctly anticipate the mindset or worldview of his intended audience. Two Paeonians from the Thraceward region, Pigres and Mantyes, decide that they want to become Darius' vassals and rule over their own people for him (5.12.1). Again the scene is theatrically constructed by the would-be tricksters; they bring their

15. Ancient authors, including Herodotus, who describe such a death, always emphasize the moral rather than the medical causes of the disease. For both aspects see Africa 1982, esp. 5, 15–16.

16. In his extensive discussion of Aristagoras' πίναξ, Jacob (1988, 283–89) defines the map as "à la fois instrument d'information et de persuasion" (288), but does not point out Herodotus' emphasis on its potential to mislead or Cleomenes' abilities to resist the map's persuasive powers.

sister to Sardis, where Darius is staying, and make her fetch water, balance a jar on her head, lead a horse, and spin flax at the same time. Darius, seeing this performance, asks the two young men if the other Paeonian women are similarly "industrious" (ἐργάτιδες), and they say yes. The trick has succeeded in that the object, their sister, has caught Darius' attention. Darius, however, does not act in consequence as the young men intend. He does not make them tyrants over their own people but is so excited by all this industry (and he is the "shopkeeper" [κάπηλος], 3.89.3) that he moves all the Paeonians en masse into Asia. We meet them again more than eighty chapters later, in Phrygia where Darius has settled them (5.98). In pursuit of private ambitions of their own, the two Paeonian brothers have brought on themselves and their people a catastrophe that they have not foreseen. Darius has reacted to the performance of their sister just as they wanted, but he proceeds to draw wholesale conclusions unimaginable to villagers from the banks of the Strymon. The limited ambitions of two rustics have here run athwart the imperial megalomania that generally characterizes the Persian monarchy in the *Histories*.[17]

In the stories about the trench at Barca, Aristagoras' πίναξ, and the Paeonian woman, the object in question galvanizes the attention of its intended audience as the exploiter of appearances intends it to do. But the exploiter himself does not correctly estimate the larger implications of the illusion he has created or the extent to which his own control over events is largely illusory. Herodotus shows that these kinds of tricks involve a *Selbstsicherheit* that is often the product of wishful thinking.[18]

This leads to the larger historiographical issues involved in the interpretation of surface appearances in the *Histories*. A set of passages remains in which the object that provides an important clue to the meaning of the larger context is not part of someone's manipulation at all but rather points to aspects of the situation that are understood only by the historian and his audience, in the clarity afforded by hindsight. We watch people inside the account misunderstanding things in their immediate context. Sometimes, with some attention, they might have been brighter—might, for instance, have behaved as Cleomenes did faced with Aristagoras' πίναξ. Sometimes, however, Herodotus presents objects in the *Histories* as inherently opaque—

17. For the imperial ambitions of Persians see Hdt. 7.8 γ 2–3 and Immerwahr 1966, 174–75, 180–81, 187. Courtiers often miscalculate rulers' drives; cf. Hdt. 3.36.6, 4.84.2, 7.38–39.

18. Marg [1953] 1982. The capacity of objects to mislead is often connected to the general Herodotean observation "look to the end." This is Solon's advice (1.32.9), and Herodotus makes it clear that many people manipulating objects do not foresee the ultimate consequences of their actions.

as are oracles, dreams, and other portents sent by the gods—so that the actors in the account could not even in the most favorable circumstances have understood their meanings.

Often their misreadings involve the sudden juxtaposition of incommensurabilities of perception. This is true, for instance, of the scene in which Scythians and Ionians meet at the river Ister, at the bridge by which Darius has crossed into Scythia (4.136). The Scythians are in the process of chasing Darius back to the Ister, and they come to the bridge in order to persuade the Ionian tyrants guarding it to undo the bridge and leave Darius to his fate.[19] The Scythians expect that the Ionians will agree to their proposal, because with little cost to the Ionians, it will win Ionian freedom from Persian rule. The Ionians are at first on the point of enthusiastically agreeing. Then Histiaeus the Milesian changes their minds by reminding the others that they are not only Ionians; they are also tyrants, and they hold their cities by virtue of Darius' power (4.137.2). After some discussion, the Ionians decide to remain faithful to Darius. Since then, Herodotus says, the Scythians have despised Ionians, judging them the basest and least manly of all free men, but the best slaves because they are the most subservient and staunchest in their loyalty (4.142).

This passage is often cited as Herodotus' considered and straightforward judgment on Ionians.[20] But the narrative makes it obvious that the Scythians, noble savages though they are, have signally failed to decipher the meaning of what it is to be an Ionian. In their own Scythian culture, the body of the king is in important ways also the body of the people. Class differences and the alienation and competition of different groups within a single society are alien to their way of thinking; thus they do not understand the fact that they have been talking to a particular kind of Ionian, that is, Ionian tyrants.[21] Herodotus and we, however, understand that a tyrant has a different set of priorities from those of ordinary people.[22] The irony here is directed not only at tyrants but also at the naive assumptions of the

19. They do not know that the Ionians at the bridge are all Ionian tyrants, although Herodotus has already given his readers this information at 4.98.

20. See, for instance, Immerwahr 1966, 232 and Legrand 1966, 101. Cf. 1.142–43, 1.146–47 for Herodotus' general description of Ionia.

21. See Hartog 1988, 112–72, for the king as the Scythian people and 62–84 for his discussion of Anacharsis and Scyles and the extent to which Herodotus presents Scythians as resistant to foreigners.

22. The joke in 4.142 has bitter and more complicated overtones when it is read in the light of the narrative of the Ionian revolt that fills books 5 and 6. There the same complex fragmentation of the Ionians, not only class-to-class but state-to-state, dogs their efforts to win independence from Persia and leads directly to the military disaster at Lade. For the programmatic locus of class distinctions in the *Histories* see the description of the multitiered and multicolored palace of Deioces at 1.98.5.

Scythians, who never understand how different Ionian society is from their own.

When people inside the account manipulate the meaning of things, the result is fairly obvious. Either they understand an object and use it successfully, or they do not. In either case, the meaning of the object becomes clear as the narrative continues. But how do we as readers understand contexts in which a misunderstanding occurs but, because it is not part of someone's deliberate manipulation of appearances, Herodotus leaves the meaning up to us? We expect that Herodotean foregrounded objects mean something, because so often they clearly do. But when objects are foregrounded without being part of a narrative context in which the context makes their meaning clear, how do we know when we are overinterpreting? How do we tell when objects in such a context are significant or what their significance is?

Sometimes the question is not an important one, because the object only adds vividness to a context whose meaning is already clear. I can argue, for instance, that the narrative about the Coan woman abducted and later left behind by the retreating Persians after Plataea is symbolically freighted (9.76.1). Elsewhere in Herodotus, Persians overrun other people's territory and violate their women.[23] Here, in contrast, a Greek commander recognizes one such woman as the daughter of a guest-friend of his and treats her courteously. Her restoration to her family signifies in one sense the end of the *Histories*: Greek families, not just on the mainland but in Ionia too, are being made whole again now that the Persian military threat has been ended. Pausanias is not (or not yet) the kind of commander who would help himself to the human spoils left behind by his enemy. As a visual image in the narrative, the Coan woman fills the same function as the skimpy Spartan dinner Pausanias orders to be set out a few chapters later (9.82). Her appearance adds to the emotional resonance of the conclusion we would reach anyway but does not greatly change it; we may impart to her overadorned person as much symbolic value as we choose.

Just a few chapters later, however, another object is described at the conclusion of the *Histories*' contemporary narrative of events. This one is powerfully resonant in ways that remain ambiguous. The body of Artaÿctes the Persian is crucified at the spot at which Xerxes first led his army into Greece, and Artaÿctes' son is stoned to death before his father's eyes. The mastermind of this activity, Herodotus tells us, is Xanthippus the Athenian (9.120.4). Xanthippus' behavior is very different from that of Pausanias, the

23. Three times Herodotus connects the violation of a Greek temple and the simultaneous violation of women by Persian invaders (8.33, 9.116.3 [and 7.33]). See also Lateiner 1989, 135–40; Dewald 1981, 93, 121.

Spartan general who has restored the Coan woman to her kin and has also refused expressly to mutilate the fallen body of Mardonius (9.79.1). It reminds us rather of Xerxes' treatment of his enemy Leonidas after Thermopylae (7.238). But Herodotus does not overtly contrast the behavior of the two generals, and this leaves us with a series of questions. Is Artaÿctes' brutalized body an ominous sign? If so, what does it say about Greeks, Athenians, or the end of the war? Does the fact that Xanthippus is Pericles' father (though Herodotus does not tell us so here) signify fifty years of Athenian imperialism to come? Or since Artaÿctes has been an outrageous figure, violating the rights of the gods as well as those of Greek women, is his punishment (like that of Pheretime in book 4) merely commensurate with his savage crimes?[24] Herodotus does not tell us. Instead, he gives us an object, the corpse of Artaÿctes hanging over the Hellespont, as a powerful but ambiguous symbol of closure to his *Histories*.

This open-endedness and Herodotus' willingness to let a multivalent object carry the weight of an important passage are frustrating, because as readers we want Herodotus to tell us not just what happened but what it meant—or at least what he thinks it means. This is an interpretive move, however, that he generally avoids. Herodotus is more interested in pointing to objects that he thinks important and interesting than in giving them a clear and fixed signification that makes it possible for us to know that we are understanding them correctly. Repeatedly he shows us how easy it is to misinterpret objects; over the course of the *Histories* we see the variety of ways that people misunderstand them. But as an author, he often leaves us to our own devices in reading objects that the narrative prominently foregrounds.

A striking example of Herodotus' authorial elusiveness occurs at an earlier climactic moment in the account of the Persian invasion of Greece. Xerxes sacks and burns the Acropolis in Athens (8.53.2), and on the next day he orders the Athenian exiles accompanying his army to offer sacrifice there "in their customary manner" (*τρόπῳ τῷ σφετέρῳ*). Herodotus then interrupts the narrative in his own voice to add, "I'll tell why I mentioned these things" (*τοῦ δὲ εἵνεκεν τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην, φράσω*), thus explicitly justifying the inclusion of the sacrifice account in the larger story of the destruction Xerxes visits on Athens. He begins with mythic detail. At the shrine of Erechtheus the earthborn on the Acropolis, there is a salt pool and an olive tree—and, Herodotus adds, there is a story that Poseidon and Athena set them there as *μαρτύρια*, visible evidence, when they were struggling over

24. Immerwahr 1966, 222–23; Boedeker 1988, 47–48; Lateiner 1989, 142. See Cobet 1971, 171–76, for a good assessment of the general issues raised by the last chapters of the *Histories*.

their respective claims to the city. Herodotus then returns as narrator to the story of the sacrifice ordered by Xerxes. Athena's olive tree burns when the Persians burn the rest of the shrine. But on the second day after the burning, the Athenians, going to sacrifice as Xerxes commanded, see that the olive has sent out a green shoot (βλαστός) a cubit long. They declare what has happened, perhaps to Xerxes and perhaps to other Greeks.

Herodotus drops the story at this point and goes on to report the panic in the Greek camp when they hear what has happened at Athens. But as part of the problem we have been exploring—the reading of objects in the world—this little account is important because it involves many of the same issues in a particularly striking form. Herodotus and his contemporary Greek audience know that the sacrifice on the Acropolis means, as it were, the refounding of Athens as a center of cult; the miraculous growth springing from Athena's olive suggests in addition that the goddess has already signaled her refusal to abandon the city at the point when the Athenian exiles make their sacrifice. In the account as Herodotus has constructed it for us, there are several additional levels of interpretation taking place around the βλαστός. The first is that of the exiles themselves. Xerxes would not have known that new growth on this particular olive tree meant something special, unless the Athenians in his train told him it did; Herodotus does not tell us what he thinks they thought it meant—only that they thought it important enough to report to some unidentified person. The second interpretation is that of Herodotus himself and the audience of his own generation, for whom the putative event, now forty years in the past, signifes the incredible regrowth about to take place in Athens during the Pentecontaetia. For us, interested as we are both in Herodotus and in the society from which he gathered such accounts, there is a third set of interpretive issues involved. We are likely to doubt the veracity of the original account and to assume that it was a romantic fiction invented by someone at Athens. But did Herodotus believe this when he put it in?[25] In any case, as Herodotus tells the story, the full significance of the green shoot could not have been known by those who first saw it. It thus resembles other σημήϊα sent from the gods: dreams, oracles, or individual odd events like the sudden disasters befalling the Chians (6.27). Herodotus seems to believe that this sign too could not be properly understood until well after the Persian invasion had ended, when later Greek audiences looked back on it.[26] He does

25. Herodotus knows that stories sometimes justify or palliate disasters after the fact; cf. his analysis of the Egyptian stories of Cambyses (3.2, 3.16.5–7).

26. See Nagy 1990a, 293 n. 88, for vegetal imagery and its connection with good government; Kirchberg 1965, 116–20 for the tensions between the temporal limitations of human knowledge and the larger schema of the gods.

not attempt to control which of these meanings we need to consider; he merely points. This is an important part of Herodotus' ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις.

We have looked at a variety of significant objects in the *Histories*—some used deliberately by people in the account as messages or tricks, others registering for us, as readers, levels of additional interpretation not controlled by the actors in the account and often not even specified by Herodotus himself. In book 4, Herodotus would like to know the number of the Scythian population, and in a sense he does know it. They are the number of arrowheads that have gone into the making of the bowl at Exampaeus. But he cannot reduce this number to a figure. He rather points at the giant bowl in much the same way that he points at other objects we have investigated here: Thrasybulus' banquet, Hermotimus' appearance as a eunuch, the crucifixion of Artaÿctes, the shoot springing from the charred olive tree, and so on. Much of the *Histories*, it seems to me, contains the same kind of pointing, reflecting an authorial alertness that deliberately records without judging. Herodotus foregrounds objects without controlling their meaning because, like the deconstructionist Amasis, he knows that the meaning of things is very likely to be multiple. It depends on who needs to know, what their purpose is, and the spatial and temporal vantage point they occupy. Small becomes big, and big becomes small; for this reason, Herodotus intends to record both (1.5.4). Herodotus often does not tell us what things mean but pulls us into the interpretive space, asking us, like himself, to remain aware of the potential objects have to become meaningful, and also of the possibility that their appearance will mislead. When, like Cleomenes, one can stop and make a πίναξ speak its secret, one learns something of importance: it takes more than three months of marching to get to Susa. When, like Amasis, one can turn a footbath into an ἄγαλμα and then instruct others about what has happened, one can lay claim to a metaknowledge about meaning that few individuals in the *Histories* possess. Driven by their own schemes, most actors in Herodotus attempt to manipulate or blindly encounter tangible objects that represent those aspects of their situations that they do not understand. The person who knows how to read objects in the world, and to extract from them the meanings they hold in context, succeeds in uncovering something significant and does so by using the same kind of canny general attentiveness that Herodotus himself displays as an investigator.

5

# Thucydides' Birth Date

Charles W. Fornara

IT IS AN UNFORTUNATE FACT, though wholly comprehensible, that except for what Thucydides himself chose to tell us about his own life we are almost totally uninformed about it.[1] Like Herodotus, he was a victim of his times, which antedated interest in literary biography,[2] and by the time biography commenced, his trail had evidently grown cold.[3] Except for the (conjectural) synchronism supplied by Apollodorus of Athens (*FGrH* 244 F 7) in the second century B.C., subsequent writers, like Apollodorus himself, were reduced (like us) to extracting the vita from the work.[4]

One of the things we would like to know is the actual age Thucydides attained when he commenced writing his history in 431 B.C. In the first place, conclusions about his intellectual biography have been predicated on the assumption that he began to write his work when he was relatively young (that is, in his twenties), when he was of an age to become a convert to the democratic idealism of Pericles (and thus abandon the conservative attitudes we impute to the members—of whatever degree—of his own family).[5] Of at least no less importance is a question relevant to the intellectual

1. For the Κιμώνεια μνήματα see *RE* suppl. 12:1090.62–1091.56. It is worth noting that this tradition derives from the periegetic literature, not the historical/biographical (though see Marcellin. *Vit. Thuc.* 14). It is possible to see a reference to Thucydides in Ar. *Vesp.* 288–90, though (in that case) it is all the more notable that the scholiast at 288 missed the point entirely.

2. The *vitae* of Pindar (Westermann 1845, 90–102) constitute another good case in point. On this subject see, in general, Leo 1901, 85–117.

3. On the difficult question of Thucydides' *Nachwirkung* in the fourth century see the balanced discussion by Luschnat in *RE* suppl. 12:1276–88. For a more sanguine (and highly speculative) view, bearing on the tradition linking Thucydides with Antiphon, see Graham and Forsythe 1984, 39–40 n. 46.

4. See, e.g., the material supplied in chap. 3 of the second Thucydides vita.

5. See Andrewes 1959, 223–39. The assumption of monolithic political family solidarity

history of the times, namely, the appropriate stage in an individual's life when he could regard himself—and be regarded by others—as a man of sufficient weight to take it upon himself to explain the "true meaning" of epochal events to contemporaries and those who would follow. On purely general grounds, the persona presupposed would seem to demand of the potential writer his prior possession of authority and status, and this presupposes considerable maturity in years. For even later, people did not attempt to write history until they had made a name for themselves in the intellectual world (consider Xenophon and Theopompus); and even the Alexander historians, whatever their intellectual pretensions, possessed the claim of having participated in the expedition.

The common view about Thucydides' age, however, makes him about 24 in 431. His date of birth is generally set 460–455, with a distinct preference evinced by most scholars for the lower limit. Thus, for example, Finley opted for "460 or a little after," von Fritz appears to do the same (460–455), Luschnat is inclined to place his birth 456–451, and Andrewes has asserted that the evidence "does not compel us to set his birth before ca. 455."[6]

The predisposition in the minds of at least some of the scholars who have contributed to the literature on this question to keep Thucydides as young as possible at the time he undertook his work, though incapable of strict documentation, glimmers clearly enough in the sentence of Andrewes quoted above. This predisposition, indeed, seems the only adequate explanation of the surprising lack of rigor that characterizes our general treatment of the fact that Thucydides was στρατηγός in 424 (meaning that he must have been little more than 30 at the time) and of our resort to a very dubious assertion found in Marcellinus' *Vita Thucydidis* 34, which alleges that Thucydides was (not much) over 50 at the time of his death. Leaving the question of the generalship till later, we shall commence with an examination of the datum provided by Marcellinus.

In a context introduced by λέγεται, Marcellinus informs us that Thucydides possessed an intelligent face, a pointed head, and a comportment that matched his history. He then makes allusion to Thucydides' death: παύσασθαι δὲ τὸν βίον ὑπὲρ τὰ πεντήκοντα ἔτη, μὴ πληρώσαντα τῆς συγγραφῆς τὴν προθεσμίαν. In an attempt to rationalize this statement, Jacoby judged that it derived from an inference from the history, parallel to

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is, of course, pure speculation in a case where we have no real inkling of the degree of kinship tying our historian to the family of Cimon (cf. Luschnat 1971). In that respect it does not differ much from the equally unsupported idea that Thucydides must have been a "young convert."

6. J. Finley 1942, 12; von Fritz 1967, 1:537; Luschnat 1971, 1092.47–52 (however, at 1093.26–32, he at least concedes the possibility of a date between 460 and 454); Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:13.

the one moderns often make, to the effect that Thucydides must have been 30 when he held his *στρατηγία* in 424.[7] As Andrewes wrote, however, "popular as this argument is today, I know of no trace of comparable reasoning in antiquity."[8] Andrewes' criticism is firmly based; it is rendered conclusive by the fact that our own view of that lower age-limit enjoys no specific ancient support. In any case, however, the problem involved in our evaluation of the testimonium remains unaffected. The assertion by Marcellinus is either an inference (however generated), and so without independent value,[9] or it is a piece of authentic testimony derived from the ancient tradition about Thucydides and therefore deserves some weight.

The second alternative can be absolutely disallowed. The ancient tradition about Thucydides' age leaves no room for Marcellinus. The well-known synchronism recorded by Aulus Gellius (*NA* 15.23) and attributed by him to book 11 of Pamphila's *Ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά* (*FGrH* 244 F 7) gives the purported ages of Hellanicus, Herodotus, and Thucydides in 432/1 as 56, 53, and 40, respectively. As stated above, this notice has plausibly been traced back to Apollodorus; it was explained by Diels, followed by Jacoby,[10] by Apollodorus' application of his acme theory, which simply held (in the apparent absence of other evidence) that Thucydides' *ἀκμή* coincided with the year in which he commenced his history. Hence Eusebius notes *Thucydides agnoscitur* (Hier. p. 115 Helm), and the *Suda* *ἤκμαζε κατὰ τὴν πξ' ὀλυμπιάδα* (*θ* 414 Adler), both setting Thucydides' floruit in Ol. 87 (432/29). Consistent with this is the remark of $\Sigma^{ABCFM}$ at Thucydides 5.26.5: *αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· σημείωσαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀκμάζων.*

In view of the persistence of this tradition, and the attendant difficulty of assuming that a late compiler (Marcellinus)[11] possessed as private information something that could have escaped the notice of the great chronographer Apollodorus, we have indeed no choice but to conclude that Marcellinus' information is at best an irresponsible inference overlooked intentionally or unintentionally by Apollodorus (if it had surfaced by then) and subsequent writers (if it indeed surfaced later)—"irresponsible" because it is ignorant of the ancient consensus making Thucydides 40 in 432/1 (and therefore approaching the age of 70 in 404) and an "inference" because it

7. Jacoby [1902] 1973, 283. Jacoby assumed that the writer simply added together the twenty years of Thucydides' exile and a span of thirty years inferred from the *στρατηγία* of 424.

8. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:13.

9. See, e.g., Classen and Steup [1892–1922] 1963, 1:4; Schmid and Stählin 1948, 1:5, 7 n. 6.

10. Diels 1876, 48–49; Jacoby [1902] 1973, 277; see also *FGrH* 244 F 7; Mosshammer 1973, 5–13; Mosshammer 1979, 126.

11. Schmid and Stählin 1948, 1:5, 3–4; Luschnat 1954, 14–58.

cannot arguably be based on a piece of genuine testimony. In that case the explanation of the datum probably should not have been sought with the manifest goodwill displayed by Jacoby, who grasped at the *στρατηγία* as the probable basis of the writer's guess. A more likely explanation is that Marcellinus' source, who speculated on Thucydides' demeanor with the cheap inference that *τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν ἔξιν προσπεφυκέναι τῇ συγγραφῇ*, and who knew nothing about Apollodorus' combination, simply assumed that Thucydides died in 411, when the work breaks off, and surmised that he was at least 30 when the work was begun.[12] One should note that the datum (in the form in which Marcellinus repeats it) looks as if it were provided in order to explain Thucydides' failure to complete the work: *μὴ πληρώσαντα τῆς συγγραφῆς τὴν προθεσμίαν*. On the assumption that he commenced his work at the age of comparative mental maturity, he concluded that Thucydides' failure to complete it was explained by his relatively early death. But whatever the explanation of the red herring in Marcellinus, it is clear that it would be methodologically improper to utilize it in an effort to obtain information (or corroborate inferences) about the lifespan of Thucydides. Combinations based upon it, like those, for example, of von Fritz and Andrewes,[13] should therefore be dismissed, and we are left to infer what we may from the bare fact of Thucydides' generalship.

The common assumption, aided or not by Marcellinus, is that Thucydides was indeed about 30 when the office was bestowed on him. But the likelihood that Athenians needed to be at least 30 in order to qualify for the *στρατηγία* is hardly an argument that in itself renders it likely that Thucydides must have sought the office as soon as it was legally permissible for him to do so. Although Andrewes writes, for example, that Thucydides' "birth and his special qualifications for service in the Thraceward area would help him to early office,"[14] the word *early* is entirely gratuitous; it obviously depends on the prior assumption that he was about 30 at the time. Thucydides became a suitable, even compelling, candidate for general because of the situation that had suddenly and unexpectedly developed in the Thraceward region.[15] But that development was of course entirely

12. For this date see n. 13 below.

13. Von Fritz (1967, 1:537) accepts Marcellinus without comment, conjoining this testimonium with the curious inference that Thucydides could not have been very old in 431, "da sein Werk unvollendet geblieben ist." Andrewes (in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:13), after rejecting Jacoby's explanation of the remark by Marcellinus, proceeded to conclude that "[t]his passage and the generalship provide the only firm basis" for inferring Thucydides' age.

14. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:13.

15. This hypothesis requires, naturally, that Brasidas' intention to invade the north could have been known to the Athenians some time in spring 424, when elections to the gener-

unconnected with his relative age. Adherents of the usual view are in fact arguing one of two alternatives: (1) Thucydides happened to be about 30 when Brasidas moved the campaign to the north and therefore was easily elected; (2) Thucydides was politically ambitious and vied for the *στρατηγία* at the very time that Brasidas (and his supporters at Sparta) contemplated moving the campaign to Thrace, so he was easily elected when he was about 30. It seems to me that neither of these alternatives need be taken seriously. However plausible (to put the best face on it) either of them may seem when taken by itself, it is apparent that neither legitimates the inference that the *στρατηγία* of 424 has unfortunately generated.

Our only real indication of the relative age of Thucydides in 431 is contained in the famous but difficult passage 5.26.5, written after 404, in which Thucydides asserts that he was of an age to be percipient about the war throughout its entire course of twenty-seven years: *ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι.*

The problem is to fix the frame of reference intended by Thucydides when he used the phrase *αἰσθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ*. According to scholiast Msc$_2$ Thucydides used the phrase to assure the reader that he was as secure in his faculties in 404 as he was in 431: *διὰ τὸ μὴ παρηβηκέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν*. The scholiast's view, which has had its modern defenders, including Krüger, Herbst, and Steup,[16] is by no means a contemptible explanation of Thucydides' words, though Andrewes deemed it so in his scornful paraphrase: "we can be sure that it had not entered Thucydides' mind that he might be thought senile at the time of writing his chapter."[17] One may retort that it equally had not entered Thucydides' mind that he might be

alship were held. Unfortunately, we know only that Brasidas had been actively engaged at Sicyon and Corinth, "preparing for the Thracian expedition" (Thuc. 4.70.1), before and during the time of the Athenian attack on Megara (4.66–74). This operation is usually placed in the archonship of Isarchus (424/3) as late as August; see, e.g., Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 3:720 (chronological table). Brasidas' advance to Heraclea (4.78.1) is generally dated in mid-August (see Busolt 1893–1904, 3.2:1141 n. 3). However, the preparations for the campaign against Megara were set in motion after private negotiations were conducted with the Athenians by disaffected Megarians (4.66.3–4.67.1), and these could well have been initiated as early as the spring, when in all probability Brasidas' intentions were formulated, discussed, and approved. If so, Brasidas' plans could have been known to the Athenians in time to influence their elections. But even if one prefers to believe that Thucydides was simply the victim of an unfortunate coincidence and that he was elected as general because his known influence in the Thraceward district (*δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν*, Thuc. 4.105.1) made him a desirable candidate, the implication is much the same, for at the very least it implies Thucydides' election (as a preventive measure) because of the *auctoritas* he had acquired in the district—a circumstance appropriate to middle age, not to comparative youth.

16. See Classen and Steup [1892–1922] 1963, 1:iv; Luschnat 1971, 1092.11–22.

17. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:12.

thought juvenile and uninformed on the evidence of the first books of his history. Much, in fact, is to be said in favor of the scholiast's interpretation. For, unlike the alternative view, it is at least securely based on the operative context presented in 5.26.1–6.

Thucydides is here expounding his judgment that the Archidamian War should be considered the initial phase of a twenty-seven-year-long war punctuated by an abortive peace (5.26.1–2). After asserting that the duration of the war was predicted by oracles, he supports this contention in 5.26.4:

> For I remember that, when the war began and until it ended, it was constantly asserted by many people that it would necessarily last for thrice nine years. I survived [ἐπεβίων] its entirety, being young enough to take it all in and giving it my attention in order to know it accurately [αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι].

To attest this claim, Thucydides now adds the reference to his exile of twenty years, and alludes to his presence among the Peloponnesians, emphasizing that this occurrence gave him the opportunity to observe affairs at considerable leisure (καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι).

The burden of the context is to validate the underlying basis of Thucydides' view (as yet undemonstrated by the remaining portion of the history, which he intended to extend from the current point in time, 421, to the final culmination of the war in 404) by emphasis upon his *continuous close scrutiny of subsequent events*. The reader has been assured, not of the mental competence of Thucydides in the period for which his history is already the direct evidence of the fixity of his attention, nor of his ability to comprehend events, but of his *continued* devotion to his subject, and of his capacity to render an apparently controversial verdict about events that extended for about eighteen years after 421. The reader has been informed that Thucydides' mental powers continued unabated until the very end of the war. In these circumstances, the problematical phrase can only mean that Thucydides wished the reader to understand that by 404 he had not yet become too old to apply the methodology (consisting of personal investigation, cross-examination of witnesses, etc.) enunciated in 1.22. The implication is not that Thucydides was relatively young in 431; it is that Thucydides might be thought to be too old in 404.[18]

18. To be sure, on this interpretation of the passage, one might well conclude that Thucydides would not have written the sentence in question unless he believed that the uninformed reader would in all probability assume that he had been older in 431 than in fact he was. But it does not follow that Thucydides' assurance to the reader therefore means (as in the

The alternative explanation, which prefers to believe that Thucydides was responding to (or preempting) the charge that he was excessively young at the start of the war, not only tears the phrase in question from its context, but requires the invention of an extraneous circumstance that is neither self-evident in itself nor intrinsically plausible. Leaving aside its psychological implausibility—for it condemns Thucydides (without reason) for a surprisingly defensive posture when the evidence of his acumen had already been presented to the reader (Thucydides wrote 5.26.5 in the expectation that the reader had already digested books 1–5.26)—worse yet it charges him with polemical absurdity. It would have been childish for Thucydides to respond to the charge that he was immature in 431 by simply asserting that he was not immature but, in fact, *αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι*. Indeed, the assumption of Thucydidean polemics in this vein, quite apart from the fact that they would have been puerile, inevitably suggests that Thucydides feared that the work itself would not be a compelling and final answer to any such suggestion. It should be added, moreover, that what is posited by those who hold this view (a necessary precondition to their interpretation of Thucydides' words) is on its face very difficult to accept. Readers of Thucydides (if there were such when he wrote this sentence) would assuredly have made no such charge. Are we then to suppose that Thucydides is here responding to a campaign against him conducted by people who are unfamiliar with his work but who accused him (in 404!) of immaturity in 431? The absurdity of what is postulated condemns the theory altogether.

Thucydides' assertion—like that immediately following, which speaks of his exile and the opportunity for investigation it afforded him—finds its full and satisfactory explanation in his concern, comparably evinced in 1.22, to establish his credentials with an unknown and future readership. If apologetics are at issue, they are to be associated with the issue confronted by Thucydides in 5.26, namely, his ability to speak with authority (and against the popular voice, which distinguished between the Archidamian and the Decelean wars) about the integrity of a war of twenty-seven years and, specifically, about the course of events that followed after the conclusion of peace in 421. Both scholiasts caught the drift correctly, although one (the author of $\Sigma^{ABCFM}$) expressed the thought more felicitously than did the other ($\Sigma^{Msc_2}$). It follows that the information conveyed in 5.26.5 offers no support to the contention that Thucydides must have been in his twenties in 431 and suggests, if anything, that he was substantially older.

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opposing view) that he was "relatively young" when he began; it suggests only that he was not "relatively old" when he began—in his fifties, for example.

It is tempting to consider whether the phrase under discussion will sustain something more than an argument about his relative senescence in 404. The question is whether *αἰσθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ*—aptly rendered by Poppo and Stahl (1875–86, ad loc.) as "propter aetatem rerum intelligentiam habens"—is susceptible of calibration in years. Thus Otto Luschnat paraphrases as "ausreichendes Verständnis" and suggests that this definition of mental development attaches (at least in the fourth century) to the twentieth year of life: "nach dessen Vollendung der Ephebe zum politisch vollberechtigen Bürger wurde."[19] It is doubtful, however, that in any context other than this doctrinaire political one, the *ἡλικία* associated with *τὸ αἰσθανέσθαι* could be set so low as this;[20] if a parallel with Athenian institutions is sought (and is appropriate), the least we should expect is the age of 30, the minimum age for *βουλευταί* and *δικασταί*, when the intellectual faculty had in theory properly developed. The matter is clearly put by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* (1.2.35), where Charicles tells Socrates not to "speak to the young" (*τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι*). When Socrates seeks a definition of this age-group, Charicles responds that the young are those who cannot yet serve in the boule because they do not yet have sufficient discretion, *ὡς οὔπω φρονίμοις οὖσι. μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεωτέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.*

Unfortunately, this trail leads only to the identification of the very earliest plausible terminus post quem. If we could with certainty extrapolate the meaning of *ἡ αἰσθανομένη ἡλικία* (cf. 2.36.3, *οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ = οἱ καθεστηκότες τῇ ἡλικίᾳ*) from *ἀνδρῶν τῶν αἰσθανομένων* (1.71.5), taking this phrase in the sense allotted it by Stahl, Classen, Shilleto, Widmann, and others[21]—"men of mature intellectual dis-

19. Luschnat 1971, 1092.37–43, citing Aristot. *Ath. Pol.*. 42.1, Aeschin. 1.18.

20. Luschnat 1971, 1092.43–50 was mindful of the difficulty: "Aber genügt das 20. Lebensjahr...auch in den Augen des Thuk. selbst? Das muss mindestens als fraglich gelten, und man tut gut, einen Spielraum von etwa fünf Jahren zu lassen, der auch allgemein zugestanden wird." Everything depends, of course, on the meaning Thucydides intended to convey by the use of the participle in 5.26.5; here we must take account of Thucydides' prejudices, which in regard to the Athenian *ekklesia*, are aptly defined by Martin Ostwald, the scholar whom we honor with this volume and to whom I feel a deep personal obligation for his kindness and support when he taught me as an undergraduate at Columbia College. In speaking of Thucydides' treatment of Alcibiades in the first assembly held before the Sicilian Expedition, Ostwald (1986, 317) observes that the manner in which Thucydides interpreted events "would accord with his recognition of the fatal weakness in popular sovereignty.... When the constitutional power to make weighty political decisions is vested in an ill-informed mob, whose votes are subject to temporary enthusiasms any powerful speaker can fire, the consequences are bound to be disastrous for the state." The minimum age for participation in that body assuredly does not entail the possession of the mental quality Thucydides invested in the participle of 5.26.5.

21. It is the speech of the Corinthians at Sparta, where they threaten to leave the

crimination"—a lower terminus of the mid-thirties would seem to be a reasonable hypothetical age to assign to Thucydides in 431. But the argument is very contingent. It is pretty clear that the meaning imputed to *αἰσθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ* by Thucydides, exactly like his second use of that verb in 5.26.5 (*καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι*) cuts a rather wide swath that is consistent with any birth date from 470 to 462.

In the final analysis we can but speculate (within these limits), though in the process we should be mindful of the (responsible) ancient tradition, for the ancients were at least good judges of the probabilities. Apollodorus, who must (one supposes) have known the critical passages in Thucydides, found no impediment in them to assigning Thucydides his forty years in 431. The scholiasts to Thucydides, whether independently or not of the ancient consensus, adopted a similar view. Furthermore, the assumption of a somewhat more advanced age than what now is generally accepted seems more in tune with general likelihood.[22] It also helps to explain in a natural fashion why Thucydides' history was never brought to completion.[23] But the chief gain is the reacquisition of a certain psychological and intellectual verisimilitude in our estimate of the position occupied by Thucydides when he commenced his history in 431. His stern posture, his absolute indifference to contemporary opinion (as in his treatment of the causes of the Peloponnesian War), his contemptuous dismissal of the ignorant masses (as in his comments about Harmodius and Aristogeiton), his firmly based skepticism about the ability of eyewitnesses to remember things correctly, and, above all, his conviction that his own appraisal of the complex set of events he decided to record entitled him to suppress the prolix and superficial explanations of popular opinion, are all aspects of Thucydides' persona that,

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Peloponnesian Alliance: *δρῷμεν δ' ἂν οὐδὲν πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὁρκίων οὔτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων*. Gomme (in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, ad loc.) chose to follow Forbes and Jowett ("men who take notice of our actions," "whose eyes are upon us"): "corresponding to *θεῶν τῶν ὁρκίων*—the eyes of the gods are on one who breaks his oath." Gomme's paraphrase illicitly suggests that *οἱ ὅρκιοι θεοί* act in virtue of their ability to observe infractions (instead of because of their knowledge of the nature of such infractions). In fact, observation is a mere facilitating condition automatically imputed to these gods. In essence, gods *know* when an oath has been broken; the proper parallel is with mortals who possess the ability to judge correctly when an oath is truly forsworn. The reference here is to people who will recognize that an oath has been broken if the Spartans fail to protect their ally. The implication of the participle, used absolutely here (as in 5.26.5), is of mature judgment.

22. See n. 19 above. The fact that Thucydides suspected that readers who knew nothing of him personally would overrate his absolute age in 431 puts this matter in its proper perspective.

23. When he wrote 5.26.5 (in 404 or thereafter), could Thucydides have had a premonition that his end might come before his completion of the work and that, therefore, it would be well to state for the sake of the record his continuous dedication to the entire subject while he was in full possession of his faculties?

taken conjointly with his remarkable and well-nigh hybristic decision to write the history of a future war, suggest an individual who has been intellectually tested and who has formed ripe judgments. The person described probably, therefore, commenced his history at least a decade older than now is commonly assumed.

6

# Thucydides' Criticism of Democratic Knowledge

Josiah Ober

I BEGIN WITH A QUANDARY that is very familiar to Martin Ostwald: Classical Athens saw the invention of both democracy and political theory, yet while we have a number of examples of criticism of democracy, no systematic defense of democracy—no democratic theory—survives from an Athenian pen. I propose that the conundrum is best explained by assuming that from the late fifth through the late fourth century B.C., democratic ideology was in a sense hegemonic: It so thoroughly dominated the Athenian political landscape that formal democratic theory was otiose.

What implications does this proposition have for reading works of political criticism? Democratic hegemony surely made criticism of democracy difficult, not because such criticism was forbidden, but because the existing political terminology tended to be monopolized by democratic discourse. In Athens, legitimate government and democracy were assumed by most citizens to be more or less synonymous; to speak or even to think about politics meant to speak and think within an idiom defined by democratic discourse.[1] Thus a formidable epistemological task faced the critic of democracy—how to construct a way of knowing about the world of political affairs that would not be colonized by the hegemonic tendencies of democratic discourse.

In his text, which I propose to read as a work of political criticism, Thucydides set out to investigate power, human nature, and their relationship to democratic Athens' potential and to its political failure. His solution

1. On democratic hegemony see Ober 1989, 332–39. I adapt the concept of ideological hegemony from A. Gramsci without necessarily accepting the negative connotations that Gramsci, and others, have associated with the concept. For a useful discussion see Femia 1981, 1–129.

to the problem of democratic hegemony was the development of a genre—critical political history—that allowed him to take an epistemological stance that he believed provided a useful and meaningful way to understand the past and simultaneously explained why the system of democracy failed under the pressures of war.

## Knowledge and Counterknowledge

Thucydides knew that Athenian democracy was based on open deliberation and voting and recognized this as a distinctive way of gaining knowledge about the world and acting upon that knowledge. Athenian democracy depended for its functioning on a socially and politically constructed "regime of truth"[2] that we may call "democratic knowledge." The practical functioning of democratic knowledge depended not only on institutional procedures but on the willingness of the citizen-participants to accept the implicit assumptions they lived by, and the information on the basis of which they cast their votes, as political artifacts rather than as absolutes denoted by a transcendent natural order.

Democratic knowledge was grounded, in the language of J. L. Austin's speech-act theory, on understanding the world of politics as the "conventional effects of conventional procedures." Thus the conventional procedures of the democracy (deliberation and voting) led to conventional effects (decrees and judgments of the δικαστήρια to which the citizens adhered). These conventions were created and maintained through constant, collective, public practice.[3] Moreover, democratic debate was open, and neither speakers nor decision makers needed to be acknowledged experts. The Athenians simply assumed that political truth was dialectical: Vigorous debate by patriotic citizens, judged by the mass of citizens, could provide a reasonable policy for the polis. The authority of decrees and judgments was not determined by the expert credentials of speakers or voters but by the subsequent actions of the citizenry itself. Thus the aim of key democratic

2. The term is Michel Foucault's (1980, 78–133). For Foucault, the regime of truth was not a neutral concept but (like hegemony for Gramsci) was productive of horrifying and oppressive power. Once again I adopt the term without necessarily accepting the negative connotations.

3. See J. L. Austin 1975, which is usefully extended and reworked to better explain political speech by Petrey (1988 and 1990). For the conventional effect see Petrey 1988, 77, which slightly rephrases Austin's "rule A.1." Austin's central point is that some forms of speech are actions rather than descriptions. Performative speech, which "does something," cannot accurately be called "true" or "false" by reference to an objectively verifiable external reality. Rather, performative speech is judged by its "felicity"—its success in influencing the subsequent behavior of human agents. The classic example is the statement "I pronounce you man and wife."

institutions was to pronounce statements that were efficacious or "felicitous" (Austin's preferred term), rather than statements that were in some ontologically pure sense "true."

Athenian political culture was based on collective opinion rather than on certain knowledge, and on the assumption that opinion could be translated into practical reality through democratic political process. The enactment formula of the Athenian Assembly, ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ—"it appeared right to the citizenry"—defines the relationship between democratic knowledge and political action. What the demos collectively opined was given, through the act of voting, the status of fact. This sort of approach to politics depended on a relatively stable consensus within Athenian society about the rules and protocols (the conventions) that governed the relationship between public speech and enactment. That which "seemed right to the demos" would only have the practical status of an enactment if the relevant parties were willing to behave in conformity to the enactment (e.g., when the assembly declared war, Athenian soldiers must be willing to march, rowers to row, and generals to lead).

The Athenian political process worked as well as it did because popular ideology provided a stable basis for collective decision making and for subsequent action. Although relatively stable, democracy was not ossified. Athenian political practice and policy remained flexible because in frequent meetings of the assembly and the people's courts contrasting views were publicly aired. Through the process of open debate, the democratic way of knowing, speaking, and acting evolved in response to changing external circumstances. The process was dialectical, in part because of the interaction of speakers and audiences. By responding vocally to speakers in the assembly and courtroom, the Athenian citizenry defined the sorts of language that could be employed by speakers in political deliberations. Athens' democracy was predicated on the assumption that the ordinary citizen was an active participant in maintaining a value system that made him the political equal of his elite (richer, better educated, perhaps better informed) neighbor.[4] For much of the fifth century, the system worked well. Athens became rich and powerful. The question Thucydides poses is whether the democratic system of knowing about and acting in the world was equal to the challenges posed by a great war—a war whose origins lay in the Spartan perception of Athens' power as dangerous.

In his history, Thucydides develops and offers his readers what we might call a counterknowledge (again borrowing from Foucault). Thucydides' preferred way of gaining knowledge about the world can be

4. This is a summary of one of the central arguments in Ober 1989.

described as "historical knowledge," and it is quite different epistemologically from "democratic knowledge." Perhaps most obviously, Thucydides establishes himself, researcher and author, as sole arbiter of the truth about the Peloponnesian War. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides seldom offers alternative versions of events; he has already done the interpretive work that Herodotus asks his reader to do for himself. It is my contention that this stance allowed Thucydides to offer a fundamental challenge to democratic knowledge.

Thucydides explicitly contrasts his own way of knowing about the past with that of others. He scorns (1.20.1) those who believe whatever they happen to hear about the past, including things about their own country, without subjecting the accounts to rigorous testing (ἀβασανίστως). His case in point is the belief, held by "the majority [τὸ πλῆθος] of the Athenians," that Hipparchus, killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, was the tyrant of Athens. This is no casual example: Many Athenians assumed that the assassination of Hipparchus set into motion the chain of events that led to the establishment of the democratic government.[5] By showing that Hipparchus was a minor figure, Thucydides undermines a foundation myth of the democracy and so robs popular rule of part of its "usable" past. The word Thucydides uses for the ignorant Athenians—τὸ πλῆθος—refers to the mass of ordinary citizens.[6] Thus, we are alerted to an important aspect of the text's critical project: It will present facts that have been "tested" and so can be contrasted to the "carelessness among οἱ πολλοί in the search for truth [ἀλήθεια] and their preference for ready-made accounts" (1.20.3). Although we need not suppose that the Athenian citizen masses were the only target of Thucydides' comments, the language and the choice of example suggest that Thucydides had the Athenians in mind when he wrote these lines.[7]

The weight Thucydides places on the λόγος/ἔργον contrast is well known. Facts are in general privileged in Thucydides' narrative in relation to speeches. Words and facts often collide in his text; men (e.g., Cleon) and states (e.g., Athens) who attempt to impose their own speech-dependent

5. The Athenian ignorance of the facts regarding the tyrants has tragic political consequences during the affair of the Herms (6.60.1); see Rawlings 1981, 256–59; cf. Euben 1986, 361: The tyrannicide story "reveals human beings as creators of meaning in the context of political struggle."

6. Ruzé 1984, 259–63.

7. This criticism has (at least) two targets: Herodotus, whose *Histories* contain two errors pointed out by Thucydides, and the Athenian masses, who are implied by the term οἱ πολλοί. For Herodotus and the errors on Spartan kings and Pitane see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, ad loc. For οἱ πολλοί as a term for citizen masses see Ober 1989, 11. Hornblower (1987, 155–90), points out Thucydides' authorial self-certainty and the rarity of this stance in ancient historiography.

meanings on reality tend to come to bad ends. This is significant from the perspective of criticizing democracy. Most Athenians, as Thucydides has explained, believe silly things about their own past and the institutions of their opponents. They got these errors from listening to poets and λογογράφοι (1.21.1)—I take the latter term as including public orators.[8] Assemblymen whose knowledge of the world and of the past is faulty cannot possibly decide rightly in regard to the future. Thus, according to Thucydides' logic, democratic knowledge is an unsound basis for practical enactment. If sustained by the empirical evidence of an "objective" historical narrative, this chain of reasoning might yield a devastating criticism of democratic politics.

Assembly speakers spoke within the conventions of democratic knowledge, which took for granted a citizenry with a good grasp of Athens' past history and the validity of public opinion. When Thucydides removed facts from the realm of affairs that could properly be understood by listening to competing speeches, by reference to the common understanding of events in the distant past, or by appearance and opinion generally, he also removed facts from the realm of things likely to be understood (and hence effectively dealt with) by the existing procedures of the assembly. Thucydides' version of historical knowledge is thus not only different from, but incompatible with, democratic knowledge. As he makes clear at 1.22.4, Thucydides' account is not "history for its own sake." Rather, it is presented as a thoroughly tested analysis of political power in the form of a precise chronological prose narrative. This history will be judged useful (ὠφέλιμα) because it will teach the reader to assess past practices accurately (τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν) so as to better understand and (perhaps) plan for what may occur in the future. This is, of course, what a good political decision maker must be able to do and what Thucydides implies the Athenian citizens are unlikely to be able to do.

The interplay between narrative and speeches is Thucydides' method of teaching his useful counterknowledge and of contrasting it with democratic knowledge. Illustrating in detail how Thucydides' critical epistemology functions within the text is outside the purpose of this chapter. But an assessment of the first debate presented to the reader by Thucydides and of

8. Λογογράφος is not used again in Thucydides' text, but I see no reason to suppose that it meant something radically different to Thucydides than to fourth-century philosophers and orators. Plato (*Phdr.* 257c) claims that the orator Lysias was accused by an Athenian politician of being a λογογράφος; here the term clearly means speechwriter. It had the same meaning when used by the Attic orators (Lavency 1964). Connor (1984, 28) translates λογογράφοι as "speechwriters" in the Thucydides passage and points out Thucydides' concern with rhetoric. As Aristotle points out (*Rhet.* 1418a21–29) speeches presented in the assembly deal with the affairs of the future, and speeches were the basis of decision making in the democracy.

the Funeral Oration of Pericles, the passage in which the political functioning of democratic knowledge is most fully explained, will sketch out the general direction of the argument.

## The Corcyra/Corinth Debate

Thucydides tells us that as a result of having a large navy, the island-polis of Corcyra was wealthy and "not unpowerful" (1.25.4). A naval victory over Corinth led the Corcyreans to deploy (and ultimately to overextend) their power by attacking states friendly to Corinth (1.30.2). The Corinthians responded by putting together an alliance of minor sea powers and preparing a punitive expedition. At this juncture, the Corcyreans realized they were in trouble and requested an alliance with Athens. The Corinthians opposed formation of a Corcyra-Athens alliance, on the grounds that it would breach a treaty between Athens and the Peloponnesian League. Each side sent ambassadors to Athens, and consequently "an assembly was called, and the parties to the dispute came forward" (*καταστάσης δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἦλθον*, 1.31.4). Thucydides presents their respective speeches.

The orations of the Corcyreans and Corinthians are not only the first of the three Athenian Assembly debates offered by Thucydides but the first speeches of any sort in his text. As such, they may be taken as representing an ideal type. The word used by Thucydides for the dispute, *ἀντιλογία*, reveals that the speakers will take diametrically opposed positions. By implication, there is no possibility of a genuine compromise in this dispute; either the Athenians make an alliance with Corcyra or they do not. Moreover, only the Corinthians and Corcyreans are mentioned as speakers, and the self-interest (self here being the states of Corinth or Corcyra) of the speakers is evident: Each speaker deploys various rhetorical tricks in an attempt to persuade the Athenian audience. In this case, there can be no question of reading public debate as a valid form of dialectical reasoning. This is not a case in which public-minded citizen-speakers who share a concern for Athens' best interests are engaged in vigorous discussion, thus offering an intelligent audience the chance to enact policy on the basis of a tolerably accurate version of the relevant circumstances. Since Thucydides presents only the speeches of the disputants, the reader is led to suppose that it is on the basis of speeches delivered by foreigners looking to their own states' interest that the Athenians will have to make this extremely important decision. The question Thucydides implicitly poses is this: Can the mass of the Athenians derive right policy (that is, a correct assessment of the relationship between present action and future advantage) from the rhetoric they hear? It will certainly not be an easy task. Thucydides has

already pointed out that he himself found that it required a great deal of work to extract a true account from informants whose λόγοι were twisted by the influence of εὔνοια (1.22.3).

The first word in the Corcyreans' speech is the abstraction δίκαιον, "just," but their appeal is explicitly aimed at Athenian self-interest. The Corcyreans state (1.32.1) that they know they will fail in their goal if they do not clearly establish (σαφὲς καταστήσουσι) that the alliance will be advantageous (ξύμφορα) for Athens and that the gratitude (χάρις) of the Corcyreans will be secure (βέβαιον). The key to the Corcyrean argument is that the addition of Corcyra's δύναμις (specifically her naval force) to that of Athens will make Athens more powerful and better able to resist enemies (esp. 1.33.2, 1.35.5). Thus the Corcyrean argument is explicitly based on precisely those factors that Thucydides' history attempts to elucidate—power and human nature as motivated by self-interest.

In order to make their interest- and power-based argument, the Corcyreans must instruct the audience on several general principles that determine advantage in interstate conduct: It is always better to take the initiative (1.33.4); the fewer concessions one makes, the greater one's own safety (1.34.3); and allying with a state whose enemies are the same as one's own will bring great advantage (1.35.5)—this last is described as the σαφεστάτη πίστις. The Corcyreans also discuss the effects making or not making the alliance will have on the probable course of the future. They confidently predict that there will be a war—those Athenians who do not think so "err in their reasoning" (γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει), since they fail to realize that the Spartans "are being impelled to war by fear of you" (φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας) and that the Corinthians, "who hate you," are a powerful influence on Sparta (1.33.3). If the Athenians do ally with Corcyra, this show of strength "will cause your enemies to be more fearful" (τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον) and correspondingly less eager to launch an attack. You Athenians "will not be showing much forethought" (οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν) if, "while on the lookout for a war that is surely coming, indeed is virtually upon you" (ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν), you give up Corcyra with its key location (1.36.1).

So the Corcyreans claim to be able to instruct the Athenians through speech, but will they be good teachers? We can hope to answer this question by looking at the evidence of the speech itself, the conformity of the Corcyrean prescription to the general principles previously established by Thucydides, and "the facts themselves" as revealed in Thucydides' narrative of the war. The Corcyreans' discussion of their own history raises immediate doubts about their qualifications as instructors in the proper conduct of

international affairs. They admit that a policy of nonalliance, which formerly had appeared to them to be sober and moderate, now appears foolish and unsafe (ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη...νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη, 1.32.4). Thus they intend to change their policy, since it seems that their stance of neutrality was in error (δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνῃ, 1.32.5). The Corcyreans were caught in this tangle of error, appearance, and false assumption because they failed to see that their δύναμις, which seemed so great when they went against the Corinthians one-on-one, was only relatively great, and that they would become relatively powerless (ἀδύνατοι, 1.32.5) when faced with a Corinthian alliance. This is a rather elementary blunder for would-be instructors in the art of diplomacy.[9]

The Corcyreans are not complete fools. They correctly predict the coming war. And they correctly (from a Thucydidean point of view) identify the prime cause of the war as Spartan fear (φόβος) of Athenian power. But were they correct in telling the Athenians that the war was, for all intents and purposes, already upon them? This brings up the much debated issue of the αἰτίαι of the war, and the relationship between what Thucydides says were the "truest but least apparent" cause (growth of Athenian power leading to Spartan fear, 1.23.6) and the "apparent" causes, among which the Corcyrean alliance is the most important (1.146). Without entering into the debate, it seems fair to say that the Corcyreans have seriously overstated the war's proximity (the Spartans will require a good deal of persuading before they declare war, 1.66–88), and one might go so far as to suggest that Athens' making of the alliance (evidently because they were persuaded by the Corcyreans, 1.44) was the act that fulfilled the Corcyrean prophecy. Furthermore, Thucydides' narrative will make it very clear that the Corcyreans have overstated the security advantages that will accrue to both Athens and Corcyra as a result of the alliance. The confident prediction that the alliance will add substantially to Athenian strength "without risk or expense" (ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης, 1.33.2) is falsified by the narrative. The Corcyrean navy plays no significant role in a war that the narrative reveals as entailing vast risk and expense for Athens and, in the end, destroying Corcyra in a nightmarish stasis.[10]

The Corcyreans warn the Athenians not to fall into the clever verbal traps that the Corinthians will set for them (1.34.3); but is the speech of the

9. Cf. Thucydides' own assessment of Corcyra (1.25.4) in which, although they are called "not unpowerful" (οὐκ ἀδύνατοι), the implication is that they think rather too much of their own wealth and strength.

10. On the irrelevance of the Corcyrean navy in the rest of the narrative see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:168.

Corinthians any worse (or better) as an example of "instruction by speech"? The first word spoken by the Corinthians is the abstraction *ἀναγκαῖον*, "necessity" (1.37.1), but they use the term only to introduce the centrality of the issue of justice. Their argument is concerned with interest and power, but they see interest and power as grounded less on necessity than on abstract notions of justice. The Corinthians employ the terminology of appearance, error, prediction, and word/fact, which is familiar to Thucydides' readers from his methodological introduction, but here the meanings of these terms tend to take on a moral connotation.[11] A good example is the Corinthian response to the Corcyrean claim that the latter had offered to arbitrate the dispute. The Corinthians claim that arbitration is impossible if one side, having already grabbed an unfair advantage, seeks to negotiate from a position of safety. Arbitration is only possible if, before embarking on the contest of arms, there exists an equality in fact as well as in words (*τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα*, 1.39.1). The Corinthians are making the familiar contrast between *ἔργα* and *λόγοι*, but the "fact" they allude to is not so much equality of power but an equal standing in relation to justice.

Although starting from rather different premises, the Corinthians, like the Corcyreans, claim to instruct their Athenian audience in general principles of international relations: an overmastering desire for victory makes people forget their true interests (1.41.2–3); it is most beneficial to do wrong as seldom as possible (1.42.2); and the power that deals fairly with equals finds truer security than one that snatches temporary advantage (1.42.4). Like the Corcyreans, the Corinthians claim to be able to predict the future course of events: If the Athenians establish the principle that it is all right for allies to revolt, Athens will face revolts among its own subjects (1.40.6). If the Athenians look at the matter clearly (*σωφρονοῦσι*), they will see that the alliance with Corcyra will bring war, not peace (1.40.2). The Corcyreans are just trying to scare the Athenians about the coming war, and it is unclear (*ἀφανεῖ*) when or whether there will be a war (1.42.2).

Put to the test of Thucydides' own stated principles and narrative, the Corinthians end up with a mixed scorecard as instructors. They are certainly right that when war comes, Athens' "allies" will revolt, and that this will be a terrible problem for the Athenians. But what of their prediction about the inevitability of war? It is certainly the case that, Athens having made an alliance, there was a war. But did the alliance cause the war? The Corinthians imply that there is a causal relationship, and that if no alliance

11. E.g., 1.38.5, where the verb *ἁμαρτάνω* means something like "to act unjustly" rather than (as it is usually used by both Thucydides and the Corcyreans) "to err."

is struck, it will at least remain "unclear" whether there will be a war. But this assessment is apparently contradicted by Thucydides' own statement that it was the growth of Athenian power and concomitant Spartan fear that led to (*ἀναγκάσαι*) the outbreak of the war (1.23.6). One might try to reconcile Thucydides' and the Corinthians' statements by arguing that the Corcyrean alliance was the key "power augmentation"—the event that proved to the Spartans that Athens was a real danger. But as we have seen, the alliance did not in fact make Athens stronger. Furthermore, if this one event catapulted the Greek world into war, Thucydides' claim that power and fear were the "least apparent" causes is inexplicable, his contrast of hidden and overt causes (which include the Corcyrean affair) becomes incoherent, and his long discursus (1.89–117) on the Pentecontaetia is mere antiquarianism. Thus, it appears that, assuming Thucydides is a good teacher, the Corinthians are poor instructors when it comes to the key issue of the probability of war.

Before turning to the outcome of the debate, we need to take stock. Both the Corcyrean and the Corinthian speeches share some of Thucydides' implicit assumptions about the importance of power and self-interest. Like Thucydides, both sides propose general rules for interstate relations, and both sides claim to be able to assess future probabilities. Furthermore, much of the terminology of knowledge, inference, appearance, establishment, error, power, interest, security, and prediction employed by Thucydides in this "methodological introduction" (1.1–24) is mirrored in one or both of the two speeches.[12] The speakers thus claim to do just what Thucydides claims his history will do—teach about interest and power and offer an understanding of past events and the probable course of the future.

In the introduction, Thucydides explicitly contrasts his own project with that of the poets and *λογογράφοι*, and he has cast doubt on competing *λόγοι* as reliable conduits to reality. Thus, it seems a reasonable inference to posit that in these, the first speeches in the text, the historian is intentionally contrasting his own historical approach to accurately understanding past and future with the approach to understanding employed in the Athenian Assembly. The implied contrast is not black and white. Individual points in each speech are confirmed by Thucydides' historical narrative. Thus, Thucydides is not claiming that "makers of speeches always lie" or that "they are consistently wrong in their understanding of present realities and future possibilities." Rather, Thucydides shows us that a given speech will probably be a mishmash of truths, half-truths, and outright errors or

12. E.g., *σαφές*, *σκοπέω*, *δοκέω*, *φαίνεται*, *σώφρων*, *τεκμήριον*, *σημεῖον*, *ἁμαρτάνω*, *κατάστασις* (and its verbal forms), *λόγος* vs. *ἔργον*, *δύναμις*, *ξύμφορον*, *μέλλοντα*, *βέβαιος*.

lies. Why must this be the case? And what are the implications of this position?

First, it must be the case (according to Thucydides' logic) because establishing the truth is not easy. Thucydides has emphasized how much labor his historical investigations entailed. Second, Thucydides claims that reality is to be equated with objective facts and that objectivity is incompatible with the context of a contest for the applause of an audience (1.21.1). Speakers of public orations were inevitably involved in a contest for their audience's favor. They could not afford to make the issue seem too difficult for an audience to comprehend within the chronological constraints imposed by an oral presentation. Third, speakers were interested parties, and thus looked at the world from a predetermined perspective. Even if a given speaker were able to see and understand "the facts themselves," he was unlikely to present these facts impartially, because he was trying to influence the audience to vote in his favor.

The audience, for its part, is presented with a mix of fact and falsehood in each speech. Because the members of the audience (in this example) are Athenian assemblymen, they judge (that is, assess the effect of past and current realities on future possibilities), vote, and by voting determine state policy, on the basis of competing views of reality represented by the speeches they have heard. How are the assemblymen to separate truth from falsehood? How are they to determine whether their collective interest (either their factional interest as *οἱ πολλοί* or their public interest as *οἱ πολῖται*) and the speaker's individual interests are congruent, or where and how those interests diverge? Thucydides' answer is "Left to their own devices, they cannot." The citizen masses are unable to determine truth accurately or to determine congruity of interest by listening to speeches because they have no way of testing for either quality. Thucydides' position seems to be that democratic knowledge does not provide an adequate grounding for assessing speeches of this kind. Thus, badly instructed by speech, the Athenian Assembly was likely to fall eventually into error and make bad policy. By contrasting his own approach to epistemology and decision making with the rhetoric of ideal-type public speakers, Thucydides has established for his readers the existence of a fatal structural flaw in the edifice of democratic ways of knowing and doing; and this flaw is a key to his criticism of Athenian popular rule.

The outcome of the Corcyrean/Corinthian debate was initially ambiguous. At the first of the two assemblies held to discuss the possible alliance, the tendency was for the assemblymen not to underrate the force of the Corinthian *λόγοι*. But at a second meeting, the assemblymen's mood

changed (μετέγνωσαν). Thus they decided to make a limited defensive alliance with Corcyra (1.44.1). The reason for the decision was, we are told, the desire to have the Corcyrean navy on Athens' side and the perceived (ἐφαίνετο) advantage of the geographic position of Corcyra on the route to Italy and Sicily, since "it appeared to them [ἐδόκει...αὐτοῖς] that there really would be a war with the Peloponnesians" (1.44.2–3). Answering the question of whether the assembly made the right decision in this case depends on how one interprets Thucydides' discussion of the αἰτίαι of the war. But it is clear (in light of the two assemblies) that the ἀντιλογία had initially led to ambivalence and indecision on the part of the Athenian assemblymen.

## Pericles' Funeral Oration

The Funeral Oration, delivered by Pericles over the Athenian war dead of 431 B.C., has long been recognized as an idealizing portrait of the democratic polis.[13] In addition to praising the bravery of those who gave their lives fighting for the common good, the speech emphasizes Athenian freedom and unity and the value of working for public, rather than private, ends. Throughout, the speech is dominated by a vision of the greatness of Athens; the splendor and power of the city itself justify the sacrifice of those who fell in its defense.[14]

Pericles' Funeral Oration is deeply complex and ambiguous, both in its syntax and in its presentation of the polis. The complexity begins with Pericles' first words (2.35.1):

> Many of those who have given this sort of speech praise the tradition of the funeral oration. But in my view the fallen have already shown themselves to be excellent in action (ἔργῳ), so that it should be enough to honor them by the action (ἔργον) of erecting the public grave you see before you.

Like Thucydides' methodological preface, Pericles' opening words establish a hierarchy of value in which ἔργα are elevated above λόγοι. By reminding his listeners, at the beginning and again at the end of the speech, that he is delivering the λόγος only because it is customary (νόμῳ, κατὰ νόμον, 2.35.1, 2.35.3, 2.46), Pericles subverts the actuality of his expressed sentiments.[15]

13. See especially Loraux 1986. I take no stand here on the issue of how much of the speech is Pericles' and how much Thucydides'. It is the relationship of the speech to other speeches and to the narrative that is important for my argument.

14. On the greatness of the polis' δύναμις see 2.36.2–3, 2.36.4, 2.38.2, 2.41.2–4, 2.43.1.

15. Cf. Cole 1990. This claim that the speech/text is superfluous in the face of the greatness of the deeds is also found in Pindar and Bacchylides.

By pointing out that his λόγος is not an ἔργον, Pericles alerts his audience to the element of idealization in his portrait of Athens.

The λόγος/ἔργον contrast is reiterated throughout the oration,[16] but two passages are particularly noteworthy:

> Furthermore, the power [δύναμις] of the polis itself, [a power] established by those [Athens'] very qualities, demonstrates [σημαίνει] that this [Pericles' statement regarding Athenian excellence] is the truth [ἀλήθεια]—and not a product of words [λόγοι] produced for the present occasion rather than [a product] of fact [ἔργα]. (2.41.2)

Here, Pericles calls his own speech into question. He admits that since his speech was (by definition) merely a construct of words, and since it was prepared for an honorific occasion, it might not be true. But, he claims, the self-evident power of the city, a "fact" rather than a product of words, will establish the truth of Athens' greatness. A similar sentiment is expressed a few lines later:

> Our power [δύναμις] is not without the witness of great proofs [μεγάλων σημείων], and we will be the source of wonder for those yet to come, as we are for our contemporaries. Furthermore, we have no need of a Homer to sing our praises, or of any such whose fine words please only for the moment, since the truth [ἀλήθεια] will show that in comparison with the facts [ἔργα], [the verbal depiction] is an underestimate. (2.41.4)

Once again, the contrast is between false, flowery praise in words (i.e., what Pericles is doing) and the trustworthy evidence of facts. But in this passage, the subversion may go even deeper. It is through the witness of great proofs (μεγάλα σημεῖα) that future generations will be amazed at Athens. But what are these σημεῖα? The σημεῖα will survive to convince "those yet to come." In light of the attack on Homer, the σημεῖα can hardly be in the form of words; we must imagine permanent monuments of some sort. Although Pericles does not say so explicitly, the audience is, I would suggest, being put in mind of (inter alia) the city's new public buildings, some of which were clearly visible from the public cemetery. These monuments were an obvious, lasting, physical manifestation of Athens' power.[17]

16. E.g., 2.43.1. Cf. also 2.40.1, 2.42.2.

17. E.g., the temples on the Acropolis, the city wall, the Dipylon and Sacred Gates. Presumably the proofs would also include victory monuments established in enemy lands (implied at 2.41.4).

As modern readers now know, Pericles is right to suggest that future generations will be amazed at these monuments to Athenian power. But does our amazement reflect a correct assessment of Athens' actual power? Not if we are to judge by Thucydides' earlier comment (1.10.1–2), in which he specifically states that to criticize Homer's λόγος on the Trojan War on the basis of the σημεῖον of the small size of the existing town of Mycenae would be improper method. In this same passage, Thucydides points out that if future generations were to judge by the physical magnificence of the city alone, the δύναμις of Athens would appear twice as great as it was in fact. Read in light of this earlier passage, Pericles' rejection of Athens' need for a Homer because the μεγάλα σημεῖα will impress future generations with the truth about Athenian δύναμις seems a painfully empty boast. Once again we are being implicitly reminded that only Thucydides' accurate account of the historical facts will allow us to know about either the real past or the probable future.

The self-subversive quality of the Funeral Oration is not limited to the issue of word and fact. In the course of Pericles' speech, each praiseworthy ideal eventually points to its opposite. Freedom is proclaimed as the prime good of the polis, but there is a strong hint that the δύναμις of Athens deprives the πόλεις within the empire of their freedom.[18] Public service defines the value of the citizen, but Pericles' language lets on that not all Athenians are public spirited.[19] Even the bravery and self-sacrifice of the dead will inspire not only desire for emulation but jealousy and disbelief.[20] Thus Pericles' discussion of Athens' πολιτεία as an ideal type is compromised by its location in a tremendously complex speech. His evocation of Athenian democracy is far from univocally positive.

Early in the oration, Pericles defines democracy:

> It [our πολιτεία] is called by the name [ὄνομα] δημοκρατία because government [τὸ οἰκεῖν] is not in the interest of the few [ἐς ὀλίγους] but of the majority [ἐς πλείονας]. However, in regard to access to the law for resolving disputes, all are equal. Yet again in regard to acknowledged worth, it is a matter of individual reputation; the nature of a man's public contribution is not decided in advance on the basis of class [οὐκ ἀπὸ

18. For the praise of freedom see 2.37.2, 2.40.5, 2.41.1, 2.43.4. The deprivation of freedom is implied at 1.41.3.

19. Esp. 2.40.1–2: "Each citizen has both private and public interests, and even those who are mostly interested in their private affairs have opinions on politics; the man who is only interested in his own affairs [ἀπράγμον] is not respected among us."

20. For their self-sacrifice see 2.41.5, 2.42.3–4, 2.43.2; on the provocation of jealousy see 2.34.2, 2.45.1.

> μέρους], but rather on the basis of excellence. And if someone is worthy and can do something worthwhile for the polis, he is not excluded by poverty, nor because of his obscurity [of birth]. (2.37.1)

In the first clause of this passage, we learn that δημοκρατία is the name (or signifier) used for the reality (or referent) "the πολιτεία of Athens" because the government (τὸ οἰκεῖν) favors the interests of the majority (ἐς πλείονας) rather than of the few (ἐς ὀλίγους). This is a somewhat ambiguous statement when viewed from the perspective of power and self-interest. Pericles does not go so far as to say that δημοκρατία is the rule of the many over the few, but neither does he say that it is the collective rule of all citizens in the common interest of all.[21] Pericles' Athens is divided into two interest groups—the few and the many—and the πολιτεία is called a democracy because it favors one group rather than the other.

The next two clauses of the passage, which should explain and clarify the referent πολιτεία, are spectacularly antithetical. The clause "However, in regard to access to the law for resolving disputes, all are equal" does not explain the signifier δημοκρατία but is in contrast to it (ὄνομα μὲν...μέτεστι δέ). Thus, the equality in regard to the law is grammatically opposed to the government favorable to the majority. Therefore terms for "many" cannot stand for "all citizens" (as they did in Athenian democratic ideology). The third clause, "but in regard to acknowledged worth, it is a matter of individual reputation," contrasts the individual citizen to the grouping of the citizenry into "few" and "majority" in the first clause, as well as contrasting the citizen's individual worth to the generalized equality of "all" in the second clause. In Athens, the individual who is worthy but poor and obscure is not excluded from public service (as he would be if the few were to control the administration), but neither is he forced into a sort of equality that would deny his individual merit. This meritocratic ideal denies the priority of preestablished classes or orders (οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους) and gives priority to individual good reputation (εὐδοκιμεῖ).

This sounds good in principle. The list—group-interest oriented administration, equality before the law for all, and individual merit in public service—has a nice "mixed constitution" ring. One might extrapolate a model of a πολιτεία in which legislation is enacted by interested groups, justice is carried out impartially by and for all citizens, and offices are executed

21. Cf. 6.39.1, in which Athenagoras of Syracuse defines δημοκρατία as the ἄρχειν of the δῆμος ξύμπας and ὀλιγαρχία as rule of a few. Cf. the comments of Gomme in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 2:107–8. Sealey (1973, 280–82) seems to go too far in reading Pericles' remark as an apology for democracy.

by competent individuals.[22] But the passage does not clarify what happens if there is a conflict between the perceived interests of the groups or between the equality of all and the merit of individuals. Can a political balance based on such a complex set of contrasts hold up under the stressful circumstances of a long, hard war? We must not forget that this is an oration over war dead.

The next passage in the Funeral Oration that deals explicitly with how the Athenians run their πολιτεία helps to clarify the contrast between group-interest oriented government and individual merit:

> We ourselves can [collectively] judge rightly regarding affairs, even if [each of us] does not [individually] originate the arguments; we do not consider words [λόγους] to be an impediment to actions [ἔργοις], but rather [regard it] essential to be previously instructed [προδιδαχθῆναι] by speech [λόγῳ] before embarking on necessary actions [ἔργῳ]. We are peculiar also in that we hold that we are simultaneously persons who are daring and who debate what they will put their hands to. Among other men ignorance [ἀμαθία] leads to rashness, while reasoned debate [λογισμός] just bogs them down. (2.40.2–3)

This passage is virtually a definition of democratic knowledge and its relation to enactment and action. The Athenians recognize that not everyone is equally capable of coming up with plans (this will be the job of the individual political leader), but the many can participate in making the decision (as assemblymen). So far so good, but in the next clause it becomes clear that the Athenians are proud of making policy on the basis of λόγοι and that they reject the existence of a hierarchy of value between λόγοι and ἔργα. As we have seen, Thucydides considers untested and competing λόγοι to be a very dubious basis for understanding reality, and he elevates ἔργα above λόγοι in his hierarchy of explanatory values. Moreover, as we have seen, Pericles himself has emphasized the λόγος/ἔργον contrast.

So is Pericles' Athens an exception to the general rules that Thucydides has established in his preface? The Funeral Oration certainly suggests that its ideal Athenians believe themselves to be exceptional: Pericles points out that other people are unable to blend speech and action in the Athenian fashion. But even while claiming to base its praise of Athenian exceptionality on the clearest proofs (cf. 2.42.1), the Funeral Oration calls that very exceptionality into question by revealing deep tensions within the ideal of a

22. This incorporation of interest-group politics into a democratic matrix might approach the ideal of "polyarchy" advocated by Dahl (1989).

politics based, first, on seamlessly blending the interests of the few, the many, and the individual and, second, on employing public speeches to plan deeds and create social realities. The oration shows that these problematic ideals are the basis of Athens' power,[23] and thus reveals to the reader the potential instability of Athenian power. The great and stable Athens established by the speech can exist only in and through the idealizing discourse of the speaker and through a suspension of the disbelief encouraged by the speech's own antithetical structure.

The Funeral Oration must, I think, be read in the context established by the Corcyra/Corinth debate. In that debate the reader was exposed to the sorts of speeches that the Athenians must assess correctly if they are to enact the best policy for their state. The narrative account of the aftermath of the debate has already demonstrated that complex, self-interested speeches on important issues could result in (at least initial) indecision. Although the assembly's eventual decision to do the active thing by making the alliance with Corcyra may be seen as confirming Pericles' emphasis on Athenian daring, the Funeral Oration ideal becomes more problematic when viewed in the context of later speeches and their outcomes—especially the Mytilenean and Sicilian Debates.

Thucydides' summary analysis of Pericles' career and Athens' final failure (2.65) suggests that the tenuous political balance revealed by the Funeral Oration could be maintained only as long as Athens remained a δημοκρατία merely in λόγος and was in ἔργον the ἀρχή of a single man (2.65.9). Pericles' ἀρχή limited the confusion and error inherent in basing policy decisions on competing λόγοι—the language of 2.65.9 invites us to see a Periclean verdict behind the final vote to accept the Corcyrean alliance. Thucydides' Pericles gives speeches, but his speeches are authoritative rather than dialectical; none of his three speeches is answered (at least by an Athenian interlocutor). Pericles' role as a statesman mimics that of Thucydides as historian—the hard work of fact-sifting and interpretation is done in advance by the expert, rather than being left to the assemblyman or reader.

After Pericles' death, the democracy existed in fact, and the flaws inherent in the democratic practice of deliberation and decision making contributed to the collapse of Athenian δύναμις. The relationship in Thucydides' text between narrative and speeches frequently questions whether the Athenians, after having been "instructed by speech[es]" of self-interested speakers, are truly able to "judge rightly regarding affairs" or to translate those judgments into appropriate action. Hence, the text, taken as

23. See esp. 2.36.4: Athenian πολιτεία and τρόποι were what made the city great..

a whole, offers a real challenge to the workability of what I have designated "democratic knowledge." Not all readers will, in the end, agree that Thucydides' criticism is valid (for the record, I do not). But the challenge offered by Thucydides' "counterknowledge" must be taken seriously—not only by ancient historians, but by democratic theorists and those interested in issues of discourse, criticism, and the possibility of resistance against hegemonic systems of knowledge.

7

# Archidamus and the Question of Characterization in Thucydides

Daniel P. Tompkins

"IT IS OBVIOUS IN THE FIRST PLACE that Greek literature is the impersonal literature." Virginia Woolf devotes most of an essay to a search for the causes of this impersonality: Greek literature is impersonal because we do not know the authors' biographies; because its language is "spare"; because it lapses "from the particular to the general"; and because Greek dramas are briefer than Shakespeare's. More than anything else, however, the "impersonality" of Greek literature springs from its characters. Homer's Penelope and Telemachus "are no more self-conscious than children," while Sophocles' Electra is "so tightly bound that she can only move an inch this way, an inch that." The language of these characters is so "bare," so uncomplicated, that they represent "types of the original"—"heroism itself...fidelity itself." Electra's words "owe nothing of their effect to any extravagance of expression, and certainly they throw no light upon the speaker's character or the writer's."[1]

Woolf thus, although in a manner more subtle and personal than that of many scholars, assumes her place in a long tradition that minimizes the role of character, the individual, or the self. Recent criticism makes it more difficult now than in Woolf's day to claim that tragic language sheds "no light upon the speaker's character," although the subject remains a matter of lively dispute.[2]

The question of characterization becomes especially acute in Thucydides, whose moments of directness or emotion have attracted special

1. Woolf 1925, 39–59.

2. For a sophisticated survey of some contemporary thinking on character (and a judicious consideration of character in the *Odyssey*) see Peradotto 1990, 99–100, 152–63.

attention. "Here the lion smiled"; "a quiver in the face of Thucydides is always worth noticing": The scholiast and Gildersleeve,[3] two thousand years apart, concur on the glacial quality of their author. Given this context, few readers have quarreled with Dover's conclusion that "there is very little individual characterization of speeches" in Thucydides.[4] Yet, on reflection, this position seems strange. Thucydides himself states and shows that characters in his work think and behave characteristically. Why should their different manners of thinking and acting, then, not be reflected in their language?

This chapter grows out of an effort to answer that question, and offers an affirmative, if qualified, response. At least some Thucydidean characters speak in ways that are distinctive within the corpus of Thucydidean speeches. In addition, their distinctive manners are, at least sometimes, appropriate to their characters and roles in the work. While it is not yet possible to demonstrate this claim for all speakers or speeches in Thucydides, I make a case in this chapter for the distinctiveness of the long speech by the Spartan king Archidamus to the congress at Sparta (1.80–85.2).

The approach to Greek style adopted here originated in the simple and traditional notion that interpretation should emphasize the exceptional aspects of a text: the striking metaphor, the prominent character, or the verbal pattern that most diverges from the norm, like Alcibiades' tendency in Thucydides to use sentence-initial *καί*, or Nicias' to use highly subordinated sentences. Continuing reflection on Thucydidean style has made it clear that groups of usages reward study even more than individual traits, and that less spectacular stylistic features—not just the easily noticed ones—deserve consideration.

Analysis requires quantification, and here some discussion is needed. First of all, quantification depends on definition, and most of the definitions of the stylistic features I study in this chapter are subject to dispute. Readers differ, for example, in identifying irony and ambiguity, levels of grammatical subordination, and even word-types (what appears to some as a participle—e.g., *ξύμφερον*—may seem to others a mere adjective shorn of any verbal force). Readers of any stylistic analysis should be aware that the data were derived by a human being and reflect that reader's judgment. Thus the standard of replicability so often instanced in the case of scientific experiments—for example, the recent "cold fusion" debate—applies in stylistics only in prosaic (and usually uninteresting) cases.

3. The scholiast (1.126.3) is commending the Pausanias excursus; Gildersleeve (1912, 239–40) is commenting on Thucydides' use of *που*.

4. Dover 1973, 23.

A second problem concerns the assessment of quantitative data. Archidamus uses fewer articular forms (participle, infinitive, or adjective) than anyone else in Thucydides. We can illustrate this tendency with a chart, but when does Archidamus' disinclination to use these forms become significant? Statistical significance is determined by a variety of devices. I have begun to study these, but do not apply them here.

Finally, we need a means of correlating stylistic traits, that is, of tracking them through the forty-odd speeches in Thucydides and finding whether certain traits cluster at all. Again, I do not report here on explorations in this area.

As one surveys recent work on literary statistics, an increasing reliance on computer analysis, even on machine-readable texts, becomes evident. G. R. Ledger's recent book on Platonic style considers only three stylistic indicators: words containing a certain letter, and percentage of words ending in certain letters, percentage of words with certain penultimate letters.[5] Thus restricted, Ledger is able to use machine-readable documents to obtain definite and sophisticated measurements of vocabulary distribution, along the way providing clear and useful discussions of statistical methodology. But he hardly begins to discuss style as most of us normally think of it.

A second work, by J. F. Burrows, discusses the distribution of the thirty most common words in Jane Austen; a third, Anthony Kenny's introduction to literary statistics, draws its examples only from counts of letters and words. Restricted to these small units, the authors produce data that are accurate, easily replicated, and—for literary critics—often exiguous. Only Burrows makes any attempt at interpretation, using Austen's thirty favorite words to discuss, often profitably, the idiolects of her characters. It is an interesting question whether these perceptive remarks depend more on his data or his intelligence.[6] Ledger's book on Plato is intended mainly to solve problems of authenticity and chronology; Kenny's is so purely statistical that it might as well concern the performance of baseball players. Statistical thoroughness achieved at such cost will win over few literary critics.

Finally, Neumann's quantitative study of the Pauline epistles is worth mentioning because of its thorough review of previous scholarship and exemplary methodology, even though, once again, literary interpretation is not the goal. Neumann surveys nearly all work done in literary stylistics in Greek (as well as many other languages); then, using a statistical model, he produces evidence that the recently disputed epistles fit well within the

5. Ledger 1989, 4–10.

6. Consider this remark: "[W]hile Virginia Woolf's mean sentence-lengths are not far from Jane Austen's, her sentences are altogether plumper."

parameters of Pauline style.[7] In many ways, this work provides a model for future studies in stylistics.

The main task of any literary critic concerned with style should be to find meaning in the data. This is the main goal of the rest of this chapter. Statistical thoroughness will come later.

## The Speech of Archidamus

Archidamus' speech is the third in a tetraptych delivered during the first congress at Sparta. Corinth leads off, insisting that Athens has broken the peace and urging Sparta to go to war. The Athenians respond that Athens acted naturally and urge moderation. Then Archidamus speaks, followed by his fellow Spartan Sthenelaidas, who successfully pushes for war. Archidamus' speech gains in interest by its relation to the surrounding speeches. Several stylistic traits foregrounded in this speech serve as the brush-strokes giving depth and particularity to this major character.

### Diction

#### *-σις nouns*

In the later fifth century, the practice, already visible in Homer, of converting a verb to a "process noun" by adding the *-σις* ending became increasingly common. Thucydides adopted the practice, using *-σις* nouns more frequently and more variously than any known predecessor or contemporary.[8] Occurring about 400 times in Thucydides and about once every twenty lines in speeches, they are absent from only four speeches, of which Archidamus' is the only lengthy one.[9] Reading through the history, we quickly realize that this noun formation is a staple of Thucydidean prose—all the more reason to note its absence from this speech.

#### *Neuter abstractions*

Another common tendency in the late fifth century was the formation of nouns from verbs, participles, and adjectives by treating these forms as neuter and prefacing them with the article. Archidamus never employs the articular infinitive, and only rarely the articular participle. He never disposes articular forms with the verve of some other speakers, who use them in oblique tenses or with prepositions or negatives.

7. See Neumann 1990, 214–21.

8. Sihler (1881) contrasts Thucydidean practice to that of Xenophon, Herodotus, Antiphon, and the Old Oligarch.

9. The other three are 1.86, 3.30, and 7.77, none more than thirty-seven lines long.

*Double prefixes*

When Cleon says (3.39.2) that the Mytileneans "rose up against us" (ἐπανέστησαν), rather than "seceded" (ἀπέστησαν), he participates in the Thucydidean practice of forming words with double or even triple prefixes. We find over 200 such words in Thucydides. They are used about 110 times in speeches. At times, as when Cleon uses double-prefixed words 10 times, the effect is dramatic. In contrast, Archidamus' speech contains just one example.[10]

## Argumentation and Rhetorical Technique

*Gnomic sentences*

A gnomic sentence is defined as a general statement about human conduct that is syntactically independent of its context. Aristotle remarks that rustic boors are the most habitual coiners of gnomes (*Rhet.* 1395a), but in Thucydides, no speaker approaches Pericles in this regard. More than half the sentences in his last speech are gnomic. Far from being rustic, the general utterances of Pericles have the function of creating a timeless universe of thought, unaffected by the general caducity of things. In contrast to Pericles and other Thucydidean speakers who rely heavily on gnomes, Archidamus uses them only 3 times.

*Verbal play*

We can count gnomic sentences with some sense that there will be general agreement as to their definition, although even here scholars never agree in detail. A consensus as to the definition and number of two other important features of rhetorical argumentation in Thucydides, irony and verbal play, would be harder to reach. By verbal play I mean the use of words in a manner that plays on their usage or meaning. Thucydides' contemporary Gorgias was famous for play of this sort, and there are many Gorgianic phrases in Thucydidean speeches—for example, προεπιβουλεύειν/ἀντεπιβουλεύειν (1.33.4) and καταφρόνησιν/ἀφροσύνη (1.122.4).

Beyond these widely noticed and unsurprising formulations, the text reveals other ways of exploiting the meaning of a word. The Corinthians begin the speech just preceding that of Archidamus by underlining the importance of "trust" (τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς...τῆς κατὰ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους ἤν τι λέγομεν καθίστησιν, 1.68.1). "Trusting yourselves, you distrust others"—the speakers, clearly ready to

10. Archidamus does add prefixes to the word παρασκεύη. But this word was so often used in the late fifth century as a straightforward noun as to become virtually unprefixed.

exploit the derivation of words, turn the tables on their Spartan audience, claiming that Athenian aggression, like that of the Persians fifty years ago, has been hindered less by Spartan vengeance than by the invaders' own mistakes (*ἐπεὶ αἵ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες ἤδη τινάς που καὶ ἀπαρασκεύους διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι ἔφθειραν*, 1.69.5).

Sparta's unshaken trust in itself now contrasts with the destructive effect that trust in Sparta has had on the allies. Both *τὸ πιστόν*, "self-confidence," and *τὸ πιστεῦσαι*, "trust that the allies placed in you," go wrong. Self-confidence prevents Sparta from believing the truth, and the allies' trust kept them unprepared until too late. The potentially ambiguous possessive *ὑμέτεραι* is now joined with the equally ambiguous prepositional phrase *διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι* (Who hoped in whom? Who trusted whom?)—language so general that it recalls the attack on Spartan self-confidence and distrustfulness at 1.68.1 but this time reveals the destructive effect that trusting Sparta has had on the allies. Here, *τὸ πιστεῦσαι* subtly shifts the emphasis from that established by *τὸ πιστόν* at the opening of the speech, exploiting the inherent imprecision of the abstract Greek of the late fifth century, to produce a cleverly pointed attack on Spartan reliability. At the same time, this verbal play reminds us that *ἀπιστοτέρους* (1.68.1), translated above as "less trusting," can also mean "less trustworthy." The verbal play of the Corinthians makes it clear that both meanings are "at play" as far as Sparta is concerned.

Such verbal pyrotechnics, found in several, though not all, Thucydidean speeches, are wholly lacking from the speech of Archidamus. The only candidate, more an oxymoron or a paradox than an actual play on words, occurs when Archidamus describes the Spartans as *ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι* (1.84.3), "educated with too little knowledge to despise the laws." In the mouths of such slick Thucydidean speakers as Hermocrates, Brasidas, or the Corinthians, this phrase might well be taken as a subtle dig; what culture educates people not to be too knowledgeable? Coming from Archidamus, it seems wholly sincere.

*Redefinition*

The famous Platonic scene in which Prodicus distinguishes between near synonyms (*Prt.* 337) reflects the late fifth century's concern with correct definition of words. From this concern springs a rhetorical technique—tendentious redefinition of terms in ways that serve the speaker's interest. Lesbos, for Cleon, is not seceding but attacking (3.39.2); Pericles advises Athenians to exhibit not *φρόνημα*, "resolution," but *καταφρόνημα*, "disdain" (2.62.4). Such distinctions occur in about ten Thucydidean speeches,

enough to notice but not enough to reward quantification. Unlike the two speakers at Sparta preceding him,[11] Archidamus does not employ this device.

*Irony*

When is Thucydides ironic and when are his speakers? This is one of the more pressing questions of Thucydidean style. Greek literature has numerous devices available for qualifying or undercutting an adjective, for example, such words as λεγόμενος ("so-called") or ὡς εἰπεῖν ("so to speak"), or the particles δή, δῆθεν, and ἆρα. By and large Thucydides avoids these, preferring the most rigorous sort of irony, which lacks any verbal signal and so forces readers to engage in interpretation on their own, that is, to look for secondary meanings behind the bald statement—a practice that leads us to recall and sympathize with the anguished proposal, nearly a century ago, that instances of irony be designated with a novel form of punctuation, the "little flagellator mark" (*le petit signe flagellateur*).[12]

No Thucydidean speaker uses irony enough to permit a statistically meaningful sample. Many, like Archidamus, avoid irony completely. Still, it is worth mentioning that this rhetorical technique is clearly available to this speaker, and that he does not opt to use it.

## Sentence Structure, Word Order, and Sentence Length

*Article-noun separation*

Speakers in Thucydides use as many as eleven words to separate articles from the substantives with which they agree. Cleon, for instance, separates the article from its noun by at least two words 14 times and by three or more words 7 times. The matching figures for Archidamus are 5 and 1. Ranked among all Thucydidean speakers, Archidamus stands third from the bottom—outdone only by two short speeches (1.86, 3.30), one of which is by his fellow Spartan Sthenelaidas.

*Antithesis: multiple pairs*

Thucydides' "penchant for expressing ideas through contrast,"[13] though frequently mentioned in general terms, rewards detailed analysis. In

11. The Athenians contrast ἀδικία with βία (1.77.4), the Corinthians, αἰτία with κατηγορία (1.69.6).

12. Alcanter de Brahm suggested this in 1899, proposing that a reversed question mark be utilized (Enright 1986, 37).

13. Rusten 1989, 23.

English, antithesis "in its most acute form" opposes two items on each side: "the regularity of her family, and the inconvenience of London hours."[14] Antitheses of this sort (A in X but B in Y) are common in Greek too:

> εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
> ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.
>
> (*Il.* 1.280–81)

> τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῶν ἄλγος εἰς ἕν' ἔρχεται
> μόνον καθ' αὑτόν, κοὐδέν' ἄλλον, ἡ δ' ἐμὴ
> ψυχὴ πόλιν τε κἀμὲ καὶ σῷ ὁμοῦ στένει.
>
> (Soph., *OT* 62–64)

In the Homeric passage the primary antithesis is between καρτερός and φέρτερος , with a secondary one between the clauses that end lines 280 and 281. In Oedipus' speech, ἄλγος is balanced with ψυχή, and ἕν' with πόλιν τε κἀμὲ καὶ σ(έ). If this is the normal Greek style, it is violated or transcended with great verve in the Corinthian speech that precedes Archidamus'. Here we find not double paired items but multiple ones: καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἰόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι, γνόντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται (1.69.3). In this passage, οἰόμενοι is paired with γνόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον sιτη εἰδότας, and ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι sιτη ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται.

Their reliance on antitheses with multiple pairs—nine of them, one with an unmatched five pairs (1.70.7)—reveals the bravura quality of the Corinthians' speech. We find two more such antitheses in the Athenian speech just preceding Archidamus', and then none at all in Archidamus' speech. Only about two-thirds of the speeches in Thucydides have this formation, so Archidamus' failure to use it is not statistically distinctive. But the contrast with the two previous speakers, and the disinclination of Archidamus to attempt other ambitious formations, mark his speech as special.

*Antithesis: internal*

Thucydides also complicates his antithetical structures by inserting secondary antitheses within the primary ones—not simply A versus B but A (a

14. Wimsatt 1941, 41–42.

versus b) versus B. Here is an example, again from the Corinthian speech: *οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ* (1.69.1). As the *μέν...δέ* opposition shows, the second part of this antithesis is broken down into an additional antithesis, giving the form A versus B (a versus b). Once again, there are so few examples of this device that quantifying them in and of itself proves nothing; but it remains worth noticing that Archidamus uses it only once (1.84.3).

*Participles*

Participles, perhaps more than any other form, contribute complexity and density to the Thucydidean sentence. Consider the following: *οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται* (1.69.2b). Here we find four participles in a sentence of twelve words,[15] a level of compression that is approximated, I believe, only by 6.17.3b (Alcibiades), which has four participles in twenty-two words. Each word carries considerable weight: *οἱ δρῶντες* are men capable of acting; *βεβουλευμένοι* describes the state they are in—their plans complete—when they act and distinguishes them from adversaries who are *οὐ διεγνωκότας*, unable to see clearly and make the proper distinctions. The aggressors are men who move at once (*οὐ μέλλοντες*).

This exceptional sentence reflects the overall style of the Corinthian speech, with about three participles every five lines. Cleon (3.37–40) uses even more (four in five lines) and Archidamus fewer (two in five lines, among the lowest in Thucydides).

*Lengthy sentences*

Unlike most of the categories just covered, sentence length has received substantial attention from analysts of style. Clearly, we need to view sentence length from a number of perspectives. If we show merely the mean length of sentences used by a character, we risk missing the exceptionally long or short sentences. If we chart the long sentences, moreover, we must decide where "long" begins (at twenty words? thirty? forty?). Also, Thucydides presents a problem not found in most modern writers: Thucydidean sentence length is determined by the editor as well as the author. As it happens, aside from their choice of a period or semicolon to indicate the ending, Thucydidean editors do not often disagree as to where a sentence ends.

15. Hence a lengthy history of conjecture, insertion, transposition, and bracketing. Recent editors accept the text.

For this discussion, I define a long sentence as one of thirty or more words. In some speeches, among them Nicias' second and penultimate ones and his letter to Athens (6.20–23, 7.61–64, 7.11–15), over forty percent of the sentences attain this length; Archidamus is near the bottom of the list at seventeen percent.

*Mean sentence length*

Another useful measure is mean or average sentence length. While Nicias, in his second speech at Athens (6.20–23), uses an average of four lines per sentence, Archidamus uses fewer than 2.5 lines—the shortest mean sentence length in Thucydides, aside from one very short speech (2.87).

*Conditions*

Archidamus, notably averse to conditional statements, uses only fourteen conditions, a bit more than one every ten lines, compared to one every four lines in Nicias' first speech (6.9–14) or in Brasidas' address to the Acanthians. Of the fourteen conditions Archidamus does use, thirteen refer to the future, a remarkably high figure, and six of these are future most vivid (future emotional), again revealing a certain monotony.

*Sentence complication*

Thucydidean speakers vary greatly in the extent to which they employ subordination. The best method I have found for measuring this remains the analysis of "degrees" or "levels" of subordination in a sentence. Consider the following sentence, already discussed above in the section on multiple pairs: *καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἰόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι, γνόντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται.* (1.69.3). Here are two parallel main verbs, *θαρσοῦσι* and *ἐγκείσονται*. The full sequence of verbal forms is organized as follows, with indentations to show the level of subordination:

*λανθάνειν*

*οἰόμενοι*

*θαρσοῦσι*

*περιορᾶν*

*εἰδότας*

*γνόντες*

*ἐγκείσονται*

For a Thucydidean sentence, this is fairly regular: The main verbs come at the end of their clauses, and the pattern of subordination is not hard to follow. It is convenient to explain this pattern in terms of "levels" or "degrees" of subordination:

| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|
| | λανθάνειν | |
| οἰόμενοι | | |
| θαρσοῦσι | | |
| | | περιορᾶν |
| | εἰδότας | |
| γνόντες | | |
| ἐγκείσονται | | |

The infinitive περιορᾶν brings the sentence to the third level of complexity. This level is not unusual in sentences in Thucydidean speeches, which can have as many as seven levels of complexity, and it is not necessarily a sign of difficulty, since clearly marked subordination is easier to understand than a denser though hardly subordinated sentence like 1.69.2b (quoted above in the section on participles).

The third level of complexity is a meaningful line of difference between simple and complex sentences. Archidamus' speech ranks among the lowest three in Thucydides (the other two are Alcibiades' speech at 6.89–92 and that of Pericles at 1.140–44).

## Conclusion

Fifteen measures of stylistic difference reveal that Archidamus' speech differs from others. Rigorous statistical analysis of two sorts remains necessary: first, a test to determine in which categories a speech is significantly different from the Thucydidean population; second, a survey of all the speeches to see if there is any correlation or clustering of stylistic usages (for instance, to test whether speakers with low numbers of articular forms also tend to avoid -σις nouns).

Even without this additional research, we can state that there are fifteen categories in which Archidamus' usage falls in the extreme low end of the Thucydidean corpus of forty-two direct speeches. These fifteen categories can be organized horizontally, according to frequency of usage (low or no

usage), and vertically, according to sample size (large or small samples), as in the chart that follows:

| | *low usage* | *no usage* |
|---|---|---|
| *large samples:* | neuter abstractions | *-σις* nouns |
| | gnomes | |
| | article-noun separation | |
| | participles | |
| | sentence length: 30+ words | |
| | sentence length: mean length | |
| | conditions | |
| | sentence complication | |
| *small samples:* | double prefixes | verbal play |
| | antithesis: multiple pairs | redefinition |
| | antithesis: internal | irony |

Archidamus' speech stands out in part because it scores low in so many categories—as if, in this speech, Thucydides is portraying a character who is not only cautious and prudent but who to some extent does not participate in the major stylistic changes of the late fifth century. Interestingly, we get no such strong results for Archidamus' shorter, later utterances at 2.11 and 2.71–74. There is, however, one speaker in Thucydides—Sthenelaidas—who resembles Archidamus in all but two of these categories. Like his colleague, Sthenelaidas avoids the innovative forms of his day (e.g., *-σις* nouns and neuter abstractions), uses short and uncomplicated sentences, and never becomes playful or ironic. The stylistic likeness between these two Spartans may be as significant as their different policy recommendations.

Even without thoroughgoing statistical analysis, it is now possible to read sentences in Thucydides and identify some characteristic traits. Reading 1.80.3b (Archidamus), we notice that despite its length (sixty words) there are no antitheses, instances of subordination, gnomes, separations between article and noun, *-σις* nouns, or articular forms. The sentence fits easily into the general picture we have drawn of Archidamus' style. Turning to a long sentence (ninety-seven words) in the Corinthian speech at Sparta (1.69.5), we find far more subordination, some striking metaphor ("your hopes destroyed us"), articular infinitives used as objects of prepositions (one in an oblique case), and the verbal play in διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι after τὸ πιστὸν... ἀπιστοτέρους...καθίστησιν in 1.68.1. Finally, consider 2.61.2 in the last speech of Pericles (thirty-two words). It is highly antithetical, with one antithesis subordinate to another and up to four items paired off (multiple

pairing), two metaphors, a -σις noun, an articular infinitive, and five degrees of subordination.

These three sentences are not only distinctive but characteristic. The traits I have mentioned serve as brush-strokes, typifying not only the sentence but the speeches that contain them. Similar brush-strokes can be found in other Thucydidean speakers. This does not mean that the speeches are verbatim transcriptions of speeches actually given, a notion that has been suggested but that faces serious objections.[16] It does mean, I think, that Thucydides was a more flexible and dramatic stylist than is generally admitted, and that Dover's claim (cited at the beginning of this chapter) that "there is very little individual characterization of speeches" in Thucydides seems increasingly difficult to accept

16. In a subsequent essay, I will discuss and attempt to refute the thesis that Thucydides simply transcribes the speeches.

8

# The Death of Thucydides and the Motif of "Land on Sea"

Stewart Flory

WE KNOW THAT THUCYDIDES lived to see the end of the Peloponnesian War and intended to write the history of that war down to at least 404. His narrative, however, breaks off in mid-thought at 8.109, with a καί...πρῶτον, "first of all," for which he never supplies a μετὰ δέ, "and then."[1] The date is 411, and many years of the war remain to be described. Readers of the *History of the Peloponnesian War* have assumed that untimely death prevented Thucydides from finishing his work.[2] There are, however, alternative, no less plausible (and, I argue, more plausible) explanations. Many have studied the incompleteness of Thucydides' book, identifying early and late passages and passages that allegedly would have been altered or omitted in a final revision. Few have seriously investigated the question of why, not how, he left his work unfinished. The considerable work on early and late passages, valuable in its own right for the insight it provides into the author's style, nevertheless takes for

I first started work on these ideas in the winter of 1986, when I shared with Martin Ostwald many instructive conversations about Thucydides in the gloom of the lowest level of the library stacks (where we had adjacent desks) of the American Academy in Rome. I presented an earlier, shorter version of this chapter at the American Philological Association meetings in Baltimore in 1989. Also incorporated here are some parts of a paper delivered at the meetings of the Classical Association of the Midwest and South, New Orleans, 1988.

1. Since Xenophon's *Hellenica* begins its account a few weeks after Thucydides leaves off, the last bit of our text of the older work might have suffered some slight damage, and so Thucydides might not have left quite so abrupt an ending. See Breitenbach 1880, viii–xii.

2. Delebecque (1957, 53) alone, as far as I have been able to discover, acknowledges (but does not explain or discuss) the possibility that Thucydides did not die abruptly but gave up on his work or left its completion to others. Konishi (1987) makes the interesting, if unconvincing argument that Thucydides never intended to continue his account to the end of the war.

granted an ancient anecdotal tradition of no distinguished pedigree that Thucydides died a sudden and premature death. For example, Eduard Schwartz, following this tradition, notes: "Der Tod nahm dem rastlosen Schriftsteller die Feder aus der Hand."[3] Most recently and authoritatively, Dover has written: "Circumstances not of his choosing prevented Thucydides from completing his work."[4] The ancient vitae offer not one but several alternative untimely deaths for Thucydides. They speak of disease, murder by poison, or death at sea.[5] Modern scholarship has added the presumption that Thucydides died very soon after the end of the war, for he demonstrates in his text knowledge of events down to about 400 but no knowledge of events after that date. Fairly recently Adcock has suggested that death by drowning on a sea voyage might explain the truncated ending of book 8. Adcock argues that Thucydides departed on this fatal trip carrying with him only a few book rolls of the end of his work in progress, leaving the rest ashore. These last book rolls perished with him, leaving the chance break where we find it now.[6]

So stood the state of our knowledge and ignorance about the death of Thucydides until 1982. At an epigraphical congress in Athens, D. M. Lewis pointed out that the "Lichas" in a newly reinterpreted archon list of 396 B.C. from Thasos could be the Lichas mentioned by Thucydides at 8.84.5 as having "died later" (ὕστερον ἀποθανόντα). If Lichas was still alive in 396, Thucydides must have lived much longer after the war than has been presumed and could have been working on his *Histories* at least as late as the 390s. Two of the French scholars editing the Thasos materials have seized upon this inscription as certain proof that Thucydides was alive in 396 and could have lived much longer, for we need not suppose that Lichas died immediately after being honorary archon at Thasos.[7] Indeed, this inscription might just supply one of the most important facts to turn up in modern times about an ancient author.

Unfortunately, nothing is ever certain. Lichas is not an uncommon name, and recently there has been a guardedly critical article by Cartledge.[8] Still, I think there would be less skepticism about the validity of the inscription for placing the historian's death later if it did not seem to disprove an assumption so fondly cherished for so long by so many. One effect of this

3. Schwartz [1929] 1960, 242.

4. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 5:387.

5. The vitae may be studied conveniently in the excellent annotated edition by Piccirilli (1985).

6. Adcock 1963, 103–6.

7. Pouilloux and Salviat 1983, 1985.

8. Cartledge 1984.

inscription should be, I believe, to remind us how slender the grounds are for believing that Thucydides died suddenly while working on his book, just after the end of the war.

Long ago Wilamowitz demonstrated convincingly that every single detail in the ancient Thucydides vitae is most likely late fabrication based on no more than extrapolations from the text of the *Histories*.[9] I would also note that the very plurality of causes of early death argues against the historicity of any one of them. If the tradition stemmed from a real event, one might expect a single cause of death, not several mutually exclusive alternatives.[10]

No more plausible is the argument that failure to refer to events in the fourth century proves that Thucydides died in the fifth. How reasonable is it to expect that an author, beset by premonitions of doom or planning a dangerous voyage, will helpfully, just at this moment, insert in his manuscript a reference to a contemporary or near contemporary event? Even modern authors have difficulty keeping a long manuscript updated in the light of current events.

I submit, therefore, that the tradition that Thucydides died suddenly soon after the war while actively engaged in working on his *Histories* derives solely from the truncation of book 8 and therefore has no validity. Even forgetting the Thasos inscription for a moment and speaking generally, I believe that in the absence of reliable confirmatory evidence, the notion that death is the proximate cause of an author's leaving work unfinished is never more than one of several possible hypotheses.

Why do authors leave books unfinished? They do not always die with pen in hand, surely. Authors give up on their work for many reasons: boredom with the topic, for example, or change of interest. I would like to suggest a possible scenario for the ending of Thucydides' literary activity. Whenever authors work on an analytical piece of writing like a history, they must deal with two categories of material: first, theory or intuition, and second, evidence. As long as theory and evidence agree, as long as the theory can be adapted to fit new evidence or new evidence found to fit the theory, writing continues. When, however, new evidence emerges to contradict theory, evidence that no amount of bending or battering can modify, the author faces the prospect of drastic revision of the theory. To come upon such contrary evidence when a great deal has already been written is particularly disheartening, for the revision will be that much more tiresome and

9. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1877, 326–67. See also the discussion of Fornara in chap. 5 of the present volume.

10. Lefkowitz (1981) has shown how little reason we have to believe any of the ancient biographical information, especially about the deaths of ancient literary figures.

time consuming. At such moments, writers may set aside their manuscripts in despair.

I believe that something like this despair caused Thucydides to abandon his work. In the absence of any hard evidence to the contrary, we ought to forsake all hypotheses about a melodramatic early death and suppose only that Thucydides lost heart in his project and set it aside. This supposition is not unreasonable. Thucydides began writing about the war, he tells us, with a theory, an incorrect theory as it turned out, that the war between Sparta and Athens would be a great one, bigger—and one almost would say "better"—than anything previous, and most worthy of a λόγος (1.1). He believed, furthermore, that Athens would win, because Pericles' strategy was wise (2.65). For a while, even despite some reverses, the evidence conformed to this theory. Then, through a concatenation of unexpected circumstances, of which the most important was perhaps the unexpected death of Pericles himself, the theory began to unravel. Later, embittered by exile, Thucydides came to see that Athens was headed for destruction, perhaps had always been headed for it and even in the end deserved it.[11] At some point in the 390s or later, when he had already written what was an immense manuscript for its day, Thucydides realized that the task of bringing his ideas about the Peloponnesian War into congruence with current events was beyond him. We can appreciate the pathetic situation of a rigorous thinker like Thucydides, for whom the congruence of λόγος and ἔργον was all important. At this point he stopped writing, though we do not know if the last part he worked on was the end of book 8.

Is there or could there be any more substantial evidence in the text to support my point of view? One type of evidence, though of a peculiarly indirect sort, might be passages that Thucydides would have had to revise substantially if he had lived on into the 390s. I am not thinking of rough spots in the text, signs of incompleteness, but rather of highly polished sections reflecting the author's hard labors, sentences and paragraphs that would have had to be relocated, drastically rewritten, or sacrificed in a final, fourth-century revision. So far I have identified one type of passage that fits into this category. These passages deal with the paradoxical motif of "land on sea." What I present in the following pages is intended not as positive proof of a particular scenario for Thucydides' literary activity but as an illustration of how easy it is to imagine scenarios other than the traditional one. I hope, therefore, that readers will allow that there is at least something to support my contention that Thucydides may have simply given up on his book and almost nothing to support the view that he died with pen in hand.

11. For a defense of this statement see Flory 1988.

Analysis reveals that Thucydides carefully works into the fabric of his narrative the bold paradoxical motif of land battles fought at sea and sea battles fought on land. This motif elegantly fits an analysis of the war that Thucydides or any reasonable person could have maintained at the close of the war or immediately thereafter but that would have seemed increasingly anachronistic and inappropriate in the early fourth century. On three striking occasions during the Peloponnesian War, the naval engagement off the Sybota islands (1.49.2), Phormio's sea battle off Patras (2.89.8), and Nicias' final encounter before Syracuse (7.62.4), Thucydides comments or has a participant comment that a sea battle (*ναυμαχία*) resembles a land battle (*πεζομαχία*). Commentators dutifully cross-reference these passages, and John Finley cites them together with a few others in his brilliant essay "The Unity of Thucydides' *History*."[12] I have found that this motif of "land on sea" is far more pervasive than has ever been supposed, occurring at least fifteen times in seven different contexts. The motif, moreover, has a kind of plot development that reveals Thucydides' changing hopes and fears about the war. In fact, the motif illustrates one theory or pattern that Thucydides imposes on the war, an irrevocable exchange of naval supremacy between Athens and Sparta. Examples of "land battles fought at sea" build to a crescendo and a reversal (sea on land) at the end of book 7, the final occurrence. The motif presumes Athens' total defeat, if not in 413 after Syracuse, then at least in 404, with Athens' navy obliterated and Sparta dominant at sea.

The paradox of land on sea begins as a straightforward description of an actual situation but soon develops into a highly schematic, exaggerated, and artificial motif. Here we can see the workings of Thucydides' innate tendency to abstractions, perhaps inspired on this occasion specifically by the rhetoric of Pericles, known for his bold metaphors. Indeed, the speeches that Thucydides gives to Pericles supply many examples of radical schematization on the theme of land versus sea, as the statesman urges his listeners to consider their mainland home an island or to consider all the world as neatly divided into land and sea (2.62.2).

Of Sybota, a sea battle that takes place just before the war proper begins, Thucydides comments that it was "a fierce sea battle but not so much as to tactics, resembling more a land battle" (*ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα*, 1.49.2). Here, however, the land tactics result not necessarily from the combatants' lack of naval skill but from the fact that the Corinthian ships, an invading force, happen to carry extra hoplites aboard. Nevertheless, given

12. J. Finley [1940] 1967, 145–46, 151.

the conservatism of the Peloponnesians, it is no surprise to find some incongruities in the early books of the *Histories*.

In the sea battle off Patras in 428, the Athenian admiral Phormio bases his strategy on his perception that the Spartan ships "will not remain in rank as foot soldiers would on land" (*οὐ μενεῖν τὴν τάξιν ὥσπερ ἐν γῇ πεζήν*, 2.84.2). Phormio's strategy proves correct, for the Spartans cannot "hold their ground" when a breeze Phormio had anticipated picks up. The Spartan commanders admit afterward that their tactics were unsuitable: "We were not really sailing for a sea battle but for a land battle" (*οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν*, 2.87.2).

After this initial victory, Phormio assures his men that they need not fear the next engagement, even though the Peloponnesian forces will be larger. He ridicules the Spartans' inappropriate tactics: "They take confidence in the success their experience as foot soldiers gives them [*διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπειρίαν*] and actually believe this experience will give them even at sea [*καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ*] the same success" (2.89.2). In describing his tactic, Phormio says he will keep to open water, "for otherwise a sea battle would have to turn into a land battle [*ἀνάγκη ἂν εἴη τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεζομαχίαν καθίστασθαι*] and in this the greater number of ships would win" (2.89.8). In fact the Spartans do manage to lure the Athenians into a limited engagement in the narrows of the Corinthian gulf and to win a partial victory by relying on land-based tactics. Thucydides describes the Spartan formation on this occasion just as he would a hoplite phalanx, "drawing up their ships in ranks four deep with the right wing in the lead" (*ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς...δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ*, 2.90.1).[13] The Spartan practice of leading with their right wing even at sea, however, is strikingly anomalous, since a trireme, unlike a hoplite with a shield on his left and a sword on his right, is ambidextrous in both attack and defense, and the primacy of the right wing, conditioned by primitive superstition as well as practical concerns, was already at this period old-fashioned even on land.[14] Thucydides thus touches on the land-sea distinction four times explicitly in this particular narrative (once in Phormio's first speech, once in the Spartan response, twice in Phormio's second speech) and twice implicitly (once in the description of the Spartan battle line, once in Phormio's description of tactics).

The naval engagements of Sybota and Patras seem to illustrate Pericles' dictum "We [Athenians] gain more on land from our experience at sea than [the Spartans] gain at sea from their experience on land" (*πλέον*

13. Cf. 5.71.1 and 6.67.1 (*ἐπὶ ὀκτώ*, the normal hoplite phalanx).
14. See Detienne 1968.

γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἤπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά, 1.142.5). Pericles' formulation presumes an extended and strained line of reasoning, and without elaborate qualification, the land-sea paradox only appears to fit the second half of the argument. The qualities of patience and fortitude that make the Spartans good hoplites will not, we presume, serve them at sea, where technical skill is required of the rowers and daring, adaptability, and improvisation of the commanders. Phormio, as we have seen, makes just such a judgment (2.89.2), and the battle off Patras itself also confirms the reasonableness of the second part of Pericles' surmise. The Spartans' attempts to apply land-based tactics to the sea prove clumsy and, in the first fight, are the cause of their undoing. For obvious reasons, we find no confirmation in the *Histories* for the first part of Pericles' statement. The closely synchronized discipline of rowing might be transferred to phalanx movements, but rowers were the very men who could not afford hoplite armor. In fact, as we shall see, a quasi-reversal of the motif "sea on land" occurs only once and in circumstances tragic for Athens.

As the war progresses, however, the Peloponnesians, despite Pericles' predictions (1.142.6–9), manage to become more adept at sea. Indeed the Corinthians had anticipated they would, referring to a time when their expertise would be "equal": μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν... (1.121.4). We would expect this circumstance to cause the land-sea paradox to disappear gradually, for it is chiefly the Spartans' initial inexperience at sea that creates a simple, one-sided dislocation of tactics. As all naval battles come to be fought with the appropriate "ram and back off" tactics instead of the old-fashioned style (seen at Sybota) of boarding parties fighting on the decks of ships deliberately locked together, it should no longer be appropriate to speak of a land battle fought at sea. But instead of dropping his comments, Thucydides now finds opportunities to exploit the paradox even further. When, for example, the Spartans are attacking from their ships the Athenians' fortifications at Pylos, Thucydides comments:

> As fortune would have it, the Athenians were fighting from land—and Laconian land at that—against an enemy at sea, and the Lacedaemonians were debarking from ships against Athenians onto land that was their own but hostile to them. (4.12.3)

> [ἐς τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη ὥστε Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Λακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους ἐπιπλέοντας, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεῶν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὖσαν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους ἀποβαίνειν.]

In the next sentence, Thucydides presses home the paradox (ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης) by reminding us of what we can scarcely have forgotten, that the Spartans were land based and good foot soldiers (τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστοις) and the Athenians a sea folk good at sailing (τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προύχειν). In book 7 we find even more baroque elaboration of the paradox, despite the fact that we now have a conflict between two sea powers, Athens and Syracuse. There would seem to be no possibility of anything paradoxical here, since the opponents should be equally at home on land and sea, and since the Athenians, arriving by ship at a land hostile to them, are only pursuing an extension of their practice in the early years of the war of raiding the Peloponnesus from the sea. In fact, however, Thucydides contrives a reversal, for the Athenians, even though attacking by sea, turn out to be landsmen compared to the land-based Syracusans. Hermocrates counsels his fellow Syracusans that they ought to fight the Athenians confidently at sea because the Athenians are actually more landsmen (ἠπειρώτας) than the Syracusans and were only compelled to become navy-oriented (ναυτικούς) by the Persian war (7.21.3). Nicias' old-fashioned tactics at Syracuse confirm Hermocrates' perception, for he tells his men he will overload their ships with archers, something he would not do "if fighting a naval battle on the high seas" (ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει) in order to fight "a land battle from the ships" (ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ, 7.62.2). The situation recalls that at Patras, and Nicias' speech recalls that of Phormio. The comparison with Phormio's speech is ironically reversed, however, for Nicias' sailors must adopt tactics that Phormio had ridiculed in the Spartans. But the Athenians now have no choice: "Our position is such that we are forced to fight as foot soldiers from our ships" (ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, 7.62.4). Thucydides himself comments pointedly on another similarity to an earlier battle—the land-sea beachhead at Pylos: "They now suffered what they had earlier inflicted at Pylos" (7.71.7). Nicias' next words make further explicit this inverse allusion to the situation at Pylos: "And remember that the land, except for what the army controls, is hostile to us" (ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς, πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχῃ, πολεμίας οὔσης, 7.62.4). At Pylos too (4.12.3) the "land" was "hostile" (ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Λακωνικῆς), but there the beachhead was secure and the outcome favorable to Athens. In Sicily, however, there is no piece of land the Athenians can call their own without a desperate fight.[15]

The Syracusans, as islanders, may be expected to be good seamen, and structural improvements they make to their ships increase their advantage

15. A number of scholars have pointed out similarities (other than the land-sea motif) between events at Syracus and Pylos (e.g., Rawlings 1981, 174, with bibliography).

still further over Athenian ships now in disrepair (7.34–36, 7.65.2). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that though the Syracusans were in fact islanders, they possessed an essentially land-based empire and derived most of their wealth from agriculture and from exploiting the inland Sicels. So, in fact, unlike the Athenians after the imposition of Pericles' policy of treating the city as if it were an island (1.143.5), the Syracusans were not true islanders at all. The mainland Athenians imported from abroad as if they were islanders, while the Syracusan islanders lived off their land. In book 7, however, in order to stress the land-sea paradox, Thucydides ignores the extent to which Sicily's economy was land based. Though the context here is admittedly military, not economic, Hermocrates' claims that the Syracusans, not the Athenians, are truly *ναυτικοί* are clearly exaggerated in such a way as to call attention to the land-sea motif. In book 8, moreover, the historian comments that the Spartans were glad that their Sicilian allies "had increased their power greatly because of the fleet they now had gotten" (*πολλῇ δυνάμει, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγενημένου*, 8.2.3), as if this were a recent development. In fact, even at the beginning of the fifth century the Syracusans had a navy large enough to offer 200 triremes to aid the Hellenic defense against Persia (Herodotus 7.158.4).

In the last retreat of the Athenians in Sicily, Thucydides sees the final evolution and, at last, a true but poignant and bizarre reversal of the land-sea paradox:

> This was the greatest reversal [*διάφορον*] ever to happen to a Hellenic army, for after coming in the hopes of enslaving others, they were now leaving in the fear that they might suffer this very fate, and instead of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, they were now beginning their march with foreboding words that were their opposite. They were traveling now as foot soldiers, not sailors, and relying more on soldiery than on naval skill [*πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ*]. (7.75.7)

Here we finally have a kind of "sea on land" but, ironically, not in the manner Pericles had earlier so confidently predicted, for the Athenian sailors' nautical expertise is of no use to them on this piece of land. This is in fact a case of "*not* sea on land." Here, the pity of the scene and the cumulative effect of the land-sea paradox make the reader accept as appropriate (and moving and pathetic) the otherwise ludicrously otiose comment that an army retreating over land makes no use of naval skills.

Thucydides' elaboration of the "land on sea" motif, however, fits the evidence neatly only down to 413 (the end of book 7), for after that time

Athens was able to rebuild the navy and fight on at sea. The motif seems exclusively associated with Thucydides' conception of events down to 413, because it does not occur in book 8 or indeed in Xenophon's *Hellenica* down to the narrative of 404. The theory of a total exchange of naval superiority between Athens and Sparta also fits the situation in 404, with Athens' long walls dismantled and the navy reduced to a twelve-ship coast guard. But the theory once again fails to fit the evidence in the early fourth century, when we now suppose Thucydides might well have been still trying to work on his book. This period in the early fourth century was one in which Athens was once again regaining power and also, as we know from several sources, including inscriptions, had plans for rebuilding its navy.[16] To finish his book at this time, Thucydides would have had not only to recast the motif of "land on sea" but to revise the conception of the war and its consequences that the motif presumes. To be effective, the motif presumes that the Athenians utterly lost their navy at Syracuse or in 404 and never rebuilt it. The survival of "land on sea" in our text thus provides a kind of internal evidence for one frustration—particularly given the physical difficulties of revising a long manuscript at the time[17]—which might have kept Thucydides from finishing his *Histories*.

Through the paradox of "land on sea" Thucydides illustrates some of war's uncertainties, specifically the failure of battles to obey the old etiquette of hoplite combat on land or the rules of the new science of trireme engagements at sea. The motif reflects both the author's hopes and his disappointments. He had been wrong before, once when Pericles' strategy failed to bring victory, and then again when Athens bounced back from apparent ruin at Syracuse in 413. Now, in the 390s, there were signs he would be proven wrong again.

So we have here an author faced with an already much revised manuscript that advances a thesis the facts now seem increasingly to belie. No wonder he could not bring himself to continue. It might be objected, at this point, that I am projecting back onto Thucydides a modern creative angst or writer's block somehow inappropriate to the conditions of literary creativity in antiquity. Chance, however, supplies an ancient parallel that has, so far as I know, never been noted. Xenophon breaks off his Hellenica after the maddeningly inconclusive battle of Mantinea. Clearly, Xenophon had hoped that this battle would be a resounding victory for either Sparta or Thebes and thus would supply a tidy stopping point in his work. Instead,

16. E.g.: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.2–10; *Hell. Oxy.* 6.1–7.2; *IG* $2^2$.1656–57. See also, for example, Strauss 1986, 58, 107.

17. For a discussion of these difficulties see Flory 1980.

there was no clear winner, and both sides set up a trophy. In Xenophon's closing words we may sense a measure of his frustration: "Let this be my stopping point; subsequent events will likely interest someone else" (ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ μέχρι τούτου γραφέσθω· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἴσως ἄλλῳ μελήσει, 7.5.27).[18]

I close with one other piece of evidence, suggestive rather than conclusive, in support of my thesis that Thucydides abandoned, rather than was prevented by death from finishing, his work. We read in Diogenes Laertius (2.57) how Xenophon acted as Thucydides' literary executor. Diogenes says of Xenophon: "It is said that although he was in a position to claim as his own the books of Thucydides because they lay hidden (λανθάνοντα), he himself made them famous." Now we do not know Diogenes' source or the time referred to—Wilamowitz cites the passage but does not discuss it in his otherwise exhaustive survey of the ancient biographical tradition—but I think the diction here, λανθάνοντα, "because they lay hidden," is significant. Given that Xenophon did continue Thucydides' unfinished history, we would not have been surprised if Diogenes and his source had said that Xenophon found the elder historian's books ἀτελῆ, "unfinished." Such a remark would fit the pattern of ancient literary biography, which is not to introduce anything that could not be extrapolated from the author's works. But λανθάνοντα is a different matter. If Thucydides had died early and with pen in hand, we would not expect his works to "lie hidden." The word in fact better fits the case of an author who has abandoned his work after a long period of unsuccessful revision.

18. Cf. the similar formula Xenophon uses in *Eq.* 10.17, 12.14 (γεγράφθω). The present tense seems to imply the author's tentativeness about the ending of his work.

9

# The Silent Women of Thucydides: 2.45.2 Re-viewed

Paul Cartledge

HISTORIOGRAPHY, in the sense of the study of history writing as opposed to the writing of history, tends to be consigned to an ill-defined and twilit zone within the field of classical studies generally and within ancient Greek history in particular. We are all aware that something that might be called "history" first emerged as an intellectual and literary practice (not yet a discipline nor quite a genre) among the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.; and we all agree that in writing history we must start from and eventually somehow come back to the primary sources, including the ancient historians. But very few of us (those of us, that is, who own up to being "historians of ancient Greece") take historiography in the above sense as the sole or even as a central concern of our research. The Momiglianos of our profession can be counted on the fingers of not many hands, and full-fledged, no-holds-barred historiography tends to be left to "literary" scholars, professors of Greek or Latin rather than of ancient history, or even (tell it not in Gath) to nonspecialists.[1]

The major exception, of course, is Thucydidean historiography. More often, and more insistently, than any other ancient historian, Thucydides

This is the third offshoot of my current research and lecture program "The Greeks and 'The Other' in Classical Historiography (with special reference to Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle)"; see also Cartledge 1990, 1992. It is a great honor and pleasure to offer it to Martin Ostwald, whose friendship I have enjoyed and whose scholarship I have admired for over twenty years, since I was a graduate student at his transatlantic spiritual home, Oxford. I also thank the editors and the anonymous reader.

1. Momigliano 1990, e.g., 40–53; Gray 1989 (a professor of Greek); Woodman 1988 (a professor of Latin); A. Cook 1988 (a professor of comparative literature).

forces his readers to confront the most basic questions of method and theory, including that of the nature of history writing as such: Is it, to use Aristotelian terminology (e.g., *An. Post.* 100a8) a τέχνη or an ἐπιστήμη, or as Thucydides himself might have put it, some ξύγκρασις (8.97.2) of the two? Not surprisingly, judgments of Thucydides' status and value as a historian (or poet or dramatist or philosopher...?) commonly echo the predominant characteristic of his style of thought and expression, that is, polarized antithesis.[2] Our honorand too has been gripped by the necessity of Thucydidean historiography.[3] So perhaps he will not take amiss yet another, if mercifully brief and minimally annotated, attempt to explicate this profound and profoundly difficult author's inchoate text. Historiography, he will surely agree, is too important to be left to the professional historiographers.

Women constitute half the human race, sometimes more than half of particular societies, as even diehard patriarchalist thinkers like Aristotle are obliged to admit. But writers of history—or his-(s)tory—have not exactly done women proud, and one can sympathize, though not necessarily agree, with those present-day revisionist historians who contend that, despite the methodological difficulties, there can and should now be a history of women as distinct from and opposed to that of men, since for mainly biological and sociological reasons history affects women differently from men, just as women affect history differently.[4] At any rate, such an effort of historiographical recuperation would seem particularly apropos when faced with the sorry record of Thucydides. For on any scale measuring historians' acknowledgment and appreciation of the indispensable contribution of women to the making of the past, the son of Olorus and ἡ δεῖνα (mother's name unknown)[5] would have to be placed somewhere near the bottom. A mere fifty references to women individually and collectively was all he could contrive—or bear—to muster. Why?

This is not exactly a new question. Two articles discussing the topic of women in (or not in) Thucydides appeared independently not so long ago, offering explanations of varying persuasiveness.[6] But although the question

2. See Rawlings 1981, x, 3–6, 263–72, for science and art in Thucydides. See Parry 1970, 7 (= 1989, 181), on antithesis as "the most prominent feature of Thucydides' style."

3. Ostwald 1988; cf. Ostwald 1986, index s.v. "Thucydides."

4. Degler 1974, cited more fully in Cartledge 1981, 85–86; also Gallo 1984.

5. Herman 1990, 349–50.

6. Wiedemann 1983; D. Harvey 1985. I agree with Harvey (1985, 90) that Wiedemann was wrong to place women on a par with the weather as a "non-rational factor which might affect historical events," but I also agree with Wiedemann that the question of rationality (or lack of it) was crucial to Thucydides' perception and (non)representation of women as historical subjects.

is not new, it is the intellectual and ideological context within which it is posed that determines the slant and force of the answers. Here, *Before Sexuality*, a recent collection of articles exploring "the construction of erotic experience in the ancient Greek world," and a characteristically brilliant essay by Nicole Loraux, devoted to what she calls the "naturel féminin" in the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, seem to me to provide the appropriate context and to point the way forward.[7] I argue that Thucydides' culturally overdetermined construction of female gender in terms of φύσις offers the most completely satisfying explanation of this instance of both "what Thucydides takes for granted" and his "self-imposed limitations."[8] Thucydides, however, is conspicuous only by his absence from *Before Sexuality*, and Loraux's article is consciously selective, dealing just with collectivities of women (and not citing either Wiedemann or Harvey). Nor does she especially privilege 2.45.2—as I shall do in the hope of showing that concealed within this short text there lie both a major historiographical subtext and a controlling historiographical program.

Many would-be explanations, not excluding psychobiographical speculations, have been more or less seriously advanced to account for the silence of women in Thucydides and/or Thucydides' silence about women. One explanation acknowledges that the Greek city was a kind of "men's club," and that war was a man's business, demanding literally masculine ἀνδρεία.[9] Thucydides' subject was war between and within Greek cities. How, then, could he possibly have introduced women prominently, let alone centrally, into his narrative, when they had virtually nothing, anyhow nothing significant, to do with or in war? This explanation is not without force but cannot be complete. Consider Aristotle on the women of Sparta. It was of course the Spartan men who did the fighting, but the men, according to Aristotle, were ruled by the women, and the latter, when physically confronted with an army of invasion in 370/69, failed to behave even as well as women in other cities did: "They were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy."[10] The Peloponnesian War should have offered plenty of scope

7. Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990; Loraux 1990, 273–300, 369–76, "En guise de conclusion: Le naturel féminin dans l'histoire."

8. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:25. But Gomme, himself the author of a notably euphemistic article on the "position" of women in classical Athens (1925), significantly does not cite Thucydides' silence on women under either of these rubrics.

9. For "men's club" see Vidal-Naquet 1981, 269 (= 1986, 206) in an article entitled "Esclavage et gynécocratie dans la tradition, le mythe, l'utopie." On ἀνδρεία see Loraux 1990, index s.v., esp. 280 and n. 31. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1260a20–24) recognizes at most an ancillary or subordinate ἀνδρεία in women.

10. Arist. *Pol.* 1269b32–39; cf. Cartledge 1981, 87–88; Napolitano 1987; Loraux 1990, 291–93. On Greek women in war, see Schaps 1982; Graf 1984.

to Thucydides for descriptions of women's behavior under attack in various parts of the Hellenic world, whether or not he shared Aristotle's negative view of alleged Spartan gynecocracy.

A second initially plausible explanation invokes Thucydides' anti-Herodotean stance. Herodotus had shown how one could both write a history of war and say a very great deal (381 references) about women, individually and collectively, Greek and non-Greek; indeed, he had treated the "usages" of women as a vital index of a society's civilization and culture and thus, from his standpoint of comparative ethnographer of custom (*νόμος*: see esp. 3.38), as an important historiographical variable.[11] But Thucydides, in line with his tacit rejection of Herodotus the *λογογράφος* (credulous retailer of myths and wonders, indiscriminate commemorator of the famous deeds of barbarians as well as Greeks, and unreliable reteller of ancient tales), implicitly denied Herodotus' positive assessment of the status of women as historical agents and cultural barometers.

Again, this cannot be a complete explanation, since it does not entirely account for the selectivity of the comparatively few references to women that Thucydides did choose to make. For instance, despite the territorial concentration on Attica of the first half of the work as it survives, not a single living Athenian woman (or woman living at Athens) is mentioned individually, and there are but half a dozen references to Athenian women collectively.

A third possible explanation must therefore be sought. It may be extrapolated from the Periclean—or Thucydidean—epitaphios (2.35–46). The genre of oratory to which this undoubtedly realistic, but unquantifiably authentic, example belongs concerned itself with the self-image of Athens and the representation of Athenians to themselves. It thus typically and necessarily discoursed a great deal about the "other," whether non-Greek (especially Persian), non-Athenian-Greek (especially Spartan), non-Athenian-male-citizen (Athenian women), or a combination of some or all of these categories (notably, Amazons).[12] The Periclean epitaphios, moreover, both in its immediate setting (placed just before the account of the Great Plague) and in its wider context (serving as a kind of benchmark for the ideal democratic polis as interpreted aristocratically by Thucydides' Pericles) was being made to do extra, historiographical work in furtherance of the historian's overall explanation of Athens' role and ultimate defeat in the Peloponnesian, or rather Thucydidean, War. This is where and how 2.45.2—and Thucydidean difference— come in.

11. Rosellini and Said 1978; Dewald 1981.

12. Loraux 1981, with bibliography on the genre at 479–81. On the Amazons see Tyrrell 1984, esp. chap. 3; Carlier and Detienne 1980.

After having him talk solely of men and the polis for nearly nine-tenths of the speech, Thucydides has Pericles make the following, almost grudging, aside (in the admirable, literal translation of J. S. Rusten):[13]

> If it is necessary to make some mention of the virtue of the women who will now be widows, I shall define it all in a brief admonition; for great is the glory for you [widows] not to be worse than your existing nature, and of her whose celebrity, whether for virtue or for reproach, exists least among males.

Rusten's commentary is as exemplary as his translation and merits extensive quotation. He remarks on the "extraordinary hermeneutic effort" that has been expended by some recent scholars on turning this value judgment "into a sort of compliment," that is, as Rusten correctly argues, precisely inverting the true meaning of the Periclean/Thucydidean prescription.[14] Rusten says "the topic of women's virtue is introduced at all only with reluctance, and the language of the two items of 'advice' is unrelievedly harsh, even cruel"—all the more cruel, we may add, in that the earlier advice to take comfort in the children who have not been killed or to have more children to replace the dead ones was apparently addressed solely to bereaved fathers.

But cruel and heartless as this advice may seem to us, it was surely not intended to be so by Pericles—or Thucydides. Rather, it was but one application of the normal and normative construction of women's φύσις, of "le naturel féminin," by free Greek citizen men in a society that was "ridden with sexism"—even if the vehemence of the application did perhaps owe something to recollection of supposedly man-eating Greek widows like Herodotus' Artemisia.[15] For women to render themselves audible or visible, or otherwise to make their presence decisively felt, within the public male space of the polis was to act precisely "contrary to nature," that is, to contradict the essential nature of "Woman." Such transgressive behavior was readily explicable and (at best) tolerable only in the topsy-turvy world of στάσις, as it was classically on Corcyra in 427, when the women on the democrats' side, along with slaves (another cultural transgression), actually did some fighting—παρὰ φύσιν (3.74.2).[16]

13. Rusten 1989, 175–78.

14. Rusten's interpretation has now been independently confirmed by Loraux (1990, 290 and n. 67), within her general discussion of "women and φύσις" (288–99).

15. For "ridden with sexism" see Golden 1990, xiv. On Artemisia see Munson 1988.

16. For an excellent discussion of "women and στάσις," with special reference to this passage, see Loraux 1990, 284–87. On the cooperation of women and slaves, ideologically as well as pragmatically abnormal and anomic, see Vidal-Naquet 1981, 269 (= 1986, 206).

Over this, at least, Thucydides and Aristotle would have been entirely at one, since they both resorted effortlessly to the language of "nature" when representing this ineluctably central feature of Greek culture.[17] But Thucydides pressed the point to its logical extreme. Ever alert to the relationship of λόγος and ἔργον inside and outside the frame of his history,[18] he proved in deed as good as his Pericles' word. If great glory accrued to the woman who was least mentioned in male, civic discourse, then it was not for the chivalrous—or chauvinist—Thucydides to mention women, or at any rate "respectable" (especially Athenian) ones, whether for praise or for blame, in his utilitarian, male-citizen oriented historiography. In the advice of his Pericles at 2.45.2, therefore, is also contained a program for Thucydides' own ξυγγραφή.[19]

That, however, by no means exhausts the historiographical implications and resonances of this paragraph, and from here my argument proceeds even further beyond any published explanation known to me of Thucydidean silence about women. Absolutely the most talked about woman at Athens in the 430s, usually for blame (possibly including formal legal proceedings) rather than praise, was of course a certain Aspasia, who just happened to be Pericles' common-law wife (as he saw it and indeed had indirectly decreed it by his sponsorship of the citizenship law of 451/50) or high-class madam and whore (as the man in the Athenian street was encouraged to see her both by Pericles' serious political opponents and by a succession of comic dramatists).[20] This is and was common knowledge, a school for scandal. Somewhat less obvious are the special reasons Thucydides had for keeping utterly silent about this particular woman of Athens.

First, partly from genuine historiographical conviction and partly out of admiration for Pericles, Thucydides went to enormous lengths to exonerate Pericles personally from any responsibility for causing the war. War had been inevitable (1.23.6), Thucydides claimed in one of his rare authorial interventions. Pericles' contribution was to have had the foresight and intelligence to recognize this and prepare Athens properly for it (1.140–44, 2.65.5–6), and it was the Spartans who (as they themselves later confessed,

17. Concerning Aristotle on female φύσις (esp. *HA* 608a21–608b15) see, e.g., Clark 1982; Lloyd 1983, 94–105, cf. 62–86 (Hippocratics); Saïd 1983.

18. Parry 1981.

19. On the naming (or not naming) of women among unrelated males in public contexts see the modern works cited by D. Harvey (1985, 86 n. 24, 90).

20. For sources on Aspasia see Hill 1951, 367. On the alleged impiety trial see Ostwald 1986, 192, 194–95, 257; Bauman 1990, 38, 41. On Aspasia's general status see Just 1989, 144 ("the paradigm case"). On the citizenship law see Patterson 1981.

7.18.2–3) had started it. There could be no question, therefore, of the relevance of any personal motives of Pericles to either the origins or the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.[21]

Second, although Thucydides did state that in 430 the Athenians "held Pericles responsible for having persuaded them to go to war" (2.59.2), what he did not state, or even hint, was that Pericles was in fact accused by his fellow citizens of having his own private and selfish reasons for embroiling Athens in an unnecessary war. One version of that allegation, expressed humorously by Hermes in Aristophanes' *Peace* of 421 (lines 605–9) but taken deadly seriously by the normally sober and pro-Athenian fourth-century chronicler Ephorus (*FGrH* 70 F 196), held that Pericles started the war to avoid charges of sacrilegious malversation. But in another Aristophanic version, placed four years earlier in the no less humorous mouth of Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 524–33) and quoted in part by Ephorus, the lovestruck Olympian's relationship with Aspasia was implicated as the decisive causal factor. The particular motivation alleged here for Pericles' starting the war (to recover a couple of prostitutes stolen by "the Megarians" from Aspasia's whorehouse) was presumably (im)pure Aristophanic invention, a parody perhaps of Herodotus' also somewhat tongue-in-cheek introit.[22] But behind that Aristophanism lay the sort of vulgar gossip that chimed with—and thus owed its general plausibility to—male Greek gender-ideology and actual political behavior. For example, Aristotle, the faithful reporter of accepted and reputable views (*τὰ φαινόμενα, τὰ ἔνδοξα*), found nothing odd in ascribing great public political upheavals to domestic erotic passions, and the Athenian democracy's tyrannicide charter-myth, which even Thucydides accepted as accurate in point of its (homo)sexual politics, depended on the very same association of ideas.[23] There was nothing intrinsically outlandish, therefore, in Homeric-style *cherchez la femme* explanations of the origins of the Peloponnesian War that pointed the finger of accusation at Pericles' "unnatural" passion for Aspasia.

So the silence of Thucydides about Aspasia is earsplitting. But how precisely is it to be construed? Gomme saw the essential point (which I have italicized):

21. De Ste. Croix (1972) triumphantly demonstrated that this was Thucydides' view; whether that view was right, in whole or in part, is a separate issue.

22. Evans (1991, 30 n. 79) rightly notes that it "might equally well be a parody of the popular traditions that were peddled by the *λόγιοι* in their oral presentations."

23. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311a37–1312b20) begins a very long catalog of revolutionary attacks on tyrants and other monarchs, Greek and non-Greek, with the Harmodius-Aristogeiton "tyrannicide" episode; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 18.2–4, 58.1. On the overall historiographical purpose of Thucydides' "tyrannicide" digression (6.54–59) see, with caution, Rawlings 1981, 258–59.

> It proves not only that he regarded the stories themselves as too puerile to need refuting, but that *he did not himself believe* either *that Pericles was guided in his policy by personal motives*, or that his political position was shaken by the outbreak of the war.[24]

But what Gomme should have added was that Thucydides did not likewise extend the benefit of the doubt, let alone ascribe loftily statesmanlike motivations, to any other Athenian politicians. When it came to not making peace in 425, breaching the armistice of 423, making peace in 421, or beginning a second war in Sicily in 415, Thucydides did not hesitate or scruple to follow the train of vulgar thought and debit the behavior of the Athenian principals (respectively Cleon, Cleon again, Nicias, Nicias again, and Alcibiades) to their sordidly selfish pursuit of prestige and lucre. In this, Thucydides asseverated that, as in the matter of the grand strategy of the war, the leading Athenian politicians after Pericles "in every way did exactly the opposite of Pericles" (2.65.7).[25]

The sharpness and rhetorical impact of that crucial distinction, for Thucydides, would have been sensibly dulled had even the existence of Aspasia been so much as implied. A fortiori, her name could not be mentioned in his public history—a silence that sorted only too happily with the (ostensibly ethical) injunction of "Pericles" at 2.45.2, and that by implication endorsed Pericles' (but not usually the man in the Athenian street's) view of Aspasia as an honorary Athenian wife.[26] In short, it suited the book of Thucydides perfectly that his ideological and programmatic construction of women's nature and role in history should have sanctioned his silence over Aspasia, and it was a masterpiece of allusion (or illusion) to have that construction articulated as a categorical imperative by none other than Aspasia's consort. Truly, Thucydides—or my Thucydides—"is not a colleague," at all events not one that Martin Ostwald would easily recognize as such.[27]

24. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:27.

25. On the composition problem of 2.65.7, see Gomme 1951, 71–72.

26. It was to honor Pericles, not Aspasia, that their bastard son Pericles was both legitimized and naturalized by special decree of the Athenian Assembly in 430; testimonia in Osborne 1981–83, 3: 27–29.

27. Loraux 1980.

*10*

# Thucydides 2.45.2 and the Status of War Widows in Periclean Athens

Lisa Kallet-Marx

*εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθῆναι, βραχείᾳ παραινέσει ἅπαν σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ᾖ.*

(Thuc. 2.45.2)[1]

THIS PASSAGE FROM PERICLES' FUNERAL ORATION has long been notorious. To be sure Pericles has had his defenders, who have suggested that the ideal to which women should aspire is motivated by a beneficent, paternalistic desire to protect or is "just another expression of that most characteristic Hellenic ideal, *σωφροσύνη*."[2] For most scholars, however, Thucydides 2.45.2 is the locus classicus of the view that Athenian women were denigrated and relegated to a life of obscurity—or at least that this was the ideal.[3] There are many variations on the theme, but for our purposes it suffices to note that there is general agreement that Pericles—or

It is a special pleasure to dedicate this chapter to Martin Ostwald, since it not only concerns an author dear to him, but was written while we were colleagues at Swarthmore College. A short version was presented at the 1990 meeting of the American Philological Association in San Francisco, and an expanded one at the University of Pennsylvania in April, 1991. I thank those who offered comments and suggestions then and at several other venues where versions of this chapter were presented.

1. "If I must make mention of womanly virtue, in the case of those who will now be widows, I shall indicate everything in a brief word of advice. Great is your reputation if you do not fall below the nature that is yours, and great is the reputation of the one who has the least renown among men either concerning her *arete* or her faults."

2. Richter 1971, 3; cf. also Kitto 1951, 224.

3. The list of proponents of this view is extensive; see Richter 1971; Pomeroy 1975, 58–60; Walcot 1973, 111–21; Wiedemann 1983, 163–70; Rusten 1989, ad loc.

Thucydides[4]—recommends exclusion from public life for women as a whole, and that his advice reflects a widespread devaluation of women in Athens generally. The variety of interpretations is certainly testimony of the typical complexity of Thucydidean Greek; but it also suggests that perhaps we have not yet hit the full meaning and implications of the passage. This should hardly surprise, given the number of almost impenetrable sentences in the speeches; the Funeral Oration is no exception. I argue that Pericles' advice is considerably more focused in its referent, that its substance and significance have been misunderstood, and that we should be struck by his saying as much, not as little, as he does. I also suggest that the passage enriches our understanding of the special nature of the Periclean polis.

It is first necessary to consider one apparent obstacle to my argument. Not only modern scholars have understood Thucydides 2.45.2 to recommend seclusion and exclusion for women; Plutarch, too, seems to have read the passage in a similar way. In his moral essay on "Womanly Virtue," Plutarch begins by registering his disapproval of Thucydides' advice to closet away women:

> *περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὦ Κλέα, γυναικῶν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ Θουκυδίδῃ γνώμην ἔχομεν. ὁ μὲν γάρ, ἧς ἂν ἐλάχιστος ᾖ παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ψόγου πέρι ἢ ἐπαίνου λόγος, ἀρίστην ἀποφαίνεται, καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς ἀγαθῆς γυναικὸς οἰόμενος δεῖν κατάκλειστον εἶναι καὶ ἀνέξοδον.*
>
> (*Mor.* 242e)

Plutarch, then, understood the passage in general to advocate complete anonymity in society for women, a relegation to the home, and he judges this with disapproval—this is not, to him, the way a good woman ought to be treated. How compelling, however, is Plutarch's sense of the passage? Ancient and Greek he was, but the difficulty of Pericles' advice lies not in the language but in the complexity of its meaning. Here Plutarch may be at a disadvantage, since otherwise he shows little acuity in his appreciation of the special nature of Periclean Athens.[5] It is important to recognize that he has entirely left out the potential for *μεγάλη δόξα* that Pericles expresses and focused exclusively on the last part of the sentence. Plutarch's comment may betray a superficial recollection of the passage that distorts the subtlety

4. For the present purpose, I need not engage in the debate on the composition and authorship of Thucydidean speeches, since what matters is simply that the ideas expressed in the oration reflect the historical context of Periclean Athens.

5. E.g., his treatment of the purpose of the Periclean building program in *Per.* 12; but cf. Stadter 1989, ad loc.

of the point being made. He clearly did not have the oration before him as he wrote his essay, as one can easily tell by noting the variations from the original (e.g., ἐλάχιστος παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ψόγου πέρι ἢ ἐπαίνου λόγος, from ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος), to which let us now turn.

Whom precisely is Pericles addressing? It is explicit that the specific addressees of Pericles' few words on "feminine virtue" are only the widows of the war dead who have been celebrated by public burial.[6] Pericles addresses his advice to ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, "those who will now be in widowhood." This makes perfect sense following remarks made specifically to the other relatives of the deceased heroes (2.44–2.45.1), not to all parents and sons. While this has not gone unnoticed, those who have recognized properly the targets of Pericles' comment have, with the exception of Anderson, proceeded to generalize to all Athenian women when assessing the overall significance of the passage. Pericles' advice, however, is applicable only to this particular category of women, for a special status is held out to them that was not open to Athenian women in general: Pericles offers the prospect of a μεγάλη δόξα, a "fine reputation," even honor or glory. It is crucial to appreciate that this clearly connotes public standing in the community as a whole. We shall return to this singular aspect of the statesman's advice. For now we can simply note that on the face of it, Pericles would seem to be alluding to the entry of these women into the public eye, not their retreat into obscurity. Let us continue with the "conditions" applied to the attainment of the widows' high public standing.

The war widows can acquire a μεγάλη δόξα if they do not fall short of their ὑπαρχοῦσα φύσις. While φύσις is regarded sometimes as a constant (e.g., Arist. *Rhet.* 1370a3), the possibility of its deterioration presented in this passage is consistent with other texts that similarly present it as something that might be improved or worsened if not guarded properly.[7] The qualifier ὑπαρχοῦσα, "existing," can define the φύσις of a given entity temporally—this would suit the notion of potential decline expressed by Pericles—but it also may emphasize what is specific (almost "peculiar") to a thing.[8] Two issues need to be addressed. First, as Walcot has noted, the remark is not "a gratuitous insult."[9] The fact that mere maintenance of their "existing nature" would bring these widows μεγάλη δόξα makes clear that it

6. This has been appreciated most fully by Anderson 1987.

7. For change for the better see, e.g., Ar. *Nu.* 515–17; for change for the worse see Isoc. *Areop.* 76; Ostwald 1986, 264.

8. E.g., Xen. *Cyr.* 6.4.4; Isoc. *Areop.* 76; Pl. *Ti.* 52b7; Arist. *Rh.* 1369b19; Arist. *Cael.* 301b17.

9. Walcot 1973, 115.

is essentially admirable, although of course it can degenerate. Second, is the φύσις Pericles speaks of common to all women—i.e., is it "woman's nature"? It is clear that, toward the end of the fifth century, φύσις had a range of meaning as applied to individuals and groups.[10] Men, women, Athenians, non-Athenians, the well-born, and the ignoble are ready examples of groups commonly thought to possess different φύσεις. In our passage, then, "existing nature" could refer to that φύσις particular to women. But just as men and women, for example, possess different natures (e.g., Xen. *Oec.* 7.22–28), so φύσεις could vary widely from individual to individual (e.g., Ar. *Vesp.* 1456–58; Lys. 19.18; Demos. 25.15). We must be alert to the possibility that the war widows Pericles addresses were as diverse in social class and personal circumstances as were their dead husbands. The φύσις of a vegetable seller was hardly the same as that of an aristocratic matron. Thus ὑπαρχοῦσα φύσις may well refer to the individual moral character peculiar to each war widow in the crowd.

Pericles then extends to the widows of Athenian war heroes the opportunity to become esteemed in the public community of Athens. In all discussions of this passage, this important point has never been noted. But it is surely extraordinary that this particular category of Athenian women might be awarded this status. However, before we consider just what this status entailed, we need to decipher the rest of the passage, for now we come to what has always been regarded as the crux.

The real difficulty in comprehension of the passage lies in the juxtaposition of μεγάλη δόξα and ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον κλέος. Pericles envisions a widow who can have both μεγάλη δόξα and ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον κλέος. This is often taken as a contradiction, a paradox, or even a descent into irony, despite the inappropriateness of such an element in an oration that is both somber and celebratory. Before resorting to such counsels of desperation, however, we need to give proper attention to the conceptual antithesis being drawn between δόξα and κλέος ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι. While δόξα is not limited by a further defining phrase, thus suggesting that it should be taken in its normal sense of public, communal esteem, κλέος is modified by ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι, "among males." Κλέος is commonly modified by phrases with ἄνθρωποι—for example, κλέος παρ' ἀνθρώποις[11]—and therefore the substitution of ἄρσενες suggests an entirely different context.

Taken as a whole, the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος, "reputation among the male sex," points to a private milieu, that is, specifically male gatherings,

10. For fuller discussion and sources see especially Ostwald 1986, 260–73; also Winkler 1990, 64–65; Heinimann 1945, esp. 89–98.

11. E.g., Xen. *Cyn.* 1.6; Pl. *Lg.* 663a.

from aristocratic symposia to conversations at the cheese shop, barbershop, shoemaker's, and so on,[12] and the reference here is evidently to "talk";[13] better still, I suggest, "gossip."[14] Such talk, no doubt of a sexual nature, at least in part, can of course be favorable or negative, but it would not enhance a respectable woman's reputation. In our passage, the ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος that a war widow wants to avoid is that for praise or blame (ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου).[15] Spacks defines the kind of talk or gossip that I suggest we should understand from the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος as that which takes place "in private, at leisure, in a context of trust."[16] As Hunter notes, "such gossip would be impossible to document in classical Athens, for the gossip found in our sources is embodied in public utterances."[17] We can, however, point to evidence that both allows us to appreciate the expectations about appropriate behavior for a respectable woman that would avoid talk among males and also suggests the target of concern about such talk.

Pericles' advice about avoiding "talk among males" is fully in accord with what we can piece together as a representative sample of the standards of behavior set by men for respectable women, especially married women. Girls were taught ideally to be modest and to maintain a proper sense of shame and decorum both in and outside the home. Thus, the young bride of Xenophon's priggish Ischomachus was instructed by her parents "to be modest" (σωφρονεῖν, *Oec.* 7.14). Modesty and quiet decorum as ideals can also be gleaned from numerous exaggerated allusions in Attic oratory, from Aristotle, and from tragedy as well.[18] The kind of talk or reputation that conspicuous or immodest behavior or bearing could prompt is well illustrated by Semonides of Amorgos' satirical poem on women and Hesiod's *Works and Days*, in passages that reveal the real source of concern about such talk, its effect on the οἶκος.[19] But how does positive gossip harm?

A reputation "among males" περὶ ἀρετῆς had more potential to do damage to a husband and his οἶκος than did a negative one. Talking about a

12. E.g., Lys. 24.20; Hyp. 4.21; Isoc. 18.9.

13. As it is translated in LSJ.

14. For the prevalence of gossip in Athens, as well as the milieux of talk, both political and private, see most recently, Hunter 1990; cf. also Winkler 1990, 66; Ober 1989, 148–51.

15. In this part of the sentence, ἀρετή has a different sense from its use at the beginning in the phrase γυναικεία ἀρετή, where it has a broader meaning of "excellence" or "virtue." In the context of a κλέος "among males" I would understand a sense primarily connected with a woman's physical beauty.

16. Spacks 1985, 5.

17. Hunter 1990, 301.

18. E.g., Arist. *Pol.* 1.5.1260a–b; Lys. 3.6–7; cf. also Demos. 47.35–42; Soph. *Aj.* 293; Soph. *El.*; Eur. *Tr.* 643–55 (I thank Linda Gillison for this reference), Eur. *El.* 341–44; cf. J. Gould 1980, 47–48; Just 1989, 105–25.

19. E.g., Semon. fr. 7.105–13W; Hes. *Op.* 699–701.

woman's beauty could have all sorts of ill effects, at least from the point of view of men. Late fifth-century Athenians might easily call to mind the foolish Lydian king Candaules, whose praise of his wife's beauty to his bodyguard led to disastrous consequences (Hdt. 1.8–12). An example from Roman rather than Greek oral tradition, worth mentioning as well, is the story of Lucretia (Livy 1.57–59). Both stories had as their starting points talk among males about the ἀρετή of a woman or women. That it was highly objectionable for well-born women to be talked about by men outside the οἶκος for good or ill emerges explicitly in one of Plutarch's "Spartan Sayings": The view of King Areus in a group of men praising other men's wives was that, "by the gods, there ought to be no talk about noble women by outsiders." This view is echoed by another Spartan, Euboidas, whose stomach turned at hearing men praise other men's wives.[20] Closer to home, a passage in Hyperides (1.5–6) illustrates familial protection of a citizen woman's honor and reputation. These anecdotes at least make clear that it was virtually taboo to talk about other men's wives, whether for good or for ill. A reputation of any sort "among males" ran the risk of slighting the woman's husband and his οἶκος, if she was married.

The distinction between δόξα in the community and κλέος among males should now be clear. Pericles' advice no longer appears contradictory or ironic. The statesman is contrasting public reputation and private gossip about someone's private life—a contrast he knew well from personal experience. In this passage, Pericles enjoins the war widows to maintain appropriate behavior and to avoid male gossip so that they may attain high public esteem.[21] Interpreted in this light, Pericles' comment, although expressed in a complex and nuanced fashion, is nevertheless not far from a comment by Gorgias, related by Plutarch and tantalizing in this context, that a woman's δόξα was more important than her εἶδος.[22]

Pericles' advice about avoiding talk among males fits well, as we have seen, into established expectations for all respectable women, but especially married women. There is, then, nothing unusual about that part of the advice, although it may be noteworthy that Pericles extends into widowhood expectations to which Athenian women were ideally held in marriage.

20. *Mor.* 217f: Ἄρευς, ἐπαινούντων τινῶν οὐκ ἰδίας ἀλλά τινας τῶν ἀλλοτρίων γυναικῶν, "μὰ τοὺς θεούς," εἶπε, "περὶ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν γυναικῶν οὐδένα δεῖ λόγον εἰκῇ λέγεσθαι, ἀγνοεῖσθαι δ' αὐτὰς τὸ παράπαν, ὁποῖαι τυγχάνουσι, πλὴν μόνοις τοῖς συμβιοῦσι"; *Mor.* 220d: Εὐβοίδας ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινούντων γυναῖκα ἀλλοτρίαν οὐκ ἀπεδέχετο, φήσας, "ὅλως περὶ γυναικείας φύσεως παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω λόγον εἶναι οὐδένα δεῖ."

21. The second part of the advice on avoiding a κλέος "among males" would presumably have had an intended effect on the males in the crowd as well.

22. Plut. *Mor.* 242f: ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός.

The remarkable element, as I have suggested above, is that *μεγάλη δόξα* is offered to the war widows. Accordingly, if we have now correctly interpreted the passage, we can turn to the most interesting question: Why was such a comment made in the context of a ceremony of the polis honoring its war dead? I suggest both that this context raises Pericles' advice out of the realm of Greek platitudes about ideal female behavior and that it has a larger significance deriving from the occasion.

Is this kind of comment typical of a public funeral oration? Of course it is impossible for any answer to carry complete conviction, since only four other such speeches are extant.[23] We can, however, draw an important inference, even if it must be qualified. In his study on the tradition of the funeral oration, Ziolkowski has established that the "consolatory" section of the Thucydidean example is otherwise highly conventional for the most part.[24] Accordingly, it perhaps takes on special significance that in no other *παραμυθία* does a parallel instruction to widows appear and in only two others, those of Lysias and Hyperides, are women addressed at all, and then with no resemblance whatsoever to Pericles' remarks to the war widows.[25] Pericles' comment, then, is unique in our admittedly small sample and may constitute a break with tradition rather than, as often supposed, a hackneyed commonplace. It is worth considering whether it tells us something specific about the Periclean polis.

By what authority could Pericles, the orator speaking for and extolling the polis at this ceremony, give such advice? A public speaker intruding into the private sphere of the *οἶκος* should catch our attention. Only a little earlier in the oration (2.37.2), Pericles contrasted public life and obligations with the private sphere, asserting that when it comes to private life and behavior, the Athenians have the freedom to do what they want.[26] In this entire section of the speech, the distinction between carefully prescribed public obligations and private life is repeatedly made explicit.[27] The point of this is not

23. Hyp. 6; Lys. 2; Demos. 60; cf. Pl. *Mx.* 236d4–249c8.

24. Ziolkowski 1981, 181.

25. Lys. 2.75: *μόνην δ' ἄν μοι δοκοῦμεν ταύτην τοῖς ἐνθάδε κειμένοις ἀποδοῦναι χάριν, εἰ τοὺς μὲν τοκέας αὐτῶν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας οὕτως ἀσπαζοίμεθα ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ πατέρες ὄντες, ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν εἰ τοιούτους βοηθοὺς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρέχοιμεν, οἷοίπερ ἐκεῖνοι ζῶντες ἦσαν;* Hyp. 6.26–27: *ὑπὲρ ὧν ἁπάντων οὗτοι πόνους πόνων διαδόχους ποιούμενοι, καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἡμέραν κινδύνοις τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἅπαντα χρόνον φόβους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παραιρούμενοι, τὸ ζῆν ἀνήλωσαν εἰς τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους καλῶς ζῆν. διὰ τούτους πατέρες ἔνδοξοι, μητέρες περίβλεπτοι τοῖς πολίταις γεγόνασι, ἀδελφαὶ γάμων τῶν προσηκόντων ἐννόμως τετυχήκασι καὶ τεύξονται, παῖδες ἐφόδιον εἰς τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν τὴν τῶν οὐκ ἀπολωλότων ἀρετήν.* One should note that widows are not even mentioned in the latter.

26. Cf. also D.H. 20.13; Vernant 1989b, 218–19.

27. See Kakridis 1961, ad loc.

that there are no social conventions or morality by which people's private lives are constrained, but rather that private behavior is a private matter; the state does not regulate private life (unlike Sparta, an obvious implied contrast). This general rule would have applied absolutely to the lives of women, whose education and behavior were the concern of their parents, ultimately of their κύριος—first, their fathers, and then, their husbands. Thus, Pericles' instructions for these war widows' private behavior should rub against our expectations, not conform to them. Perhaps this is why he begins his advice to the war widows with the words εἰ δέ με δεῖ. His apparent reluctance is surely founded not on lack of interest or belief in the triviality of his following comment or its referents but on an awareness of the normal impropriety for the polis to prescribe private behavior. Nevertheless, he overcomes his reluctance and, adopting the function of these widows' κύριοι, proffers this advice. Why? What relevance for the polis does the behavior of these widows have?

Recent work on the significance of public burial in Athens has devoted much attention to the assumption by the Periclean polis of certain functions normally within the private sphere.[28] Public burial and the commemoration of the war dead effected a transfer from the private to the public sphere by removing from the family the privilege and obligation of burying its dead and carrying out the appropriate rituals.[29] The war hero himself has now been co-opted by the polis, as is symbolized by the public burial, and likely by a hero cult, with annual sacrifices made at the δημόσιον σῆμα.[30] But special concern was extended also to the hero's family, and this was expressed in both tangible and symbolic ways. The "war orphans," sons of the war heroes, were educated at state expense, and when they attained adulthood, the polis gave them hoplite armor and special seats of honor in the theater. The polis acted as father, as Plato writes at the end of Aspasia's Funeral Oration in the *Menexenus* (249b). The custom of leading the war orphans onto the stage in the opening rituals of the Great Dionysia expressed this paternal aspect of the polis, as Goldhill has well shown.[31] The state acted in loco parentis, and a bond was created between city and former orphan, now with a new parent, the polis. These young men, then, like their fathers, were highly honored but were also removed from the private to the public sphere as the obligations of father to son were taken over by the state.

28. E.g., Humphreys 1983b, 1–32; Loraux 1981, 23–27, 31–32, 102–10, 114, 180–85; see also Shapiro 1991, 644–49.

29. But see Shapiro 1991, 656: "As the yearly burial of the war dead in the *demosion sema* continued to separate many men from their families in death, the union between these men and their survivors is increasingly stressed on lekythoi that may have gone into the tomb of yet another family member, or into a cenotaph."

30. Cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 58.1; Jacoby 1944, 39.

31. Goldhill 1990, 106–13.

What seems to become increasingly clear, as we consider Pericles' advice and its implications by looking at the broader social context, is that the widows of the war dead, like their husbands and their sons, are similarly to be accorded high honor—μεγάλη δόξα is open to them—while they are also partly co-opted into the public sphere. They too have acquired a new guardian in the state—thus Pericles acts as κύριος in giving his advice—but they also have new responsibilities to the polis, through their relation to their dead husbands, in place of their past responsibility to the husband's οἶκος. Their behavior affects the glory surrounding not only the war dead themselves, but also that of the polis, because of their husbands' new status as heroes of the polis. In the lifetime of their husbands, any gossip about such women would have been a slight not only to their husbands' honor, but to that of the entire οἶκος; after their husbands' death and elevation to the status of public heroes, such gossip would deflect glory from the hero, and the polis itself. This is why these particular widows' behavior—not that of women in general—is now, and only now, of special interest to the polis as a whole, and why we now see a public orator offering advice appropriate to a woman's κύριος.

A further implication of what has been argued here about the status of the widows of war heroes is of significance for the larger issue of democratic ideology in Periclean Athens. It has to do with the social and economic strata to which these widows would have belonged. Some scholars have argued, partly on the basis of the Athenian casualty lists, that the soldiers buried in a public burial at public expense and commemorated by a funeral oration would have been only hoplites and cavalry.[32] On the other side is the view, which I accept, that the war heroes celebrated by public burial were men of all social/economic levels, the poorest peasant along with the privileged aristocrats, for a simple reason: Athenian military power, based as it was on naval empire, relied above all on the rowers in the fleet, who were drawn largely from the thetes. This was a fact appreciated by critics and supporters of Athens' democracy and empire alike. Pericles' Funeral Oration, a glorification of Athenian spirit and δύναμις, articulates clearly the recognition that the navy is the basis of Athens' greatness and also the ideology that rich and poor were political equals in their sharing of full citizenship and their potential for contributing to the political and military greatness of the state. Conception and reality clash violently if the bones of rower and hoplite, fisherman, peasant, and aristocrat, were not heaped together in the public grave.

This is important given the significance of funeral practices in expressing the power and status of individual families among the aristocracies of

32. For discussion and bibliography, see Loraux 1981, 18, 32–37.

ancient societies.[33] Burying men of all social classes together according to the same ritual had a striking equalizing effect, elevating all to a special and equal status. Now that we see that war widows, too, were given public status as well through their connection with the heroes of the polis, it is perhaps justifiable to speculate that this potential to obtain public standing in the polis, μεγάλη δόξα, of which Pericles speaks, acted in an important sense to equalize these women of very different social levels. There is an implication that the ribbon seller, peasant, and aristocratic woman were all (equally) able to attain a great δόξα, as long as they did not allow their particular φύσις to degenerate. If so, public burial helped forge an egalitarian self-image among certain Athenian women (whose numbers will have been appreciable by the end of the twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War) as well as men.

Scholars have noted a development toward the greater exclusion of Athenian women from the public community of Athens coincident with the height of democracy in the age of Pericles. Although this can often be stated in far too extreme a fashion, it is reasonable to regard women's participation in the public life of Athens as restricted chiefly to their contribution to the religious life of the polis.[34] This is observable as a general rule. A remarkable exception, I have argued, is that of the widows of war heroes honored by the polis, whose symbolic relationship to the polis sets them apart from all other women. They, and they alone, are offered public esteem, a μεγάλη δόξα, as a result of their connection with those who have been made public heroes, their husbands. Their status in the community at large has been elevated, as has that of their husbands and their sons. The temporal boundaries of this status are more difficult to date with certainty, but I suggest that the privilege and status of these war widows are peculiar to Periclean Athens, to an age in which the polis as an entity exerted a hold over individuals and families whose primary allegiance to the polis was made explicit, a hold exerted in both words and deeds (in the Funeral Oration, in the public burial of war dead, and in the "adoption" of orphans and widows of war heroes). The relationship, moreover, between polis and the war heroes, their sons, and their wives seems to have an inherent ambiguity, for public privilege comes at the cost of family autonomy; the family loses aspects that both defined its integrity and saw to its preservation (e.g., the burial of its dead, economic self-sufficiency, and control over the behavior of its members). The treatment of the war widows, then, offers us further insight into the

33. Humphreys 1980, 123.

34. I am not concerned here with women's private activities in public, e.g., at the fountain, personal shopping, occupations in the agora, or at funerals.

tangible ways in which the special character of Periclean Athens at the height of the Athenian polis was manifest.

*11*

# "Here the Lion Smiled": A Note on Thucydides 1.127–38

Cynthia Patterson

THUCYDIDES' EXTENDED DIGRESSION on Pausanias and Themistocles in book 1 of his *Histories* has provoked frequent comment and at times puzzlement—from antiquity and the scholiast's comment on 126–27, "here the lion smiled," to Gomme's authoritative "the whole excursus on Themistokles is irrelevant to the narrative, and so is the greater part of those on Kylon and Pausanias."[1] The style has been thought uncharacteristically anecdotal—indeed very much "Herodotean"—prompting the comment that "even Thucydides could be gullible" and the almost predictable conclusion that this part of book 1 must have been written "early."[2] The content of the digression is less often commented upon, unless to question the credibility of the details in the stories or to raise the issue of bias in either the text or its sources.[3] Least often is the purpose of the digression

I am happy to offer this chapter to Martin Ostwald, in whose class I first met Herodotus and Thucydides, and for whose kindness and guidance over the years I am most grateful.

1. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:446–47. As Hornblower (1987, 26) notes, Gomme applies the scholiast's comment to the digression as a whole.

2. Hornblower 1987, 24, n. 36. Westlake (1977, 95–110) documents the unusual and Herodotean features of Thucydides' style in this digression—e.g., the general use of Σπαρτιάτης instead of Λακεδαιμόνιος—and notes that "of the approximately sixty words not found elsewhere in the *History* at least one-third are used by Herodotus, in most cases several times" (105). Westlake's conclusion is that Thucydides was using a written source, certainly an Ionian writer and possibly Charon of Lampsacus. Although Westlake cites the opening chapters of book 6, on the history of Sicily, as a possible analogous instance of Thucydides' working from a written source, I am not convinced.

3. See Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:425–47, and Westlake 1977, 95 n. 4, for bibliographical references. The quotation of letters (with the "Herodotean" introduction τάδε) is the prime locus of suspicion (Westlake 1977, 102–3).

given much attention. I argue that in the Themistocles-Pausanias digression, style is closely connected with content, and form with substance, and that Thucydides is here echoing, if not parodying, Herodotus' narrative style, as he "corrects" Herodotus' interpretation of the two most famous Greeks at the end of the Persian Wars. Without naming or directly confronting his predecessor,[4] Thucydides has fashioned a cleverly oblique critique that, despite its deceptively anecdotal style, articulates his disagreement with Herodotus and encapsulates his view of both Athenian and Spartan character.

## Herodotus on Themistocles and Pausanias

Herodotus paints at best an ambiguous portrait of Themistocles.[5] The "son of Neocles" is abruptly introduced in book 7, chapter 143, when he offers what turns out to be the prevailing and "correct" interpretation of the "O divine Salamis" oracle from Delphi. Herodotus then relates another occasion on which Themistocles' opinion had prevailed in Athens: the decision in 493 B.C.E. to use the surplus silver for the building of a fleet (chap. 144). But he does not indicate that Themistocles had established any real political position or leadership in Athens in the years preceding the Persian Wars. More significantly, I think, Herodotus does not credit Themistocles with foresight or planning on that former occasion. Rather, he implies that Themistocles had in mind the war with Aegina and not a potential Persian naval invasion.[6]

Similarly, Herodotus appears to underplay the significance of Themistocles' recognized role at Salamis. First, a certain Mnesiphilus imparts to Themistocles the basic Salamis strategy (8.58).[7] According to

4. Thucydides of course never refers to his predecessor by name. Interestingly, one of the few specific, if implicit, corrections to Herodotus occurs in this digression. See Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:426, on the question of the archons vs. the *ναύκραροι*.

5. This seems to be the general view, as it is also the view that Thucydides counters Herodotus with his strongly worded encomium of Themistocles. I argue that there is more to that historians' disagreement than is generally recognized. Charles Fornara (1971, 71), however, has argued that "Thucydides' abstract formulation of Themistocles' genius in I.138.3, so often quoted as if in refutation of Herodotus, reads as if it were a judgment derived from Herodotus' own account, so little are the two incompatible." I consider specific points of Fornara's argument below, but in general he seems to me to have over-read Herodotus in the light of Thucydides.

6. According to Fornara (1971, 68), the introduction of Themistocles, "there was a certain Athenian...", is no "slap in the face" but in fact a highly effective dramatic device, used also by Homer to introduce Dolon (*Il.* 10.314) and by Xenophon to introduce himself (*An.* 3.4.1). That may indeed be true but is itself no indication of Herodotus' approval (cf. the example of Dolon).

7. Again, on Fornara's view (1971, 72, n. 19), this "mention of Mnesiphilus in 8.57–58 is

Herodotus, this otherwise unknown Athenian advised Themistocles as follows:

> If once they draw off the ships from Salamis, you will never again fight for any fatherland at all; everyone will run off, each one to his own city, and neither Eurybiades nor any other man will be able to keep the army from scattering. Greece will be lost, and all through sheer folly. If there is any means at all by which you can undo this decision, if by any means you can persuade Eurybiades to change his mind and stay here, do so. (8.58, tr. Grene)

Themistocles applied his persuasive skills to this purpose—resorting eventually to simple threat (8.62)—but in the end it was his famous ruse, the message to Xerxes that the Greeks were fleeing, that ensured that the Peloponnesians would have to stay and fight. Still, although the trick was Themistocles', Herodotus brings in Aristides, "the best and the justest man in Athens" (8.79), to inform the Greek generals of their predicament, since, as Themistocles himself says, "They will think I have made up a lie and will not believe me" (8.80). Themistocles clearly had a reputation for mendacity, which Herodotus did not dispute.

On Herodotus' account, the timing of both the message to Xerxes and the subsequent battle seems fortuitous rather than planned. Although modern analysts of the battle suggest that the Greeks (or Themistocles) took advantage of peculiarities of geography, current, and wind within the Salamis channel as well as the element of surprise, Herodotus betrays no knowledge of such strategic planning.[8] Herodotus' Themistocles seems a clever if unscrupulous character, who just happens to put in motion a great Greek victory.

On the issue of Themistocles' moral character, Herodotus' account is more overtly prejudicial.[9] Themistocles is a man partial to the power of the bribe. At Artemisium, the Euboeans gave Themistocles 30 talents (ἐπὶ μισθῷ, 8.5) to ensure that the Greeks would stay and engage the Persians

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calculated to give dramatic emphasis to the crucial moment at Salamis, not to deprive Themistocles of credit."

8. See, inter alios, Hammond 1973, 251–310. Similar lack of awareness of strategy is of course also evident in Herodotus' description of the battle of Marathon.

9. Fornara (1971), however, disagrees, arguing that Herodotus and Thucydides essentially draw a similar portrait, deceit being in fact the key to Themistocles' "strategic genius" (71). Herodotus' "purpose is artistic"—aiming "neither to blacken Themistocles' reputation nor to whitewash" (72), but relying on the audience's knowledge of the hero's fall to give full meaning to the historical drama. But did Herodotus' audience know everything Thucydides knew (or claimed to know)?

before Euboea. Then, says Herodotus, "he gave a share—five talents—of the money to Eurybiades, as though the money came from himself. When Eurybiades had been persuaded, there remained only...the Corinthian commander, Adeimantus." So, "to him Themistocles said, and confirmed it with an oath, 'You will not desert us, for I will give you more money than the king of the Medes would send you for deserting your allies'" (8.5). He sent over three talents to Adeimantus—and kept the rest for himself. The reader will not be surprised later on to find Themistocles, "unknown to the other generals," soliciting or extorting funds from Parians, Carystians, and (unsuccessfully) Andrians (8.111).[10] Likewise, his self-promoting and deceitful message to Xerxes about the bridges at the Hellespont seems at this point not at all "out of character."[11]

Herodotus' portrait of Pausanias, the Spartan "man of the hour," is in contrast quite positive in tone and detail. Herodotus' Pausanias engineered the victory at Plataea and took from that victory his rightful royal portion (ten of everything—women, horses, camels, etc., 9.81). But this was a king who laughed at the excesses of Persian wealth and the folly of Persian imperialism (9.82).[12] Further indication of Pausanias' good upright Spartan character is his refusal to respond in kind to Persian atrocities by impaling the head of Mardonius upon a pole (9.79) or to punish the sons of a Theban medizer for the crime of their father (9.88). Herodotus acknowledges that he had heard reports that after the war Pausanias was more corruptible and aspired even to tyranny and the Persian king's daughter (5.43). These reports, however, along with the Athenian claim that Pausanias' arrogance legitimated their assumption of leadership (8.3), do not receive Herodotus' full endorsement. While Herodotus' Themistocles is a less than noble character who wins by luck and trickery, his Pausanias is a traditional Spartan ruler and general with only the suspicion of the traditional Spartan vices. On Herodotus' account, Spartan leadership maintained its restraint to the end of the *Histories*; it was the Athenians who subjected Greeks to extortion, and who, under Xanthippus at Sestos, subjected Persians to atrocity (9.120).[13]

10. Cf. Plutarch's discussion of Themistocles' character, in particular his citing of an anecdote about Themistocles' honesty (*Them.* 5). The literary character of Themistocles grew increasingly complicated. The reality, no doubt, was complex as well.

11. Here Herodotus comments that the Athenians trusted Themistocles because of his past success but were, like the rest of the Greeks, unaware of his real purpose (8.110). Fornara (1971, 71) considers this episode a "remarkable instance of his famous foresight."

12. Laughter, however, may itself be a signal of over-confidence and impending doom; see Lateiner 1977, 173–82, esp. 177 on Pausanias.

13. Once again, Fornara (1971) considers Herodotus' portrait of Pausanias in no way an indication of Herodotus' positive estimation of the man; rather, the method is "artistic not his-

## Thucydides' Response

Such a presentation of the character and relative merits of the "most famous" Greeks of the early fifth century apparently did not sit well with Thucydides, who saw things differently.[14] Given that the formative years of the Athenian empire were crucial to Thucydides' interpretation of the Peloponnesian War, the later historian could not allow Herodotus to stand unchallenged. His problem was, how could he correct Herodotus without actually allowing his predecessor "into the ring?" The narrative parody or echo—a digression full of both Herodotean language[15] and Herodotean techniques (such as duplicitous or treasonous letters sent by unwitting messengers), which also set the record straight—was a masterful as well as economical solution to the problem.

The point of departure for the digression in book 1 is the Spartan demand on the eve of war that the Athenians should "drive out the curse of the goddess" (1.126). In explanation, Thucydides says that "in former times there was an Athenian named Cylon" and launches into a story of a would-be tyrant and a misunderstood oracle, in the course of which he manages to correct Herodotus on a small matter of the Athenian magistracy.[16] But this is simply an ἀρχή. To the one Spartan demand, the Athenians respond with two demands of their own. They insist that the Spartans drive out both the curse of Taenarus, incurred when helots were taken from suppliancy, and also that of the Brazen House. With the latter begins the story of Pausanias.

The most striking aspects of Thucydides' narrative on Pausanias are his assertion as fact of all that Herodotus has presented as rumor or allegation and his complete omission of the positive "Spartan" virtues that Herodotus seems to have admired. We hear in great anecdotal detail of Pausanias' intrigues with the Persian king, even to the point of quotation from the Spartan's letter to Xerxes: "I propose...to marry your daughter and to bring both Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your control" (1.128, trans.

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torical" and, because of the reader's knowledge of his end, produces a "magnificently ironic and tragic picture" (65). Fornara's reading requires that Herodotus' readers knew the full details of Pausanias' disgrace, as narrated by Thucydides. Again, are we right to privilege Thucydides account so? In recognizing this feature of his interpretation, however, Fornara comes quite close to recognizing also the point of this chapter: "Perhaps that explains Thucydides' supplementary account. He may have felt obliged to provide it in order to keep the historical record unambiguous and free from what easily could become a deceptive tradition" (66).

14. Or, if we grant Fornara's "artistic" reading of Herodotus, Thucydides may have been concerned about the impressions left on the popular mind by Herodotus' account.

15. See the analysis of Westlake 1977.

16. See Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 1:426.

Warner).[17] When Pausanias did come back to Sparta, we are told that he was confident that a well-placed bribe would clear his name (1.131). At this point Thucydides expands on the general theme of arrogance, bringing up the Delphic tripod (not mentioned by Herodotus) on which Pausanias had inscribed to his own greater glory:

> Leader of Hellenes in war, victorious over the Persians,
> Pausanias to the god Phoebus erected the trophy.
>
> (1.132, trans. Warner)

The Spartans had that erased. Likewise, when faced with undeniably direct, highly dramatic evidence of his negotiations with Xerxes, and perhaps more important of his intriguing with the helots ("this was in fact the case," says Thucydides), they finally resolved to arrest their regent. Pausanias took refuge in the temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, and although he was removed when at the point of death, the Spartans nonetheless were told that their actions had brought about a curse. So much for Spartan virtue—and implicitly, for Spartan defense of Greek freedom.

Thucydides now moves on to the "irrelevant" career of Themistocles, but there is a connecting thread, however tenuous or however Herodotean. When the Spartans investigated the charge of Persian collaboration lodged against Pausanias, they discovered, according to Thucydides, evidence implicating Themistocles as well. So we are off and running with a story of folktale appeal that considers in a new light Themistocles' activities after the Persian Wars. As a kind of new Odysseus, Themistocles took refuge at the court of the Molossians, supplicating King Admetus with the king's child in his arms (a rare bit of Thucydidean domesticity!). Themistocles then took passage on a merchant ship on its way to Ionia and, after a close call with the Athenian fleet near Naxos, arrived safely at Ephesus. At that point he rewarded the captain, whom he had earlier threatened to accuse of taking a bribe if he did not do as he was told (1.137), with a monetary gift. From Ephesus, Themistocles made his way to the Persian court, where he introduced himself to the new king, Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes. He openly claimed to have done the Persians both evil (the battle of Salamis) and good (the preservation of the bridges). Admired by the Persians for his intelligence (and stringing them on with hopes of bringing Greece under Persian

17. It may be worth noting that in fact the Spartans did form an alliance with the Persians during the Peloponnesian War in order to defeat the Athenians (8.18, 8.37). Perhaps the digression is not early after all.

power), he soon became an influential figure within the Persian court. And as tokens of appreciation, Magnesia provided his bread, Lampsacus his wine, and Myus his meat (1.138)—a thoroughly Herodotean touch.

In concluding his digression, Thucydides speaks directly to his readers in his own austere and sharply contrasting voice:

> Themistocles was a man who showed an unmistakable natural genius; in this he was quite exceptional, and beyond all others deserves our admiration.... To sum him up in a few words, it may be said that through force of genius and by rapidity of action this man was supreme at doing precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment.
>
> (1.138, trans. Warner)

That was real virtue or excellence in Thucydides' eyes, and it was to him the excellence of Pericles as well as Themistocles. Perhaps also, to the extent that they followed such leaders, it was the virtue of the Athenian polis as a whole.[18] The Persian victory itself, however it happened, did not entitle the Athenians to their empire. Rather, their energy and intelligence underlay that empire and made the Athenians (like Themistocles) worthy historical actors, doing good or evil (cf. 2.41) on the historical stage. Thucydides' Themistocles illustrates virtues that Thucydides admired—and that he thought needed to be recovered from Herodotus' ambiguous portrait. By the same token, it is now Pausanias who is the man not to be trusted. Pausanias becomes the quintessential hypocritical Spartan, the sort we meet at Plataea (3.52–68) or hear appealed to by the Melians (5.105).

Before embarking upon the story of the momentous war between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides apparently thought it necessary to set the record straight on these two famous heroes whose careers bridged the end of Herodotus' *Histories* and the beginning of his own. The manner in which he did so testifies to the flexibility of his art as well as to his familiarity with his predecessor. Although Herodotus is not mentioned by name, the Herodotean "signature" should leave no doubt as to the target of Thucydides' excursus. And although the uncharacteristic style has caused the digression to be taken as less "serious" history than we expect of Thucydides, I suggest that book 1.126–38 constitutes in fact a substantial historical objection to Herodotus—whether or not we as readers are in fact

18. As is often noted, the plague was the one aspect of the war Pericles had not foreseen. See Thucydides' summary of his character and leadership (2.65) and his (or the Corinthians') analysis of Athenian character (1.70).

convinced. Rather than an indication of naive gullibility in a young historian relying on either oral or written sources, this digression shows the mark of the master. Perhaps here the "lion" did smile, but the humor was not frivolous.

# 2
# Politics and Society

12

# Buphonia and Goring Ox: Homicide, Animal Sacrifice, and Judicial Process

Marilyn A. Katz

Among the ancient Greeks, both animals and inanimate objects could under certain circumstances be held liable on a charge of homicide, and we possess a number of ancient testimonia referring to a special homicide court dedicated to the adjudication of such cases. In the Bible, too, an ox that has gored a human being to death is itself requited with death, and analogous provisions appear in ancient Near Eastern law collections. These regulations—in their Greek, Israelite, and Mesopotamian versions—are ordinarily discussed as subcategories of those legal provisions that have to do with homicide in general, and the focus is consequently fixed on the shedding of human blood and the taking of human life. In this chapter, I explore this same network of analogous ideologies and practices from a somewhat different perspective: the relationship between the laws governing homicide committed by nonhuman agents and those myths and traditions that concern the origin of animal sacrifice.

My discussion focuses on the point of intersection between the judicial and ritual spheres, and it investigates the particulars of a cultural logic that

Impressive though Martin Ostwald's bibliography is, it betrays little hint of his extensive familiarity with the texts and traditions of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. But as many of his friends and students are aware, Martin's knowledge in these areas is formidable, and I have often come away from even a casual conversation about such subjects impressed by his erudition and enlightened by his insights. Martin fostered my first tentative investigations into biblical antiquity with enthusiasm and gentle criticism. I offer this chapter in gratitude for his generous support and encouragement, and in tribute also to his contributions in the field of ancient law. I would like to thank Jay Katz and Steven Wilf for comments and criticism that were helpful in revising an earlier version of this chapter.

constructs a complementarity between the killing of human beings by animals and the slaughter of animals by men. Underlying this paradoxical complementarity between crime and rite, transgression and mandate, is a complex cultural discourse on the proper relation between human beings and animals. I begin with a brief survey of this cultural construction and then survey the laws governing homicide by animals together with the myths concerning the origin of sacrifice. I close with some suggestions about how these myths and traditions are related to the structure of legal liability and moral agency.

## "Between Beast and God"

Among the ancient Greeks, humanity is a status defined through a double exclusion of its opposites—animals and gods. In this respect the human realm is constituted, as Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Marcel Detienne have established in separate articles, as an arena located "entre bêtes et dieux"—between beast and god.[1] Human beings differentiate themselves from the gods chiefly through the practice of animal sacrifice. But they separate themselves from the realm of beasts primarily through marriage and agriculture, which represent acculturations of those sexual and dietary habits whose unregularized and indiscriminate forms characterize the world of brute animals. Human beings neither graze the fields nor mate at random, as animals do, but they sow seed, both sexually and agriculturally, according to a set of strictly observed social regulations.

The ancient Greeks make a distinction between wild and domesticated animals and regard the latter as members in some form of the civilized realm. Thus, human beings are not creatures radically alien from animals but are distinguished from them by a more fluid boundary—in Aristotle's view (*Pol.* 1.2.11–12; 1253a14–16) by the capacity for λόγος ("rational language") and τὸ δίκαιον ("justice"). A human being is, like an animal, a ζῷον, a living creature, but one with a capacity for life in a political collectivity, and hence a πολιτικὸν ζῷον (*Pol.* 1.2.9; 1253a3).[2] Certain classes of humans—women and slaves among them, although in different degrees—share an incapacity for fully rational existence that causes them to be aligned in Greek thought with the realm of beasts. Similarly, young boys as well as girls, in the period before they assume adult status, are regularly compared to young wild animals. The equivalence is developed from the other side as well—Greek mythology abounds in such hybrid creatures as centaurs and

1. Vernant 1980a, Vidal-Naquet 1975, Detienne 1981b.
2. For a recent discussion of man as a political animal see Davis 1989.

satyrs which the Bible, for example, rigorously excludes from the limits of the created world.

The Greeks do not, however, sentimentalize the relation between man and beast in the manner, for example, of the Romans, who prohibit the slaughter of a domestic animal because "he is a most hardworking companion to a man in his work" (*laborissimus...hominis socius in agricultura*, Col. 6 praef. 7; cf. Ael. *VH* 5.14; Var. *R.* 2.5.3). For, although Varro and Columella report that the slaughter of an ox at Athens was prohibited (Var. *R.* 2.5.4; Col. 6 praef. 7), Aristotle makes clear the general Greek assessment of the relationship in its concrete and practical aspects: Domestic animals exist, Aristotle explains, solely "with a view to the good of man" (*Pol.* 1.8; 1256b7–26).[3]

Among the Greeks, then, the realm of beasts constitutes a domain of the Other, a zone, as one commentator has put it, of "non-civilization... indispensable to the existence of civilization, like a belt which, so long as it constrains the body of society, prevents it from falling apart."[4] What especially marks ancient Greek ideas about the relation between men and animals is a concern with the dialectics of that relationship. The ancient Greeks elaborated an extensive cultural discourse on the boundary separating the human from the animal world, and they also developed specific cultural practices that functioned to constitute it.

## "In Our Image, After Our Likeness"

In the Bible, the notion of the Other is constituted from the idolatry, immorality, and impiety of the Canaanites and other inhabitants of the promised land—in the context, to be sure, of the assumption of an original unity of the human species, subsequently differentiated only through secondary and acquired characteristics (ethnic, geographic, political, or cultural).[5] Thus, among the ancient Israelites, we find no evidence of an ideologically charged dialectic between animal and human words, in the manner of the ancient Greeks. Rather, in the first of the two narratives that make up the creation story in Genesis (the P source),[6] mankind is brought into being

3. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν (*Pol.* 1.3.7; 1256b15–18). Compare the explanation of Rashi, the eleventh-century biblical commentator, for the destruction of animals in the flood: Since animals exist for the sake of man, their survival without man would be pointless (*hakol nivrah' bishvil 'adam vkhivan shehu' khalah mah tzorekh ba'elu*, commentary on Gen. 6.7).

4. Papaioannou, in Vidal-Naquet 1975, 139.

5. Bottéro 1975, 111; cf. Rausky 1978.

6. Historical criticism identifies four discrete sources of tradition making up the first five books of the Bible (Pentateuch or Torah) and designates one of them by the book where it

for the explicit purpose of exercising dominion (*vyirdu*) over the "fish, birds, cattle, and all creeping things" (Gen. 1.26);[7] in the second (the J source), the animals are first proposed and then rejected as helpers (*ezer knegdo*, Gen. 2.18) for Adam.[8]

Animals in the biblical text therefore are not men's companions, as they are in the Roman view cited above, nor is the boundary between the human and animal worlds problematic, as it is among the Greeks. Nevertheless, human conduct toward beasts is regulated in the Bible in a number of different ways. Rest from labor is provided for man, slave, and animal alike on the Sabbath (Exod. 20.10 [P]; cf. Deut. 5.14 [D]). The prohibition against boiling a kid in its mother's milk (Exod. 23.19b [P]; cf. Deut. 14.21b [D]), from which the Jewish dietary code derives, can be connected also with the injunctions against slaughtering an animal on the same day as its young (Lev. 22.28 [P]) or taking a mother bird together with her young (Deut. 22.6–7 [D]). These commandments, like those prohibiting the muzzling of an ox while it is threshing (Deut. 25.4 [D])[9] or requiring one to raise up a beast—even that of one's enemy—that has fallen under its burden (Exod. 23.5 [P]; cf. Deut. 22.4 [D]), are sometimes understood as examples of a general injunction of kindness toward animals. The spirit of the text is probably better reflected, however, when interpretation emphasizes the benefits that accrue directly to human beings from such regulations. Nachmanides (d. ca. 1270), for example, explains that these commandments are not a matter of extending mercy to animals, "but they are decrees upon us to guide us and to teach us traits of good character."[10]

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appears exclusively (D, the Deuteronomic source), another by its partisan set of concerns (P, the Priestly source), and the other two (J and E) by the first letters of the names that predominate therein for designating the deity. Biblical citations throughout this chapter are drawn from the Jewish Publication Society *Tanakh*.

7. It is worth noting that, in contrast to the distinction between animals and human beings on which the biblical text appears to insist, Rashi (commentary on Gen. 1.26) interprets *vyrdw* as reflecting a contiguity between men and beasts: Human beings, depending upon the character of their conduct, may end up "subordinating" animals (*vyirdu*) or "descending" to their level (*vyardu*).

8. Molly Levine calls to my attention a parallel Talmudic story that Adam had intercourse with all the animals but found no satisfaction (*vlo' nitkarerah da'ato*) until he approached Eve (*Yevamoth* 63a).

9. Compare Hyde's suggestion, in connection with his interpretation of the Buphonia as a harvest festival, that the outrage committed in the myth by the ox in devouring the sacred barley-cakes should be understood as a reference to the fact that "unless their mouths are bound the oxen will devour the grain" (1917, 160).

10. Nachmanides 1976, 271. Similarly, Maimonides (d. 1204) explains that the object of the law requiring us to raise up a tired animal is "to make us perfect; that we should not form cruel habits; and that we should not uselessly cause pain to others; that on the contrary, we should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures, except when necessity [to eat] demands the contrary [i.e., sacrifice]" (1967, 1:217 sec. 202). Maimonides does, however,

Although the behavior of human beings toward animals is regulated in the biblical system, the boundary that divides men from beasts is no more problematic than the boundary that separates them from the divine realm. In contrast to the elaboration in Greek culture of a hybrid race of giants, demigods, and theriomorphs, the biblical narrative, in a problematic and disputed passage (Gen. 6.1–4 [J]), contrives to eliminate from the created world the monstrous race of Nephilim and Gibborim (both translated in the Septuagint as γίγαντες).[11] In response to mating between "the daughters of men" (*bnot ha'adam*) and the "divine beings" (*bne ha'elohim*), the human span of life is limited to 120 years (Gen. 6.3). And following the generation of the Nephilim and Gibborim from this nefarious union, God resolves upon the destruction of his creation (Gen. 6.7) and subsequently brings on the flood.

Although men exercise dominion over beasts and must temper their own behavior toward them, we do not encounter in the Bible the elaboration of a cultural dialectic between the animal and human realms, as we do among the ancient Greeks. The comparison between these two cultural systems, however, can be further developed by contrast with a third—that of the ancient Mesopotamians—where the world of animals is wholly and unproblematically Other, and where the relation between man and beast is culturally irrelevant.

Among the Babylonians, the relation between human beings and animals is formulated on a purely instrumental basis—animals constitute part and parcel of the material available for human communication with the gods, and "like the rest of the sublunary world, beasts belong to a wholly different category than that of humans."[12] The boundary separating the animal and human realms, like that dividing gods from men, is absolute. There is no exercise of human dominion over beasts here, as in the Bible, nor do we encounter indications of that anxiety over difference characteristic of the ancient Greeks. So far as the worlds of animals and men intersect among the Babylonians, human beings are drawn conceptually into the orbit of beasts: The "savage" or "primitive man" (*lullu*) lives like the beasts and among them and belongs to a race apart, like Enkidu in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*. "Civilized" men, or human beings proper (*awilum*), inhabit an altogether different domain, that of the walled cities.[13] Within the civilized realm, animal flesh together with beer, bread, and other foodstuffs make up

think that the prohibitions against killing the mother bird or the cow together with its young derive from the similarity of maternal feelings between men and beasts (1963, 3:48), but Nachmanides undertakes to explain why this is an erroneous view (1976, 265–71).

11. See the discussion in Cassin 1978, 122–25. (It is not relevant to the present discussion to take up the question of the creatures identified as Nephilim in Num. 13.33.)

12. Bottéro 1975, 106.

13. Cassin 1975, 115–20.

the daily offering extended to the gods. But in contrast to the elaboration, among both the ancient Greeks and the Israelites, of a complex cultural discourse around the practice of animal sacrifice, the Mesopotamian texts do not systematically distinguish the slaughter of beasts from other aspects of the food preparation that forms the core of daily worship.[14]

The boundary separating men from beasts in the ancient world varies from that of an absolute divide, as among the Babylonians, to a strict division arranged as a hierarchy in the Bible, to a fluid line subject to disruption and reconstitution, as among the ancient Greeks. But when men shed the blood of animals in sacrifice and when animals shed human blood by homicide, a special potential develops for the intersection of the ontological status of the two realms. The cultural construction of both the sacrificial ritual and the regulations governing homicide by animals complement, in each case, the cultural construction of the relation between the human and animal realms.

## Homicide by Animals in Biblical and Mesopotamian Law: Sacrificial Rite and Judicial Process

Following the flood, Noah introduces into the world a momentous innovation that is subsequently sanctioned by God—the practice of animal sacrifice (Gen. 8.20–22 [J]).[15] In the immediately following narrative (Gen. 9.1–7 [P]), God confirms the original hierarchy between men and animals (Gen. 9.2 [P]) but at the same time introduces an alteration in the dietary code.

Human beings had at first been confined to eating seed-bearing plants and trees with seed-bearing fruit (*kol haetz asher bo; kol'etz zore'a zera pri'etz zore'a zera'*, Gen. 1.29 [P]), while animals were given "all the green plants" *kol yereq 'esev* ', Gen. 1.30 [P]). Following the expulsion, men were assigned "the grasses of the field" (*esev hasadeh*, Gen. 3.18 [J]), along with the fruits of their own labor. Now, at the time of Noah, the consumption of animal flesh is added to that of the "green grasses" (*kyereq 'esev*, Gen. 9.3 [P]),[16] and reg-

14. Katz 1990, 101–17.

15. One may perhaps imagine that Abel's offering in Gen. 4.4 (J) consisted in animal sacrifice and even suppose, more boldly, that Abel's awareness of the "correct" object for the shedding of blood should be contrasted with Cain's alternation between the opposites of vegetarian offering and the killing of a human being—but the text does not allow for clarity on either of these points.

16. In Rashi's opinion, these initial provisions for food placed men and animals in the same category, a situation that was altered after Noah (commentary on Gen. 1.29–30). Nachmanides disputes Rashi on this point, insisting instead that an initial discrimination in dietary provisions for men and beasts was revised further after the flood (1971, 56–57).

ulated, at the same time, by a strict prohibition against the consumption of blood: "You must not, however, eat flesh with its lifeblood in it" (*'ach basar bnafsho damo lo thokelu*, Gen. 9.4 [P]).

The text adds to this prohibition against the consumption of animal blood an injunction against the shedding of human blood: "But for your own lifeblood I will require a reckoning: I will require it of every beast; of man, too, will I require a reckoning for human life, of every man for that of his fellow man!" (*v'akh et dimkhem lnafshotekhem 'edrosh miyad kol khaya 'edrshenu umiyad ha'adam miyad 'ish ahiw 'edrosh et nefesh ha'adam*, Gen. 9.5 [P]; cf. Deut. 12.23 [D]). Why should this admonition appear here in the text? As Nachmanides observed, its insertion implies that one might imagine that the permission to slaughter animals entailed consequences for the evaluation of human life: "On account of the permission given here for slaughtering...it became necessary to [specify that spilling the blood of human beings] is forbidden to [men] as well as to all living things." Living creatures, by contrast, are permitted to devour each other.[17]

There is no further discussion in Genesis of the prohibition against the consumption of "flesh with its lifeblood in it." But sacrificial procedure is further elaborated in the Holiness Code of Leviticus (H),[18] where the prohibition against the consumption of animal blood is based on the principle that "the life of the flesh is in the blood" (*ki nefesh habasar badam*, Lev. 17.11; cf. Lev. 17.14), and where it is specified that the violation of the prohibition incurs a charge of bloodguilt. Thus, the biblical hierarchy that allows human beings dominion over the animal world is not absolute, and the structure of sacrificial ritual encodes an insistence on certain limitations. As the formulation at Genesis 9.4–5 suggests, and as the Holiness Code makes clear, the regulations forbidding the shedding of human blood by animals or other men are complemented by those prohibiting the consumption of animal blood by human beings.

Sacrificial ritual incorporates this prohibition by requiring the devotion of the animal's blood and fat to the divinity, on the grounds that these "belong to the Lord" (Lev. 4.3 [P]). Thus, in every sacrificial offering the blood and fat are disposed of separately: The fat is turned into smoke upon the altar, and the blood is dashed out against its sides (Lev. 17.6 [P]). This joint disposition of the two substances constitutes an acknowledgment of

17. Nachmanides 1971, 135.

18. The Holiness Code, a subsection of P, is regarded by historical criticism (see n. 6) as a self-contained whole, parallel in form to the Covenant Code (Exod. 20.21–23.33) and to the laws of Deuteronomy (Deut. 12–18). For discussion of these three groups of laws and their interrelationship see Boecker 1980, 135–207; see also Walton 1989.

the divinity's proprietary interest in all of his creations and a recognition as well that human dominion over the animal world is limited and does not include the unqualified right of life and death.

Among the ancient Mesopotamians, by contrast, the slaughter of beasts is not systematically distinguished from other aspects of the food preparation that forms the core of the daily worship of the gods. In this context, too, animals function solely as the instrument of human communication with the divine realm, and the texts describing ritual procedure betray no tendency to interpret blood as a symbolic substance. Similarly, in the one Mesopotamian myth known to us that represents the first occasion of animal sacrifice,[19] animal slaughter is simply part of the procedure for provisioning the gods.

In the epic known as Lugalbanda I or "Lugalbanda in (or and) Hurrumkurra," the culture hero Lugalbanda is visited in a dream by the god Anzaqar, who asks him, "The red bullock—who will tie it up for me? / Who will make its animal fat flow for me?" Upon awakening, Lugalbanda slaughters the requisite animals and prepares a banquet for the gods, which includes meat, beer, black bread, and wine. The story thus becomes an aetiology for the Mesopotamian oblational system, which was focused around the provision of daily meals for the gods. In Mesopotamian culture generally, then, animals do not occupy a special status in relation to human beings—quite the opposite: "The animal has no other relation with mankind than does matter with the laborer who works it: The animal, like vegetable or mineral substance, only makes up part of that reservoir on which man draws in order to support first the gods' life, and then—since he must survive in order to fulfill his essential economic role—his own."[20]

If in ancient Mesopotamia human beings can shed animal blood more or less casually in the course of provisioning the gods, and if in the Bible men can shed the blood of beasts only within the parameters of a strictly limited set of procedures, what consequences are entailed when an animal sheds human blood? The situation is addressed in the famous biblical case of the goring ox (*shor nagakh hu'*), which has parallels among the law codes of ancient Mesopotamia.

The goring ox appears in a section of the so-called Covenant Code of Exodus (21–24), which is part of the JE narrative, and which is regarded as one of the oldest sections of the Bible.[21] The first section of the code, consisting of the first 32 verses of chapter 21, covers the Law of Persons,

19. For full discussion see Hallo 1984 and 1987 (in Katz 1990).
20. Bottéro 1975, 106.
21. Boecker 1980, 135.

including slavery, intentional and accidental homicide, kidnapping, assault and battery, and wrongful injury and death. The case of the goring ox appears as part of the last category, in verses 28–32, where it is specified, along with other provisions, that an ox that gores a human being to death must in turn be stoned, and its flesh discarded:

> 28. When an ox gores a man or a woman to death [*shor nagakh hu'*], the ox shall be stoned [*sagol yisaqel*] and its flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is not to be punished.
> 29. If, however, that ox has been in the habit of goring, and its owner, though warned, has failed to guard it, and it kills a man or a woman—the ox shall be stoned and its owner, too, shall be put to death [*yumat*].
> 30. If ransom [*kofer*] is laid upon him, he must pay whatever is laid upon him to redeem his life [*pidyon nafsho*].
> 31. So, too, if it gores a minor, male or female, [the owner] shall be dealt with according to the same rule.
> 32. But if the ox gores a slave, male or female, he shall pay thirty shekels of silver to the master, and the ox shall be stoned.
> 35. When a man's ox injures his neighbor's ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price; they shall also divide the dead animal.
> 36. If, however, it is known that the ox was in the habit of goring, and its owner has failed to guard it, he must restore ox for ox, but shall keep the dead animal.
>
> (Exod. 21.28–30, 35–36)

A strikingly analogous set of regulations appears in two ancient Near Eastern law collections, both dating from the first half of the second millenium B.C.E. and both written in Akkadian—the *Laws of Eshnunna* and the *Laws of Hammurapi*.[22] The relevant triad of laws in the Mesopotamian collections are roughly comparable with each other. Each contains three provisions; the second and third of these fine the owner of an ox that is known to be dangerous and has killed a man and specify a reduction of the fine if the victim was a slave. Furthermore, both triads are divided into a consideration of those damages inflicted accidentally, as it were, and those for which fault can be assigned. They differ only in that the *Laws of Eshnunna* address first the case of an ox that has gored another ox, while the *Laws of Hammurapi*

22. For a thorough review of this material and a discussion of the complexities involved in interpreting it see especially Finkelstein 1973 and 1981, and Jackson 1975. See also Boecker 1980; Greenberg 1976 and 1986; Morgenstern 1930; Paul 1970; van Selms 1950; Walton 1989; and Yaron 1971.

first consider an instance in which an ox not known to be dangerous kills a man:

> 53. If an ox has gored another ox and caused its death, the owners of the oxen shall divide between them the sale value of the living ox and the carcass of the dead ox.
> 54. If an ox was a habitual gorer, the local authorities having so duly notified its owner, yet he did not keep his ox in check and it then gored a man and caused his death, the owner of the ox shall pay two-thirds of a mina of silver (to the survivors of the victim).
> 56. If it gored a slave and caused his death, he shall pay fifteen shekels of silver.
>
> (*The Laws of Eshnunna*, tr. Finkelstein 1981, 20)

> 250. If an ox, while walking along the street, gored a person and caused his death, no claims will be allowed in that case.
> 251. But if someone's ox was a habitual gorer, the local authority having notified him that it was a habitual gorer, yet he did not have its horns screened nor kept his ox under control, and that ox then gored a free-born man to death, he must pay one-half mina of silver.
> 252. If (the victim was) someone's slave, he shall pay one-third mina of silver (to the slave's owner).
>
> (*The Laws of Hammurapi*, tr. Finkelstein 1981, 20)

We can observe, first, that the absence in the Mesopotamian regulations of any notion of the animal's liability reflects the general disposition in this culture toward an instrumental treatment of beasts. The matter of the goring ox in the *Laws of Eshnunna* is taken up together with that of a decrepit wall that falls upon an individual; and in the *Laws of Hammurapi*, the owner of the goring ox is considered along with the builder whose construction of a house or boat is faulty. In both cases, the animal is simply the instrument that brings about death or injury, and it is excluded from the compass of fault and responsibility. In biblical law, by contrast, the animal does incur liability, but this is only one of several significant differences between biblical and Mesopotamian provisions.

Thus, although the tenor of the discussion as a whole and the casuistic form in which the laws are cast is the same in all three groups, there is a strict comparability between the biblical and the Mesopotamian laws only with respect to the disposition of an ox that kills another ox—section 53 of

the *Laws of Eshnunna* and verse 35 of Exodus 21. This discrepancy results partly from a difference in context—the Mesopotamian laws consider the issue of culpable negligence generally, while the biblical chapters address the law of persons.[23] It is also worth emphasizing, however, that the biblical laws do not envision any circumstances that do not also figure in the Mesopotamian context—the protases are comparable in both sets of regulations[24] and address two basic situations: The goring of a human being and the goring of another ox. These two situations are further qualified in accordance with the status of the offender and of the victim: The ox either was or was not a habitual gorer; the victim was either a free person, a minor, or a slave.

The incommensurability between the Mesopotamian and biblical laws appears exclusively in the consequences attendant upon the goring of a human being (free person, minor, or slave) and applies whether or not the ox was a known offender. The singularity of the biblical legislation can be isolated under four headings: (1) the offending animal must be stoned to death, (2) its flesh may not be consumed, (3) the owner of a dangerous ox incurs liability for capital punishment, and (4) such an owner may ransom his life. The first two provisions apply whether or not the ox was a habitual gorer; the third and fourth apply only if it was.

For our purposes the first and second provisions are of greater interest—the stoning of the animal and the prohibition against the consumption of its flesh. What interests us is not so much the special category accorded human life but the animal's status in this same legal situation. Is the animal by virtue of its crime assimilated to the status of a human being for the purposes of punishment, or is the original difference between them preserved? Let us address this question by taking up in sequence the first and second provisions.

Why is the animal stoned? Different answers are advanced, usually by comparison with other biblical instances of either the crime (homicide) or the punishment (stoning). Where homicide is the reference point, importance is attached to "the uniqueness and supremacy of human life," which is set forth in Genesis (9.5) as an inviolable principle.[25] Where stoning is

23. Or as van Selms puts it, "the fundamental idea which underlies the whole [Mesopotamian] system is that of the protection of property.... Israelite law is altogether different" (1950, 327). On the disputed matter of conceptualizing the relationship among the ancient law systems, Finkelstein argues against both the idea that Israelite law was wholly unique and the notion that there existed a "customary law common to the entire ancient Near East" (1981, 18 n. 10, 24, 37–38). See also Yaron 1971 and Jackson 1975, 135–41.

24. On the relationship between protasis and apodosis in these groups of laws see Jackson 1975, 136–37.

25. Greenberg 1960, 16; cf. Finkelstein 1973, 180–81; Finkelstein 1981, 28.

emphasized, interpreters point to the "ritual defilement" incurred by the ox[26] and to the need for communal expiation.[27]

There are problems connected with both sets of explanations. Homicide in the Bible is characteristically a crime calling for private execution of the guilty party by a relative of the dead man, who functions as the *goel hadam*, "avenger" or "redeemer of blood" (Num. 35.19). This procedure could hardly be undertaken against an animal and is not envisioned here. Furthermore, in the biblical view (as opposed to that of the Talmud)[28] an animal clearly lacks the necessary mens rea for the commission of the crime of homicide. As Nachmanides (on Gen. 9.5) remarks, "The beast has no reason [with which to discern between good and evil] so that it should be punished or rewarded [for spilling human blood]!"[29] Finally, the principle assigning a special status to human life is called into question by the law—also part of the Covenant Code—that allows one to execute on the spot and with impunity a thief caught in the act.[30]

Stoning, on the other hand, is never the prescribed method of execution for homicide. While it can serve as an expression of popular outrage, stoning is the regular sanction invoked against crimes that entail ritual defilement of the corporate community. Hence, this form of execution bears a close resemblance to expiatory ritual (and in particular to the scapegoat rite at Lev. 16.22);[31] it is carried out in public and by the community as a whole, and it represents a form of capital punishment that avoids further defilement of the executioners.[32] But in what respect has the ox become defiled or polluted? Not, surely, simply by the commission of homicide, for which stoning was not the appropriate penalty.

Finkelstein attempts to address both of these issues—to take into account the shedding of human blood without assigning to the ox liability

26. Morgenstern 1930, 89–91.

27. Jackson 1975, 114.

28. There are provisions outlined in tractate *Sanhedrin* 2a for bringing to trial animals who have killed a human being (see the discussions in Finkelstein 1981, 32; Jackson 1975, 120; cf. also Hyde 1916).

29. Nachmanides 1971, 133–34.

30. "If the thief is seized while tunneling, and he is beaten to death, there is no bloodguilt in this case. If the sun has risen upon him, there is bloodguilt in that case" (Exod. 22.1–2). Greenberg (1960, 1986) does not take up this case, and Finkelstein argues that the situation envisioned is killing in self-defense (1981, 38). This seems questionable, since the interpretation does not flow from the text but is dictated by an interest in claiming for the Bible a lenient view of crimes against property. Cf. Greenberg 1960, 18–19.

31. Morgenstern 1930, 91.

32. For review and brief discussion see Finkelstein 1981, 27–28; Jackson 1975, 112–14; Morgenstern 1930, 89–91.

for homicide and to bring the ox's act within the compass of a crime against the corporate body. He argues that the ox "has objectively committed a *de facto* insurrection against the hierarchic order established by Creation,"[33] the hierarchy, that is, that sets man over beast. Goring to death a human being constitutes an act of "insurrection against the cosmic order," and the ox's action thus constitutes a crime that "'offends' the corporate community" and strikes at its "moral and religious fibers," and for which the prescribed penalty is death by stoning.[34]

This construction of the ox's crime in political terms ("insurrection") is not altogether satisfactory. It stands at the opposite pole to an interpretation in magico-religious terms, which argues that the animal is stoned as the bearer of demoniac possession.[35] Both views seem insufficiently attentive to the specific operation of purity and pollution categories within the biblical system itself—the political approach attempts to transcend such categories[36] while the ritual approach draws them into the orbit of a generalized primitivity.

The stoning of the ox is most economically interpreted by comparison with the case of the *'egla 'arufa*, the "heifer with a broken neck" (Deut. 21.1–9).[37] This law specifies that when a murderer is unknown, the elders of the town nearest to the point where the corpse was discovered break a heifer's neck beside a stream in a valley.[38] They thereupon wash their hands over the heifer's corpse, declaring, "Our hands did not shed this blood, nor did our eyes see it done," and they request absolution from bloodguilt.

As this instance makes clear, any homicide brings bloodguilt into the community, and this must be expiated. When the agent is known, the bloodguilt is fixed upon him, and the "blood redeemer" (*goel hadam*) exacts the penalty. When the murderer is unknown, however, bloodguilt permeates the community as a whole, and its agents must cleanse the corporate body by exacting a penalty from an animal substituting for the murderer.[39] The treatment of the goring ox combines these two situations—the animal has shed the blood of a human being, but since it cannot be regarded as a

33. Finkelstein 1981, 28; cf. Finkelstein 1973, 180–81.

34. Finkelstein 1981, 27–28.

35. E.g., Morgenstern 1930, 91.

36. "The determining element in all this is [a] belief in transcendence...a human life transcends all other considerations within the community" (Finkelstein 1973, 271).

37. Cf. van Selms 1950, 329; Finkelstein 1973, 276–79.

38. Otherwise attested as the means for killing an unredeemed firstborn animal (Exod. 13.13).

39. Similarly, the owner of a habitual gorer is permitted to ransom his life because the ox's death will expiate the bloodguilt (van Selms 1950, 329–30). Cf. Finkelstein 1981, 29–32.

murderer, bloodguilt attaches to the community as a whole. The beast is executed as the instrument of communal pollution, and it is killed, consequently, in a manner that absolves the community as a whole.[40]

This argument proceeds from the assumption that the difference in the two procedures for treating homicide does not amount to a qualitative distinction between the two crimes but reflects instead a difference between the two types of criminals—one who is identifiable and to whom liability can be assigned, and another who is either unknown or to whom liability cannot be assigned. The goring ox, then, would at one level be regarded as equivalent to an unknown murderer.[41]

This conclusion seems especially clear from the treatment of the owner of a habitual gorer. This man becomes liable in a manner similar to (though not identical with) any other homicide, as is shown by the language describing his penalty. The text reports that in such a case "the owner will be put to death" (*yumat*, Exod. 21.29), and it draws here on the terminology for private execution.[42] The difference in the disposition of the two cases (a nonhabitual versus habitual gorer) is not that the owner of a nonhabitual gorer was not negligent in the first instance. Criminal negligence elsewhere causes bloodguilt.[43] Rather, liability of any kind can be assigned only if the ox was a habitual gorer, and since even then it cannot be assigned to the ox, it falls upon its owner.

The stoning of the ox, then, does not reflect a special value attached to human life in the ancient Israelite system any more than does the breaking of the heifer's neck. It does, however, indicate the particular importance that this cultural system assigns to lifeblood.[44] As the regulations at Genesis 9.5 set forth, the lifeblood of human beings may not be shed at all with impunity; the lifeblood of animals may only be shed through sacrifice.[45] These two provisions complement each other, both where they are first

40. My argument here, which draws some of its elements from Morgenstern (1930), Finkelstein (1973 and 1981), and Jackson (1975), is closest to that of van Selms (1950). I disagree only with Selms' emphasis on the stoning of the ox as a means of exempting members of the community from a blood feud (1950, 329).

41. As we shall see below, the court in ancient Greece that oversaw trials for homicide by animals took up cases of unknown murderers as well.

42. Greenberg 1960, 30 n. 36; Finkelstein 1973, 181 n. 36; Jackson 1975, 111.

43. E.g., when someone falls and dies from a roof on which the builder had failed to install a parapet (Deut. 22.8).

44. See most recently Zohar on "the special nature of blood as *nefesh*" (1988, 611). And contrast Daube's notion (1947, 123–24) that a murderer seizes or takes control of his victim's blood, on which Jackson bases an unlikely argument that the stoning of the ox is related to a form of retaliation designed to "secure the return of [the dead man's] blood to his family" (1975, 116–18; citation p. 117).

45. I do not take up in this chapter the distinction between animals that are sacrificed and those that are "struck down." "He who kills ('strikes down') a beast shall make restitution

articulated in the text and where they find expression within the ancient Israelite cultural system.[46] The requirement that the goring ox be stoned is in keeping with the first of these two regulations; the prohibition against its consumption, I suggest, derives from the second.

It is most commonly assumed that the ox's flesh is proscribed because the animal was ritually defiled or taboo.[47] But to what biblical concept does the term *taboo* correspond? Elsewhere, dietary prohibitions encompass permitted animals that have not been sacrificed or certain animals categorically excluded as either "unclean" (*tameh*, e.g., Lev. 11.4–8), an "abomination" (*sheketz*, e.g., Lev. 11.10–12), or "abhorrent" (*to'evah*, e.g., Deut. 14.3). Similarly, no animal that has died a natural death (*khol nvelah*, Deut. 14.21) or that has been "torn by beasts in the field" (*basadeh trefah*, Exod. 22.30) may be consumed, and the carcasses of both permitted and forbidden animals convey impurity in the same degree (Lev. 11.24–28, 39–40). Although any of these terms might be translated also as "taboo," none of the categories to which the terms refer seems capable of accommodating an ox that has killed a human being.[48]

Greenberg argues that "the tabooed status of the corpse [is] inferred from v. 28" and explains further that "any ox that killed a human was bloodguilty and its flesh taboo."[49] But this reasoning is circular, and it is not clear in any case that bloodguilt may be imputed to an animal in the same way as to a human being. If it should be, the animal would then be guilty of homicide and liable to pay at the hands of the "avenger" (*goel hadam*)—and I argued above that this cannot be the case.[50]

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for it, but he who kills ('strikes down') a human being shall be put to death" (*umakeh vhemah yeshalmenah umakeh adam yumat*, Lev. 24.21 [P]). The difference between the animals in the two situations can in my view be understood by analogy with the distinction between free men and slaves (cf. n. 50 below).

46.Consequently, neither provision should be interpreted in isolation from the other, in the manner, for example, of Greenberg, who elevates what he calls "the uniqueness and supremacy of human life" to the status of a "jural postulate" (1960, 16, 15). See also Finkelstein 1973, 28 n. 6, and Paul 1970.

47. "Probably...the animal is regarded as being somewhat demoniac in character, and therefore unclean and not to be used by mortals for profane purposes, such as eating"; "[T]he killing of a man by an animal rendered that animal...taboo" (Morgenstern 1930, 88–89); "[The ox may not be consumed because it] is laden with guilt and is therefore an object of horror" (Greenberg 1960, 15). Paul, too, following Greenberg, refers to "the taboo status of [the beast's] flesh" (1970, 78–79). Boecker claims that the animal is accursed (1980, 165), but this has even less textual evidence behind it.

48. Cf. Jackson, who argues that the beast should be regarded as "torn" (*trefah*)—a term that, as he observes, "normally denotes tearing by wild animals." "But," he goes on to argue, "the difference between this and stoning is not substantial" (1975, 116).

49. Greenberg 1986, 14.

50. Van Selms observes in this connection that the ox must be stoned also when it has gored a slave but that "the killing of a slave cannot form a reason for blood-revenge" (1950, 328).

It may be that the animal has become polluted, but this too would not necessarily prohibit its consumption. For the *hat'at*, or expiatory offering to which an individual guilty party's pollution was transferred, was nevertheless consumed after having been sacrificed (Lev. 6.17–22).[51] However, the *hat'at* of the anointed priest (Lev. 4.3) or of the community as a whole (Lev. 4.13) may not be consumed (Lev. 6.23); it must be entirely burnt outside the camp (Lev. 4.11–12, 4.20–21). It may be that the flesh of an ox that has been stoned to death is assimilated to this category and that this suffices to account for the proscription. But while pollution can be transferred to an animal, and while the act of shedding human blood can bring pollution into the community, it is not clear that the animal itself can be regarded as committing a sin (*het'*) any more than it can itself incur bloodguilt.

An alternative interpretation is suggested by a comment in the *Mekhilta*, which inquires why the prohibition on consumption was included at all. "Do I not know this from the fact that it is to be stoned?" the commentator asks. He goes on to explain, "If the owners of an ox that is being led out to be stoned, anticipating its stoning, slaughter it ritually, its flesh is nevertheless forbidden to be eaten. In this sense it is said: 'And its flesh shall not be eaten.'"[52] The logic behind this argument implies an initial assumption that the animal could be consumed if it could be sacrificed. The proscription, however, indicates that the beast has been consigned to the category of forbidden food—the category of the "unclean" (*tameh'*), which, in turn, may not be rendered fit through sacrifice. We may add that sacrifice in general is a purifying and inclusionary procedure—it renders an animal's flesh fit to eat, and brings it within the compass of the permitted. Stoning, by contrast, is an exclusionary procedure—it expels the animal from the human community and consigns it to the category of the inadmissible.

The ox's flesh may not be consumed, because the animal cannot be sacrificed. And the animal cannot be sacrificed, in turn, not because of the act it has committed, but because of the action that has been taken against it—not, in other words, because it is polluted, but because it has been stoned. Thus, Maimonides, drawing on the passage in the *Mekhilta* cited above, remarks:

> By this prohibition we are forbidden to eat the flesh of an ox that has been stoned, even if it was slaughtered before it was stoned, because

51. This apparent contradiction remains the focus of dispute in the scholarly literature on biblical sacrifice. For discussion see Katz 1990, 117–41, to which should now be added Zohar 1988 and Milgrom 1990.

52. Lauterbach 1976, 78.

when once sentence was passed it became forbidden food, even though it was slaughtered in accordance with the ritual requirements.[53]

The law of the goring ox reflects the hierarchy governing relations between man and beast that was enjoined at the time of their creation. And it incorporates this principle by differentiating the animal from a human criminal—by treating it as other than a murderer or sinner. Thus, the animal is stoned, not because it has committed homicide, but because it is the instrument through which bloodguilt has come into the community. Its flesh is proscribed, not because it is laden with pollution, but because the judgment against the animal has rendered it unfit for sacrifice. Such a disposition upholds both the principle that the lifeblood of human beings may not be shed at all with impunity and the regulation that restricts the consumption of flesh to those animals whose lifeblood is shed through sacrifice.

The biblical system as a whole enjoins a strict distinction between the realms of beasts and humans. These two separate domains, however, are brought into close contact when lifeblood is shed. On this occasion, human dominion over the animal world is tempered through the regulations that govern animal sacrifice. Correlatively, an animal that has killed a human being incurs liability for the shedding of human blood but is dealt with in a manner that preserves the original hierarchy between men and beasts.

## Homicide by Animals in Ancient Greek Law: Sacrificial Rite and Judicial Process

In ancient Greece the distinction between the domains of men and beasts is much more fluid. This same principle applies to the relation between the laws governing sacrifice and animal homicide. In fact an explicit connection between sacrificial rite and judicial process is affirmed in our sources. Pausanias, describing the homicide court at the Prytaneion where animals, inanimate objects, and unknown killers were tried for homicide, traces the origins of its procedure back to the time of Erechtheus, the legendary king of Athens, during whose reign "an ox-slayer killed an ox for the first time on the altar of Zeus Polieus" (*τότε πρῶτον βοῦν ἔκτεινεν ὁ βουφόνος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦ Πολιέως Διός*, 1.28.10); when he ran off, the ax he had used in the slaughter was tried and thereupon expelled (*ὁ δὲ πέλεκυς παραυτίκα ἀφείθη κριθείς*). At another point in the same narrative section, Pausanias discusses sacrifices to Zeus Polieus. These, he explains, ordinarily conclude

53. Maimonides 1967, 2.185, sec. 188.

with a judicial proceeding in which the participants "bring to trial the ax" utilized in the ritual slaughter (ἐς δίκην ὑπάγουσι τὸν πέλεκυν, 1.24.4).

This interrelationship between sacrifice and trial is attested in a number of brief notices[54] and appears also in an extensively elaborated account in the section of Porphyry's *De abstinentia* drawn directly from the lost Περὶ εὐσεβείας of Theophrastus.[55] There, Porphyry recounts the history of a certain Sopatrus,[56] an alien who was farming in Attica, and whose grain and fruit offerings to the gods, set out upon a sacrificial table, were consumed and destroyed by a plough-ox returning from the fields. Sopatrus slew the beast in a rage and was subsequently overcome by remorse, whereupon he fled away.[57] But a drought descended nevertheless upon the Athenians. In accordance with instructions from Delphi, Sopatrus was recalled and the slaughter was performed again—this time as a sacrifice.

Sopatrus agreed to perform the remedial ritual in return for a grant of citizenship and on condition that the community as a whole take part in it. The resulting organization of ritual behavior (2.29–30) was perpetuated as the ox sacrifice at the Dipolieia in Athens (ἀπὸ δ' ἐκείνου μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀεὶ τοῖς Διιπολείοις Ἀθήνησιν ἐν ἀκροπόλει οἱ εἰρημένοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ποιοῦνται τὴν τοῦ βοὸς θυσίαν). Water carriers were selected to carry water for sharpening the knife and ax. When the implements were readied the ax was handed to the slaughterer. Following the slaughter and flaying of the slain beast everyone partook of the animal's flesh, and its hide was stuffed with hay, stood upright, and yoked to a plough. The participants all together now proceeded to a trial of this same action (κρίσιν δὲ ποιούμενοι τοῦ φόνου πάντας ἐκάλουν εἰς ἀπολογίαν τοὺς τῆς πράξεως κοινωνήσαντας), calling to account in succession the water carriers, knife sharpeners, the one who handed over the ax, and the one who performed the slaughter. The last mentioned passed the blame on to the knife itself (τὴν μάχαιραν), which, unable to speak in its own defense (καθ' ἣς οὔσης ἀφώνου), was judged guilty of the murder (τὸν φόνον κατέγνωσαν).[58]

This account is problematic and difficult on several counts, not least in its postulation of cereal offerings as the original form of sacrifice to the

54. For a full consideration of the testimonia, and of the differences among them, see Hyde 1917; see also Durand 1986.

55. The relationship between the sources was originally established by Bernays; see Hyde 1917, 153 n. 3.

56. The name of the first individual to sacrifice an ox is given variously as Thaulon (Σ Hom. *Il.* 18.483; *Suda* θ 67 Adler), Diomus (Porph. *Abst.* 2.10), or Sopatrus (as here).

57. Similarly, Θαύλων is described (by Σ Hom. *Il.* 18.483) as φυγαδευθείς following the sacrifice of the ox.

58. Another notice of the βουφόνια at the Dipolieia appears at a different point in Porphyry's text, but it comprises only the initial stages of the Sopatrus saga: βοῦν δὲ Διόμος

gods—the account itself is part of a polemic against animal sacrifice and a defense of vegetarianism. But the principal difficulty is unquestionably the interpretation of the myth and of the ritual with which it is connected.[59]

The interpretation of the Βουφόνια/Διιπόλια has been determined, for the most part, by the currently prevailing theory of sacrifice.[60] Thus, Mommsen views it as a threshing festival designed to secure favorable weather conditions,[61] in accordance with a notion of ritual action as unmediated instrumentality. Hyde, following Robertson Smith's interpretation of sacrifice as totemic meal, argues that the Buphonia was "in some way connected with agrarian rites, and [probably] had some form of totemism behind it."[62] Burkert, following Meuli, detects elements of the "comedy of innocence" in the Buphonia but regards its primary function as a marker of the year's end.[63] Durand and Vernant propose structuralist analyses, which emphasize elements in the myth that invert the "proper" relationship between man and beast.[64] Durand, in discussing the myth's formulation of the relation between savagery and civilization, particularly focuses on the role of the ox in cereal cultivation and argues that the beast is endowed with a double status as both sacrificial object and agricultural auxiliary.[65]

These interpretations are compelling, each in its own way, but none attempts to comprehend the rite either within the framework of its extension into the judicial realm[66] or with reference to its resonance with the other, better-known story of the origin of sacrifice in Hesiod's *Theogony*, which assigns its invention to the god Prometheus. In the Hesiodic account, too, the judicial and religious realms are conflated, since the epic narrative

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ἔσφαξε πρῶτος, ἱερεὺς ὢν τοῦ Πολιέως Διός, ὅτι τῶν Διιπολίων ἀγομένων καὶ παρεσκευασμένων κατὰ τὸ πάλαι ἔθος τῶν καρπῶν ὁ βοῦς προσελθὼν ἀπεγεύσατο τοῦ ἱεροῦ πελάνου· συνεργοὺς γὰρ λαβὼν τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι παρῆσαν, ἀπέκτεινε τοῦτον (*Abst.* 2.10).

59. For discussion of such issues as the location of the festival, the relation between the Διιπόλια and Βουφόνια, conflicting testimony on the matter of the guilty instrument (identified as both knife and ax), and the like, see Hyde 1917.

60. For discussion and references see Katz 1990, 90–100.

61. Mommsen, in Hyde 1917, 159–60.

62. Hyde 1917, 167. Hyde explains further: "It [the rite] seems to show that the early community which centered around the Acropolis believed it was mystically maintained by eating an ox as a sacrament, in which ox, god and worshippers were akin. Slowly the special deity of an agricultural ox-clan grew to become the god of the State." Cf. also Pestalozza 1956, who argues that it was originally a festival of the primordial mother goddess.

63. Burkert 1983, 142–43.

64. Durand 1977a; Durand 1977b; Vernant 1980b.

65. Durand 1986, 59.

66. Indeed Hyde, who discusses both the Buphonia and the Prytaneion, nevertheless concludes that "there appear to be two different sets of ideas quite independent of one another at the bottom of the buphonia and the trials" (1917, 298).

begins at the point "when gods and mortal men were coming to a settlement at Mekonê" (*Th.* 535).[67]

In the *Theogony*, Prometheus contrives to disrupt the primitive commonality and commensality prevailing between men and gods through an unequal division of the sacrificial portions; he conceals the edible parts in the animal's stomach and skin and wraps the white bones in gleaming fat. Invited to choose between them, Zeus sees through the trick but nevertheless selects the portion that is ever after destined to belong to the gods: "Ever since that time, the tribes of men have burned white bones for the immortals upon aromatic altars" (*Theog.* 556–57).[68]

In the *Theogony*, then, the origin of sacrifice is referred back to a primordial moment at which it coincides with an original instance of discrimination or judgment—leading, in this case, to a permanent disruption between gods and men. Within this new world order, sacrifice becomes the means, as Vernant has shown, through which the rift between the human and divine realms is simultaneously instantiated and recuperated: "As the central act of worship [sacrifice] links men with gods, but it does so by separating their respective shares.... It unites them, not so that they may be rejoined...but to confirm the necessary distance between them."[69]

In the Greek view, as we observed above, the human realm is constituted as intermediary between the world of the gods and the domain of the beasts. Similarly, the ritual of sacrifice, in which an animal is slaughtered and its parts distributed between gods and human beings, extends both into the domain above men and into the realm below them. The two myths of sacrifice taken together make up an inclusive unity, a complementary pair applying to each of these separate domains. The myth of Prometheus regulates interactions on what Detienne calls "the high road" that leads from men to the gods.[70] Its complement is the myth of the Buphonia, which institutionalizes relations on "the low road," in the avenue of continuity between man and beast. The hierarchy between men and gods, according to the myth of Prometheus, is defined by divine fiat. The establishment of the proper relation between men and beasts, however, is a matter of more complexity, requiring, but not simply resting on, divine sanction. Its basis is the

67. On the translation of ἐκρίνοντο, see West's note ad loc.: "The word denotes a 'settlement' in the legal sense, though not necessarily in a legal context; a definitive division between parties, however arrived at" (1966, 317). See also Rudhardt 1970, 7, on cosmic apportionment; Vernant 1989a, 226 nn. 19–23.

68. For a complete analysis of the myth, together with a consideration of the version in the *Works and Days*, see Vernant 1989a.

69. Vernant 1989a, 34, 35.

70. Detienne 1989, 7–8.

human capacity, as Aristotle defined it, to distinguish between the just and the unjust, and the myth of the Buphonia is organized so as to bring this element to the forefront.

The mythic exegesis of the origin of the Buphonia is structured around three specific mythical moments—the crime of the ox, the crime of the ox slayer, and the crime of the ax/knife. The ox's consumption of the offering placed on the altar represents a transgression—the devouring by an animal of an offering set aside for the gods. The ox thereby establishes its culpability and its liability for punitive action. To slay the ox, however, incurs further guilt, for which expiation is made possible only through the remedial efficacy of judicial action.

This account condenses into a single myth a tripartite sequence that is in other respects characteristic of Greek culture and that envisions the establishment of civilization and its institutions as the stabilizing third element in a succession of criminal actions. Both Hesiod's *Theogony* and Aeschylus' *Oresteia* are constructed around a succession myth in which the remedy for violence is the transfer of a dispute to a politico-judicial sphere constituted for the purpose and overseen by the gods.

The Buphonia brings the slaughter of animals within the compass of this same ideological scheme and makes clear an implied equivalence between animal and human life, which is, however, resolved into a hierarchy between them in the end. The slaughter of animals by human beings is first criminalized and then legitimized by means of its transfer into the judicial realm. In this way, the functioning of judicial procedure becomes the criterion marking off the world of men from that of beasts, and it serves also as the means for establishing the proper, hierarchical relation between them.

The operation of this same principle is evident behind the institution of the kings' court at the Prytaneion, one of the five homicide courts at Athens, where the trials of animals, inanimate objects, and unknown killers took place.[71] As Aristotle describes it:

> Whenever one does not know who did it, one brings a case against 'the doer.' The βασιλεύς and the φυλοβασιλεῖς try also the cases of inanimate objects and of animals besides.
>
> (*Ath. Pol.* 57.4, tr. MacDowell)

71. For discussion see Hyde 1917, 167–75, 285–88; Düll 1941, 1–18; MacDowell 1963, 86–89; S. G. Miller 1978, 18–19.

[ὅταν δὲ μὴ εἰδῇ τὸν ποιήσαντα, τῷ δράσαντι λαγχάνει. δικάζει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ φυλοβασιλεῖς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων.]

Other testimonia (the *Suda*, Harpocration, Pollux, etc.) mention only the prosecutions of unknown murderers and lifeless objects. But Plato includes an extensive discussion of homicide by animals in the *Laws* (873e–874b), where this crime is considered, as in Aristotle, together with homicide by inanimate objects and unknown murderers.

These judicial proceedings occurred at a building otherwise reserved for state dinners and the administration of various forms of social welfare, and this group of functions provides the key to the logic governing the trials in question.[72] The Prytaneion housed the city's hearth, that sacred central space around which the city constituted itself symbolically as one large household or οἶκος. Ambassadors and certain other classes of privileged outsiders gained admission to the city proper through association with this inner sanctum and through the same rituals of incorporation that at the family hearth integrated strangers into the individual οἶκος. At the Prytaneion the welfare of orphans and ἐπίκληροι was overseen, and in this respect too the Prytaneion substituted for the family hearth. Thus, individuals bereft of family protection and hence deprived of their means of connection to the polis were retrieved from exclusion and brought back within its compass through programs of social welfare that symbolically replicated the ordinary functioning of family life.

Similarly, in the so-called trials of animals and inanimate objects,[73] the state took upon itself a function normally reserved to the family. Although homicide in ancient Greece, as in ancient Israel, polluted the community as a whole, the responsibility for prosecution and hence for the expiation of bloodguilt fell upon the closest surviving family member (Demos. 43.57, 47.72).[74] In this respect, the trial of animals at the Prytaneion affirmed the commonality between human beings and animals, for it replicated procedures normally applied to human beings who had fallen outside the compass of the human community. But the subjection of animals to these politico-judicial proceedings also enacted their differentiation from human beings,

72. For discussion of the building and its functions and a collection of all the relevant testimonia, see S. G. Miller 1978, esp. app. A.

73. The precise form of the judicial proceedings and the makeup of its personnel are problematic. Jury trials were probably not at issue, and a defense would naturally have been out of the question, except perhaps where animals were involved and could have been defended by their owners. There are conflicting opinions on whether the φυλοβασιλεῖς or ἐφέται presided. For discussion see references in n. 71 above; Gagarin 1981a, 132–33.

74. Cf. Glotz 1904, 179.

since the end result of such trials was in all likelihood execution and expulsion of the animal's corpse.[75]

The cultural logic governing these procedures has less to do with guilt and innocence, or indeed with the administration of justice in the normal sense—where it applies to members of the same community—than it does with the rules and rhythms that regulate admission to, and exclusion from, the human community. The connection Pausanias draws between procedure in the Prytaneion and the first occasion of animal slaughter implies an equivalence between the shedding of animal blood by human beings and the killing of men by beasts. But men, with their capacity for justice and other forms of rational discrimination, can transcend their liability for bloodguilt by appeal to judicial procedure. Such transfer of bloodguilt is unavailable for animals, and their death and expulsion is the only means for ridding the community of the pollution occasioned by the shedding of blood.[76]

Here, as in the domain of sacrifice, the judicial realm is constituted as the boundary that divides men from animals. The prosecution of human beings and animals alike for the crime of murder brings into being a judicial realm that discriminates among degrees of guilt and provides expiation for the shedding of blood. Its functioning encompasses human beings alone, and hence domestic animals who have shed human blood have thereby irremediably consigned themselves to the realm of the wild outside the human community and must be expelled from its midst.

Like the ancient Israelites, the ancient Greeks developed a complementarity between the killing of animals by humans and the killing of human beings by animals. For the Greeks, however, this complementarity was part of a larger cultural scheme that affirmed the commonality of animals with humans and constituted the human realm through an elaboration of its difference from the domain of beasts. The Buphonia myth constructs an original moment when animals can commit sacrilege and when their killing is equivalent to murder; similarly, the *Theogony* myth originates from a point of commonality between men and gods. Subsequently, both the practice of sacrifice and the court at the Prytaneion come into being through a differentiation of the human realm from that of both the beasts and the gods.

In the Bible, a distinction between animals and humans, and between human beings and God, exists from the outset and constitutes the premise

75. This, at any rate, is what Plato, our own witness on the matter, enjoins (*Lg.* 873e).

76. Cf. Hyde (1917, 297–98), who appeals to the functioning of the *lex talionis*, and who must consequently also advance the questionable view that the Greeks attributed rationality to animals. Space does not allow for a consideration here of the cases of injury by an animal and their judicial remedy through the γραφὴ βλάβης.

of the narrative. Human dominion over beasts, however, was subsequently modified through sacrifice. But the laws developed to encompass an animal that kills a man were nevertheless accommodated fully to the principles of the fundamental distinction between men and beasts and of mankind's dominion over the animal world.

All three of these ancient cultures—Mesopotamian, Israelite, and Greek—practiced animal sacrifice and developed legal remedies for the killing of human beings by animals. But in each case, the cultural elaboration of these practices was correlated with different understandings of the relationship of the world of men to that of beasts. Only among the ancient Greeks and ancient Israelites did the legitimation of animal slaughter entail culturally significant consequences. These were expressed in an ideology of legal liability and moral responsibility, and both animals and human beings were brought within its compass. Its ultimate implication is to make it clear that the humanness of human beings and the bestiality of beasts is not to be taken for granted. It is rather a principle whose validity always remains open to question, and which therefore must be constantly reaffirmed through rituals of cultural inscription that are designed to establish it as truth.

13

# The Perception of Deception and Gullibility in Specialists of the Supernatural (Primarily) in Athenian Literature

Donald Lateiner

GUILE AND GUILE DETECTION are enduring needs in the social encounters of peasant and complex societies, even between family members, such as parent and child. Telling lies, cheating, and evasion of due punishment often meet not moral stigma but approval and even prestige for impressive social skills. Even the seriously penalized crime of adultery with another man's wife seemed desirable, likely, and difficult to prevent in the eyes of Athenian jurors and theater audiences.[1] This chapter examines whether the same anxiety and admiration coexisted when individuals claimed extraordinary powers and knowledge of magic and the future.

Ancient literary sources are generally compromised whenever irregular, supernatural phenomena appear. They perceive entrepreneurial, noninstitutional supernaturalists as mad or cunningly dishonest, although the same upper-class and literate sources often endorse the Olympian gods, their myths, and their cults. They reflect the dominant ideology, the establishment's jaundiced and class-determined view of unsanctioned religious activities. While the magical papyri and *defixiones* provide access to other views, the cultists' secrecy, their claims of direct contact with divinity/ies, and their forecasts and promises of procuring or coercing divine cooperation as part

My former colleague and mentor Martin Ostwald studied forty years ago the relations of religious seers and fortune-tellers to the Athenian state (Ostwald 1951). May this chapter bring him anamnetic pleasure, if little unfamiliar information.

1. Lys. 1.33; Ar. *Th.* 410–27, *Lys.* 404–19; Gardner 1989, 51–55. Winkler (1990, 71–77) discusses extralegal erotic temptations and the not-very-amicable jockeying for prestige that characterizes male Mediterranean social groups.

of preemptive strategies produced a marginal social type, the lonely but powerful outsider with an inside track to occultism. This liminal, countercultural figure in the Western social order, the initiated magus-sorcerer-mystic (in varying proportions) possessed of a secret knowledge, presented himself as close to God and sometimes empowered to enable or prevent preternatural events in the public and private lives of his contemporaries. At the least, from the point of view of comparative anthropology, such claimants to preternatural knowledge successfully perform cures and other rituals that diffuse family crises, heal psychosomatic illnesses and some other maladies, and defuse otherwise insoluble problems in personal relationships. Did an Azande baby die at birth? Did a Samian youth fall in love with an unsuitable maiden or lad? Not the mother or lovesick adolescent is responsible but a child-blighting witch's spell or a malevolent soul-stealing magician or spirit, so don't blame any of the innocent victims! Find some expert to take effective countermeasures![2] Such intermediaries of supposed power elicited several literary sketches in fifth-century Athenian literature, most of them sharply critical. After a necessary introduction through the praised deceptions of Odysseus, I examine fifth-century portraits of claimants to preternatural powers.

Mediterranean Greek attitudes toward the moral evaluation of deceptive behavior differ significantly from those of the North Atlantic's "moral community." Discretion, secrecy, and self-serving misdirection are tactical weapons that support each family's honor and integrity and, as importantly, impugn those of others.[3] Odysseus, after he has returned to Ithaca, lies to everyone at first meeting—most gratuitously—to his father Laertes, since the suitors are dead, and advantage from, or the need for, deception is past. The disguised son Odysseus' egotistical display, perhaps a delicate sadism from a modern point of view, resembles the like-minded scheming pleasure in superior knowledge and the amusing sadism of the Olympian parental-substitute, his shape-shifting, κέρδος-minded, patron goddess Athena, when Odysseus awakes alone on Ithaca (*Od.* 13.197–299, 24.304–26).

Odysseus intentionally misrepresents facts with convincing detail to (an admiring if undeceived) Athena, to Eumaeus, Telemachus, Antinous, the other suitors, and to Penelope, all in books 13–19 alone. His self-centered skill is commended by Homer, although the hero himself ironically con-

2. Johnston 1990; cf. Winkler 1990, 71–126, on love magic. Lévi-Strauss (1963) helpfully analyzes the triangulation among belief, privilege, and faith in shamans, patients, and their social groups. See also Evans-Pritchard 1937 on the Azande and Tambiah 1973 on magic as "illocutionary act."

3. Du Boulay's influential study (1976) illuminates Penelope's relations with the suitors in the *Odyssey*.

demns the art of deceit (13.254–55, 19.203; cf. 14.156 and Autolycus at 17.396). The "character of the listener determines the character of the lie." He always knows which deceits will bring profit.[4]

The resourceful lies of Odysseus serve his immediate needs for physical comforts (e.g., a cloak at *Od.* 14.459–512) and his long-term plans to restore his social stature (e.g., assertions of nobility and former wealth at *Od.* 6.164, 14.200–212, 17.419–23, 19.194–98). Beyond the immediate utility of a cultivated skill in provoking valuable gifts, successful frauds such as Odysseus' boost self-esteem and confidence in one's shrewdness and survival power. Trust is an expensive luxury in Homer's agonistic world, perhaps also in ours. Eternal vigilance and the exercise of deceit contribute to a necessarily permanent state of defensiveness in all (Mediterranean) societies. They are necessary disciplines for success in life's anxious contests and for the establishment of certain social identities, male and female.

Later varieties of fraudulent personae presented by Greek authors betray an ambivalence similar to amused Athena's mock exasperated, yet admiring, description of Odysseus: a self-aggrandizing cheat who can vie with the labile gods in his low disguises, fancy lies, and lethal tricks, and a wily deceiver who always chases *κέρδος*, "profit," because he will not and cannot alter his nature.[5] Achilles, it is true, passionately condemns feigned sentiments and false words, but even this supposedly blunt hero's own talk about talk comes in a far from candid set of speeches about his dealings with the Achaeans (*Il.* 9.312–14). Planned deceit for personal advantage is central to many Greek speeches and narratives, with good and bad consequences for the artful dodgers. Here, however, we can focus on only one subset of group and individual deception, fraud based on claims to knowledge of, and power in, the preternatural realm.

4. For the victims of deceit mentioned see *Od.* 13.256–86, 14.192–352, 17.419–44, 19.165–202, 19.221–48, 19.262–303. Other victims include Nausicaa, Polyphemus, Circe, and Laertes. Cf. Trahman 1952, 31–43, esp. 36–39, 41, for the quotation. For Odysseus' connection with fairy-tale figures of magic see Swogger 1981, 24–26; Carpenter 1946, 20–22, 68–72; Page 1973, 4, 30, chap. 4.

5. *Od.* 13.291–95:

> κερδαλέος κ' εἴη καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ὅς σε παρέλθοι
> ἐν πάντεσσι δόλοισι, καὶ εἰ θεὸς ἀντιάσειε.
> σχέτλιε, ποικιλομῆτα, δόλων ἆτ', οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες,
> οὐδ' ἐν σῇ περ ἐὼν γαίῃ, λήξειν ἀπατάων
> μύθων τε κλοπίων, οἵ τοι πεδόθεν φίλοι εἰσίν.

Walcott (1977, 6–9) collects ancient texts and modern evidence about social responses to deception. Murnaghan (1987) analyzes disguise for both gods and humans in the *Odyssey* (11–16) and also recognizes how this character trait defines Odysseus' heroism (3–5). Herzfeld (1985, esp. 3–50) studies modern Cretan villagers' bluffing, thieving, and cheating, within a system of masculine honor. Martin's study of Homer's Achilles (1989, 22–25, 90–101) exploits the suggestive modern parallels to the world of the *Iliad*.

Men holding religious credentials (office is hardly the word) or claiming divine connections often encounter suspicion, already in the *Iliad* and more so in the *Odyssey*. Prophets, prophecies, seers, and augurs are handily attacked because they are marginal to the heroic power structure and often alien to a particular social group. Even the acknowledged diviners Calchas, Polydamas, and Halitherses are accused of bad faith or motives, including mercenary ones, as well as of simple ignorance and of pandering to women's foolish desires in their "guilt-research" (*Il.* 1.106–10, 12.233–43; *Od.* 1.415–16, 2.178–90). The wandering mantis Theoclymenus requires his present hosts' goodwill even for food and material support. He, like his congeners, must wait to be called in from the outside (κλητοί, 17.382–86). He must prove his skill and here fails entirely—at least among the suitors—and departs empty-handed after his "hilarious" prophecies (20.358–80).

Hesiod's archaic Olympian Muses acknowledge true, false, and false like-to-true utterances in their prophetic bards' words to the human community (*Th.* 27–28; cf. Odysseus, *Od.* 19.203). Inspired mantic fraudulence and enthused hoaxes based on seers' assumed power to descry the future and sorcerers' ability to act at a distance are alleged to be the stock-in-trade of the swindling μάγος and the γόης. The Greeks—like all believers—were clearly aware that claims to divine knowledge are not always true. Some were quick to attribute belief in unauthorized preternaturalistic acts—that is, sympathetic magic, and supernatural knowledge—to exotics, "others," barbarians, women, slaves, or a varied, brittle combination of these.[6]

In all periods, skepticism toward divine messengers, sorcerers, healers, and mediums coexists with genuine belief in the efficacy of magic. Magic transfers properties by analogical acts, imposes meaning on the world, and constructs an affective, symbolic system based on the concept of "persuasive acts."[7] Not provable and practical effectiveness but individual and communal experience and belief determine satisfaction with incantation, scapulomancy, and other forms of magic (or science, for that matter). Belief that most witch doctors are quacks or frauds does not impede belief in a few competent experts and in dream interpretation, herbalism, and arcane knowledge as such. Every failure may merely indicate that the wrong expert was consulted or that the procedure was somehow botched, not that the formulae, substances, and "systems" of "miracle workers" cannot influence the world of nature—they can if rightly performed by the right charismatic per-

6. Euripides' hysterical Phrygian slave in the *Orestes* (1376, 1495–98) believes in vanishing people, such as Herodotus' evanescent Aristeas or Salmoxis (cf. Lateiner 1990).

7. Tambiah (1973, 199–229 = Tambiah 1985, 60–86, esp. 71, 84) elaborates this model and discusses differences between Western concepts of various paradigms of science and magic, including the influential anthropologists Evans-Pritchard (1937) and Malinowski (1948).

son.[8] Ancient literary representations of magic and divination generally acknowledge bizarre powers while questioning the practitioner's legitimacy, and few writers deny both.

The successes of Pythagoreanism and Orphism, dim topics among the dimmest areas in Greek religion, illustrate the willingness and ability of supernatural traditions to absorb "disconfirming" data. The little we might now know is further vitiated by the fact that few of their sectarian texts are, or ever were, authentic. Already in the early fourth century, Plato knew that long before his day many documents had been interpolated for profit (*Rep.* 364b–365c). Orpheus was literally a name to conjure with. The opportunities for blessedness and damnation through esoteric written texts always invite embroidery and the sheer invention of pseudepigrapha.[9]

Any cultic or divinatory entrepreneur (unconnected to the established shrines) who is known to the Greeks has very few options in his feats and life-style. Pythagoras willy-nilly provides the paradigm of the sage and the magus. Sooner or later, the religious entrepreneur will be Pythagorized. Furthermore, if his innovations cannot be assimilated to accepted Hellenic beliefs and customs of the preternatural, they tend to be mocked as barbaric and then dismissed as a hoax by the literate classes. Examples from Herodotus and the Athenians Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Plato supply the principal evidence.

The words *μάγοι* and *γόητες* never specify a stable set of beliefs or practitioners but furnish the defenders of the dominant belief system with two pejorative terms to describe persons engaged in noninstitutional supernatural activities or in promoting beliefs deemed foreign to, or subversive

8. The successful mid-fifth-century mantis Polymaenetus provides a case history. After a prominent and lucrative career he bequeathed his *τέχνη*, mantic tomes, and considerable fortune to his Siphnian disciple Thrasyllus, who subsequently wandered about the Aegean producing money and babies, eventually contracting an upscale marriage (Isoc. 19.5–7, 19.45). Euenius of Apollonia and Deiphonus his son (or self-proclaimed son, cf. Hdt. 9.95) also exemplify passing on mantic secrets to a relation. Northwestern Greece seems to have been the right place for seers to come from. Evans-Pritchard (1937, 183–93) discusses Azande explanations of the business of "witch doctors" (quoted by Lloyd 1979, 17–19, see also 2–3); cf. Luck 1985, 5–6.

9. Thesleff 1961; Burkert 1972, 97–165; West 1982a, 29; West 1983, chap. 1 ("a hubbub of books"), also pp. 46, 52, 56; Bremmer 1983b, 6. Guthrie (1962, 1:148–72) discusses the problem of extricating historical truth about Pythagoras from the sources. Herodotus is the first writer to mention his sect, but he says surprisingly little about the man (2.81; perhaps 2.123 alludes to his doctrines). Burkert (1972, 97–192) represents the sage as embodying the survival of ancient ritual, lore, and wisdom based on superhuman authority. He emphasizes the lacunose factual record; cf. Burkert 1985, 296–304, esp. 299, 303. Even the materialist Democritus developed a sorcerer's persona and powers in later Greco-Roman culture. Winkler (1985, 260–62) summarizes Democritus' spiritualist career. Further evolutions of the miscegenation of sages and magi will appear in my study of Tyanean Apollonius, "Entrepreneurs of the Supernatural in the Roman Empire."

of, prevailing religious paradigms and sensibilities. An implication of fraud always attaches to the person labeled as γόης and usually to the μάγος in the literary texts of the dominant classes. These words and their derivatives, regardless of the author's belief in the existence of supernatural powers, carry a common charge of unscrupulous manipulation of willing dupes.[10]

Herodotus believes that the Μάγοι were originally a Median tribe (1.101) but somehow (not specified) became a priestly caste of interpreters of supernatural phenomena (1.107.1, 1.120.1, 1.132.3; 7.19.1, 7.37.2, 7.43.2, 7.191.2; etc.) Their authentic Eastern rituals are little known, but Herodotus, our earliest authority, attributes to them at least sacrifice and incantations for divinities.[11] He hints that he considered their business to be no more than impressive hocus-pocus; for example, he undercuts the claim that the Magi bound the winds at Artemisium by spell by suggesting that the winds merely blew themselves out (7.37, 7.43, 7.114.1, 7.191).

New religious rituals and moments of miracle, both ancient and modern, seem absurd and contrived to many an ancient or modern historian. Herodotus' sardonic account of Peisistratus' Athenian political strategies is riddled with extraordinary events, probably a relic of the tyrant's own propaganda and policies as well as his opponents' allegations. Before the battle of Pallene, Peisistratus approached a nearby temple of Athena and met the chresmologue Amphilytus, θείῃ πομπῇ (by divine plan?), who there provided the easily interpretable and helpful "net and tunny" oracle in an inspired performance (ἐνθεάζων; occurs once in Hdt. 1.62.4–63.1). Peisistratus was celebrated for his patronage of mystery cult, festivals, and temple-building, for example, at Athens, newly Attic Eleusis, and Athenian-dominated Delos. He also patronized the charismatic chresmologue Onomacritus, known for his Orphism and ritualism. The tyrant was said to have collected oracles for himself on the Acropolis.[12]

The family of Peisistratus and Hippias repeatedly acknowledged the significance of dream omens and themselves interpreted oracles with recognized authority (5.56, 6.107; 5.93). Diviners and supernatural appearances play an important part in their political strategy and in that of their successors', such as Themistocles and the Persian Mardonius in the fifth century (cf. 8.96, 9.43). Some contemporaries believed in such procedures; others

10. R. Gordon 1987, 59–95 (an epochal article); Luck 1985, 21; MacMullen 1966, 95–127; Smith 1978, 70, 81–93 (for later periods). Neither term appears in Homer, Aristophanes, or Thucydides. Philostratus (*VS* 1.10) blames the Persian magi for Protagoras' notorious agnosticism.

11. See the last two Herodotean references; cf. Arist. fr. 36 Bekker; Lloyd 1979, 13, n. 20.

12. Arist. fr. 7 Rose; Hdt. 5.90.2. West (1983, 9 n. 13, 248–51) considers the Onomacritan connection with Orphism to be a later invention.

discredited them. Lasus of Hermione, for instance, successfully exposed Onomacritus' interpolations of his reputed oracle collections (7.6.3).[13]

In 480, in response to a Delphic vaticination, the chresmologues predicted Athenian defeat if Athens engaged the enemy in a naval battle. Themistocles found it prudent to offer a different interpretation rather than to dismiss this oracle or oracles as such. The chresmologues' position was deemed sufficiently respectable in this case nearly to determine Athenian strategy, although it did not at this time sway more votes than the competing chresmic exegesis of a more aggressive naval policy (Herod. 7.142–43). Suitable diviners to expound one's policies were apparently always to be found, as the year 415 proved at Athens. In the political tussling over the decision to attack Syracuse and its allies, prophecies were brought forward and suppressed at will. The fact remains that the pronouncements were still considered worthy of attention and not merely contemptible or suitable only for women and fools. There is no ancient evidence that the influence of diviners later waned (other than Aristophanes' decreased attention, in his later comedies, to preternaturalists).[14]

Sophocles' Orestes in the *Electra* instructs his trusty servant—many times proven in his "nobility," that is, total loyalty to Orestes' selfish interests—to invoke the god Apollo and to swear before the Argive authorities any oath to promote credence in his message of Orestes' death. The lie that brings profit is acceptable. Even Apollo's oracle for Orestes says that ruses are necessary, and one that brings renown is even more defensible. Then, in a justification hardly relevant to the immediate plot, Orestes instances past sages [Pythagoras, Salmoxis?] who have lied about dying and then returned home to great honor, profit, and full credence in their resurrection.[15]

13. Hdt. 1.60 reports the notorious epiphany of Athene/Phye; cf. Pearson 1941, 335–55, 338 = Pearson 1983, 49; Nilsson 1951, 49–50, 63, 131; Fontenrose 1978, 157–58; Stern 1989, 13–20; Connor 1987, 40–50, esp. 42–47 (with helpful bibliography from social anthropology). West (1983, 46) evaluates Epimenides' earlier purification of post-Cylonian Athens. Hippias, Peisistratus' son, had a "stash" of oracles which the Spartan king Cleomenes captured. The younger Athenian tyrant was reputed an oracle expert (5.90.2, 5.93.1), and his father was himself believed to have been a chresmologue. He attracted the nickname "Bacis" and legends of divining skills and oracle collection (Σ Ar. *Pax* 1071; *Suda* β 47 Adler). On the Ionian historian's attitude to religious entrepreneurialism see Lateiner 1990, 231–45.

14. Plut. *Nic.* 13.1–3; note the silence of Thucydides on this issue. Diopeithes the chresmologue affected Spartan politics between 402 and 398 (Plut. *Ages.* 3.6–9).

15. *El.* 23–66, esp. 61–64:

> δοκῶ μὲν οὐδὲν ῥῆμα σὺν κέρδει κακόν·
> ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον πολλάκις καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς
> λόγῳ μάτην θνήσκοντας· εἰθ' ὅταν δόμους
> ἔλθωσιν αὖθις, ἐκτετίμηνται πλέον.

Sophocles may here have in mind Pythagoras; see the scholia ad loc. Herodotus' account of Salmoxis (4.94–96, esp. 4.95) seems close to Sophocles' portrait in describing a prophet's

Orestes boasts that he also will become a hero on the basis of the success of his oracle-based lies and murder. The fraudulent seer joins the venal prophet elsewhere in Sophoclean dialogues (*OT* 387–90; *Ant.* 1055–56). Sophocles' Oedipus immediately imputes to Teiresias motives of personal gain when he encounters his unwelcome prophecies. He calls him, with angry tragic pleonasm, a quack magician and a streetcorner priest (*μάγον μηχανορράφον, δόλιον ἀγύρτην*).

Mendicant priests (*ἀγύρται*) of Orpheus and of other cult figures were already a ubiquitous fifth-century phenomenon. Plutarch tells an amusing anecdote of Philip, an impoverished *Orpheotelestes* of the early fifth century; Aeschylus' mid-fifth-century Cassandra speaks of herself in similar terms of mendicant divination (*ἀγύρτρια...μάντις*); and Attic comedy, from the late fifth century and for a century at least, displayed a stock figure of the professional charlatan meddling in supernal messages and cultic affairs. This insulting label remained useful at the end of the fourth century. Demosthenes then deployed it in his snide attack on Aeschines' upbringing and poor old mother, who was, to judge from Demosthenes' malicious words, an initiator in a hodgepodge caricature of Bacchic-Orphic-Sabazic rites, which were purposely described as an exotic and alien scam cooked up from well-known ritual but conducted in Athens only as marginal religious activities.[16]

The *Bacchae* of Euripides rests on three elements (inter alia) common in Athenian fifth-century religious life: an exotic mortal priest of an alien oriental cult,[17] a pervasive distrust in religious innovation and claims of divine conception, and an enlightened man's readiness to sneer at extravagant religious claims. Dionysus in disguise expresses his opponents' view (29–30) that the new faith amounts to little else than convenient excuses (*σοφίσματα*) for covering up sexual escapades (*ἁμαρτία*). The invasive, innovative orgies of submission to the novel deity strike Pentheus, the cocky rationalist, as a social revolution (*νεοχμά*, 216) counterfeit ecstasies (*πλαστα ῖσι βαγχείαισιν*, 218), the self-aggrandizing frauds of a stranger whom he describes as a "wizard conjuror" (*γόης ἐπῳδός*, 234; cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 1038). Some men fabricate falsehoods (*ἐψεύσατο*, 245) about divinities for venal motives or personal gain. Pentheus eventually accuses the "marvel-

staged resurrection—a cultic fraud to local Euxine Greeks. Priority cannot be determined; a common source such as "Aristeas" seems likely.

16. Plut. *Mor.* 224e; Aesch. *Ag.* 1273–75; Ar. *Pax* 1045–1121; Ar. *Av.* 959–91; Antiph. *Misopon.* fr. 159 K = Athen. 6.226d, devotees of Cybele; Demos. *Cor.* 18.258–60, 19.249, 19.281. Burkert 1972, 132 n. 68. West (1983, 20–24) hypercritically dismisses the story about Philip because of Diogenes Laertius' parallel anecdote (6.4), in which Antisthenes mocks an Orphic initiator who tarries unhappily in this mundane life.

17. Cf. the image of Orpheus in Eur. *Alc.* 966–71, *Cyc.* 646.

interpreter" Teiresias (τερασκόπος, 248, i.e., not a regular priest) of producing one more new god for men (τόνδ' αὖ...δαίμονα ἀνθρώποισι ἐσφέρων νέον, 255–57) with rotten orgies for women, in order to pocket regular profits (μισθοὺς φέρειν, οὐχ ὑγιές, 262; cf. Eur. *IA* 520–21, *Hel.* 744–56). Pentheus provides the rationalist's reasons to laugh down the myth (καταγελᾷς, 286): manic prophecy (τὸ μανιῶδες, 299), induced panic (μανία, 305), and women simulating ecstasy (μαινάδων...νόθων, 1060). Cadmus, his grandfather, is equally ready to promote cynically the "flattering fiction for the family" (335). Euripides' first 350 verses describe the characters and positions of the credulous converts, the skeptical authorities, and the cynical exploiters of unauthorized supernatural practices as they existed in late fifth-century Athens, a so-called Age of Reason. Whatever his own view of religious epiphenomena may be, the responses portrayed reveal current crises in belief and controversy about cultic entrepreneurs.

Aristophanes' portrayals of "religious" hustlers and con-men borrow liberally and often from Homer's sometimes amoral, always self-centered Odysseus and from contemporary free-floating popular suspicions of supernatural claims to control the daemonic that have left little written trace. The honored Greek ideal of self-seeking achievement at any cost (πονηρία) glorifies material and spiritual one-upmanship, success however achieved. The comic poet's heroes often deceive ordinary folk and official opponents. The great ones like the Sausage-seller or Pisthetaerus are great in part by virtue of these very skills of impostership. These unscrupulous rogues tailor presentations of self in order to manipulate others and assert the primacy of their own interests and worldview. They are excessive, clever with words, and resourceful in their actions in emergencies. Their impudent impostures, liberated from any social restraint, are self-aggrandizing. Their only goal is to win, to master the credulous crowds. Their singleminded, foxy lunacy enthralls their stage victims and the audience. Ambition, appetite, survival at all costs, and dexterous responsiveness to others' weaknesses—including the wish for preternatural knowledge—focus Aristophanes' satiric attention.

The cynical manipulation of established oracles and prophecy *ad libitum* promotes the plans of, for example, Pisthetaerus, Nicias, and Demosthenes. A Delphic oracle persuades the heroic Sausage-seller in *Knights* (220) to enter politics. The oracle at Delphi motivates Chremylus and the entire plot of *Plutus* (32–55). This traditional cultic phenomenon is never challenged in the play. Here a certified and revered oracle rather than a roving mantic or raving chresmologue is responsible. The venerated voice of Apollo advised Chremylus in effect that his son must become an amoral

seeker of wealth, willing to do anything regardless of its decency. The institutional voice may be correct here, but the portrait is not flattering.

The petty religious hustlers of Aristophanes, however, bear the best witness to the common Athenian's awareness of oracle-mongers and soothsayers as an inexhaustible source of the humor of fraud. Aristophanes satirizes the profession as well as individuals. He lampoons Hierocles in the *Peace* (1043–1126) and the Paphlagonian with his oracles of Bacis and a mighty thirst in *Knights* (115–24, 193–210, 1003–86). In *Birds*, the mendicant priest, the vagrant oracle-monger, and the portentous, footloose sage Meton appear as frauds of the supernatural. Their brazen hypocrisy in matters of cult and divination nicely highlights the perfected picture of the consummate con-man, persuasive Pisthetaerus himself (862–89, 959–91, 992–1020). Aristophanes' frequent parodies of preternaturalists indicate that both established oracles and vagrant oracle-mongers often affected or profited from Athenian politics and propaganda campaigns. Even the otherwise admirable Lysistrata is compelled to resort to the lowest means to keep the sex-starved women loyal to the cause of peace. She "discovers" a suitable χρησμός, couched in hexameter bombast but lucid in its support of the female "demagogue's" policy (*Lys.* 767–80).[18] Two-obol, temple-haunting dream-interpreters are a comic fixture in Greek life and literature, more common than another extra-institutional medium—spontaneously message-delivering, "possessed" prophets (ἐγγαστρίμυθοι).[19]

Aristophanes ridicules diviners at every appearance. He condemns not belief in divination as such, it is true, but the corrupt practitioners. This category, nevertheless, includes every mantis and chresmologue on his Athenian stage. Trygaeus' slave reasonably expects the chresmologue Hierocles (note his "speaking name") to be a (more reputable) mantis. The interloper approaches their sacrifice excitedly. The slave is emphatically corrected about the profession of this historical person, so some difference between the two terms was understood in 422/1. His following interference with the feast—he wants the choice cuts of meat—is based on pretended expertise in sacrifices (θυσία), which is not an oracle-expounder's business at all, and provides much of Aristophanes' caricature of the historical grasping and hungry mendicant oracle-merchant from Oreos. It appears here (and frequently elsewhere from Homer on) that a mantis' status was higher than a chresmologue's, such as the followers of the legendary (and generic)

18. See Whitman (1964, chap. 2) for the cunning intelligence of the hero. Nilsson 1951, 125, 136–40; Dover 1972, 76–77; Fontenrose 1978, 153–57.

19. For diviners see Ar. *Vesp.* 50–53; Thphr. *Char.* 16; Plut. *Arist.* 27; Alciphr. *Epist.* 3.59. For the "possessed" see Ar. *Vesp.* 1019; Pl. *Sph.* 252c; Plut. *Mor.* 414e; Clem. Al. *Protr.* 2. Cf. the cledonic implications of αὐτοματίζων (D.S. 16.92.2–3).

Boeotian Bacis. The Roman imperial cicerone Pausanias asserts that historical μάντεις never were chresmologues and never produced oracles. The context makes clear that this avoidance of oracle collecting and the specialization in dream, bird-flight, and entrail divination was to their credit.[20] Hierocles is called a greedy glutton, an imposter (ἀλαζών), and a venal thief, a comic triad of abuse handy for other oracular seers as well (*Pax* 1117–24).

Aristophanes alleges that diviners fit oracles to events after the fact. They select and interpret the traditional texts to benefit themselves. These ancient charges of bogus activity are found in both comedy and tragedy. Furthermore, historically the preternaturalists encouraged the war efforts of 431 and 415 and opposed initiatives to promote peace, policy positions likely to provoke the comic poet's hostility. Cleon in *Knights* is ridiculed extensively and significantly for his employment of oracles in order to manipulate the character of Demos for his own selfish advantage (61, 997–1000; cf. the similar incidents in *Peace* and *Birds*). His inexhaustible supply of perfectly pertinent Bacis oracles satirizes the diviners' willingness to serve political interests by merchandising allegedly supernal signs and oracular responses. Chresmologues in Aristophanes furnish oracles of Bacis, the Sibyl (both generic labels), and even the respected and fixed Pythia (leaving aside the archly invented "Glanis" of *Knights* 1004). Even if Delphi is not attacked, its oracles and name are always available to imposters. The marginal and often foreign oracle "experts" seemed the most culpable class of diviners, the preternaturalists most deserving of ridicule and charges of fraud, because their commodity was in uncontrollable supply, could easily be tampered with, and except for responses from established shrines, could always be manufactured at will.[21]

The seer was cheap to hire—two obols was pay for a dream-interpreter (*Wasps* 52–53). The purveyors seemed dishonest quacks to many. The oracle-mongers especially, to judge by their frequency in Aristophanes, seemed a more promising comic target than the semi-respectable interpreters of birds, dreams, and weather omens (cf. *Peace* 1087).

In truth, most of the fifth-century evidence for individuals practicing both types of soothsaying depends on comedy. Diopeithes is mentioned as a

20. Ar. *Pax* 1045–47, 1052–1126; cf. Eup. *Poleis* fr. 241 KA = Σ Ar. *Pax* 1046; Paus. 1.34.4. For Hierocles' known official duties for the Athenian demos see the Chalcis decree, *IG* $1^2$:39.64–66; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 143. Argyle (1970, 139) leaves the distinction unsettled. Smith (1989, 142–43) notes the "professional" jokes, here and earlier (*Pax* 1032) for Stilbides.

21. Smith 1989, 144–46, n. 17, 150–51. Smith (1989, 152–54) argues that Aristophanes was not ridiculing the possibility of the human art of divination as such, e.g., the practice of Delphi or other shrines of fixed abode. A Delphic oracular response that turns out to be entirely right motivates the plot of *Plutus*, and other Pythian responses appear in a positive light. Thucydides never comments negatively (or positively) on embassies requesting Delphic services.

mantis in *Knights* (1085), *Wasps* (380), and *Birds* (988); Lampon appears likewise in *Birds* (521, 988) and is alluded to as mantis in *Clouds* (332). Diopeithes in fact successfully introduced legislation in Athens against unbelievers and astronomers. That is, he presented himself as part of "normal" religion in opposition to deviant religious beliefs and practices. Lampon the mantis was very influential from before 443 until the teens. He participated professionally in the founding of Thurii in 443, moved a complex rider concerning religious matters to the "first fruits" decree for Eleusis of 422, and was the first Athenian signatory to the Peace of Nicias, as Thucydides records the names. Lampon is even said to have received free food at the Prytaneion, an unachieved goal of Xenophon of Colophon and Socrates.[22] The comic poets Cratinus, Callias, Lysippus, and Aristophanes ridicule his gluttony, but the historical high status and honors were real enough. Stilbides, Nicias' chief mantis, reputedly restrained the general's superstition, but in Aristophanes he represents another hungry entrepreneur of the supernatural who wants to assist Trygaeus the sacrificer (here read "feast preparer") but is promptly thwarted by the sinewy comic hero.[23]

Belief in bewitching spells is demonstrable from a farcical scene in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (422 B.C.E.). The mid-fifth-century politician Thucydides once, late in his career, rose to defend himself in court but suddenly could not speak. In the courtroom satire, Bdelycleon, in his hilarious excuses for the prisoner dog's entirely natural silence, refers to the momentary unnatural paralysis of the politician-general (891–1008, esp. 946–48; cf. Ar. *Ach.* 702–12). Nearly contemporary and numerous curse tablets, *defixiones*, attest to belief in the invasive potency of magical curses against litigant-opponents and their rhetorical powers in and out of court (cf. *IG* 3.3, app. [Wuensch]; Pl. *Men.* 80a–b, *Euthd.* 303a–c). A business for the secretaries of magic certainly existed in Socrates' city. Allegations of such magically manipulated psychological seizures as Thucydides' might be a convenient way to save face after a lapse of self-possession as well as a nasty accusation against your "unscrupulous" opponents. Nothing could be proved, but something muddy might stick. The accuser could sincerely believe in the charge—nothing, after all, is accidental in this world, especially the unex-

22. Plut. *Per.* 32.1; Plut. *Mor.* 812d; *Suda θ* 418 Adler; Σ. Ar. *Av.* 521; *IG* $1^2$:76.47–61; Thuc. 5.19.2, 24.1; Σ Ar. *Pax* 1084; see Ostwald 1951, 29–30 for beneficiaries of σίτησις; Plut. *Per.* 6.2–3 for Lampon's powers; Ath. 344e for his appetites, probably culled from comic sources. In extant sources (Ostwald 1951, 41), he is called mantis seven times, chresmologue three times, and *thytes* or diviner/sacrificer twice, further evidence for the lack of a clear distinction in later times.

23. Plut. *Nic.* 23.7; Ar. *Pax* 1031; other references are collected in Garland 1984, 82, and Smith 1989, 142, 150, including frr. from Eupolis and Cratinus.

pected fit—but in any case, a politician's unsupported charge was a fair tactic, this one less mendacious than some others, in the competitive arenas of a free and godly society.

Either way, Aristophanes' slapstick and dialogue assume an Athenian audience's familiarity with an under-the-counter business of casting spells. This passing reference to applied magic, and others, like the allusion in *Acharnians* (1128–31) to scrying by catoptromancy (mirror-magic), offer a momentary window into other, less reputable ancient technologies of spiritual power and into Athenian beliefs about controlling supernormal phenomena. The ages of reason never co-opt all inhabitants of any epoch.[24]

Aristophanes' *Clouds* portrays Socrates as a con-man playing on spiritual ignorance as well as on his victims' need for cash. He prays in occult, new ways to new (false) gods, including a Trinity of Chaos, Clouds, and Tongue (423–24). He can prophesy, initiate men into mysteries, and like a magician, at will summon the powers to appear. These divinities are not the recognized Olympian gods but the occult yet true and supreme Gods, the Clouds, and Socrates can coax their attention for conversation and service (247–92). These claims and skills are probably meant to represent actionable offenses, invocation and worship of non-Athenian deities as well as commerce with noninsitutionalized higher beings. Trials on charges of impiety for acts of witchcraft, chants, and sorcerers' poisons took place in Socrates' city, although most of the evidence is from the fourth century (for example, Ninus, Theoris, and Phryne).[25] No evidence or reason suggests that these offenses were then newly added to the Athenian law code. Aristophanes exposes the confidence tricks of noninstitutional "divine" swindlers and cultic frauds, while parading on stage various forms of gullibility in the ordinary citizens and their "betters," as part of his comic, educative mission.

Religious authority was diffused among institutional officers and free-floating "experts" in archaic and classical Athens. Priests, magistrates, temple-cult assistants, and expounders of sacred law were certainly more prominent and numerous than diviners and oracle-merchants (*μάντεις* and *χρησμόλογοι*). These last two categories might be employed for the moment, or, more likely, they were contradicted (without fear of sacrilege)

24. See Faraone 1989, 149–60, esp. 153, 155. D. Jordan (1985) is publishing more than one hundred *defixiones* from the Athenian agora. The curse tablets, last collected by Wuensch (*IG* 3.3, app.) and Audollent nearly a century ago, now number over 1100; cf. *KP* 3:968–76. Many centuries later, Libanius (1.71; cf. 245–49) reports a similar event and explanation. Bonner (1932, 203–8) illuminates the late classical hexing of a bath.

25. On Phryne see Alciphr. 4.3.1; Ath. 585e (*ψυχαγωγοῦσιν*), 590e (*δεισιδαιμονῆσαι*), 591a (*φίλτρα*). Posidipp. *Ephesia* fr. 13 KA; *RE* 20.1:903–6. On Theoris see Demos. 25.79–80. On Ninus see Demos. 19.281.

in their unsolicited kennings, overruled, or just ignored as occasion and policy warranted. The μάντεις were a more respected class of interpreters of visible signs, hired ad hoc by the demos, but not a certified omen-bureaucracy. The latter group were not officially sanctioned or publicly approved but only unauthorized interpreters of signs and mobile purveyors of their own collections of oracles. They accessed these without license or permit and merchandised them mainly to private parties. The "diviners" had no corporate structure or identity and often were from distant corners of Hellas such as Acharnania or were more remote "foreigners."

Thucydides reports that enough prophecies and chresmologues circulated in 431 for every Athenian to find the oracle that best fit his war politics. However anyone tried or tries to distinguish between the mantis and the chresmologue, the two classes of seers who had puffed up Athenian hopes, they were close enough, for both the Athenians of 413 and for the historian later, to be joined in the people's common anger and in Thucydides' disdain after news of the debacle in Sicily arrived home. Thucydides employs θειάζειν ("to practice inspired divination") uniquely here in his text to describe their common activities. The context is plainly contemptuous, and the noun θειασμός uniquely appears in the notorious earlier passage about Nicias' excessive proneness to fortune-telling divination, a kind of religious subculture that Thucydides derides.[26] Thucydides never reports the Athenian demos' hiring of μάντεις for the army, for assemblies, or for obtaining oracular responses, although we know such events occurred. The magisterial silence speaks volumes for the intellectual's response to contemporary mantic and chresmologic enterprises and popularity.

Thucydides indicts the brisk business in the chanting of anonymous oracles on the brink of the Peloponnesian War. Everything unusual seemed portentous to the Athenian public as well as to their enemies (1.25.2; 2.8, 2.21.3; cf. 2.54.4, 4.118.1; also 1.103.2, 1.126.6). Professional prophets seem to have been consulted in all seriousness at the beginning of every major campaign; the right to consult them was guaranteed by the peace treaty of 421; later some erroneous forecasts caught up with them (5.18.2, 8.1). An oracle early in the war was employed to justify Delos' purification by the Athenians. Nicias' soothsayers expounded the Sicilian eclipse as requiring a

26. 2.21.3, 8.1.1; 7.50.4 is glossed as "superstition" by LSJ; see Garland 1984, 75; Argyle 1970, 139; Marinatos 1981, 138–40; B. Jordan 1986, 126, 134–36. For later references to the relationship between seer and general, cf. Pl. *La.* 198e–199a; Xen. *An.* 1.7.18. Plato (*Ap.* 22c; cf. *Ion* 534c) also lumps both classes of diviners together as ignorant men who speak in ecstatic trances: ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομαντεῖς καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί...[sc. οἶ] ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι.

thrice-nine day delay before embarkation and retreat, and the Athenian soldiery as well as their commander, somewhat contemptible to the historian (and general) for his addiction to such communications, were fearfully agitated by that event and capitulated to the mantic interpretation of the celestial phenomenon (3.104, 7.50.4). Here and in his "second preface" (5.26.3; cf. his unnamed Athenian psychologists at Melos, 5.103.2), Thucydides condemns purveyors of mantic and chresmologic "skills" and the numerous people who trusted them. They precipitated major decisions without justifying them beyond reference to their private, preternatural channels. The "thrice-nine" years prophecy produced at the beginning of the war and defining its length was the only such oracle that turned out right for the obstinate faithful (*μόνον δὴ τοῦτο ἐχυρῶς ξυμβάν*), according to Thucydides.[27] But one success outweighs many failures in this branch of human endeavor. The relative political neutrality of this prophecy is striking, but the rule-proving exception accounts for Thucydides' unusual quotation of it.

The historian recognizes that men were so eager to believe in mantic reality that they changed and would change their interpretations, or even deconstruct the texts themselves, to fit the facts that emerged. In his psychological analysis of peripheral religious phenomena (2.54.1–3), Thucydides is confident (*ἦν δέ γε οἶμαι*; cf. 2.17.2) that *λοιμός* and *λιμός*—plague and famine—will each be "chanted" as the accurate text, whenever future circumstances are appropriate to the one or the other. The plague eventually became so debilitating that Thucydides remarks the fact that people *stopped* supplicating and consulting the seers (2.47.4). The unbearable extreme stress unsettled regular and confirmed religious habits.

The pugnacious "Hippocratic" opponent of superstition who composed *On the Sacred Disease* (ca. 400 B.C.E.) rejects, in a paradigmatically limited rationalist critique, all the incantations and senseless magical prohibitions of the magi, vagabond charlatans, and quacks (*μάγοι...καὶ ἀγύρται*[28]

27. Marinatos (1981, 138–40) recognizes Thucydides' scorn for the oracle-mongers as notorious frauds, although she argues for his credence in established oracles (mistakenly, in my opinion). Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 152–58; Jordan 1986, 126 (follows Marinatos). The policy issues addressed by oracle-contests before the Sicilian expedition (Plut. *Nic.* 13; *Alc.* 17) are analogous to the discordant interpretations of the Pythian "wooden wall" oracle debated before the battle of Salamis in 480, when the chresmologues were beaten by Themistocles, but only by his alternative interpretation, not for believing in divination by oracle as such.

28. See Lloyd 1979, 15–29, for criticisms of magic in the Hippocratic *Morb. sacr.* and *Aër.*; see Kudlien 1983 for ancient snake-oil salesmen and quack-remedy purveyors. The physician Democedes generously befriended both the defeated Egyptian doctors of Darius and the Elean mantis (Callias? cf. Hdt. 5.44.2), formerly chained with him in the King's prison (Hdt. 3.132.2). As noted above, the Sophoclean Oedipus employs the same terms of reproach for Teiresias (*OT* 387–90). The labels often appear together, sometimes with *γόητται* to emphasize

καὶ ἀλαζόνες, 1–2, 21). He complains that they have a rich fund of excuses for failure in the gods' nearly infinite inscrutability, and that they suffer no penalty when they fail. Such "con-men quacks" constantly devise pseudomedical cure-alls that provide them with a good living (4).[29] Medical quacks, employing exorcisms, talismans, roots, and stones, as well as some occasionally useful folk-remedies, were often pilloried from the fifth century on. The pressing needs of sufferers continue to maintain their business. The failures of their methods never sufficiently persuade desperate customers of their general uselessness any more than Freudian psychoanalysis' clinical shortcomings drive it out of business.[30] "Con-men" and some sincerely persuaded individuals have always noticed an entrepreneurial opportunity for credence, power, and cash in human pain and in other exigencies where rational approaches offer insufficient assistance to the spiritually and physically needy. This Hippocratic author, Ionian rather than Athenian, thoroughly deconstructs preternaturalists' suppositions. The arguments are substantially the same as we have encountered in Athens.

Pericles himself, when ill, "allowed" his women to hang an amulet around his neck (Plut. *Per.* 38). Exorcism and other forms of supernatural entrepreneurship did not disappear in the age of enlightenment, even among the self-identified enlightened elite.[31] Such appeals to extrahuman agencies always coexist with understandable anxieties, concomitant hoaxes, and gullibility for "superstition." The optimistic drive to manipulate nonnatural forces seems ineradicable.

Plato repeatedly has Socrates refer to his personal, restraining δαιμόνιον, his divine signs, orders from god through oracles and dreams, and his involuntary service to god. Platonic personae call Socrates a conjuror (γόης) and a charmer (ἐκήλει; *Men.* 80a–b; *Symp.* 215c–216a; *Rep.* 358b), and employ similar terms of sorcery such as the *vox propria* for spiritual possession, κατέχεσθαι. Alcibiades relates how Socrates can control the words, actions, and internal organs of those who come near him, once his words remove their wits and reduce them to a condition approaching women, adolescents, drunkards, or frenzied Corybants. Plato takes for

confidence-tricks (see, e.g., "conjurors and imposters"—Plut. *Mor.* 166a; Str. 10.3.23; Zos. 1.11 [reign of Antoninus]). Here they are contrasted to μάντις σαφής.

29. Edelstein 1937, 201–46 [= Edelstein 1967, 205–46], esp. 205–8. Lloyd 1979, 15–19, esp. 17; Hippocr. *Virg.* 8; 22; *Art.* 42, 44 (on uncredentialed medical swindlers). See also Diph. fr. 125 KA; Alex. fr. 112 K; Thphr. *Char.* 16.

30. The elder Pliny notoriously offers to Roman readers countless magical nostrums: e.g., *Nat.* 29, esp. 2.4, 10.35 (ointments). Cf. Gell. *NA* 9.4.7, 13–16; Lloyd 1979, 13 n. 20; Williams 1978, 180–84. Lévi-Strauss (1963) compares the psychotherapeutic techniques and psychosomatic issues facing experienced faith-healers and Western psychoanalysts.

31. See Faraone 1992, chap. 7, on misleading discontinuities in the evidence for magic in the classical period.

granted the existence of necromancers, sorcerers, and vagrant magicians. He reports, in a rare statement of sociological import, that rich and poor alike patronize them.[32]

On the other hand, Euthyphro's claim to religious expertise, as well as his self-endorsed veracious prophecies for the future, by his own admission meet derision and laughter in the Athenian assembly. He attributes this foolish rejection of his religious insight to envy. Socrates says that only μάντεις like Euthyphro know what will happen to him, but Euthyphro's confident forecast of Socrates' acquittal makes clear to the reader that his knowledge of the future is nil.[33] Comparisons of Socrates to self-proclaimed reporters and controllers of the daemonic and the divine suggest Plato's desire to connect philosophy to occult, eternal truths and the supernatural, a somewhat surprising link between Plato and both Pythagoras' self-identified progeny and the butts of the comic stage.

Greek willingness to believe and confide in certain kinds of divine revelation available here and now existed in the Athenian polis, but such claims and claimants also encountered skepticism and exposé. Greek belief systems allowed space for belief in preternaturalists and also for disbelief, for allegations of hocus-pocus and mumbo-jumbo, gossip about human manipulation of alleged heavenly signs, and even public accusations against the manipulation of widely respected oracular shrines. Furthermore, the pretensions of nonestablished seers, religious innovators, and street-corner magicians and sorcerers were often derided by fifth-century Athenian authors as frauds and swindlers. Nonetheless, the intelligentsia's need for regular derision in public (e.g., at the theater) as well as in private venues indicates a notable ambivalence in the Athenian people—hunger for cheap knowledge of the future here on earth and for the eternity beyond, but also readiness to laugh at that understandable inclination.[34] The typology of the fifth-century preternaturalists often features a different way of life (abode, diet, and powers) and an alien origin. Arrogation of power to see or influence future events or to expiate past guilt sometimes encountered acceptance, sometimes rejection, in Athenian society. "Primitive" faith and recent rationalist criticism continued to jostle against each other for attention and power.

32. Plato (*Rep.* 364b–e; *Lg.* 909a–d, 910a–b, 933a–b) assumes the ubiquity of healers and prophets. His fantasyland sentences street-corner sorcerers and prophets to solitary life imprisonment and denies them burial. These men, beast-like (θηριώδεις) in their rapacious desire for monetary gain, pretend to be able to call up the dead. They resort to sorcery to compel the gods. Elsewhere Plato endorses Delphi and its oracles (*Rep.* 427b–c) but no other intermediate earthly source of divine knowledge (*Phdr.* 244d–e reports a non-Socratic view), so far as I know. Did this tolerance arise from Socrates' acceptance of Delphi's validation of his wisdom?

33. Pl. *Euthphr.* 3b–e; Plato here deploys the humorous topos of the seer who cannot see. Smith (1989, 147 n. 31) provides bibliography on Socrates' attitude toward divination.

34. Cf. Luck 1985, 21.

*14*

# The Athenian Economy

Edward E. Cohen

> The very concept of "the economy" in the modern sense is untranslatable in Greek, because it simply did not exist.
>
> Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 8

CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING DOGMA that classical Athens as a primitive society did not even have an economy, this chapter shows that fourth-century Attica functioned through a differentiated system of handling valuable assets (an economy) that was organized and perceived, in typically Athenian antithesis, through "disclosed" (φανερά) and "invisible" (ἀφανής) spheres, both of which were highly dependent on the newly-emergent Athenian bankers (τραπεζῖται).

An economy is "a system of producing, distributing, and consuming wealth."[1] But anthropologists have developed models of primitive groups where production, distribution, and consumption are accomplished solely through familial or political relationships. In such societies, economic activity cannot occur without direct social significance; thus the economy is said to be embedded in the society itself.[2] Since no system for creating or dealing with wealth exists as an independent sphere, motivationally and finacially distinct from other institutions, such a society can be said to lack an

1. *Webster's Unabridged Dictionary*, 2d ed., s.v. Because modern economic science has focused almost exclusively on price-making markets, anthropologists and historians have tended to equate the very term *economy* with this particular market form. See Will 1954; Lepore 1970. Such markets, however, are actually somewhat anomalous occurrences and should not be taken as definitionally determinative. See Neale 1957; Roll 1973, 371. Like economies, markets have numerous definitions and subdivisions in modern jargon. The United States' capital market for example is said to be a composite of three separate autonomous entities: the stock market, the bond market, and the money market. See Stigum 1978, 7.

2. See Polanyi 1944, 63–64; Polanyi 1957, 68; Humphreys 1978, 152. For similar conceptualization, cf. Parsons' "structural differentiation" (1951, chaps. 4 and 5) and Mauss' "faits sociaux totaux" (1923–24).

economy—although more precisely it lacks not a system of handling wealth (an economy), but the disengaged commercial activity that would permit the intellectualized concept of an economy.[3]

Fourth-century Athens was very different. The Athenians functioned through a market process in which unrelated individuals, often in the city only transiently, sometimes even operating from abroad, sought monetary profit through commercial exchange (ἀλλαγή).[4] Not only were these transactions disembedded from society; they were seen by theoreticians in their writings and by litigants in their court cases as carrying significant threat to traditional social and familial methods of handling production and consumption.

In the *Politics* (1256a–1257b), Aristotle argues against what modern economists would call the "scarcity postulate" (a purported inability to meet overall consumer demand because of inherent absolute limitations on total potential wealth). Characteristically analyzing commercial issues in ethical context, Aristotle poses the issue not in terms of the adequacy or expansibility of the "supply side" but as a problem of misguided desire ("demand")—true wealth, although not infinite, is sufficient to meet man's needs, properly conceived.[5] In deprecating individuals' tendency to misconceive of wealth as monetary assets, he notes the development, relatively recently,[6] of a new type of economic activity that has adversely affected traditional values and methods.[7] This "monied mode of acquisition" (χρηματιστικὴ κτητικὴ

3. Analogously, increasing interdependence among modern economies tends to preclude the independent analysis of domestic systems through traditional monetary and fiscal tools. See Kohn 1976, 485–86.

4. *ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς (ἦσαν) καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν* (Arist. *Pol.* 1257a31–36); *εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος* (Arist. *Pol.* 1257b3–5).

5. Modern economists, eschewing philosophical concerns, tend improperly to deprecate Aristotle's approaches and analyses. See Schumpeter 1954, 57; Soudek 1952. M. I. Finley (1970) defends Aristotle's alleged lack of observation by insisting that, in the absence of an economy, there was nothing to observe. Cf. M. I. Finley 1985, 21. See, however, Meikle 1979, 57–58, for a critique of these "anachronistic" evaluations of Aristotle's thought. Cf. Johnson 1939, 450; J. T. Lewis 1978; Lowry 1969, 1974, 1988; Meikle 1989. In fact, Aristotle's treatment of currency-denominated exchange (in the *Politics*) and of commodity value (in the *Ethics*) won the admiration of Marx (*Capital* 1.60)—who like Aristotle dealt with economic themes in wider political and philosophical context.

6. There is general consensus that coinage was unknown prior to the seventh century but substantial conflict as to the precise date of its introduction in the sixth century. For the first half of the century see Weidauer 1975, 72–109; Cahn 1977, 279–87; Kagan 1982, 343–60. For later dates see R. M. Cook 1946, 90–91; Robinson 1951, 156–64; Kroll and Waggoner 1984, 325–33. For the effect of coinage on the ancient Greek economy see Postan 1944; Kraay 1964; Crawford 1982, 29–59.

7. Aristotle sees the introduction of coinage as the precondition to the development of retail trade (*τὸ καπηλικόν*) but explicitly separates an earlier, "simple" state of this trade from

[τέχνη]),[8] has arisen from the new dominance of distribution by experienced businessmen motivated by profit considerations ("making money from one another").[9] The individual pursuit of profit reflects society's new functioning through the exchange of goods and services for money, not bound to societal relations, replacing the prior system of household production/consumption, which had been augmented sporadically, where necessary, by barter within defined social relationships.[10]

Aristotle actually appears to be describing a system of production, distribution, and consumption actuated by a supply-demand pricing mechanism, the essence of a market economy.[11] In any event, however, this commercial world of the market is far removed from traditional forms of organ-ization through the "household" (οἶκος), in which production and consumption were governed not by other people's money but by societal and familial relationships and motivations. Now transactions are ephemeral, and prices are determined by economic considerations. Although Aristotle

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the profit-seeking, complex market activity existing in his own time: *πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος* (*Pol.* 1257b1–5). Modern scholars sharply differentiate the nature of economic activity at Athens in the fourth century from that prevailing earlier; see Davies 1981, 38–87; Polanyi 1957, 67 ("in Aristotle's writings we possess an eyewitness account...of incipient market trading at its very first appearance in the history of civilization").

8. Χρηματιστική, an adjective, is derived from the noun χρῆμα, which carried the dual meaning of "money" and "property" (goods, chattel, etc.). When applied to the fourth-century market, as in the Aristotelian phrase *ἡ κτητικὴ χρηματιστικὴ* [τέχνη] (*Pol.* 1256b40–41), the monetary notation is clearly present. Cf. Humphreys 1983b, 12 ("*chrêmatistikê*, the art of money-making"). Since Aristotle's discussion is focused entirely on the changes wrought in economic organization by the introduction of coinage, it seems unreasonable to translate χρηματιστική here by such phrases as the "art of getting wealth" (Jowett).

9. *τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη* (Arist. *Pol.* 1258b1–4). For Aristotle's view on the appropriate role of money see *EN* 1133a18–b29.

10. Under the prior system (*ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ* [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία], *οἱ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων*) barter was employed only *κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις*. Aristotle notes that discontinuous exchange in kind still prevailed in his time among many non-Greek nations: *ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν* (*Pol.* 1257a19–25). On the entire section see Barker [1946] 1948, 18–27.

11. Aristotle does not examine the nature of this price mechanism, which was irrelevant to his own ethically-derived concept of the "just price" (*EN* 1133a–b). Polanyi therefore infers that a mature pricing mechanism (in his opinion, the essence of the market economy) arose only some years later. He thus terms the fourth-century Athenian economy "market trade," the "juncture" of the "orbit of trade," and "the institution of the market" (Polanyi 1957, 83–87). For the emergence of the market economy in a variety of societies see Rodinson 1973, xv–lxix; for the usefulness of Polanyi's conceptualization of the market in the study of Greek economic history see Valensi 1974; for its inapplicability to certain aspects of the Greek world, not relevant to our discussion, see Figueira 1984a, 15–30.

longs for the former system, its replacement by impersonal coined money is what he actually portrays—and rues.

This portrayal reflected a reality truly altered. The fundamental building block of Athenian society,[12] the οἶκος had been perceived in the early fifth century as self-sufficient, producing for its own private consumption and pursuing in its marital couplings dynastic arrangements of aristocratic purity intended to perpetuate the οἶκος and thereby preserve control of the πόλις for its "best" citizens (ἄριστοι).[13] But by the fourth century, agricultural products were increasingly being raised for cash sale,[14] consumer items were often produced by commercial workshops,[15] and aristocratic marriages for dynastic continuity had disappeared.[16] Financial stability had become dependent on the marketplace credibility (πίστις) of former slaves who were able to marshal unprecedentedly large monetary resources.[17] In the sixth century, nonagricultural income and property were, for the upper classes, "politically negligible"; by the fourth century a variety of economic bases supported the propertied citizens and "tended to obliterate differences of origin."[18] Within his own lifetime and writings, the conservative commen-

12. The ancient sources identify this οἶκος—rather than the individual—as the basic constituent element of Athenian society (see Arist. *Pol.* 1252a–b; Xen. *Oec.*), and in recent years this judgment has come to be accepted by scholars. See, for example, Foxhall 1989, 22; Fisher 1976, 2, 5; Hallett 1984, 72–76; Hunter 1981, 153; Jameson 1990, 179. In a constitutional sense, "the πόλις was an aggregation of οἶκοι" (H.-J. Wolff 1944, 93). For the fullest discussion of the word in its various attributes see MacDowell 1989, 10–21. Cf. Karabélias 1984, 1:441–54.

13. See Connor 1971, 3–84; Humphreys 1983b, 10.

14. In Attica, rents for agricultural land were by the fourth century—in contrast to the old hectemorage system—invariably paid and calculated in money, not in kind. See Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.2, 3.11.4; Xen. *Symp.* 8.25; Lys. 7.4, 9–10; Is. 9.42; Thphr. *Char.* 4.5. For the significant cash generated in the fourth century from the leasing of public property, including land, see Osborne 1988, 291–92. For epigraphic evidence as to the contents of such leases, cf., e.g., Walbank 1983; Walbank 1984; Langdon 1987, 47–58; D. M. Lewis 1959, 239–47 (publication of *SEG* 18.13).

15. The development of such shops is confirmed by the high proportion of slaves known to have been engaged in specialized craft activity in the mid-320s—in sharp contrast to the very low percentage so employed in the late fifth century. Cf. *IG* $2^2$:1553–78, lists reporting the manumission of 171 slaves in the 320s (cf. Pritchett 1956, 279; Kliacko 1966); and the Attic stelae, recording in 414 the sale of some 53 slaves (Pritchett 1953, 240; Pritchett 1961, 23). The earliest significant information on such commercial workshops dates from the end of the Peloponnesian War (the shield-factory of Lysias and Polemarchus: Lys. 12.8, 19; Pl. *Rep.* 8; Plut. *Mor.* 835b–c).

16. For more than forty years prior to the regime of Demetrius, "an exceptionally well-documented period," not a single marriage link can be discerned among political personages (J. K. Davies 1981, 120).

17. Demos. 36.57 (of the banker, former slave Phormio): τοσαῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρήμαθ' ὑμῖν ἀνεγνώσθη προσηυπορηκώς, ὅσ' οὔθ' οὗτος οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς κέκτηται. πίστις μέντοι Φορμίωνι παρὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι καὶ τοσούτων καὶ πολλῷ πλειόνων χρημάτων, δι' ἧς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ὑμῖν χρήσιμός ἐστίν. ἃ μὴ προῆσθε.

18. Davies 1981, 38; Mossé 1973, 49.

tator Xenophon reflects this fundamental change from embedded to market economy. Where in the earlier *Oeconomicus* he had lauded the traditional household as a potential solution to all of Hellas' contemporary problems, by the 350s in the later *De vectigalibus*, he is actively proposing financial incentives to promote trade, to encourage immigration of economically useful aliens, and to increase the money supply.[19]

This new system naturally required new functionaries. Since hundreds of separate communities minted their own coins—and a number of dominant currencies circulated far from their own territories[20]—a prominent place in the market was taken by the money changer, who conducted business on the τράπεζα (literally the "table" in the marketplace on which currency was exchanged).[21] Since the new price-denominated, profit-oriented market functioned through these coins, monetary exchange through the τράπεζα itself involved numerous discrete fleeting transactions—themselves further embodiment of the new economic system. Beyond the exchange of currency, however, these money changers (called τραπεζῖται) provided loans, accepted deposits, and served as intermediaries in facilitating commerce, becoming what we would term "bankers."[22]

Since the provision of these functions originated not in traditional familial, social, or political relationships but in the isolated transactions of a

19. See Humphreys 1983b, 13. The evidence for movement to a market economy is so pervasive that Millett (1990, 168), in attempting "an alternative type of analysis along non-market lines" for the process of sale, is forced to concede "the appearance in the ancient literature of the external trappings of market exchange"—while turning to "modern African markets" for refutation of the Athenian evidence.

20. The Cyzicene stater, for example, was in circulation over a vast geographical area and reached Athens itself in large numbers. Staters have been found with relative frequency in hoards dating to the fourth century in South Russia (*IGCH* 1001, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1045). They have also been found in the Piraeus (*IGCH* 47), and Cyzicene coins are known to have been held by Athenians (Lys. 12.11, 32.6, 32.9). Even earlier there are several references to staters in the accounts of the treasurers of Athena (*IG* $1^2$:301.5–6 = *IG* $1^3$:376.6–7; *IG* $1^2$:302d.12, 54–55 = *IG* $1^3$:370.13, 64–65; *IG* $1^2$:305.15 = *IG* $1^3$:378.21.

21. At Athens these money changers occupied prominent positions in both the city marketplace and in the maritime commercial emporium at the Piraeus. The tester (δοκιμαστής), a public slave, was assigned to test monetary silver while seated "among the τράπεζαι" and the law regulating the circulation of legal coinage was itself set up "among the τράπεζαι." See Stroud 1974, 157 ll. 5–6, 44–46.

22. Both Demosthenes and modern banking codes fix on the same basic factors in finding the necessary essence of a bank in its generation of revenue through loans funded by outside deposits, "other people's money" that the bank must return. In the language of the United States Code, a "bank" must "(1) accept deposits" and "(2) make commercial loans" (12 U.S.C.A. sec. 1841). For the French, a "banker" has been defined as one who accepts deposits and grants loans (Law of 13 June 1941, defining banks and financial establishments; for equivalent provisions preserved in later amendments see Colmant 1990, 53). Ancient Roman banking likewise has been defined through the twin functions of deposit and credit and on that basis has been isolated from other financial businesses of its period (Andreau 1987, 5). And for Demosthenes, the

business environment, the τράπεζα further disembedded the new economy from the social fabric of traditional society.[23] Because of its commercial genesis, autonomous of traditional society, operation at Athens of a *trapezitic* business (a "bank") was open even to those who had no prior stake in the preexisting fabric of relationships—to nonaristocrats, non-Athenians, even slaves.[24] Wealth no longer depended on political and social relationships. To a considerable extent, influence and prestige now followed accumulations of money gained in market transactions. Early in the fourth century, bankers of humble origin are already found fully involved, socially and economically, with wealthy foreigners and with well-placed citizens from families of high standing.[25]

But it was not only, or even primarily, the "visible" economy that was affected by the new order. Bankers actually functioned largely in a world of hidden transactions, or confidential dealings, in a "parallel," "underground," or "black" market that existed in counterpoint to the "official" world of commerce. Although contemporary economists have recently come to attribute various legitimate economic functions to such clandestine markets,[26] ancient historians continue to assume their impropriety and have largely avoided sustained inquiry into the actual world of undisclosed property.[27]

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τράπεζα is "a business operation producing risk-laden revenues from other people's money" (ἡ δ' ἐργασία προσόδους ἔχουσ' ἐπικινδύνους ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀλλοτρίων, 36.11).

23. As Humphreys has insightfully seen (1978, 152–53).

24. Demos. 36.50–51. For the large number of noncitizen and slave bankers see Bogaert 1968, 73. Many bankers, however, were citizens, either through birth (for example, Aristolochus, Archestratus, Antisthenes, and Antidorus) or through naturalization. See Osborne 1981–83, 4:96.

25. A wealthy foreign litigant, closely related by politics and marriage to the ruler of Bosporus (himself a considerable "benefactor" of Athens), details his own prior close personal relationship with a banker who was formerly a slave (Isoc. 17.6)—and notes the networks of "friends" and high credibility that were joined to the large financial resources of the Athenian bankers (Isoc. 17.2). Compare the extensive involvement of the well-known citizen Pythodorus with the banker/former slave (Isoc. 17.33; cf. Demos. 54.7). Another client, Menexenus (Isoc. 17.12) was from a family that itself had significant holdings of real estate and further was deeply involved in the litigation over the assets of Dicaeogenes, a large estate consisting primarily of real property (Is. 5.43), much of it subject to creditors (Is. 5.21). Cf. Mathieu and Brémond [1929–42] 1963, 1:74 n. 1; J. K. Davies 1971, 145.

26. These clandestine markets appear omnipresent in every differentiated economy (see Feige 1989, 9; Rosenvallon 1980). Far from an immoral challenge to legitimate authority, the underground economies' circumvention of governmental inefficiencies or absurdities, ranging from counterproductive or repressive systems of taxation through restrictions on the free operation of commerce, has been recognized as often critical to even minimal effective functioning of individual economies. See Martino 1980, 2; Connolly 1981, 136.

27. For example, Hasebroek's suggestion (1920, 156–58) that all loans at the *trapezai* and much deposit activity represented invisible assets was rejected by Bogaert (1968, 349) with the

Yet the "invisible" sphere was of enormous financial and theoretical importance. Like many basic Athenian concepts and institutions, the economy was dichotomously divided into "disclosed" (*φανερά*) and "invisible" (*ἀφανής*) markets, complementary opposites that shaped perception and activity.[28] In the disclosed market, real-estate loans were attested by boundary stones placed openly on property, and estates were transferred with full confirmation of already known holdings, but with virtually no mention of bank deposits, which belonged largely to the invisible market.[29] In the invisible market, investments and ownership were cloaked in secrecy, hopefully protected from creditors, tax collectors, and others potentially adverse. Yet the existence of the secret sphere was much bruited, rumors of nonexistent wealth were rampant,[30] and allegations of tax avoidance or creditor evasion were frequent.[31] For example, Demosthenes' father, who is known to have dealt extensively with Athenian banks,[32] avoided taxes by concealing much of his property throughout his lifetime and possibly escaped liability for his father-in-law's debts.[33] The wealthy Stephanos was accused of acting in

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explanation that "il faudrait considérer tous les Athéniens ayant de l' argent en un banque ou chez des particuliers comme des fraudeurs fiscaux, ce qui est naturellement injuste à leur égard." Factors underlying ancient historians' eschewal: Primitivist assumptions denying the very existence of an economy did not encourage the complicating recognition of a parallel commercial system, especially one performing specialized functions; the inherent secrecy of undisclosed assets did not provide source materials easily accessible to ancient or modern observers; tax evasion and the defrauding of creditors do not teach the moral lessons for which the classics have been cultivated in the "High Culture" of the Western World. On this past ethical orientation see Connor 1989, 533–36; Todd 1990, 161; Bernal 1987, 4.

28. The Greek tendency to understand and to organize phenomena through contrast, indeed preferably through antithesis, has been much studied in recent years in a proliferation of structuralist studies; see esp. Lévi-Strauss 1963–67, vol. 2; Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1969; Segal 1986, 43–45. Indeed, "binary division" was so central to Hellenic culture that it has been said to have "dominated Greek thought" (Garner 1987, 76). Garner lists numerous examples of the phenomenon (1987, 75–83). For the critical role in Greek thought of theories based on opposites see Lloyd [1965] 1987, 15–85.

29. The disclosed contents of decedents' estates, revealing only limited bank deposits, are thus highly misleading as to the scale of bank activity in Athens. Money was also hidden at home (cf. Thompson 1988, 833), and there are many examples of currency actually being buried (see the examples gathered by Thiel 1922, 50 and Bolkestein 1958, 119, 124). Cf. Xen. *Vect.* 4.7.

30. Lys. 19.45: *ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί...οὐ νῦν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ πολλῶν ἐψεύσθητε τῆς οὐσίας, οἳ ζῶντες μὲν πλουτεῖν ἐδόκουν, ἀποθανόντες δὲ πολὺ παρὰ τὴν δόξαν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐφάνησαν.* Cf. Gabrielson 1986, 110–11; Gabrielson 1987, 12; Humphreys 1983b, 10.

31. Demos. 1.8–9, 24.197–98, 38.26, 47.54, 50.8–9, 52.26; Is. 4.27, 6.60–61, 7.40; Isoc. 8.128, 12.145; Lys. 7.31–32, 12.20, 18.7, 18.21, 19.9, 19.29, 19.57–59, 20.23, 28.3, 29.4, 30.26; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1; Xen. *Sym.* 4.30–32; Hyp. fr. 134; Arist. *Pol.* 1309a15–21; Antiph. fr. 204 K; Dem. Phal. fr. 136 Wehrli = Plut. *Mor.* 349a; D.S. 13.47.7, 13.52.5, 13.64.4. See J. K. Davies 1981, 82–84; Wyse [1940] 1967, 396; Christ 1990, 150–57.

32. Demos. 27.11. See Paoli [1930] 1974, 20 n. 2.

33. See J. K. Davies 1971, 128–29; de Ste. Croix 1953, 55 n. 105.

concert with his bankers "to conceal his wealth in order that he might obtain secret returns through the bank" (διὰ τῆς τραπέζης, Demos. 45.64–66). Even important foreigners came to Athens to use the τράπεζα to conceal funds from overseas rulers. An entire surviving court speech (Isoc. 17) details the efforts of Sopaios, a power at the Pontic court, to hide vast sums through Pasion's bank.

But precisely because this differentiation of visible from invisible assets was grounded in Athenian cognitive concepts of bipolarity, and their attendant societal values,[34] modern scholars have been entirely unsuccessful in abstract efforts to find inherent in specific objects distinct qualities that would render them predictably either invisible or visible.[35] The Athenian insistence on antithesis permitted not a spectrum of objects and a variety of categories but only a counterpoised opposition between the two types of assets. Thus, where Anglo-American law easily contrasts "real property" and "personal property" but still can allow for items sharing certain characteristics of both ("fixtures"), the Greek antithetical universe permitted only two divisions: "disclosed property," characterized as φανερὰ οὐσία, and "other property," categorized as ἀφανὴς οὐσία.

The Athenians tended to express differentiation between realty and personalty in terms of this antithesis.[36] Yet since even the limited evidence surviving from antiquity offers examples of real-estate ownership that had been carefully hidden and items of personal property with dominion unambiguously disclosed,[37] the Athenian categorization is manifestly unsatisfactory to modern analysts accustomed to classification along a spectrum that

34. For the philosophical treatment of this polarity between visible and invisible qualities see Schuhl 1953.

35. A number of researchers have focused on the object's capacity to appear as ἀφανής or φανερά: Büchsenschütz 1869, 38; Boeckh [1817] 1976, 633; Hermann 1882, 96; Busolt and Swoboda 1920–26, 2:1213 n. 2. For the inadequacy of these efforts, but without a clear alternate formulation, see Bongenaar 1933, 234–49; Koutorga 1859, 6–11; Schodorf 1905, 90; Weiss 1923, 173, 464, 491. For other inconclusive efforts to attribute inherent characteristics to these terms see Gabrielson 1986, esp. 101 n. 7.

36. Harp. s.v.: ἀφανὴς οὐσία καὶ φανερά. ἀφανὴς μὲν ἡ ἐν χρήμασι καὶ σώμασι καὶ σκεύεσι, φανερὰ δὲ ἡ ἔγγειος· Λυσίας ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἱπποθέρσην. Fragments of this speech are preserved in P. Oxy. 13, no. 1606 (Gernet and Bizos 1924–26, 2:252–55). The differentiation of realty from all other assets, and its characterization as φανερὰ οὐσία, was so pervasive that the mere act of selling real property might be seen as the conversion of visible into invisible οὐσία; Demos. 5.8 (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 850d; Aeschin. 1.96–97; 101–3. See Lys. fr. 79 = Gernet and Bizos 1924–26, 2:268–69, no. 24.

37. Owners of real estate are said to have refused rental income solely in order to keep their holding ἀφανής: Lys. 32.23; Demos. 28.7. Cf. the χωρίον whose ownership Theopompus was charged with concealing (Is. 11.47). See Wyse [1940] 1967, 712; Thompson 1976, 57–59; Humphreys 1983c, 221. For visible personalty see Demos. 43.5; Lys. 19.31.

provides special place for incompatible exceptions and for objects of blended nature.[38] To the Athenians, however, consistency lay in the universality by which objects were organized by reference to antithetical grouping. The persistence of the counterpoised categories, not the "true" nature of the objects, determined classification of particular items. Because ownership of land was difficult to conceal—not because of any universally persisting characteristic—real property became identified with visible wealth;[39] because control of intangibles was relatively easy to hide, financial assets came to be seen as the essence of invisible property.[40] But even bank deposits might be revealed by their owners or otherwise become attributable to them, and thus become visible.[41] Yet with further obfuscation, they could be returned to the universe of invisible wealth (*ἀφανὴς οὐσία*),[42] a world congenial to bankers, but not to taxes, creditors, and government controls.

The bankers' inventory of loans and deposits—the archetypes of invisible assets since both were intangible and protected by professional confidentiality—were recognized as ultimately different from all other forms of property, because they alone could not be physically seized.[43] Although money "loom[ed] large among the attested instances" of invisible wealth,[44] coins were still inherently tangible—in contrast to the bankers' deposits (*παρακαταθῆκαι*) and loans (*χρέα*), which had absolutely no corporeality. The concept is most strikingly illustrated by the Greek expression for a

38. Gabrielson (1986, 101) characterizes the ancient evidence as "hardly credible." For modern frustration in seeking to organize the source material through non-Athenian categories see Beauchet [1897] 1969, 3:13–21; Lipsius [1905] 1966, 677; Weiss 1923, 173, 464, 491.

39. Although MacDowell (1962, 146) clearly goes too far in claiming that "land and buildings are always counted as visible," realty was indeed the form par excellence of *φανερὰ οὐσία* (Gernet 1981, 345; Gabrielsen 1986, 110).

40. For real estate as the prime form of *φανερὰ οὐσία*, and monetary assets as its counterpoised equivalent in the world of *ἀφανὴς οὐσία*, see, e.g., Lys. fr. 79 = Gernet and Bizos 1924–26, 2:268–69, no. 24.

41. At Isoc. 17.11, the depositor—after changed circumstances free him of concern over possible seizure of his assets—determines to withdraw his bank deposits and function visibly (*φανερῶς ἤδη πράξω περὶ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ*). Money on deposit at the Heraclides bank is described at Demos. 48.12 as *ἀργύριον...φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῇ τραπέζῃ τῇ Ἡρακλείδου*. See Demos. 45.30 (*τῶν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης ὄντων, ἃ πάντες ἤδεσαν*). Cf. Hyp. 5.9 (*χρέα φανερά*); Lys. 12.83 (*τὰ χρήματα τὰ φανερά*); Is. 11.42–43 (*χρέα δ' ἐπὶ τόκοις ὀφειλόμενα...καὶ οὕπω λέγω περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ κατελείφθη μὲν οὗτοι δ' οὐκ ἀποφαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ φανερὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων ὁμολογούμενα*).

42. See, e.g., Isoc. 17.7. At first the son of Sopaeus had made his assets openly known (Isoc. 17.41). This obfuscation of assets even developed special nomenclature: *ἀφανίζειν* or *ἀποκρύπτεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν*. See Is. 11.47; Demos. 28.3, 45.66. Cf. Cloché 1941, 35–36.

43. On the legal implications of this differentiation see Gernet 1956, 347–48.

44. Gabrielson 1986, 102. It is Demosthenes' money that Dinarchus brands *μηδὲν φανερόν* (1.70); see Wyse [1940] 1967, 516. Cf. Ar. *Ec.* 602.

credit unaccompanied by security (which would provide tangibility): A mere "naked loan" is termed an obligation "in the sky" (*μετέωρον*)[45]—in high antithesis to the landed assets that constitute visible property par excellence. Thus, at Isaeus 8.35, a broad variety of assets, all expressed in monetary value, all termed *φανερά*, are contrasted with the single other asset, a not inconsiderable amount of loans (*δανείσματα*).[46] Similarly, the businessman Diodotus delivers cash to his closest relatives but "reveals" the existence of various loans (Lys. 32.5–6).[47] At both Demosthenes 38.7 and Andocides 1.118, debts are specifically contrasted with visible assets.[48] And at Demosthenes 42.5, the thought is expressed that an asset "once becoming a loan will disappear."[49] Even where other cash holdings are generally known (*φανερόν*), an individual's bank deposits might be kept in confidence.[50]

Similar analysis conceived in Athenian, not modern, concepts is likely to provide even further insight into the Athenian economy. Modern scholars have understandably been unable to translate their concept of the economy into Greek—not because there was no such economy, but because of their own refusal to translate the Athenian system through Athenian terminology and conceptualization, a desirable methodology exemplarily pioneered by the scholar whose contributions we honor through this volume.

45. See *SIG* 364.42, 46 (Ephesus, third century): *οἱ τὰ μετέωρα ἐγγυώμενοι*. Cf. *SEG* 1.363.9 (Samos, third century): *δικαστήριον τὸ διαλῦσον τὰ μετέωρα συμβόλαια*. Socrates was accused of being *τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής* (Pl. *Ap.* 18b).

46. *ἐκέκτητο οὐσίαν, ἀγρὸν μὲν Φλυῆσι, καὶ ταλάντου ῥᾳδίως ἄξιον, οἰκίας δ' ἐν ἄστει δύο, τὴν μὲν μίαν μισθοφοροῦσαν...χιλίας εὑρίσκουσαν, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν...τριῶν καὶ δέκα μνῶν· ἔτι δὲ ἀνδράποδα μισθοφοροῦντα καὶ δύο θεραπαίνας καὶ παιδίσκην καὶ ἔπιπλα..., σχεδὸν σὺν τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις ἄξια τριῶν καὶ δέκα μνῶν· σύμπαντα δὲ ὅσα φανερὰ ἦν, πλέον ἢ ἐνενήκοντα μνῶν· χωρὶς δὲ τούτων δανείσματα οὐκ ὀλίγα.*

47. *αὐτῷ δίδωσι καὶ πέντε τάλαντα ἀργυρίου παρακαταθήκην· ναυτικὰ δὲ ἀπέδειξεν ἐκδεδομένα ἑπτὰ τάλαντα καὶ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς..., δισχιλίας δὲ ὀφειλομένας ἐν Χερρονήσῳ.*

48. Demos. 38.7: *ἐγὼ δ' οἶδ' ἀκούων ὅτι τὴν οὐσίαν Ξενοπείθης καὶ Ναυσικράτης ἅπασαν χρέα κατέλιπον, καὶ φανερὰν ἐκέκτητο μικράν τινα.* And. 1.118: *τὰ ὀφειλόμενα* (opposed to *φανερὰ οὐσία*).

49. *χρέως γενόμενον ἀναφανήσεται.* On money itself as "invisible property" in Lys. 32. 4 (*τὴν μὲν ἀφανῆ οὐσίαν ἐνείμαντο, τῆς δὲ φανερᾶς ἐκοινώνουν*) see Wyse [1940] 1967, 516.

50. Isoc. 17.7: *ἐδόκει βέλτιστον εἶναι τὰ μὲν φανερὰ τῶν χρημάτων παραδοῦναι, περὶ δὲ τῶν παρὰ τούτῳ* (sc. *Πασίωνι τῷ τραπεζίτῃ*)*...ἔξαρνον εἶναι.* At sec. 2, Isocrates' client offers the jurors subtle word-play on bankers' avoidance of the "visible" sphere. After noting how bankers incur obligations "without witnesses," he promises to make *φανερόν* the way in which he was deprived of his own deposits: *ὅμως δὲ καὶ τούτων ὑπαρχόντων ἡγοῦμαι φανερὸν πᾶσι ποιήσειν ὅτι ἀποστεροῦμαι τῶν χρημάτων ὑπὸ Πασίωνος.*

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# Oligarchic Thinking in the Late Fifth Century

David M. Lewis

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I have suggested that scholars, even Martin Ostwald, have tended to overlook one of the harder pieces of evidence concerning the development of ideas about the Athenian constitution. But I have only expounded the point in reviews,[1] and this seems to be a good occasion to say it at greater length.

In *Athenaion Politeia* 9.1–2, the third of the most demotic features of Solon's constitution gets the largest coverage:

> ...τρίτον δέ, (ᾧ) μάλιστά φασιν ἰσχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἔφεσις· κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἁπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίγνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον. οἴονται μὲν οὖν τινες ἐπίτηδες ἀσαφεῖς αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι τοὺς νόμους, ὅπως ᾖ τῆς κρίσεως ὁ δῆμος κύριος. οὐ μὴν εἰκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καθόλου περιλαβεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον· οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.
>
> [...and the third, the one which is said particularly to have contributed to the power of the masses, the right of appeal to the jury-court—for when the people are masters of the vote they are masters of the state. In addition, because his laws were not written simply and clearly, but were

1. D. M. Lewis 1984, 1989.

> like the law on inheritance and heiresses, it was inevitable that many disputes should arise and that the jury-court should decide all things both public and private. Some people think that he made his laws unclear deliberately, in order that the power of decision should rest with the people. However, it is not likely that he was unclear for that reason, but rather because it is impossible to define what is right in general terms. It is not right to estimate his intentions from present-day practice; one should judge from the rest of his political programme.]

So Rhodes in his Penguin translation, inevitably sliding over some resonances; I shall return to one of them.

This passage suggests various observations. The first is the least important for my present purposes. Whatever may be said about the general case for rescuing Aristotle himself from responsibility for the *Athenaion Politeia*, there are things here that are very close indeed to *Politics* 1273b35–1274a21. Aristotle was also aware of those who blamed Solon for radical democracy because he had made the jury-court κύριον πάντων, and he also refused to accept the view that Solon had intended this result, offering in refutation a brief statement of other aspects of Solon's program as it affected the demos.

We cannot know whether the author was the first to isolate three demotic features of Solon as most worthy of comment. Evidently, however, it was already accepted that Solon had created ἔφεσις to the jury-court, and at least some people had identified this as the source of the power of the masses. The implication that this was a bad thing is not at first strongly emphasized. It is implicit, however, when the topic is expanded by discussion of the lack of simplicity and clarity of Solon's laws. Whatever the logical grammar of the sentence beginning ἔτι δὲ καί, this is common ground between the author and his predecessors. Whether those of his predecessors who thought that Solon had been deliberately unclear are the same as those who thought that ἔφεσις had created the power of the masses or are merely a subset of them is not stated.

At this stage in the *Athenaion Politeia* we are given no clue as to the date of the predecessors to which the author refers. But we do get guidance later on, when the actions of the Thirty are described at 35.2. Among the actions that the author ascribes to the period of their moderation, the period when they were pretending to pursue[2] the ancestral constitution,

> τῶν Σόλωνος θεσμῶν ὅσοι διαμφισβητήσεις εἶχον καὶ τὸ κῦρος ὃ ἦν ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς κατέλυσαν, ὡς ἐπανορθοῦντες καὶ ποιοῦντες

2. Like Rhodes, I prefer διώκειν.

ἀναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν· οἷον περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλῃ ποιήσαντες καθάπαξ, τὰς δὲ προσούσας δυσκολίας "ἐὰν μὴ μανιῶν ἢ γηρῶν ἢ γυναικὶ πιθόμενος" ἀφεῖλον, ὅπως μὴ ᾖ τοῖς συκοφάνταις ἔφοδος· ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ' ἔδρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[they annulled the laws of Solon which provided scope for disagreement, and the discretionary power which was left to jurors, in order to amend the constitution and leave no opportunity for disagreement. For instance, in the matter of a man's bequeathing his property to whoever he likes, the Thirty gave the testator full and absolute power, and removed the attached difficulties ("except when he is insane or senile, or under the influence of a woman"), so that there should be no way in for malicious prosecutors; and they did likewise in the other cases.]

The passages are closely linked by the reference to the κῦρος of the jurors and the recurrence of the ἀμφισβητ- root. Some aspects of the first passage are clarified by the second. It looks as if Rhodes' translation of ἀμφισβητήσεις in the first passage as "disputes" may be slightly misleading. Since there the ἀμφισβητήσεις are linked directly to Solon's lack of simplicity and clarity, we can accept the implications of the second passage that they are not just any disputes but those that arise from the nature of the laws. If, for example, the law had simply said that any will was valid, there would have been no opportunity for argument as to whether the testator was competent or under undue influence. Similarly, it becomes clear that the objection to Solon's lack of simplicity in the first passage lies, in this case, in the addition of the qualifications. This fits the author's comment that Solon had difficulty in formulating general rules for what was best. I do not see any grounds in these passages for Rhodes' observation that "experience had shown that there were difficult cases not adequately covered by Solon's laws,"[3] It may well be the case that Solon's lack of clarity is also to be connected with his archaic language.[4]

I think that the connection between the passages is tight enough. It would be even stronger if it were certain that the passage about wills, quoted by Plutarch (*Sol.* 21.3) from "the law about διαθῆκαι," were part of what the *Athenaion Politeia* describes as "the law about κλῆροι and ἐπίκληροι." I do not claim that as more than very likely.

3. Rhodes 1981, 162.

4. Cf. Ar. fr. 233 KA (cited by Rhodes); D.S. 13.35.3, the laws of Diocles at Syracuse, which were found difficult to understand in the fourth century because of their archaic language.

If the connection is accepted, it follows that a substantial body of the criticism of Solon referred to at *Athenaion Politeia* 9 (and in *Pol.* 1273b35–1274a21) is earlier than 404[5] and that at least some of the Thirty's actions were influenced by it. This should be given full weight in assessing their thinking. They were not only trying to make Athens more like Sparta (if that was an aspect of their program); they were trying to make Athenian institutions work better.

The roots of hostility to juries and sycophants can be traced much further back. Sycophants and their activity are all-pervasive in the *Acharnians* of 425.[6] *Wasps* contains ample material for a view of Athens as dominated by irresponsible juries, and it may be particularly in point to call attention to lines 583–87, where Philocleon calls attention to the jury's unchecked power to override a will nominating a husband for an ἐπίκληρος. Whatever Aristophanes' own intentions were, others could have been wondering how this came about and whether anything could be done about it.

Looking elsewhere in the 420s, however, we find that pseudo-Xenophon is not all that much bothered about juries, except in relation to Athenian control of the allies (1.16–18) and the excessive amount of public business (3.6–8), but it could be held that he does not belong to the mainstream of thinking about the constitution. His concern is rather to demonstrate that Athenian democracy, however horrible, does in fact work;[7] he rebuts the one suggestion about improving the jury system that he considers, that juries should be made smaller, by saying that they would be easier to bribe (3.7). There were surely more radically-minded thinkers about, but when did they start to talk and write?

The oligarchs of 411 had, at least in one respect—the number of their Council—implied that they were going back to Solon. If they had had feelings similar to those of the Thirty about "sycophants" and the jury-courts, we do not hear of them. It has often been observed, for example, that the "constitution for the future" of *Athenaion Politeia* 30 is extraordinarily silent about the jury-courts. The most that one can say about their attitude is that one aspect of their general abolition of state pay could have been a hope that it would have a beneficial effect on the social composition of juries.

There could be some grounds for supposing that the explicit criticism is very recent in 404. It is at least a possibility that the codification of the laws in 409 and the following years had thrown up argument about the

5. Rhodes 1981, 162: "The accusation probably arose in the late fifth century."

6. Ar. fr. 228 KA, from the *Daetales*, takes the word two years back, and the implication of Cratinus fr. 70 KA is, unsurprisingly, that we could take it back earlier still if we had the right kind of evidence. LSJ misses the earliest prose evidence, [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.14.

7. D. M. Lewis 1969.

wording of Solon's legislation, and passages like Lysias 25.25–26 suggest that the years between the revolutions were rich in "sycophantic" activity. Increased knowledge and increased motivation may have produced the line of thinking that we seek. ἐπιστάμενος τὸ οὔνομα οὐκ ἐπιμνήσομαι. I regard the lower limit as established.

16

# From Athena's Owl to the Owl of Athens

H. A. Shapiro

NOT THE LEAST of Martin Ostwald's contributions to our understanding of archaic and classical Athenian society have been his rigorous studies of the crucial word *νόμος* and its various compounds: *εὐνομία*, *ἰσονομία*, *αὐτονομία*, and so on. Often at the center of these studies stands the pivotal figure of Cleisthenes, as is perhaps implied in the title of his classic *Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy*. The focus of the following lines that I offer for Martin Ostwald's consideration is one of the few families of words that might rival *νόμος* in going to the heart of Athenian political life: *δῆμος*, *δημόσιος*. And once again, Cleisthenes takes center stage.

In a recent paper, David Lewis has dealt with the concept *δημόσιος* and the meanings and usages of the word from its earliest Athenian attestation in a poem by Solon (fr. 4). Lewis arrives at a somewhat unexpected conclusion with regard to *δημόσιος*: "When it starts appearing, there need not be any suggestion of the existence of institutions we might call democracy."[1] The meaning of *δῆμος* as the "whole people" (*populus* rather than *plebs*) is quite old; therefore *δημόσιος* is derived from this sense of *δῆμος* and is free of any political connotation. My purpose here is simply to add to the discussion a new piece of remarkable archaeological evidence that was apparently not yet known to Lewis and to suggest a few possible implications.

The evidence in question comes from an Attic black-figure amphora (fig. 1) that was acquired in 1986 by the Munich Antikensammlungen and

I am particularly grateful to Bert Käser (Munich) for sharing with me his notes and his opinions on the vase that is the focus of this chapter, as well as for providing photographs of it. I thank also Josiah Ober for reading a draft, and Carmen Arnold and Adrienne Lezzi-Hafter for helping me obtain photographs.

1. D. M. Lewis 1990, 262.



Fig. 1. Munich, Staatliche Antikensammlung 9406; Attic black-figure amphora. (Photo courtesy of Museum.)

promptly given a preliminary publication by Bert Käser.[2] It is of generous proportions (height 56.6 cm) and is almost complete. On each side, within a reserved panel (*Bildfenster*), stands a large owl upon a tendril, once accompanied by the word ΔΕΜΟΣΙΟΣ in unusually large, well-spaced letters. Owing to the shape and the inscription, it is generally agreed that the vase must be a standard measuring vessel of a type otherwise known only in very fragmentary examples found in the Athenian Agora.[3] The masculine ending

2. Munich Inv. 9406; Käser 1987.
3. The basic work is that of Lang and Crosby (1964, 58–63).

of δημόσιος suggests that we should supply a noun, and Käser's choice was μετρητής. I wonder if we might also consider ἀμφορεύς, a word well attested for this shape since the Bronze Age.[4]

The Munich amphora can truly be called unique, since the Agora fragments all come from vases very different in proportions and design and much later in date. With tens of thousands of Attic vases known and intensively studied for almost two centuries, it is indeed a rare occurrence when a new vase turns up for which it can honestly be said that there are no good parallels. So, in spite of the detailed chronology of Athenian vases so painstakingly worked out by Ernst Langlotz, Sir John Beazley, and others, the Munich amphora immediately presents a problem when we ask its date. Käser suggested ca. 500, but without adducing any reasons or arguments, and his dating was accepted, equally laconically, by Konrad Schauenburg.[5] There are only three criteria that could be useful for dating, and we may look briefly at each of these in turn: the shape of the vase and configuration of the *Bildfenster*; the letter forms of the inscription; and the typology of the owls.

The shape, a one-piece or belly amphora with narrow neck, low center of gravity, and small foot, is characteristic of the second quarter and middle of the sixth century, and the small reserved picture field, as Käser pointed out, finds its best parallel on the so-called horsehead amphoras that likewise belong in the second quarter.[6] Yet if indeed the vase belongs to a special class of object commissioned by the state for public use, it could well have a deliberately archaizing form. The obvious parallel would be the Panathenaic prize amphoras, which show only slight development of an early Archaic shape of neck-amphora over two centuries and continue to use the black-figure technique long after it had otherwise died out.[7] But whereas the sequence of Panathenaics is relatively complete and even minor variations can be dated with some precision, the uniqueness of the Munich amphora means that its shape is of little use for dating.

The inscription, though striking in its outsized proportions, has typical Attic letter forms difficult to date with any accuracy. The only letter that might at first look diagnostic is the four-bar sigma, which in a stone inscription would suggest a relatively late date, but there are isolated instances of

4. For a Linear B tablet (with ideogram) see Ventris and Chadwick 1956, 331, no. 233. For Homeric uses of ἀμφιφορεύς (from which ἀμφορεύς derives, by haplology) see Snell and Mette 1955, 691. An example of the word in fifth-century usage is found at Hdt. 4.163.

5. Schauenburg 1988, 70–71. The amphora is also mentioned by Scheibler (1987, 63).

6. Käser 1987, 228; on horsehead amphoras see Picozzi 1971.

7. See Beazley's survey of Panathenaics (1986, 81–82).

Fig. 2. Heidelberg, Archäologisches Institut der Universität 73/3; Attic black-figure amphora. (Photo courtesy of Museum.)

this form on vases as early as ca. 600.[8] Henry Immerwahr believes that the letter forms would not be incompatible with a date in the late sixth century.[9]

As Athena's bird, the owl is naturally quite popular on Athenian vases from the very beginning of the black-figure style.[10] Nevertheless, the stage at which the bird is elevated from mere animal ornament to an explicit association with the city goddess can be pinpointed to the third quarter of the

8. See Jeffery 1961, 66–67. One very early example is on the Nessus Amphora in Athens (Simon, Hirmer, and Hirmer 1976, pl. 44).

9. Personal communication (October 1989). The vase is not mentioned in Immerwahr 1990.

10. There is an early example on the handles of the Nessus Amphora (above n. 8).

sixth century.[11] On a group of vases depicting the rape of Cassandra by the Lesser Ajax, a small owl perches on the rim of the shield of Athena's statue (the Palladium).[12] In addition, on two contemporary pseudo-Panathenaic amphoras (i.e., of Panathenaic shape but without the prize inscription), an owl sits on the shield of Athena Promachus (fig. 2).[13] In all these instances, the owl seems in part to signify that "Athena" is a statue and not the living goddess.

The last quarter of the sixth century marks a significant further development of the relationship of Athena and her owl. Now several vases—some, but by no means all, made to be dedicated to the goddess on the Acropolis—depict Athena in her sanctuary (indicated by a column and/or altar), accompanied by an owl, sometimes more than one.[14] Owls may perch on an altar, on the shield that the goddess has set aside (fig. 3), or on her knee or outstretched hand.[15] In scenes where Athena is absent but the owl is prominent, we must suppose that it denotes her sanctuary or is even a kind of stand-in for the goddess.[16] By the early fifth century, the owl alone is suddenly a ubiquitous motif—for example, on a class of skyphoi now numbering over 150.[17] Very occasionally, owls replace the cocks atop the columns on Panathenaic amphoras (fig. 4).[18]

11. A possible forerunner is the Burgon Amphora, the earliest extant Panathenaic (hence usually dated ca. 566); see London B130; Beazley 1986, 81–82, pls. 89–90. The neck of side B is decorated with an owl with wings spread. It is impossible to tell, however, if the owl was deliberately placed here because of its association with Athena, since all subsequent Panathenaics substitute palmettes as neck ornament. The neck of side A on the Burgon Amphora, above Athena, has a Siren. On other attempts to interpret owls in early black-figure as Athenian symbols see Scheibler 1987, 94 n. 127; Shapiro 1989b, 28.

12. See Chamay and Bothmer 1987, 59, pl. 8.1.

13. Amphora in the Schimmel Collection, now on loan in the Metropolitan Museum of Art see Chamay and Bothmer 1987, 64, pl. 9.1. On amphora Heidelberg 73/7 see Shapiro 1989a, pl. 11e. Cf. also the plaque Akropolis 2509; Graef 1925, pl. 103.

14. A. B. Cook (1940, 776) connected this proliferation with the tradition that there were large numbers of owls on and around the Acropolis, hence the proverb "an owl to Athens" (= coals to Newcastle). For the survival of the proverb into the Renaissance see Craik 1990, frontispiece.

15. For owls on altar and shield see lekythoi, Athens NM 1138 (fig. 3) and Kansas City 34.289; Shapiro 1989a, pls. 10d–e, 11a–b. For an owl on Athena's knee see skyphos, Akropolis 1265a; Graef 1925, pl. 77. For an owl on Athena's hand see pinax, Akropolis 2547; Graef 1925, pl. 105.

16. This was the theory argued at length by Cook in his chapter "The Owl of Athena" (1940, 776–834). The subsequent literature on Athena and her owl is extensive, e.g., Groothand 1968 and Stupperich 1980.

17. See most recently Jacquemin and Maffre 1986, 189–91, with earlier references. Of large-scale vases, the one that comes closest to the Munich amphora is an early fifth-century red-figure belly amphora with a solitary large owl in a Japanese private collection, Mizuta 1981, 1–2, pl. 1.

18. E.g., Agora P24661; Moore and Philippides 1986, no. 319. For other examples see Schauenburg 1979, 70 n. 96 and the amphora in Austin (illustrated here, fig. 4).



Fig. 3. Athens National Archaeological Museum 1138; Attic black-figure, white-ground lekythos. (Photo courtesy of Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Athens.)

The manner in which the owl is drawn—the body facing left or right (rarely frontal) and the rendering of the feathers—varies tremendously, according to the fancy of each painter, and does not show a chronological development into which we could place the Munich Δημόσιος amphora. In addition, no other owl in black-figure is of the monumental scale of the two on this vase. Nevertheless, the iconographical development strongly suggests that the use of the owl as a symbol of Athena, hence of her city, is probably unthinkable before the late sixth century.



Fig. 4. Austin (Texas), Archer M. Huntington Art Gallery 1980.32; Attic black-figure amphora. (Photo courtesy of Museum.)

For the dating of the Munich amphora, we have arrived at a somewhat shaky terminus post quem of ca. 510. But given the premise that there are deliberately archaizing elements, what stops us from pushing it down into the fifth century? There is one other clue that may help, the distinctive tendril on which each owl is perched. It is composed of a double volute on a stem, somewhat reminiscent of an Ionic capital. On a group of six



Fig. 5. Havana, Museo Nacional Palacio de Bellas Artes, Lagunillas Collection 226; Attic black-figure amphora. (Photo courtesy of Adrienne Lezzi-Hafter.)

Panathenaic prize amphoras of the late sixth century, Athena's shield device is a white owl perched on a tendril less "architectural" but nevertheless with curled ends not unlike those in Munich (fig. 5).[19] Since the shield devices on Panathenaics of the late sixth century are often characteristic of a single painter or workshop, it is likely that these six are closely related, and we

19. Five of the six are collected by Vaerst (1980, 516). To these may be added a fragment from the Agora that preserves only the lower half of the white owl and most of the tendril: Agora P20236b; Moore and Philippides 1986, no. 239 (dated ca. 510). Vaerst also cites one instance of Athena carrying the same shield device in a mythological scene, on a non-Panathenaic vase of similar date: Madrid 10914; Beazley 1956, 336.

might even speculate that the commission to produce the Δημόσιος amphora went to the same workshop.[20]

The dating first proposed by Käser for the Munich vase and strengthened here with additional arguments, in the decade 510–500, makes almost irresistible the temptation to associate it in some way with the reforms of Cleisthenes. Is it possible, for example, that in this period Athens first devised standards of liquid and dry measure *guaranteed by the state?* To be sure, Athens had been exporting olive oil and other produce for generations, and Athenian merchants and their customers must have agreed on various standard measures. The Panathenaic prize amphoras had to retain the same shape because they too contained a specified measure of the prize oil, presumably also one μετρητής. But with the Δημόσιος inscription, here combined with the new emblem of the polis, might we be seeing evidence for the appropriation, by the democratic state, of a regulative function previously left to the free market?

To answer these questions, we must know the exact purpose for which the Munich amphora was made, the purpose it actually served (if different), and the circumstances of its discovery. Those who decry the antiquities market on the grounds that vital information is lost when the provenance of an object is obscured or deliberately suppressed would have powerful ammunition in the present instance, for it would indeed be of extreme interest to know in just what context the vase was found and in what part of the Mediterranean world. Käser observed that a vase in such perfect condition can only have come from a grave.[21] He combined this observation with the fact that the actual volume of the amphora is several liters short of a μετρητής (39.3 liters) and theorized that the vase, instead of being used in the Agora as a standard measure, was sent abroad after it was discovered to be too small. This ingenious scenario may well be right, but one could imagine others—for example, that the vase was commissioned for the export of Athenian olive oil that was designated as such by the owl and inscription. Käser infers from the similarity in shape and design of the Munich amphora to horsehead amphoras that it must belong to a series of measuring vessels originating in the early sixth century, of which no others survive. But the shape, with its massive and sturdy proportions, could equally well have been

20. See Beazley 1986, 86, on shield devices. Frel (1969, 385) collected several of these Panathenaics and attributed them to his Painter of the Havana Owl. See also Moore and Philippides 1986, no. 239, on the attributions. The Havana Panathenaic (fig. 5) is now published in Olmos 1990, no. 11.

21. Käser 1987, 228.

considered appropriate for a transport amphora.[22] Of course we are still faced with a problem—if such amphoras were produced over a period of time or in any quantity, why have no others survived?

If, for the moment, we assume, with Käser, that the Munich amphora belongs to a tradition of public measuring vessels going back almost a century, would such a vase in the time of Solon have said δημόσιος? What would the word have signified in Solonian Athens? Solon himself uses the word twice in his long ode on justice and injustice (fr. 4). Once it is clearly contrasted with ἱερός and must mean simply "profane" (4.12).[23] The other instance, δημόσιον κακόν (4.27), must have been a kind of set phrase, for it recurs at Theognis 50 and in a grave epigram from Corcyra of the period of Solon.[24] It would more or less denote the antithesis of our expression "the common good." In these usages, Lewis is no doubt correct that the word is rather general and presupposes no political connotation. And it does not imply that the "people" have done anything as a corporate entity. When Solon visits Croesus of Lydia, however, he tells him that Tellus, the happiest of all men, fell in battle for Athens and was buried δημοσίῃ ("at public expense") on the spot where he fell (Hdt. 1.30). However we imagine this was carried out (Who decided that Tellus should be accorded this honor? Were other casualties accorded it too? Who paid for the burial?), it seems likely that Herodotus is using the word δημοσίῃ somewhat anachronistically, having in mind the public burial of the Athenian war dead that only became a regular feature of Athenian life after the Persian Wars. The earliest well-attested use of δημοσίῃ in this context is an epigram for the Athenian casualties at the Euripus River in Boeotia in 507/6.[25] This is in fact the same campaign that the Athenians won, against the coordinated forces of Boeotia and Chalcis, and commemorated with a monument on the Acropolis.[26] This was the first victory of the Athenian democracy in its infancy, and as Christoph Clairmont has recently pointed out, the unique use of δημοσίῃ at this early date can only be understood as a token of Athenian pride.[27] The newly constituted δῆμος confers its first public honor. It is in this same spirit that I would like to read δημόσιος on the Munich amphora, as a self-conscious product of the young democratic state.

22. On the shapes of transport amphoras see Grace 1961. Most such amphoras, however, lack a foot, while the foot of the Munich amphora is unusually thick.

23. On the dichotomy of sacred/profane and the Greek vocabulary for it see Connor 1988, esp. 162 n. 4.

24. Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 4.

25. Page 1975, no. 1.

26. Hdt. 5.77; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 15.

27. Clairmont 1983, 88–89.

Finally, the owls on our vase inevitably suggest comparison with the Athenian owl tetradrachms that carried Athena's image, and that of her bird, to every corner of the Mediterranean. In both cases, of course, the owl performs the same function; it is the official emblem of the city. The problem of when the silver "owls" were first minted is perhaps the greatest crux in Greek numismatics, with arguments ranging from the time of Solon to that of Cimon.[28] The majority opinion currently favors a date in the last quarter of the sixth century, and our survey of vase iconography has confirmed that the evolution of the owl, from decorative element to attribute of Athena to integral element of her cult, hence appropriate symbol of the city, was completed in these same years. But for the political historian, like the honorand of this volume, a numismatic date of, say, ca. 520–500 is not good enough. He would ask: Does the owl tetradrachm, numismatically speaking a radical break from the earlier *Wappenmünzen* issued under the tyrants, represent a deliberate form of Athenian *Selbstdarstellung* under Cleisthenes and the democracy? Or was it a creation of Hippias that, because of its evident commercial success, continued unchanged long after the fall of the tyrant? Both cases have been forcefully argued, but the most recent evidence of coin hoards seems to incline toward Hippias, on the grounds that there are too many issues of pre-480 "owls" to squeeze comfortably into a period of less than thirty years.[29]

What, if anything, can the owls on the Munich amphora contribute to the discussion? If we were to interpret the owls in the same sense as the δημόσιος inscription, we should see the adoption of the owl as the city's emblem in a specifically Cleisthenic context. But inscription and owl need not be so inextricably linked, and the owl even occurs as an obverse type on *Wappenmünzen*.[30]

One clue may suggest a way out of the dilemma. The very earliest owl tetradrachms show a couple of false starts before the standard type is established (fig. 6). The small incuse square is closer to that on *Wappenmünzen* than on standard "owls," and one example has a crescent moon beside the owl that quickly disappears.[31] But most noticeably, only in this earliest group does the owl face left (as also on *Wappenmünzen*), with the AΘE legend

28. Good overviews of the problem are given by Kraay (1976, 60–63) and, most recently, by Kroll and Waggoner (1984, 326–33). The extremes in dating are represented by Cahn 1975 at ca. 590 and M. Vickers 1985 at ca. 479–60.

29. Kraay 1976, 61; Kroll and Waggoner 1984, 328–29; cf. Price and Waggoner (1975, 64–65), who accept a date of 510 or 506, first argued fully by Wallace (1962).

30. Franke and Hirmer 1964, pl. 114.

31. Kraay 1976, 61, pl. 10, no. 175.



Fig. 6. Athenian owl tetradrachm. (Photo courtesy of American Numismatic Society.)

Fig. 7. Athenian owl tetradrachm. (Photo courtesy of American Numismatic Society.)

along the left side of the square.[32] Standard owls face right, and the inscription is at the right and read, more satisfactorily, from top to bottom (fig. 7).[33] If we were to follow the Pisistratid date for the introduction of the "owls," then the earliest group could be those of Hippias, while the Cleisthenic issues would have marked the change of government by reversing the owl and legend. The owls on the Munich amphora face right. They conform to the type initiated under Cleisthenes, which would presumably have become the standard for other "official" uses of the emblem.

32. Best illustrated in Franke and Hirmer 1964, pls. 116–17, top.

33. One exception is the series of decadrachms issued ca. 490–86 (Franke and Hirmer 1964, pl. 118).

17

# Land Ownership, Territorial Possession, Hero Cults, and Scholarly Theory

Irad Malkin

A RECENT THEORY BRINGS TOGETHER (in a causal relationship) archaeological criteria for assessing population growth (with some novel quantification methods), theories of social economy (applied to the shift in the eighth century from pastoral economy to arable farming), and the cult of heroes. It offers a good example of a possibly meaningful and fruitful approach to combining different disciplinary venues. The much talked about Greek Renaissance of the eighth century B.C. included such phenomena as the rise of the polis, colonization, and the new spirit apparent in Geometric art and the spread of the epic. All of these are salient aspects among and within which land ownership and territorial possession occupy a prominent place. The preoccupation with definitions of land, both as individual plots (κλῆροι) and as territories, characterizes much of the discernible human activity in the Greek Renaissance. New territories were settled and defined in colonies overseas. Immigrants such as Hesiod's father arrived in Ascra to work their plots of land. The Attic countryside knew an "internal colonization," while its older communities were quite probably demarcating their own territories.[1] All of these processes have to do with land, but to

The beauty of Classics, among other things, is the need, inherent in the discipline, not to be disciplinary. I hope that a historian's discussion of the criteria for assessing one of the fundamental aspects of the Greek Renaissance—the rise of Greek hero cults in their political and territorial context—will be of interest to Martin Ostwald, whose writing and teaching has taught me to be mindful of both the fruitfulness and the pitfalls of new approaches. I am very grateful to Carla Antonaccio for her generous help and timely advice after reading a draft of this paper. Responsibility for views and errors remains mine.

1. Whitley 1988, 176–78.

what extent are they accessible to us? How are they to be perceived? For the historian, colonial lands—as far as entire territories are concerned—are more perceptible than individual plots. As has been rightly suggested, the question of new lands, possessed and cultivated by individuals and communities, may perhaps be better understood through a prism of religion and cult and made concrete through archaeology. Conversely, these new processes may shed light on new developments in the history of Greek religion. Within this context, the cult of heroes plays a major role.

The connection in archaic Greece between the ideas of land ownership and the role of heroic cult has been pointed out by A. M. Snodgrass, who claims that eighth-century dedications in Mycenaean tombs and the origins of hero cults around them emanated from changes in the nature and function of land ownership. Such cults, he suggests, functioned as "proof" or validation of ownership and possession of certain lands, a proof that was particularly important for the newly-rising free peasantry. Besides noting the unprecedented scale of hero cults in the eighth century, Snodgrass emphasizes the apparent growth in population and its connection with the changes in modes of subsistence—arable farming instead of pastoralism. Demarcation of plots of land became all important. The eighth-century discovery of "ancient" (Mycenaean or Iron age) tombs and the hero cults instituted around them was, argues Snodgrass, closely linked to the idea of land possession. Heroic tombs helped assert claims to ownership of land within which the hero's remains were regarded as buried. Moreover, says Snodgrass, one could draw a map of eighth-century hero cult and superimpose it onto a map that demonstrates the changes in population growth and the spread of arable farming, and the two maps, roughly speaking, would overlap. Where they do not—as in Laconia, Thessaly, and Crete (where arable farming also expanded)—this is because the land was worked not by free peasants but by serfs.

"The likeliest explanation," claims Snodgrass, "is that it [the cult formed around Mycenaean tombs] originated in *local* attempts to consolidate the ownership of land." He also claims that "by instituting a cult of a local hero, a community could acquire a sense of security in an age of apparently fluid and unpredictable settlement."[2] The argument about the relation between hero cult and possession of land is essential to Snodgrass' theory. I limit this discussion to this argument without entering into other aspects of the debate, notably the controversial influence of the rise of the Homeric

2. Snodgrass 1980, 39 (my emphasis). For the theory in general see Snodgrass 1982; cf. Snodgrass 1987, 160–64; Snodgrass 1988, 26.

epic on the institution of hero cults.[3] The question Snodgrass raises about hero cult and land has wider ramifications. First, if hero cults functioned in the eighth century as expressions of "proof" or validation of ownership and possession over particular plots of lands, is this not relevant also to the extended, communal notion of territorial possession, that is, of the "land" belonging to the political community? Second, from the point of view of the historian of Greek religion, it could be claimed that the origins of communal heroic cults should also be traced to the private sphere of landed property.

To begin with, I am not certain I fully understand the terminology employed by Snodgrass, particularly with regard to the lack of clear distinction between *land* and *territory* implied, for example, in the passage quoted above. In my view such a distinction is of paramount importance: *Territory* is the demarcated land functioning in the context either of the local community (e.g., a village may be said to have a "territory") or of the entire state (in the Greek world, the combination of ἄστυ and χώρα). By contrast, *land*, at least in the way it is used by Snodgrass, sometimes means private plots, and sometimes communal lands, although the two meanings are quite different.

The private aspect is often emphasized. Snodgrass claims that the salient feature of the new heroic worship is that it was practiced by the newly emerged "humble" (i.e., not aristocratic) free peasantry, and that its essential aspect was the consolidation of land ownership. By this he must mean private land ownership. Snodgrass, however, uses the term *local*, which I find too ambiguous since it may signify both the private and the public domain.[4] In a recent article, the hero cults are explicitly mentioned as "markers for territorial claims by *individual free landowners*"; it is also suggested, however, that the heroes were "anonymous members of an alleged ancestral group...that was of interest only to the local community that claimed descent from them."[5] Here the terms *group* and *local community* do not seem to tally with the "individual free landholders."

Using the term *land* for both the private and the public spheres could be justified if peasant ownership of land was communal. However, the free

3. Hadzisteliou Price 1973; Hadzisteliou Price 1979; Coldstream 1976; De Polignac 1984, 127–51; cf. I. Morris 1987a, 193–94; Bérard 1982; Snodgrass 1980, 38–40; Snodgrass 1982; Snodgrass 1987, 159–64; Malkin 1987, 263–66; Whitley 1988. Snodgrass has recently (1988) made some excellent points about both scholarly perceptions and the real difficulties in accepting the *interpretatio Homerica*.

4. A recent critique of Snodgrass' hypothesis (Whitley 1988) also understands the theory as referring to private landownership but does not notice the ambiguity.

5. Snodgrass 1988, 26 (my emphasis).

peasants in the areas that Snodgrass considers important—especially Attica and the Argolid—did not own land in common. The evidence for this, at least in Attica in the classical period, is relatively abundant and may be projected to the archaic period with high probability.[6] Also, one should take into account Whitley's observations about Attica: Most Attic cults are found in the older Attic communities; moreover, their raison d'être was political, that is, staking local (not private) territorial claims.[7] Another way to justify an ambiguous terminology for private/communal lands might be through a formal distinction between *ownership* in the political (communal), territorial sense and *possession* in the individual, private sense. However, such a distinction must remain entirely speculative, since Greeks, unlike Romans, do not seem to have distinguished between ownership and possession.[8]

In short, the term *land ownership* is misleading, as it does not distinguish between territory and property, between the communal *espace* demarcated on the ground as territory and private plots. If hero cults were intimately linked with the latter, which is implied by Snodgrass' "free peasantry," then the essential corporate aspect of the cult of heroes is lost. If *land ownership* does not apply to private ownership, then the relation between hero cults and land becomes territorial and political. But before I turn to the implications for the public sphere, the implications of private ownership must be tested.

Is there any evidence for deriving individual property rights from corporate cult? Scholars would like to find at least one explicit mention of a hero cult, even in the classical period, which was used to substantiate a private claim to land ownership, as if someone were to say: "This land is mine since I am a descendant of the ἥρως whose tomb I can point out." For scholars interested in private property, such as Fustel de Coulanges or Paul Guiraud, there was no problem since they did not attempt to distinguish between ancestor or family (*gens*) tombs (i.e., private cults) and hero cults. The locus classicus for both is a passage in a speech of Demosthenes. When the son of the Athenian Tisias was sued by his neighbor, claiming that by encroaching on public land he had caused him harm, Demosthenes brought proof that the land in question was in fact private: "Who would think of

6. Fine 1951; M. I. Finley 1951, 1968a; Pecirka 1973; Gallant 1982; Osborne 1985a. Gallant's attack on current Medieval analogies is justified; however, perhaps a better analogy is the twelfth-century Renaissance (characterized by population growth, the clearing of forests, the new colonizing monastic orders, and the cultivation of new lands). Osborne's epigraphical analysis only strengthens the case for clearly demarcated "private" lands (or distinct lands belonging to public bodies).

7. Whitley 1988, 176–78; by contrast, in the Argolid the purpose of such cults was "centripetal" (Whitley 1988, 178–81).

8. Harrison 1968, 200–205.

burying his own ancestors there" (i.e., in public land)?[9] The existence of family tombs, therefore (i.e., without a corporate cult attached to them), was used to substantiate the claim that the land belonged to the private, not the public, domain.

Snodgrass' thesis, where it applies to the private ownership of land by free peasants, has come almost full circle to stare in the face of Fustel de Coulanges' ideas about the origins of private property. Whereas the latter claimed that the tombs of ancestors (as well as that of the cult around them) constitute the origins of private (landed) property,[10] Snodgrass claims that private land-ownership gave a decisive impetus to hero cults. More simplistically, whereas the one derives property from religion, the other derives religion from property.

Fustel's ideas have been aptly described as "thoroughly self-contradictory"[11] because of his emphasis on corporate-family ownership expressed in ancestor (group) burials on the one hand and individual (private) ownership of plots of land on the other. In fact, Snodgrass' thesis faces the same difficulty. Since the hero cult from the eighth century on (and possibly already in Homer)[12] was public and political, the eighth-century aristocrat or free farmer, by emphasizing the heroic aspect of a discovered tomb, would have been working against his own interest; henceforward the tomb would have been publicly accessible (even if the tendance of the tomb remained hereditary). In other words, whereas hero cult was public and communal (both in terms of attitude and worship), it would have been in the interest of Snodgrass' free farmer to keep the plot of land private and exclusive.[13]

There is also a major problem of definition and recognition. As was recently pointed out by Carla Antonaccio,[14] it is necessary to differentiate between tomb and hero cult. For us to recognize a cult at a tomb as heroic, some public aspects, and a continuity in time, must be demonstrated. As it is, most of the evidence used by Snodgrass[15] confounds hero and tomb cults as belonging to a single category. This is certainly not the case, argues

9. Demos. 55.13.

10. The dead are thus primordially also at the root of religion. Cf. Momigliano 1980, xii; Momigliano 1977, 325–43; M. I. Finley 1977, 305–27.

11. Humphreys 1980, 96. Humphreys also analyzes most of the relevant literary evidence.

12. Hadzisteliou Price 1973, 1979.

13. One little-known illustration, discussed by Osborne 1985, 122, may be relevant: The ὀργεῶνες of Egretes lease a land to Diognetes in 306/5 on condition that when they sacrifice to their hero in the month of Boedromion, he guarantee that the οἰκία and the ἱερόν therein must be open and roofed, and that the kitchen (ὀπτάνιον) benches and tables also be available for use.

14. Antonaccio 1990 (based on her unpublished thesis).

15. Based on Coldstream 1976. Cf. Whitley 1988.

Antonaccio. In fact, most of the tombs examined do not belong to the category of (continuous) hero cult and often contain no more than a single dedication.

Antonaccio's convincing distinction must be kept separate from one made by Farnell, who was well aware of the problem of differentiating between ancestor and heroic cult. Farnell distinguishes "ancestor religious *tendance* (of a tomb)" from heroic worship.[16] However, Antonaccio argues that "tendance"[17] also signifies continuity, whereas often only a single act of reverence is apparent in the tombs.

In sum, as far as the analogy between private and communal territorialization is concerned, the role of the hero cult seems to apply only to the political, not the private, domain of land ownership. In that case this heroic territorialization must be seen as belonging to the new world of the polis and can no longer be regarded as unconnected with the (contemporary) rise of the city-state. Indeed, it is intimately related to it. The cult of heroes and the city sanctuaries must now be conceived as belonging to the same domain.[18]

In the latter respect, the present critique notwithstanding, Snodgrass' thesis provides a most important suggestion once we throw out the implication of private land-ownership. The implication is that in the older, "noncolonial"[19] Greek world, territorialization through heroic cult (where we may accept it) is simultaneously apparent both in the sphere of local communities and in that of the polis (to which these communities may belong).[20] Is it possible to confirm such heroic territorialization? In spite of the numerous hero cults of the Greek world, some of which are attestable to the early archaic period, we have yet to find an explicit connection with the

16. Farnell 1921, 344.

17. Her own choice, "tomb cult," while semantically correct, also implies continuity and should perhaps be replaced.

18. Whitley, who analyzes Snodgrass' data, arrives at the same "political" conclusion from a different angle. On the importance of the political aspect see also de Polignac (1984, 127–51). Snodgrass now (1988, 23) accepts the rise of the city-state as causally related to the institutions of hero cults but not as an alternative to his own suggestion.

19. Such distinctions are dangerous too: Eretria, for example, an important mother city, may have been (re)founded (from Lefkandi?) only ca. 700. Schefold (in Auberson and Schefold 1972, 23) calls Eretria a "colony." The question is controversial. Kahil 1980; Kahil 1981; Krause 1982; I. Morris 1987a, 165–66.

20. As Snodgrass (1980, 42–44) correctly warns, our thinking about the noncolonial Greek world must not be dominated always by the idea of the polis. Achaea, for example, does not seem to have known polis life before the fifth century; cf. Snodgrass 1977, 33. Other Greeks lived in ἔθνη, etc. Messenia could have hardly known polis life, but hero cults abounded there, especially under Spartan domination. Were these instituted in protest? As modern oppression often illustrates, rites connected with death (e.g., public funerals) are difficult to suppress. For the possible Messenian "response" see Snodgrass' excellent discussion (1988, 26).

idea of territory, a connection that is comfortably archaic as well. The only clear evidence both for the institution of heroic cults and for their territorial implications is in the world of Greek colonies.

In this contemporary colonial world, heroic territorialization was conceived through the heroized founders. I argue that the territorial significance of the polis cult accorded to founders of colonies is intimately linked with the phenomenon Snodgrass points out. The founders' heroic cult was the first cult that a colony could truly call its own, distinct from the cults imported from the mother city. It would probably have been the first heroic cult in a colony, except for rare cases where a ἥρως was already identifiable, as at Pontic Heracleia, which was founded around the tomb of the Argonaut Idmon.[21]

The death of the founder marked the end of the colony's foundation and his burial in the agora of the city created the first communally-articulated bond with the soil. This was different from the bond expressed through the sacred precincts of the gods. The gods came to the colony with the settlers, and the living founder allotted them plots of sacred land (τεμένη), just as he allotted the colonists their κλῆροι. With his death, the entire community focused on him through a heroic cult in the political heart of the city, the agora. The cult title of the founder is pregnant with territorial significance. He was πολισσοῦχος, (πολιοῦχος), the "holder of the polis."[22] Through stories of the exceptional (the common and acceptable customs are usually too obvious for our sources to comment upon), the significance of having the founder interred in the city is illuminated. Phalanthus' ashes, for example, were spread in the agora of Taras, Sparta's colony, to insure the possession of Taras in the hands of its inhabitants.[23]

Colonies constitute the other end of Snodgrass' spectrum. Unlike the mainland, no Mycenaean tombs could have been found there (possibly with some exceptions—for example, at Sicilian Thapsus), and the land and territory were settled, at least initially, in a comprehensive act of foundation (not through gradual expansion of homestead farms). The term πολισσοῦχοι is significant if we want to understand the relation between hero cults and territory. It combines πόλις and ἔχειν (to hold, obtain, have). Greek heroes held (ἔχειν) the land, and the land they held was territorial, not private landed property. Aias, for example, held Salamis.[24] When the Greeks fought at

21. These and the points in the following paragraph are culled from Malkin 1987, pt. 2 (on the cults of founders). For Idmon see Ap. Rh. 2.846–50.

22. Malkin 1987, index s.v. *polissouchos*, notably on Callim. *Aet.* fr. 43.74 Pf.

23. Justin 3.4; cf. Strabo 6.282; Malkin 1987, 216–21.

24. Pind. *N.* 4.48: Αἴας Σάλαμιν' ἔχει πατρώαν. Cf. Brillante 1989, 10: "ἔχοντι valorizza l'aspetto di possesso, da parte dell' eroe, della terra nella quale è sepolto e che continuerà a

Plataea against the Persians, the seven local ἀρχηγέται were honored. They were not even the main heroes of tiny Plataea, only of the field of battle, but the field was not a personal property.[25] By way of another illustration, the people of Colophon, after their liberation from Alexander, decided to extend their city to include their own abandoned "old city." Prayers and sacrifices were ordered to particular gods, "to the other gods and goddesses, and to the *heroes who occupy* [κατέχουσιν] *the city and country.*"[26]

As far as the (mostly eponymous) founder heroes in the older Greek world are concerned, the evidence about them is often too late and derives mostly from sources like Pausanias. As I suggest elsewhere, perhaps the heroization of founders in colonies influenced the mother cities to search for their own eponymous founders, around whom the communal identity and beginnings of the polis could be focused in heroic-historical terms.[27] This approach of regarding the polis hero cults as the focus of identity around the tutelary heroes of the territory is close in spirit to that of Claude Bérard, who also supports a political interpretation of hero cults. In his view the aristocracy of the eighth century transformed its "princely tombs" into heroic tombs of cult recipients, thus both giving a share in the cult to the community and elevating its own status.[28] Though Bérard is able to substantiate continuity of cults at ancestral tombs—for example, at the West Gate of Eretria—this in and of itself does not imply the participation of the polis community. By contrast, in the colonies it is evident that we have a communal decision regarding the reverence to the founder hero.

Hero cults accorded to founders of colonies have been somewhat marginalized or ignored in discussions of the importance of hero cults in the eighth century. One sometimes gets the impression that colonial phenomena are "to be studied next week," as if we were concerned with some-

possedere per tutto il tempo futuro." Pfister 1909–12, 510–11; Martin 1951, 97; Nilsson 1976, 188, 716; Nock 1944, 162. These examples are not colonial and are adduced to clarify the link between hero and territory. The evidence about them is too late to pinpoint their institution in the eighth and seventh centuries.

25. Plut. *Arist.* 11.3. Cf. Lefkowitz 1985, 50.

26. Cf. Malkin 1987, 151–52.

27. Cf. Malkin 1987, chap. 8; Snodgrass 1988, 23–24. Snodgrass' implication that I confuse "extravagant burials" with the "institution of a lasting cult" is misleading. In Malkin 1987, 261, I suggested that such aristocratic burials provided a *context* within which only certain (*oikist*) burials were transformed into heroic and civic dimensions. More misleading is Morris 1987b, 752: "Malkin (1987) has argued that hero cults began with the worship of founders." I have never suggested such a preposterous idea. Morris provides no page number and confounds in this case heroic cults accorded to founders with general hero cults.

28. Bérard 1982, e.g., p. 94: "C'est donc bien l'époque de la formation de la cité qui voit les tombes des princes transformées en heroöns"; p. 100: "Ainsi les princes, dans leurs heroöns, sont-ils maintenant au service de la cité tout entière."

thing peripheral and late. In truth, especially for those concerned with understanding the attitudes implied in archaic hero cults, there is nothing more relevant, or at least more useful, than the cults accorded to founders in Greek colonies.[29] The heroization of *oikists* of colonies provides us with an opportunity to observe a deliberate establishment of polis cult within a well-defined context and time frame, and with some clearly marked functions. These cults are apparent in dozens of city-states, are contemporary with the "rise of the polis," and apply to Greeks of different origins in wide-ranging geographical areas. By definition, that wide-ranging aspect makes it a central, not a peripheral, phenomenon of archaic Greek culture. And it is not as if only some particular Greeks, say, near the mouth of the Phasis in the eastern Black Sea, are observed as having started some new practice. On the contrary, Greeks in north Africa, the western Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Greeks of diverse ethnic origins living in new communities established from a plethora of mother cities, were all beginning something both new and universal. What context could be clearer, lacking cluttering antecedents, for someone today who wishes to understand "attitudes"? Yet the opportunity is curiously often missed.

We cannot penetrate the psychology of the archaic Greeks in order to understand precisely what they saw in the heroized dead.[30] We could not do that even if we did have an abundance of explicit verses of poetry or inscriptions. What is more apparent to us is the function of hero cults. In the framework of this chapter, this function, when it is shown to be connected with land, is apparent as political and territorial, not as private and individual. Having joined together several modes of research and observation, Snodgrass has perspicaciously raised an important question for the Greek Renaissance of the eighth century. His proposal, where continuous cult can be evidenced, may be accepted as signifying territorial values on the level of the local community and polis. The one hundred Attic ἀρχηγέται in Cleisthenes' list from which the Pythia chose the ten eponymous tribal heroes may have been among those heroes to whom cult was instituted in the eighth century. But all these are nonascertainable possibilities. By contrast, the heroic cults accorded in the eighth and seventh centuries to founders of colonies upon their death afford us a glimpse at their function and meaning in the framework of the polis. The cult of oikists is, of course, only one form of political hero cult. I have chosen to emphasize it here because these politically heroized persons fulfilled the heroic function of

29. Lampros 1873; Leschorn 1984; Malkin 1987, pt. 2. The so-called ἡρῷον at Lefkandi has yet to be proven as such. Cf. Popham, Touloupa, and Sackett 1982; Snodgrass 1988, 24.

30. Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1981, 1983; I. Morris 1989.

"holding the land," that is, the territory of the polis. They were πολισσοῦχοι. As such, they are the opposite of the hypothetical heroes of individual landed property.

18

# *Knemides* in the East? Some Observations on the Impact of Greek Body Armor on "Barbarian" Tribes

Elfriede R. Knauer

AFTER A FORMATIVE PERIOD during the first half of the seventh century B.C., the hoplite's canon of accoutrements and of the tactics determined by them was established. They dominated Greek warfare for the next three hundred years. This process has been described and analyzed with competence more than once.[1] But one paradox renders the study of this development difficult: Just before the wealthier soldiers began to provide their own panoply when serving in their mother cities, the habit of providing warriors' graves with weapons had been discontinued on the Greek mainland. Thus our evidence for the archaic and classical periods no longer comes from burials, but from the dedications of weaponry in the important Greek sanctuaries—principally at Olympia. Such pieces, occasionally furnished with dedicatory inscriptions, were naturally found out of context. Their dates, however, could be established with some certainty, thanks to the astonishingly consistent development of archaic art and artisanry reflected by them.[2]

Much of Martin Ostwald's work concerns itself with the Greek city-state, its laws, and the rise of democracy. Connected with the ascendency of these institutions is that of the Greek hoplite, the fully armed citizen soldier. Therefore it may not be out of place to salute the honorand with a few archaeological notes pertaining to Greek armor. This article owes much to Joan Mertens' constructive reading, but responsibility for the opinions expressed here rests with me alone.

1. Snodgrass 1984, 69–154; Gamber 1978, 263–90; Nickel 1969, 18–21.

2. Snodgrass 1984, 69–70. A find of late seventh-century Cretan armor is particularly rich in dedicatory inscriptions; see nos. 14–17 in Muscarella 1974 (reference kindly supplied by Joan Mertens). Exceptional for the chance it offers for dating is the Corinthian helmet of the

Oddly, an eloquent contemporary source, namely vase-painting, cannot really be relied on for a reconstruction of the actual panoply. Although many of the narrative scenes on vases of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. are mythological, one might yet expect that the body armor of the heroes depicted would portray the latest achievements of the archaic weaponsmith's art. Instead the painters insouciantly mix armor that can be matched by authentic contemporary pieces with imaginary artifacts, such as the Boeotian shield. This type seems never to have been actually manufactured. Rather, it was modeled on vague recollections of the figure-eight shield of Mycenaean times or its successor, the geometric Dipylon shield, probably in order to evoke a heroic context.[3] The painters also accommodated reality to their artistic conventions. A case in point—which affects much of Greek art—is the concept of heroic nudity. A Greek hoplite never went to war unshod or half naked, as he is often shown.[4]

But scholarly skepticism must not be driven to the extreme. We should not disregard the evidence of artistic representations altogether. A lavish rendition of the archaic hoplite's equipment is on Exekias' amphora in the Vatican (ca. 530 B.C.), with Achilles and Ajax at the gaming-board (fig. 1).[5] Our detail gives only Achilles (without his Boeotian shield, because of its fictitious character; the classical hoplite's shield was circular). Achilles' Corinthian helmet is pushed back and reveals the well-groomed hair and beard and the intent gaze of this noble head. Exekias seems to be the first to have represented a pushed-up Corinthian helmet. When not engaged in battle, the Greek hoplite may, indeed, have worn his helmet in this fashion. Exekias, however, uses it as an artistic conceit to give expression to the subtle physiognomic nuances first introduced by him.[6]

Over a short tunic, Achilles wears a white corselet of linen or leather, tied with a cord and eyelets. While the white has rubbed off, the remaining rich incision suggests stitching and embroidery, which excludes the garment's being metal armor. This cuirass has leather strips (πτέρυγες) at the edge, and one shoulder flap is just visible below the border of the splendid mantle. The shoulder flaps of Ajax' cuirass (not shown here), bear feline

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so-called Miltiades type (so named after a helmet found at Olympia; see H.-V. Herrmann 1972, pl. 32c) that was discovered in battle context, in the Persian siege ramp at Palaeopaphus on Cyprus, of 498 B.C. (Maier 1984, fig. 181).

3. Snodgrass 1984, 100–102; Gamber 1978, 274–75.

4. The intricate concept of "heroic nudity" has been discussed repeatedly by Himmelmann who recently (1989, 1990) summarized his work on the subject. Two articles by Bonfante (1989, 1990) also address the subject.

5. Beazley 1956, 145.13; Simon, Hirmer, and Hirmer 1976, pl. 26, pp. 86–87.

6. Knauer 1986, 122; Mommsen 1988, 447 n. 8.

Fig. 1. Vatican, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco, Inv. 16757; black-figure belly-amphora by Exekias, ca. 530 B.C.; Achilles at the gaming board. (Photo from Simon, Hirmer, and Hirmer 1976, pl. xxv.)

masks.[7] What may appear to be the tattoo of a panther head on Achilles' deltoid muscle is the top of a rarebrace, or armguard, fashioned of sheet bronze. A matching vambrace for the lower arm is absent. The combination protected the sword arm, while it could be dispensed with on the shield arm.[8] He has chased *παραμηρίδια*, or thighguards, and at the shins, *κνήμιδες*, or greaves (again of resilient sheet bronze), which snapped around the legs. To prevent chafing, small leather pads were fastened above the

7. Feline masks decorate the shoulder blades of the cuirass of Neoptolemus on the Naples hydria by the Kleophrades Painter (Simon, Hirmer, and Hirmer 1976, pl. 128 top; Beazley 1963, 189.74). This is of some importance in view of the far eastern evidence I discuss below, n. 49.

8. For both types (with Gorgon heads) see Gamber 1978, fig. 289; Schefold 1967, fig. 148c (late archaic). Besides Exekias, Euphronius gives some of his warriors Gorgon armguards; see *Euphronios* 1990, no. 34, fig. 7. Their faces show no fangs or snakes.

ankles. Achilles lacks ankle- and footguards.[9] His being unshod is certainly due to the concept of heroic nudity already mentioned. The volutes of his arm- and thighguards delineate the muscles in an ornamental fashion. Except for the embossed kneecap, his greaves remain undecorated. Many such simple κνήμιδες have been found, as have others with the chased head of a Gorgon as special protection for the vulnerable knee.[10]

Of the surviving examples, most greaves from the early sixth century on—and the rarer armguards—imitate the underlying anatomy quite carefully; so do (even more importantly) many metal muscle-cuirasses.[11] The wearer was thus encased in a duplication of his own nude body.[12] Apparently the idea behind it was to endow pieces of body armor with the complex idealizing message of the concept of heroic nudity. Hellenistic

9. The latest treatment of the subject, especially of the ankle guards, is by Bothmer (1989). To the examples listed by him add two in the Kunsthistorische Museum in Vienna, Inv. 6.4997 a, b; see Gschwantler and Oberleitner 1974, no. 143, pl. 27. No provenance is known, but Apulia is suggested, where the majority of these comparatively rare pieces of equipment have been found. The Vienna pieces are inappropriately described by Gamber (1978, fig. 334) as "halbe Beinschienen."

10. For finds from Olympia see H.-V. Herrmann 1972, pl. 34ab; Mallwitz and Herrmann 1980; Yalouris 1987, 61–71 (for greaves see fig. d, p. 67). Also Snodgrass 1984, figs. 46, 124; Gamber 1978, fig. 290; and the miniature panoply in the Kunsthistorische Museum in Vienna, Gamber 1978, pl. 9. The single greave, with Gorgon head, in the Levy collection, may be Apulian. For further examples see the entry describing this piece (no. 91) by Dietrich von Bothmer, in Bothmer 1990. See also the greaves of Menelaus on the skyphos by Macron in Boston *ARV*² 458.1, and the woman on the bell-krater G 482, *ARV*² 615 in the Louvre (second half of the fifth century), connected with the Geneva painter. She presents a pair of κνήμιδες on a stand—they have Gorgon masks at the knee (fig. 5372 in Daremberg–Saglio, vol. 4:148). I have corrected the wrong inventory number of the piece given there). The pair of late sixth-century greaves in the British Museum (from Ruvo, Apulia, GR 1856.12–26.615, bronze 249; cf. H. B. Walters 1899, no. 249) has Gorgon heads at the knees that taper into minute bodies along the shins. The fashion of Gorgon head greaves survived into Roman wallpainting, surely to evoke a mythical setting; see *EAACO* vol. 3, colorplate before p. 234, and pp. 773–74; but also occasionally on Roman legionaries' greaves; cf. Junkelmann 1986, pl. 36. I have not yet seen what must be the authoritative survey of the development of greaves by Kunze (1991).

11. See, e.g., the breastplates B5101 in Yalouris 1987; cf. Gamber 1978, pl. 9, fig. 300; Mallwitz and Herrmann 1980, pl. 33. The set of helmet, cuirass, and greaves in Hesperia Arts Auction 1990, lot 6, seems older than the fifth/fourth century. A horseman's panoply (Apulian burial of about 330 B.C.) has simple greaves and a muscle-cuirass, hinged at the sides and tied at the shoulders, without shoulder flaps. The anatomy is very natural. The entry, no. 95 (D. Cahn) in Bothmer 1990, mentions more than thirty cuirasses from that region; cf. also Cahn's bibliography.

12. A case in point is the Alexander Rondanini in Munich, a Roman marble copy of a (bronze?) original of about 330–20 B.C. The naked, youthful king appears heroized, bent over forward, with one foot put on a support, in a pose hitherto reserved for gods (Poseidon, Hermes). On the ground (as a support and, naturally, added by the copyist) is his undecorated cuirass with slightly contracted muscles, repeating, so to speak, the attitude of the owner; see Himmelmann 1989, 90–91, 95–96; Vierneisel-Schlörb 1979, no. 33, pp. 370–79, figs. 180, 184.

rulers seem to have taken a further step by adding divine emblems, such as thunderbolts, on the shoulder flaps, besides the customary apotropaic Medusa-head on the chest and stylized florals delineating the pectorals. It was left to the Romans to convert Greek body armor into an instrument of imperial propaganda. The most authoritative images developed by Roman art for the emperors present them as victorious generals in richly embossed muscle-cuirasses.[13] Winged victories, defeated enemies, and personified virtues celebrate the invincibility of the emperors as rulers of the world. No Greek breastplate of the classical period was ever overlaid with such a conspicuous reference system.[14] Although Rome added to the Greek model the highly charged symbolic imagery so characteristic of its art, the underlying anatomical cuirass must still have conveyed some of the heroic notions of the prototype.

Since finds of late archaic and classical armor on the Greek mainland are exceptional, we must turn to the periphery for evidence. While sporadic examples of greaves have been mapped recently on the Iberian peninsula and in Southern France,[15] it is South Italy[16]—mainly Apulia[17]—the

13. For a genealogy of the muscle cuirass see Stemmer 1978, 131–49. For a recent review of such materials see Gergel 1991. An unusual jerkin- or doublet-like (leather?) cuirass with a straight double row of leaf-shaped πτέρυγες is worn by a Roman statue in the museum in Odessa, no. 50066 (Dzis-Raĭko 1983, no. 100, p. 57 fig). Apparently an eastern variant of a classical prototype, it has interesting parallels in India; see below, n. 41.

14. Some archaic breastplates are engraved or chased with animals or decorated with figural scenes, but these are always integrated into the overall "replica" of the thorax; see, e.g., the later seventh-century Crowe-cuirass from Olympia or the breastplate from Afrati (Crete); Snodgrass 1984, figs. 26, 70. Also see the pieces M394 and B5101 (Yalouris 1987, 65–66).

15. See Dehn 1988, 174–88; Blech 1988, 188–90. The Gauls shunned body armor; the latest overview by Brunaux and Lambot (1988) lists only offensive weapons.

16. Servius Tullius, sixth king of Rome (about 578–35 B.C.), is traditionally credited with the establishment of a new political assembly linked with the *centuriae*, the smallest unit of the Roman legion. Livy (1.43) describes the equipment of the wealthy members of the first class who served in eighty *centuriae*: helmet, *clipeus* (round shield), *ocreae* (greaves), cuirass, all of bronze, plus lance and sword. That corresponds to the Greek panoply, which was also adopted by the Etruscans. See, e.g., the pair of greaves from the vicinity of Lago Trasimeno, in the Vatican, *Gens Antiquissima Italiae* 1988, 5.6, 89–90, with references to Etruscan body armor, the two greaves (one in miniature) in Heidelberg in Borell 1989, no. 51–52, pl. 23–24, and the cuirass from Lanuvio in Cristofani 1990, 10.6.14. Cf. the south Italian pieces in n. 11 above. For the transition from militia to standing army between the later Republic and the principate, with the concomitant change of equipment, see Junkelmann 1986, chaps. 3–4; 162–64, pls. 17, 18, 26a, 28a, 32a (muscle-cuirasses), 115, 179, pls. 29, 32a, 36, 37, 45 (greaves).

17. Besides the finds from Magna Grecia (above, n. 11), it is pictorial sources (Apulian vases showing heroes or warriors, in panoply or with their weapons suspended in a *naiskos*) that supplement our detailed information on such equipment; e.g., the volute-krater with the rearming of Achilles (Bothmer 1990, no. 127) and murals in South Italian tombs (Steingräber 1989, fig. 22, p. 14, n. 45), with parallels, from Etruria to South Russia, here characterized as part of a Hellenistic koine.

Balkans,[18] ancient Thrace, and South Russia[19] that provide specimens of great perfection, mostly the work of Greek artisans. Breastplates and greaves seem to have gone out of fashion on the Greek mainland by the early fourth century, because hoplites no longer constituted the main tactical resource of Greek armies. They had been largely replaced by lightly armed mobile units. The *Randvölker*, however, seem to have worn κνήμιδες down into and throughout the fourth century. The continued use of traditional Greek hoplite armor by "barbarian" nobility indicates the prestige that they continued to see in such panoplies—not only for use during their lifetimes but also as grave goods.[20]

Our concern lies with copies or adaptations of Greek body armor by non-Greek tribes. Since the sixth century B.C., the Scythians had been well aware of the Greek way of life, through trade contacts or physical proximity to the Greek colonies around the Black Sea. An outstanding example of a Greek goldsmith's work made for Scythian nobility is the golden comb found in the Solocha kurgan at the lower reaches of the Dnepr (fig. 2).[21] It may have served as a ceremonial implement to fasten the topknot of the chieftain. In spite of its miniature size, the battle scene at its crest, worked on both sides, is so detailed that no item of the warriors' array escapes us. There are many compelling representations of Scythians in their characteristic garb: boots, trousers, and girt, pelt jackets, worn with the furry side next to the body, which allowed for the lavish adornment of the garments' exterior.[22] The comb shows what would otherwise be known only from

18. Sixth/fifth-century finds in Bulgaria include helmets in Sofia, Nova Zagora, and Plovdiv and cuirasses in Kazanluk and Sofia (Venedikov 1976, nos. 184, 186, 188; 185, 187; 190, 191–93). For nos. 190 and 191, not pictured in that catalog, see *Gold der Thraker* 1979, nos. 189, 190. For simple greaves, see Snodgrass 1984, fig. 124. An interesting case is the pair of plain Greek greaves found in a Celtic chieftain's tomb of the fourth century B.C. in Ciumeşti (Rumania), together with a typical Celtic coat of mail. The burial proves the early thrust of Celtic tribes into the region. The greaves have four holes each for tying them with two straps above the ankle and below the knee; see Rusu 1971, 288–89, fig. 6.

19. E.g., helmet and greaves from the Kekuvatsky barrow (Crimea); Artamonov 1969, fig. 270. See the summary in Rolle 1979, vol.1 text, 134–36, derived from her catalog, 1979, vol. 1; the finds are numerous, especially—but not exclusively—from the *Fürstengräber* in the steppe region. Cf. Rolle and Murzin 1988, 3 (greaves belonging to warrior no. 3 in niche 3). See also the golden-chased sheath of an ἀκινάκης (later fourth century) from the Chertomlyk kurgan (one of three from the same mold), portraying a battle between Scythians and Greeks. The Greek goldsmith shows the Greeks partly in panoply, with simple muscle-cuirass and greaves (*Gold der Skythen* 1984, no. 55, 106–9). Similar attire (though without breastplate) appears on a gilt silver bow-case from Karagodeuashkh (Minns 1913, 220–21). For exact figures of Greek style accoutrements found in Scythia (over sixty helmets and more than seventy greaves), see now Rolle 1991, 131–34.

20. Snodgrass 1984, 153–54, 216, fig. 124.

21. Rolle 1980, 82–90; *Gold der Skythen* 1984, no. 51. Piotrovski 1989, pl. 128–29.

22. Rolle 1980, 54–69; Knauer 1985, 613–17.



Fig. 2. Leningrad, Hermitage; golden comb from Solocha kurgan (Melitopol district), first half of 4th c. B.C.; detail, Scythian chieftains fighting. (Photo from *Gold der Skythen* 1984, no. 51.)

pieces of armor recovered in tombs, namely, the mixture of imported and indigenous equipment worn by the combatants. Two Scythian chieftains fight. One of the horses has been dispatched already, but its master carries on, defiantly, on foot. The prospective victor is followed by a retainer who is probably of lower rank, because he does not sport any piece of foreign gear.

The horseman's helmet and κνήμιδες are clearly of Greek origin; the other trappings reveal how Greek models have been skillfully adapted to the requirements of the steppe warriors. A striking feature is the insouciance with which the horseman wears his greaves, fastened over the wide trousers by straps. This must have offended a Greek's sensibility. The rider's leather corselet with individual metal scales and shoulder flaps, but without πτέρυγες, is the clever invention of eastern tribes and is much more flexible than Greek plate armor.[23] The leather trousers provided additional protection. His γωρυτός, the bow-and-arrow case, and his imbricated shield,

23. Scale armor is already attested in the second millennium B.C. in, e.g., Egypt, Nuzi (Iraq)—Gamber 1978, 117–18, 306–8—and Bogazköi (Turkey)—Neve 1984, 370–71. Its



Fig. 3. Regional Historical Museum, Lowech, Bulgaria, inv, no. 590; gilded silver plaque, part of a horse's harness, ca. 400–350 B.C., from the Letnitsa hoard; hunter on horseback. (Photo from *Gold der Thraker* 1979, no. 277.)

strapped to his back and awaiting use once the warrior dismounts, are indigenous.[24] His opponent's helmet is of "Phrygian" type; his corselet has scales at the chest and ends in a skirt with modified πτέρυγες. His crescent πέλτα or γέρρον, made of sticks or reeds bound together with leather thongs, is of Eastern type. Interestingly, both animals are shown without saddles, which were necessary for heavily armed horsemen.[25] Stirrups, the

ancestry is unknown, but the Near East with its steppe-contacts is a likely source; Rolle 1979, pls. 27–28, p. 44; Rolle 1980, 67, 83. The Scythians may have copied Assyrian and Urartian models; see Galanina 1987, 15 ("Schutzwaffen"). See now Rolle 1991, 131–34. Scaly cuirasses occur in vase-paintings and may be borrowed from the East. Increasing familiarity with the Orient, especially during the Persian Wars, raised Greek awareness of the idiosyncrasies of the Achaemenids' multinational army; see, e.g., the cup Oxford 1911.615 (Beazley 1963, 399). The names of a good number of Greek weapons are of oriental origin; see Benveniste 1937, 37–46; Trümpelmann 1988. The somewhat later impact of scale or splint armor, primarily on Roman and Far Eastern body armor, was momentous but can only be hinted at here; see Junkelmann 1986, 168–69; Laufer 1914, chap. 5 ("The Problem of Plate Armor"); Dien 1981–82, 13.

24. For the remains of such a shield and those of a lamellae-corselet (sixth/fifth century B.C.) see Minzhulin 1988, 118; the archer also had guards at the upper arms. See now Rolle 1991, 137–42.

25. Rolle 1980, 87; Bunker 1983, 84; Knauer 1990, 285.

somewhat later invention of the steppe nomads, are lacking, although we have a careful contemporary depiction of "proto-stirrups" in the well-known torque from the Kul-Oba kurgan.[26] In the tomb-chamber of the chieftain who owned the comb, a reworked Corinthian helmet, greaves, a corselet of scale armor, and Greek wine amphorae were found among the many indigenous trappings.[27]

More clumsily executed and surely the work of local Thracian craftsmen, whose Greek contacts must have been less direct than the Scythians', is a gilded silver plaque of a horseman fighting a bear (fig. 3). Part of a hoard from Letnitsa (north-central Bulgaria), it has been dated to between 400 and 350 B.C. It was one of a series of plaques embellishing a horse's harness.[28] Though lacking elegance, it documents how close the rider's outfit is to the Scythian examples. The remnants of an egg-pattern may indicate rough terrain, on which a wolf, the warrior's first quarry, lies in frozen agony. The hunter's array consists of boots, trousers, and a long-sleeved jacket, perhaps of leather. One of the sleeves is characterized by its folds as overlong—a typical feature of nomad dress, also found in the Scythian comb. It protected the hands in the bitter cold steppe winters (gloves were unknown) and the arms against blows, almost like a primitive *Rüstärmel* (*manica*). His scale cuirass has πτέρυγες, and there is a shield on his back. For a hunting party he is unusually well equipped, since he also wears κνήμιδες, but combat with a bear may justify their presence. Fastened with three thongs, these greaves deserve attention because of the human head (not that of a gorgon) at the knee. It wears a torque about its neck.

Precious metals abound in the Balkan mountain ranges and were mined from earliest times on.[29] Hoards of gold and silver objects of unrivaled lavishness have come to light in Bulgaria during the last decades. The Letnitsa find is one of them; even better known are the treasures from Panagyurishte and Rogozen.[30] In workmanship, style, and iconography, they constitute a unique blend of foreign inspiration—that is, Greek, Phrygian, and Achaemenid—with local traditions.[31] They attest to the skills of the local

26. Littauer 1981, 99–105; Piotrovski 1989, pl. 126–27.

27. Rolle 1980, 83.

28. Cf. Hoddinott 1989, 54.

29. *LaW* 453–55; *KP* 1:865–67 s.v. "Bergbau."

30. Mostly dated to the fourth century B.C. For Panagyurishte see Venedikov 1961; Venedikov 1976, nos. 360–68; *Gold der Thraker* 1979, 180–88, pls. 362–67. See also Painter, in B. F. Cook 1989, 79–80. For Rogozen see *The Thracian Treasure* 1986; *Thrakische Silberschatz* 1988; B. F. Cook 1989.

31. Berciu 1971, 257; Archibald, in B. F. Cook 1989, 12–25. Before its impact on Thrace, Achaemenid art had itself been exposed to, and had digested, Greek influence; see Oelsner 1985, 119–28; Bouzek-Ondrejova 1988, 84–94.



Fig. 4. National Museum of Antiquities, Bucharest; gilded silver greave from Agighiol tomb, northern Dobrudja, Romania. 4th c. B.C. (Photo courtesy of W. Schindler.)

craftsmen in the service of Thracian grandees or kings. The greave of the bear hunter has lifesize contemporary counterparts.[32] The silver greave pictured here and found in the Agighiol tomb in northern Dobruja (Romania) is somewhat simpler and closer to the hunter's (fig. 4).[33] The exotic iconography and the manifest *horror vacui* make these pieces "barbarian" products, but the underlying form is undoubtedly Greek.

The objects studied so far came from regions that had been in contact with Greek culture. They affirm the appreciation that products of a "higher" civilization enjoyed locally. And yet, when imitated, they were ingeniously adapted to the needs of an environment with different requirements, be it in life-style or beliefs. Thrace and Scythia lie at the western end of the vast steppe-belt that extends all through the Asian continent and reaches deep into China. Situated at considerable altitudes, with few major mountain

32. For an inlaid one from the Mogilanska mound (near Vratsa, NW Bulgaria), with the richly attired and tattooed head of a goddess, see *Thracian Treasures* 1976 cover, no. 292. For a recent summary of the habit of tattooing see C. P. Jones 1987, 139–55.

33. See Berciu 1971, 209–66, esp. 217–19, pls. 113–14.1; cf. a second one from that mound, with face tatoo but without a torque (pls. 112, 114.2). See also Taylor, in B. F. Cook 1989, 91.

ranges to obstruct the migrations of its—ethnically quite diverse—inhabitants, these grasslands constitute a rather homogeneous environment that mandated a mobile way of life—pastoral nomadism supplemented by agriculture.

The seasonal migrations of those tribes covered astonishing distances, as did their frequent campaigns and marauding expeditions. Their wealth consisted of herds of cattle, horses, and at times camels; small portable, precious objects, such as jewelry or harness decoration; and silk. Incursions into China taught them to appreciate the last commodity, which found its way west, in small quantities, at a surprisingly early date,[34] first through barter and "gift giving" among chieftains, later in a more organized way, along the so-called Silk Routes. "Steppe empires," formed by coalitions of tribes, succeeded each other over the centuries and, under ever new names, threatened the sedentary cultures of the Middle and Far East. Destructive as their activities may often have been, their role as intermediaries and their contribution to world art is important. Their art is—in its ever fresh reformulation—the result of the absorption and integration of foreign models into their own physical and spiritual universe.[35]

The Scythians spearheaded such a migration during the seventh century B.C. They pushed the Cimmerians out of South Russia, causing them to wreak havoc in the Near East. Various sources speak of the terror they spread.[36] By the third century B.C., the Scythians themselves fell victim to yet another tribe, the Sarmatians, who took their place in South Russia. The Sarmatian contribution to warfare was the armored horseman. The rider wore scale body armor, the horse scale housing. Sarmatian cavalry units were employed by Marcus Aurelius. Some of them were even stationed in Britain.[37]

While the Sarmatians settled in South Russia, another steppe tribe, the Hiung-nu, formed an empire at the border of China, driving other tribes to

34. For the environment see Taaffe 1990, 19–40, esp. 33–37; for the steppe tribes see Sinor 1990, 1–18. For the westward migration of silk see Raschke 1978, 607–22; Granger-Taylor 1987, 13–31; Barfield 1989. Chinese silk finds dating back to the end of the third millennium B.C. have recently been reported from the North Bactrian site of Sapalli-Tepe (present day Southeast Turkmenistan); Brentjes 1988, 18; Carter 1991, 169.

35. Basilov 1989.

36. E.g., Hdt. 4.11–14; Ezek. 38 (where they appear as "Gomer", as they do already at Exod. 10.2–3). See *KP* 3:210–11 s.v. "Kimmerier", and the important study by Bolton 1962; cf. Rolle 1991, 71–73.

37. Nickel 1975, 150–52. For the Sarmatians see Lubo-Lesnichenko 1989, 41–43; Melyukova 1990, 110–17, and now Rolle 1991, 428–29. The Sarmatians continued the wild-animal style that had characterized much of Scythian art before contact with the Greeks, but their compositions lacked the fierce agility of their predecessors.

the west and south. Among them were the Sakas and the Yüeh-chi confederation, both of Iranian stock.[38] By the end of the second century B.C. they established themselves between Transoxania and Baluchistan. These nomads dealt a deathblow to the Greek kingdoms that had grown from the remnants of the Seleucid empire, the successor state, in Bactria and Northwest India, to Alexander's vast empire.[39] There these tribes encountered a rich and diverse culture, which produced a provincial, orientalized version of Hellenistic art. Although Greek political supremacy in this area came to an end about the late second century B.C., the presence of Greek deportees, veterans, and settlers since the times of Achaemenid rule, had left its cultural imprint in Central Asia and North India.[40] It is important to realize that the accoutrements of Greek soldiers were well known and that depictions of them are not hard to find in the arts of that vast area.

The Yüeh-chi, or Kushan, empire rose in the first century A.D. It was situated at the crossroads of age-old commercial routes that linked the Mediterranean world and Persia to the Punjab, the plain of the Ganges, and China. Kushan art, named after the province of Gandhāra, is an outstanding example of the creative appropriation of foreign prototypes by "barbarian" nations. Buddhism was furthered by their first rulers, and from the seedbed of local Hellenizing traditions sprang a new and momentous iconography for the creed that was on its way to peacefully conquer China.[41] Merchants

38. For the Hiung-nu see Yü 1990, 118–49; for Indo-Europeans in Inner Asia see Narain 1990, 151–76. For the complex Indo-European question cf. Pulleyblank 1966, 3–39; see also Drews 1988; Meid 1989. An unexpectedly rich bibliography is to be found in Ginzburg 1989, pt. 3.1 ("Congetture eurasiatiche").

39. See Spuler 1950, 309–21; also Holt 1988.

40. Altheim-Rehork 1969; especially important is the contribution of Schlumberger 1969, 281–417. French excavations of the Greek city Aï Khanum in northern Afghanistan document this process most clearly; see Bernard 1973–87; also Bernard 1989, 176–84. A surprisingly "western" bronze statue of a warrior, (h-42 cm) of the fourth century B.C., is on exhibit in the Urumqi (Wulumuchi) Museum (Xinjiang). His features are clearly Caucasian, he kneels like an archer (the objects in his hands are lost) and wears a short tunic and a high helmet of "Phrygian" type (for such helmets see Maass 1987, 69). The statue was excavated at the upper reaches of the Ili and thus at an important "gate" leading into the steppe of Kazakhstan. For figs. see *CAH*[2] 1988, 4:182, fig. 8, and Xinjiang weiwuer 1985, pl. 90 (references to these publications kindly supplied by V. Mair). Classical muscle-cuirasses are worn by the warriors on a pair of clasps (found in the late 1970s) from the first-century A.D. early Kushan tombs at Tillia tepe in northern Afghanistan. They seem to be the work of local craftsmen under strong Hellenistic influence; cf. Sarianidi 1986, 321–22, with pl. 165, and the excellent photograph in Sarianidi 1990, 66. For a comprehensive presentation of the finds from that necropolis see Sarianidi 1985. For the Greek linguistic heritage in Central Asia and India, as documented by inscriptions and papyri (excluding coins), see Schmitt 1990, 42–58.

41. Rosenfield 1967. Gandhāran stone or stucco reliefs with scenes from the various lives of the Buddha have many warrior figures that must reflect actual equipment in use locally during both the rise and fall of the Hellenistic princedoms in Central Asia and North India; see,



Fig. 5. Private collection, Philadelphia; schist relief from Gandharan stupa, Taxila (?), Pakistan, ca. 2d c. A.D.; detail: the Buddha exchanges clothing with a hunter. (Photo courtesy of G. N. Knauer.)

and missionaries would move east along the well-established trade routes, and with them many portable artifacts.

This discussion of the migratory peoples in the heartland of Asia seemed necessary in order to trace the way in which western models for body armor might have traveled to the Far East. A case in point is the recent discovery of a rich array of bronze equipment in the tombs of the aristocracy of the Dian tribes—a civilization in the remote southwestern province of Yunnan in China. Attempts to explain its many puzzling features have produced a vast literature.[42] Yunnan had contacts not only with

e.g., Ingholt 1957, nos. 47, 63, 64, warrior no. 561. The latter, in Ingholt, resembles the hunter, with whom the Buddha exchanges his clothes (fig. 5). Unusually, the hunter here wears a cuirass with πτέρυγες. (Indian princes employed armed Greek women as harem guards; Ingholt, 1957, nos. 10, 442). See also the cuirasses worn with the dhoti by the guardians at the gate of cave 4 at Pitalkhora, near Aurangabad (Maharashtra), in the first century B.C. (Härtel and Auboyer 1971, pl. 135). For such jerkinlike cuirasses see the piece in Odessa (Dzis-Raĭko 1983, no. 100, p. 57 fig). Cf. n. 13 above.

42. Rawson 1983; Pirazzoli-t' Serstevens 1982, 79–89; Pirazzoli-t' Serstevens 1974; Dewall 1979, 69–143; Lutz 1986.

Southwest Asia and Tibet but also with northwestern China and thus with the steppe regions and, apparently, with hellenized Central Asia.

The finds from the vicinity of Lake Dian, near Kunming, consist of weapons, ornaments, vessels, bronze drums, and containers filled with cowrie shells, whose lids are covered with vivid and detailed scenes from the life of the Dian tribes from about 400 B.C. to 200 A.D. Cast by the lost wax process, these miniature figures act out all of their activities: sowing, weaving, hunting, tribute offering, cultic practices (including human sacrifices), and warfare against the many neighboring tribes of nomadic pastoralists. Decapitated heads of the latter are displayed on the mounts and in the hands of victorious Dian warriors and as trophies in houses.[43] This practice alone, best known from the Scythians, hints at links with the steppe tribes.[44] Our understanding of the Dian culture is helped by Chinese sources from the Western Han onward.[45] Once the Han emperors had brought the Dian region under control, local art gave way to Chinese models.

Some pieces of body armor can hardly have been fashioned without some knowledge of the appurtenances of steppe tribes or of hellenized Central Asia. Chronologically they range between the fifth and the first century B.C. A bronze rarebrace, or upper armguard, of the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) shows incised animal combats, framed by a cable pattern (fig. 6).

While the decoration bespeaks steppe contacts,[46] the design of the object must ultimately go back to Greek models. Gilded bronze greaves and vambraces (fig. 7) can be compared to the shin- and armguards apparently worn by the gilded figure of a Dian general (with head-trophy at his horses' chest), who is the center of a battle scene on the lid of a cowrie-shell con-

43. E.g., Rawson 1983, pls. 39–41; Lutz 1986, nos. 24, 25, 26, 88.

44. See Pirazzoli-t' Serstevens' references to links with the steppe (1974, 119–27, esp. 121). The pedigree of the bronze containers with figured lids should be sought in pieces like the circular ceremonial copper lamp (dm 30 cm, fourth to second century B.C.) in Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan), which portrays a mounted archer aiming at a procession of horned cattle arranged along the rim (Basilov 1989, 18, 21), and a related incense burner (fifth to third century B.C.) in Frunze, from the Issyk Kul area, which portrays felines at the rim and camels in the center (Pugachenkova 1988, fig. 170). See also the simpler Siberian ancestors, kettles with animals at the rim (e.g., Basilov 1989, 39).

45. Pirazzoli-t' Serstevens 1974, 134–42; Rawson 1983.

46. See Yunan Provincial Museum 1975, 121; Lutz 1986, no. 75. I believe that the holes along the lower and side edges served to attach padding. Some pelt-patterns, tails, and claws of the bestiary tattooed on the body of the male from the fourth-century kurgan 2 in Pazyryk (Rolle 1980, 91–93), resemble features on the rarebrace. Bunker (1983, 91) believes the style of the engraved animals to be dependent on Bactrian embroidery of the type found at Noin Ula (Mongolia) from the first century A.D. In a 1989 talk (the manuscript of which she kindly sent me), Mrs. Bunker hints at the possibility of classical models for a Dian shinguard.

Fig. 6. Kunming Museum, Yunnan, China, excavation no. M 13:4; bronze upper-arm guard, from Lijiashan, Dian culture, Warring States Period, 475–221 B.C. (Photo from Rawson 1983, no. 152.)





Fig. 7. Kunming Museum, Yunnan, China; Gilded bronze vambrace (replica), Dian culture, Western Han Period, 206 B.C.–A.D. 8. (Photo courtesy of G. N. Knauer.)



Fig. 8. Kunming museum, Yunnan, China, excavation no. M 13:356; lid of a bronze cowrie container from Shizhaishan, Dian culture, Middle Western Han dynasty, (ca. 150–50 B.C.; battle scene. (Photo from Rawson 1983, no. 40.)

tainer of the late second or early first century B.C. (fig. 8);[47] the knight on another receptacle may be wearing them, too.[48] The pigtailed opponents of the Dians are being beheaded and plundered by the chieftain's men. Their and their foes' accoutrement deserves detailed study for its typological pedigree. This cannot be done here. But little doubt seems possible about their dependence on classical prototypes via as yet undocumented intermediaries. The piece of bronze plate armor for the back, on exhibit in the Kunming museum with remnants of scale mail and a bronze quiver, clearly reflects western models. The customary rendering of the chest muscles as volutes

47. A simple greave (reaching to below the knee), an armguard, and armor for the back were found in the rich tomb at Lijiashan [M 24:88], of the sixth/fifth century B.C., bespeaking very early contacts with the West (Lutz 1986, 152–53). Cf. Dewall 1979, 127. Her conspectus of the inventories of the Lijiashan tombs lists many pieces of defensive body armor.

48. Rawson 1983, pls. 83–84; Lutz 1986, no. 5. Both gilded warriors clearly belong to the Dian nobility. The general wears smooth shin guards, the knight probably vambraces; both have not been recognized as such, perhaps because of the minute size of the figures.



Fig. 9. Kunming Museum, Yunnan, China, excavation no. M 24:88; bronze plate armor for the back. from Lijiashan, Dian culture, Late Spring and Autumn period, 6th–5th c. B.C. (Line drawing from Yunan Provincial Museum 1975, p. 120.)

on classical cuirasses has here been transformed into two, masklike, frontal faces, encompassed by carinated curves (fig. 9).[49] They evoke the Gorgon- or animal-heads of classical cuirasses. The neckguard is decorated—almost *aegis*-like—with numerous snakes.

Recently, fresh attempts have been made to trace the ancestry of Chinese weaponry. In the process, less credit was given to likely influences from Central Asia than in the seminal earlier study by Bertold Laufer.[50] Without going into detail here, I would like to stress those connections again. The exchange and adaptation of foreign models was an ongoing practice.[51] One instance must suffice. The powerful terracotta figures of foreign soldiers (taken over into the iconography of the Heavenly Guardians of the four corners of the world), who customarily protect the entrances of the more important tombs of the T'ang period, wear elaborate plate armor and

49. For a Greek cuirass with masks on the shoulder blades see n. 7 above.

50. Dien 1981–82; Laufer 1914, 73–315.

51. Contacts go back into the Bronze age, long before the mounted nomads began their incursions; see Hüttel 1979, 1–29; Shaughnessy 1989.



Fig. 10. Painted pottery figure (warrior guardian), T'ang dynasty, A.D. 618–906. (Photo from Sotheby's 1984, lot 135.)

greaves (fig. 10).[52] These, worn over trousers, are occasionally decorated with chased demons-masks at the kneecaps. This feature might be considered an independent invention of the fertile artistic mind of the Chinese. But another feature found on the cuirassed shoulders—fierce masks of monsters that seem to disgorge the upper arms of the wearer from their fangs—hints at western connections. Close parallels to this feature are found in the painted renderings of armed gods and warriors on the walls of temples and mansions of the Sogdian merchant aristocracy in Russian Central Asia.

The Sogdians plied and dominated the trade routes to T'ang China. The impact of their presence on the art of the period has long since been recognized and appreciated. That such influences should also be felt in the field of weaponry should not surprise. The T'ang emperors customarily received embassies from the west and often engaged foreign generals and mercenaries.[53] The murals at Panjikent in the Zarafshan valley, east of

52. Cf. the terracotta warrior in Vollmer 1983, 67. For the pedigree of the type see Laufer 1914, 294–301.

53. For the political history of the period see Franke 1936, 350–529.



Fig. 11. Mural from Panjikent (near Samarkand, Uzbekistan), ca. 7th c. A.D.; Warrior (or god?) in breastplate. (Photo from Azarpay 1981, fig. 45.)

Samarkand, provide several instances of comparable cuirasses (fig. 11).[54] The exuberant monster-masks seem a far cry from those we have met with on Greek greaves, rarebraces, and cuirasses, and yet, there must be a connection. The ever more rewarding archaeological work in Central Asia may present us some day with examples that will bridge the gap between late antique and early medieval times.

A curious postlude to the history of body armor with monstrous masks is found in western art between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries

54. Cf. the many-armed god Veshpakar (Azarpay 1981, fig. 5) which is modeled on Hindu divinities, though the masks are a local trait. For the murals of Panjikent see also Marshak 1990, 123–76.

Fig. 12. Niklas Stoer, woodcut in Waldis 1543; the legendary king Eusterwon. (Photo from Geisberg 1929, pl. 37.)

and beyond. Italy initiates the depiction of ancient heroes (from classical antiquity as well as from biblical and medieval history and legend) who wear greaves, occasionally with monster-masks, and breastplates with such motifs at the shoulders. The rest of Europe soon follows suit (fig. 12). These features are found at times with the archangels of the Eastern church. Plate armor of this type is also frequently furnished with stylized scrolls for the chest muscles. These idiosyncrasies even occur in actual pieces of sixteenth-century armor. Links with Central Asia and the Far East seem undeniable to me.[55] But this is a different story, which I hope to document elsewhere.

55. The *pax mongolica* certainly furthered such connections.

19

# Andocides' *On the Mysteries* and the Theme of the Father in Late Fifth-Century Athens

Barry S. Strauss

FEW SCHOLARS HAVE MADE as great a contribution as Martin Ostwald to our understanding of the politics and ideology of fifth-century Athens. Among the major politico-ideological themes that Ostwald explores in his magisterial *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of the Law* is the conflict between old and new in the late fifth century. This conflict manifested itself variously as a struggle between generations, ideologies, and political factions, and over the interpretation of the past, as represented by that protean and pervasive political slogan, the πάτριος πολιτεία, that is, the "ancestral" or "traditional constitution."[1]

It is the contention of this chapter that one of the reasons for the popularity of the concept of πάτριος πολιτεία in Athens was its ability to provide a metaphorical and semantic link between politics and society. The word πάτριος is derived from πατήρ, "father," and suggests a whole complex of words having to do with family, inheritance, tradition, and fatherland: among them πατρῷος (inherited, patrimonial), πατρικός (hereditary, inherited), τὰ πατρικά (patrimony), and πατρίς (fatherland). As a pun, therefore, πάτριος πολιτεία might suggest not only "ancestral" or "traditional constitution" but also "paternal constitution." Much the same can be said for those other contemporary watchwords in Athens at the end of the fifth century—τὰ πάτρια and νόμος πάτριος. As much recent scholarship has suggested, public and private were closely intertwined in fifth-century Athenian

1. On πάτριος πολιτεία see Fuks [1953] 1971; Ruschenbusch 1958; Cecchin 1969; M. I. Finley 1971; Walters 1976; Harding 1978; Ostwald 1986, 342–43, 367 n. 119.

ideology. In the debate over tradition and novelty in late fifth-century Athenian politics, the father was an important symbol. The paternal theme in Andocides' speech *On the Mysteries* is a case in point.[2]

Before turning to that text, the main subject of this chapter, let us briefly explore two points in further detail: the feasibility of πάτριος πολιτεία as a pun on πατήρ in Attic Greek and the political significance of the father in late fifth-century Athens.[3] On the subject of the pun, a skeptic might well ask if the literal connection between πάτριος and πατήρ really meant much to Athenians, and to ordinary people as well as to the intelligentsia. One might reply that several examples in oratory of wordplay and jingly repetition suggest that the connection did indeed mean something. For example, Isaeus (3.30–32) tells the story of a claimant to her father's estate who is supposed to have been given an old family name by her father. The woman's husband, however, has no knowledge of any such name—and is it not ironic, the orator asks, that someone claiming a patrimony (ὁ κλῆρος ὁ πατρῷος) has no knowledge of paternal nomenclature (τοῦθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς κείμενον ταύτῃ)?[4] In Isaeus' *On the Estate of Nicostratus*, where the identity of Nicostratus' father is in dispute, the orator uses the words *patronymic* (τὸ ὄνομα πατρόθεν) and *fathers* (πατέρες) as virtual synonyms in the same sentence (Is. 4.4). In *Against Aristocrates*, Demosthenes (23.111) plays on the words πατήρ and πατρικός (hereditary), noting that it was preferable for Philip of Macedon to have the Athenians rather than the Thessalians as allies, since the Athenians were his hereditary friends (πατρικοὶ φίλοι), while the Thessalians had once expelled his father (πατήρ). The pseudo-Demosthenic *Answer to Philip's Letter* contains references to fathers (πατέρας), ancestral practice (πάτριον), the fatherland (πατρίδος), and forebears (προγόνων), all in close juxtaposition ([Demos.] 11.21–22). Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (4.25) juxtaposes fatherland (πατρίδα) and ancestral deeds (τῶν πατρίων).[5]

Did ordinary Athenians make as elegant puns of πάτριος and πατήρ as did Isocrates and pseudo-Demosthenes? Perhaps not. By 413, however, after years of witnessing powerful images of filial disrespect and intergener-

2. On public and private see Humphreys 1983b, 1–32; Winkler 1990, 45–70; Halperin 1990, 11, 95; Jameson 1990; Strauss 1990.

3. I offer a more detailed discussion of these and other related points in my forthcoming book on *Fathers and Sons in Athens*.

4. Cf. similarly Demos. 21.157.

5. The pseudo-Demosthenic document is a fourth-century B.C. political pamphlet rather than a genuine oration, apparently the work of the historian Anaximenes of Lampsacus (Didymus *In Demos.*, *FGrH* 72 F 11). It reveals, nonetheless, the language that the elite thought might impress the masses.

ational conflict on the public stage, any connotation of *father* in a term of political discourse is likely to have been strong and evocative. As Ostwald and other scholars have remarked, the 420s and the following decade, down to the failure of the Sicilian expedition in 413, was a period in which youthful and filial rebellion was very much on Athenian minds, and in which a generation gap between young and old and fathers and sons was often noted.[6] It was an era in which the extraordinary promise and perils of the younger generation were personified by such Janus figures as Alcibiades and Andocides, and by such symbols of youthful exuberance as the Sicilian Expedition and the mutilation of the Herms. An Athenian hearing in 411 that so-and-so advocated the πάτριος πολιτεία did not take that to mean that so-and-so literally wanted to make his or anyone else's father the leader of Athens. The auditor might take the term to mean, however, that paternal symbolism was an important part of what so-and-so had in mind. The πάτριος πολιτεία was a symbolic statement about using an image of the Athenian past as an authority for the present. The past was, as it were, a πατήρ, who would guide his wayward sons.

A whole complex of argument developed according to which the reform of Athens required a return to a regime of old, a regime moreover in which old men ruled, young men knew their place, and sons obeyed their fathers. Thrasymachus yearns for the good old days in which government was exclusively in the hands of the old while young men remained silent (DK 85 B 1). In his *Demoi* of 412 or 411, the comic playwright Eupolis bemoans government by children or adolescents and conjures up the great men of Athens' past (Miltiades, Pericles, etc.) to replace them (frr. 99–146 KA). Then there was Alcibiades, who personified the danger that private misbehavior might spill over into public life; his youthfulness and youthful disobedience and misbehavior were well known (Thuc. 5.43, 6.13, 6.15, 6.17–18; Plut. *Alc.* 2–4, 7–8). Finally, one of the informal charges circulating against Socrates around the time of his trial is that he had taught sons to obey him rather than their fathers, or even that he had taught sons to have contempt for their fathers (Xen. *Ap.* 20; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.49). Thus, the interrelated notions that Athens needed to restore its traditional constitution, the tradition of rule by elders, and traditional filial obedience were prominent themes in fifth-century ideology.[7]

Compared to the trial of Socrates in 399 B.C., which is one of the best-known events of European history, the trial of Andocides in 400 is a mere

6. Forrest 1975; Ostwald 1986, 229–49; Reinhold 1976; Thury 1988; Strauss 1990.
7. See Ostwald's perceptive remarks (1986, 341–43); Strauss 1990.

footnote (although it too involves the issues of impiety and the aftermath of defeat and civil war). Nevertheless, the case of Andocides has much to teach the historian. As often in Attic forensic oratory, Andocides' defense depends not only on his own (slanted) presentation of the facts but on his attempt to present himself to the judges as a man of noble character. In pursuit of this end, he mixes a generally ordinary and unsophisticated style with occasional and melodramatic borrowings from the vocabulary and narrative structure of tragedy; that is, he attempts to endow his life story with the gravity of a tragic protagonist's dilemma. Andocides presents himself as a good citizen, a good friend, and—most interesting for the purposes of this chapter—a good son. Andocides boldly manipulates the symbols of father and fatherland and skillfully deflects his opponents' allegations that he had trampled on πατήρ, πατρίς, and πάτριος νόμος. Andocides' rhetoric is thus an important datum in the study of Athenian paternal-filial ideology in the years after the Peloponnesian War.[8]

The main source of evidence for the trial is Andocides' defense speech, *On the Mysteries.* The survival of this text makes it possible to examine Andocides' defense strategy in toto, apart of course from an analysis of his rhetorical gestures. An analysis of the prosecution's strategy must be somewhat more speculative, although we are not completely in the dark. A cautious reconstruction can be made on the basis of Andocides' statements. Moreover, [Lysias] 6, *Against Andocides,* has also survived. This text purports to be part of a speech made in support of the main prosecutor, Cephisius. Most scholars today are inclined to accept the speech as genuine, while acknowledging that some doubts remain (for example, [Lys.] 6 might be a pamphlet that circulated at the time). The author claims to belong to the Eumolpidae family, which provided priests for the Eleusinian Mysteries ([Lys.] 6.54); he certainly comes across as a religious zealot. There are strong, if not certain, grounds for identifying the author as Meletus, one of Cephisius' three supporting prosecutors (along with Agyrrhius and Epichares) and allegedly the man who arrested Leon of Salamis under the Thirty (And. 1.94). Straws in the wind indicate that he was the same Meletus who co-prosecuted Socrates in 399, but a firm identification is impossible. Other evidence for Andocides' trial includes a few relevant comments in Andocides' earlier speech *On His Return* (And. 2.6–9, 2.15, 2.23, 2.25–26), accounts in Thucydides (6.60.1–3) and Plutarch (*Alc.* 21.1–6) of

8. On the date and the style of Andocides' defense speech see Blass 1887, 1:319–22; Jebb 1893, 1:95–96, 112–25; MacDowell 1962, passim; Kennedy 1963, 147. On elements of tragedy in the diction and narrative of the speech, see Blass 1887, 1:319–22; Jebb 1893, 1:95–96; Opelt 1979, 210–18; Ober and Strauss 1990, 256–58. For examples of Andocides' use of vivid and colorful details in *De myst.* see F. D. Harvey 1984; Sommerstein 1987b.

the events of 415, and scholarly compilations of later centuries (especially the *Vita Andocidis* and Tzetzes *Historia* 49). Much can be said, therefore, about both prosecution and defense.[9]

The trial itself was quite complex and is not easy to summarize. The immediate, underlying issue, according to Andocides, was a quarrel between himself and Callias, son of Hipponicus (And. 1.117–23). Kin by marriage, both men were members of the Athenian elite. Their quarrel concerned money and the hand of an ἐπίκληρος, one of the daughters of a certain deceased Epilycus. Andocides wanted the bride and her estate for himself, Callias for his son Hipponicus. As both men were related to Epilycus, each had a claim.[10]

Threatened by a lawsuit from Andocides, Callias allegedly acted first (And. 1.121). He arranged for Cephisius and the coprosecutors to accuse Andocides of having illegally participated in the Eleusinian Mysteries that had just ended (autumn 400). The official charge was an ἔνδειξις, that is, having exercised a right to which the accused was not entitled; the broader moral, if possibly not legal, implication was impiety (And. 1.71–72, 121). Why Callias could challenge Andocides' right to attend the mysteries depends on fifteen-year-old events from spring 415. Before turning to the much debated narrative of that year, let us briefly note a pretrial maneuver by the prosecutors.[11]

Callias claimed that ancestral law (νόμος πάτριος) had been violated by someone who had left a suppliant's bough on the altar of the Eleusinion (an Eleusinian cult temple at Athens) during the Eleusinian festival (And. 1.110–16). As a member of the family of the Kerykes, one of the two families who administered the mysteries, Callias brought this matter to the council, where he denounced the alleged culprit, Andocides. Callias claimed that the penalty, according to πάτριος νόμος, was death. Callias was not able to prove Andocides' guilt; moreover, his invocation of πάτριος νόμος was challenged by a reference to an officially inscribed law of Athens, which set a stiff fine, and not death, as the penalty. So Callias and his colleagues were left with the charge of impiety, which brings us to the events of 415.[12]

9. On sources of evidence see MacDowell 1962, passim; Marr 1971; Furley 1989. On Meletus see Burnet 1924, 10–11; Dover 1968a, 78–83; Marr 1971, 334 n. 1; Blumenthal 1973, 167–78; Keaney 1980, 296–98. Keaney argues convincingly that Pl. *Ap.* 32c8–d3 hints that Socrates' prosecutor Meletus is the same Meletus who arrested Leon of Salamis under the Thirty, and therefore the Meletus of Andocides' trial (And. 1.94). This is a strong argument, but it is not decisive, because Plato or Socrates might have been trying to confuse the judges by attempting to blame Socrates' accuser Meletus for the crimes of another man named Meletus.

10. See MacDowell 1962, 10–11, 206–7; J. K. Davies 1971, 31, 264–65, 268–69.

11. On ἔνδειξις see MacDowell 1962, 13–14; cf. Ostwald 1986, 536 n. 41.

12. Ostwald 1986, 161–69.

Andocides had become notorious for his alleged role in 415 in the mutilation of the Herms and the parodying of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the two scandals that preceded the sailing of the Sicilian Expedition (And. 1.11–70; 2.6–9, 2.15, 2.23, 2.25–26; Thuc. 6.60.1–3; Plut. *Alc.* 21.1–6; [Plut.] *Vita And.* 834). The facts are neither simple nor clear and are too dependent on Andocides' highly tendentious accounts. It seems likely that Andocides was in on the initial plot to mutilate the Herms, though probably, as he claims, he did not take part in the deed itself (And. 1.61–64). There is good reason to think that he had participated in a parody of the mysteries too. It is certain that Andocides was arrested and imprisoned (though whether on a charge of parodying the mysteries as well as mutilating the Herms is disputed) and that in return for confessing his guilt and turning state's evidence, he was granted immunity and released from jail, while those he named were charged with having mutilated the Herms. Some fled; others were captured, tried, and executed (And. 1.60–68, 2.23; Thuc. 6.60.2–3; Plut. *Alc.* 21.2–4).

Andocides could not hide the fact that he informed on his ἑταῖροι, but the charges also arose—perhaps in 415, perhaps later—that he had informed on his kinsmen too, and even on his father, Leogoras (And. 1.52–53, 1.67; [Lys.] 6.23; [Plut.] *Vita And.* 834e; Tz. *Hist.* 49 = *Chil.* 6.367–75). Andocides vehemently denies having denounced his father (And. 1.19–24). It seems likely that Leogoras was accused in 415 of both the mutilation and the parody (And. 1.17, 1.47). He was imprisoned and managed to gain his freedom and survive; Andocides takes credit for the outcome, but skepticism is in order (And. 1.48–68, 2.7–8).[13]

As a result of his immunity, Andocides avoided the prosecution, execution, or exile that others suffered in 415, but he incurred enormous opprobrium (And. 2.6–7). As the speaker of *Against Andocides* says, Andocides was the man who reached the limits of shame by snitching on his family and friends ([Lys.] 6.23). Andocides was castigated as the kind of man who, rather than follow the standard Greek dictum of "help your friends, hurt your enemies," followed the rule of not hurting his enemies but doing all the hurt he could to his friends ([Lys.] 6.7).[14]

13. MacDowell (1962) offers the most detailed account of Andocides' activities in 415. Marr (1971) and Seager (1978) are far more skeptical about Andocides' credibility, as was Thucydides (6.60.3—assuming, as is likely, that this passage refers to Andocides). Other details are discussed by Hatzfeld (1951, 173–77), Dover (in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:264–76, 285–86), Aurenche (1974, 108–10), Fornara (1980), Raubitschek (1981), Kagan (1981, 209), Ostwald (1986, 327–28), and Furley (1989).

14. On the opprobrium incurred by Andocides' behavior see MacDowell 1962, 3–4; Pecorella Longo 1971, 47.

It was probably this kind of opprobrium that led to the Isotomides Decree of 415 (And. 1.71; [Lys.] 6.9, 6.24), according to which anyone who had confessed to committing impiety would be barred from the temples of Attica and the Athenian agora—in other words, he would suffer a kind of public death. The decree applied to Andocides, in spite of his immunity from prosecution. It may have been an ad hominem attack. In any case, he went into exile, building up a fortune as a merchant over the years. After two failed attempts to return home, the amnesty of 403 finally allowed Andocides to settle in Athens and to play an important role in its politics and finances. The collision with Callias followed three years later.[15]

Memory of the events of 415 had no doubt dimmed somewhat by 400, but the prosecution would be sure to fan what flames remained. *Against Andocides*, for example, gives great play to Andocides' impiety and personal betrayal in 415 ([Lys.] 6 passim). Like Socrates during his trial, Andocides probably knew that he would have to defend himself not only against the stated charge but also against the "old accusers" (Pl. *Ap.* 18d9–10). The old accusations against Andocides in 415 might be thought of as four related offenses: that he had committed impiety, that he was a snitch, that he had betrayed his friends and family, and that he had betrayed his father. In his defense Andocides is careful to respond to each of these old accusations, and of course to the stated charge of illegally attending the mysteries. Andocides' defense, in other words, is an apologia as well as a narrowly delimited brief. One of Andocides' defense strategies that emerges, both directly and indirectly, as a prominent theme in *On the Mysteries* is his claim to a sterling reputation as a good son to both his father and his fatherland.

The paternal theme in Andocides' defense speech can, for the sake of analysis, be divided into five lines of argument. First, Andocides offers a revisionist account of the events of 415, according to which he was the savior rather than the denouncer of his father. Second, he invokes his love for his Athenian fatherland, equating his own triumph over exile after years of struggle to the Athenians' triumph over enemies after years of struggle. As Athens had returned to its ancestral ways (*τὰ πάτρια*), so Andocides had saved his father (*πατήρ*) and regained his fatherland (*πατρίς*). Third, Andocides attacks his prosecutors as enemies of fatherhood. Fourth, he calls on the great deeds of his forefathers as grounds for acquittal. Fifth, he invokes the jury's sympathy for him as a man who had lost his father (apparently Leogoras had died in the years since 415) and had no sons.

15. On the vicissitudes of Andocides' career up to the time of his trial see J. K. Davies 1971, 31; Ostwald 1986, 546–47; Strauss 1986, 99–100.

Andocides' first line of defense is his account of his treatment of his father in 415. He had to fight against the widespread belief that, to save his own skin and get released from prison, he had turned informer on his own father as well as his friends and kinsmen. The charge had been alive and well when Andocides attempted vainly to return to Athens from exile several years after 411.[16] Furthermore, the Hermocopidae and the profaners of the mysteries had a general reputation as arrogant and spoiled youths, which created a presumption of filial disobedience on the part of Andocides. He took great pains then to explain to the Athenian Assembly that he had turned informer in 415 only to save his father's life; clearly, someone had accused him of jeopardizing his father's life (And. 2.7). The prosecution brought up the charge again in 400, and Andocides takes great pains again to portray himself as his father's savior in 415 (And. 1.17–24).[17] The later ancient tradition was not persuaded, however, and believed that Andocides had denounced Leogoras ([Plut.] *Vita And.* 834e; Tz. *Hist.* 49 = *Chil.* 6.367–75).[18]

None of this proves anything other than that malicious gossip will always find an audience. Much more damning, however, is the flimsiness of Andocides' defense, which MacDowell has demolished. To outline his argument, Andocides claims first that one Lydus denounced Leogoras, hence Andocides could not have denounced him too (And. 1.17, 1.19). Multiple denunciations, however, were common in Athens. Andocides also claims that the survival of Leogoras past 415 proves that Andocides never denounced him; had Andocides denounced him Leogoras would have been tried, convicted, and executed—or if acquitted, Andocides would have been executed (And. 1.20). This argument is clearly false. By Andocides' own admission, Leogoras blocked action on Lydus' charge by the technicality of a prosecution for an illegal decree (*γραφὴ παρανόμων*). Leogoras might have used the same tactic against any denunciation by Andocides (And. 1.17, 1.22). *The Life of Andocides* says that Andocides informed on his father and then got him off by promising that Leogoras would in turn denounce other malefactors, which he did (834e). In neither case would Andocides have been executed.

16. For the date see MacDowell 1962, 4 n. 9; Marr 1971, 33 n. 1.

17. On Hermocopidae and profaners as arrogant youths see Ostwald 1986, 541, 549–50. Pseudo-Lysias mentions the betrayal of kinsmen (*συγγενεῖς*) and friends (*φίλοι*) without specifying Andocides' father ([Lys.] 6.23). This is a curious omission, but it is a quirky speech, far more interested in the issue of impiety against Eleusis than anything else, and fragmentary to boot. See Dover 1968a, 169, n. 23. Marr (1971, 336) cites the silence of this passage as evidence that Andocides' alleged denunciation of his father was a slander that was not universally alleged.

18. For later sources see MacDowell 1962, 172.

Therefore, Andocides' argument in 400 leaves a huge loophole. Would he not have closed it had the facts been on his side? Perhaps Andocides had done what his enemies alleged, and denounced his own father to the authorities in 415. No doubt he would have preferred not to include his father's name on the list of those he denounced, if only for reasons of self-interest (such behavior was bound to incur opprobrium). But perhaps Leogoras' guilt was too well-known to deny, or perhaps Andocides could not strike a deal without including such a relatively big fish.[19]

Andocides' apparent guilt certainly complicated matters for him, but all was not lost. By 400, many of the men who had lived through the events of 415 were dead. Many of the jurors were thus ignorant and impressionable. In these relatively favorable circumstances, Andocides' strategy seems to have been the "Big Lie" technique—deny one's guilt boldly and often enough and people will come to believe you. Andocides thus hammers home the argument of his loyalty to his father. He refers to it often in *On the Mysteries*, particularly in his discussion of the furor in 415 over the profanation. To take the most striking example, in sections 17 to 24 of the speech (fifty lines in the Oxford text), he uses the word πατήρ (or πατέρα or πατρός) fourteen times.[20]

Having discussed the weakness of Andocides' arguments, let us note, with admiration, his ability to play on the jurors' emotions and the sanctity of the father-son tie in normative discourse. First, Andocides emphasizes his role in persuading Leogoras to stay in Athens and fight rather than go into exile. He paints a vivid picture: "My father was denounced by Pherecles' slave Lydus, but he was persuaded by me to remain and not to go off into exile; it took many supplications as I held on to his knees" (And. 1.19).[21] What could be more touching than a grown son who so subordinates his pride to his father's best interests that he doesn't mind the self-abasing gesture of clinging to the old man's knees? Who could be more pious than a son who keeps intact the tie between father and fatherland?

Second, Andocides emphasizes the drama of his stay in prison—where denunciations had landed him and various family members—and his selfless decision to incur the opprobrium of denouncing his former comrades in order to save his imprisoned father and kinsmen. He makes much of the uproar in Athens before his statement put an end to a series of charges and

19. On the flimsiness of Andocides' defense, multiple denunciations, and Leogoras freed on a technicality see MacDowell 1962, 169–71.

20. No other part of the speech even comes close in frequency of the use of the word πατήρ. It appears seven times in sections 41–47, but five of those are in lists of degree of kinship (e.g., "cousin of my πατήρ") in section 47.

21. This and the following translations are my own.

countercharges (there had already been five separate informers in the affair of the Herms and Mysteries), and the pitiful sight of his family members in prison, their women and children gathered outside, "the crying and weeping of those bewailing and lamenting their present evils" (And. 1.48). Andocides gave in to the plea of his cousin and fellow prisoner Charmides, who urged him to save his kinsmen and his father Leogoras, "whom you [sc. Andocides] probably love most of all" (And. 1.50). Andocides claims that his confession only implicated four men who had not already been denounced, and all four of them survived to the present day in 400. In return, Andocides saved his father, brother-in-law, three cousins, and seven other kinsmen, all of whom, as he says dramatically, "owe it to me that they now see the light of the sun" (And. 1.68).[22]

Third, Andocides notes repeatedly that his self-interest and that of his father and kinsmen were completely at one with the best interests of Athens. He says:

> This is my greatest task in this trial, gentlemen, not to appear evil just because I was saved [in 415]; to make <first you> and then everyone else learn that I did nothing out of evil or lack of manliness, but rather on account of the disaster that struck the city and, to a lesser extent, us too; I said what I heard from Euphiletus out of forethought for my kinsmen and friends, out of forethought for the whole polis, out of virtue and not evil motives—so I think. (And. 1.56)

Although he denies any participation in the parodying of the Mysteries, Andocides admits that he had been present when the plot to mutilate the Herms had been hatched; he claims to have opposed it and to have played no part in the deed itself (And. 1.61). Had Andocides kept silent in 415, he argues, three hundred Athenians accused unjustly of mutilating the Herms would have been executed, and Athens' turmoil would have continued. By coming forth with his denunciations, however, Andocides says, "I saved myself, I saved my father and my other kinsmen, and I delivered the polis from fear and the greatest of evils" (And. 1.59). Andocides not only denies that he denounced his father in 415, but he also denies having had any selfish motives then. He insists rather that he was guided by patriotism and filial piety, and that he was a model son.

Andocides' second defense argument draws an analogy between depictions of himself as a son who loved his father and as a citizen who loves his

22. For drama see Ober and Strauss 1990, 256. For the possibility that Andocides denounced as many as twenty-two men, see Seager 1978, 223.

fatherland. Andocides claims that his enemies say he would have preferred to go into exile rather than to stand trial, if he could have escaped from Athens (And 1.4). He denies this indignantly:

> I would never accept a life elsewhere, cut off from all the good things of the fatherland [στερόμενος τῆς πατρίδος]. Even if the polis is in the condition that these enemies say it is, I would much rather be a citizen [of Athens] than of other poleis that I may perhaps think are more prosperous at present. (And. 1.5)

The orator establishes two things here. First, he is willing to stand by his fatherland in bad times as well as good. Second, he would suffer if he were deprived of his fatherland, and suffer emotionally rather than materially, since other poleis are more prosperous.[23]

From the point of view of paternal symbolism, these two points might prove immensely valuable to Andocides. First, given the etymological connection between πατρίς (fatherland) and πατήρ (father), a reputation as a citizen loyal to the πατρίς could only help the orator's shaky status as a good son. Second, Andocides' particular crime against his father was, allegedly, to have abandoned him for the sake of his own self-interest. By demonstrating his altruism in regard to his πατρίς, Andocides implants the idea among the jurors that he was undoubtedly equally altruistic in regard to his πατήρ.

Third, and less tangible, was the whole matter of Andocides' exile. There is an element in the prosecution's case of a charge that Andocides was—if a twentieth-century expression might be permitted—a "rootless cosmopolite." His checkered wanderings around the Aegean are taken as signs both of divine disfavor and of Andocides' dismissal of the ancestral ways (τὰ πάτρια) of his fatherland. *Against Andocides*, for example, makes the orator into a figure of Sisyphean suffering, whose life has been scarred again and again by pain and which lacks all charm. Men reject Andocides everywhere because he violated the most basic rule of civilization, treating one's acquaintances well. The gods refuse to save him, because to do so would promote atheism. If impiety as grave as Andocides' goes unpunished, men will surely conclude that the gods do not exist ([Lys.] 6.28–32).

A man who prefers foreign countries to his fatherland is a man who has little regard for the traditions of his fathers—and probably also a man who would betray his own father for the sake of self-interest. So Andocides' prosecutors may have argued. At any rate, *Against Andocides* lays great

23. Note the emotional connotations of στέρομαι (LSJ s.v.). On Andocides' hatred of exile, cf. Hyp. 1.20.

emphasis on the speaker's own piety, which he constantly compares to Andocides' impiety, noting the traditional piety of his family. He points out that his grandfather, Diocles son of Zacorus, was an offical of the Mysteries (a hierophant) who advised the Athenians on a case of impiety ([Lys.] 6.54). This makes a nice contrast with Andocides' father Leogoras, who had a reputation for high living, spendthrift ways, and profaning the Mysteries and mutilating the Herms (Ar. *Nu.* 109 with schol.; Ar. *Vesp.* 1269; Eup. fr. 50 KA; Pl. Com. fr. 114 KA; And. 1.17, 1.47).[24]

Andocides is thus vulnerable to a smear as an exile from Athens' noble traditions. By countering with a portrayal of himself, however, as a good Athenian who never wanted to live abroad, Andocides turns the tables on this whole complex of charges. He makes himself, symbolically, a good son of both fatherland and father and, hence, a man deserving to be acquitted.

Andocides' third line of argument is to attack his prosecutors as enemies of fatherhood. As Meletus played a relatively small role in the prosecution, so Andocides does not devote much time to counterattacking him. Andocides does mention the accusation that, under the Thirty, Meletus had arrested Leon (perhaps the famous general Leon of Salamis), who was later executed. This only warms up the audience though for the scene of Leon's children (παῖδες), who wanted to do their duty and avenge their father by prosecuting Meletus but were prevented by the amnesty of 403 (And. 1.94). It was Meletus, Andocides implies, and not he who was a father-killer.[25]

Callias was a bigger fish, both in the case against Andocides and in Athenian life generally, and accordingly Andocides treats himself to a long, leisurely, and poisonous counter-attack. Apparently, Callias had made much of Andocides' alleged violation of ancestral law (νόμος πάτριος) in the affair of the suppliant branch; he may have even emphasized the link between himself, his (Callias') father (πατήρ), and νόμος πάτριος. According to Andocides, Callias had informed the Council that

> it was an ancestral law [νόμος πάτριος] that if someone should place a suppliant branch in the Eleusinion, he should be executed without trial, and his father [πατήρ] Hipponicus had once made an official pronouncement on these things to the Athenians, and that he [Callias] had heard that I [Andocides] had placed the suppliant branch. (And. 1.115)

24. On the piety of [Lys.] 6 see Dover 1968a, 78–83. On Leogoras see Davies 1971, 30; Ostwald 1986, 542.

25. Andocides' charge may have been a smear: "Meletus" was a common name, and it is not certain that the Meletus of Andocides' trial is the same Meletus who arrested Leon. See MacDowell 1962, 208–9; J. K. Davies 1971, 382.

Callias accused Andocides of violating *νόμος πάτριος*. By pointing, furthermore, to the solidarity between himself, his *πατήρ*, and the *νόμος πάτριος*, Callias also subtly reminded his audience of Andocides' offenses against his *πατήρ*, Leogoras. Andocides' supporter Cephalus had already made short shrift of the *νόμος πάτριος* argument by pointing out the superiority of Athens' written, inscribed law, which set the penalty for the alleged crime at a monetary fine, not execution (116–17).[26] Not that it was possible to get rid of the argument entirely; Andocides' alleged violation of the *νόμος πάτριος* no doubt emerged again in the trial. The author of *Against Andocides* puts it dramatically:

> You know well, men of Athens, that it is not possible for you to make use both of the ancestral laws [*νόμοι πάτριοι*] and of Andocides, but either one or the other. Either the laws must be wiped out or this man must be got rid of. ([Lys.] 6.8; cf. 9–10)

Andocides, perhaps wisely, prefers to attack Callias' record as a *πατήρ* rather than return to the *νόμος πάτριος* argument. He focuses on Callias' alleged lurid behavior in his own *οἶκος*. According to Andocides, Callias first of all had an affair with his wife's mother Chrysilla, from which union a son had been born. Callias had refused to recognize the son as his own at the Apaturia and had perjured himself before relenting only several years later (And. 1.124–28). Second, although Callias was claiming the daughter of Epilycus for his son (not the son of Chrysilla but a different son), he really wanted her for himself (And. 1.120–21). Third, Callias had proven to be a bad son to his father Hipponicus, having damaged Hipponicus' fortune, his even keel, indeed his whole life (And. 1.131). In short, Callias was a bad *πατήρ* to his son and a bad son to his *πατήρ*. Andocides paints Callias and not himself as the true enemy of fatherhood.

A fourth line of argument concerns the Athenians' forefathers (*πατέρες*). Andocides points out, first, that observing an amnesty is a tradition-hallowed custom in Athens, hence the amnesty of 403, under which he claims to be protected, should invalidate the prosecution. Second, he notes the signal contributions of his particular forefathers to Athenian glory. He notes pointedly that his great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather had both played important roles in the expulsion of the Pisistratid tyranny about a hundred years before. Presumably this might stand him in good stead in 400, with the expulsion of the Thirty still fresh in people's minds (And. 1.106–9, 141–43).

26. Ostwald 1986, 161–69.

A fifth argument tried by Andocides evokes the jury's pity and sympathy. The orator points out that if he is condemned to death, his family, "the οἰκία of Andocides and Leogoras," will come to an end (And. 1.146). Andocides notes that his father has died in the years since 415, and that he himself has no brothers or sons. He is thus in a sorry predicament, and the solution he proposes is to implicate the jurors in a shared, quasi-paternal relationship. "You, then," he says, "must be mine in place of a father [ἀντὶ πατρός] and in place of brothers [ἀντὶ ἀδελφῶν] and in place of sons [ἀντὶ παίδων]" (And. 1.149). It is a nice metaphor, perhaps calling to mind Andromache's statement to her husband Hector that, since she is an orphan, he must be her father and mother (*Il.* 6.429–30). Assuming the jurors understood the allusion, then it would have helped Andocides strengthen his appeal to their paternal instincts with a reference to literary tradition.[27]

To sum up, at the end of the fifth century in Athens, the father and related concepts (fatherland, patrimony, paternal, inherited, ancestral) were rich in symbolic and ideological connotations. The figure of the son who was disobedient or disloyal to his father was connected in the public mind with such negative images as oligarchs who were disloyal to Athens' ancestral constitution (πάτριος πολιτεία) and dissipated young aristocrats who treated the symbols of the Athenian δῆμος (for example, Herms or the Eleusinian Mysteries) with violence and arrogance (ὕβρις). Hence, the public perception in 400 that Andocides had not merely disobeyed but denounced his father Leogoras in 415 cast a dark shadow over his defense.

Andocides rose to the occasion, however, by denying the allegations that he had betrayed his father in 415. He counterattacks by portraying himself, in vivid details, as a good son who saved his father's life. He also describes himself as a good citizen who moved heaven and earth to defend his fatherland and to regain it from exile. Furthermore, he attacks his prosecutors as bad sons and irresponsible fathers. He recites the great deeds of his forefathers and asks the jury's sympathy for his current status as an orphan without any sons of his own. In short, Andocides transforms his image from that of an arrogant, lawless youth who had trampled on πατήρ and πάτριος πολιτεία alike to a sympathetic defender of democracy and his beloved father. Manipulative as these tactics may seem today, they were quite effective at the time.

27. For the allusion to *Iliad* see MacDowell 1962, ad loc. I translate παῖδες as "sons" rather than "children" because here the emphasis is on males and the continuity of the οἶκος.

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# Aristotelian Politeiai and *Athenaion Politeia* 4

Robert W. Wallace

## On the Interpolation of *Athenaion Politeia* 4

MOST SCHOLARS AGREE that the so-called Constitution of Draco in *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is a historical fabrication, of the πάτριος πολιτεία type, that has been interpolated into the text of this work. Despite occasional attempts to defend it, the historicity of this chapter must be discounted. In outline, the case for fabrication rests on the following points: a flourishing tradition of bogus πάτριος πολιτεία provisions in the fifth and fourth centuries (as in Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*); clear fifth- and fourth-century parallels for each of chapter 4's provisions; many obvious anachronisms, such as cash fines and the absence of any adequate means of preserving Draco's provisions once Solon had annulled them.[1] Questions

Few scholars have equaled the skill and wisdom of Martin Ostwald in analyzing the complex and inadequate sources for the early history of Athens. His work has been a constant inspiration. I am delighted to contribute in his honor this chapter on one fourth-century version of Athens' early politeiai. I am indebted to P. J. Rhodes for reading and commenting on a draft of this chapter. He continues to hold the orthodox view concerning the interpolation of *Ath. Pol.* 4.

1. See Ostwald 1986, 9 n. 22 ("the spurious Draconian constitution"); Figueira in chapter 21 of the present volume. Among the earliest and most thorough demonstrations of historical falseness is E. Meyer 1892, 1:236–39. Busolt and Swoboda (1920–26, 1:53 n. 2, with addenda, 630 c–d) list with brief descriptions those works before 1920 that accept the historicity of this chapter (note in particular Wilamowitz 1893, 1:71–98, whose acceptance was itself used as an argument for historicity by Seeck 1904, 306–7). This position has only rarely been adopted since then; cf. Rizzo 1963, judged not persuasive by Stroud (1968, 82 n. 70) and Rhodes (1981, 86); cf. also Cataudella 1966, 183–93. Develin (1984) is I think no more successful: After a page (297) of (in my view) unacceptable general arguments (e.g., "had the whole package [i.e., chap. 4] been an invention," it could hardly have "survived the scrutiny of historical tradition"; or, "as an invention the Drakontian constitution would be obviously unhistorical and unlikely to

of the circumstances of its fabrication are more complex, although most scholars now accept that the various provisions of chapter 4 reflect ideological and constitutional developments of both the late fifth and the fourth centuries.[2] Accordingly, this set of provisions as a whole was probably generated during the second half of the fourth century, as a part of the fourth-century revival of πάτριος πολιτεία ideology of which Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* is our first clear indication.[3] As Fuks pointed out ([1953] 1971, 95–96), after Solon was "democratized" in the fourth century, the "moderates" may have looked to the earlier history of Athens for their ideal *politeia*. It is possible that a politeia fabricated under political circumstances to be Athens' politeia "before Solon," was attributed to Draco only by a historian.

Five arguments have been advanced to support the hypothesis of interpolation, of which three may be considered subordinate.[4] First, it is argued that chapter 4 should be regarded as interpolated because some of the material in that chapter is poorly coordinated with other parts of the *Athenaion Politeia*. As Rhodes for example has pointed out, "there is no cross-reference between 3.vi and 4.ii on the appointment of magistrates, or between the very similar 3.vi and 4.iv on the Areopagus."[5] Furthermore, according to 4.2, "the politeia *had been* entrusted to those who bore arms," but no reference to a hoplite politeia occurs earlier in (extant sections of) the *Athenaion Politeia*.[6] This argument for interpolation is in itself inconclusive, for, although these observations are valid, it need not follow that poor coordination of this kind must be explained by the hypothesis of interpolation. Many other instances of poor coordination occur in sections of the *Athenaion Politeia* that are not suspected of interpolation. For example, in 8.2 it is stated

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recommend itself to the historical tradition of the *Ath. Pol.*"), Develin's method is to "pick and choose" (302), defending many points in chap. 4 as not historically impossible, while dismissing a number of details as modernizing. This method could of course be used to justify nearly anything. (On the question of preservation, Develin accepts transmission by memory [306–7].) I agree with Day and Chambers (1962, 199): Chap. 4 is full of "blatant historical absurdities." Develin's essay is a characteristic effort (cf. Develin 1979) to "save the phenomena" of Athens' early constitutional traditions.

2. See, e.g., Fuks [1953] 1971, 84–101; Dow 1953, 103–4; Ruschenbusch 1958, 421–22; Day and Chambers 1962, 198; Develin 1984, 297. Contrast Rhodes 1981, 87 ("invention in the late fifth and in the fourth century both seem possible") and Figueira in chapter 21 of this volume.

3. For this revival see R. W. Wallace 1989, 131–206, esp. 149–58.

4. Of the many recent scholars who have discussed this chapter, only von Fritz ([1954] 1976), with von Fritz and Kapp (1950), and Develin (1984) have argued against its interpolation. For earlier versions of this view see Bonner and Smith 1930–38, 1:145–48; Mathieu 1915, 112–13.

5. Rhodes 1981, 86; see also, e.g., Wilcken 1903, 85–98.

6. On the force of the pluperfect tense in ἀπεδέδοτο see the section "On *Athenaion Politeia* 4 as a Dracontian Politeia" below.

that "in ancient times" the Areopagus chose the annual magistrates, but this had not been mentioned in *Athenaion Politeia* 3.6 and 4.4, earlier discussions of the selection of magistrates.[7] Difficulties of this kind in chapter 4 might be explained if this chapter derives from an independent document that Aristotle has poorly integrated into his text.[8]

Second, in an analysis of ring composition in the *Athenaion Politeia*, J. J. Keaney has stated that chapter 4 "does not fit into the pattern of ring composition" demonstrated by chapters 2, 3, and 5.[9] Rhodes, who accepts Keaney's analysis of the general structure of these chapters (but believes that an original discussion of Draco's θεσμοί was replaced by the current chap. 4), objects to Keaney that the pattern of this section "can be developed in more than one way." (Admittedly, Rhodes does not describe a new pattern that incorporates chap. 4.) In any case, however, the *Athenaion Politeia* is a very imperfect product,[10] and it is again perfectly conceivable that Aristotle himself included in his text material that he accepted as historical but that he did not (or could not) successfully integrate into a particular literary scheme. Chapter 7.1 mentions that under Solon the Athenians ceased to use the θεσμοί of Draco except for those pertaining to homicide. We therefore might expect some earlier reference to these θεσμοί. Since a history of the Athenian politeia presumably had to include some mention of Draco, Aristotle may have been forced to work with the traditions available to him, regardless of how well they cohered with his broader plans.

Third, with the exception of a passage of the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (365d; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 2.1.2), no other reference to a constitution of Draco occurs in ancient literature, despite widespread use of the *Athenaion Politeia*. Three objections may be raised against this argument from silence—or near silence. As Mathieu (1915, 112) pointed out, *Athenaion Politeia* 4 could perfectly well be the source of the *Axiochus* passage. Also, if we discounted every ancient tradition attested by only one source, we would lose much of our detailed knowledge of Athenian constitutional history—knowledge, for

7. See further examples at Rhodes 1981, 43, 50, 118, 481.

8. I shall not discuss here the question of Aristotelian authorship of the *Athenaion Politeia*. For the purposes of this article, the consensus view, that this text was written in the 320s, in Athens, and in Aristotle's school, is sufficient.

9. See Keaney 1969, esp. 415–17; the quoted passage occurs on p. 415 n. 20.

10. After citing many different types of imperfections, Rhodes (1981, 50) summarizes: "*A.P.* is thus a very uneven work. There are passages where the sequence of thought has been very carefully worked out, where there are guiding phrases to help the reader to follow this sequence, and where attention has been given to such matters as the balance of the sentences and perhaps even the rhythm; but there are also passages that are inconsistent with one another, passages where the meaning is obscure, and a few passages which are grammatically incoherent." See further R. W. Wallace 1989, 43–46.

example, that the Thirty took down the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus concerning the Areopagus (*Ath. Pol.* 35.2). Finally, *Athenaion Politeia* 4 does not in fact attribute a constitution to Draco. Therefore, the absence of other ancient references to a politeia of Draco is entirely understandable.

Following from this, the fourth and most common argument for interpolation is based on a perceived contradiction between chapter 4 and other Aristotelian statements about Draco. By its own testimony *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is believed to describe a politeia of Draco,[11] but in *Politics* 1274b15–16, Aristotle says that Draco codified the laws under an existing politeia (Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσί, πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν), and in *Athenaion Politeia* 41.2, he is thought not to assign to Draco his own politeia in a list of Athens' eleven political μεταβολαί.[12] Theseus' is second, Draco's is given no number, and Solon's is third:

> δευτέρα δὲ καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην, ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν, ἡ ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἡ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ᾗ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον. τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο.
>
> [Second, and after this the first to have the form of a constitution, the change under Theseus, which deviated slightly from monarchy. Next, that under Draco, in which they also first wrote down laws. Third, that under Solon after the civil disturbances, the change which brought about the origin of democracy.]

A "constitution of Draco" in *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is thought to be inconsistent with these passages, and therefore to be interpolated.[13]

Fifth, the *Athenaion Politeia* also includes what are judged to be a number of awkward, patchwork phrases thought to have been inserted by the interpolator in order to cover his traces. These have been found at 3.1, where Aristotle proposes to describe "the order of the archaic politeia before Draco"; at 41.2, "bien gauche" (Mathieu 1915, 112), where Draco's politeia is cited in a numbered series but with no number; and at 7.3, where we are told that Solon divided the population into four groups by property qualifications, "as they had been divided before" (καθάπερ διῄρητο καὶ πρότερον). This may be a reference to 4.3, the only passage in the (extant)

11. See, e.g., von Fritz 1954, 81–83; Day and Chambers 1962, 198; Bordes 1980, 252; Develin 1984, 297; and (somewhat more ambiguously?) Rhodes 1981, 85–87.

12. In this list of changes it is unclear whether the implied substantive is μεταβολή or μετάστασις; it also makes little difference. See Rhodes 1981, 483.

13. See Rhodes 1981, 53–56, and the references he cites on p. 85.

text where such criteria are mentioned.[14] Three different circumstances for the interpolation of *Athenaion Politeia* 4 have been hypothesized. Either Aristotle himself discovered and inserted this material after issuing a first edition of his text[15] or the interpolation was made later, either by a Peripatetic[16] or by a political propagandist for Demetrius of Phalerum.[17]

The case for interpolation thus rests primarily on what are believed to be both inconsistent and patchwork statements within the *Athenaion Politeia* and on an inconsistency between the *Athenaion Politeia* and the *Politics*. Chapter 4 is only one of a large number of passages in the *Athenaion Politeia* that have at one time or another been suspected of textual interpolation. These include chapters 3, 8.1, 8.3, 8.4, 10, 13.1–2, 15.2, 18.1–2, 22.5, 25.3–4, 27.4, 46.1, 51.3, 54.7, and 61.7.[18] So large a number of suspected interpolations must raise the question of whether these difficult passages should be explained not by the hypothesis of interpolation but as the result of careless and uneven composition by Aristotle. In particular the insertion of a supposed "constitution of Draco," with elaborate camouflage (in the "harmonizing" passages), seems problematic in a work of purely historical and scholarly significance. What would be the purpose or intended effect of such an insertion? What goal could the interpolator hope to achieve by his effort? Whatever view is taken of the other problematic passages in this text, I argue that the so-called patchwork statements pertaining to chapter 4 imply on the contrary that this chapter is integral to the *Athenaion Politeia*. I also argue that this chapter does not purport to describe a distinct politeia of Draco; it therefore does not contradict Aristotle's view in the *Politics* that Draco did not establish a new politeia; and in any case, disagreements between the *Athenaion Politeia* and the *Politics* need not be significant. If these arguments can be supported, no good reason remains for doubting that, despite its awkwardnesses, chapter 4 was an original component of the *Athenaion Politeia*.

14. See Rhodes 1981, 86: "the evidence of patchwork at any rate in 3.i and 41.ii [Rhodes is less certain about 7.3]...makes it clear that the 'constitution' is in some sense an insertion in the text of *A.P.*" (cf. 5 n. 21, 45–46, 53, 85, 97, 137, 484–85). So also Day and Chambers (1962, 198); Jacoby (1949, 385 n. 51); and many others. All three passages are bracketed in the edition of Blass and Thalheim.

15. See Weil 1960, 108, 110; Ruschenbusch 1958, 421–22; cf. Seeck 1904, 271–74; Jacoby 1949, 94, 385 n. 51 (Aristotle may have borrowed this material from Demetrius of Phalerum); Bonner and Smith 1930, 134–48. Cf. Day and Chambers (1962, 198) and Rhodes (1981, 53), both admitting alternatives.

16. See Wilcken 1903, 97; cf. Rhodes 1981, 87 ("a deliberate revision made presumably in the Aristotelian school").

17. See Stecchini 1950, 101–2, discredited by von Fritz 1954, 76, 92 n. 16; cf. Dow 1953, 103–4. See also Seeck 1904; Jacoby 1949.

18. See Rhodes 1981, 53–57; Mathieu 1915, ii, 70.

We may first consider the question raised by the alleged discrepancy between *Athenaion Politeia* 4 (and 41.2) and the *Politics*. That is, if *Politics* 1274b15–16 states that Draco did not establish a new politeia, and (by contrast) *Athenaion Politeia* 4 and 41.2 state that he did, a contradiction of this sort might be thought to justify the assumption of interpolation. But this can be discounted. In *Athenaion Politeia* 41.2, Aristotle gives a list of Athens' eleven "changes." These are not necessarily changes of politeia (i.e., μεταβολαὶ πολιτείας). That phrase is not used, and for two reasons it is clear that Aristotle did not intend it to be understood. First, according to 41.2, while Ion's μετάστασις was the first μεταβολή, Theseus' μεταβολή was "the first to have the form of a politeia" (πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν).[19] Second, many of the μεταβολαί in this list did not involve any change of politeia (as opposed to change within the politeia), as for example in the διοικήσεις of Peisistratus and the Areopagus Council.[20] Therefore, when Aristotle mentions "after Theseus' [μεταβολή] that [μεταβολή] under Draco, in which they first wrote down laws," this neither asserts nor denies that Draco's μεταβολή involved a new politeia. Therefore, whether or not *Athenaion Politeia* 4 describes a politeia of Draco, chapter 41.2 need not contradict it. In this respect, therefore, 41.2 constitutes no basis for supposing that chapter 4 is interpolated.

The second part of this argument for interpolation is based on a possible contradiction between *Athenaion Politeia* 4 (if it claims to be a politeia of Draco) and *Politics* 1274b15–16, which claims that Draco codified the laws under the existing politeia. In any case this argument must be inadequate. For even if *Athenaion Politeia* 4 does describe a *politeia* of Draco, the *Politics* and the *Athenaion Politeia* are elsewhere contradictory, and a contradiction here would not prove interpolation.[21] Aristotle could have changed his mind or found new evidence.

Finally, we may consider the so-called patchwork or harmonizing phrases, which many scholars have seen as an effort by the interpolator to disguise his textual chicanery. By contrast, proponents of the integrity of chapter 4 contend that these phrases represent Aristotle's own attempts to incorporate chapter 4 within his text. First, in 3.1 Aristotle proposes to describe "the order of the archaic politeia before Draco" (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος). This phrase is picked up in 4.1: "that

19. The Greek text here is not quite certain, but the text as printed is standard; see Rhodes 1981, 484. In Aristotle's view (*Pol.* 1286b11–13, 1287a1–9), under certain circumstances monarchy is not a politeia.

20. See the discussion in n. 36 (with text) below.

21. On the question of allotted or elective magistracies in Solon's politeia, see most famously *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, as opposed to *Pol.* 1273b35–1274a3, 1274a16–17, 1281b25–34.

is the outline of the first politeia" after which came Draco's θεσμοί. These two comments need contain nothing irregular. They each presuppose a subsequent presentation of Draco's provisions, which is then provided. Second, in 7.3 we are told that Solon divided the population into four groups by property qualifications, "as they had been divided before" (καθάπερ διῄρητο καὶ πρότερον). However, even if this last phrase does refer to 4.3 (the only passage in the [extant] text where such criteria are mentioned), a cross-reference of this type need not presuppose interpolation. On the contrary, since this cross-reference (if it is such) is neither very obvious nor especially needed in order to integrate chapter 4, we might perfectly well attribute it to Aristotle. Third, in 41.2 Aristotle mentions the "[change] under Draco" (ἡ [sc. μεταβολὴ] ἡ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος) paralleling in historical order the account in chapter 4. Two arguments may be raised at once against the hypothesis that this is a harmonizing phrase by an interpolator. First, as von Fritz says, if the interpolator of chapter 4 had taken such pains to cover his traces even within 41.2 itself, why did he not simply alter the numbering of μεταβολαί in 41.2 in order to bring the text into line?[22] Second, as Develin observes (1984, 300), the report linked with Draco in 41.2 that the Athenians then for the first time wrote down laws does not in fact reflect the contents of chapter 4 and thus would be a poor means of concealing its interpolation.[23] To be sure, 41.2 does not give Draco's change a number in the series of changes there recorded and numbered. Conceivably the text of 41.2 itself might yield an explanation for this, that the preceding reference to Theseus' change as the "first to have the order of a politeia" confused the author's count. As various scholars have pointed out, the exposition in this passage is in any case confused, with the eleven implied substantives shifting unpredictably from μεταβολή (or μετάστασις) to πολιτεία.[24] Futhermore the proponents of interpolation cannot disprove the possibility that only the mention of Draco in 41.2—and not the report of his measures in chapter 4—was interpolated, perhaps by someone who believed that some reference ought to be made in the summary (in 41) to the lengthy description of Draco's measures recorded in *Athenaion Politeia* 4. Alternatively, we may ask whether Draco's measures, although important enough to be mentioned, were in some way different from the other changes in this list. All of the numbered μεταβολαί in 41.2 seem to involve a shift in the body that actually

22. Von Fritz 1954, 76–78; see also Develin 1984, 299. On this basis Weil (1960, 108) argued that the interpolator must have been Aristotle.

23. This point had earlier been made by Headlam 1891, 167.

24. See Rhodes 1981, 485–98 (with his summation on 487–88); Day and Chambers 1962, 66 n. 2.

exercises power (thus Solon's democracy, Peisistratus' tyranny, Cleisthenes' democracy, the Areopagus as ἐπιστάτης after 479, the Four Hundred, and so forth).[25] This was not true of Draco's τάξις, where the hoplite assembly retained its control of government.

Thus none of these "harmonizing" phrases requires the hypothesis of interpolation, and positive reasons may be adduced against any such purpose. Accordingly, none of the arguments for the interpolation of *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is supported. There is therefore no reason not to accept this chapter as an awkward but integral component of the *Athenaion Politeia.*

## On *Athenaion Politeia* 4 as a Dracontian Politeia

With the notable exception of von Fritz and Kapp, most scholars believe that *Athenaion Politeia* 4 describes a distinct politeia of Draco.[26] Von Fritz and Kapp contend that chapters 3 and 4 are "two different sketches of the same constitution, one from a more evolutionary, the other from a more stationary, point of view."[27] Draco is mentioned not as the creator of a politeia but only as "the most representative figure of the period, during the strictly oligarchic or aristocratic regime which developed after the abolition of the monarchy and continued until the archonship of Solon."

Von Fritz and Kapp argue that chapter 3 records only the stages by which the nine archons and the powers of the Areopagus came into being, while chapter 4 describes in detail the qualifications of Athens' various magistracies, and the Areopagus' competence is rephrased to correspond to Draco's major innovation, a written code of law:

> [A] careful reading...reveals that Chapter 4 contains absolutely nothing that represents a definite innovation in comparison with the latest stage of the development described in the preceding chapter. It simply repeats in slightly different words what had been said about the functions and power of the Areopagus, and gives additional information concerning the mode of election of the leading magistrates of the city, a question that had not been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter.

In 4.2 Aristotle writes that "the politeia had been entrusted [ἀπεδέδοτο]" to the hoplites. Von Fritz and Kapp argue that this shows continuity of politeia

25. For Theseus' μεταβολή see the section "The First Politeia" below.

26. See, e.g., Drerup 1941, 2 and the references in n. 36 below.

27. See von Fritz and Kapp 1950, 8–11 (from which the quotations are taken); see also von Fritz 1954, 81–86. Similar arguments were made by P. Meyer (1891, 35–42) and Blass (1895, 476–79).

with 3. Only one component of the government described in chapter 4 is not mentioned previously, the council of 401. But even this (they contend) may not have been an innovation. In any case, even if some of the measures reported in chapter 4 were introduced by Draco, these were insufficient to constitute a new politeia. Therefore (they conclude) *Athenaion Politeia* 4 does not contradict *Politics* 1274b15–16; Draco did not establish a new politeia.

Despite the many brilliant observations of von Fritz and Kapp on *Athenaion Politeia* 3–4, the two main difficulties in their thesis are clear.[28] First, 4.1 states that the τάξις in 4 was Draco's:[29] Both τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος (3.1) and μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (4.1), whatever the precise reference of ταῦτα, nonetheless imply a temporal progression, so the material reported in 4 is later than that in 3; and chapter 4 begins "the first politeia had this (i.e., the preceding) general nature," and then proceeds to Draco's τάξις. Second, if the measures recorded in 4 are not assigned to Draco, when in fact did they originate, and why does Aristotle not mention them in their proper place? Von Fritz and Kapp suggest that Aristotle, having described the "first politeia" in 3, later added an elaboration of it in 4 but overlooked his own summation of 3 at 4.1 because he failed to revise his text for publication. This argument is unsatisfactory in light of Aristotle's express statements of chronological development between chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, we must reject the idea that chapters 3 and 4 describe the same politeia (except for a change in the Areopagus' competence), of which Draco is merely the representative.

Yet if the arguments of von Fritz and Kapp for the relationship of chapters 3 and 4 must be rejected, we may nonetheless repeat the question they raise, whether the constitutional provisions in chapter 4 constitute for Aristotle a new politeia. We may observe that the politeia in chapter 3, which is expressly described (3.1, 4.1) as a (single) politeia, is evolutionary in nature, and that Aristotle's description of that politeia is also incomplete. So, too, the pluperfect ἀπεδέδοτο is consistent with the view that Draco had not changed fundamental aspects of the politeia. Although Richards (1891, 467) followed by Rhodes (1981, 112) suggested that the pluperfect might be used of a Dracotian measure that preceded and formed the basis of his other reforms, most scholars have accepted the prima facie meaning of this tense,

28. For the first of these see Weil 1960, 106 n. 67; cf. the criticisms—not decisive—of Rizzo (1963, 273–81) and Develin (1984, 296, 298–99). Rhodes (1981, 86) remarks simply that the hypothesis of von Fritz and Kapp "cannot be right."

29. On the text of 4.1 see Chambers 1965, 32–33, which shows (with a photograph) that the papyrus in fact reads ἡ τάξις αὐτοῦ (a reading earlier hypothesized by Wilcken), rather than Kenyon's αὐτῆς.

that a hoplite politeia had been enacted before Draco's legislation. Thus Bonner and Smith state (1930, 139), "this is the only possible meaning if the pluperfect...of the manuscript is retained."[30] Furthermore, Develin observes (1984, 300) that when Aristotle reports, for example, the constitution of Solon, he does so in direct-action statements: Solon "set up a constitution" (πολιτείαν κατέστησε, 7.1), Solon "divided [the population] into four classes" (διεῖλεν εἰς τέτταρα τέλη, 7.3), Solon "made the archonships allotted" (τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε κληρωτάς, 8.1). This is also true of Cleisthenes: συνένειμε πάντας, τὴν βουλὴν κατέστησεν, διένειμε τὴν χώραν (21). The measures in chapter 4, however, are reported uniformly in the passive voice. Aristotle does not say that Draco *established* a popular council or *established* the hipparchs and generals. Their existence is presupposed (as it were) in the regulations that are devised for them.[31] This is inconsistent with Aristotle's practice when introducing a new politeia.[32]

Even beyond these arguments, however, the text itself indicates that Aristotle regarded Draco's reforms merely as a stage within a politeia, and not as a new politeia in their own right. After describing the evolution of the archonship and the Areopagus' early powers, he remarks (4.1): "Then Draco codified the θεσμοί, and his τάξις was as follows." Is τάξις synonymous with πολιτεία? In no case where a new politeia is recorded elsewhere in the *Athenaion Politeia* does Aristotle call it a τάξις. Furthermore, in 5.1, Draco's θεσμοί are expressly called not a politeia but, again, "an ordering within the politeia," a τάξις ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. The view that Aristotle saw Draco's reforms as merely a stage within the politeia is further supported by the three observations made in the preceding paragraph about *Athenaion Politeia* 3–4: Aristotle can accept the notion of evolution within a politeia; the phrasing used to report Draco's measures is not that used to report new politeiai; and the pluperfect ἀπεδέδοτο suggests that Draco did not alter fundamental aspects of the existing politeia. Thus when Aristotle states (3.1) that chapter 3 describes the "τάξις of the archaic politeia before Draco" he means that it represented an earlier τάξις—which itself was also evolutionary—in a politeia that later developed under Draco. This point is made perfectly explicit in 5.1. And when he states (4.1) that *Athenaion Politeia* 3 represents the first politeia after which came Draco's τάξις, his phrasing at 3.1

30. Because the hoplite franchise is not mentioned in chap. 3, Kenyon had emended with the imperfect ἀπεδίδοτο.

31. A similar point is made by P. Meyer (1891, 37).

32. Busolt (1893–1904, 2.2:37 n. 1) pointed out, however, that the politeiai reported in *Ath. Pol.* 30–31 display a similar type of syntactic presentation. In chap. 4, therefore, the *Athenaion Politeia* might simply be reproducing the style of its source.

and 5.1 shows that this does not imply that *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is itself a distinct politeia. This chapter simply describes Athens' subsequent legal and governmental developments once the essential elements of the politeia were fixed.

## Aristotelian Politeiai

The hypothesis developed in the preceding two sections of this study, which is consistent with the position on Draco that Aristotle expressed in the *Politics*, raises the question "What were the essential components of a politeia for Aristotle?" For if all the measures recorded in *Athenaion Politeia* 4 are assigned to Draco (or at any rate to a period later than that of chap. 3), why should Aristotle not have thought that these sufficed to constitute a new and distinct politeia? To answer this question we must determine what Aristotle thought were the essential components of a politeia. Not every constitutional change initiates a new politeia. What then distinguishes one politeia from another, and on what conditions is a particular politeia said to change to another type?

In the *Politics*, Aristotle uses three criteria to distinguish politeiai: the identity of the sovereign civic body (*πολίτευμα*),[33] the criteria for appointing magistrates, and the end or goal of the society:

> *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.* (1289a15–18)
>
> [For a politeia is an arrangement of the magistracies in the state as to how they are to be distributed, and of what is sovereign in the politeia, and of the end that each community aims at realizing.]

Of these the crucial element is the identity of the *politeuma*. At the beginning of his discussion of politeiai he writes:

> *ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία.* (1278b8–11; see also 1279a25–26)

33. On the meaning of *πολίτευμα* see Bordes 1982, 450–51; cf. Ruppel 1927. On the term *sovereign* in translating Aristotle see Mulgan 1970.

> [A politeia is an ordering of a city both in respect of its other powers[34] and especially of that power that is sovereign in all issues. For the sovereign civic body is everywhere the sovereign of the city, and the sovereign civic body is the politeia.]

Thus, the identity of the *politeuma* is the most important factor in determining the type of politeia. Of course each politeia has other components: different magistracies, with different lengths of tenure and methods of appointment, and so forth. These are classified in accordance with particular types of politeia. However, they do not in themselves determine the type of politeia, of which they are in essence incidental features.

Aristotle's six types of politeia are hypothesized on the basis of these criteria:

> ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. (1279a25–31)

> [Since the term πολιτεία signifies the same thing as the term πολίτευμα ("sovereign civic body"), and since the sovereign civic body is the sovereign in every city, the sovereign must necessarily be either one, or few, or many; when the one, or the few, or the many, rule with a view to the common interest, the politeiai under which they do so must necessarily be right politeiai. On the other hand the politeiai directed to the personal interests of the one, or the few, or the masses, must necessarily be perversions.]

The good politeiai are kingship, aristocracy, and what Aristotle terms "polity"; the "perversions" are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The essential characteristic of kingship and tyranny is a sovereign civic body of one person, governing either in the common interest (kingship, 1279a32–34) or in his own (tyranny, 1299b6–7). Aristocracy is characterized by a *politeuma* of οἱ ἄριστοι, determined by merit (ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετήν, 1293b1–7); the government is elected κατ' ἀρετήν, ἐκ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων, to work for the common good (1279c34–38, 1294a9–11, 1299b24–25). Oligarchy requires a *politeuma* of οἱ πλούσιοι; wealth is the criterion for

34. On this translation of ἀρχή see Mulgan 1970, 518–19.

office, and the rich govern in their own interests (1279b7–8, 1279b17–18, 1290b1–7). In democracy κύριος ὁ δῆμος, the people form the *politeuma* and govern in the interests of the poor. Free birth is a prerequisite for participation in the council, courts, and assembly; a property qualification may be set for some offices (1278b11–12, 1279b8–9, 1290b1, 1291b39–41). Aristotle pairs with democracy "polity," which is government of τὸ πλῆθος directed to the common good, and in which magistrates are chosen in accordance with moral worth (1279a37–39, 1288a12–15). These descriptions are closely paralleled in Aristotle's summary of the six different types of constitution in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1160a31–1160b21).

Several scholars have established that in a number of significant respects the *Athenaion Politeia* describes the development of Athens' constitution in a manner consistent with the general analyses formulated in the *Politics*.[35] Does the *Athenaion Politeia* adhere to the criteria for distinguishing politeiai that are adopted in the *Politics*? Only once, in *Athenaion Politeia* 3, does Aristotle mention the criteria for electing magistrates, and nowhere in the *Athenaion Politeia* does he mention the τέλος of the politeia. However, at every point he does establish the identity of the sovereign civic body, and in this his usage is consistent and conforms to the *Politics*.

Whenever the *politeuma*, the sovereign citizen body, changes, the politeia is said to change. Furthermore, at no other point in the *Athenaion Politeia*, when constitutional changes occur other than in the sovereign civic body, are these changes said to have effected a new politeia. The politeia has merely evolved, as for example we have seen in the "sketch of the first politeia" in chapter 3. This distinction has not always been correctly understood. Day and Chambers, for example, variously call the developments of Athenian democracy between 594 and 411 changes in type of politeia, or changes within a politeia, changes into different forms of democracy.[36] Bordes writes (1980, 252): "From the moment when an institutional change occurs that he thinks important, Aristotle speaks of a change of politeia."

In the *Politics* Aristotle is clear: There are four εἴδη δημοκρατίας, four forms of democratic politeia (1291b15–28, 1292b22–1293a10, 1318b6–1320b17). In the *Athenaion Politeia* Solon "established a politeia" (πολιτείαν κατέστησε, 7.1) in which the δῆμος was κύριος (9.1). All Athenian citizens, of

35. See especially Day and Chambers 1962; Keaney 1963; Blank 1984, 275–84.

36. Contrast Day and Chambers 1962, 68–69 ("'Areopagite' domination...was regarded by Aristotle as a new constitution") with their statement that this government "will also have been democratic, for the Cleisthenic constitution was not formally revised or suspended" (p. 67); for another formulation, see pp. 120–21. Jacoby (1949, 388 n. 62) takes Aristotle to task for regarding the tyranny, the predominance of the Areopagus, and so forth, as distinct politeiai (see also von Fritz 1954, 81–88). As far as I have noted, Rhodes (1981) does not discuss this issue (but cf. Rhodes 1981, 488: "changes of constitution").

whatever economic status, could now take part in the ἐκκλησία and δικαστήρια. This was the ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας (41.2) and a μεταβολὴ τῆς πολιτείας (13.3). The *Athenaion Politeia* reports no new politeiai between Solon and 411, even though there were four μεταβολαί (41.2) and other important legal and constitutional innovations and, for two extended periods, the city was not "managed" (διοικεῖν) by the δῆμος. Peisistratus' regime is called a tyranny (15.3, cf. 16.1), but (as Day and Chambers [1962, 93–97] recognize) in the view of the *Athenaion Politeia*, just as in Herodotus (1.59) and Thucydides (6.54), the politeia itself did not formally change. Peisistratus "managed" the city "more like a citizen than like a tyrant" (πολιτικῶς μάλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς, 14.3, 16.2). Cleisthenes, too, did not establish a new politeia. As a result of his constitutional reforms, δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία (22.1); this was a new εἶδος δημοκρατίας, not a new type of politeia. Just so, neither the transition from election to lot in 487/6 nor the μεταβολή after 480 is said to have involved a μεταβολὴ τῆς πολιτείας. In the *Athenaion Politeia*, just as Peisistratus διῴκει civic affairs and undertook ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τῶν κοινῶν πάντων (15.5), so the Areopagus διῴκει τὴν πόλιν, οὐδενὶ δόγματι λαβοῦσα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (23.1) and exercised an ἐπιμελεία (26.1). Indeed, the Areopagus' competence included ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή (25.2). Ephialtes (δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, 25.1) is not said to have effected a new politeia; he merely "took away all of the ἐπίθετα by which the Areopagus guarded the politeia" (25.2), with the result that "the politeia was further weakened by zealous demagogues" (26.1; cf. 28.1), and the state was not "managed" as before: "So long as Pericles was the leader of the δῆμος, matters κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν were better, but when he died, they became much worse" (28.1).

Throughout the period from Solon to 411, no politeia is said to have been either abolished or established. Athens had the same democratic politeia undergoing evolution toward tyranny, oligarchy, or greater democracy. By contrast, in 411 the politeia was changed. The Athenians were forced to "set up the politeia of the Four Hundred" (καταστῆσαι τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν, 29.1), an ὀλιγαρχία (32.2). The major innovation of this politeia concerned the sovereign civic body. De jure, "the politeia was to be entrusted to those of the Athenians who were most capable of serving the state with their persons and their property, to the number of not less than five thousand"; de facto, it was given over to the Four Hundred (29.5, 31.1). This politeia was replaced by that of the Five Thousand, characterized in the *Athenaion Politeia* only by a hoplite citizen body (33.1) and the absence of pay for public office. This in turn was quickly abolished by the δῆμος. Similarly, six years later the δῆμος overthrew the

δυναστεία (36.1) of the Thirty and "set up the present politeia" (ἐνεστήσατο τὴν οὖσαν πολιτείαν) in which the people themselves "took control of the politeia" (λαβεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν, 41.1).

Thus according to the *Athenaion Politeia*, for nearly two hundred years down to 411, Athens had the same type of politeia, followed by a rapid series of changes. The *Athenaion Politeia*'s presentation establishes a clear principle: The *politeuma* is the central factor in determining the identity of the politeia. If the former does not change, no other change effects a change of politeia—not in the method of electing magistrates (22.5), in the number of citizens (21.2), or in the criteria for citizenship (26.3).

## The Politeia in *Athenaion Politeia* 3–4

Since the *Athenaion Politeia* consistently distinguishes Athens' politeiai according to the nature of the sovereign civic body, this element can serve to establish whether or not Aristotle regarded the governments described in *Athenaion Politeia* 3 and 4 as distinct politeiai. In *Athenaion Politeia* 3 we are told that the magistrates were elected, although not by whom. The *politeuma* is not identified (as it may have been in the lost beginning of the *Athenaion Politeia*). Despite this omission, however, two other passages indicate that the sovereign civic body in chapter 3 was either identical with, or at least of the same type as, the *politeuma* after Draco.

First, in 4.2 Aristotle says that the politeia "had been entrusted" to the hoplite class. Although certain scholars have questioned the force of this pluperfect, prima facie it shows that in Aristotle's opinion Draco did not change the *politeuma*. Therefore he did not initiate a new politeia. In my opinion, this otherwise puzzling pluperfect was intended precisely to show that Draco did not change the politeia (as in the *Politics* Aristotle believed he did not), since the sovereign civic body is the determining component of each politeia-type.

Second, in 2.2 Aristotle says that after Cylon (and before Solon) the politeia was ὀλιγαρχική, in the hands of the wealthy. In Aristotelian terms this is consistent with a hoplite politeia, as in chapter 4. In an oligarchy, Aristotle writes, "the politeia should be reserved for those who carry arms"; "the earliest politeia (after the kingships) among the Greeks was in fact composed of warriors"; and "the politeiai of those early times [i.e., before states became larger and were called democracies] were, quite understandably, oligarchic or monarchic" (*Pol.* 1297b1–26). According to *Politics* 1321a12–13, "oligarchy will flourish when the territory is suitable for heavy infantry." In Aristotle's view an oligarchy may be very large provided that

participation is limited by wealth. In a hypothetical case that he provides in the *Politics* (1290a32–37),

> Oligarchy cannot be simply defined as a form in which a few persons have sovereign control of the politeia. If there were a total population of 1300, and of these 1000 are wealthy and assign no share in power to the remaining 300 poor, although they are men of free birth and their peers in other respects, nobody would say that here there is a democracy.

So, even if we disregard the force of Aristotle's pluperfect and suppose that a hoplite sovereign body was established with Draco's *θεσμοί*, before this the sovereign civic body can only have been "the few." Solon's government was the *ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας* (41.2), and chapter 3 shows that long before Draco, the monarchy had been abolished.

## The First Politeia

One related problem remains to be considered. According to *Athenaion Politeia* 41.2, Theseus' *μεταβολή* was the first to have the *τάξις* of a politeia. *Athenaion Politeia* 3 is expressly (4.1, 3.1) a description of the *τάξις* of the first politeia. Therefore, if the *Athenaion Politeia* is to be consistent, in its essential components the politeia in chapter 3 should be that of Theseus. Various scholars have denied this. In their view Theseus' constitution is a "restricted monarchy,"[37] while the constitution before Solon is labeled an oligarchy (2.2).

Although the description of Theseus' politeia originally in the *Athenaion Politeia* does not survive, Plutarch, Heraclides' epitome, and *Athenaion Politeia* 41.2 supply some evidence for it. According to *Athenaion Politeia* 41.2, Theseus' politeia was "a slight deviation from monarchy" (*μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς*)—this is the basis of von Fritz's "restricted monarchy." Plutarch (*Thes.* 25.3) writes that Theseus "first inclined to the mob, as Aristotle says, and gave up monarchic power" (*πρῶτος ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, καὶ ἀφῆκε τὸ μοναρχεῖν*). It is uncertain whether the last clause of this text is also from Aristotle. Rhodes remarks, "what was involved in Theseus' inclination to

37. The phrase is that of von Fritz (von Fritz and Kapp 1950, 10); for other skeptics see Weil 1960, 109; Rhodes 1981, 108–9 (who suggests that the politeia in chap. 3 may be called "first" because this was "the first point at which *A.P.* has given an outline of the *πολιτεία*"). Cf. also Isocrates 12.148 and Pausanias 1.3.3, which maintain that Athens had a single government from Theseus until the time of Solon and Peisistratus.

the ὄχλος is not clear" (1981, 75). Finally, Heraclides in his epitome says that "Theseus made a proclamation and reconciled them on level and equal terms" (Θησεὺς δὲ ἐκήρυξε καὶ συνεβίβασε τούτους ἐπ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ μοίρᾳ). Although in Heraclides the antecedent of τούτους is the sons of Pandion, presumably Aristotle intended his remarks to refer to the Athenians generally.

None of these three texts identifies the sovereign. Following this passage, however, Heraclides records: "Beginning with the Codridae, kings were no longer elected, because they appeared to have become effeminate and weak" (ἀπὸ δὲ Κοδριδῶν οὐκέτι βασιλεῖς ᾑροῦντο διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τρυφᾶν καὶ μαλακοὺς γεγονέναι). The meaning of this is not immediately clear, since βασιλεῖς were elected at Athens down to 487. But again presumably, as Rhodes observes (1981, 66, 77–78), this passage refers to what Aristotle later mentions in *Athenaion Politeia* 3.3, that the Codridae gave up the kingship in return for the (life) archonship. At the time of the Codridae, then, the archon replaced the βασιλεύς as the chief authority in Athenian government.

Heraclides' text, I believe, points the way to a solution to our problem. That is, according to the *Athenaion Politeia* as Heraclides reports it, before the Codridae Athens' βασιλεῖς had been elected. Details of the transition, from an original office (ἀρχή) of elected king, through the addition of a *polemarch*, to the replacement of the elected king by an elected archon under Medon or Acastus, are provided in *Athenaion Politeia* 3, under the first politeia. Therefore, it is implicit in the reconstruction given in the *Athenaion Politeia* that within the first politeia, long before the Codridae surrendered the kingship for the life archonship, the king had been replaced as sovereign by the *politeuma*, the sovereign civic body, which elected him.

This is consistent with the view that Theseus replaced the inherited kingship with an elected kingship, a "slight deviation" from kingship (41.2), in which Athens still had as its chief authority a king who ruled for life and came from a single family, but who was now elected. Who, according to Aristotle, elected him? The view that the δῆμος did so cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's own statements that Theseus' government was only a "slight deviation" from monarchy and that Solon's politeia was the "beginning of democracy" (ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας). There is no sign in Aristotle of the tradition of a fully democratic Theseus.[38] Since *Athenaion Politeia* 3.1, 4.1, and 41.2 assert that Athens had a single politeia between Theseus and Solon, and since *Athenaion Politeia* 2.2 says that Athenian government before Solon was oligarchic, we must suppose that the *politeuma* was some restricted

38. For this tradition see the sources cited in Rhodes 1981, 74.

group of wealthy citizens. Therefore, *Athenaion Politeia* 3 can indeed be a (partial) description of Athens' constitutional development within a single politeia from Theseus to Solon. Since during this period there was no change in the type of *politeuma*, according to Aristotle there was no change in politeia.

Finally, in Aristotle's opinion, did Theseus establish a hoplite census, as we find in *Athenaion Politeia* 4? Even though he states in the *Politics* that throughout Greece monarchies were replaced by hoplite governments, this conclusion is not required by the hypothesis that Athens had a single politeia from Theseus to Solon. The nature of the electorate may change within a single politeia provided it remains either one, the few, or the many. In the *Politics* (1297b16–22), Aristotle is also aware that the hoplites emerged as a social force rather late in archaic Greece. It is probably best to assume that for Aristotle, in spite of Theseus' popularizing efforts, they did so at Athens as well. It is possible that the first reference to them in the *Athenaion Politeia* occurred at 4.2.

21

# The Strange Death of Draco on Aegina

Thomas J. Figueira

A CURIOUS ANECDOTE describes the death of the seventh-century Athenian statesman Draco on the island of Aegina. The story has not received much attention. Its oddity and apparent triviality seem to condemn it as a source for archaic political history. This story, however, is significant for its indications both about fifth-century Athenian and Aeginetan policies toward each other and about their attitudes toward their troubled past relations.[1] Consequently, at Athens or on Aegina, what one chose to believe about the biography of Draco could expose one's stance toward Athens' foreign and domestic policies. Moreover, even a tendentious account of archaic history (such as this one) must strive to satisfy an audience immersed in historical traditions, whose knowledge demands our respect for its awareness about the general contours of the archaic intercommunal landscape. For us, accordingly, a recovery of the context for fabricating pseudohistory can sometimes share the value of a discovery or a validation of genuine recollections. While there was undoubtedly some true recollection of Draco, the material on the statesman bears the strong impression of historical reconstruction, which was pervaded by both partisan and moralizing influences.[2]

The *Suda* reports the anecdote under the rubric Δράκων, Ἀθηναῖος νομοθέτης (δ 1495 Adler) and tells us of a journey Draco took to Aegina for the purpose of legislation, which ended in the statesman's suffocation at the hands of his overardent Aeginetan admirers. This notice contains the only

It gives me great pleasure to dedicate this chapter to Martin Ostwald, whose maieutic art guided this author's gestation as a student of the Athenian constitution, and whose many acts of generous support sustained my work on Aeginetan matters.

1. Cf. Figueira 1985.
2. Against Draco's historicity see Beloch 1912, 1:2.258–62. Cf., in general, Adcock 1927.

strictly biographical data on Draco and stands as a substantial item in the thin dossier on his political activity. Draco's abortive legislation and death on Aegina dominate the notice, and these aspects of the story are more prominently featured than his accomplished legislation at Athens. Before we can assess Draco's misadventure on Aegina, however, it is necessary to embark on a survey of Athenian traditions on this statesman.

## The Place of Draco in Athenian Political Tradition

Draco cuts a rather poor figure among the attestations, when these are compared with the wealth of material on Solon. Most references are incidental and conventional and fall into two categories: the "Draco and Solon" category and the "not Draco but Solon" category.[3] It was possible to invoke Draco to symbolize early Athenian institutional traditions, just as the whole law code could be characterized as the "laws of Solon." This class of attestations might be termed the "Draco and Solon" category. Our earliest citation is Cratinus' linking the two men as a source for Athenian law (fr. 300 KA; cf. Plut. *Sol.* 25.2 Flacelière): *πρὸς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ Δράκοντος οἷσι νῦν φρύγουσιν ἤδη τὰς κάχρυς τοῖς κύρβεσιν*. Andocides gives a similar formulation in his description of the recodification of the laws after the democratic restoration: *τέως δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς* (1.81; cf. 82: *τῶν νόμων τῶν τε Σόλωνος καὶ τῶν Δράκοντος*). Moreover, such formulations mirror topical constitutional language, as shown by Andocides' citation of the psephism of Teisamenus directing codification: *πολιτεύεσθαι Ἀθηναίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος...χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς, οἷσπερ ἐχρώμεθα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ* (83).

Crediting Draco alongside Solon for his legislation becomes conventional hereafter. Aeschines, speaking of Solon's and Draco's concern for *σωφροσύνη*, notes that they prescribed rules for the upbringing of children and adolescents (*Tim.* [1] 6). Xenophon, commending the utility of his legislation on slaves, provides a similar pairing (*Oec.* 14.4). More general reflections are also not lacking. Demosthenes praises the two statesmen for the legal heritage of the Athenians (24.211). Later Lucian echoes this type of reference when he calls Draco and Solon the best of legislators and attributes to them the principles of equity found in the Attic *δικαστήρια* (*Cal.* 8). Rhetorical passages of late antiquity are replete with such linkages (e.g. [Lucian] *Dem. Enc.* 45; Him. *Or.* 1.59 Colonna; Them. *Or.* 2.31b). The steady influence of such passages served to establish Draco's place among

3. Note Schlesinger 1924.

later catalogs of early lawgivers, after Aristotle's somewhat minimizing inclusion of him in the *Politics* (esp. 1274b15–18; cf., e.g., Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.16.79–80; D.Chr. 80.3; Them. *Or.* 2.31b; Cic. *De orat.* 1.197). In Josephus' tendentious treatment of Greek lawgiving, Draco as the earliest codifier of written law can illustrate the backwardness of the Greeks as legislators (*Ap.* 1.21).

As the references cited from Xenophon and Aeschines indicate, citations in this tradition can sometimes provide specifics. Lysias assigns to Draco the law on idleness (fr. 10 T; cf. D.L. 1.55). Others, such as Pollux (8.42) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 17.1), shared this attribution. Significantly, the origin of the law was controversial, as both Solon and Peisistratus were also given credit (Hdt. 2.177.2; Thphr. fr. 99 W; cf. Poll. 8.42). A similar uncertainty over the role of Solon and Draco appears in regard to the mandating of oaths to the three gods Zeus, Poseidon, and Athena (Σ Hom. *Il.* 15.36–37 Erbse; Eust. *Il.* p. 1004.13–14; cf. Poll. 8.142; Hsych. s.v. *τρεῖς θεοί*). Only one penalty (other than death) is attributed to Dracontian legislation: Pollux mentions a twenty-ox fine (9.61). Characteristic of this type of allusion, however, is the introduction of money with an ox type, which suggests confusion, again with Solon. Even in homicide legislation, an area that Atthidographic tradition generally reserved for the initiative of Draco, there are quite a few attributions of details to Solon (Phot. s.v. *ἀνδραφόνων*; Phot. s.v. *ποινᾶν καὶ ἀποινᾶν*; *An. Gr.* 1:428 Bekker; Σ Hom. *Il.* 2.665b Erbse; Eust. *Il.* p. 316.44–46). Aside from citations from statute (such as in the orators), passing references to Draco's legislation on homicide betray a similar spirit to allusions to the other laws just noted (e.g., Demos. 20.158; Jsph. *Ap.* 1.21; Eus. *PE* 10.7.17; Σ Aeschin. 1.6; Xenarch. fr. 4.21–23 K—alluding to the killing of adulterers).

Whether we consider these more specific points or the general appreciations of Cratinus, Xenophon, and others, there is little hint in this tradition that the legal heritage of Draco had been forgotten or largely superseded in classical Athens. Porphyry provides us with what may be considered virtually a *prooimion* to Dracontian laws, which establish basic Athenian religious institutions:

> *ἐπεὶ καὶ Δράκοντος νόμος μνημονεύεται τοιοῦτος, θεσμὸς αἰώνιος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νεμομένοις, [κύριος τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον,] θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ ἥρωας ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ ἑπομένοις νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδίᾳ κατὰ δύναμιν, σὺν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν πελάνους ἐπετείους.* (*Abst.* 4.22)

A confusion of attribution between Solon and Draco has already been noted regarding several laws. In the second category of attestations, which is quite

different thematically, a choice between Solon and Draco occupies the center of attention. Except for homicide legislation, Draco's laws were extinct, so he could be introduced to emphasize Solon's role as a reformer (Plut. *Sol.* 17.1). Since the *Athenaion Politeia* (7.1) has nearly the same phrasing as Plutarch, the agreement of these sources shows that the supersession of Dracontian lawmaking was a standard or received view, which both authors found in Atthidography, Athenian local history. This class of testimonia then comprise the "not Draco but Solon" category.

The extinction of Draco's laws owed in large part to their harshness (a theme persisting even today in the adjective *Draconian*). Among the witticisms of the late fifth-century sophist Herodicus of Selymbria was an attribution of Draco's laws to a snake rather than a man (Arist. *Rh.* 1400b20–23). That this was a topos is proven by a fragment of Demades, suggesting that Draco wrote his laws in blood rather than ink (fr. 23 de Falco). This same quality of severity is reflected in Aristotle's dismissal of Draco in the *Politics*, where there is nothing ἴδιον in his laws except ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος (1274b15–18).

Plutarch offers details after a stock reference to severity (*Sol.* 17.1)—idleness and minor thefts of food were punishable by death. After citing Demades, he closes with a supposed quote from Draco himself, to the effect that even minor crimes warranted execution, with nothing more serious available for graver offenses (*Sol.* 17.2–4). The application of the death penalty for theft especially impressed later writers (e.g., Gell. *NA* 11.18.1–5; Tz. *Chil.* 5.342–51; Alciphr. 2.38.3—where Solon is also mentioned). Given the stature of Solon as a νομοθέτης, there is naturally a tone of disparagement in most of the citations within this tradition. This is so much the case that in a rare context in which the speaker must approve Dracontian severity (as in Lyc. *In Leoc.* 64–66) he is careful to avoid the name of Draco, although the death penalty for minor thefts makes it clear whom the speaker has in mind. In contrast, the unsuperseded homicide law can be lauded for its rendering of murder as φοβερόν and δεινόν with an explicit reference to Draco (Demos. 20.158), presumably because it bears the authority of Solon (who left it in place) and of the rest of Athenian legal tradition. In Attic courts, one may praise Solon and Draco, or praise currently valid practice supposedly derived from Draco, or disparage Dracontian laws now extinct (sometimes to the advantage of Solon), but no one before an audience drawn from ordinary Athenians ever praises superseded legislation of Draco or implies that Draco was a superior legislator to Solon.

A chronological conclusion emerges from this pattern of references. Surviving attestations imply that Draco achieved greater interest for the Athenians after 450, and perhaps in the 430s, as our earliest reference from

Cratinus argues.[4] This significance continued in the war years (Herodicus) and just afterward (Xenophon and Lysias). That this pattern is not merely a trick of accidental survival is suggested, in the first instance, by the absence of Draco in Herodotus, who was so interested in the stories associated with early σοφοί, in particular with the Seven Sages.[5] Indeed only in late authors does Draco find his way into such company. Draco's absence suggests that Solon was the canonical spokesman for archaic Athenian moral tradition and that the material available in Attica to Herodotus did not make much of Draco. Little is known directly about the polemics of late archaic Athens, but some indications exist that constitutional debate occurred in the form of retrojections onto the program of Solon, of controversial institutions such as a probouleutic popular council (*Ath. Pol.* 8.4; Plut. *Sol.* 19.1–2). With this perspective, Draco was not seen as a forerunner by polemicists before 450, a set of circumstances matching the surviving attestations.

Through consideration of this evidence, Draco as a legislator for the Aeginetans does not become much clearer to us, but more baffling. In the *Suda*, he does not appear, at least superficially, to be the statesman sharing with Solon the laurels for the Athenian political order, since oligarchic Aegina was so unlike (and opposed to) democratic Athens. And, if he is to be seen as the "man of blood" whose antiquated laws were mostly replaced by Solon, we are left with the question of identifying those who connected him with Aegina.

## Dracontian Homicide Legislation

It is tempting to argue that the assignment of the Athenian homicide law to Draco is the one fixed point around which the other types of allusion to the statesman's career ought to be oriented. The Athenians had always remembered what Draco had legislated on homicide, and any awakened interest in him at the end of the fifth century started from this basis.[6] A long sequence of inscribed laws confirmed the status of Draco as their legislator. Such a judgment would allow us to confront our fanciful Draco (smothered on Aegina) with a historical seventh-century statesman established in genuine tradition. There is, however, a devastating objection to any privileging of

4. Fr. 300 quite possibly belongs to the well-attested *Nomoi* (frr. 128–42 KA), which Geissler (1925, 20) dates to 439–37. In the play, the laws of Solon and perhaps of Draco, represented as old men, made up the chorus. Note the reference to θεσμοί in fr. 134.

5. Note the absence of Draco in the lists in D.L. 1.41–42, esp. in the list of 17 of Hermippus (cf. *FHG* 3.37–38, fr. 8 = fr. 6 Wehrli). See, in general, Burn 1960, 207–9.

6. For the inscription note the ed. prin. of Köhler 1867, 27–36. For believers in the classical statute as virtually Dracontian see Stroud 1968, esp. 60–64; Gagarin 1981, esp. 21–24. On homicide courts see MacDowell 1963, esp. 117–23.

the historicity of the homicide laws as Dracontian, namely that the prominence of Draco as their originator belongs to the very same rediscovery of the *νομοθέτης* that is attested from the late fifth century. There is more to this point than the banal observation that all the references to Draco's legislation on homicide follow the publication of the inscribed law on unintentional homicide in 409/8 (*IG* $1^3$:104).

Let us consider what can be learned from this inscription itself. The law recorded in it was the prevailing statute on unintentional homicide, as its reception from the archon basileus shows (line 6). Moreover, there has been at least one revision since the seventh century. The mention of the *πρῶτος ἄχσον* (line 10) indicates that the archetype for the law belonged either to Solon's law code or to a later redaction claiming Solonian authority.[7] Retained archaic (Dracontian or Solonian) features persisted: the role of the *ἐφέται* as jurors (ll. 13, 17, 29), the *φράτορες* as possible exculpators (18–19, 23), and the law's representation of itself as a *θεσμός* (20).[8]

The law cannot have been an entirely seventh-century document, however.[9] For one thing, the stipulation protecting the murderer (line 28; cf. Demos. 23.37–40) if he avoided Amphictyonic rites is unlikely to have preceded 600 and the First Sacred War, when the Amphictyony achieved authority for Delphi and Solon initiated closer Athenian contacts.[10] Moreover, Demosthenes describes a stipulation that citizens were not to abuse physically, or extort money from, those accused of murder, and he cites an *ἄξων* (the first *ἄξων* in the restoration) as his authority (23.28–31). Transgressors of this provision are to be tried before the *heliaia*. Here, manifestly, was a part of the homicide code that could not derive from Draco, because the *heliaia* was a Solonian institution (Arist. *Pol.* 1274a3–21; *Ath. Pol.* 9.1; Plut. *Sol.* 18.3–4).[11]

Not only is the surviving law obviously a statute revised since the seventh century, but a consideration of citations of homicide law in the orators favors a disconcerting conclusion: All Athenian homicide law could be cited by Attic orators as Dracontian regardless of anachronism, including the statute on intentional homicide (note esp. Demos. 20.157–58).[12] Yet, *IG*

7. Extreme skepticism is owed to arguments for the existence and survival of Dracontian *ἄξονες*, for which see Hermann 1849, 7–9; Stroud 1968, 32–34, with notes.

8. Other archaisms are the possible appearance of the *φυλοβασιλεῖς* in line 12; the use of *δικάζειν* in 11–12; and the introduction of the phrase *ἀγορᾶ]ς ἐφορί[α]ς*, "border market" in 27–28 (cf. Demos. 23.37). See Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 266; Stroud 1968, 45–47, 53, 63–64.

9. Note Hignett 1952, 305–11.

10. See Jeffery 1976, 73–75.

11. This provision has been restored in lines 30–31 of the inscription. Cf. Stroud 1968, 54–56.

12. Most telling are two sequences: Demos. 23.22, 28, 37, 44, 51, summed up with *ὁ μὲν νόμος ἐστὶν οὗτος Δράκοντος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσους ἐκ τῶν φονικῶν νόμων*

$I^3$:104 appears to offer us a Dracontian homicide code that began with unintentional killing, an order which, in itself, would be odd indeed. If the heading δεύτερος ἄξων is correctly restored in line 56 of the inscription, we are compelled to believe either that intentional homicide did not appear in the Dracontian segment of the revised code of the ἀναγραφεῖς, "codifiers" (ll. 5–6), or that intentional homicide was placed not only below unintentional killing but also on an ἄξων other than the first. Moreover, the unintentional homicide statute beginning the inscription opens with the word καί, the most natural explanation of which was that the law on intentional homicide once preceded it in any earlier version of the code.[13] These considerations prompt the hypothesis that the ἀναγραφεῖς in 409/8 seem to have decided against treating intentional homicide procedure as Dracontian. They differed from both the Demosthenic view on Dracontian legislation and the implication of one Atthidographic tradition, namely, that Draco's homicide laws were left untouched by Solon. So the ἀναγραφεῖς confound our natural expectation that Draco's authorship of the law on intentional homicide ought to have been a precondition for the emergence of his reputation as a legislator on murder.

Nonetheless, there is another sign that the recodification of Athenian laws may have done this very thing.[14] Plutarch, citing οἱ πλεῖστοι (*Sol.* 19.3), argues for the Solonian establishment of the Areopagus based on the fact that laws of Draco mention only ἐφέται and not Areopagites. That Plutarch's source(s) could maintain such a view at all must mean that an influential understanding of Draco's legislation excluded from it intentional homicide in its contemporary formulation, with trials before the Areopagus (cf., e.g., Demos. 23.22; *Ath. Pol.* 57.3). The law surviving in *IG* $I^3$:104 would provide such an authoritative witness, and one that clearly saw the ἐφέται as the Dracontian jurors.

Furthermore, in primitive seventh-century Attica, Draco is unlikely to have provided for two bodies of aristocratic jurors, and the Areopagus was most probably earlier than the ἐφέται, as its prominence in myth suggests (the trials of Ares and Orestes). So, if we are forced to choose between the Areopagus and ἐφέται, the Areopagus should be held as prior.[15] Thus, in deciding what was Dracontian and what was not, the ἀναγραφεῖς seem to have used criteria converse to those that seem natural to us. Yet Plutarch's

παρεγραψάμην; Demos. 23.53, 60, 62, 82, 86, closing with ἔστι μὲν οὐκέτι τῶν φονικῶν ὅδ' ὁ νῦν ἀνεγνωσμένος νόμος.

13. Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 266; Ruschenbusch 1960, esp. 130. For other theories note Stroud 1968, 34–40 (esp. useful for earlier views); Harrison 1961; Gagarin 1981, 99–110.

14. Cf. Sealey 1976, 99–105.

15. Hignett 1952, 79–82, 309–11; cf. Kahrstedt 1937, 15–17; R. W. Wallace 1989, 8–22, 44–47.

argument on the Areopagus, combined with the internal evidence from the law itself, shows that affixing the label Δράκοντος (*IG* $1^3$:104.5) to specific statutes within Athenian homicide law derives from a process of historical reconstruction and not from direct transmission.

The version of the homicide laws belonging to the ἀναγραφεῖς, which was erected in the Stoa Basileios, differed from a version that is known to have stood on the Areopagus (see Lys. 1.30 for a case before the court in Delphinium; cf. [Lys.] 6.15). This copy of the laws was probably used by Demosthenes in his oration against Aristocrates, just as this same edition of the laws is cited by the speaker in another, pseudo-Demosthenic speech (47.71). Demosthenes uses a formula, τὸν νόμον τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα (in diverse variants: 23.28, 44, 51, 60, 62), which shows him to be working from notes taken from a single edition. He considered these statutes to be Dracontian, significantly referring to the law on intentional homicide as the first in his string of citations (23.22). Accordingly, the laws on the Areopagus did not bear the same pattern of labeling as the revised code in the Stoa Basileios. Either the Areopagite laws all bore a note describing them as Dracontian or they contained no attribution at all, but were believed to be Dracontian by virtue of tradition. Nevertheless, they were valid law, as the orators' use of them illustrates, so the presence, absence, or the variety of the label did not affect the continued validity of the statute.

The codifiers of Athenian law employed more restrictive criteria for the attribution of laws to Draco than did other Athenians. In the same spirit, the proposal of Teisamenus after the democratic restoration distinguishes between the θεσμοί of Draco and the νόμοι of Solon in a legalistic, antiquarian mode of citation (And. 1.83). As we have already seen, a consistent denomination of Dracontian laws as θεσμοί is not a regular feature of traditional citation. What is more, this distinction between Dracontian θεσμός and Solonian νόμος is probably not an accurate reflection of the evolution of archaic legal terminology.[16] How the codifiers proceeded can only be material for speculation. There is little likelihood, however, that the codifiers determined a law to be Dracontian or Solonian (for the purposes of labeling and citation) by deciding the (virtually unascertainable) degree to which it diverged from its original state. Probably they used one or more "litmus tests" in checking for the presence of a procedure or institution that they held as datable. Plutarch or his sources may have unwittingly used circular reasoning, since the ἀναγραφεῖς could have denied the label Dracontian to the intentional homicide law, because they already considered the Areopagus to have been established by Solon.

16. Note Ostwald 1969, 55–56, 158–60 (with Solon frr. 31.2, 36.18 W). Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 35.2; Plut. *Sol.* 19.4.

To what extent Draco's responsibility for homicide law was a genuine recollection or valid rediscovery of archaic tradition is uncertain. It is striking that the most manifestly archaic part of the laws is the very section traced by the Athenians to their earliest legislator, when it is equally possible for us to imagine that the homicide laws (as the oldest) should have been the most thoroughly amended. If the codifiers of the homicide laws truly distinguished the law on intentional homicide as non-Dracontian, they were making judgments on attribution virtually as historians. Once the inscribed homicide law of Draco is recognized as the product of late fifth-century historical reconstruction, we are compelled to observe that traditions about early Attica that crystallized in this period were not unaffected by its ideological struggles. When we suggest that the ἀναγραφεῖς were applying simple criteria to assign laws to different Athenian statesmen, we are also authorized to ask whether they too may not have been conditioned by the ideological conflict raging about them when they applied the label Δράκοντος. Against this background, Draco becomes a figure whose peculiarly fifth-century rediscovery was fraught with temptations toward using him as an embodiment of party political positions.

## The Constitution of Draco

After a case has been made for Draco as a historical figure—the reconstruction of his activities could be subject to ideological controversy—it becomes possible to consider the most controversial piece of evidence on the legislator, the so-called constitution of Draco that appears in *Athenaion Politeia* 4.[17] This is also the only testimonium on Draco that, when presenting details of Draco's legislative activity, parallels the anecdote about his visit to Aegina, and it is a singular witness indeed. The constitution cannot be taken seriously as a seventh-century political order. It has many anachronisms; note particularly the monetary fines for failure to attend meetings of the βουλή or assembly, the prominence of the στρατηγοί and ἵππαρχοι, the use of sortition for council and magistracies, and its timocratic rather than aristocratic undertones.[18] It has found few (and these rather tentative) defenders of its authenticity.[19]

While Attic tradition invariably contrasted Solon and Draco to Draco's disadvantage, the constitution implicitly makes Draco the more important legislator, attributing many of Solon's accomplishments to him. In Draco's

17. [Pl.] *Ax.* 365d is the only other possible contemporary attestation of such a Dracontian *politeia*. See in general the discussion of R. W. Wallace in chap. 20 of this volume.

18. Jacoby 1949, 316–19, n. 140. See also Rhodes 1981, 112–18.

19. Note Seeck 1904, 306–18; Rizzo 1963; Develin 1984, 302–7.

polity, there already exist the Solonian classes, a popular council, sortition, an Areopagus charged with oversight of the laws, and the right of εἰσαγγελία. Therefore, the fourth-century convention that Draco could not be praised in detraction of Solon did not yet prevail when the Dracontian politeia was composed. That (and other aspects noted below) suggests a late fifth-century date for its creation.

The constitution was intended as an alternative to Periclean imperial democracy. The στρατηγοί and ἵππαρχοι are important. Their property qualifications and provision for their giving security are specified. Since there are πρυτάνεις, the council operates in προβούλευσις at frequent sittings like the Cleisthenic βουλή. The πρυτάνεις provide sureties with the military officers, implying that theirs was not a sortitive, rotating office, and that the presidents were chosen from the same class as the στρατηγοί, those with estates of at least 100 minas. That would be a deliberate timocratic touch. The reference to ἄλλας (= minor?) offices implies an administrative mechanism like that of the fifth century, not of the archaic period.

The Dracontian council of 401 is especially helpful in determining the ideological affiliations of the constitution. Its complement is arbitrary, lacking any conceivable grounding in the Ionian or Cleisthenic tribal order (a serious detriment to its credibility as an archaic institution). Its strength was meant to differentiate it from the Solonian (populist) council of 400, which would fit our hypothesis that admission to its membership was timocratic. At the same time, the near coincidence of the 401 βουλή with the council of 400 of 411 suggests two further conclusions: The evolution of both councils in congruent antidemocratic circles and an origin for the Dracontian politeia in the period before the failure of the 400 had discredited a body of that size and number.

Counterdemocratic features of the constitution and its preference for Draco over Solon are aspects of the same moderate oligarchic sensibility, of which the whole polity is redolent. Points of comparison stand with the moderate intermediate regime of 411 (or the 5000) and the "future" constitution of the same year. Active political rights are limited to those of the hoplite census and above (Thuc. 8.97.1; *Ath. Pol.* 33.1–2). Fines were levied for nonattendance of meetings of the βουλή and assembly (*Ath. Pol.* 30.6). Moreover, significantly, the ζευγῖται favored in the Dracontian Constitution also fill allotted offices below a few elite positions, like archons, treasurers, and military officers (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 30.2). Zeugite participation is encouraged by the provision of a drachma fine for nonattendance at assembly and council, proportionately a stiffer penalty than the two or three drachmas levied against upper-class absentees (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 4.4). Even eligibility for the elite offices is open to those possessing estates of only

1000 drachmas for the archons and ταμίαι and 10,000 drachmas for the military offices. This was not the plan of an extremist like Critias.

While much political power is vested in the ζευγῖται, the functions reserved for the Areopagus augment the influence of the wealthy. The return to the Areopagus of supervision of the constitution and specifically εἰσαγγελίαι betrays the intention of undoing the democratizing work of Ephialtes (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 35.2). Yet, the elite is not simply trusted to act with political propriety. The author avoids a naive, archaic fusion of economic status and moral qualities. Upper-class office holders must hold their estates unencumbered by debt and possess legitimate sons over ten (*Ath. Pol.* 4.2; cf. Din. 1.71; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 23.18–22, the anachronistic "Decree of Themistocles"). Elite devotion to civic duty is not assumed, but enforced by fines.

The Dracontian Constitution is sufficiently dissimilar to anything actually proposed or implemented during the Decelean War that it ought not to be seen as an effort to polemicize directly on behalf of any of the actual fifth-century oligarchies. After the fall of the 400, the succeeding moderate regime conducted affairs rather like the full democracy, so the eventual reversion to a democratic constitution remains a most obscure transition. Thereafter, it is doubtful that any practical politician would have framed a moderate oligarchy like the Dracontian Constitution without taking the precaution of introducing an elected directorate of limited size. That is what one supposes that Theramenes and other moderates anticipated as the role of the Thirty. The constitution also contains no hint (even formulated anachronistically) of the debate over the suspension of pay for public service (Thuc. 8.97.1; *Ath. Pol.* 29.5). Thus, it might best be dated before the upsurge of doubts about Periclean democracy after the Sicilian debacle, and possibly even before Athenian finances were strained by the Archidamian War. The wide consensus of scholars who have seen the constitution as Theramenean reflects the document's ideological flavor, but their description ought not to be held sufficient to date it in or after 411.[20]

Nothing in the account of the Dracontian Constitution by the *Athenaion Politeia* excludes an origin in a fifth-century political pamphlet. The lack of tight logical causation in chapters 2–4 of the treatise is not owed to an interpolator who introduced what Aristotle and his associates would have considered a historical absurdity but to the failure of the Atthidography underlying this work to combine the material surrounding Cylon, Draco, and Solon into a synthesis.[21] The Dracontian Constitution

20. The most complete discussion is Fuks [1953] 1971, 84–101.

21. Von Fritz (1954) suggests that the author believed that Draco was legislating within an existing constitution rather than prescribing his own politeia. This explains the enumeration

may derive from someone who drew on fifth-century polemic, such as Demetrius of Phalerum,[22] or perhaps from one of the "conservative" authorities read for their criticism of Solon, on the grounds that his legal ambiguities had allowed an aggrandizement by the popular courts (9.2).

Before turning to the *Suda*'s account of the death of Draco, it is appropriate to reassess what we have learned from the rest of the material on the statesman. The strong interest in collecting oral traditions during the second half of the fifth century directed Athenian public attention toward Draco. The persona that Draco assumed was greatly affected by the appropriation of Solon as the fount of Athenian populism, by proponents of Periclean democracy. A tactic left to those disenchanted with the democracy was to find a respectable pedigree for alternatives to the imperial δῆμος. Unsurprisingly, Draco, the available pre-Solonian legislator, became an alternative source for constitutional tradition. The high degree of partisanship associated with the name of Draco is shown by the Dracontian politeia.

Yet, the late fifth century stands as the high water mark in the atmosphere of controversy surrounding Draco. Alongside the Dracontian Constitution, which magnifies his role, the code of the ἀναγραφεῖς paradoxically gives us a minimizing interpretation—namely, Draco as the source of only a part of the homicide code. Perhaps fabrications like the constitution prompted a reaction that refused any connection between Draco and the Areopagus. As open advocacy of oligarchy declined after the Thirty, Draco was restricted to a subordinate role vis-à-vis Solon, and his harshness and an association with *all* homicide law were the only well-defined features of his public image.

The *Athenaion Politeia* and other accounts reflective of the work of the Atthidographers, such as Plutarch's *Solon*, failed to contextualize Draco's political activity, either his legislation on homicide or the apocryphal constitutional νομοθεσία. There is almost no ancient integration of Draco either with the aftermath of Cylon's coup d'état or with the agrarian crisis leading up to Solon. Only one detail stands out with unusual solidity—the *Athenaion Politeia* assigns the legislation of Draco to the archonship of Aristaechmus (probably 621/0). We even lack any clear witness to the office held by Draco as legislator (a θεσμοθέτης? cf. Paus. 9.36.8), let alone how his efforts were accommodated with the authority of the archon himself. A skeptical conclusion offers itself, namely, that the only solid evidence on Draco was a note on a copy of the archon list that he legislated in the year of

in *Ath. Pol.* 41.2. See also Develin 1984, 297–302. Cf., e.g., De Sanctis 1975, 206–14. In chap. 20 of this volume, R. W. Wallace convincingly argues the case against an interpolator. He and I differ, however, over the date of the constitution; he opts for a fourth-century composition.

22. Jacoby 1949, 385–86, n. 51 (note D.L. 5.80).

Aristaechmus.[23] Other themes in the citations were vague traditions, including legal harshness, involvement with homicide law, reputation as the earliest source for written law, and a suggestion that his work was superseded by that of Solon. From these meager ingredients, the legend of Draco was created and subsequently elaborated in the fifth century.

## The *Suda* on Draco

The *Suda* reports the death of Draco on Aegina as follows:

> Δράκων, Ἀθηναῖος νομοθέτης. οὗτος εἰς Αἴγιναν ἐπὶ νομοθεσίαις εὐφημούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγινητῶν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐπιρριψάντων αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν πετάσους πλείονας καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ἱμάτια ἀπεπνίγη, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάφη τῷ θεάτρῳ. γέγονε δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις κατὰ τοὺς ζ' σοφούς, ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ πρεσβύτερος· τῇ γοῦν λθ' Ὀλυμπιάδι τοὺς νόμους ἔθετο γηραιὸς ὢν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. ἔγραψεν ὑποθήκας εἰς ἔπη τρισχίλια. [*Suda* δ 1495 Adler][24]

The *Suda* entries on Athenian statesmen probably derived from Atthidography, although there is a near certainty that one or more intermediaries have intervened. At a guess, I suggest Hermippus as an intermediary for this story. He wrote a work called Περὶ νομοθέτων, which is known to have treated the Attic hero Triptolemus.[25] The supposition of an original derivation in Atthidography is made more likely in this case by the tone of the anecdote. Its hostility to the Aeginetans—apparent in the fecklessness of their greeting—is appropriate to the patriotic spirit that pervades the *Atthides* (regardless of the political inclinations of specific Atthidographers). This hypothesis, however, cannot be tested directly, since no references to Draco survive among their fragments. A strong indirect indication exists in the role in Athenian history given to Draco by the *Athenaion Politeia*, a work thoroughly dependent on Atthidography.

Draco is also (here uniquely) the author of a considerable body of poetry, the Ὑποθῆκαι, in 3000 verses. Isocrates uses the same term to denote the archaic didactic poetry of Hesiod, Phocylides, and Theognis (2.43). Again the parallel with Solon—perhaps specifically with his supposititious hexametric *Nomoi* (fr. 31 W = Plut. *Sol.* 3.5)—is significant. An altogether reasonable conjecture that an Attic tradition of admonitory poetry

23. See Figueira 1984a, 461–62. Cf. Jacoby 1949, 93–94, with 186, 308–9, 347.

24. The *Suda*'s chronology parallels the chronographic tradition in which most of the variation is owed to corruption in the transmission of figures. See Stroud 1968, 66–70.

25. On Triptolemus see fr. 3 in *FHG* 3.36–37 = 84 W (cf. frr. 80–88).

that might have preceded Solon has been utilized by some ancient polemicist to render Draco a forerunner of Solon in poetry as much as in *νομοθεσία*. The Ὑποθῆκαι may have been a compilation of archaic normative poetry that was apocryphal only in its attribution to Draco. It would not have contained programmatic material involving the supposed legislative activities of Draco. Rather the aristocratic moralizing of such poetry enhanced the stature of Draco as a genuine conservative spokesman. The pretended "survival" of the corpus may have underwritten a contention that the opponents of imperial democracy could also provide real knowledge of a Dracontian political program.[26]

Draco in the gloss of the *Suda* and in the anecdote about his death on Aegina is Draco the *νομοθέτης*, most akin to the author of the Dracontian Constitution. His status as an oligarch is not really doubtful. He was, after all, about to make laws for oligarchic Aegina at the moment of his death. This lawgiver does not, however, come out of the episode on Aegina in a very positive light. His prospective lawgiving is aborted by a quite ridiculous death.[27] Death by suffocation with clothes at the hands of his Aeginetan hosts is a nasty imputation about the islanders' vaunted hospitality (e.g., Pind. *O.* 8.21–30; *N.* 3.1–3, 5.8–10; *Pae.* 6.123–31).[28] In short, we have an Athenian source denigrating the Aeginetans.

This mode of "death by apparel" makes its second appearance here in the record of Athenian and Aeginetan polemics. The Aeginetans told Herodotus a story in which the single Athenian survivor of an impious attempt to steal from Aegina the statues of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia had been put to death by the womenfolk of his dead comrades when he returned to Attica (5.82–88).[29] Their weapons were the fibulae they wore on their clothes. It was suggested by the Aeginetans that the Athenian adoption of Ionian dress was a punishment for Attic women, excluding their use of similar pins for the future. The story in Herodotus has its context in an explanation of how the Aeginetans achieved their independence from Epidaurus and became embroiled militarily for the first time with the Athenians through the dispute over the statues. This confrontation led to the ἔχθρη παλαιή, "ancient hatred," between the two states. Regardless of how they differed over the sequence of events, the juxtaposition of

26. Theognis may be a parallel, as the compilation of Megarian aristocratic poetry under his name was especially interesting to late fifth-century oligarchic or conservative Athenians like Critias (fr. 5 W), Xenophon (Stob. 88.14), and Antisthenes (D.L. 6.16).

27. On the topical features of the deaths of prominent individuals see Szegedy-Maszak 1978, 207 n. 42; Fairweather 1974, 269–70.

28. Figueira 1981–82, 324–29.

29. See Figueira 1985 for full discussion.

Aeginetan independence and conflict with Athens was common to the Aeginetan, Athenian, and Epidaurian informants of Herodotus.

The Draco anecdote is implicitly set at the time of Aeginetan independence, since this is the most appropriate setting for *νομοθεσία*. Furthermore, it is possible that the differentiation of Draco from Solon notable in the Dracontian Constitution is implicit here. Solon was credited by Atthidography with a new system of weights, measures, and coin weights, different from the Pheidonian measures in use on Aegina (*Ath. Pol.* 10.1–2; Androt. *FGrH* 324 F 34; Plut. *Sol.* 15.3–4). Regardless of the anachronism and confusion of this tradition, its existence may indicate that Solon's legislation was considered as signifying an estrangement from Aegina. Thus, Draco could be viewed as a likely legislator on Aegina. The dates for the two statesmen bracket the period when Aegina became independent from Epidaurus.[30] It is possible that Aeginetan independence (with its attendant transition from friendship to enmity toward Athens) could parallel the passage from a supposedly Dracontian (oligarchic) Athens to a Solonian (democratic) Athens. The two murders by articles of clothing, one on Aegina, and one in Attica, take on a curious symmetry.

Nevertheless, two aspects of the anecdote make it improbable that the *Suda*'s version is the initial story that was told about Draco and the Aeginetans. First of all, it is bizarre that an Athenian storyteller should bring an Attic statesman to Aegina only to kill him off at the hands of the Aeginetans. Second, there is the confirming detail that the tomb of Draco existed in the theater on Aegina. Although ease of verification is seldom a true guide to the presence of wholecloth fabrication in ancient stories, a part of the audience would have been able to validate for themselves the factuality of a tomb in the theater on Aegina, if this detail had appeared in a classical narrative. Moreover, a burial site within a theater is properly a *ἡρῷον*, just the sort of honor that a city would accord its *νομοθέτης*.

The possibility then arises that the anecdote as we have it in the *Suda* is reactive mythologizing. By this I mean the tendency to counter an enemy's portrait of the distant past, which does not allow easy corroboration or contradiction, with a restructuring of the account rather than with a bare denial of its historicity. The stories in Herodotus about the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* betray such a reaction as this. An Athenian storytelling of the odd death of Draco by suffocation at the hands of fervent Aeginetan admirers may accordingly entail an Aeginetan account describing *νομοθεσία* by Draco on the island. That story provided an aetiology for a *ἡρῷον* in the theater in the town of

30. Figueira 1983, 24–29.

Aegina. Naturally, one could object that such an Aeginetan story seems far-fetched. Is it, however, more unlikely than the existence of any connection at all between the statesman and the island, let alone an Attic story that he was smothered there?

There is ample evidence, starting with Herodotus, that fifth-century Athenians believed the Aeginetan oligarchy to be an illegitimate suppression of the local δῆμος. At a date ca. 490, the Athenians had conspired with a disgruntled Aeginetan aristocrat named Nicodromus and his followers to overthrow the Aeginetan oligarchy (Hdt. 6.87–93). A breakdown in Athenian planning allowed the oligarchs to break the back of the rebellion before turning to face an Athenian expeditionary force. Basing his account on Athenian informants, Herodotus styles the rebels as the δῆμος and the government as the παχέες, "thick ones," a derogatory term for the Aeginetan elite. He retails with horror the sacrilegious brutality with which the oligarchs slaughtered their rebel prisoners. In an especially significant gesture, the Athenians settled the escaped rebels at Sunium (Herodotus reports), where they seem to have become Athenian citizens.[31]

After the subjugation of Aegina by Athens in ca. 457–56, at the time when Herodotus was collecting the materials for his history, some Athenians and even some residents on Aegina were agitating against the Aeginetan oligarchy. A cult of Athena Polias was inaugurated on Aegina, symbolizing that Aegina belonged to Athena of Athens (*IG* 4:29–32). The Aeginetans defended their political traditions through their ξένος, Pindar. *Olympian* 8 in honor of Alcimedon of Aegina belongs to this period. In verses 21–32, alongside characteristic praise of Aeginetan hospitality and justice, Pindar upholds aristocratic judgment. The scholia read this as a warning against entrusting decision making to the δῆμος and noted the servile origin of the Aeginetan masses (Σ Pind. *O.* 8.30c, d, i, l). In the same ode, Pindar celebrates the connection of the honorand with the Athenian aristocrat Melesias, upon whom, according to the poet, Aeginetan youths looked as an athletic and political patron (*O.* 8.54–66; cf. *N.* 4.93–95, 6.66–69 for other cases of his patronage on Aegina). Thucydides, the son of Melesias, led the right-wing opposition to the policies of Pericles (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 28.2, 28.5; Plut. *Per.* 11.1–3, 14.1–3, 16.3).

The Aeginetans needed influential Athenian friends not only to forestall further Athenian hegemonism but also to intercede with the Athenian people. After its subjugation, Aegina at first paid the heavy tribute of 30 talents. During the 430s, the assessment of tribute was reduced (to either 14 or 9 talents). Hidden away in the biographical tradition about the historian

31. Figueira 1991, 83–86, 104–28, offers details on fifth-century Athenian imperialism as practiced against the Aeginetans.

Thucydides is a piece of evidence connecting Thucydides son of Melesias with Aeginetan finances (Marcellin. *Vita Thuc.* 24; Anon. *Vita Thuc.* 7). His usury on Aegina is said to have led to the expulsion of the Aeginetans from their homes in 431. The Aeginetans were in fact exiled for their secret complaints at Sparta before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.27.1). They had protested their lack of autonomy, that is, their tributary status (Thuc. 1.67.2, 1.139.1, 1.140.3; Plut. *Per.* 29.5). The charge that Thucydides son of Melesias caused the downfall of his Aeginetan friends is derived from the political propaganda of the partisans of Pericles. While it is not to be trusted as the literal historical truth, the accusation shows that friends of the Aeginetan ruling class became involved in the financial dealings between the islanders and their masters, the Athenians.

It is against this background of patronage of the Aeginetan elite by right-wing Athenians that the "discovery" of Draco's role as a legislator on Aegina and the attribution of a *ἡρῷον* to him in the theater on Aegina may be understood. That lost Aeginetan account, to which the Athenian anecdote in the *Suda* reacted, was another gambit in Aeginetan attempts to solidify their status as clients of aristocratic Athenian politicians. If an influential segment of the Athenian leadership could be convinced that Draco truly legislated on Aegina, then the Aeginetan government was not an oligarchic usurpation but a version of the *πάτριος πολιτεία* of the Athenians themselves. Indeed it turned out that Aegina was Athenian, but not in the sense supposed by Athenian imperialists, who aspired to restore the Aeginetan *δῆμος* to power and eventually won their point when the island became an Athenian colony (Thuc. 2.27.1). Rather, Aegina preserved the fundamental, primitive polity of the Athenians, a moderate oligarchy as the Dracontian Constitution portrayed it.

My hypothetical Aeginetan story bringing Draco to Aegina as a *νομοθέτης* must belong to the period between the subjugation of Aegina and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. That is the only period when the necessary conditions prevailed: both the existence of conservative Athenians and of Aeginetans seeking rapprochement and the countervailing influence of Athenians determinedly hostile to the prevailing regime on Aegina. That date is not irreconcilable with my suggested date for the Dracontian Constitution, which, in any case, is likely to be in the fifth century. The congruence of the anecdote about Draco's death and the constitution indicates that it was during the prewar period that Athenian traditions about Draco began to be exploited, for constructing alternatives to imperial, Athenian democracy. The moderation of the Dracontian politeia is appropriate to a period when resistance to democracy was still largely theoretical, namely, before the brutality of the war had embittered partisanship and

before modest reforms had been tested and rejected in the regime of the 5000.

## Conclusion

Draco does not seem to have been an important figure in Athenian institutional traditions before the second half of the fifth century. After that time he became the subject of considerable historical reconstruction. That is not to say that some of this reconstituted picture—for example, his date in the archonship of Aristaechmus, his severity, his place at the beginning of Athenian *νομοθεσία*, and his connection with legislation on homicide—does not depend on sound recollection. Even in the matter of homicide law, however, there can be no guarantee that Draco was not associated with it because it was perceived as the most archaic segment of the code and thus suitable for the first legislator.

It is striking that the first appearance of Draco in Cratinus is in a context where the desuetude of his lawmaking is accented: The Athenians are roasting barley on the *κύρβεις* that bore Solonian and Dracontian laws (fr. 300 KA). In another fragment from the likely source for the citation, a comedy called the *Nomoi*, an illiterate claims sound knowledge of the past, perhaps Athens' true legal tradition, by oral transmission (fr. 128 KA). Thus Cratinus' allusion suggests that the reconstruction of Draco's contributions to Athenian life may have been controversial from the start. The Dracontian Constitution reflects this controversy, with its proposal for a counter-Solonian, nondemocratic political order.

Because the associations surrounding Draco resonated contrapuntally to imperial democracy, the Aeginetans could choose him to symbolize their affinities with Athenians who were sympathetic to their political practices. An old tradition that associated Solon with an alienation of the Athenians from the Aeginetans may have helped in lending credibility to the notion of Draco as a friend to Aegina. Other Athenians, however, turned the link between Draco and Aegina into a sinister story in which the *δυσδαιμονία* of the Aeginetans is foremost. With such partisan treatments of Draco current, it is not surprising that a segment of Athenian opinion, reflected in the recodification, reacted against the pretensions of an oligarchic Draco. *IG* $1^3$:104 suggests that Draco was assigned only those homicide laws that mentioned the *ἐφέται* and other jurors, officials with no wider constitutional significance. Draco's position vis-à-vis the Areopagus was too controversial to admit in that publication of the laws.

22

# Tyranny and Outlawry: *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10

Edwin M. Carawan

In 1955 Martin Ostwald published a seminal study of Athenian laws on tyranny and subversion.[1] Some of the basic assumptions about early Greek Law, from which Ostwald drew his conclusions decades ago, have since been questioned, but few contributions in this area have not been influenced by Ostwald's elegant thesis. He argued, in essence, that Athenian laws against tyrannical conspiracy and overthrow of the democracy—from the fall of the Peisistratids to the crisis following Chaeronea—derive from a law of Draco, the substance of which is reported in *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10:[2]

> *θέσμια τάδε Ἀθηναίων ἐστὶ καὶ πάτρια· ἐάν τινες [τυραννεῖν] ἐπανιστῶνται ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, ἢ συγκαθιστῇ τὴν τυραννίδα, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος.*
>
> [These are ancestral ordinances of the Athenians: If any persons rise up to establish a tyranny, or (anyone) aid and abet them in tyranny, he shall be "outlawed," himself and his kin.]

Ostwald supposed that this law of Draco had been superseded by Solon's legislation but was revived to lend authority to the decrees against the

1. Ostwald 1955, 103–28.

2. This is the text of Chambers (1986, 7); see also Rhodes 1981, 220–23; cf. J. K. Davies 1973, 225 (suggesting the first clause, *ἐάν...ἐπανιστῶνται*, was a later addition). Ostwald followed the Budé edition of Mathieu and Haussoulier (1952, 18), bracketing *ἐπὶ τυραννίδι* rather than *τυραννεῖν*, and inserting *τις* after *συγκαθιστῇ*; the differences do not appreciably affect the problems of substance.

tyrants and the followers of Isagoras. The Dracontian statute was again the source of law in the decree of Demophantus (410) and in the law of Eucrates (337/6). Over the years, this outline has been often cited and generally accepted, but in recent work certain points have come into dispute.[3] Other issues aside, the basic thesis, that Athenian statute law on tyranny and overthrow of the democracy originated in Dracontian legislation, is challenged by new findings on the early development of law and political authority. The issue is not merely a question of authorship, whether Draco or some other legislator first formulated the law; it is also a question of the fundamental mechanism by which sovereign authority was vested in official bodies and defense of the regime was no longer left to the unilateral initiative of the leading clans. The question of the origins of the tyranny law is inextricably connected with the problem of *ἀτιμία*—how this ancient customary sanction evolved from outlawry and primitive vendetta to a loss of rights and legal protections.

Ostwald's reconstruction proceeds as follows. The author of *Athenaion Politeia* mistakenly assumed that the ancient penalty of *ἀτιμία* was equivalent to that of his own day; he cited the law, in fact, as an instance of the leniency of laws regarding tyranny in the time of Peisistratus.[4] The original legislation would have carried the more serious penalty of outlawry. Swoboda had argued that *ἀτιμία* was already equivalent to "loss of citizen-rights" in Solon's time.[5] Ostwald therefore reasoned that the tyranny law in question (in which *ἄτιμος* apparently means "outlawed") must belong to the era before Solon—hence to the earliest lawgiver, Draco. Earlier action against the followers of Cylon, led by archons from among the Alcmaeonid clan (Thuc. 1.126; Hdt. 5.71), seems to resort to an ad hoc procedure (108), and Draco's legislation is likely to have included a more formal regulation. Solon then amended the tyranny law, prescribing trial before the Areopagus; presumably, a simple decree without trial had previously served

3. Ostwald assumed that the sentence of outlawry was originally imposed by verdict of the Areopagus council, but the old view of the Areopagus as high court in the Dracontian era has now been seriously challenged; cf. R. W. Wallace 1989, esp. 22–25. This problem of jurisdiction is not essential to Ostwald's basic thesis on the origin of the law as a rule regarding the *execution* of outlawry upon the would-be tyrant. The question whether an aristocratic council or other governing body originally determined the sentence of outlawry will therefore remain largely outside the scope of the present study. See Carawan 1990a, 410–14; Carawan 1985, 115–40; Carawan 1987, 167–208.

4. *Ath. Pol.* 16.10: *ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ περὶ τῶν τυράννων νόμοι πρᾳοι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς οἵ τ' ἄλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ μάλιστα καθήκων πρὸς τὴν τῆς τυραννίδος (κατάστασιν)· νόμος γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν ὅδε· θέσμια τάδε, κτλ.*

5. Swoboda 1905, esp. 153–63; cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1920–26, 1:234. Swoboda himself (1893, esp. 58–60) had earlier concluded that the law in *Ath. Pol.* 16 belonged to the mid-sixth century (when Peisistratus was first expelled). From Swoboda's later findings on *ἀτιμία* (1905) others argued for a pre-Solonian enactment; cf. Schreiner 1913, 66–68.

to render would-be tyrants ἄτιμοι.[6] The original Dracontian statute was later restored or reenacted in the era of Cleisthenes;[7] and from the language of this reenactment, the decree of Demophantus was drafted after the revolution of the Four Hundred.

Two major premises of this reconstruction are now disputed: (1) The Aristotelian report itself may in fact suggest a source other than Draco's legislation;[8] and (2) the finding that ἀτιμία had evolved already in Solon's time from outlawry to *Rechtslosigkeit* is no longer generally accepted—Ostwald's conclusion that the more serious penalty must belong to a law of the earlier lawgiver is therefore questionable.[9] Thus we must first reconsider the nature of Dracontian legislation, then reconstruct the changes affecting ἀτιμία that came as a consequence of Solon's law.

It is generally assumed that Draco's legislation encompassed other crimes in addition to homicide, and some scholars suppose that Draco also enacted "fundamental" law—rules establishing bodies of government and constitutional powers such as the jurisdiction against tyranny; these presumably were statutes separate from the code of homicide and other felonies.[10] Such assumptions are based upon ancient traditions that (whatever their misconceptions) clearly presuppose a fairly complete code of substantive law under Draco: We are repeatedly told that Solon abrogated Dracontian laws other than the homicide code; and there is of course Plutarch's report that Draco assigned the same penalty to all offenses however trivial.[11] Such traditions

6. A decree of assembly, council, or other governing body, without trial, would have empowered the archons to act; it is also likely that even without decree the initiative of archons and private citizens would be justified against flagrant attack upon the polis.

7. On reenactment cf. Ostwald 1969, 16, 141. There is an awkward convolution in this theory that is not often remarked: We are not only to suppose that the author of *Ath. Pol.* was mistaken in his interpretation of ἀτιμία in the ancient law but to assume that he has mistakenly reported this law as valid in the time of Peisistratus himself, though it was (by Ostwald's thesis) then in abeyance and only reenacted at the fall of the Peisistratids. In effect, the "leniency" actually belongs (supposedly) to the lost Solonian law that this law replaced. The reconstruction offered here will suggest a solution.

8. Gagarin 1981b, 71–77; cf. Gagarin 1986, 56. Ostwald himself now seems to accept Gagarin's suggestion that the law as we have it is Solonian (1986, 8 n. 19).

9. On the development of ἀτιμία from outlawry to the complex array of disabilities for various wrongs in classical times see Ruschenbusch 1968, 16–29; he argues (20–21), from the case of Arthmius of Zeleia (Demos. 9.43–44), that ἀτιμία retained the force of outlawry as late as ca. 460. But see also Hansen 1976, 54–98, esp. 76–80. Against Ruschenbusch's date, Hansen rightly observes that the sentence upon Arthmius is in fact ἄτιμος καὶ πολέμιος, which would indicate that ἀτιμία in itself no longer entailed outlawry; he suggests that the change to "loss of rights" belongs to the period roughly 550–500.

10. Cf. Stroud 1968, 75–81.

11. *Ath. Pol.* 7.1; Plut. *Sol.* 17.1; Gell. *NA* 11.18.3; D.L. 1.55; Pollux 8.42. On execution for theft cf. Xen. *Oec.* 14.4–5.

are notoriously dubious, and notable among them, the account of a Dracontian politeia in *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is generally held suspect.[12] Avoiding these difficulties, Ostwald suggested (1955, 107) that the original tyranny law was in fact incorporated into the one body of Dracontian law that we know to be authentic, namely, the homicide code. In his recent critique of Ostwald's thesis, Michael Gagarin has disputed this otherwise plausible hypothesis.[13]

Gagarin points to the tradition that, whatever reforms Solon enacted in other areas of the law, Draco's homicide code remained forever unaltered; this directly contradicts Ostwald's assertion that the tyranny law was abridged or amended by the later lawgiver, if we are to assume that it was a provision of the law on "justifiable homicide." Gagarin supposes therefore that if Draco enacted a tyranny statute it would necessarily be one among the provisions of other felony law (or "fundamental" law) that Solon, according to tradition, abrogated. And if that Dracontian law were once invalidated and replaced by other legislation, Gagarin argues, there is no reason to suppose, and indeed good reason to doubt, that archival texts of the law would have been preserved for opponents of tyranny to discover in the late sixth century.[14] It was clearly in the interest of the new regime to remove all record of the old legislation in order to avoid dispute over conflicting laws.

As an alternative to Ostwald's hypothesis, Gagarin supposes that the tyranny law cited in *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10 was, in fact, a Solonian enactment based upon pre-Dracontian ordinances of the thesmothetes, rulings specifically in regard to the Cylonian conspiracy; he notes that the term *θέσμια* is used in regard to the ancient judgments of the thesmothetes in the Aristotelian "second constitution" (3.4) and nowhere else in *Athenaion Politeia*.[15] Though it is reasonable to suppose that the substance of the tyranny law goes back to customary rules more ancient than Draco, Gagarin himself sees that the tenuous connection with *Athenaion Politeia* 3.4 cannot bear much insistence. If the coincidence of terms shows anything at all, it points rather to a revisionist coloring, such as we already suspect from the archaizing phrasing of 16.10, *θέσμια τάδε...καὶ πάτρια*. This kind of lemma is more likely to belong to a later enactment or to be the comment of an

12. Cf. Wilamowitz 1893, 1:76–77; Ruschenbusch 1960, 148–52; Rhodes 1981, 109–12; cf. also R. W. Wallace and T. Figueira in chaps. 20 and 21 (respectively) of the present volume.

13. Gagarin 1981b, 72–73; Gagarin (1978, 119–20) had earlier accepted Ostwald's suggestion.

14. Of course the very tradition that convinced Stroud of the survival of Dracontian laws would also argue against this point.

15. *Ath. Pol.* 3.4: *θ[εσ]μοθέται δὲ πολλοῖς ὕστερον ἔτεσιν ἠρέθησαν, ἤδη κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν αἱρουμένων τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως ἀναγράψαντες τὰ θέσμια φυλάττωσι.*

Atthidographer. it cannot serve as reliable evidence on the original context of the law.[16]

The author of *Athenaion Politeia* probably drew this report from a secondary source and not directly from archival records. But the text of the law itself (ἐάν τινες ἐπανιστῶνται ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, ἢ συγκαθιστῇ...ἄτιμον...καὶ γένος), though transmitted at second hand, bears nonetheless the mark of authenticity. First, as Ostwald noted, the shift from plural to singular ("if any persons rise up...if anyone aid and abet") is a peculiarity of archaic law not likely to be imitated by a later author. Second, the very wording of the penalty ("ἄτιμος himself and his kin"), which the fourth-century author found puzzling and remarkable, would for that very reason appear to be a more difficult reading than one an Atthidographer might fabricate.

The decisive point in Gagarin's critique of Ostwald's thesis is the argument that the tyranny law cannot have been part of the homicide code: If it were, it would have been preserved unaltered; if it were extraneous to the homicide code, it would have been effaced by Solon's reforms. It should now be recognized, however, that Draco's homicide law was subject to various alterations; these changes, involving jurisdiction, procedure, and penalties, probably took the form of addenda or preambles to the Dracontian statutes, which in themselves appear indeed to have remained unaltered.[17] The extant fragmentary copy, from the republication of 409, shows clearly that even clauses of the law that were quite obviously obsolete were retained verbatim. Thus the retroactive provision of the original law—"And let those also who were earlier guilty of homicide be subject to this statute" (*IG* $1^3$:104.19–20 = Demos. 20.158)—is copied without change. If indeed the original tyranny law was part of the homicide code, there is every reason to suppose that it too would have been retained unaltered, though superseded by later amendments.

Also, the evidence for separate "fundamental" law in the Dracontian legislation is exceedingly weak. The Dracontian politeia in *Athenaion Politeia* 4 is contradicted by the more reliable tradition that Draco himself made no change in the existing constitution (*Pol.* 1274b15). And there is no confirmation independent of *Athenaion Politeia* to prove that Draco made law specifically regarding governing bodies or citizen status. Indeed, the very nature of the homicide legislation as we now understand it would strongly suggest that Draco himself made no significant changes in constitutional rules. He appears for the most part to have codified what were customary

16. As Ostwald notes (1955, 108); see also J. K. Davies 1973, 225; Rhodes 1981, 222.

17. Cf. Stroud 1968, 54–56; Gagarin 1981a, 23–25. By the very nature of publication on the ἄξονες, this would be the ordinary method for revising earlier statutes: cf. Ruschenbusch 1966, 36–37.

rules, in order to give them greater recognition and effectiveness. The actual innovations in procedure appear to be limited in scope and few in number.[18]

Despite the common assumption that Draco made substantive law regarding felonies other than homicide, there is no proof that Draco addressed these matters apart from allowing the customary remedy of self-help.[19] The various allusions to Dracontian law on theft, adultery, and so on, can all be traced back to the notorious tradition (e.g., Plut. *Sol.* 17.1) that all offenses were punished with death. That tradition almost certainly derives from the fact that in the homicide code Draco addressed various felonies, to allow for so-called justifiable killing in those cases where an injured party was entitled to exercise self-help "with impunity"—that is, where the offender's life was forfeit and his family would have no claim either to legal action or to private settlement (*νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι*). Much like the other provisions of the homicide code (and pre-Solonian procedure in general), these are not substantive laws prescribing penalties per se but essentially rules of recognition enabling the injured party to take action. Thus the rule for the "penalty" for homicide—exile and *αἴδεσις*—is no more than an instrument of private settlement.[20] There is every reason to suppose, then, that the earliest Athenian tyranny law was a provision of this kind, a rule to allow for the initiative of magistrates and private citizens against anyone involved in a flagrant attack upon the government or anyone who had been condemned for conspiracy, by whatever jurisdiction was customary.

If we accept Ostwald's thesis as viable at least in regard to the nature of Draco's legislation, we are still faced with the more serious objection that the evident meaning of *ἀτιμία* in the tyranny law is no sure sign of pre-Solonian authorship. Recent arguments tend strongly to the conclusion that *ἀτιμία* was still in Solon's time equivalent to outlawry, since *ἄτιμοι* were not merely deprived of citizen rights but were subject to immediate execution if apprehended in Attica. Such is the clear implication of Solon's amnesty law (Plut. *Sol.* 19.4) excluding those *ἄτιμοι* exiled for tyranny or bloodshed.[21]

18. Cf. Gagarin 1981a, esp. 148–50, 161–63.

19. Cf. Ruschenbusch 1960, 149–51.

20. On the nature of early exile and *ποινή* see Gagarin 1981a, 120–24; Cantarella 1979, 231–37. On early homicide procedure as an instrument of settlement see Thür 1970, 426–44; see also Carawan 1990b, 47–67.

21. Plut. *Sol.* 19.4: *ἀτίμων ὅσοι ἄτιμοι ἦσαν πρὶν ἢ Σόλωνα ἄρξαι, ἐπιτίμους εἶναι, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου ἢ ὅσοι ἐκ τῶν ἐφετῶν ἢ ἐκ πρυτανείου καταδικασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ φόνῳ ἢ σφαγαῖσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἔφευγον ὅτε ὁ θεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὅδε.* Σφαγαί is generally interpreted as bloodshed in civil conflict; cf. Gagarin 1981a, 129 n. 49.

The disability in these cases must amount to more than mere loss of rights. Even in the classical period those guilty of such crimes were subject to exile or death. It is reasonable therefore to suppose (as Gagarin and others have done) that ἀτιμία retained its ancient force in Solon's time. On such reasoning, Solon, not Draco, would be the likely author of the tyranny law in *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10.

On the other hand, the Solonian law against neutrality in time of stasis (*Ath. Pol.* 8.5) would seem to require a penalty of loss of rights rather than outlawry. Any citizens that failed "to come to the aid of their party" were to be ἄτιμοι and "to have no share in the polis" (τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν).[22] The latter phrase (if it is not a later gloss on ἄτιμος) may well be the lawgiver's restatement of the penalty—such redundancy being not uncommon when the valuation of key terms has changed.[23] Otherwise—if ἀτιμία means something other than having no share in the polis—it would at least suggest that ἀτιμία was not in itself a dangerous enough disability to drive the offender into exile. There has been no general agreement on the precise meaning of this law, and the Aristotelian report cannot be relied upon as conclusive evidence that ἀτιμία under Solon meant only loss of rights. But there is good reason to assume that the substance of the law is authentic. Whatever its application, the aim of the stasis law appears to be consistent with that of Solon's law for εἰσαγγελία to the Areopagus against overthrow of the democracy. The lawgiver evidently undertook to replace the customary rules of unilateral response with the necessary mechanism for official action in the public interest. And if public order was his aim, it is highly unlikely that those who were derelict in time of crisis were to be outlawed and subject to violent attack rather than simply disqualified from citizen rights.

Thus, though the amnesty law would suggest that ἀτιμία still meant "outlawry" in some sense, the stasis law is at least an indication that ἀτιμία no longer automatically meant exile upon pain of death. Evidently ἀτιμία still carried much of its ancient meaning—public dishonor inviting reprisal

22. *Ath. Pol.* 8.5: ὃς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μὴ θῆται τὰ ὅπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. This testimony is crucial to Swoboda's argument that ἀτιμία was reduced to *Rechtslosigkeit* by Solon's time. In favor of authenticity, see Goldstein 1972, 538–45; Bers 1975, 493–98; esp. Manville 1980, 213–21 (with reference to the question of outlawry and loss of rights in ἀτιμία). Against authenticity, cf. Hansen 1976, 78. It is also perhaps possible that the law penalizes those who fail to "ground arms"; but in either case the aim of the law appears to be civic responsibility, and the penalty is therefore not likely to be outlawry. See also n. 23 below.

23. For the meaning of πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν cf. Pl. *Lg.* 768b, where τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος refers specifically to denial of the citizen's right to serve in the law courts. For similar restatement of uncertain terms in statute see the discussion of the law of Demophantus at n. 27 below.

and denial of rights and legal protections—yet Solon somehow redefined the rules of self-help and "justifiable homicide" in such a way as to alter profoundly the practical consequences of *ἀτιμία*. We have other, direct evidence of precisely such a reform.

In the Dracontian code, the law against "violent seizure," theft of goods, and abduction of persons asserts an ancient principle of "justifiable homicide." The offender was subject to "death with impunity" (*νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι*).[24] The evidence we have suggests that rape or "adultery" was to be remedied in the same way.[25] And there are clear indications that this was also the fate of exiled homicides who returned illegally without "pardon" (*αἴδεσις*); conversely those who abided by the terms of exile were expressly protected from vindictive attack.[26] It is reasonable to suppose that all *ἄτιμοι*, surely those exiled for tyranny as well as those exiled for homicide, were subject to this remedy, to be slain with impunity.

In classical times the archaic formula "death with impunity" (*νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι*) is part of the official language in decrees against tyrannical uprising. It is found apparently in the Erythrae decree (of the mid-fifth century) and in the decree by Demophantus in 410, which, Ostwald persuasively argued, draws upon the language of a much earlier decree against tyranny and subversion:[27]

> *ἐάν τις δημοκρατίαν καταλύῃ...πολέμιος ἔστω Ἀθηναίων καὶ νηποινεὶ τεθνάτω.... ὁμόσαι δ' Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας..."κτενῶ...ὃς ἂν καταλύσῃ τὴν δημοκρατίαν...καὶ ἐάν τις ἄρξῃ τιν' ἀρχὴν καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας...καὶ ἐάν τις τυραννεῖν ἐπαναστῇ ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκαταστήσῃ."* (And. 1.96–97)
>
> [If anyone overthrow the democracy...he shall be an enemy of the Athenians, *to be slain with impunity*.... Let all Athenians swear, "I shall kill him...whoever overthrow the democracy...and whoever hold office under an antidemocratic regime, or if anyone rise up to establish tyranny or aid and abet the tyrant."]

24. Demos. 23.60: *καὶ ἐὰν φέροντα ἢ ἄγοντα βίᾳ ἀδίκως εὐθὺς ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι* (= *IG* $1^3$:104.37–38; Stroud 1968, 57). On *νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι* see the study by Velissaropoulos (1990) and my response (Carawan 1990c). Swoboda (1905, 161–64) supposed that *νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι* was introduced (along with the designation *πολέμιος*) specifically to redefine outlawry when *ἀτιμία* had ceased to convey the more severe penalty.

25. On Athenian adultery law in general cf. Cohen 1984, 147–65. The law of adultery attributed to Draco by Pausanias (9.36.8) is attributed to Solon by Plutarch (*Sol.* 23.1). For extortion of ransom see [Demos.] 59.65, and Lys. 1.4, 29. For the customary penalty as *νηποινεί* cf. Xen. *Hier.* 3.3; Pl. *Lg.* 874b–c.

26. *IG* $1^3$:104.26–29 = Demos. 23. 37; see also Demos. 23.28 (quoted at n. 30 below).

27. Erythrae decree: *IG* $1^3$:14 = *IG* $1^2$:10.29–34; Tod 29; *νηποινεὶ τεθνάτω* is restored but (given the parallel to Demophantus' decree) probable.

In the phrasing of this law, the terminology of Cleisthenic democracy is joined with that of an earlier era. In the oath, the "overthrow of democracy" (ὃς ἂν καταλύσῃ τὴν δημοκρατίαν) is framed and reinforced by the formulae of the ancient tyranny law:

> καὶ ἐάν τις τυραννεῖν ἐπαναστῇ ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκαταστήσῃ (And. 1.97)
>
> ἐάν τινες [τυραννεῖν] ἐπανιστῶνται ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, ἢ συγκαθιστῇ τὴν τυραννίδα (*Ath. Pol.* 16.10)

The general provision—that anyone conspiring to overthrow the democracy be declared "public enemy, to be slain with impunity" (πολέμιος...νηποινεὶ τεθνάτω)—is reinterpreted in the oath: "I shall [endeavor to] kill [him] by word and deed, by vote or by my own hand if I am able...and if another kill him, I shall hold [the killer] guiltless before the gods...as one who has slain an enemy of the Athenians." Thus official language preserves the archaic formula, νηποινεὶ τεθνάτω, when its meaning is no longer self-evident.

In archaic usage, the formula is best understood in terms of ἄποινα and ποινή, ransom and blood-payment. The life and person of the offender is forfeited to his captor to do with as he will. He may hold him for ransom and threaten brutality to coerce payment, or he may refuse ransom, whatever the offender's plea, and put him to death "without liability."[28] This appears to be the nature of Dracontian remedies against theft, abduction, and other felonies, and may thus account for the tradition that all crimes were punishable by death. It may also explain the puzzling testimony that some crimes were punishable by enslavement before Solon's reforms.[29]

Against public enemies this rule provided an incentive for private citizens to intervene where they might otherwise be reluctant to risk violent confrontation and vendetta. The offender who is subject to "death with impunity" might be held for ransom or forcibly disseized, and any citizen who took action against him was expressly indemnified against claims by the offender's kin. Now there are obvious limitations to this remedy—the would-be tyrant might sometimes be ransomed and safely find refuge in

28. See Carawan 1990c. I argue, for instance, that the fate of the suitors in the *Odyssey* is meant to be an obvious fulfillment of Telemachus' oath—1.376–80 and 2.68–78 (in assembly), νήποινοι...ὄλοισθε.

29. Ruschenbusch (1968, 30–37) argued that the provisions for "arrest" (ἄγειν/ἀπάγειν) in Draco's laws against violent seizure, etc., originally allowed enslavement. His arguments for original lawful enslavement for certain wrongs are persuasive on many points, though his more extreme position on the persistence of this remedy into classical times has been generally discounted; cf. Hansen 1976, 115.

exile—but the lure of ransom with indemnity at least assured that individuals would be more eager to intervene. Thus the sentence of outlawry was a more credible deterrent against public enemies. Once this primitive remedy was removed, however, it became necessary to devise other means of assuring that citizens take action, such as the law for εἰσαγγελία to the Areopagus and perhaps also the stasis law against those who fail to come to the aid of their party.

It seems certain that Solon abrogated or invalidated the ancient remedy νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι in the case of homicide exiles, and it is reasonable to suppose that this was but one instance of a general reform of the old self-help procedures. In Demosthenes 23.28, we find a documentary record of this reform. We are first given a cross-reference to the Dracontian statute for apprehension and execution of exiles who return illegally, "it shall be lawful to kill or arrest...as it states on the [first] ἄξων." There follows a provision for substantive reform: The captive offender is *not to be tortured or held for ransom*; in the event of such treatment, "anyone willing" may bring charges before the competent archon, for trial before a court of the people.[30] The latter provisions clearly mark this statute as a Solonian amendment, which was probably joined to the homicide code as an addendum or preamble.

These Solonian restrictions upon self-help were evidently intended to eliminate a disruptive element of private settlement—the seizure of hostages for ransom—which had served as an incentive for private initiative, but which in Solon's time was comprehended as a threat in itself to public order. In regard to exiled homicides who returned illegally, the reckoning was no longer left to the discretion of the victim's family as Draco had provided.[31] The exiled homicide who returned without "pardon" and purification was now more clearly identified as an imminent threat to public order, both by reason of his defilement and because of the disruptive vendetta his presence might provoke.[32] It is reasonable to assume that a like concern

30. τοὺς δ' ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ⟨α'⟩ ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ. εἰσφέρειν δ' ἐ⟨ς⟩ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. τὴν δ' ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν.

31. It seems evident from Draco's Law itself that intentionality per se was not ordinarily at issue in trial before the *ephetai*; the question of the killer's intent was an issue for an official determination only in those cases where there were no eligible kinsmen of the victim surviving. Cf. *IG* $1^3$:104.16–19 = Demos. 43.57. That no separate penalty was prescribed for cases of intentional homicide (distinct from exile for unintentional killing) was well argued by Gagarin (1981a); see also Carawan 1990b, 47–67; Carawan 1991.

32. Against the usual view that miasma-doctrine dictated early homicide law, we should note that the threat of vendetta probably inspired precisely those ordinances where religious motives are often assumed (as in the trial procedures at Phreatto and Prytaneion courts). The prohibitions in Demos. 20.158 again have no connection with the extant provisions of Draco's

would have prompted revision of the status of other ἄτιμοι, particularly those exiled for their part in the failed coup of Cylon. If we assume that Draco had prescribed impunity for the self-help killings of ἄτιμοι, including public enemies, it is reasonable to suppose that Solon effectively amended this remedy by redefining the status of the ἄτιμος: He was no longer subject to ransom or brutality; once this aspect of outlawry was ended, the ἄτιμος essentially had no *legal* recourse against other measures by his adversaries. His person was no longer forfeit to his captor; but he might be arrested, might be killed or injured in the arrest, or might have his property seized without cause, and yet he had no legal redress.

To deny legal recourse against violent attack was already an established form of remedy in Draco's law: In the law of ἔνδειξις (Demos. 23.51), we find "there shall be no prosecution for homicide [φόνου δίκας μὴ εἶναι] against those that first give evidence against exiles who return where prohibited." Presumably there had been cases where claims were made against those who had fatally attacked one they suspected of being an exiled homicide. His kinsmen might argue either that he was innocent of the original homicide, or that he was later "pardoned" and thus no longer subject to "death with impunity."[33] The law of ἔνδειξις had provided a precaution against just such disputes arising out of self-help, but a precaution that had evidently proven inadequate.

The sum of the evidence thus far indicates that in Solon's Law, "denial of legal recourse" evidently became equivalent to ἀτιμία as the standard prescription for private action against a public offender. Draco had previously treated the ἄτιμος as subject to self-help execution "with impunity"—allowing neither legal recourse nor private claims against the killer or captor of an ἄτιμος. Subject to this remedy were homicide exiles, those guilty of abrogating sacrosanct laws (Demos. 23.62), and surely also those who had been condemned for tyranny or civil bloodshed (Plut. *Sol.* 19.4). Without expressly altering the law (and without thus violating the "seal" against abridgment), Solon restricted private intervention by redefining the consequences of ἀτιμία, removing ransom and other financial settlement as incentives for action against the ἄτιμος.

The ἄτιμος was still denied legal protections, but the incentive for others to take advantage of his predicament—hence the deterrent against violating ἀτιμία—were now in some cases greatly diminished. In homicide disputes the customary obligation of vendetta was nonetheless binding upon

Law. The religious sanctions and legal procedures appear to have developed in parallel; cf. Parker 1983, 104–43, 367–92, esp. 119–20.

33. Cf. Hansen 1976, 16, 115. The law is cited explicitly by Demosthenes as part of Draco's code.

kinsmen of the victim, and in most cases, this itself would have proven sufficient to deter an exiled homicide from returning without "pardon." In regard to crimes against the state, however, it would appear that no more effective deterrent was at first devised than the automatic extension of this "denial of legal recourse" to kinsmen of the offender. The public enemy is ἄτιμος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος. Not only is he denied legal recourse in his own right, but his kinsmen are also barred from legal remedies in his behalf. Despite this extension of the legal disability, the offender was not in quite such imminent danger of unrestricted violence as in other periods. In decrees of the fifth and fourth centuries the tyrant or subversive would be declared a public enemy (πολέμιος); reward and indemnity would be expressly promised to his killers or captors. But in the time of Solon and Peisistratus, without such express provisions of outlawry, when ἀτιμία no longer meant "death with impunity," the predicament of the tyrant or traitor was not nearly so hazardous as it had been in Draco's law and was again to be in decrees of the Cleisthenic democracy. The report in *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10, that the tyranny law in the time of Peisistratus was lacking in severity, would appear after all to have some historical basis.[34]

The ἄτιμος was still "outlawed" so far as he had no legal protection or remedy against violent attack or civil claims; but once the rule that his person was forfeit, that he might be seized or injured "with impunity," was no longer valid, his kinsmen were entitled to bring legal action against the killer or captor—the killer might plead "justifiable homicide" but he must now stand trial on that plea.[35] In regard to homicide disputes, the restriction of vindictive violence would serve public order. Solon therefore allowed not only for the family to take action but for "anyone willing" to bring charges if the exile were held for ransom. In the case of those exiled for attempted tyranny and other urgent wrongs against the state, however, there was every reason to continue the absolute license to kill that had been provided under the old rule of "death with impunity" against ἄτιμοι. For this reason the "hereditary" penalty—ἄτιμος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος—was introduced into statute law as a standing procedural rule. In this way not only was the offender himself denied legal recourse, but it was also assured that his kinsmen could take no legal action in his behalf.

34. This reconstruction would at least resolve the difficulties noted in n. 7 above.

35. As I shall attempt to show elsewhere, the separate jurisdiction for pleas of lawful or "justifiable" homicide belongs to the era of Solon's amendments to the Dracontian law: There is nothing in the extant fragment of Draco's Law to indicate a separate jurisdiction; the text of the law found in Demos. 23.53 is almost certainly not the law that Demosthenes had read to the court.

There can be little doubt that some form of hereditary penalty was part of the older legal mechanism. Thus in the "seal" against abridgment of the homicide laws, ἀτιμία extended to children and property of the offender.[36] This extension of ἀτιμία, however, seems to be particularly relevant to confiscation of property. In regard to attempted tyranny (and perhaps related crimes of civil conflict), it is reasonable to assume that outlawry, by customary rule, had indeed extended to the immediate προσήκοντες, as they were expected to side with their kin in the uprising.[37] But true outlawry appears to be a matter for the governing body to decree. The aim of the "hereditary" clause in the tyranny statute, as a standing procedural rule, however, is likely to be more immediate and restricted, to prevent legal action by the offender's kinsmen. The evidence would indicate, after all, that the kinsmen of tyrants and traitors who were to be punished with the same absolute outlawry as the offenders themselves were expressly condemned *nominatim* in the decree of outlawry; their status was not simply an automatic consequence of the sentence upon their kinsman.[38] It is therefore likely that the original intent of the designation ἄτιμος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος as a standing rule of statute law was not to impose outlawry on the kinsmen of the offender as an inherited penalty per se but to exclude all legal recourse on behalf of the offender—both legal protections that might be sought by the

36. Demos. 23.62: ἄτιμον και παῖδας καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου. Here the disability extending to descendents is obviously related to confiscation; i.e., they have no recourse against appropriation of what would be their property. The same formula is found in 21.113 (a [later] bribery law) and in the Decree of Eucrates 20–21 (ἄτιμος καὶ γένος τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου). Hereditary ἀτιμία was never an ordinary penalty for homicide, though the law (of Draco?) allowed ἀνδραληψία, seizure of hostages among family of the killer to force settlement (Demos. 23.82). In classical procedure, hereditary sanctions involve a less serious loss of rights, often amounting essentially to an inherited liability for fines; along with his assets, the descendents automatically inherited the father's debts to the state (e.g., the inherited ἀτιμία of Cimon).

37. Cf. esp. the fourth-century decree of Amphipolis (*SIG*³ 194 = Tod 150): ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι· Φίλωνα καὶ Στρατοκλέα φεόγειν Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴγ γῆν τὴν Ἀμφιπολιτέων ἀειφυγίην, καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ ἤμ που ἁλίσκωνται, πάσχειν αὐτοὺς ὡς πολεμίους καὶ νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι, τὰ δὲ χρήματ' αὐτῶν δημόσια εἶναι.

38. Cf. the decree against the Peisistratids (Thuc. 6.55.1); the five sons of Hippias were named in the decree, none for Thessalus or Hipparchus (and Thucydides concludes therefore that the latter in fact had no sons). Some kinsmen of the tyrants obviously remained in Athens, presumably under no serious disability; e.g., Hipparchus the son of Charmus, ostracized in 487 (*Ath. Pol.* 22.4). Against the followers of Isagoras, confiscation of property and destruction of their homes is expressly noted in the extant report (Σ Ar. *Lys.* 273); hereditary outlawry is not mentioned. The sons of Themistocles, similarly, seem under no serious threat despite the decree of outlawry against him; see J. K. Davies 1971, 66-69; Frost 1980, 229. In the classical era, sons of "tyrants" who were subject to outlawry were themselves named in decrees; cf. *SIG*³ 58 = *ML* 43. We have no single instance of prosecution against the kinsman of a public-enemy ἄτιμος (as opposed to those who inherited the liabilities of public debtors) based upon violation of automatic hereditary ἀτιμία.

offender and legal measures by kinsmen who might act in his behalf. By the very nature of early Athenian law, this is not likely to be a statute prescribing what penalties the people (or the council) can or cannot impose in their decrees against public enemies. It is a procedural rule about the automatic consequences of a prior judgment or flagrant wrong. Thus in this singular instance, what has often been interpreted as "hereditary outlawry"—ἄτιμος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος—is probably better understood as "without legal recourse either in his own right or in respect of his *genos*."

## Conclusions

Ostwald's work has given us a definitive historical perspective on Athenian democracy: The evolution of political concepts is to be understood in the workings of law; the structure of institutions often yields more valuable evidence on the letter and original intent of legislation than the extant record of statute and legal precedent that is so often colored by partisan sources or misconstrued in popular reasoning. If this "constitutional model" sometimes seems preoccupied with a "surface phenomenon" (as Finley called it), it is often nonetheless indispensable. It is crucial to our understanding of ἀτιμία as it developed from outlawry to a set of procedural restrictions. Ostwald himself supposed that ἀτιμία was already somehow redefined in Solon's time and that later Athenian laws for tyranny and subversion derive from provisions of primitive outlawry in Draco's law for "justifiable homicide." On both counts the findings of this study concur. The law in *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10, however, appears to reflect the fundamental changes wrought by Solon rather than the words of Draco himself; the tyranny law is Solon's attempt to reformulate the ancient rules of self-help in terms of a new mechanism of legal recourse. The full translation of ἀτιμία, from outlawry to loss of rights, belongs to the transformation that Solon began and Cleisthenes accomplished. Solon's initial reform may be reconstructed as follows.

Dracontian law had allowed self-help with impunity (νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι) against ἄτιμοι—public enemies and exiled homicides. By Solon's reform, tyrants and murderers were subject to trial and state execution, as well as to confiscation of property by the state.[39] The ἄτιμος was no longer to be seized and held for ransom, subject to brutality (as Draco's Law had allowed); but there would be no recourse to the other protections of law that now availed for ἐπίτιμοι against seizure of person or property, neither

39. In regard to state execution of homicide penalties, a very valuable study has been made by Thür (1988, 142–56).

for the ἄτιμος himself nor for kinsmen acting in his behalf. Before the formulation of such laws, the burden of defense against a tyrant's uprising rested by customary right and practical necessity upon the shoulders of the leading clans (as the Alcmaeonidae led the opposition against Cylon); their remedy was essentially a form of self-help against a rival faction. By Solon's law this unilateral response was subordinated to rules of procedure and official sanction. The leading clans were no longer empowered to act without restriction against a threat to their own preeminence. In their place, Solon seems to have asserted a tenuous bond of "sovereignty" that was not yet realized in the hearts and minds of the people—a sovereignty of the polis.

23

# Samian Autonomy

David Whitehead

FEW IN OUR TIME have done more than Martin Ostwald to demonstrate that recreating the conceptual world of classical Greece means scrutinizing every vestige of the fragmentary record that world has left us. What is more, he is no Procrustes, hell-bent on making the bodies fit the beds. No reader of *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*—to mention only the μέγιστον βιβλίον—could fairly complain of any lack of coherent, overarching argument. Yet equally to be valued are the occasional admissions, *faute de mieux*, of aporia or anomaly. In this tiny tribute to a great classicist and a good friend, I should like, if I can, to convince our honorand that one of his earlier investigations brought together a body of evidence that is actually more uniform than he himself allowed.

In *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History*—originally planned as an appendix to *Sovereignty* but, in the event, published separately and sooner—Ostwald sought to develop and modify understanding of a concept first elucidated twenty-four years earlier by E. J. Bickerman.[1] Bickerman had established the fundamental point that in classical usage αὐτονομία was no mere synonym for ἐλευθερία. Its proper context was the relationship between states, specifically between a stronger one and a weaker, and it was a way of describing (and hence protecting) the position of the latter in relation to the former. However, while Bickerman saw its origins in the Persian overlordship of the Greek cities of Asia Minor in the sixth century, Ostwald has

An early draft of this chapter was read and evaluated for me by Trevor Quinn, who expressed support for its general thrust; I must nevertheless exempt him, in the usual way, from any responsibility for the detail of the argument. My thanks, too, to Hermann Schibli, for converting the typescript of this chapter into electronic form.

1. Bickerman 1958. See further, besides Ostwald 1982, Schuller 1974, 109–11; Quinn 1981, 97–101; Karavites 1982; Lévy 1983.

now, convincingly,[2] focused attention on the fifth-century Athenian Empire. In the process, moreover, the content and import of *αὐτονομία* has been considerably clarified. In the surviving record at least, no actual definition of it seems to have been attempted until 377, with the "charter" of the Second Athenian Confederacy (a document to which we must return below), yet the essence of such a definition can be distilled, Ostwald reasonably contends, from the fifth-century testimony: "With the single exception of the Samian decree of 405 B.C., the *νομος*-suffix in *αὐτονομία* refers not to the legal or judiciary system but to the potential of establishing one's own norms, primarily in political and military affairs."[3] I should like to suggest that no such exception need be recognized.

The document in question is a familiar one—*IG* $1^3$:127 ($2^2$:1), enacted in 405 (but inscribed, after reaffirmation, in 403/2), whereby the Athenians granted citizenship to their sole remaining allies, the Samians[4]—and the section germane to our purposes here is lines 12–18:

> *δεδόχται τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, Σαμίοις Ἀθηναίος ἔναι,*
> *πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλωνται· καὶ ὅπως ταῦτα ἔσται ὡς ἐπιτηδειό-*
> *τατα ἀμφοτέροις, καθάπερ αὐτοὶ λέγοσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἐρήνη γένηται, τότε περὶ*
> *τῶν ἄλλων κοινῆι βολεύεσθαι. τοῖς δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν*
> *αὐτονόμος ὄντας, καὶ τἆλλα ποιῶν κατὰ τὸς ὅρκος καὶ τὰς συνθήκας καθάπερ*
> *ξύνκειται Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Σαμίοις· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνκλημάτων ἃ ἂγ γίγνηται*
> *πρὸς ἀλλήλος διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰς δίκας κατὰ τὰς συμβολὰς τὰς ὅσας.*

Ostwald's commentary on these lines runs as follows:

> The grant of citizenship is followed by the words *πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλονται* (12–13), leaving the details to be worked out after the war (12–13). Then comes the sequence of special interest to us: *τοῖς*

2. See Lévy 1984; Lévy 1983, addendum; Rhodes 1984; Westlake 1984; Lachenaud 1984; Aalders 1986. For some doubts and queries see Hannick 1985; Gawantka 1985. Note also that Ostwald's case was argued simultaneously and, thus, independently (but at a lower methodological level, and lacking any reference to Bickerman), by Karavites (1982).

3. Ostwald 1982, 47.

4. See generally Gawantka 1975, 143–46, 178–97, with biblio. at 179 n. 32; Osborne 1981–83, 1:33–37, 2:25–26; Cargill 1983, 322–23.

> δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν αὐτονόμος ὄντας (15–16), followed by a confirmation of existing agreements (16–18). The sequence of clauses shows that αὐτονόμος is not here used to describe the political independence of Samos: that is done by the declaration that the Samians are free "to adopt a constitution of their choice"; the term is rather applied to judicial matters in that autonomy is described as the condition in which they can "use their own laws." Moreover, the fact that the existing agreements, including regulations on disputes arising between citizens of the two states, form part of a separate clause shows that αὐτονόμος refers narrowly to the free use of the Samian lawcode at Samos. In other words...the reference is simply to the statutes.[5]

This is a characteristically pellucid and logical Ostwaldian exposition—but not the only one that can be contrived, nor, I venture to suggest, the best. Three elements of it merit a second look: the argument explicitly drawn from "the sequence of clauses"; the claim that the mention of δίκαι κατὰ τὰς συμβολὰς τὰς ὅσας restricts the sense and application of αὐτονόμος ὄντας; and an assumption, crucial but unstated, about the conceptual relationship between νόμοι and πολιτεία.

Ostwald maintains that "the sequence of clauses shows that αὐτονόμος is not here used to describe the political independence of Samos: that is done by the declaration that the Samians are free 'to adopt a constitution of their choice'; the term is rather applied to judicial matters in that autonomy is described as the condition in which they can 'use their own laws.'" With the notion that the participial phrase αὐτονόμος ὄντας supplies, as if in parenthesis, a background condition to prescriptive matter couched in the infinitive (following δεδόχθαι), there can be no quarrel. Formal parallels, if any were needed, are offered by Xerxes' orders to Mardonius in Herodotus 8.140 α 2 (τοῦτο μὲν τὴν γῆν σφι [sc. Ἀθηναίοισι] ἀπόδος, τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλην πρὸς ταύτῃ ἐλέσθων αὐτοί, ἥντινα ἂν ἐθέλωσι, ἐόντες αὐτόνομοι) and by the Mytileneans' description, in Thucydides 3.10.5, of their status within the deteriorating Athenian Empire (ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν). In fact, though, neither passage, nor indeed any other fifth-century evidence, offers much useful guidance on how widely, behind the provisions of *IG* I³1:27.12–18, the backcloth of αὐτονόμος ὄντας should be construed as spreading. The issue is indeed the scope and definition of αὐτονομία itself.

As Ostwald himself points out, we are denied (in terms of what has survived) a "documentary definition" of αὐτονομία until the imperial "charter"

5. Ostwald 1982, 45–46.

of 377 (*IG* 2²:43.20–23): ἐλευθέρ]ωι ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, πολι|τ[ευομέν]ωι πολιτείαν ἣν ἂν βόληται, μή|τε [φορ]ὰν εἰσδεχομένωι μήτε ἄρχοντα | ὑπο[δεχ]ομένωι μήτε φόρον φέροντι. These four specifications, together with the later guarantees about landownership (35–46), amount to a definition of autonomy in terms, at least, of its "minimum conditions";[6] and as epigraphic phraseology goes, the whole presentation is of a logic and clarity to gladden the scholar's heart. The fifth-century material is more fragmentary and more troublesome, however. There is little enlightenment, for our purposes here, in what is preserved of, or safely restorable in, the decrees relating to Mytilene in 427/6 (*IG* 1³:66.10–12)—ἀπο|[δίδοσιν αὐτοῖς τὲν γ̑ε̑]ν καὶ αὐτο[νό]μος δ̣οκ[εῖ] ἓ̣ν|[αι αὐτὸς οἰκοῦντας πάντα] τ[ὰ] σφ[έτερα] αὐτο^[ν...—or to Selymbria in 408 (*IG* 1³:118.10–12)—καταστέσασθαι δὲ Σελυμ]βριανὸς τὲμ πολι|[τείαν αὐτονόμος τρόποι ἢ]ότοι ἂν ἐπίστουτ|[ται. And as to the Samian case itself, the crucial and frustrating point is that *IG* 1³:127, for all its interest and importance in other respects, is not and was not the fundamental document as regards autonomy. It is able, rather, to refer to that concept almost in passing, because at least one earlier decree had already dealt with it directly. According to Thucydides 8.21, the basic status—forfeited by the revolt of 440—had been voted seven years earlier, in summer 412: Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων.

Whether the ill-preserved *IG* 1³:96 was the instrument of this grant may be doubted.[7] If it was, the antecedent provisions that *IG* 1³:127 presupposes have not, alas, survived. But in any event the Athenians' concerns had by 405 moved on a stage. The Σάμιοι were now to be nothing less than Ἀθηναῖοι. For those of them that had actually come to Athens, an amendment to the main decree (32–40) duly ordered distribution among the ten tribes.[8] Clesophus and his fellow πρυτάνεις were chiefly preoccupied, though, with the newly enfranchised Samians in Samos, those Samians who would be perpetuating the existence of Samos as a polis in its own right. And it seems reasonable to suggest that the understandable difficulties in providing for this unprecedented state of affairs resulted in a thread of argument, through lines 12–18, that obeys its own logic rather than ours. First, thoughts go to the politeia, which can be whatever the Samians want it to be, within reason—that reason to emanate (as the Samians themselves have suggested) from postwar talks between the two communities. Such talks,

6. Ostwald 1982, 48–49.

7. See Andrewes, in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 5:46–47; cf., independently (and on different grounds—moving the date down to ca. 405), Quinn 1981, 19–22; but Quinn's argument is challenged by Shipley 1987, 124–25.

8. Though not, expressly, their constituent demes; see Whitehead 1983.

however, will also embrace *τὰ ἄλλα*. This broader vista then conjures up a more all-embracing topic than the politeia—the *νόμοι*. And this reference to the *νόμοι*—in the Ostwaldian sense, of "the source which issues and guarantees norms"[9]—triggers the mention of *αὐτονομία*.

That my reading of these lines is right and Martin Ostwald's wrong are of course propositions equally incapable of positive proof. In my judgment, nonetheless, we are far from obliged to restrict the application of *αὐτονόμος ὄντας* to the seven words immediately preceding. What is more, if we are looking for contemporary confirmation that *αὐτονομία* did subsume constitutional as well as *nomos*-framing freedom of choice, current restorations—if correct—of the decree concerning Selymbria (quoted above), enacted only three years earlier than *IG* $1^3$:127, add evidence to probability.

In his commentary, Ostwald argues that "the fact that the existing agreements, including regulations on disputes arising between citizens of the two states, form part of a separate clause shows that *αὐτονόμος* refers narrowly to the free use of the Samian lawcode at Samos." I must respectfully submit that this argument lacks force.

Deciding what else is to take place *κατὰ τὸς ὅρκος καὶ τὰς συνθήκας* would be the purest guesswork, so let us concentrate upon the *δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν*. Since, as it seems, these would routinely be heard in the courts of the defendant's home city,[10] that is, in this instance, either Samos or Athens as circumstances might dictate, one can readily agree that lines 17–18 have no bearing on any aspect of Samian law or legal procedure wholly internal to Samos itself. Yet this scarcely warrants referring *αὐτονόμος ὄντας* "narrowly...to the lawcode," and (once again) why must we do so? Coming so soon after talk of *νόμοι* and *αὐτονομία*, the concern of lines 17–18 is, relatively speaking, narrow and technical; but *αὐτονομία* itself, on Ostwald's own showing, was surely a framework flexible enough to encompass not only the continued observance of such technicalities[11] but also the larger societal norms that underpinned it.

Thus far I have sought to question the cogency of arguments expressly employed by Ostwald to justify a narrow application of *αὐτονομία* in *IG* $1^3$:127 (the legal or judiciary system) rather than, as elsewhere, a broad one (the potential of establishing one's own norms). Ostwald's method is essentially that of step-by-step elimination. Set aside constitutional freedom as being covered by *πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλωνται*, and what is left must be law. Subtract, further, interstate law—or at any rate this aspect of

9. Ostwald 1982, 9–10 (encapsulating Ostwald 1969, 26–29).

10. See in brief Meiggs 1972, 229–30; more fully de Ste. Croix 1961, 105–6, 110.

11. For *δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν* in the context of *αὐτονομία* see also the Mytilene and Selymbria decrees cited in text above.

it—and what is left (as the sole object, or beneficiary, of *αὐτονομία*) must be domestic law.

Yet a hidden element in this reasoning needs to be exposed and tested. It concerns the relationship between *νόμος* (or *νόμοι*) and *πολιτεία*. If, by the stage of differentiating between interstate law and domestic law, Ostwald had already demonstrated beyond doubt that the provision *τοῖς δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν αὐτονόμους ὄντας* had a purely legal/judicial connotation, that would strengthen his hand. In fact, however, to do so begs the very question at issue. As I have already indicated, I cannot share Ostwald's confidence that the addition of the clause *αὐτονόμος ὄντας* to the clause about *νόμοι* disqualifies it from being the background to lines 12–18 as a whole, including the guarantee about the politeia. While that in itself might remain a legitimate difference of opinion, there is perhaps a way of resolving it by indirect means. Consider the following phrases:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Thuc. | 2.37.1: | *πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους* |
| | 3.62.3: | *(πόλις) κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα* |
| | 6.18.7: | *οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις...ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν* |
| | 8.97.2: | *νομοθέτας καὶ τἆλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν* |
| Xen. | *Hell.* 2.3.11: | *νόμους καθ' οὕστινας πολιτεύσοιντο* |
| | (cf. 5.3.25: | *νόμους...καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσοιντο)* |
| | 7.1.44: | *κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους νόμους ἡ πολιτεία ἦν* |
| Lys. | 30.35: | *ἐννόμως διοικηθήσεται τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν πάντα* |
| Isoc. | 2.3: | *οἱ νόμοι καθ' οὓς ἕκαστοι πολιτευόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν* |
| | 19.13: | *τὸν Κείων νόμον, καθ' ὃν ἡμεῖς ἐπολιτευόμεθα* |
| [Demos.] | 10.4: | *ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι* |
| Pl. *Lg.* | 950A: | *τοῖς μὲν εὖ πολιτευομένοις διὰ νόμων ὀρθῶν* |
| Arist. *EN* | 1181b 22: | *νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη* (sc. *πολιτεία*) |
| | *Pol.* 1292a 32: | *ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία* |
| | 1292b 12–21: | *τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους...τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν...οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρατοῦσι δ' οἱ μεταβαλόντες τὴν πολιτείαν.* |

Some of the individual items (which could easily be multiplied) in this dossier of evidence present their own problems of interpretation. And I would not deny that there are distinctions to be made within it—between *νόμος* as "statute" and *νόμος* in a broader sense, and between the active

πολιτεύειν and middle πολιτεύεσθαι. Yet whatever importance such distinctions might take on in other circumstances, for our inquiries here the cardinal point is what can be discerned overall about the pre-Aristotelian perception of the relationship between a city's νόμοι and its politeia. Aristotle, as is well recognized, was eager to drive a conceptual wedge between the two (*Pol.* 1289a13–25, 1265a1–2, 1273b32–34, 1274b15–19, 1286a2–7, 1298a17–18; *EN* 1181b7). Furthermore, by providing actual arguments for doing so, he might be reckoned to have shaped our own perceptions quite as much as have the more obvious, yet in this regard more superficial, influences of Plato and his imitator Cicero.[12] Be that as it may, even the rigorous Aristotle could not rid himself entirely of the older conception of πολιτεία as something embraced by νόμος; and of course this persisted well beyond his day.[13] At any rate there seems no good reason whatever to imagine that in 405 any such clearcut, mutually exclusive distinctions were drawn.[14] Instead, Athenians and Samians alike would have understood the politeia of Samos as a product of its νόμοι, statutory or otherwise.[15] And from this it would naturally follow that a mention of the Samian constitution would of itself limit the semantic field neither of νόμοι referred to later nor, I maintain,[16] of the αὐτονομία within which such νόμοι were still to be freely observed.

I have endeavored to show that *IG* 1³:127 need not be thought to sound a pre-echo of the later, narrowly judicial meaning of αὐτονομία.[17] Any compulsion to think that it does can be legitimately resisted if we keep two points in mind.

First, Athenian public documents of the classical period, insofar as they trouble to define concepts like autonomy at all, rarely do so with that rigor

12. On this point see Newman 1902, 142–43.

13. See, e.g., *SIG*³ 526.28–32 (oath of the Itanii, third century—πολιτεό|[σομ]αι...κα|[τὰ τ]οὺς νόμους τοὺς προϋπ|[άρχ]οντας); *SIG*³ 618.10 (letter of C. Manlius Vulso to Heraclea, 188—πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ὑμετέρους νόμους); Plb. 4.76.2 (κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύειν).

14. Conceivably they did originate very shortly afterward, in the decree of Teisamenus (403/2), which began thus: πολιτεύεσθαι Ἀθηναίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος... (Andoc. 1.83). The semantic relationship between these two clauses, however, is far from obvious.

15. The possibility that the Samians' νόμοι did not exist in statutory form is raised by Ostwald himself (1986, 132 n. 143; cf. 1986, 90 on the Samian νόμος in Hdt. 3.48.3).

16. Quinn too (1981, 74 n. 55) makes the assumption, without pausing to test its validity, that the confirmation of autonomy encompasses the politeia provision.

17. For that later meaning, Ostwald (1982, 68 n. 262; cf. 1982, 62 n. 155), following Bickerman, cites Cicero *Att.* 6.2.4 (*omnes* [sc. *civitates*] *suis legibus et iudiciis usae* αὐτονομίαν *adeptae revixerunt*), *An. Gr.* 1:466 Bekker (αὐτονομουμένη πόλις· ἡ τοῖς ἑαυτῆς νόμοις χρωμένη καὶ οὐχ ὑπακούουσα ἑτέροις), and Σ Thuc. 2.29.2 (αὐτόνομον· ἰδίοις νόμοις χρώμενον). It strikes me that only the first of these passages proffers anything unambiguous, but I cannot pursue the point here.

and precision that is (rightly) the scholar's stock-in-trade. A reasonable parallel to Martin Ostwald's impeccably logical approach to, say, the Delphi clause in the Peace of Nicias (*αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους*, Thuc. 5.18.2)[18] would be my own attempts, some years ago, to distill a clear definition of the noncitizens' privilege (*ἰσοτελεία*) in fourth-century Athens—attempts that some have insisted were predestined to failure.[19]

Second, if the Athenians did indeed spell out what they meant by Samian autonomy—and it would seem barely conceivable that at some stage they did not—this took place not in 405 but in 412. Thus, to regard *IG* $1^3$:127 as revealing anything directly about Samian autonomy is to see it in the wrong light. Athens' far-flung hegemony was now in ruins, her defeat inevitable and imminent. If, as Bickerman and Ostwald have shown us, the whole essence of *αὐτονομία* was its predetermination by force majeure, that condition, as far as Athens and Samos were concerned, no longer obtained. The Athenians' response was mass enfranchisement for the Samians. "This may have seemed," wrote Russell Meiggs, "an empty gesture."[20] But applied to the decree as a whole, this dismissal is too sweeping. What was truly empty was the allusion to autonomy—a guarantee that Athens was no longer in a position to give, and for which Athens and Samos alike would now have to look, however forlornly, to Lysander and the Spartans.

## Appendix: Αὐτοτελεῖς in the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.2)

The provision runs as follows: *τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*. According to Ostwald (1982, 7), "*αὐτοτελεῖς* includes the injunction that Delphi must pay tribute to neither a superior power nor to a confederacy but be left to determine the disposal of her finances without outside interference." Beyond a small injection of caution (in the word "includes"), this faithfully echoes Gomme (Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 3:667): "Delphi was not to pay tribute either to a superior power as *ὑποτελεῖς*, or as a member of a federation as *ξυντελεῖς* (cf. iv.76.3)."

But can it really be right? I certainly do not deny that *ξυντελής* (or *συντελής*) and, especially, *ὑποτελεῖς* and their cognate verbs were com-

18. Ostwald 1982, 7. See Appendix below.

19. See Whitehead 1977, 12 (reiterated in Whitehead 1984, 9). Pro: Henry 1983, 246, 249. Con: Rhodes 1981, 653–54; Osborne 1981–83, 2:33 n. 91.

20. Meiggs 1972, 357.

monly used in the fifth and fourth centuries to describe, or imply, the mandatory surrender of monies from entity A to (specified or unspecified) entity B, which controls or subsumes it (see LSJ under the relevant words). Since when, though, was *αὐτο-* the opposite of *συν-* or *ὑπο-*? If *αὐτοτελεῖς* possessed the meaning Gomme claimed, its complete absence from our literary and documentary sources on classical imperialism would be rather astonishing. And Gomme's way of construing the word does not square very well with the meanings that classical (and later) writers provide: "with full powers" ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.5, 53.2); "complete in itself" (Arist. *Pol.* 1325b20); and so on. (Hyperides' *ψήφισμα αὐτοτελές*, *Eux.* 15, is a technical term of some kind, if one can credit Hesychius, *αὐτοτελὲς ψήφισμα*) On the contrary, if these other usages are relevant at all, they encourage us to look within Delphi for the meaning and significance of *αὐτοτελεῖς* in this treaty. Had *αὐτονόμους* not preempted it there, a case might have been made for interpreting *αὐτοτελεῖς* in a broad and sweeping sense, tantamount indeed to *αὐτονόμους* itself. But in context—preceded, that is, by *αὐτονόμους* and followed by *αὐτοδίκους*—the word seems most naturally to convey the idea that the Delphians shall be interference-free in raising their own revenues (cf. Whitehead 1976) as well as in running their own courts.

24

# A Dedication from the Chersonese at Olympia

A. J. Graham

κεῖνται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα ἄξια ἐπιμνησθῆναι, μάχαιρα ἡ Πέλοπος χρυσοῦ τὴν λαβὴν πεποιημένη, καὶ εἰργασμένον ἐλέφαντος κέρας τὸ Ἀμαλθείας, ἀνάθημα Μιλτιάδου τοῦ Κίμωνος, ὃς ⟨τὴν⟩ ἀρχὴν ἔσχεν ἐν χερρονήσῳ τῇ Θρᾳκίᾳ πρῶτος τῆς οἰκίας ταύτης· καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπὶ τῷ κέρατί ἐστιν ἀρχαίοις Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι·

Ζηνί μ' ἄγαλμ' ἀνέθηκαν Ὀλυμπίῳ ἐκ χερονήσου
τεῖχος ἑλόντες Ἀράτου· ἐπῆρχε δὲ Μιλτιάδης σφίν.

Paus. 6.19.6

AS HAS OFTEN BEEN OBSERVED,[1] Pausanias' account of the ivory horn of plenty[2] that was preserved in the Sicyonian Treasury at Olympia contains an obvious error. Herodotus' well-known story of the colonization of the Thracian Chersonese (6.34–38) makes it clear that the Elder Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, established the family's rule there, not his nephew, Miltiades the Younger, son of Cimon and victor of Marathon. The same confusion is found elsewhere in late sources,[3] and it seems probable that Pausanias had no more information than the dedicatory inscription that he quotes.[4]

1. See, e.g., Hitzig and Blümner 1904, 2.2:630–31.

2. For the horn of Amalthea see the thorough article by Wernicke in *RE* 1.2:1720–23. An early account is in Pherecydes (*FGrH* 3 F 42).

3. E.g., Nep. *Milt.* 1–2; Σ Aristid. *Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων* 168.3 Dindorf (3:551–52), where the scholiast must be thinking of Miltiades, son of Cimon, since he is the subject of the passage in Aristides on which he comments.

4. Kinzl 1968, 113–14. In detailed studies of some of the inscriptions copied at Olympia by Pausanias, Gallavotti (1978a, 1979) suggests that he may have been using a collection that already existed. His main arguments in favor of this hypothesis (1978a, 3) are the facts that there are hardly any inscriptions quoted in the books about Athens and that when Pausanias

It is difficult to decide whether Pausanias' mistake lay in the patronymic or in the statement that the dedicator established the family's rule in the Chersonese. In favor of the view that Miltiades, son of Cimon, made the dedication may be the Corinthian helmet found at Olympia and inscribed Μιλτιάδες ἀνέ[θ]ε κεν: τ]ô[ι Δί.[5] While a helmet of this style could have been made in the lifetime of Miltiades the Elder, as Kunze stated, both shape and inscription better suit the time of the Younger Miltiades.[6] The two unusual features of the dedicatory inscription, the omissions of both the *ethnikon* and the name of the enemy, if they need explanation, surely find it best in the assumption that the helmet formed part of the booty of Marathon, a battle so famous that it needed no further indication than the name of the victorious Athenian commander.[7] One recalls the self-confident use of name alone in the notorious dedicatory inscription of Pausanias the Regent after Plataea (Thuc. 1.132.2). Whether or not that is right, if the helmet was dedicated by the Younger Miltiades, as seems most probable, the analogous use of the name Miltiades alone might suggest that he also dedicated the horn of Amalthea.

Such a conclusion would, however, go against the consensus of published opinion on the subject, which prefers Miltiades the Elder.[8] It is true that most of those commentators wrote before the discovery of the helmet just mentioned. Even so, the arguments in favor of the preferred identifica-

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does refer to an inscription at Olympia that he clearly knows personally, he merely paraphrases in prose; e.g., the inscription on the base of the Nike of Paeonius; see 5.26.1. Gallavotti does not treat the dedication at 6.19.6.

5. See Kunze 1956, 69–74; for the inscription, Lazzarini 1976, no. 114. The restoration of the interpunctuation is justified by Kunze by the spacing of the letters but is perhaps rather bold.

6. See Kunze 1956, 70–71. The helmet is very similar to nos. 151–52 in Kukahn 1936, pl. 4.1–2. Those were found in a Corinthian grave, with Black Figure pottery dated to the beginning of the fifth century (Kukahn 1936, 46). Kukahn established that this form of helmet came in about the middle of the sixth century (45–47). Precise dating is also made difficult by the long working life of a Greek helmet; see Pflug 1988, 66–67.

7. Kunze's argument that Miltiades would not have dared to omit the *ethnikon* after his return to Athens, since he would again arouse the fear of tyranny (cf. Hdt. 6.104.2), seems unconvincing. After Marathon, Miltiades' prestige made him untouchable until his failure at Paros (Hdt. 6.132–36). And Kunze's explanation for the two omissions—that the helmet was not part of dedicated booty but Miltiades' own, which he had worn in battle—is not only without support, but seems improbable and farfetched. (It is repeated by Jucker 1964.) In any case, Kunze himself later discovered another helmet of the same period, which bears an inscription of precisely the same form (Δείνανδρος [τ]ᾶ Δὶ Ὀλυνπ[ί]οι) and only differs from Miltiades' in that the dedicator is unknown to us; see Kunze 1967, 107–8; *SEG* 24:309. This might suggest that we do not need to look for special explanations for the form of Miltiades' dedicatory inscription.

8. See, e.g., (to keep to modern times) *RE* 2.1:400; Kirchner 1901, no.10209; Hitzig and Blümner 1904, 2.2:630; *RE* 15.2:1680–81; Berve 1937, 39; von Blumenthal 1937 (by implication); Bengtson 1939, 13 n. 4; Kahrstedt 1954, 8; Kunze 1955, 7–8; Kunze 1956, 70 n. 4.

tion were hardly decisive. It was felt, first, that Pausanias would more easily make a slip in the patronymic than perpetrate a whole false statement. That may well be right in terms of probability but need not have been so in fact. The second argument seems more substantial. Pausanias states at 6.10.8, where he is talking about winners of the chariot race, that he will give Miltiades' dedications in another part of his work. Since the passage 6.19.6 is the only place in our extant text where a dedication of a Miltiades is mentioned, some have concluded that it must represent the fulfillment of the undertaking of 6.10.8.[9] In that case the dedicator of the horn of Amalthea should be Miltiades the Elder, a winner of the chariot race (Hdt. 6.36.1). However others have justifiably objected that the fit between the two passages is not good.[10] At 6.10.8, Pausanias speaks of dedications in the plural and clearly implies that they related to victories in the chariot race. So it seems rather unlikely that the dedication of 6.19.6 was in his mind and better to assume that the promise of 6.10.8 was not kept. The weakness of these two arguments does not, of course, exclude the possibility that the dedicator of the horn of Amalthea was Miltiades the Elder. We know that he fought various campaigns in the Hellespontine region,[11] any one of which might have included the capture of Ἀράτου τεῖχος.

It might be thought that those words, Ἀράτου τεῖχος, should offer another approach to the problem.[12] The name Aratus is certainly Greek, but we know of no individual of that name who might be involved in the right area at the right time.[13] In any case, such strongholds with such names were typical of the region,[14] so the name in itself tells us nothing definite

9. Kunze 1955, 7–8; Kunze 1956, 70 n. 4; but the argument is an old one; cf. Hitzig and Blümner 1904, 2.2:584–85 (n. to 6.10.8).

10. Hitzig and Blümner 1904, 2.2:584–85 (n. to 6.10.8); Kinzl 1968, 113–14 n. 6.

11. Hdt. 6.37.1: ἀποτειχίσας ὧν τὸν αὐχένα τῆς Χερσονήσου ὁ Μιλτιάδης καὶ τοὺς Ἀψινθίους τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ ὡσάμενος τῶν λοιπῶν πρώτοισι ἐπολέμησε Λαμψακηνοῖσι. Stein may have been overprecise in glossing τῶν λοίπων "sc. πολεμίων," but the indication of various military involvements is clear.

12. Von Blumenthal (1937, 476–77) conjectured Ἀράζου, in place of Ἀράτου, arguing from Ἄραζος in St. Byz., a city πρὸς τῷ Πόντῳ, named after Ἀράζου τοῦ ἡγησαμένου, and from the easy confusion of zeta and tau in old Attic lettering. Much earlier Ἀράπλου had been suggested (see Preger 1891, 54 n.) on the basis of ps.-Scylax 67, Ἄραπλος, but that reading is itself disputed; see *GGM* 1:n. ad loc. Editors have rightly declined to admit these conjectures into their texts, though Ἀράζου was accepted by Bengtson (1939, 13 n. 4), and Kahrstedt admitted it as an alternative possibility (his Ἀράξου being presumably a misprint), though without acknowledgment (1954, 10). Kinzl (1968, 113 n. 6) preferred Ἀράπλου.

13. Cf. Hitzig and Blümner (1904, 2.2:630), who even maintain that our ignorance of any individual so named in this period justifies the assumption that it certainly was just a place name, *Aratouteikhos*. But that grossly overestimates the extent of our knowledge. Better the simple confession of ignorance, as, e.g., by Berve (1937, 39) and Kahrstedt (1954, 10).

14. Cf. ps.-Scylax 67, where there are several examples, and Hdt. 9.115, where Sestos is called a τεῖχος.

about the enemy who held it. Either the Elder or the Younger Miltiades could well have taken such a place from either Greek or barbarian opponents, and it is easy to excogitate more complicated possibilities.

The evidence and arguments so far considered seem insufficient to decide which Miltiades made the dedication reported by Pausanias, and those scholars who have left the question open seem well advised.[15] However, this is not the only historical question raised by the dedication. The wording of the inscription has been brought into the argument over whether there existed a "state" of the Chersonesitans in the sixth century.[16] Kahrstedt argued that the description of the dedicators as "the men from the Chersonese" was chosen not in order to avoid the term *Chersonesitans* as incorrect but for metrical reasons.[17] The reading and translation of the passage are involved in this argument.

Although he gave no references, Kahrstedt accepted the conjecture *οὐκ* (= *οἱ ἐκ*) for the *ἐκ* of the manuscripts. This reading was proposed long ago by Philipp Buttmann and was designed, like Preger's alternative, *οἱ 'κ*, to provide acceptable Greek for the translation "the men from the Chersonese dedicated me as an offering to Olympian Zeus, having taken the fort of Aratus."[18] According to Threatte, the crasis *οὐκ* is not attested in Attic inscriptions as representing *οἱ ἐκ*, and *οἱ 'κ* is similarly unexampled.[19] In the most recent critical edition of Pausanias, both conjectures are silently condemned by their absence from the apparatus.[20]

The absence of the article has not deterred translators from rendering the passage as if it were there, as a few examples show:

> Me Iovi Olympiaco posuit donum Cheronesus,
> Miltiadis ductu, quum moenia cepit Arati.

15. E.g., Rumpf 1936, 63; Friedländer and Hoffleit 1948, no. 52 nn.; Kinzl 1968, 113–14; Isaac 1986, 172–73.

16. See Kahrstedt 1954, esp. 8–9 (with references to earlier literature); Ehrenberg 1946, 121–28.

17. Kahrstedt 1954, 8.

18. Buttmann's conjecture appears first in the apparatus of Bekker's edition of 1826–27 and was apparently not published separately. Presumably it was one of the ingenious conjectures of his friends, which Bekker admitted into his editions; see the remarks of Schubart and Walz 1838, xi. It is curious that von Blumenthal (1937, 476) proposed the same conjectural emendation without any reference to Buttmann. He argued that in old Attic *οὐκ* would be written *hoκ*, which would easily be changed into *ἐκ*. Preger (1891, no. 54; note "*scripsi*") defended his introduction here of prodelision (or aphaeresis) on the grounds that Attic writers did not observe the rule about crasis so strictly that they did not depart from it to avoid ambiguity. But he offers no instances of what was in his mind.

19. Threatte 1980, 426–27, 429–34.

20. Rocha-Pereira 1977.

I was dedicated as an offering to Olympian Zeus by the men of Chersonese
After they had taken the stronghold of Aratus: Their leader was Miltiades.

To Olympian Zeus was I dedicated by the men of Chersonesus,
After they had taken the fortress of Aratus. Their leader was Miltiades.

They from the Chersonese set me up as a delight to Olympian Zeus
after seizing the fortress of Aratus; Miltiades was their commander.

Consecrated to the delight of Olympian Zeus by Chersonesians
who took the fortress of Aratos; Miltiades commanded.[21]

However, this rendering does not seem likely to be correct. If we keep to the transmitted text and observe the natural order of the Greek, it is the ἄγαλμα that is from the Chersonese. To give the place of origin of a dedication with ἐκ/ἐξ is a common feature of Archaic wording. Take, for instance, the inscription on the gold bowl of the Cypselids: Ϙυψελίδαι ἀνέθεν ἐξ Ἡρακλείας.[22] So a close translation of our epigram should read: "To Olympian Zeus they dedicated me, a pleasing gift from the Chersonese, those who took Aratus' fort. Miltiades was their commander."[23]

21. Respectively, Schubart and Walz 1838 (although the decision to translate into Latin hexameters may be constraining, *Cheronesus*, as the subject of the verb of dedicating, must be understood as a community, state, or the like); Frazer 1898, 312; W. H. S. Jones 1933; Friedländer and Hoffleit 1948, no. 52; Levi 1971, 2:339.

22. *SEG* 1:94.

23. In all the works I have consulted, the epigram appears to have been understood in this way only by Krafft (1877, 134), who paraphrases: "die Gabe aus dem Chersones gesandt worden, nachdem die Eroberung eines Ἀράτου τεῖχος, dessen Lage nicht bezeichnet werden kann, unter Anführung des Militades gelungen war." It is unfortunately not strictly possible to be sure how he took the Greek in detail from such a loose paraphrase, but it is obviously possible that he understood ἐκ Χερονήσου with ἄγαλμα. Isaac's very literal translation (Isaac 1986, 172–73: "They dedicated me as a delight to Olympian Zeus from Chersonesos, having taken *teichos* Araton [sic]. Their leader was Miltiades") might suggest that he also understood the epigram in this way. But his discussion shows that to be an illusion, for he uses the epigram to prove that Miltiades (I or II) was a tyrant over the people of the Chersonese: "The one original document we have, signed by a Miltiades...shows us an absolute ruler over an unspecified group of people on the Chersonese." So he follows the traditional interpretation.

The absence of the definite article with ἑλόντες would certainly seem strange in classical prose,[24] but it is not so in poetry, where the example of Homer may be presumed to be one reason for its frequent nonexpression.[25] Another reason suggested for the common omission of the article in verse is that it is a feature of high style to avoid simple expressions that only increase understanding.[26] That explanation would be particularly apt in the case of our epigram, which belongs to a type that is mildly enigmatic and holds back information about the dedicator(s).

A striking example of this type is the Attic dedication on the base of a bronze statuette, which has been dated by its letter forms to the end of the sixth century:

πᾶσιν ἴσ' ἀνθρόποις ὑποκρίνομαι ὅστις ἐ[ρο]τᾶι·
ὅς μ' ἀνέθεκ' ἀνδρῶν· Ἀντιφάνες δεκάτεν.[27]

Hansen has rightly followed the interpretation of Crönert,[28] which leads to the following translation: "To all men I answer alike, whoever asks, who among men dedicated me? Antiphanes, as a tithe." The epigram envisages a dialogue with its reader, who has to proceed to the end of the rather riddling, teasing words before he receives the answer he seeks. On the bronze, this character of the epigram is made much more obvious by the disposition of the inscription, since the reader has to follow the writing almost twice round the base before reaching the end of the maze.[29] This operation may even have been made slightly more difficult by the presence of the now missing statuette. Lazzarini is able to adduce another good example of this type of epigram, her no. 688 from Halicarnassus, which is formally similar

24. Cf. KG 2.1:608–9, where the rule is stated that the article is used with participles to express a determined person or persons, and that when omitted it shows that they are indeterminate. This is often clear from the examples cited, but contrast Pl. *Lg.* 7.795b (διαφέρει δὲ πάμπολυ μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γυμνασαμένου), which is naturally found "auffallend."

25. See, e.g., Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948, 52), who reject the emendation οὐκ on the grounds that the article is not necessary in the epic style; Bers (1984, 11), who writes of the "omission (or, better, nonexpression) of the definite article in poetry as compared with all varieties of prose"; and Wackernagel (1920, 2:147–50). For the details of Homeric usage in this respect see Chantraine 1963, 2:sec. 466; cf. Wackernagel 1920, 2:128–29.

26. Wackernagel 1920, 2:148.

27. Hansen 1983, no. 286; Lazzarini 1976, no. 658 (though with markedly inferior readings to Hansen's). Lazzarini follows the suggestions of Beloch reported in *SEG* 3:45. The same errors vitiate the text of Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948, no. 131) and destroy the value of their translation.

28. W. Crönert 1925, 2050.

29. See the drawing in *IG*1²:vi, and photograph; Lazzarini 1976, pl. 2.3.

and of the same period.[30] The same character can be seen in our epigram. Who dedicated it is not expressed at all with the verb. Partial information comes with the participial clause in the second line. But the full revelation is given only in the final phrase—and even then only for readers with the knowledge and intelligence to understand—by the naming of Miltiades. The dedicators were his followers. One would love to know how the words were disposed on the object.

If this interpretation of the dedicatory epigram is right, does it help to clarify the inscription's historical significance? The dedicators are no longer defined as "the men of the Chersonese," so the document does not seem to contribute to the debate about the existence of a state of the Chersonesitans. However, Herodotus makes it plain that there was such a political entity under the rule of the Philaids,[31] and his testimony is clearly confirmed by coins,[32] so we do not need the epigram in that debate. It may be significant, nevertheless, that the dedicators are only defined as men commanded by Miltiades, without any *ethnikon* or other designation.[33] We know that Miltiades the Elder, the *oikistes*, led both Thracian Dolonci and Athenians on his initial expedition (Hdt. 6.36.1). We also know that the Younger Miltiades employed a force of mercenaries (Hdt. 6.39.2). It is probable that both leaders, in all their military actions, used forces of varied origin and status, for whom the sole unifying factor was the person of their commander. This may be the reality that the words of the dedication accurately reflect.

At some risk of pressing the evidence too hard, one could also employ the following argument. If the object dedicated was "from the Chersonese," and if it formed part of the booty taken at the capture of the fort of Aratus,[34]

30. Lazzarini 1976, 129–30.

31. 6.38.1 (the Chersonesitae establish the worship of Miltiades the *oikistes*); 39.2 (the Chersonesitae...from all the cities, the men in power, come together to join in mourning with the newly arrived Miltiades the Younger); 103.4 (Miltiades the Elder described as *oikistes* of the Chersonese); 4.137.1 (Miltiades the Younger described as the *strategos* and tyrant of the Cheronesitai on the Hellespont). It may also be significant that he calls the inhabitants of Sestos Chersonesitae (9.118.2, 9.120.1). There are, naturally, many questions of detailed interpretation, which it is not necessary to go into here. See the references in n. 16 above.

32. Kahrstedt 1954, 8–9. For these Attic weight tetradrachms see Head 1911, 257; Seltman 1955, 86–87; Kraay 1976, 158. The inscription XEP on one of these rare coins establishes their origin clearly enough. Athena's head on the obverse has an obvious reference; the lion with head turned back on the reverse is thought to refer to the Milesian origin of Cardia. The general opinion of the numismatists is that the issue belongs to the reign of the Younger Miltiades.

33. Berve 1937, 39.

34. Dr. E. Knauer has suggested to me that the horn of Amalthea was an actual drinking horn, part of the booty captured at the fort, rather than a work of art created specially for the dedication and paid for from part of the proceeds of the spoils. It does not seem to me possible

that fort should be situated within the Chersonese.[35] Even that conclusion would still leave too many possibilities for the campaign to be pinpointed with any certainty. The Younger Miltiades had to establish his rule by trickery and force (or the threat of force [Hdt. 6.39.2]), and it is possible that his later flight from the Scythians and subsequent return involved fighting within the Chersonese, even though there is no record of it in Herodotus' brief account (6.40). But if there was one time when it is highly likely that it was necessary to take by force fortresses within the Chersonese, it was when Miltiades the Elder initially established his rule over the peninsula, and made it secure from the threats of the Apsinthians. So at the least one might say that the dedication could have been part of the booty taken on that occasion by the forces of Miltiades the Elder.

But these are only possibilities, and it would be unwise to press such exiguous and uncertain evidence too hard. This reexamination of the historical significance of the dedication reported by Pausanias could hardly be expected to yield new and certain historical conclusions. It will be enough if a more correct understanding of the epigram excludes false historical deductions and defines more accurately the possible historical circumstances of an important, fascinating, and tantalizing dedication.

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to choose between these possibilities. Rumpf (1936, 62–63) showed that artistic representations of horns of plenty certainly existed by the time of this dedication. However, it is also true that drinking horns were prevalent in the area and at the time; see Ath. 11.476; Xen. *An.* 7.3.21–25; Jacobsthal 1944, 1:111–14. And some of the ancient accounts make the horn of Amalthea an actual bull's horn; Pherecydes (*FGrH* 3 F 42); Str. 10.2.19 (C 458).

35. Contrast Berve (1937, 39), who, using the received translation, suggested that ἐκ Χερονήσου might imply that Aratus' fort was outside the Chersonese proper, presumably thinking that, because the men were from the Chersonese, the fort should be outside it and so possibly a stronghold of the Apsinthians. But he rightly recognized the uncertainty of such a supposition, which is excluded by the translation I am advocating.

25

# The Polis in the Hellenistic World

Erich S. Gruen

MARTIN OSTWALD has ventured all too rarely into the Hellenistic world. That subject is the poorer for it. Students of political institutions have, on the whole, shied away from the era of "Hellenismus." Its reputation as a time of decline and deterioration long discouraged serious research. A central feature of that reputation rested on a widespread conviction: that the Hellenistic period witnessed the failure of the polis.

The scholarship of recent years has done much to revive respect for the cultural contributions of the age, for its poetry, philosophy, science, art, and religion. But the institutional structures continue to draw fire. The prevailing image remains that of the corrosion of civic spirit. Emphasis shifted from the polis to the cosmopolis. The vast conquests of Alexander the Great and the ambitions of his successors altered the balance drastically and irremediably. Instead of the manageable machinery of the compact city-state, individuals confronted an array of large and distant political forms: monarchies, nation-states, federal leagues, and imperial dominions. The once proud institutions of Greek cities endured only as hollow survivals. Traditional loyalties yielded to the demands of security. Hellenistic kings determined the fate and governed the policies of the cities within their spheres. The monarchs could be benefactors or oppressors, posing as advocates of liberty while entrenching control and dominance. Poleis became the playthings of the great powers. Such are the conventional clichés of the subject.[1]

It is with special pleasure and affection that I offer this chapter to Martin Ostwald, my first mentor in ancient history, and the man whose advice sent me into this field, with much benefit to me (if not to the field).

1. See, e.g., Tarn and Griffith 1952, 79: "Man as a political animal, a fraction of the polis or self-governing city-state, had ended with Aristotle"; Ehrenberg 1969, 190–204: "the Polis was something alien to the nature of the Hellenistic state...the Polis in none of the Hellenistic

The matter demands renewed scrutiny. How valid, in fact, are these platitudes about the Hellenistic polis? Is it the case that the cities enjoyed only a sham autonomy, lacked independent authority, and carried no serious impact on the course of historical events? Could they no longer generate the enthusiasm, devotion, and civic pride that had once characterized the heyday of the classical polis? A challenge to those propositions is overdue. Even in the age of the superpowers and gargantuan Hellenistic empires, the polis held its place as a focus for loyalty and affection.

The role of the polis in the world of international diplomacy provides an appropriate starting point. As is well known, assurance of freedom and autonomy for Greek cities was a common feature of diplomatic discourse. Hellenistic kings or dynasts regularly bestowed such guarantees upon communities within their spheres of influence or with which they had some connection.[2] Ptolemy I in the early third century magnanimously "liberated" the smaller islands of the central Aegean, granting them their ancestral laws and constitutions, and awarding them exemption from taxes.[3] Similar wording exists in a letter from the Seleucid king Antiochus I to the city of Erythrae, affirming autonomy and freedom from tribute.[4] One could readily multiply examples. Third-century monarchs repeatedly issued declarations that guaranteed ἐλευθερία, αὐτονομία, and δημοκρατία.[5] Such phrases became part of the conventional language of the eastern Mediterranean, whether in the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, or Antigonid realms. For that very reason, of course, they have been devalued or undervalued, called empty sloganeering and formalistic pap. After all, the monarchs are bestowers of awards and guarantors of privilege. Does this not simply underscore the source of ultimate authority? Antiochus III, in fact, had the gall to say, while his

states had any share in the general life of the state"; similarly, Glotz 1928, 448; Kreissig 1974, 1074–84; Préaux 1967–68, 408–60. Even Green, in his excellent new survey (1990), repeats some of the clichés (80, 337, 343–44, 382, 394, 453, 587, 589). A more moderate position, but one in essential agreement, is expressed by Will (1988, 329–35). The monarch's relationship with the city obtains a legalistic treatment in Heuss (1937). Informal dependence of the polis, underscored by euergetism, is stressed by Veyne (1990, 85–131). One may find a valuable corrective in Gauthier 1984, 82–107. But Gauthier too dwells upon royal *euergesia* and polis traditions, also discerning a decline in civic spirit, though one that does not manifest itself until the late Hellenistic period. On social and cultural relations among Hellenistic poleis see J. K. Davies in *CAH*² 7.1:304–20; and the fine treatment of Giovannini (forthcoming).

2. Cf. Heuss 1937,.216–44; Bernhardt 1971, 4–18; Mastrocinque 1977. On the origins of αὐτονομία as a concept in interstate relations see the incisive arguments in Ostwald 1982.

3. *SIG*³ 390, lines 11–16: Πτολεμαῖος πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος ἐγένετο τοῖς τε Νησιώταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν τάς τε πόλεις ἐλευθερώσας καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀποδοὺς καὶ τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν πᾶσιν καταστήσας καὶ τῶν εἰσφορῶν κουφίσας.

4. *OGIS* 223, lines 21–28.

5. On δημοκρατία in this context see Musti 1966, 138–45. The term is taken too literally by Quass (1979, 37–52).

troops besieged the towns of Lampsacus and Smyrna in 196, that those cities would have their freedom—but only after they acknowledged that it was his gift to give and not theirs to take.[6] No wonder declarations of autonomy have been dismissed as vacuous propaganda.[7]

The imposition of modern realism and cynicism, however, may have misconceived the Greek mentality. Standard contrasts between classical Greece and the Hellenistic period have bedeviled the subject. To be sure, the heyday of Athens and Sparta was over. Those once great powers no longer held central stage or exercised predominant influence on the course of events. For the vast majority of Greek cities, however, how drastic a change had been wrought by the arrival of the Hellenistic era? At various times in the fifth and fourth centuries the small—and even not so small—poleis came under the sway of Persian rule, the Athenian empire, Spartan hegemony, or the overlordship of Philip of Macedon. And these relationships, too, were generally accompanied by pronouncements of autonomy and adherence to ancestral institutions.[8] If this was devaluation of the linguistic currency, it applies as much to the classical as to the Hellenistic age. There had been no transition to degeneracy across a chronological divide. For lesser cities, the protection of a greater power was often desirable, and the association quite welcome.

Nor should one infer that declarations of freedom and autonomy were nothing but pious frauds, a facade to screen the real exercise of authority. The celebrated announcement at the Isthmian Games of 196 merits notice in this connection. Rome's conquering general, T. Quinctius Flamininus, victor over Philip V in the Second Macedonian War, gathered representatives of the Greeks and made a startling statement. He proclaimed that the Greeks were to be free, subject to no tribute, and at liberty to govern themselves with their own ancestral laws.[9] The audience who heard those words, we are told, was stunned by disbelief at first, then broke into wild applause and shouts of glee that rang out with such force that birds flying overhead were shattered by the noise and fell dead to the ground.[10] That particular report, despite its embellishments, carries import that has been inadequately appreciated. The phraseology of Flamininus was hardly novel. Indeed it followed closely in the paths long demarcated by Hellenistic rulers and Greek

6. Livy 33.38.5–7.

7. So, e.g., Orth 1977, 53–55, 111–16, 178–80; de Ste. Croix 1981, 302–3; and, most vigorously, Green 1990, 196–98. For a more cautious treatment see Musti in *CAH*[2] 7.1:204–9.

8. The point is wisely made by Gauthier 1984, 86.

9. Plb. 18.46.5, 18.46.15; Livy 33.32.5, 33.33.5–7, 34.41.3, 39.37.10; Plut. *Flam.* 10.4, 12.2; App. *Mac.* 9.4.

10. Plut. *Flam.* 10.4, 12.2.

tradition. What astonished the gathering in Corinth was to hear those familiar phrases in the mouth of a Roman. Nothing of the kind had been anticipated. Greeks had expected the worst.[11] The elation expressed at the Isthmian Games requires emphasis. The Hellenic crowds obviously reckoned the language of autonomy as meaningful and telling, no mere empty posturing or political mirage. As in the case of relations with Hellenistic monarchs, the expressions denoted the favor of the greater power and respect for the privileges of the lesser. The joy exhibited at Corinth signifies that the freedom of the polis, however restricted in practice, remained a concept precious to those who dwelled in a city and who continued to place a high value on its institutions.

The enduring sense of esteem can be illustrated in the sphere of interstate relations. The epigraphic record includes numerous treaties of alliance and cooperation. Some, to be sure, involve Hellenistic monarchs as contracting agents. But the vast majority consist of agreements between and among individual city-states. One representative example is a pact between Rhodes and the Cretan city of Hierapytna ca. 200 B.C. The *συμμαχία* took a conventional form, a defensive alliance, committing both partners to mutual support in the event of attack by other parties and providing for full-scale collaboration. Solemn oaths were sworn by the peoples of both cities, and the treaty was duly inscribed for public exhibit in each site.[12] Agreements that concluded a war and established new relations among former adversaries show comparable features. A peace treaty between Magnesia and Miletus in the early second century confirmed territorial boundaries, restored property and prisoners, and pledged peace and friendship for all time. It too was accompanied by an oath to be administered to the Magnesians and Milesians. More interesting still, as the document informs us, this agreement was witnessed by a host of representatives from various other poleis from both the Aegean and mainland Greece, who had helped to effect the reconciliation.[13] There is no hint of the presence of Hellenistic kings or monarchical influence in the document—or indeed in most documents of this sort. One will not, of course, claim that such compacts between poleis held significant weight in the power politics of the eastern Mediterranean or that they bear comparison with alliances involving wealthy kingdoms that could marshal myriads of mercenaries. But the very existence of treaties between poleis, with the pledges of their citizenry and the attestation of external witnesses, possesses real significance. It publicly

11. Cf. Gruen 1984, 132–46.

12. *SIG*³ 581.

13. *SIG*³ 588—usually dated to 196, but perhaps a decade later, according to the recent argument of Errington (1989, 279–88).

displayed the continued vitality of the polis, its political and territorial integrity, and its autonomous posture. The fact that contracting partners had little clout on the larger international scene in no way diminishes this manifestation of their diplomatic identity. That was the identity to which its citizens related and with which they associated. Considerations of *realpolitik* must not be allowed to minimize the psychological and emotional importance of that attachment.

The point can be further underscored in another sphere of diplomatic activity—the involvement of cities in international arbitration. The practice existed already in the classical period but came to full flower in the Hellenistic era.[14] An impressive quantity of epigraphic documents attests to verdicts delivered by particular poleis serving as impartial arbiters and settling controversies between two or more states. So, for instance, Megara intervened to mediate a boundary dispute between Epidaurus and Corinth ca. 240. The decree recording the Megarian decision presents the territorial delineation in precise detail.[15] Or, on the other side of the Aegean, Rhodes effected a settlement between Samos and Priene ca. 190.[16] The arbitrating city need not come from the vicinity of the disputants. In a case dating to 138, a territorial disagreement between Sparta and Messene was adjudicated by arbiters from Miletus.[17] Numerous other instances exist to illustrate the institution. States regularly had recourse to third parties in territorial contests, according them full authority to pronounce verdicts and agreeing in advance to abide by those verdicts. The repeated appointment of such arbiters by individual poleis reaffirmed international recognition of the polis as an integral and effective unit.

A very similar but distinct practice confirms that conclusion. Impartial judges were summoned with increasing frequency by one city from another, not to adjudicate quarrels between states, but to decide cases between citizens of the same state. That institution too has a rich epigraphic record. For the most part, the extant inscriptions, over two hundred in number, express the gratitude of a polis toward the "foreign judges" sent by another city to resolve an internal controversy. Nearly all fall in the period of the third and second centuries.[18] So, for example, a decree by the people of Samos honors and accords privileges to judges who had been sent by Myndus ca. 280 to

14. Testimony on arbitration in the period prior to 338 B.C. is collected by Piccirilli (1973). A new volume, on the Hellenistic period is awaited (Ager, forthcoming). Older collections can still be consulted: Sonne 1888; Raeder 1912; Tod 1913.

15. *SIG*³ 471.

16. *SIG*³ 599.

17. *SIG*³ 683.

18. See the summary in L. Robert 1973, 765–82.

settle a dispute among Samian citizens. The decree itself would be inscribed and installed in the sanctuary of Hera in Myndus.[19]

This practice, as it happens, has often served to advance the thesis of polis disintegration during the Hellenistic age. An ostensibly logical conclusion emerges: Cities could no longer manage their own affairs, no longer had confidence in their own citizens to deliver fair judgments, and thus had to resort to outside help. The routine, so it is held, signifies a failure of civic institutions and reflects discredit upon the machinery of the polis. Communities had yielded authority to a growing body of international judicial specialists.[20] That interpretation is singularly misguided. No evidence suggests the evolution of a professional corps of jurists who had absorbed functions once belonging to the citizenry. The texts refer repeatedly to individuals chosen ad hoc by a community to answer an appeal by another—and often in very large numbers. There was no select group of juridical experts engaged in the formation of international law. Those who carried out the function did so on a temporary basis and earned the gratitude of the engaged partners. Indeed, they often performed a signal service.

The majority of preserved cases constitute property suits, and many of them involve disputes between debtors and creditors. Thus, they frequently reflect quarrels between the haves and have-nots, clashes between persons of different social and economic levels. The Hellenistic age, of course, had no monopoly on such quarrels. Wrangles over possession of property, confrontations of rich and poor, and problems of debt were endemic in the history of the Greeks. Factional fights and contests between the *oligoi* and the *polloi* repeatedly wracked Hellenic cities during the classical era.[21] The problem was compounded by the difficulty, often near impossibility, of finding disinterested judges from the community itself. Too many citizens had a stake in any local matters calling attention to abuse of social or economic power.

The new system that arose in the Hellenistic era, therefore, represented a positive rather than a negative step. It did not replace the regular civic tribunals. The older courts continued to operate in normal fashion and are often attested in our documents.[22] Hellenistic practice, however, promoted the use of external and more detached arbiters to settle internal quarrels for which no easy domestic solution was forthcoming. The repeated phrases in the documents that hail foreign judges for impartiality and justice and for refusing to take sides with rich or poor were more than just banal formali-

19. *SEG* 1:363.

20. Cf. Tarn and Griffith 1952, 88–91. Préaux (1967–68, 102–4) sees the institution as a means of shoring up democracies and preventing excessive influence by the few.

21. De Ste. Croix 1982, 283–300.

22. L. Robert 1973, 765–82.

ties.[23] They exemplify authentic gratitude for an institution that could redress the ingrained hostilities that had their roots in the classical period. When honorific decrees employ the term *homonoia*, as they commonly do, that word possesses some substance. The foreign jurors were rarely royal appointees or dynastic delegates.[24] They were nominated by, and responsible to, the polis.

We may now profitably turn from the interstate to the internal scene. Here too our knowledge of the machinery of the polis depends overwhelmingly upon epigraphic evidence, a fact that can cause some discomfort. Testimony on officials and offices, on magistrates and political institutions, may reveal no more than a surviving facade—powerless functionaries going through the motions, holding outmoded posts, and repeating obsolete formulas. A skeptical approach certainly has merit as caution and warning. But the texts contain more value than has customarily been recognized. The inscriptions document a sense of civic pride in the community, a locus of loyalty that continued to be centered in the polis.

A striking phenomenon—the oath of allegiance—demands attention at the outset. Two examples bring it into focus. In an inscription from the Cretan town of Itanos, dating from some time in the third century, its citizens swore a binding loyalty oath: "All the Itanians swore the following...I will not betray the city, land, or islands of the Itanians...nor any of their citizens....And I will perform the duties of a citizen in fair and equal fashion on all matters sacred and human in accordance with existing laws...and any others we may pass later....Nor will I abandon the city in war or in peace, as far as is in my power."[25] A similar pledge occurs in a document from Cos, vowed by its citizens in the late third century. "I will adhere to the established democracy...the ancestral laws of Cos, and the decrees of the assembly....I will be a just juror and a fair-minded citizen, voting in elections and in decisions of the assembly without favoritism, in accord with what seems to me to be of advantage to the people."[26] Were such phrases no more than

23. E.g., *IG* 12$^{5}$:869.

24. The emphasis by Heuss (1937, 69–90) and Préaux (1967–68, 2:423) on royal intervention fails to take account of most of the testimony.

25. *SIG*$^{3}$ 526 = *Inscr. Cret.* 3:89–91, no. 8, lines 1–39: [τάδ]ε ὤμοσαν τοὶ Ἰτάνιοι πά[ντες]...πόλιν τὰν Ἰτανίων οὐ πρ[οδ]ωσέω οὐδὲ χώραν οὐδὲ νά[σ]ους[s] τὰς τῶν [Ἰτ]ανίων, οὐδὲ...τῶν πολιτᾶν προδωσέω [οὐδέν]α....πολιτεό[σομ]αι δὲ ἐπ' ἴσαι καὶ ὁμοίαι καὶ θί[νων κ]αὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πάντων κα[τὰ τ]οὺς νόμους τοὺς προυπ[άρχ]οντας...κ[αῖ κά] τινας ἄλλους ὕστερον θεώ[μ]εθα....καὶ ο(ὐ) π[ρολειψέ]ω [τ]ὰν πολιτε[ί]αν οὔτε ἐ[ν πολέ]μωι οὔτε ἐν εἰ[ρήν]αι κατὰ τὸ δ[υνα]τόν.

26. *Stsv* 3:545, lines 14–29: ἐμμενῶ ταῖ καθεστακυίαι δαμοκρατίαι...καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ἐγ Κῶι πατρίοις ὑπάρχουσι καὶ τοῖς δόγμασι τᾶς ἐκκλησίας...ἐσσεῦμαι δὲ καὶ δικαστὰς δίκαιος καὶ πολίτας ἴσος χειροτονῶν καὶ ψαφιζόμενος ἄνευ χάριτος ὅ κά μοι δοκῆι συμφέρον ἦμεν τῶι δάμωι. On this document see Sherwin-White 1978, 124–31.

hollow bromides mouthed meaninglessly like a pledge of allegiance to the flag in American schoolrooms or the singing of the national anthem prior to baseball games? Not likely.

The inscriptions cited above record not routine pledges but vows made on the occasion of admitting new citizens into the community. The document from Cos even specifies the democratic institutions of the city whose protection and perpetuation are to be promised by those taking the pledge. But administration of the oaths went well beyond the newly enfranchised. As the Cos decree asserts, "the citizens shall all swear, from the youth upwards, with the leaders and generals first." And the taking of oaths would be performed in a solemn public ceremony accompanied by sacrificial victims for the gods.[27] Epigraphic texts may not, of course, convey the heartfelt sentiments of those making the vows. But the symbolic communal significance of the ceremony holds center stage. It provides a conspicuous assertion of collective allegiance to the polis.

The issue of citizenship can be pursued further. As is well known, the Hellenistic period produced a remarkable explosion of intercity exchanges of citizenship, the *isopoliteia*. This institution entailed not just the award of citizen privileges to individuals from another community for services rendered but wholesale enfranchisement of one polis by another and vice versa.[28] An example is the joint proclamation by the peoples of Temnos and Pergamum: "The people of Temnos shall hold citizenship in Pergamum, and those of Pergamum in Temnos. They shall share all the privileges shared by the other citizens. And the people of Temnos shall have access to ownership of land and property in Pergamum, and those of Pergamum in Temnos."[29] Similar phrases recur in numerous Hellenistic documents. Does this mean then that citizenship itself had been cheapened? Did the award to whole communities of free access to political privileges signify that poleis no longer attached much value to their own ancestral institutions? Or were these arrangements mere formalities anyway, designed only to express amicable relations between states, on the stage of international relations?[30]

Neither thesis accurately captures the meaning of this increasingly widespread institution. The notion of empty formality for diplomatic ends

27. *Stv* 3:545, lines 6–12: τοὶ δε πολῖται πάντες ἡβαδὸν ὀμνυόντω, πρᾶτοι τοὶ προστάται καὶ τοὶ στραταγοί.

28. On the institution, in general, see Gawantka 1975, with the collection of instances (pp. 206–20).

29. *OGIS* 265, lines 17–21: ἔμμεναι Ταμνί[ταισι ἐν Περ]γάμω πολι[τ]είαν καὶ Περγαμή[νοισι ἐν Τάμνω,] μετεχόντ[ε]σσι ὧν καὶ οἱ ἄλλο[ι πολῖται μετέχοι]σι, καὶ γᾶς καὶ οἰ[κία]ς ἔγκτησιν ἔ[μμεναι τῶ Ταμνί]τα ἐμ Περγάμω [κ]αὶ τῶ Περγ[αμήνω ἐν Τάμνω].

30. Gawantka 1975, 124.

founders on the fact that our documents often record in detail the procedures for registration and enrollment on citizen lists.[31] As for cheapening the concept of polis citizenship, surely the reverse holds. The institution of isopoliteia voiced a sense of confidence in the strength and importance of citizen privileges in a polis. The desirability of those privileges is presupposed by a declaration that they can be shared by members of another community. Isopoliteia did not mean, in fact, the exercise of dual citizenship, with a corresponding dilution of its meaningfulness. Implementation of isopoliteia took effect, for practical purposes, only when an individual moved permanently from one partner-state to the other, whereupon he became fully entitled to the prerogatives of his new city—but had to yield those of his previous.[32] The intensity of feeling for traditional rights arising from the polis had evidently not diminished. Hellenistic cities relaxed the exclusivity that had generally characterized the polis of the classical period. The change points, however, to a more widespread advertisement of civic pride rather than to a devaluation of it.

Such advertisement also manifests itself in the production of civic festivals. That feature did not, of course, confine itself to the Hellenistic era. But it does represent a clear continuity in Greek practice stretching from the Archaic through the Hellenistic periods. An appropriate example derives from the city of Magnesia on the Maeander. A long inscription prominently displayed in the agora of that city delineated the epiphany of the goddess Artemis Leucophryene, which gave impetus for the creation of a regular festival in her honor ca. 207.[33] Magnesia dispatched envoys to states all over Greece and the Aegean, to announce the festival and to obtain their consent to the inviolability of the city as sanctuary for the goddess. The response proved gratifying. Representatives from a wide range of cities on the mainland and in the islands acknowledged Magnesia's *asylia* and honored the festival of Artemis Leucophryene.[34] Among the respondents were the Aetolian League, Antiochus III, Ptolemy IV, Attalus I, and Philip V, a glittering array of powers.[35] It is vital to stress that the polis of Magnesia, through its representatives, created and maintained that festival and served as patron for worship of the deity. The roster of cities and kings that paid homage to that patronage reinforced Magnesia's civic esteem.

31. Gauthier 1984, 104–7; however, Gauthier reckons isopoliteia principally as a sign of the growth of democracy in Hellenistic cities.

32. Note the pact between Hierapytna and Praesus in the early third century (*Inscr. Cret.* 3:78–81, no. 1, lines 5–15).

33. *SIG*³ 557. On these inscriptions see the remarks of Diskin Clay in chap. 31 of the present volume.

34. *SIG*³ 558–62; *OGIS* 233.

35. *SIG*³ 554; Welles 1934, nos. 31–33.

The monarchs made this gesture not to submerge the polis under their own structures but to accord public tribute to its traditions and institutions.

The great pride felt by citizens for their cities can be illustrated in another way. Poleis frequently solicited their own citizens to contribute funds for public purposes. The requests presupposed a willingness and inclination to cooperate.[36] For instance, a third-century decree from Oropus in Boeotia initiates an open subscription earmarked to finance construction or repair of the city wall. The measure offers high civic honors and special privileges, including the designation *proxenoi* and *euergetai*, to all those who lend the city a talent or more—at 10 percent interest.[37] Of course, only a very small number of citizens possessed the wherewithal to provide that kind of loan. But the decree directs its appeal beyond the wealthy elite. Its provisions encourage the less affluent to supply what they can and offer honors commensurate with the size of the gift—to be determined ad hoc by the demos: "With regard to those who lend the city less than a talent, the people shall consider in what manner each of them deserves to be honored by the city."[38]

An analogous proposition occurs in a second-century decree from Crannon in Thessaly. In this case the public treasury itself had fallen into heavy debt because of military expenditures. The inscription calls for contributions from all citizens, each according to his own means. No donation, it appears, would be too small to earn a welcome.[39] The campaign represents a genuine summons to the citizenry as a whole. The polis could afford nothing tangible in return—except to inscribe the names of donors on the stele that recorded the decree. Can we assess the results of this appeal to the civic-mindedness of those dwelling in Crannon? Its effectiveness can be inferred with confidence from the very existence of the stele. The concluding portion of the stone, now no longer extant, recorded the names of those who pledged their contributions. The names, as specified in the decree, were listed in sequence according to the sum pledged. Contemporary society offers close parallels: The brochures of opera companies, symphony orchestras, or even universities who register subscribers or alumni donors in an order that corresponds to the size of the gift provided. In Crannon, as elsewhere in Hellenistic Greece, contributions by the citizenry to bolster the city or to bail out the treasury exhibit once again that sense of individual

36. On the institution of *epidosis* generally, see Kuensi 1923.

37. *SIG*³ 544, lines 12–23.

38. *SIG*³ 544, lines 23–26: ὅσοι δ' ἂν ἔλαττον ταλάντου δανείσωσιν τῆι πόλει, ὑπὲρ τούτων τὸν δῆμον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καθότι ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄξιος ἦι τιμηθῆναι ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως.

39. *ISE* 2:99, lines 14–23.

attachment to the community that refutes the persistent refrain about the death of the polis.

Surviving inscriptions disclose a notable upsurge in generosity in the Hellenistic age.[40] Wealthy benefactors and civic leaders gave regularly to shore up the resources or enhance the beauties of various cities in the Mediterranean. Such persons appear with frequency in public declarations that express the cities' gratitude and bestow honors upon the benefactor. The generosity has provoked varied interpretations and paradoxical conclusions. Hellenistic *euergetism* (patronage) is commonly adjudged as symptomatic of decline. The increasing dependence of cities upon the beneficence of a few, it has been asserted, meant that the *oligoi* determined the fate of their poleis.[41] The earlier system of liturgies represented a democratic solution—the populace in general imposed financial obligations upon the rich for the welfare of the whole. But Hellenistic practice delivered cities into the hands of *euergetai* who supported public services, held the offices, and met official expenses out of their own pockets.[42] The thesis can be refined to distinguish between the early and late Hellenistic periods. A recent analysis argues that civic benefactors in the third and early second centuries were still zealous patriots, the citizenry as a whole remained in control of the services required, and the honors accorded were relatively modest. Circumstances changed, however, in the later second century. Euergetism became a nearly autonomous system, a virtual government in itself, bypassing participation in regular state offices, and generating honors of an extravagant sort.[43] The polis, on this interpretation, had become merely the ward of its wealthy patrons.

The negative construction is unduly harsh and probably misguided. One can read too much between the lines of our epigraphic documents. No reason compels us to doubt the sincerity, for instance, of the Samian decree of ca. 243 that confers honors upon Bulagoras, one of the island's leading citizens. Bulagoras expended much of his large fortune with remarkable generosity for public ends. Among other things, he advanced the city money to pay for three separate grain commissions that provided sustenance for the populace, then guaranteed out of his own pocket repayment of the city's loan for the purchase of the grain itself, as well as interest and all expenses.

40. Royal benefactions to cities, of course, were quite frequent, at least down to the mid-second century. That is a separate matter, not directly relevant here. And the kings had as much to gain as did the cities. On royal benefactions see Gauthier 1985, 39–53; Bringmann (forthcoming).

41. Tarn and Griffith 1952, 108–9; cf. J. K. Davies in *CAH*² 7.1:310–11.

42. For this view see especially Veyne 1990, 70–131.

43. Gauthier 1984, 87–92; 1985, 39–75.

But Bulagoras was more than just a paymaster. He represented the city on delicate diplomatic missions, served as public advocate in suits against the state, and held elective office to oversee the functions of the gymnasium and training of the ephebes.[44] The inscription surely did not lie in ascribing to Bulagoras zeal for the common good and the public welfare.

To take another instance, the city of Olbia on the Black Sea passed a decree ca. 200 expressing gratitude to its native son Protogenes. He had provided to the polis loans, advances, and gifts totaling twenty-two talents to extract it from financial straits and restore it to fiscal solvency.[45] Here again private benefactions combined with public services as ambassador and financial officer.[46]

Countless similar decrees have survived from this flourishing era of euergetism. And not all the benefactors were men. A first-century monument from Priene pays homage to a benefactress, Phile. She was the first woman to attain the office of *stephanephoros*, evidently Priene's eponymous magistracy. And while in that office, she personally financed a water reservoir and the city's principal aqueduct.[47]

Did the generosity of such individuals signal the corrosion of civic-mindedness among the ordinary citizens of Hellenistic poleis? This conclusion hardly follows from the texts. One might note that Bulagoras of Samos, mentioned above, had advanced loans to the public treasury and had not simply donated funds.[48] That act presupposes confidence that the state could repay the loan and that it remained a viable entity.[49] A similar conclusion applies to Protogenes of Olbia. The vast bulk of his donations came in the form of loans rather than gifts. Nor was he the only donor in Olbia. The inscription makes references in the plural to landowners, wealthy classes, and men of importance.[50]

The responsibility of the well-off for the community remained a central element in the ideology of the Hellenistic city. The classical system of liturgies had evolved into the voluntary practice of euergetism—surely not a degeneration. The benefactors earned prestige, distinction, and authority. But one can hardly deny them a sense of pride in the community, the object of their benefactions. Nor is there anything to suggest apathy on the part of the beneficiaries. The very publication of a decree that honored the *euer-*

44. *SEG* 1:366.
45. *SIG*³ 495.
46. Cf. Gauthier 1985, 70–72.
47. *Inscr. Prien.* 208.
48. *SEG* 1:366, lines 33–47.
49. Gauthier 1985, 69–70.
50. *SIG*³ 495, lines 27–28, 66, 122; see Gauthier 1985, 70–72.

*getes* is telling. It testifies to the state's zeal for advertising the communal spirit of donors and recipients who shared an attachment to the polis.

An Athenian inscription of 281 drives home the point more decisively. The decree honors a certain Euthius, who had served as the city's archon in the previous year. The gratitude expressed has nothing to do with any financial subventions that Euthius might have made to the polis or, as is often the case in our documents, with service as an intermediary between the city and some monarch or dynast. The demos praises Euthius simply for effectively and successfully carrying out his own duties as an Athenian magistrate and officeholder: "Euthius, while serving as archon, performed the sacrifices to the gods in accordance with ancestral practices and zealously supervised the procession in honor of Dionysus. And he carried out all other duties associated with his office with justice, obeying the laws and decrees of the council and people."[51] For such functions Euthius was presented with a gold wreath and an honorary decree inscribed on a marble stele. Similar distinctions were also accorded to Euthius' assistants and helpmates in office. The inscription (and there are others like it) demonstrates that Greek cities could commend their citizens not only for material contributions and services in the larger world of Hellenistic power politics but simply for faithful exercise of duties as a public official, maintenance of the city's laws and traditions, and enhancing the life of the polis.

The enhancement could be achieved in a variety of ways. One might note as an illuminating illustration honorific decrees passed to bestow privileges upon artists and intellectuals. So, for instance, the Athenians in 261 accorded posthumous honors to the great philosopher Zeno, founder of the Stoa, ordering at public expense the construction of a tomb to be crowned with a gold wreath.[52] The act may have been prompted by Antigonus Gonatas, the Macedonian ruler and patron of Zeno. But there is no reason to doubt the Athenian assembly's sincerity in associating the eminent philosopher with the intellectual life of the city. The decree hailed Zeno for the admirable tenets of his philosophy and the example of his own life, which served as a model for Athenian youth. Other decrees stand on record paying tribute to artists who elevate the cultural life of their cities. These include female artists, and they range from early to late Hellenistic times. In 218, Aristodama, a celebrated poetess from Smyrna, obtained from the cities of Lamia and Chalaeus honorary citations with full proxeny privileges.

51. *ISE* 1:14, esp. lines 10–16: *ἐπειδὴ Εὔθιος ἄρχων γενόμενος τάς τε θυσίας ἔθυσεν τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τῆς πομπῆς τῶι Διονύσωι ἐπεμελήθη φιλοτίμως καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἔπραξεν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν δικαίως πειθόμενος τοῖς τε νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου.* For the circumstances, see Gauthier 1979, 348–99; Habicht 1982, 95–107.

52. D.L. 7.10–12.

The decrees specify Aristodama's public recitals in those cities that lauded their traditions, legends, and history.[53] Well over a century later, Delphi conferred proxeny honors upon Polygnota of Thebes, a renowned harpist, for distinguished performances that added luster to Delphi and to her own city.[54] The citizenry of Greek communities continued to take pride in both the political and the cultural life of their poleis.

The combination of culture and public commitment is perhaps best exemplified in the most familiar of Hellenistic institutions: the gymnasium and the *ephebeia*. Both were fixtures in the classical period, and both enjoyed considerable expansion in the Hellenistic age. No need to linger long over these well-known institutions. A few points, however, bear special relevance to this discussion. An inscription from the city of Dreros in Crete ca. 220—again only one example among many—records the ephebic oath of that polis. Ephebes, of course, constituted the select youth of Greek communities, who underwent one or two years of intensive instruction in both military and civic matters—a form of state-supported higher education for those who would contribute actively to public affairs. The Dreros document contains the oath of allegiance sworn by the ephebes when embarking upon their course. The solemn vows uttered before all the gods and goddesses expressed the solid loyalty of the ephebes and their pledge to resist any enemies of the state.[55] The polis remained the focus of loyalty for those in training for full exercise of citizenship rights.

Donors frequently provided endowments to install or expand educational institutions, namely the gymnasia. Instruction in physical, mental, and moral disciplines, both at an early age and continuing through the ephebic years, took place in the gymnasia. Numerous inscriptions attest to the benefactions of the wealthy to promote the proper training of the young. For example, a document from Teos details the various teachers and experts to be hired in order to provide every form of instruction, including lyre or harp playing, archery and spear throwing, weaponry, and a range of academic subjects. All of this was to be underwritten through an endowment provided by a certain Polythrous.[56] That so much would be invested to insure the cultivation of youth as future leaders or contributing citizens of the community exhibits the enduring hold that the polis had on the people's imagination.

The foregoing will not allay skepticism on all fronts. Appropriate doubts can still be voiced. Does the epigraphic testimony really get us

53. *SIG*³ 532; *SEG* 2:263.
54. *SIG*³ 788.
55. *SIG*³ 527.
56. *SIG*³ 578.

beyond a relatively narrow elite? How much of this professed patriotism for the polis affected the average Greek? What involvement would he have in treaties between city-states? Or in an arbitration settlement by one city for two others? Or in the contributions of the wealthy to shore up the state of the treasury? Or in the training of ephebes in gymnasia to supply an elite leadership?

Cold facts chiseled on stone do not provide easy answers to such questions. But a number of items deserve consideration and offer some insight. First, the matter of interstate treaties. When cities concluded such pacts, they did not limit themselves to negotiations between striped-pants diplomats in isolated chambers. The treaties, once agreed to among representatives, required oaths to be sworn by the peoples of both cities and were then inscribed and exposed to public view.[57] How many persons actually declared their oaths we cannot know. But a ceremony for the purpose must have existed, as directed by the documents, giving at least symbolic voice to all individuals within each polis. The same holds for oaths of allegiance to the cities. As we have seen, the inscriptions that record such oaths at Itanus and Cos assert that the entire citizenry of those towns pledged their loyalty to the polis. Here again the symbolic character of such an event, performed in public ceremony, signified the solidarity of the citizenry as a whole and their collective adherence to the community. That carries well beyond any elitist mentality. Civic festivals sponsored by the polis and advertising its prestige were open to all citizens who shared that common pride. The subscriptions organized to finance various public facilities not only looked for large gifts from major donors but also solicited contributions from all citizens, each to give according to his means. The practice reinforced the sense of communal responsibility and participation in promoting the welfare of the city-state.

Even interstate arbitration by neutral poleis has relevance here. It would seem logical to infer that for such high-level diplomacy only a select few would render expert verdicts in the name of their poleis. The enterprise could hardly touch the broader public. Or could it? When Megara provided mediation in a land dispute between Corinth and Epidaurus ca. 242, the Megarians sent 151 arbiters to hear the disputants.[58] The number implies not a corps of experts but selection, perhaps by lot, from the citizenry at large. Nor was this a unique instance. Eretria sent 301 judges to adjudicate a quarrel between Paros and Naxos in the second century, and Cnidus supplied 204 to hear a case between Cos and Calymna in the second or first

57. E.g., *SIG*³ 581.
58. *SIG*³ 471.

century, and one other of 101 persons to arbitrate between Sparta and Megalopolis in the mid-second century.[59] To be sure, large tribunals were the exception rather than the rule. But they serve to show that, even in a sphere where one might expect only skilled and experienced experts, the polis often invoked a democratic principle and stressed the privilege or responsibility of participation by all.

And what of participation generally in the political process? The question does not admit of precise response. But inscriptions do occasionally record the number of persons attending the assembly meeting that produced the inscribed decree. And they give some very revealing figures. Two decrees from Halicarnassus announce the presence of a voting membership of 4000 and 1200.[60] Suspiciously round numbers? Perhaps. But other figures are unmistakably precise. From Magnesia on the Maeander come three documents with the following numbers: 4678, 2113, and 3580.[61] Six decrees from Colophon give voter totals of 1023, 1270, 1180, 903, 1000, and 1342—and that only registers those persons who voted yes.[62] Additional instances could be cited.[63] It seems plain that popular participation in Hellenistic city-states did not consist merely in empty slogans. The involvement of citizens in legislative and judicial activity had a much broader compass than is generally acknowledged. And even in the case of honorary decrees, regarded by many moderns as routine and generally tedious gestures, the people of the poleis appear to have turned out in significant numbers to record their votes.

All of this adds up to an impressive showing. The results should oblige us to rethink some of the clichés and stereotypes that fill the handbooks of Greek history. Civic spirit had not evaporated in the Hellenistic age. The polis held its place as a center of allegiance and a source of pride. Hellenistic individuals were not all driven to seek inner solace or to reach out longingly to the cosmos. They could still find support and stimulus in the familiar institutions of the polis.

59. *IG* 12$^5$:128; *SIG*$^3$ 304, 512.
60. Michel 1900–27, 455; Cousin and Diehl 1890, 95–96.
61. *Inscr. Magn.* 92a, 92b, 94.
62. *Inscr. Prien.* 57; *Inscr. Lampsac.* 33; L. Robert 1963, 304, 307.
63. See a representative sampling in Gauthier 1984, 96–97.

26

# Paean and Paeanists of Serapis and the Flavian Emperors

Robert E. A. Palmer

ON 6 MAY 146, IN THE REIGN of Antoninus Pius, the *paeanistae* honored their "prophet" with a bust. The inscription, set up when Metilius Ampliatus served as *curator*, was carved in Greek and dated both in the Roman and Alexandrian manner. These singers of the paean belonged to a holy order that hymned thanks to Zeus Helios Great Serapis and Deified Emperors.[1] In the reigns of the Severan emperors, the paeanists are again attested, this time as recipients of an imperial favor. The Roman paeanists still expressed themselves in Greek and still occupied quarters they called *oikos*.[2] Such is the evidence of paeanists for the god Serapis, and such the bald evidence for their close relation to emperors and imperial cult.

The *paeanistae* are not the earliest formal organization at Rome to practice Greek singing. In the age of Cicero, an association (*societas*) of Greek singers belonged to a "synod" that presumably supplied song to the *scaena Graeca* in Rome.[3] Equally at home in Rome in a later era were, for example, a "great synod" of harpists (*psaltes*), whose organization had all the aspects of a thoroughgoing Roman guild: *curator*, *magistri*, and *decuriones*.[4] The *paeanistae*, first appearing in 146, exhibit nothing new about Roman society in regard to practitioners of Greek song and music in the city.

What made the *paeanistae* unusual was the character of the divinities they hymned. The paean enjoyed a long history that had begun with Apollo

1. See the App.
2. See the App.
3. See *ILLRP* 771 (whose date is inferential).
4. *ILS* 5246. Like the synod of the association of Greek singers, the great synod of harpists had a membership drawn from both freeborn men and freedmen.

and that had been long associated with the healing cult of Asclepius.[5] As a god of healing Asclepius could lend to Serapis, another god of healing, the paean for hymning praise and gratitude. Accordingly, Demetrius of Phalerum wrote paeans to Serapis for a cure.[6]

Paeanists are earlier attested as servitors of the Athenian cult of Asclepius.[7] And the claim is made that the Roman paeanists of Zeus Helios Great Serapis belonged in fact to the cult in Egypt,[8] where no paeanist is attested. Serapic paeanists are known only in Rome and in a setting that appears Roman, although their language is Greek and their ties with Alexandria are manifest. Yet it is only to be inferred that they sang in Greek at Rome.[9]

For what did the devout give institutional thanks to Zeus Helios Great Serapis by way of a paean sung by professional paeanists? The philosopher-tyrant Demetrius of Phalerum composed his paean to Serapis who had cured his blindness.[10] To gain Serapis' medical treatment, incubation in one of his Serapea, especially the mother clinic outside Alexandria, was advised.[11] But an efficacious dream would suffice, such as that experienced by Antoninus Pius' contemporary Aelius Aristides. In his dream this arch-hypochondriac underwent head surgery for one of his many ailments; the surgery was performed by Serapis while Asclepius assisted.[12] Presumably at Rome, too, paeans rose in chorus in thanks for Serapic cures. So far all is clear and wants no subtlety of argument to understand the prior role of Roman paeanists. But the "holy order" that the paeanists at Rome constituted served other gods, namely Deified Emperors or *Theoi Sebastoi.*

The proper appreciation of the time and circumstances when the paeanists joined the plethora of divine servitors at Rome can be gained from identification of these *Divi Augusti.* We begin with the provenance of the

5. See Edelstein and Edelstein [1945] 1975, 1:325–36 for the testimonia, and 2:199–208. Sophocles was the reputed author of the best known paean to Asclepius.

6. D.L. 5.5.76; still sung in the author's lifetime. See, e.g., Cumont 1929, 71, 232–33 nn. 5–6, 237 n. 44.

7. Oliver 1940.

8. Otto ([1905] 1975, 1:115, 2:311) takes them to be priests. Their priestly function is not borne out by the Roman evidence of Apuleius (*Met.* 11.9). See Vidman 1970, 63–64. In his collection of documents (1969), Vidman gives the text of *IG* 14:1084 as no. 384 but ignores the other evidence of the paeanists at Rome; see App. below.

9. In general, for the role of the paeanists in ritual music at Rome, see Malaise 1972a, 121–23.

10. See n. 6 above.

11. Strabo 17.11.17 (C801) is the cardinal passage; see Otto [1905] 1975, 1:13–15, 118–19, 122–25; Henrichs 1968, 51–80. For the history of Serapis under the Ptolemies see Fraser [1972] 1986, 1:246–76.

12. Aristid. *Or.* 49.46–48.

inscription set up in their *oikos* on 6 May 146, our terminus ante quem. This inscription apparently comes from the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata on the modern Via del Corso. If we proceed a few paces down the modern Via Lata and cross the Piazza del Collegio Romano, we arrive at once at the site of the great rectangular Iseum and the absidal Serapeum, rebuilt by the emperor Domitian after their predecessors were destroyed by fire in A.D. 80.[13] These shrines were the greatest the gods Isis and Serapis had in Rome in 146. Apparently, there a devotee might hear at night voices of this divine pair.[14] The two Egyptian gods invited incubation. The most famous incident of recorded incubation occurred in A.D. 70, when Vespasian and his son Titus, on the eve of their triumph over the Judaeans, slept in the shrine or shrines of the Egyptian gods that had stood before the fire in the brief reign of the latter prince.

Both Vespasian and Titus, severally, had come fresh from Egypt to Italy in the wake of the two victories of their soldiers, that in northern Italy over fellow Romans and that in Jerusalem over Judeans. Their triumph was celebrated for suppression of the revolt in Judea. Vespasian had gone from Judea in the winter of 69/70 to Alexandria and awaited the opening of the seas. At Alexandria many *miracula* occurred, not the least those worked by him. A blind man and a man with a crippled hand approached him at the instigation of Serapis himself, who promised them cures. Serapis accorded Vespasian the "king's touch."[15] After some hesitation, swept aside by favorable diagnoses given by the physicians (at the Serapeum), Vespasian did as asked. The blind man saw; the crippled man regained use of his hand. Subsequently, the new prince entered the temple of Serapis, cleared of all worshipers, and underwent a miraculous vision, though not that of the deity.[16] Shortly thereafter the new believer set sail for Rome and for rule. Not to be outdone in profession of the new piety, Titus went to Egypt after

13. Much has been written about this complex, well-attested by authors, architectural remains, and much of its stone furnishings. See, e.g., Malaise 1972b, 180–82, 187–215. If the willful pedestrian continues beyond the above mentioned piazza, he enters the Via del Pie' di Marmo and beholds a colossal foot that may have belonged to Serapis' cult statue.

14. Juv. 6.522–31; cf. Porph. *Plot.* 10. Perhaps in the earlier temple of Isis on the Campus Martius but surely in one of her Roman temples standing in the reign of Tiberius occurred, if it occurred at all, an incubation rite that is represented as a luridly fraudulent mating of a noble woman and an equestrian man pretending to be the god Anubis (Jos. *AJ* 18.65–80). Such would not have been a curative incubation.

15. The curious will find in Shakespeare's *Macbeth* (4.3.140–59) a representation of the royal touch. England's monarchy gave up this curative power under William of Orange, who referred petitioners to the Old Pretender. It is sorely missed in the present state that was the last Stuart's American colony.

16. Tac. *Hist.* 4.81–84; Suet. *Ves.* 7. See K. Scott [1936] 1975, 8–13. Henrichs 1968, esp. 65–72, lays much emphasis on Vespasian's *imitatio Alexandri.*

the firing and surrender of Jerusalem. At Memphis he participated in the consecration of the new Apis Bull after assuming a royal diadem.[17]

Returning to Vespasian and Titus' vigil of triumph, we must note that they ought to have followed tradition and spent the night in the Villa Publica on the Campus Martius. But instead they passed the vigil in the "temple of Isis," neighbor to that conventional building.[18] For the people of Rome, if not for themselves alone, the triumphant princes underwent Serapic incubation, no more no less.

When Tacitus introduces the subject of Vespasian and his Serapic cures and his experience of a vision in the god's temple, he surely has in mind to resume the subject later in his *Histories*. Surely one such resumption will have occurred at the juncture of the triumph of A.D. 70. Another will have occurred, as we shall see, in his treatment of Domitian's rebuilding after the fire of A.D. 80. In retelling the story of how Ptolemy I Soter brought Serapis to Alexandria from Pontic Sinope, Tacitus implicitly invites the reader to savor the very onset of the Hellenistic ruler cult, a cult that had found its impulse in the king's epiphanic experience of Serapis. To explain to his Latin readers the ground laid for Serapis, he offers the *synkreseis* of Serapis: "Many say the god is Aesculapius because he cures sick bodies; some, Osiris who is the oldest divinity those nations have; several, Jupiter as lord of the world; many, Father Dis by his symbols that they find manifest in the very god or they interpret obliquely."[19] We interpret Tacitus in anticipation of his first resumption, when he will insinuate the topic of two men of Sabine ancestry, that solid Italian stock, adopting the role of a Ptolemy. Tacitus will not have gone wrong.

In 81 the second son of Vespasian had succeeded his brother Titus. Titus, by an all too vague account, had spent the final days of his short rule in a vain attempt to cure the plague besetting Rome: "medendae valitudini leniendisque morbis nullam divinam humanamque opem non adhibuit inquisito omni sacrificiorum remediorumque genere."[20] A profound author might have told us how Titus had "lost face." His father had cured. His father and he had slept with Serapis on the eve of their joint triumph. In A.D. 80 the temple(s) of Isis and Serapis had burned to the ground. The city residents perished from a pest that no amount of princely intervention

17. Suet. *Tit.* 5.3. On the significance of his act see Otto [1905] 1975, 1:391.

18. Jos. *BJ* 7.123, who ought to have named Serapis, for the imperial father and son had had no experience of Isis. See Coarelli 1968, 55–103. The recently found tombstone of an *aedituus templi Serapei*, "warder of the precinct of the Serapeum," who had been manumitted either by Claudius or Nero, certifies that the Serapeum of the Campus Martius already existed as a discrete sacred site before the Flavian regime. See *AE* 1977, no. 28.

19. *Hist.* 4.84 (the concluding sentence of Tacitus' apparent digression).

20. Suet. *Tit.* 8.4.

could prevail against. Domitian rebuilt the Iseum and Serapeum with extraordinary munificence.[21] But he did not stop there.

Immediately to the southeast of the apse of the Domitianic Serapeum, the emperor built an entirely new building, the *templum Divorum.*[22] It is known to us by the fragments of the Marble Plan of Rome set up by the Severan dynasty.[23] The fragments, surviving or preserved in drawings, show a long rectangular court with colonnades on the long east and west sides and the short south side. Columns (?) without walls are also shown in the central court. At the north end, that is, by the Serapeum, the monumental entry is fronted by a freestanding triple arch. Immediately inside, to the right and left, stand temples reached by staircases. At the south end, in the court, stands an altar, also reached by steps, that apparently belongs to yet a third temple at grade.

One of the temples belonged to Divus Titus and the other apparently to Divus Vespasianus. Very probably, the third was built by Domitian in anticipation of his own formal deification after death or in expectation of worship as a living *dominus et deus.* Titus and Vespasian needed no temple in this *templum Divorum.* They already shared a temple as *divi* on the west side of the forum, where they faced that of Divus Julius. Of that temple and its original setting no doubt can be entertained.[24] Domitian's entirely new and unparalleled structure had a function different from that of the deified Caesars, although Claudius' temple on the Caelian Hill was situated within a grandiose, nearly quadrangular colonnade that Vespasian himself had finished.[25] But Titus and perhaps Vespasian himself had planned a temple for the latter on the lines laid down for Caesar and, presumably, for Augustus, as gods. Domitian, in effect, built second temples to his father and brother in close proximity to Serapis and made over to them the lesser portion of a vast roofed courtyard and its colonnades, when these *divi* had no need of them.

21. See n. 13 above. The date of the new buildings is not known.

22. Today often wrongly called *Porticus Divorum* (Eutr. *Brev.* 17.23.5). The correct name, *templum Divorum,* is found in *CIL* 6:10234 (see below). In the *Chronograph of 354* and the regionary gazetteers, it is simply *Divorum* as it is inscribed on the Severan Marble Plan (see below).

23. Besides the magisterial work of Carettoni (1960, 97–102, frr. 35–36), Rodriguez Almeida (1981, 122–26) has added some new fragments to the environs of Iseum, Serapeum, and "Divorum" as *Gruppo* 35. What is represented on the Severan Marble Plan of Rome may be presumed to be either a restoration, a reconstruction, or an amplification dedicated by Hadrian in A.D. 126. See the fragment of the Fasti Ostienses that reads *t]emplum Divorum* (Degrassi 1937–63 [*Inscr. Ital.* 13] fasc. 1:203, 233). L. Richardson (1976, 159–63) argues that the large altar belonged to Mars in the new setting of a new Villa Publica and that the signs on the marble plan in the central court were trees (Carretoni 1960, 99, says "perhaps" trees).

24. See, e.g., Platner and Ashby 1929, 556.

25. Platner and Ashby 1929, 120–21.

Domitian's reason is clearly to be inferred from a source long known to us for its correct name of the Domitianic complex but never, to my knowledge, properly understood in context. On 11 March 153, just seven years after our document of the holy order of the paeanists of Zeus Helios Great Serapis and of Deified Emperors, the Association of Aesculapius and Hygia met *in templo Divorum in aede divi Titi* and drew up a new charter (*lex*) that recorded new benefactions and donations. Among the rules adopted were those enjoining certain meetings, observances, and ceremonies. Five, or very probably six, observances were to be kept at the burial society's *schola*, which was located *via Appia ad Martis intra milliarium I et II*. These observances and their dates were the anniversary of the society (4 November), "memorial day" (*dies care cognationis*) on 22 February, a day of distribution of *sportulae* by the president (14 March), the violet day on 22 March, and rose day on 11 May. The sixth holiday fell on 4 January for distribution of New Year's gifts (*strenuae*). But the society's paramount feast day, because it heads the list, fell on 19 September, the birthday of the reigning emperor, Antoninus Pius. It was not to be observed at the society's quarters, on the Appian Way by the temple of Mars, between the first and second milestone. Rather, like the conclave gathered to enact the new charter of the Association of Aesculapius and Hygia, the emperor's birthday was to be celebrated *in templo Divorum in aede divi Titi*.[26] There is nothing exceptional about these arrangements, save for the shift of observances. A funeral society of dependents of Domitian's wife met at a private shrine of Silvanus and was named *collegium Silvani*.[27] Another funeral society (properly calling itself a *collegium salutare*) met in the Lanuvian temple of Antinous, and its members called themselves *cultores Dianae et Antinoi*.[28] By rights, the members of our Association of Aesculapius and Hygia ought to have worshiped at its quarters on the Appian Way. Its new charter acknowledges the grant of land for *aedicula cum pergula*, a marble statue of Aesculapius, and a covered annex or *solarium*.[29]

Several inferences are to be drawn. First, if the reigning emperor's birthday was to be observed in the *templum Divorum*, then Titus and Vespasian's birthdays were to be celebrated there in perpetuity. Second, if worshipers of Aesculapius and Hygia came here only on occasion associated with the ruler cult, then the cult of Vespasian and Titus here, not at their

26. *CIL* 6:10234 = *ILS* 7213 = *FIRA* $3^2$:36; cf. A. E. Gordon 1983, no. 66. This place is mentioned three times in the charter.

27. *CIL* 10:444 = *ILS* 3546 = *FIRA* $3^2$:42 (Domitianic).

28. *CIL* 14:2112 = *ILS* 7212 = *FIRA* $3^2$:35 (Hadrianic).

29. See n. 26 above.

temple on the Forum, resembled the cult of Aesculapius and Hygia: It was a healing cult. Third, the imperial government positively allowed this cult among its own dependents. This last inference is drawn from the fact that among benefactors of the Association of Aesculapius and Hygia were its principal donor, who was the widow of a freedman and procurator of a Flavian emperor, surely Domitian, two freedmen of Hadrian, and a defunct member (?) who had been freed by Trajan.

The intent of Domitian in building the *templum Divorum* is now clear. The deified Vespasian and Titus were to have special temples beside that of Serapis, who had made the father a miracle worker. To this shrine, new in structure and concept, the faithful could come and find resort for their sick bodies in the great courtyard and cure in the temple of the *divus* they chose. Like Aesculapius, like Hygia, Divus Vespasianus and Divus Titus might restore their health. And cures must have been worked. In 146 the holy order of paeanists hymned their paeans to Zeus Helios Great Serapis and to Theoi Sebastoi. In light of the evidence known about the *templum Divorum*, the *divi* addressed by the paeanists must surely have been Vespasian and Titus.

Persistent belief in Vespasian's healing powers is attested by Tacitus, who finishes his notice on the restoration of eyes and hand by remarking that "men who witnessed both the miracles still mention it today long after a time when telling an untruth would have got them gain."[30] The building of the *templum Divorum*, the establishment of an entirely unprecedented kind of cult for the deified emperor, and even probably the institution of the Divi Flavii as divine healers alongside Serapis will have supplied Tacitus with a third occasion to mention Serapis and Vespasian in the same breath. At the same time, Tacitus must have been aware that around 100 Vespasian's cures still enjoyed a currency to which his second son had given fillip by promoting the new cult in the new precinct. This new cult took that of Serapis as its model and, in turn, was acknowledged by the paeanists of Serapis.

The force of momentum gained by the healing cult of deified Flavians was not balked after Domitian's assassination in 96. It was felt when Tacitus was composing his history and even later when it was twice attested indirectly under Antoninus Pius. How much of the momentum can be attributed to the cult of Serapis cannot be gauged. For sheer public spectacle we have Apuleius' detailed description of the procession of Isis, of which we may be pardoned for rendering a pertinent passage that concerns the environs of the Iseum, Serapeum, and the *templum Divorum*:

30. Tac. *Hist.* 4.81 (written about thirty years after the event).

> Next the soothing orchestra and the pipes and flutes with the sweetest of measures sounded. Thereafter followed a charming choral group of the choicest youth gleaming white in gala garments, who repeated a delightful hymn that an expert poet had arranged and composed courtesy of the Muses, and whose lyrics repeated meantime the refrains of the greater prayers. There came also the flutists devoted to Great Serapis, who, ears pricked up to the movement of the right hand, played and played again through slanted pipe the strains regular to temple and to the god.[31]

Doubtless on a smaller scale, a similar ceremony will have been prescribed for the divi. We do not know the anniversaries of any temple of the deified Flavians. Probably the birthday of one or another was chosen.[32] The paeanists will have kept their memory, and therefore their deeds, evergreen.

The history of the paean has been lengthened in these pages beyond the Roman cult of Serapis to a new cult, a cult whose rites praised deified emperors as healers of the sick. To my knowledge, Vespasian and Titus must stand at the head of a list of Roman men who miraculously cured. Vespasian's success and Titus' failure may serve as emblems of a new dynasty of lesser ancestry. As Augustus and Gaius before them, they took their credentials from Ptolemaic Egypt. Domitian, however, took a further step and, with an astuteness unknown to the class from whence he had risen, developed a new mode of imperial worship that not even his death has effaced.

31. Apul. *Met.* 11:9; the mise-en-scène given at 11.26 (*de templi situ sumpto nomine Campensis*). Cf. Mart. 9.29.6. If the paeanists of Zeus Helios Great Serapis and Deified Emperors had their *oikos* where the one inscription is said to have been found at the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata, they did not have far to go to join the public parade. See App.

32. Vespasian's birthday on 17 November and Titus' on 30 December were still officially observed over four centuries after their births. See Degrassi 1937–63 (*Inscr. Ital.* 13), fasc. 2: 531, 546. If Hadrian did indeed restore or rebuild the whole or a part of the *templum Divorum* as assumed from the fragment of the Fasti Ostienses (n. 23 above), the anniversary of one or all the internal temples may have been changed in A.D. 126.

## Appendix

*IG* 14:1084 = *IGRom* 1:114 = *IGUR* 77. Tablet found at the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata, 6 May A.D. 146:

ἡ ἱερὰ τάξις τῶν Παιανιστῶν
τοῦ ἐν Ῥώμῃ Διὸς Ἡλίου
μεγάλου Σαράπιδος καὶ Θεῶν
Σεβαστῶν ἐτείμησαν Ἔμβῆν
προφήτην, πατέρα τῆς προ-
γεγραμμένης ταξέως, προτό-
μῃ μαρμαρινῇ, ἣ ἀνατεθεῖσα
ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τῶν Παια-
νιστῶν τῇ πρ(ὸ) α′ νωνῶν
Μαίων, ἥτις ἐστὶν κατὰ
Ἀλεξανδρεῖς Παχὼν ια′,
ἐπὶ κουράτορος Μετειλίου
Ἀμπλιάτου πρεσβυτέρου,
Σέξτῳ Ἐρουκίῳ Κλάρῳ
β′, Γνέῳ Κλαυδίῳ
Σεβήρῳ κω(ns)σ(ulibus).

[The Holy Order of Paeanists serving in Rome Jupiter Sun Great Serapis and the Deified Emperors honored the prophet Embes, father of the aforementioned order, with a marble bust that was set up in the Oikos of the Paeanists on the day before the nones of May, which is among the Alexandrians the eleventh of (the month) Pachon, in the superintendance of Metilius Ampliatus the elder, in the consulship of Sextus Erucius Clarus for the second time and of Gnaeus Claudius Severus.]

For the collocation/syncretism of Zeus Helios Great Serapis see *IGUR* 188–90, 193, 194; *ILS* 4392–4403. For inclusion of Pluto (cf. Tac. *Hist.* 4.81) see *ILS* 4391.

The paeanists honored Embes, who was the *pater* of the society. Already in 146 they were sufficiently adapted to Roman ways as to have a curator (a Latin title) with a Roman name, even though Embes had no Roman name. Embes served the cult as "prophet" (cf. *CIL* 6:846, 12:410 add., Apul. *Met.* 2.28). Metilius Ampliatus was further described as an "elder" or the "elder," either a religious title or a family designation.[33]

33. The titles found in this document have an analogue in the Egyptianizing cult of

The *oikos* received the honorific bust of Embes because it served the *paeanistae* as headquarters, presumably near the site of the present-day church of Santa Maria in Via Lata, that is, just west of the ancient Via Lata. We have some idea of its importance from *CIL* 6:3770.

The site of the *oikos*, kept apparently as *oecus* in Latin (see *CIL* 6:26), seemed to offer Moretti (in *IGUR* 77) the choice of assigning the paeanists to the cult of the Iseum Campense in Region IX, of which Serapis also partook, or the temple of Serapis in Region VI. They could not have served the Serapis of Region VI in 146, because there is no evidence of the temple at that time, since it is probably of Severan origin.

*CIL* 6:3770 = 31330 = *IG* 14:1059 = *IGRom* 1.145 = *IGUR* 35. Tablet found at the cemetery of Santa Agnese on the Via Nomentana.

[- - - φιλο]-
κύριοι οἱ [Παι]ανισ̣τ̣ά̣[ι - - - δεηθῆ]-
ναι παρ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε ἐπιτρέψε ἧν ει[- - - καὶ]
στεγάσαι τὰ ἐπικείμενα τῷ οἴ̣κ̣[ῳ - - -]
Severus Paeanistis (salutem). poteṣtis sicut in [libello - - - su]-
pra cuneos fenestrarum exstrux[istis - - - in excel]-
so pedum quattuor. scripsi (ante diem) V id[us - - -. recognovi].
ταῦτα ἱερώτατοι αὐτοκράτορες, ἐν ε- - -
τῆς - - - ὑπ- - -λμοι- - -ι- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
Imp(erator) Caes(ar) M(arcus) [Aurelius Antoninus - - -]
beneficium [ - - - scripsi].
recognovi.

2 ἐπιτρέψαι intel.

Although found well outside the city, this inscription surely belonged to the oikos (line 4) of the paeanists (lines 2, 5); see *IG* 14:1084. The text is paragraphed by extruded lines 5, 8, and 12. The paeanists record their words in Greek, and the emperors record theirs in Latin. Although it had been long in Rome, the sodality doubtless kept, and officially employed, the Greek language even unto an address to the emperor.

Antinous at Rome. A religious "elder" is met in the perhaps contemporary dedication to Antinous as the "new god Hermes," made by him on behalf of the *Hadriana Synhodos*; see *IG* 14:978a = *IGRom* 1:55 = *IGUR* 143, found at the Palazzo Santacroce. A "prophet" of Antinous, *synthronos* of the gods of Egypt, is attested on a broken inscription found near the Iseum and Serapeum; see *IG* 14:961 = *IGUR* 98.

Before the reply of the emperor beginning in line 5, the paeanists presented their petition. Here they called themselves *philo]kyrioi* (a restoration Moretti does not record), a term of loyalty, like *philokaisar* and *philosebastos* (see commentary on *IG* 14:1084). Their petition referred to the official precedent of a *beneficium* (cf. line 13), presumably of a former prince (line 3). The petition, it appears, concerns modifications to their headquarters, the *oikos* of line 4, specifically, if not fully understood, modifications to the roof line. The emperor Severus (line 5) replied to the effect that the limit of whatever remodeling was requested was four feet in height. Further, the remodeling somehow was related to the "wedges of the window," perhaps being triangular openings above each window. That the emperor intervened at all suggests either that the paeanists sought some variance of building code or that they sought to honor the Severan House with images set *supra cuneos fenestrarum*.

Another time, the paeanists address the throne, which this time is occupied by two or more emperors (line 8). That Caracalla, if it was Caracalla, replied would suggest that the (second?) petition he confirmed had been addressed to him and to Geta (A.D. 211–212), not to him and his father Severus (A.D. 198–211). It seems improbable that "the most sacred of emperors" (line 8) are not Caracalla and Geta, since a reply from Elagabalus, the other *Imp. Caes. M.* [*Aurelius*, etc.] after Severus, had no coregent.[34] The text ends at line 14,[35] and although the text is broken on the right, the word *beneficium* and the very inscription of the text tell us that the paeanists succeeded in their petition.

*CIL* 6:26 = *ILS* 7303. Marble tablet of unknown provenance.

Fabius Demetrius et Caecilius
Philon aedem cum sigillo
Apollinis iuvenibus Oecianis
d(ono) d(e)d(erunt) d(e)d(icaverunt).

Fabius Demetrius and Caecilius Philon apparently acted for their fellow iuvenes in providing a chapel with some kind of small sculpture of the god Apollo. Iuvenes seemed to favor worship of Hercules,[36] and cannot otherwise be linked to the cult of Apollo.

34. Kaibel restored the name of Caracalla.

35. See the photograph in *IGUR*.

36. See *ILS* 6287, 7306; cf. Forbes 1933, 56–57. On these *iuvenes* and others named for a place in Rome see Panciera 1970, 21–33, esp. 29–33.

# 3
# Philosophy

27

# Plato's *Ion* and the Problem of *Techne*

Charles H. Kahn

## The Socratic Background

THE *ION* IS ONE OF THE FEW WORKS BY PLATO that can be dated with some confidence in the 390s, before his first voyage to Sicily.[1] In my opinion, only the *Apology* and the *Crito* are likely to be earlier. So the *Ion* is a fundamental text for understanding Plato's conception of τέχνη—the kind of knowledge or expertise that is teachable, that is, normally the result of training by another expert in the field.

In the *Apology*, Socrates insists upon his lack of knowledge or wisdom (σοφία). He does not of course claim to be ignorant in every respect. He claims to know that it is bad and shameful to do wrong or to do an unjust act under any circumstances (*Ap.* 29b6; cf. 28b8, 32b–c, 33a, etc.). He firmly maintains that the most important thing in life is self-examination in the concern for ἀρετή, moral excellence (38a; cf. 31b5, 41e), that is, in the concern for "intelligence [φρόνησις] and truth and making one's soul as good as possible" (29e, 30b2). This is what it means to spend one's life "in the practice of philosophy [φιλοσοφεῖν] and in testing myself and others" (28e5). If,

This chapter is an excerpt from work in progress for a book on Plato forthcoming from the Cambridge University Press. I am happy to have a chance to dedicate it to Martin Ostwald, one of my oldest and dearest friends. We met as students of David Grene in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago in 1946. I eventually followed Martin to Columbia, where once again we had the same teachers, Ernst Kapp and Kurt von Fritz, and the same thesis advisor (von Fritz). It has been a joy to be Martin's neighbor and colleague again, in Philadelphia. And the love of Plato has been a theme that we have shared all these years.

1. For dating the *Ion* between 394 and 391 B.C., see Méridier 1931, 23–24, 28; others have followed him. See Flashar 1958, 96 n. 2. Flashar dates it in 394 or shortly thereafter (1958, 100–1).

as the name φιλοσοφία suggests, this practice involves the search for wisdom "concerning the greatest things" (22d7), it certainly does not imply the *possession* of such wisdom. And Socrates denies that he has anything of this sort. Specifically he denies any share in the kind of scientific knowledge pursued by the natural philosophers (19c) and in the skill or art (τέχνη) by which the sophists claim to educate people (παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, 19d–20c), the art that he describes as "expertise in human and civic excellence" (20b4).

The wisdom that Socrates lacks but seeks is indiscriminately referred to as σοφία, ἐπιστήμη, and τέχνη. The latter term more particularly implies an ability to teach others. Since there is independent evidence (from Aeschines) that Socrates denied possession of any such expert knowledge or τέχνη, we may reasonably infer that this was a characteristic attitude of the historical Socrates. But when we turn to the *Crito*, the situation is not exactly the same. In responding to the popular view, urged by Crito, that it would be cowardly to let the city put him to death when he might escape, Socrates appeals to other opinions, opinions held by men who judge wisely in moral matters just as the doctor or trainer judges well in matters of bodily health. This analogy between physical welfare and moral excellence serves to introduce the notion of an expert in moral matters corresponding to the position of the doctor in matters of health. So in questions of what is good or bad, right or wrong, it is not the opinion of the many that counts, since they have no special knowledge. In such matters too, "we should follow the opinion of the one person, if there is someone who has knowledge" (*Cri.* 47d1), "the one who knows about what is just and unjust, that one person and the truth itself" (48a6).

Nowhere in the *Crito* does Socrates claim to possess such expertise. He claims only to follow "the reasoning [λόγος] that upon reflection seems to me the best" (46b). But his whole life has been spent in such reflection, in the concern for ἀρετή; and he remains loyal to certain moral principles (λόγοι that have been agreed upon often before, 45d8, 46b–c, 49a–b). If the *Crito* does not unambiguously represent Socrates as an expert (ἐπιστήμων) in matters of right and wrong, it certainly presents him as making his decisions in the light of such an ideal of moral knowledge. To this extent, there is a noteworthy distance here from the epistemic skepticism of the *Apology*, where Socrates' fruitless search for wisdom led him to the conclusion that only a god can be wise "but human wisdom is worth little or nothing" (23a). The ideal of "the one who knows about matters of right and wrong" is formulated in the *Crito* without the irony that Socrates generally assigns, in the *Apology* and elsewhere, to human pretensions to wisdom.

This notion of a moral τέχνη, which puts in an ambiguous appearance in the *Crito*, will play an increasingly important role in later dialogues,

beginning with the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*. Its most famous exemplars are the philosopher-kings of the *Republic*, but we find it still later in the royal or political art of the *Statesman*. It is no accident, however, that the first positive references to the possibility of such an art are introduced in cautious, conditional form: "If there is someone who has such knowledge..." (*Cri.* 47d1). Given Socrates' emphatic disclaimer in the *Apology*, the possibility of genuine knowledge concerning what is good and bad must inevitably be regarded as problematic. Later on, however, Plato's own position becomes equally clear: Virtue in the individual and justice in the city must depend ultimately upon moral cognition, upon knowledge in the strongest sense. In order to deal with the question of the existence of a moral τέχνη, Plato must first clarify this notion of τέχνη, as he begins to do here.

## The *Ion*: Why Poetry Is Not a Τέχνη

Although Ion is proud of his recent victory at the poetic competitions in Epidaurus, it is Socrates who pointedly calls attention to the pretensions of his craft:

> Ion, I have often admired you rhapsodes for your art [τέχνη]. Firstly, your body is adorned in a way fitting to your art [τέχνη], to make you appear as fine as possible; and secondly, you must spend your time with many excellent poets and above all with Homer, the best and most divine of poets. (530b)

Socrates emphasizes, and Ion agrees, that the chief distinction of the rhapsode is to understand the poet's thought and to interpret that thought for the audience (530c). By thus focusing attention on the exegesis of poetry and not simply on its performance, Plato points to the fundamental role in Greek education played by poetry in general and Homer in particular. It is as a moral and intellectual influence rather than as an art form that poetry becomes an object for Plato's criticism, both here and later: in the *Hippias Minor*, in the *Protagoras*, and of course in the *Republic*.

The discussion that follows falls into three parts. In section 1, Socrates argues ad hominem against Ion that his success as a rhapsode cannot be due to τέχνη, since he is competent only on Homer. If he possessed the relevant art or science (τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη), he would be able to speak on poetry as a whole. Section 2 is more positive; here Socrates gives his alternative explanation of Ion's success in terms of divine possession or inspiration, making

use of the famous image of the magnet. The Muse is the magnet who transmits her power to the poet, who passes it on to the rhapsode or actor, who in turn exercises the power of possession over the audience, just as the magnetic stone attracts iron rings that in turn attract other rings and pieces of iron. Poet and rhapsode are conceived as the passive instrument by which the Muse herself exerts her power on the auditors. This conception gives a noncognitive explanation for the achievement of the poet as well as for that of the rhapsode and thus undermines any claim that the poet's thought (διάνοια) makes an intellectual contribution to education.

Ion is unconvinced by this explanation of his success in terms of possession or being "out of his mind" (536d5; cf. 534b5–6); he would like to think that he knows what he is doing. Hence in section 3 Socrates provides a more general argument to show that the rhapsode has no τέχνη. The basic premise is a version of what will appear in the *Republic* as the principle of specialization, the principle on which the division of labor is founded: "Has not some specific task [ἔργον] been assigned by the god to each of the τέχναι for it to have knowledge of?" (537c5). This is then reformulated as a principle of individuation for the arts: "I call two arts distinct when each one is knowledge of a different subject matter [πράγματα]" (473d5).

From this it follows that if the subjects known are distinct, the τέχναι are distinct, and conversely. So "what we know by one art, we will not know by a different art" (537d2). Socrates then applies this principle to a variety of passages in Homer and proceeds to show that, for any topic mentioned in the poems, there always seems to be an expert more competent than the rhapsode to judge this particular subject matter—the rhapsode has no subject that is specifically his own. Ion grants the case for the charioteer, the doctor, the fisherman, and a host of other professions, but he insists that the rhapsode knows best "what is appropriate for a man to say, and what for a woman, what is appropriate for a slave and a freeman, and for a ruler and a subject" (540b). Socrates shows that this breaks down for specific cases (the rhapsode does not know what is appropriate for a ship captain to say if his ship is caught in a storm). But Ion firmly resists in the case of a general knowing what to say in order to encourage his troops. He insists that he is not only an excellent rhapsode but also an excellent general, "having learned this from the works of Homer" (541b5).[2] He even maintains that the two arts are one and the same. Against this extraordinary claim, Socrates tries several logical moves, none of which succeeds in getting Ion to admit

2. In Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 1036) Homer is praised for teaching men "battle formations, prowess, and putting on armor." In this context, Flashar (1958, 86) cites *Rep.* 599c–e, where such a claim for Homer's educational contribution is rejected as in the *Ion* but on different grounds: What city has been improved by Homer's influence?

defeat. Socrates nevertheless concludes that Ion is deceiving him and that he refuses to reveal "how clever [he is] in the wisdom concerning Homer" (542a1). He then confronts Ion with a final dilemma: "If you really have a τέχνη...it is unjust of you to deceive me; if however you are possessed by divine dispensation...you do no wrong. Choose which you prefer: to be regarded by us as unjust or as divine." Faced with such a choice, Ion naturally opts for the more attractive alternative.

By way of substantive philosophical content, we find in this brief conversation a positive theory of poetry, an incipient theory of τέχνη, and the negative application of the τέχνη theory to poetry via the rhapsode. The theory of poetry that reinterprets the traditional notion of poetic inspiration as divine madness or possession may have been anticipated by Democritus, who is quoted by Clement of Alexandria as saying "whatever a poet writes with divine frenzy [ἐνθουσιασμός] and holy inspiration [πνεῦμα] is exceedingly beautiful."[3] If the notion of poetic possession may have been borrowed, Plato has nevertheless developed it systematically by the parallel to Corybantic ecstasy, prophetic frenzy, and the supernatural powers of the Bacchae when possessed. The magnificent simile of the magnet with its chain of iron rings is certainly Plato's own, and it has the deliberate effect of giving the same explanation for poetic creation as for rhapsodic performance. Thus the attack on Ion becomes an attack on Homer and the poets.[4] It was of course the poets who claimed that they were divinely inspired, and it was their "wisdom" and their "thought" that played such an important role in Greek education. By eliminating the intellectual component from their achievement, Plato, like Heraclitus before him,[5] challenges their claim to be counted as σοφοί. He thus pursues the line indicated by Socrates in the *Apology*, whose examination of the poets led him to conclude that

> it was not by wisdom or skill [σοφία] that they compose their poems but by some natural gift [φύσει τινί] and frenzy, like the prophets and oracular seers. For the latter also say many fine things, but they don't know what they are talking about.[6]

3. Fr. 68 B 18 DK. The quotation does not seem to be verbatim, and Clement's language may be influenced by our passage in the *Ion*, to which he has just referred. Linguistically more convincing is a similar fragment (68 B 21 DK): "Since Homer was allotted a godlike nature, he constructed a glorious ordering of manifold verse." But this text does not imply possession. For discussion see Tigerstedt 1970, 163–78.

4. This was correctly seen by Méridier (1931, 13), following Schleiermacher and others.

5. Heraclit. B 42, 56–57 DK.

6. *Ap.* 22b9, on which Burnet comments: "It is well to remember here that σοφία was the regular word for artistic skill, especially in music and poetry."

The theory of the *Ion* is a systematic working out of this hint from the *Apology*. The ultimate target is not only the poets of contemporary Athens but their great predecessor, Homer himself.[7]

There is no question that the Homeric poems exerted enormous influence on the intellectual development of the Greeks from childhood on. Many commentators assume, however, that Plato's attack is directed not only against this general influence of poetry but specifically against the professional sophists' use of the poets as part of their training program.[8] We seem to see such a practice illustrated in the *Protagoras*, where the famous sophist is made to remark, apropos of the interpretation of Simonides' poem, that "it is a very important part of a man's education [παιδεία] to be competent on the subject of poetry, that is, to be able to understand what is well said by the poet and what is not well said, to know how to judge with discernment and to give an explanation when questioned" (*Prot.* 338e–f). This is essentially what Ion promises to do for Homer. Plato's contempt for this notion of education is reflected later in Socrates' comment that to converse about poetry is to act like banqueters who require a floor show because they are unable to enjoy their own conversation; furthermore, the poets are not there to answer our questions, hence the conversation is futile (*Prot.* 347c–348a). Is Plato attacking the teaching of such long-dead figures as Protagoras and Hippias? Or does he have a more contemporary educational practice in view?

Plato's theory of τέχνη gets its start in the *Ion* with the fundamental principle of a one-to-one mapping between a science and its subject matter. This principle is carefully articulated in our dialogue (537c–538a); hence it can be taken for granted in later discussions of τέχνη (e.g., *Grg.* 462b–465a; *Chrm.* 171a). In *Republic* 5 (447d) a variant of this principle, extended to cover capacities (δυνάμεις), is used to distinguish the object of knowledge from the object of opinion. The original principle is certainly defensible if the notion of subject matter is taken intensionally, that is, as defined by the approach of the science. In that case, the principle "one science if and only if one subject matter" becomes something like a conceptual truth. It is part of the notion of what it is for a science to have a definite subject matter. The principle is much more problematic, however, even manifestly false, if *subject matter* is taken extensionally to refer to different slices of the world, different sets of objects or individual entities. In this sense, different sciences can obviously study the same subject matter. The set of human beings, for example, constitutes the object for anthropology and psychol-

7. Compare Woodruff 1983, 6: "To attack Homer he [i.e., Socrates, but I would rather say Plato] would have to attack his representatives, the rhapsodes."

8. E.g. Flashar 1958, 32; Friedländer 1964, 129.

ogy, linguistics and human genetics. A critic of Plato could claim that the *Republic* argument for two kinds of objects corresponding to knowledge and opinion trades on just this ambiguity between the intensional and the extensional reading of *object*. A fuller discussion would have to defend Plato against this charge by a more careful analysis of the notion of intensional object. But that would take us too far afield.

The principle of a one-to-one mapping between τέχνη and subject matter is already implicit in the first, ad hominem argument, which relies on Ion's admission that his talent is limited to Homer. Since poetry is a single subject, the corresponding art of exegesis would have to be equally general. If it were by τέχνη that Ion could explain Homer, he would be equally capable of speaking about the other poets, "for I suppose that the whole thing is poetry" (532c8). By a slight readjustment, the same principle will apply to the work of the poet as well as to that of the exegete. This allows us to reconstruct the argument that Aristodemus could not remember, when at the end of the *Symposium*, Socrates was obliging a sleepy Agathon and a tipsy Aristophanes "to agree that it belongs to the same man to master the art of composing comedy and tragedy, and that he who was a tragic poet by art (τέχνη) would be a comic poet as well" (*Symp.* 223d). If there was a τέχνη of composing tragedy or comedy, it would have to be the same for both, since "the whole thing is poetry." It is simply because they are inspired by different Muses that one poet composes tragedy, another composes comedy, one composes epic, another composes invectives, "and each of them is no good at the other kinds of poetry" (*Ion* 534c).

If we can detect the one-to-one principle already at work in this first argument against Ion, it is openly stated as the basis for the more rigorous argument of section 3 (537c–538a). If the rhapsode had a τέχνη, there would have to be a corresponding subject matter that he was uniquely qualified to know. However, for any particular passage of Homer that Socrates and Ion discuss, there seems to be a different art that is better qualified to judge the action described in that passage (if the action is a chariot race, the charioteer is a better judge than the rhapsode, etc.). But at this point we must observe that, even for cases where the mapping principle is assumed to be valid, there is something tricky or perverse in Socrates' use of it. Its application in this argument has the effect of making the work of art disappear. One looks *through* the poem to focus only on the various human actions described. The description itself, the poetry as such, never comes into view. Ion makes a desperate effort to direct attention to the poet's art of character portrayal when he specifies, as the rhapsode's proper subject matter, "what is appropriate for a man to say, and what is appropriate for a woman, and for a slave...and for a ruler" (540b). But Socrates forces him

back onto the extrapoetic terrain of the first-order arts ("Does the rhapsode know better than the pilot what the ruler of a ship should say in a storm at sea?"). The poem as an art work has no independent status. This must be quite deliberate on Plato's part, since it directly serves his purpose of undermining the claims that poetry should be counted as σοφία. A similarly depreciative conception of art is developed in book 10 of the *Republic*, when the poet and the painter are represented as imitating reality at third hand. The theory of art sketched in the *Ion* is less merely hostile, since it also takes account of the positive, "divine" impact of poetry on the audience. But that impact is seen as entirely devoid of intellectual content.

## Argumentation in the *Ion*

The refutation of Ion does not represent an elenchus in standard form. There is no thesis maintained by Ion and shown to be contradicted by the consequences of premises he accepts, since the thesis refuted (that the rhapsode as such possesses a τέχνη) is never explicitly asserted by him (it is of course taken for granted by Ion, for example, at 530c8, but to be formally refuted it would have to be formally affirmed). On the other hand, the contradictory thesis, that the rhapsode operates not by τέχνη but by divine gift or possession, is asserted by Socrates but never accepted by Ion as the consequence of an argument. He does accept it verbally at the end, but only to avoid the charge of being unjust. This is Plato's elegant way of showing that Socrates has won the argument, even though Ion will not grant his point.

The central portion of the dialogue is not an elenchus at all but the exposition by Socrates of a positive explanation of the power of poetry. In sections 1 and 3, we find systematic arguments in the form of a classic Socratic *epagoge*, an inductive generalization from the arts and crafts. In section 1, Socrates cites arithmetic, medicine, painting, sculpture, and various forms of music to show that a good judge of one specimen of any given art should be a good judge of other practitioners of the same art. In section 3, he cites the charioteer, the doctor, the fisherman, the prophet, the cowherd, the woolworker, and the general, to show that for every action described in Homer, there is a specialist who can judge this action better than the rhapsode can.

How good are these arguments? The *epagoge* in section 1 is formally defective,[9] but it makes a sound point: there is really something odd about

9. There is a slippery slide from (1) If one can recognize the superiority of good poets, one can also recognize that the others are inferior (531d12–532b2), which is trivially true, to (2) If one can understand and explain good artists, one can also explain inferior ones (532e7–533c3), which is a substantive claim, apparently falsified in Ion's case. The slide is

competence in a well-defined area that extends only to the leading representative of the field and to none of his peers. The argument of section 3 is more ambitious. The mapping principle introduced here is important historically, for its utilization in Plato's later work, and also philosophically, as defining the proper subject matter for a given science. Socrates' application of this principle to the rhapsode and (by implication) to the poet is more dubious. If Ion had been more quick-witted, he might have blocked the second *epagoge* by citing those passages in the *Odyssey* where a minstrel performs, as one case where the rhapsode is the privileged judge of the action described. Plato is aware of this possibility, and he has cunningly arranged for Socrates to mention the judging of rhapsodes as an example in the earlier *epagoge*, at 533b–c. But the position of the minstrel is too marginal in the total Homeric picture of human affairs for Ion to take much satisfaction in a τέχνη that would make him an expert in this function only. He opts for a more noble, if less plausible, role, that of the general encouraging his troops (540d–541d)—his chosen models are Hector and Agamemnon.

From the logical point of view, the most interesting passages in section 3 are Socrates' final efforts to counter this rather silly move on Ion's part. Socrates does not succeed in refuting Ion, for the rhapsode is insensitive to logical defeat. But he displays some sophisticated techniques that go well beyond the familiar argument from analogy. When Ion insists that he knows how a general should encourage his men, Socrates suggests that Ion may possess two quite distinct arts: the art of the rhapsode and the art of the general. In developing this distinction, he introduces, probably for the first time in philosophical history, the terminology *qua X* or *under the description Y*: "Suppose you were both a horseman and a lyre-player...if I asked you, by what art, Ion, do you know when horses are well trained? Is it *qua* horseman or *qua* lyre-player?" (540d–e). Ion recognizes the distinction in this case, but refuses to recognize it in the parallel case of general and rhapsode. So Socrates proceeds to a second tactic: "You say that the rhapsode and the general have a single art?" "Yes, I do." "Then whoever is a good rhapsode is a good general?" To this implication Ion willingly consents, for this is precisely his claim. But he balks at the converse, which is equally entailed by his identifying the two arts: "Whoever then is a good general is also a good rhapsode?" "No, I don't think so" (541a).

What is Socrates to do with such an interlocutor? His final ploy is to return to the implication that is acceptable to Ion, that a good rhapsode will

effected at 532a3: "the same person is competent about both"—which is ambiguous between the two claims. However, proposition 2 is supported by its own *epagoge*. Proposition 1 is not logically needed; it is part of Socrates' rhetorical softening up of his opponent before the logical kill.

also be a good general. He argues then from the positive to the superlative: "But if you are the best rhapsode in Greece, you are also the best general?" Ion cheerfully accepts the compliment (541b). Socrates asks him why in that case he performs only as a rhapsode and does not pursue an even more honorable career as general. The dialogue ends with a dispute about whether someone from Ephesus, like Ion, could actually serve as general in the city of Athens. From the point of view of the reader, Socrates has clearly won the argument. But his victory cannot be logically consummated, because of the stubborn obtuseness of Ion. Socrates prevails nevertheless, but only by the rhetorical maneuver of obliging Ion to choose between being thought either dishonest or inspired.

28

# The Place of *Phthonos* in the Argument of Plato's *Phaedrus*

Matthew W. Dickie

THAT OUR OWN INTELLECTUAL, social, moral, and political presuppositions will in greater or lesser degree affect our reading of a text is incontrovertible. Whether we can break free of these constraints and confront ancient texts in something approaching the spirit in which their original audience or the readers of succeeding generations received them is a matter of dispute. In the study of ancient literature and to a much lesser extent in ancient history, there is a growing awareness of the problems faced by those interpreting ancient texts.[1] In the case of philosophical texts, the issues on which our attention focuses tend to be those that we have come to accept as philosophically interesting. What is not, in our eyes, philosophically significant, we pass by. It goes without saying, unless we naively suppose that the problems with which philosophers grapple are eternal and enduring and that their own cultural background plays no part in determining the form their interests take, that our response to an ancient philosophical text will be very different from that of an ancient reader and that we may fail to pay sufficient attention to issues that the author of the text thought interesting.[2]

An approach that offers the possibility of breaking out of the hermeneutic circle is to employ the commentaries written in antiquity as an

I hope that a chapter on generosity of spirit in the *Phaedrus* will seem an appropriate tribute for a scholar who has given unstintingly of himself to others.

1. On the difficulties facing the interpreter of tragedy and of Greek religion, cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1989, 134–35; Sourvinou-Inwood 1990, 295. On the interpretation of historical texts cf. Cameron 1989, 1–10.

2. For a conscious break from presuppositions about the importance of unity in the interpretation of the *Phaedrus* see Heath 1989a, 12–27; Heath 1989b, 151–73.

aid to the interpretation of ancient texts. The rationale behind the procedure is that ancient commentators have more in common with their author and their author's outlook than has any modern scholar and that they respond to issues that escape the modern scholar's attention. Also, very often, an ancient commentator knows the texts better than any modern scholar.[3] How much is to be gained by attending to what scholia single out for comment in a text is evident from Jasper Griffin's study of pathos in the *Iliad*.[4] There remains the problem that even in reading an ancient commentator, we see only what we want or are able to see. That danger can to some extent be circumvented by an awareness of that tendency and by a conscious attempt to keep our minds open to what the commentator is in fact saying.

Modern interpretations of Plato's *Phaedrus* are not conspicuous for the attention they pay to the ancient reception of a work whose popularity and influence in antiquity was enormous.[5] Besides the authors who cite passages from it, imitate it, or are inspired by it, there is a full-scale commentary by the fifth-century Alexandrian Neoplatonist, Hermeias. The commentary is based in part at least on lectures given in Athens by Hermeias' teacher, Syrianus, which in their turn must owe much to Iamblichus, who was responsible for a revival of serious philosophical interest in the work.[6] The later scholia in the main come from this commentary.[7] Yet virtually none of this material is ever referred to.[8] In this chapter, my discussion of the role played by φθόνος in the argument of the first section of the *Phaedrus*, and in particular of its significance for Plato's conception of love and goodness, is indebted above all to Hermeias and to a lesser extent to other ancient interpreters. These writers display a sensitivity to the importance of φθόνος in the dialogue and to what is implied in Plato's references to the notion. This

3. On this aspect of Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle and the help they afford in the understanding of that author see Sorabji 1990, 15.

4. Griffin 1976, 161–85; Griffin 1980, 103–43.

5. Trapp 1990, 141–73; on its relative neglect by philosophers—on the ground that it was a work of Plato's youth—until Iamblichus revived interest in it and made it part of the canon of Neoplatonic study see Bielmeier 1930, 1; Larsen 1972, 361–62.

6. The evidence for this statement is Hermeias himself, who speaks of listening to Syrianus in Proclus' company (92.6–9 Couvreur); Proclus, who asserts that he and Syrianus in their inquiries into the *Phaedrus* demonstrated a point (*In Parm.* 944 Cousin); and Damascius, not necessarily a disinterested reporter, who says that Hermeias lacked intellectual acumen and originality but remembered everything his teacher had said and whatever was written in books (*Vit. Isidor.* 100 Zintzen); cf. *RE* 8:733–34; Bielmeier 1930, 29–39.

7. Cf. Bielmeier 1930, 54–56.

8. For an expression of the conviction that the Neoplatonists' commentaries contribute almost nothing to our understanding of Plato cf. *RE* 8:734: "Wie bei den übrigen neuplatonischen Platonkommentaren, so ist auch bei dem der H. der Gewinn für das Verständnis Platons sehr gering."

is not altogether surprising. The ancients were in general more conscious than we are of the part that φθόνος plays in human life. A good deal of thought was expended in antiquity in interpreting exactly what Plato meant by asserting at *Phaedrus* 247a7 and *Timaeus* 29e1–3 that the gods and the Divine Demiurge respectively were free of φθόνος.

I argue that Socrates' aim in his palinode is to demonstrate that a true lover will not succumb to the φθόνος that afflicts the lovers of his own earlier speech and that of Lysias' speech, and that, so far from succumbing to φθόνος, the true lover will replicate in his relations with his beloved the ἀφθονία, the overflowing generosity of spirit, that the gods had displayed toward him as a disembodied spirit following in their train and that they had shown toward each other; the gods had wished him to participate with them in the knowledge that gave them their immortality and had thus been willing to let him share in their immortality. This overflowing generosity of spirit is the same form of goodness that the Divine Demiurge of the *Timaeus* exhibits in creating the cosmos.[9] It wishes to endow others with the goods that it itself enjoys and, in particular, to allow men to partake of the knowledge that gives the divine its immortality.[10] It is a condition of mind that is not just the negation of φθόνος but its contrary. The theme of φθόνος is, accordingly, the principal thread tying the first two speeches in the *Phaedrus* to Socrates' palinode. In his commentary, Hermeias recognizes this.[11] Furthermore, he sees the gods' freedom from φθόνος and that of the true lover, who is, in his view, to be identified with the philosopher, as an overflowing generosity of spirit that never ceases and that is always concerned to provide for the well-being of others.[12]

Before we proceed to the *Phaedrus*, we should first look briefly at the *Timaeus* to see what freedom from φθόνος means in it. The reason Timaeus gives for the Divine Demiurge's creation of the cosmos is that "he was good." He goes on to explain exactly why his goodness made him wish to create the cosmos:

> In one who is good there is no φθόνος present about anything at all; since this was so in the case of the Divine Demiurge, he wished everything to be as like himself as possible. (29e1–3)

9. Cf. Stenzel 1928, 243–44: "Dieses griechische Wort Phthonos ist für Platon der stärkste Gegensatz zum Guten; dieses ist neidlos, denn er sucht seine Kräfte über alles hin zu erstrecken."

10. For a similar account see Price 1989, 96–97.

11. Cf. 192.4–5, 204.11–13 Couvreur.

12. Cf. 144.4–8, 192.5–11, 208.8–13, 256.8–10 Couvreur.

> [ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ.]

This is perhaps the most important of all Platonic texts for later antiquity, whether Jewish, Christian, or pagan.[13] The key notion in the passage is φθόνος, a word which has a range of meanings that no one English term covers. In Latin, *invidia* and *livor* have very much the same range. For the most part, envy or jealousy are perfectly adequate renderings of the term, but it may also signify a meanness of spirit whose presence makes a person begrudge sharing his knowledge or skills with others. Depending on the context, to say of someone that he is φθονερός may mean (1) that he is envious of others who enjoy goods he himself does not have, (2) that he is jealous and does not like to see others sharing in the privileges he himself possesses,[14] (3) that he is endowed with a grudging state of mind and cannot bear to give others a share in the goods he possesses himself, or (4) that he both grudges giving others a share in the goods he himself possesses and grudges their possessing goods themselves. The Divine Demiurge is free from the φθόνος that resents sharing goods with others, and he also has no share in the φθόνος that cannot bear to see someone else enjoying some good.[15] Not only is he free from these forms of φθόνος but his state of mind is the direct contrary of them—it is characterized by an overflowing generosity of spirit that shows itself in his wish to make the products of his creation as like himself as possible.[16] The Divine Demiurge's goodness is,

13. Cf. Philo *Opif.* 21, *Deus* 108, *Plant.* 91, *Migr.* 193, *Congr.* 171, *QG* 1.55; Plut. *Mor.* 573c, 1015a–b, 1102d; Justin. Mart. *Ap.* 1.10.2; Iren. *Adv. haer.* 3 *praef.*, 3.23.6, 3.24.4–5; 4.1.2, 4.14.2, 4.16.5, 4.38.3; 5.24.4; Sext. Emp. *M.* 9.105; Gal. *UP* 4.2.1–2 Helmreich; Hermog. *Id.* 243, 247 Rabe; Plot. 5.4.1; Greg. Nyss. *De orat. domin.* 5 = *PG* 44.1148; Bas. *Hom. in hexam.* 1.2.7 Naldini = *PG* 44.1148, *De invid.* 1 = *PG* 29.9; Athan. *Contra gent.* 41 Thomson, *De incarn. verb.* 3.3.2 Kannengiesser; Joh. Chrys. *De virg.* 8.22–23 Musurillo and Grillet; Sen. *Ep.* 65.10; Aug. *De nat. dei* 11.21; Boeth. *Consol.* 9 *carm.* 9. Hermogenes (*Id.* 243 Rabe) cites it first in a list of propositions about the gods that possess an awesome quality.

14. Cf. Aug. *Comm. in Ep. ad Gal.* 3.5 = *PL* 26.445: *invidia vero aliena felicitate torquetur, et in duplicem scinditur passionem: cum aut ipse est aliquid in eo, in quo alium esse non vult: aut alium esse videns meliorem, dolet se ei non esse consimilem.*

15. Plotinus (5.4.1.34–36), who has *Ti.* 29e1–3 in mind, argues that the one, if it is the beginning and source, will not stay within itself and grudge giving of itself: πῶς οὖν τὸ τελεώτατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὑτῷ σταίη ὥσπερ φθονῆσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν, ἡ πάντων δύναμις;

16. Cornford (1937, 34–35) takes the Divine Demiurge's lack of φθόνος to imply that "the imperfection of the world is due to necessity, not to the deliberate withholding of any excellence that it might possess." This is followed by severe criticism of A. E. Taylor 1928, 78, for crediting Plato with the Christian notion that God created the world out of "overflowing love." Cornford's own interpretation seems contrived; his criticism of Taylor, as well as being misinformed, has a curious period flavor.

accordingly, a goodness that gladly gives of itself and that rejoices in seeing others enjoying the privileges and benefits enjoyed by itself.[17]

In his commentary on this passage of the *Timaeus*, Proclus recognizes that not only are envy and jealousy at issue but also a state of mind that grudges giving goods to others. He argues (1) that φθόνος is never just anguish prompted by other people's goods but a mixed passion compounded of both anguish and pleasure, as Socrates had demonstrated in the *Philebus* (48b8–11), (2) that φθόνος is also having the ability to do others good but refraining from doing so and keeping the good to ourselves, and (3) that φθόνος is furthermore a deficiency (ἔνδεια) in goods:

> (1) μήποτε οὖν φθόνος μέν ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς λύπη, συμμιγὲς τοῦτο πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπογεννώμενον ἔκ τε ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, ὡς ἐν Φιλήβῳ Σωκράτης ἀπέδειξε, (2) φθόνος δὲ καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑαυτῷ κατέχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, (3) φθόνος γε μὴν καὶ ἡ ἔνδεια αὐτὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. (1.362.31–363.4 Diehl)

Proclus takes this last aspect of φθόνος to underlie the other two. As such, it is the reason that individual souls experience anguish at others' having goods and keep these goods to themselves, since in such souls, who are only good to the extent that they participate in the good itself, a deficiency of goods exists. Since no such deficiency exists in the divine, as it is goodness itself, φθόνος is absent (1.363.4–365.3 Diehl). Proclus' point, which he supposes to be Plato's also, is that envy, jealousy, and grudging sharing our goods with others represent a feeling of inadequacy that is inconceivable in a being who can never be deficient in anything.

The Divine Demiurge's desire to make everything as like himself as possible[18] must principally mean that he wished people to be as like himself as possible. The theme of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is only alluded to at this point in the *Timaeus*, and its implications are not spelled out. It is more fully developed toward the end of the dialogue (89d7–90d7), where Timaeus explicitly says that god has given to each of us the most important of the three parts of the soul as a δαίμων, that this part of the soul raises us toward kinship with heaven (90a3–7), and that, if it is properly exercised and fastens upon the truth, it will have immortal and divine thoughts (φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα) and will, so far as is possible for human nature, partake of immortality (90b6–90c6). Implicit then in the Divine Demiurge's eagerness to create everything in his own image, because he is good and free of φθόνος, is a

17. For the divine rejoicing, because it is free of φθόνος, in men acquiring divine knowledge, cf. [Pl.] *Epin.* 988b6–7: ἀλλ' οὐ συγχαῖρον ἄνευ φθόνου διὰ θεὸν ἀγαθῷ γενομένῳ.

18. Cf. Milobenski 1964, 21.

willingness to see men partake in the knowledge that gives him his immortality.

The topic of φθόνος in the lover's relationship to his beloved makes its first appearance in the *Phaedrus* in the speech (purported to be by Lysias) that *Phaedrus* reads to Socrates. Φθόνος is a main theme in that speech and in the speech of Socrates that follows.[19] Lysias argues that it is much more in a boy's interest to yield to the advances of a nonlover than to yield to a lover. A considerable part of the charge against the lover, though it is never put in so many words, is that his actions will be governed by φθόνος and that he will, out of φθόνος, act in such a way as to damage his beloved's real interests: There is much that will cause the lover distress, and he will imagine everything that happens has been done with a view to harming him; he will keep the beloved from any association with others out of fear that he will be outdone in understanding, wealth, or some other quality; as a result, the lover will deprive his beloved of any contact with friends, and the affair will end in a quarrel (232c3–232d4). There is no room to doubt that such conduct should be categorized as jealous. That jealousy is at issue is confirmed by the contrasting way the nonlovers' conduct is characterized in the passage that follows, or at any rate, the conduct of those nonlovers who get their way because of their ἀρετή—they would not be jealous of the associates of the boy (οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνοῦσιν φθονοῖεν), but far from that, because of their conviction that the boy was despised by them and would benefit from his association with others, they would hate those who were unwilling to associate with him (233d4–7).

What explains the freedom from φθόνος and the concern for the boy's welfare on the part of the nonlover who gets his way because of his ἀρετή is that very ἀρετή. Lysias does not explicitly say that nonlovers of this sort possess these admirable traits because of their ἀρετή, but it is reasonable to suppose that their ἀρετή explains their generosity. Ἀρετή here, as at *Timaeus* 29e1–3, acts as a restraint on φθόνος and at the same time is responsible for the nonlover's goodwill.[20] That goodwill shows itself in its eagerness to see the boy benefit from the help that others can give him.

In demonstrating that he can make a better case for Lysias' thesis, Socrates three times brings up the topic of the lover's jealousy. In Socrates'

19. Cf. Stenzel 1928, 245–46: "Diese (sc. Lysias' speech) und die erste Rede des Sokrates...haben ein und dasselbe Thema: Phthonos, Neid der Liebe, Eifersucht; Verengerung der erotischen Beziehung, ausschliesslicher Besitz des Geliebten"; similarly, Milobenski 1964, 33.

20. On ἀρετή and freedom from φθόνος cf. Pi. *O.* 4.4–5; Hdt. 7.237.2; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.22–23; Demos. 18.278–79, 20.139–41.

speech, the lover's jealousy is directed more at the beloved than at those with whom he associates, because his overriding concern is to ensure that his beloved always looks to him for everything and is his inferior (239a7–239c1). Since the lover, for these reasons, must be jealous, he will keep his beloved from many beneficial associations that would make a man of him, and he will be responsible for doing him the greatest harm by preventing him from attaining wisdom. He will do this by keeping the boy at as great a distance as possible from philosophy, out of fear of being despised:

> φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστα ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν. (239a7–239b4)

He will also of necessity display jealous resentment toward a boy who has any property of his own and will rejoice in its loss, since such a boy is less easily seduced and, when seduced, less tractable: ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις, ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν (240a4–5). Finally, Socrates, in concluding his case, mentions jealousy as one of the disagreeable traits that a boy will find in a lover: The lover will be untrustworthy, ill-natured, jealous, physically repugnant, and harmful to his property, his physical well-being, and above all, the education of his soul, a matter that Socrates again asserts is of the highest importance both among gods and men (241c1–6).

The burden of Socrates' case against the lover is that out of φθόνος he keeps the object of his affections from philosophy and by so depriving him does the beloved the greatest conceivable harm. This issue is hardly raised by Lysias. It receives emphasis in Socrates' speech because in his recantation he makes it his primary task to establish that the true lover will, since he lacks all φθόνος, be eager to see his beloved imbibe as much philosophy as possible and attain the highest degree of wisdom. In other words, Socrates' first speech was composed with the recantation in view. Further evidence that this is so is found in the response that Socrates imagines his and Lysias' speech would draw from a lover of noble and gentle character:

> He would suppose that he had been hearing those brought up amongst sailors, men who had known nothing of the love of free men, when he hears it said that lovers form great enmities because of small matters and that they view the objects of their affections with envious resentment and are harmful to them. (243c1–9)

> [λεγόντων ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἡγεῖσθαι ἀκούειν ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων.]

In the palinode the topic of φθόνος resurfaces at three crucial junctures: (1) in the account of the gods' attitude to each other and to the disembodied souls who follow them in their journey through the heavens (247a7), (2) in the description of the attitude of the true lover to his beloved (253b5–c2), and (3) in the envoi to the speech, where the nonlover's essentially mean-spirited attitude is denounced in comparison with the overflowing generosity of the true lover (256e4–257a2). I will discuss these passages separately in the three sections that follow.

Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (247a7). This sententia must rival *Timaeus* 29e1–3 in the number of times it is cited or alluded to in antiquity.[21] In the sentence that precedes and is explained by it, Socrates speaks of blessed sights and passages within heaven that the gods proceed through, attending to their own business (πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ, 247a6), while whosoever is willing and able follows (ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος, 247a6–7). The subject of the larger context is the gods' and the souls' journey through heaven, their ascent to the rim of heaven, and what they see from that vantage point in the extraheavenly zone, as they are borne in a revolution around it.

The image of Φθόνος standing outside the chorus of the gods is clearly a metaphorical way of saying the gods are free of φθόνος. It explains both the gods' attitude toward each other in their journeys within and without heaven and their attitude toward whoever is willing and able to follow them on that journey. The latter group are undoubtedly the disembodied souls.[22]

The standard modern interpretation of the figure of Φθόνος standing outside the divine chorus is that it is an attack on the archaic notion of divine jealousy.[23] This may well be so. After all, when Aristotle deals in the

21. Cf. Philo *Fug.* 62, 74, *Lg.* 1.131, 3.7, *Spec.* 2.249, *Prob.* 13, *Praem.* 39, *QG* 4.103, 4.107, 4.142; Plut. *Mor.* 679e, 954f, 1086f, fr. 31 Sandbach; Max. Tyr. 41.3a; Lucian *Prom.* 18; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.4.19.2, 5.4.24.2, 5.4.30.5; 7.2.7.2, 7.7.49.4; Origen *Cels.* 8.21.

22. Cf. Hermeias (144.1–3 Couvreur): τὸ δὲ ἕπεται δὲ ὁ αἰεὶ θέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων λέγεται ψυχῶν· τὰ γὰρ ἀνωτέρω περὶ τῶν κρειττόνων ἡμῶν ἐλέγετο γενῶν; Plotinus 5.8.10.1–4: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς καίπερ ὢν πρεσβύτατος τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ὢν αὐτὸς ἡγεῖται, πρῶτος πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὴν τούτου θέαν, οἱ δὲ ἕπονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ψυχαί, αἳ ταῦτα ὁρᾶν δύνανται.

23. For the view that Plato rejects divine jealousy both here and at *Ti.* 29e1–3, cf. Greene 1948, 294 n. 113; Milobenski 1964, 24; De Vries 1969, 132; Walcot 1978, 69; Runia 1986, 136.

*Metaphysics* with the issue of men pursuing forms of knowledge that are the gods' special concern, he explicitly denies the poets' sayings about the jealousy of the divine (982b31–983a3a). It is likely then that Plato is implicitly[24] disposing of this issue by asserting that the gods do not resent men participating with them in contemplating the everlasting realities.

Although Plato is in all likelihood taking a sideswipe at the notion of divine jealousy by saying that Φθόνος stands outside the chorus of the gods, that can hardly be his main point. There are two issues to be explored: (1) what the gods' freedom from φθόνος as regards each other means and (2) what their feeling no φθόνος toward the souls who accompany them signifies.

Zeus is the commander-in-chief of the gods on their journey; the other gods are divided into eleven groups, each of which has a leader. Each of the leaders keeps to the position in which he or she has been placed, and the whole host follows Zeus' lead (246e4–247a4). In attending to their own business and in following Zeus' lead, the gods display freedom from φθόνος; they do not begrudge their leader his position, and they do not out of jealousy interfere in each other's affairs. Corroboration for this interpretation is found in the way in which Dio of Prusa, in a speech largely inspired by the *Phaedrus*, fills out Plato's description of the gods' journeys:[25]

> The gods do not quarrel with each other, nor is one worsted by another, for they are friendly to each other; but each attends to his own business unhindered by the others and enjoys the wholehearted benevolence of all the others. (*Or.* 36.22)

> [οὔτε γὰρ ἐρίζειν θεοὺς οὔτε ἡττᾶσθαι θέμις οὔτε ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἅτε φίλων οὔτε ὑπὸ ἄλλων κρειττόνων, ἀλλὰ πράττειν ἀκωλύτως τὰ σφέτερα ἔργα μετὰ πάσης φίλιας ἀεὶ πάντων κοινῆς.]

The reference to each of the gods attending to his own business certainly echoes the definition of justice in the *Republic* (433b4), and it is reasonable to suppose that Plato means that the gods enjoy a well-ordered and just existence.[26] He also means us to understand that because they lack φθόνος, the gods, on their journeys within and without heaven, foster each other's intellectual activities. In marked and patently intentional contrast,[27] most of the souls following in their train exhibit an envious competitiveness that

24. Thompson ([1868] 1973, 49) describes 247a7 as a "bye-blow at the vulgar notion" of divine jealousy. Runia (1986, 136) also recognizes that there is more to it than an attack on divine jealousy.

25. Cf. Trapp 1990, 151.

26. Rowe 1986, 179.

27. I am indebted to Price (1989, 96) for this point.

results in their failing to acquire the knowledge the gods so easily attain and thus in their fall from heaven. The soul who best resembles them is able to see the eternal realities, though with difficulty. Then there is the soul who sees some of the realities but not others, when the head of his charioteer is forced down by the unruliness of his horses (248a1–6). In their frantic and disorderly competitiveness, the rest of the souls try to get ahead of each other and, in doing so, trample on each other and break off each other's wings. The result is that they see none of the sights in the extraheavenly zone and, in consequence, are doomed to fall back to earth (248a6–248c9).

Stripped of its figurative language and brought down to earth from its heavenly setting, the image of Φθόνος as having no place among the gods is a figurative way of saying that if the dialectic of philosophy is to be pursued to the advantage of the participants, the discussion must be carried on without φθόνος.[28] This is a point made elsewhere by Plato. If the parties to a discussion are motivated by φθόνος, they do not look to the truth but engage in personalities and endeavor to keep anyone else from getting the better of themselves in the debate (*Grg.* 457c4–457e5, *Ep.* 7 344b1–8). If, however, the questioning, answering, and refutation of hypotheses of dialectic are carried on in a spirit of goodwill (εὐμενεία), the outcome will be understanding of the issues involved (*Ep.* 7 344b1–8).

Freedom from φθόνος is a necessary condition for the gods to contemplate reality successfully and for humans to attain knowledge of the forms, but the very act of contemplating reality and feasting on it creates a condition of mind that precludes φθόνος. In the *Republic*, Socrates says that the sight of the ever-fixed realities that neither do injustice to each other nor are wronged by each other but exist in an orderly and rational fashion leads humans to imitate them, to make themselves like them, and thus to free themselves from the φθόνος and ill-will (δυσμενεία) that fill human minds when they are set on purely human concerns (500b7–500c7).

At first sight the text of 247a4–7 does not encourage the reader to suppose that the gods' freedom from φθόνος extends, in the case of the souls who accompany them, beyond the journeys they make within heaven, to the sights to be seen in the extraheavenly zone. Yet if that is how the Greek is to be understood, it is hard to give meaning to this aspect of the gods' freedom from φθόνος. When Plato goes from describing what the gods see in the extraheavenly place to telling what the souls who have been with them see there, he uses the same verb (ἕπεσθαι) that he had employed at 247a6: ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη (248a1–2). The repetition is a very good

28. On φθόνος and dialectic cf. Milobenski 1964, 27–33.

indication that the theme of souls accompanying gods is one theme in Plato's mind and covers both the journeys within heaven and the sights of the extraheavenly zone.

If that is the case, it is much easier to give content to the gods' feeling no φθόνος toward the mortal souls who accompany them. It means that the gods are prepared to allow mortal souls to see the sights on the extraheavenly journey. That in its turn means that the gods do not begrudge mortal souls the nourishment provided by the knowledge acquired on that journey, upon which their own divinity depends.[29] That is to say, the gods are happy to allow mortal souls to share, to the extent they can, in their divinity.[30] Thus the soul that best succeeds in following the gods will be by the same token the one that most resembles the gods: ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη (248a1–2). The theme then that is alluded to in the *Timaeus*, namely, that the divine, because it lacks all φθόνος, does not resent ὁμοίωσις, turns out to be present in the *Phaedrus* as well.

We do not entirely exhaust the significance of the image of Φθόνος standing outside the chorus of the gods by interpreting it to mean that the gods do not resent souls attempting to make themselves in their image. Both Hermeias and Dio take Plato to be saying something much more positive about the gods than that they are free of envy and jealousy. Hermeias' assertion that the image of Φθόνος standing outside the chorus of the gods does not just mean that the gods are not jealous, since that is no great matter in a good man, but also signifies a goodness and concern for mortals that is full to overflowing means that he takes the gods not just to be free of φθόνος but to possess the contrary disposition, generosity of spirit:

> τὸ δὲ φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται οὐχ ὅτι οὐ βασκαίνουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐνταῦθα σπουδαίου λεγόμενον μέγα τί ἐστιν), ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτῶν τῆς ἀγαθότητος καὶ προνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀνεκλείπτου δόσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ χορηγίας τῶν καλῶν σημαίνει τὸ ἄφθονον. (144.4–8 Couvreur)[31]

29. Runia (1986, 136) correctly suggests that *Phdr.* 247a7 is epistemological in intent, while *Ti.* 29e1–3 is cosmological. There is an epistemological component to the *Timaeus* passage also.

30. Cf. 247d3–4: ἰδοῦσα [sc. ἡ θεοῦ διανοῖα] διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ; 249c5–6: πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν.

31. Proclus begins his discussion of *Ti.* 29e1–2 (οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε περὶ οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ φθόνος) with a question suggesting that the absence of φθόνος in a good man is no great matter: καὶ τί τοῦτο, φαίη τις ἄν, εἰ μὴ φθόνει νοῦς; τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς μετρίοις πρόσεστι τῶν ἀνθρώπων (*In Ti.* 1.362.18–20 Diehl).

Similarily, Dio construes the meaning of the image to be not only that the gods are not jealous of each other but that all of them as a body look with wholehearted benevolence on each other's activities: *μετὰ πάσης φιλίας ἀεὶ πάντων κοινῆς* (*Or.* 36.22). Philo Judaeus also puts a strong positive construction on the image. It provides the warrant for his assertion that wisdom, as it is divine and willing to share itself, will never exclude the thirsty but will pour over them an unstinting draught of itself:

> *ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἱερώτατον Πλάτωνα "φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται," θειότατον δὲ καὶ κοινωνικώτατον σοφία, συγκλείει μὲν οὐδέποτε τὸ ἑαυτῆς φροντιστήριον, ἀναπεπταμένη δὲ ἀεὶ δέχεται τοὺς ποτίμων διψῶντας λόγων, οἷς ἀκράτου διδασκαλίας ἄφθονον ἐπαντλοῦσα νᾶμα μεθύειν τὴν νηφάλιαν ἀναπείθει μέθην.* (*Prob.* 13.3)

The intuitions of Hermeias, Dio, and Philo about the meaning of the image were presumably based at least in part on the feeling that it has a portentous character to it and that as such it amounts to something rather more than an unremarkable denial of the gods' jealousy.[32]

The figurative language of the image makes it difficult for us to assess exactly its full significance. It is much easier to deal with the more prosaic assertion, though possessed of a certain grand resonance, at *Timaeus* 29e1–2, that in one who is good there is never any *φθόνος* about anything. The comprehensive character of the denial helps us understand that *φθόνος* in all of its aspects is absent in such a being. Furthermore, the reader used to the convention of asserting a matter's contrary by denying the contrary of what is asserted will naturally infer that Plato is saying not just that the good man is free of *φθόνος* but that he is endowed with the contrary disposition, a generosity that gladly shares with others what it possesses and that rejoices in the good fortune of others. Nonetheless, the statement that *Φθόνος* stands outside the divine chorus has the ring of a very strong assertion to it, one that suggests the complete exclusion and exile of *Φθόνος* from the gods. In short, it is no more than a figurative way of saying that the gods not only are free of *φθόνος* but possess the contrary disposition of generosity of spirit.

There is nothing, however, in Socrates' account of what the gods do on their journey that requires the notion of overflowing goodness and generos-

32. Plotinus (2.9.17.16–7) and Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* 1.21; 1:99 Saffrey and Westerink) both take 247a7 to imply that the divine is generous: *ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν παθούσης* [sc. *ψυχῆς διοικούσης*], *δούσης δὲ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι μὴ θέμις φθόνον ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι* (Plotinus); *καθάπερ γὰρ οἶμαι πᾶσι μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὰ προτείνουσι οἱ θεοί, δέχεται δὲ ἀεὶ ὁ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος, φησὶν ὁ ἐν Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης* (Proclus).

ity to explain it. Their conduct toward the souls following in their train is quite sufficiently explained by their freedom from jealousy. The conduct, however, of the lover who has followed in the train of one of the gods and who, because he lacks all φθόνος, wishes his beloved to be as like himself and the god he honors as possible (253b5–253c2), insofar as his behavior replicates that of the god he has followed, is not explicable if the model he emulates is only free of jealousy and is not an entirely generous and giving spirit. Since it is plausible to suppose, though the matter is not susceptible of strict proof, that the conduct of the lover toward his beloved replicates on the human plane that of the gods, it follows that the exclusion of Φθόνος from the divine chorus symbolizes not only the gods' freedom from jealousy but also their all giving, all generous spirit.

Some additional support for that thesis is found in the final sentence of the speech, where Socrates denounces the benefits to be gained by a boy from association with a nonlover: The nonlover dispenses only mortal goods, and those in sparing quantity, and begets in the boy's soul an illiberal and mean spirit (256e1–7). The mean and niggardly spirit that characterizes the nonlover is reproduced in the boy who associates with him. If Plato's assumption is that the same pattern that obtains between the nonlover and his boyfriend holds good in the relationship between (1) the gods and the mortal souls who follow in each of their trains and (2) the true lover and his beloved, then the gods' generosity of spirit (ἀφθονία) will beget this same spirit in the mortal souls, and the embodied souls will in their turn beget the same quality in the boys who arouse their love.

A very different interpretation of the gods' freedom from φθόνος has been given by Charles L. Griswold, who sees in its absence "another sure sign that they [the gods] virtually lack eros." That we hear nothing of the functioning of the wings of the gods is also for Griswold an indication that "the eros of the gods is always satisfied."[33] The gods' lack of ἔρως has some important implications: (1) The gods are completely impassive as they take in the extraheavenly forms,[34] and (2) "They circulate through the heavens without paying any attention at all to human beings."[35] Griswold would apparently extend the gods' lack of concern from the journey around the extraheavenly sphere to a general indifference to the human condition. "We are on our own."[36] Griswold's gods, in short, are Stoic in their ἀπάθεια and Epicurean in their lack of concern for human affairs.

33. Griswold 1986, 97. The first point is not valid. It is perfectly possible to love and be free of jealousy. The reverse is not possible; it is not possible to be jealous, unless we attach some importance to that which arouses our jealousy.

34. Griswold 1986, 104.

35. Griswold 1986, 97.

36. Griswold 1986, 97.

The position that Griswold takes seems quite tenable if all that is taken into consideration is Plato's account of the gods' progress around the extra-heavenly sphere. There is no hint there that the gods have any regard for the human souls who follow in their train. It would not, however, be quite true to say that Plato has nothing to say in the *Phaedrus* about ἔρως on the part of the gods, for he does say that Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, gave the name ἵμερος to the emotion that emanates from the lover and is borne toward the beloved (255c1–3). It has to be conceded that this is no more than a passing remark on Plato's part and that it is not integrated into any larger whole. The remark can hardly be discounted entirely, since if Plato were firmly of the opinion that the gods were free of ἔρως, it is very hard to see why he should have attributed the passion to Zeus. Nor is it easy to make sense of the ἔνθεος φίλος, in comparison to whose friendship the friendship of other friends and acquaintances pales into insignificance (255b5–7), and the θεία φιλία, whose benefits are incomparably greater than those conferred by the friendship, compounded of mortal σωφροσύνη, of the nonlover (256e3–257a2), unless such friendship had something in common with the divine.

Οὐ φθόνῳ, οὐδ' ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὑτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι (253b7–253c2). Hermeias took these lines to be a rebuttal of Lysias' assertion that a lover will become embroiled in enmity with his beloved and look on him with φθόνος: τρόπον τινὰ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἐναντιούμενος τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ, ἐπειδὴ ἔλεγεν ὁ Λυσίας ὅτι φθονοῦσι τοῖς παιδικοῖς (192.4–5 Couvreur).[37] They look back even more directly to the charge brought by the noble lover against Lysias' speech and Socrates' earlier speech, on his hearing in them that lovers take up great enmities for small reasons and are envious of their beloved and harmful to them—namely, the charge that the speakers must have been brought up among sailors and have seen nothing of a freeborn (ἐλεύθερος) love (243c2–8).

Hermeias goes on to say that true lovers not only are not jealous but imitate the divine, which is wise, good, and noble, and that they are not filled with ill-will as counterfeit lovers are but seek to make their beloveds like themselves, since what they want for their beloveds is what they want for themselves:

37. Also relevant to Hermeias' conception of the goodness of the divine is his commentary on the story that Thoth came to Ammon and told him to pass on to the Egyptians what he, Thoth, had discovered (274d5–6). It demonstrates that the divine is ungrudging and wishes to share its goods with others: καὶ τὸ ἄφθονον καὶ μεταδοτικὸν τῆς θείας ἐνεργείας διὰ τούτου ἐνδεικνύμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἄχρι τοῦ εὑρόντος ἑστάναι τὴν εὕρεσιν τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ἀφθόνως μεταδιδόναι τοῖς πᾶσιν (256.8–10 Couvreur).

οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὖν ἐρασταὶ, φησὶν, οὐ φθονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μιμοῦνται τὸ θεῖον, σοφὸν ὂν καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, οὐ δυσμενοῦντες ὡς οἱ νόθοι ἐρασταὶ, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῖς φέροντες· ὅ γὰρ βούλονατι ἑαυτοῖς, τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. (192.6–9 Couvreur)

In pointing to this similarity between the lover and god, Hermeias brings out the kinship between this passage in the *Phaedrus* and Timaeus' assertion that the Divine Demiurge, because he lacks all φθόνος, wishes to make everything in his own image (*Ti.* 29d7–30a5). Hermeias adverts again to this same conception of the goodness of the divine, when he remarks that the hope Socrates expresses at the end of his palinode, that Lysias may, like his brother, turn to philosophy (257b3–4), shows that the true philosopher is like the divine in holding goods out ungrudgingly to all. He supports that assertion by appealing to the proposition that Φθόνος stands outside the chorus of the gods (κατὰ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ θειοῦ, 208.8–12 Couvreur).

Accordingly, the true lover's freedom from φθόνος constitutes not just an absence of jealousy in his relationship with his beloved but also an overflowing generosity of spirit that holds nothing back. His complete freedom from φθόνος shows itself in his wish to make his beloved as like himself and the god he follows as possible. The nature of the lover's freedom from φθόνος is also partly explained in the phrase ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ, which is to be construed not so much as a separate point as a gloss οὐ φθόνῳ. Here ἀνελεύθερος means not only "not freeborn" but also "not giving freely" or "ungenerous."[38] The true lover has none of the hostility that springs from a mean and ungenerous spirit but is marked by a generous and giving spirit.

Ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνῃ θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν τῇ φιλῇ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν παρέξει (256e3–257a2). Here, at the very end of the speech, Socrates addresses the issue of whether the true lover will confer greater benefits on his beloved than will the nonlover. He tells the boy to whom the speech is supposed to be addressed that he is now in a position to see what a divine gift the friendship of a lover will be. Acquaintance with a nonlover, he asserts, since it has an admixture of mortal self-restraint and doles out merely mortal benefits parsimoniously, will implant in his soul the illiberality praised by the multitude as ἀρετή and will cause that soul to roll around mindlessly on the earth and below the earth, for nine thousand years.

38. Cf. Dover 1974, 115.

This is in part a recapitulation of something Socrates said a little earlier: Neither human σωφροσύνη nor divine madness is able to provide a greater good than that which love eventually confers on lovers who are winged and ready to take off (256b3–7). Hermeias sees in this a pointed rejection of Lysias' thesis that lovers are jealous of their beloveds and wish them always to be dependent on themselves. He also sees in it an enigmatic way of saying, contra Lysias, that mortal virtues do not do the soul as much good as the divine virtues of intellection:

> τουτέστι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἧς περιποεῖ ὁ ἔρως, ὃ οὔτε σωφροσύνη οὔτε ἄλλη ἀρετὴ περιποιεῖ. ἐπίτηδες δὲ λέγει τοῦτο ὡς πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγον ἐπειδὴ ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐραστὰς φθονεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς καὶ βούλεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ ἐν ἐνδείᾳ εἶναι. πρὸς τὸν λόγον οὖν Λυσίου αἰνιττόμενος ταῦτα λέγει καὶ ὅτι αἱ περὶ τὸν θνητὸν βίον ἀρεταὶ οὐ περιποιοῦσι τοιοῦτον ἀγαθὸν τῇ ψυχῇ οἷον αἱ νοεραὶ καὶ θεῖαι ἀρεταί. (204.11–16 Couvreur)

Hermeias repeats this latter point when he says, in commenting on mortal σωφροσύνη at 256e5–6, that the many praise as σώφρονες those like themselves, even though such persons possess nothing that is intellectual or that leads the way up to the one (εἰ καὶ μηδὲν νοερὸν καὶ ἀναγωγὸν ἔχουσι, 205.23 Couvreur). Hermeias then takes Plato to be drawing a contrast between purely human virtues and the virtues of intellection (τὸ νοερόν) that enable a man to raise himself (ἀναγωγή) from the physical to contemplation of the one.

In contrast to Hermeias, I take Socrates at 256b5–7 to have the mortal σωφροσύνη of the nonlover in mind and to mean there and later that in comparison with the true lover, the nonlover has very little to offer, because he is parsimonious and sparing in what he gives, unlike the true lover, who in his total freedom from φθόνος is prepared to give his all. I do not believe as Hermeias does that Plato has the virtues of intellection in mind. The lovers in Lysias' and Socrates' speeches in favor of the nonlover have already been found wanting in respect of their generosity of spirit: The noble lover who condemns such love denounces it precisely on the ground that it is not liberal (ἐλεύθερος) but is rather the sort of love that those brought among sailors would have known (243c7–8). Here ἐλεύθερος means primarily freeborn and by implication the liberal or generous behavior characteristic of a free man. The true lover, who is free of φθόνος, is by the same token unmarked by such illiberal hostility (ἀνελεύθερος δυσμενεία, 253b7–8); he holds back nothing from his beloved but wishes to give him

everything he has and tries to make his beloved all he himself is (253b8–253c2). Socrates' final point is that, judged by the extremely elevated standards of goodness and generosity that characterize a true lover, the nonlover is found to be sadly wanting.

If we turn back to Lysias' speech we can see the deficiencies in the nonlover's generosity. It is limited by his always calculating where his own interests lie and by his making sure that they are not damaged by the affair with the boy (231a2–6). Because he has attended to his own interests so well, he cannot allege neglect of his own affairs, reckon up the trouble he has gone to for the boy, or blame the boy for the quarrels he has had with his relatives (231b2–5). This is the mortal σωφροσύνη of which Socrates speaks so disparagingly. True, the nonlover is free of φθόνος to the extent that he does not begrudge his boyfriend his associations with others who might benefit him and wishes in fact to see him enjoy the benefits of these associations (232d5–7). His freedom from φθόνος does not, however, seem to go much beyond this, and he certainly is not prepared to give freely and without hesitation whatever he has to give. To him that would seem imprudent. The true lover, on the other hand, has no such cautious inhibitions. Furthermore, what he has to offer his beloved is knowledge that will ultimately place him in the company of the gods. The nonlover has no such gift to offer and can only impart a state of mind that is inimical to the pursuit of philosophy.

The implication of Socrates' condemnation of the effect the nonlover will have on a boy as an implanting of the ἀνελευθερία praised by the multitude as ἀρετή is that there is a higher and truer form of ἀρετή exhibited in the love of the true lover. This criticism of the ἀρετή praised by the multitude may reasonably be supposed to look back to what Lysias implies about the nature of the nonlover's ἀρετή (232d4–7, 234b1)—by comparison with the wholehearted and total generosity of the true lover, it is a rather cautious niggardliness. Such a conception of goodness as an unbounded generosity that holds back nothing of itself from another is exactly the conception of goodness that Plato employs in the *Timaeus* to explain the Divine Demiurge's creation of the cosmos in his own image.

Despite the disclaimers Socrates utters later in the *Phaedrus* about the seriousness of his second speech, if what he implies in that dialogue about the nature of true goodness and love is taken in conjunction with what he has to say about the Divine Demiurge's goodness in the *Timaeus*, it does look as if he supposes the highest form of love and goodness to be one that holds back nothing of itself and wishes to see its object made in its own likeness. From

the point of view of those who favor a liberal pluralist conception of love as a tolerance of diversity and as a fostering of the individuality of the beloved, lovers who try to make their beloved as much like themselves as possible do not really love and may even be accused of being intensely egoistic and of engaging in an intellectual and emotional imperialism. Nonetheless, Plato's account of love and goodness had an enormous appeal for pagans, Christians, and Jews in antiquity.

Explicating φθόνος is important for understanding the argument of the first part of the *Phaedrus*. The topic of φθόνος is introduced into Lysias' speech and the speech that Socrates recants, as a foil against which Socrates demonstrates that a true lover will have none of the mean spirit and grudging and resentful cast of mind of the false lovers of the earlier speeches but will seek to emulate the gods in the overwhelming generosity of spirit in which he shares his wisdom with his beloved. The true lover in the palinode turns out to be like the Divine Demiurge in the *Timaeus* in wishing in his total freedom from φθόνος to make his beloved as like himself as possible; that is, he holds back nothing of himself out of φθόνος. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato uses the notion of freedom from φθόνος to define both the nature of love and that of goodness. Goodness conceived as the desire to make others in our own likeness and thus to hold back nothing of ourselves is the form of goodness to which he also appeals in the *Timaeus*. From the portentous way he speaks of this form of goodness at the end of the palinode, there is reason to suppose that he imagined it to be the core of true goodness.

29

# Out of the Cave: What Socrates Learned from Diotima

Dorothea Frede

## The Date of the *Symposium*

READERS OF THIS CHAPTER'S high-sounding title may expect many things, but nothing nearly as dry as a discussion of the relative date of the *Symposium* must seem. The *vestigia* of such discussions in the past ought to be a sufficient deterrent from such endeavors, since none of our ingenious suggestions and conjectures can ever really give positive and ineluctable proof of the exact place of any of Plato's writings, especially where criteria like stylometry do not offer us any help.[1] But if the lessons from the past have taught us humility in that respect, they are hardly able to quench our thirst for speculation. Even students most reluctant to get enmired in the question of the chronology of Plato's work will inevitably be confronted with the question of the genealogy of a central idea and will ask themselves what may have led Plato to it and how it stands in relation to some other, possibly diverging, conceptions on the same subject that are expressed in different dialogues. So the problem of change and progress in Plato's doctrine is unavoidable. The notion of "progress" is, of course, a

This chapter contains the sketch of an answer to a question raised by Martin Ostwald in conversation; it is at the same time my note of farewell after six years of happy collegiality at Swarthmore. Special acknowledgment should be given not only to the editors of this volume but also to the anonymous reader of the first draft of this chapter, whose comments have forced me to tidy up my thoughts and arguments.

1. For a daunting example of the hazards of speculation cf. the reception of Owen's attempt to argue for a much earlier date of the *Timaeus* in Cherniss' scathing review (1965). Thesleff's recent monograph (1982) on Platonic chronology documents the prevailing disorder: No two schemes suggested in the past agree (8–17), and his own suggestions are not likely to settle the matter (237–38).

tricky one. It presupposes that there is a certain order to the way ideas are born and grow. Any claim that Plato *must* first have conceived of a certain thought, before he could have gone on to a further conception, will invariably be challenged by the mocking inner voice of doubt about what can justify such a "must." What may seem to us the natural way to proceed may not at all have been the natural way for Plato.[2]

The only relatively safe criteria that can justify the claim of "progress" for a thinker about whose manner of literary production we know as little as we know about Plato's are the manifestations of increasing complexity, fruitfulness, and reflective clarity in the treatment of crucial problems. The progress that is claimed here for the *Symposium* concerns the introduction of Eros as a pedagogical incentive to higher insights. A new assessment of its importance and presuppositions shows that it does not belong to the same period of Plato's thinking as the *Phaedo*, as is currently widely held, nor can it antedate the *Republic*. Diotima's *scala amoris* is not a preview of the way out of the cave but a review and a revision.

This chapter cannot do justice to all the intriguing features that characterize the *Symposium* or to the ample secondary literature; it focuses on certain significant changes in Plato's anthropology, psychology, and theory of education. If it lays claim to a change in his conception of what it is to be a human being, of what is decisive about the soul's higher faculties and what is the most appropriate kind of education, this does not support revisionism in any strong sense. The suggestion is merely that the changes we find expressed here for the first time in Plato had further-ranging consequences in certain of his later writings—most importantly and immediately in the *Phaedrus*, but also in such late works as the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*. There is nothing new in the idea of eliciting new doctrine from Diotima's revelations to Socrates. The central place of her speech in the dialogue and the seriousness of Socrates' deference to her teaching as the source of his authority in "erotic matters" have suggested to many readers that Plato wanted to emphasize, in as dramatic a form as he ever does or could do, that there is something new and highly unusual in the lesson he lets Socrates learn from the prophetess Diotima. The claim that these innovations lead us beyond the doctrines of the *Republic* is not based on new evidence; if it differs from most currently held evaluations of the dialogue, this is due to a different calibration of certain of its features at the cost of others. Such will-

2. Considerations of plausibility are hardly conclusive. The *Symposium* may seem like the natural continuation of the *Phaedrus*, since Phaedrus' complaint about the neglect of Eros, which starts the *Symposium*, insinuates that he has internalized the lesson on the importance of love, as Socrates had hoped (*Phdr.* 257a–b). But while this is the "logical" order of the two dialogues, it is no proof that Plato did not invent the "younger Phaedrus" much later.

fulness will not escape the reproach of subjectivity, but this is a risk shared by all of Plato's interpreters.

Before we turn to the innovations contained in this centerpiece and the further influence they have on Plato's later work, we should first take stock of the reasons that make it difficult to place quite generally the *Symposium* within the work of Plato.[3] This dialogue is recognized by most scholars as a kind of maverick in both form and content. Neither the features that are truly unique nor those that are conspicuous but shared in some form by one or more of the other dialogues permit any definite conclusions as to affinity or incompatibility. There is the unusually complex framework (comparable only to the convoluted introduction of the *Parmenides*).[4] There is the unusual freedom of speech granted to the other participants, culminating in Alcibiades' enthusiastic eulogy for Socrates, which has no real parallel in any of Plato's other dialogues. Neither Protagoras' "Great Speech" in the dialogue named after him (320c–328d) nor the speech attributed to Lysias in the *Phaedrus* (230e–234c) can be regarded as equivalents. There is also the surprising fact that the enlightenment, including the crucial elenchus,[5] comes from a woman. Aspasia, the only other female speaker in any of Plato's dialogues, is received with incredulity by Socrates' partner as the alleged source of his mock funeral speech in the *Menexenus* (249d). And nowhere else do we get such a complete portrait of Socrates, while Socrates himself practices unusual self-effacement.

3. For a discussion of a possible absolute date cf. Dover 1965. He argues convincingly for 385/4 as terminus post quem, since the "dissolution of the Argives through the Lacedemonians" (193a) can only refer to the fate of Mantinea. That the "invincible army of lovers" is treated as a mere possibility does not show that it antedates the formation of the Sacred Band at Thebes around 378 B.C. (*pace* Nehamas and Woodruff 1989, xi–xii). Nor are Dover's cautious considerations that Plato would have expressed himself differently if he had been talking about a reality conclusive (15). So we have no definitive terminus ante quem.

4. The *Symposium* is a thrice-told story: It is a carefully researched and rehearsed reproduction (*Symp.*173b) of a long past conversation that the self-professed madman Apollodorus (the very one who could not stop weeping during the discussion at Socrates' last day; cf. *Phd.* 59b) had heard from Aristodemus, another unshod admirer of Socrates. The question of the fictitious date of the narration itself (before Socrates' death but long after Agathon's departure from Athens; cf. Bury 1932, lxvi) need not concern us. Nussbaum's attempt (1986, 168–71) to read into the opening scene an excitement about a possible return of Alcibiades to Athens must be mistaken. She ignores the time reference (*τότε,* 172b1), as well as the fact that neither is Alcibiades treated as a "hot issue" (he is mentioned only in third place) nor would a politically motivated auditor seek enlightenment from people who have eyes and ears only for Socrates.

5. After a mini-elenchus, where Socrates chastens Agathon for treating his theater audience with contempt (194a–c), there follows a real elenchus, which quickly reduces Agathon to speechlessness (201b–c). But Socrates refuses to take credit for this elenchus; he presents it as a mere repetition of a lesson he had been taught by Diotima (177d–e, 198d, 201d5). Diotima as an advocate of male homosexual love is clearly not a feminist's woman but reminds us rather of Athena, born fully armed from Zeus' head. On this topic generally see Halperin 1990, chap 6, "Why is Diotima a Woman?".

None of these anomalies, whether they contain similarities to other dialogues or not, seem to help us in the task of placing the *Symposium* within the overall order of Plato's work with any hope of precision. The relatedness of the topic, Eros, has in the past often prompted scholars to place it next to the *Phaedrus*. This seemed indeed a natural assumption until in recent years the recognition of the importance of the method of dialectic as elucidated in the *Phaedrus* (263a) suggested a relatively late date for the dialogue,[6] much later than most commentators want to acknowledge for the *Symposium*. The latter is nowadays usually placed in the vicinity of the *Phaedo*, when Plato was working his way to the *Republic*.[7] A closer look shows that not only the topic, Eros, but also the fruitfulness of the changes in Plato's psychology, anthropology, and conception of education should persuade us to reestablish the close ties between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* and to assign both works to the post-*Republic* period of Plato's philosophy. The working hypothesis pursued here is that there is a kind of division of labor between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, that they supplement one another in crucial respects. This is not to suggest that each dialogue presents us with half-theories that could be joined together like Aristophanes' half-persons. What should warn us off attempting such a perfect fit is not only the realization that Plato nowhere tells us a full story but also his famous words of warning in the *Phaedrus* (275c–d) not to expect more from written work than a reminder for those who have done the serious thought-work themselves.

## The Ascetic Socrates

The initial plausibility of assigning the *Symposium* to an earlier period derives some strength from the notion that Plato wanted to counter his picture of "Socrates in preparation for death" in the *Phaedo* with a picture of "Socrates in life" so that the two dialogues would form two chapters that were meant to complement each other.[8] The "worldly" Socrates of the *Symposium* does indeed share quite a few of the ascetic traits of the "otherworldly" Socrates of the *Phaedo*. In spite of the fact that he goes to a drink-

6. Socrates' expression of hope that Lysias should become a convert to philosophy like his brother Polemarchus (*Phdr.* 257b) is clearly a reference to *Republic* 1.

7. This seems to be the position of Nehamas and Woodruff (1989, 34 n. 34), who treat the reference to the four cardinal virtues in Agathon's speech as an anticipation of the *Republic*. But there is nothing that supports a claim to priority here. Cf. also Irwin 1977; Kahn 1987; Santas 1988.

8. Cf. Cornford (1971, 119), who sees in the *Symposium* the complementary picture to the intellectualism of the *Republic*. See also Allen 1984, 14.

ing party in finer than his ordinary clothes and with more than his usual attention to toiletry, he comments with hardly disguised irony on his own tribute to the elegant world. His concessions to such refinement are in fact quite superficial. When the spirit of philosophy comes over him on his way to Agathon's house, he disregards politeness and takes all the time he needs to think through the problem that occupies him. He is obviously not concerned with food or drink; his concern is with discourse, which he alone pursues through the night, just as he lets the *logos* determine the course of his last day on earth in the *Phaedo*. His intrepidity in the face of death is echoed in the *Symposium* by Alcibiades' description of Socrates' total disregard for his own physical comfort—for food, sleep, heat, or cold—and by his undaunted courage in the face of death in battle (219e–220e).

The similarity between the two dialogues is not confined to the portrait of Socrates. They also seem to share, at least at first sight, the same conception of the soul—in neither of the dialogues is there any mention of the division of the soul into three parts. And both seem to presuppose the same model of recollection of the forms by some physical instantiation—the *Symposium* concentrates on one of the forms mentioned in the *Phaedo* (100d5), the beautiful. Moreover, as Alcibiades' rueful accusation shows, Socrates does not pay much attention to physical beauty (216d–e). It is a pretense for reaching the person's soul, a claim that agrees well with the picture we find in some of the earlier dialogues.[9] So the spirit of ascetism seems to run equally through both dialogues.

These similarities should not distract, however, from the fact that they are greatly outweighed by dissimilarities between the two dialogues. In spite of Socrates' personal ascetism and the preference given to inner over external beauty, the *Symposium* does not share the *Phaedo*'s negative attitude toward the whole physical realm. There is neither the comparison of the body with a tomb or prison of the soul, nor the stark devaluation of the common man's set of values to "vulgar" or "bogus-virtues" that have only the name in common with the real virtues (cf. *Phd.* 68b–69c, 82a–d). And the philosopher is not looking forward to departing to a better land of justice and happiness. Even though the view from the highest point of the "ladder" leaves the initiate with little respect for particular physical beauty

9. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates is "distracted" by the fascinations of discussion from Alcibiades' beauty (309b). In the *Charmides*, the "smitten" Socrates (155d–e) is concerned only with the boy's *sophrosyne*, and no more attention is paid to the boy's beauty after the opening gambit. The Socrates of the early dialogues is generally not as ascetic as the Socrates of the *Phaedo*. The need to explain the complexity of the Socratic attitude seems to be one of the motifs of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*.

(211e—in terms that recall *Phd.* 67a), freedom from the body and its encumbrances is not among the conditions for the ascent in the *Symposium*.[10]

But the contrast between the dying Socrates of the *Phaedo* and the Socrates who learns from Diotima his lesson about the worth of this life goes much further. Instead of a complete rejection of earthly life, of the physical as such, and the admonition that philosophy should be a preparation for death, we now see the sublimation of all that is good in life.[11] The *Symposium* does not presuppose a strict dualism of soul and body. There is instead a continuous ascent from individual physical beauty to general physical beauty, to the beauty of "customs," and on to the beauty of political institutions and laws (210a–c). From there the ascent takes the beauty lover to the appreciation of the beauty of theories, until he is ready for the glimpse of the beautiful as such. If the ascent teaches him to make little of physical beauty, this is due only to a greater appreciation of more and higher kinds of beauty in our earthly life.[12] The shift between the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium* is therefore not merely a shift in emphasis and tone, that is, it is not merely a matter of a more benign attitude toward the beauty of the body. The rigid soul-body dualism and the insistence on the need for a strict separation and for deferral of all proper understanding to an afterlife is replaced by the possibility of healing humankind's insufficient nature through sublimation. It is no longer recommended that the soul should flee from earthly life as soon as the gods permit it but that it acquire the right assessment of the different kinds of goods in this life. The theme of sublimation, rather than liberation, is discernible throughout the dialogue. We find vestiges in the earlier speaker's eulogies; they all argue, more or less successfully,[13] for the moral elevation of humankind through love. This discussion is given its ontological foundation by Diotima's new theory of the nature of love and the nature of humankind. It is time to take a closer look at what is so new about her suggestions.

10. Whether the *scala amoris* should be interpreted inclusively or exclusively is thoroughly reviewed by A. W. Price 1989, 45–54. Price cautiously argues for an inclusive reading, treating the appreciation of physical beauty as an integral part. An inclusive reading is also suggested by Irwin (1977).

11. *Sublimation* is to be understood not in the Freudian sense of displacement and redirection of the sexual impulse but in the "chemical" sense of refinement. For a discussion of the difference between the Platonic ascent and Freudian sublimation cf. Santas 1988; Kahn 1987.

12. The difficulties inherent in this seemingly smooth ascent are left aside here; for a critical discussion, cf. A. W. Price 1989.

13. I would attribute Aristophanes' much-discussed hiccup to suppressed laughter at Pausanias' somewhat desperate plea that to do *anything* is fair in love (185b), provided it serves the acquisition of virtue.

The conception of Eros as a being in between the mortal and the immortal at first startles Socrates and for good reason. Not only is a god of long standing here demoted to the status of a demigod, a mighty but needy daemon, Eros now also constitutes a bridge between the divine and the human and elevates humans to the status of "in-between beings" as well. Although Diotima at first applies this in-between status only to Eros and to the "daemons" who shuttle backward and forward between the human and the divine, it is clear that this intermediary status also attaches to at least a part of human nature (203a)—insofar as we all have a certain striving for the good and the beautiful in us, we are all "daemonic" beings, the children of Poros and Penia.[14] Together with this spiritualization of human nature goes a different kind of psychology and a different kind of conception of education than the one presupposed in the model of *anamnesis*. The soul no longer prepares for leaving the body behind like an old garment. A human being is by nature an in-between creature. There is no longer (in principle) the good soul languishing in the body's prison, an alien being in a strange vessel. Instead, man has become a mortal-immortal being. This special kind of earthly *athanasia* acquired through self-completion and self-extension by creation in the beautiful is a novelty in the *Symposium*. That it does not represent an interim solution that is replaced by the "proper" sense of a transcendent immortality is confirmed by the reassertion of such an immanent immortality in *Phaedrus* 277a and *Laws* 721b–c.

That Plato's *Symposium* does not address the question of parts of the soul does not show that the dialogue must predate the *Republic*, where the tripartition is introduced and explained for the first time.[15] As indicated by a comparison between the doctrine of the *Timaeus*, where the three parts are fully discussed, and the *Philebus*, where no such partition is ever mentioned (although the soul's functions form an important part of the discussion), Plato introduces the parts of the soul only where he deems it necessary, so no conclusions about a more or less developed state of his psychology can be drawn *ex silentio*. A discussion of the complex question of the interaction of the different parts of the soul with their different desires in effecting the ascent would have strained the limitations of a banquet speech. I regard his

14. Cf. the more than accidental similarity between Socrates and the rough, poor, unshod and unhoused Eros—the eternal hunter and lover of *phronesis* and philosophy throughout his life, the sorcerer, wizard, and sophist (203d).

15. Plato's silence is taken as decisive by most commentators; cf. Santas (1988, 58, 74) (in spite of his acknowledgment of closeness to the *Phdr.*). Kahn (1987) leaves out the *Phaedrus* and sees the *Symposium* as preceding both the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*, since the latter contains indications of an incipient bipartition of the soul. Price does not explicitly discuss chronology but refers to the "more developed doctrine of the *Republic*" (51); he assumes a close connection between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, however.

economy as part of the division of labor between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, where the different roles of the three parts of the soul in their appreciation of beauty and the soul's upward flight, on earth as well as beyond, are fully explained.

There are also more tangible arguments to show that Diotima's doctrine represents a substantial change in Plato's position. The introduction of Eros' (and human nature's) intermediary status presupposes the renunciation of an important principle on which Plato relied in his arguments in the *Phaedo* for the immortality of the soul. It is the "principle of opposites." This principle is, in brief, that wherever there are opposite states and changes between them, the change must go from one opposite to the other. Just as people wake up from being asleep, so the living must come from the dead (70d–e). The proof works only if there is no alternative, so it would not work if a "μεταξύ" were conceivable. In the *Phaedo* no third state is taken into consideration, not for the case of life and death or for any of the other pairs of opposites referred to. Diotima's lecture to Socrates must be regarded as an explicit revocation of this principle. This revocation is the gist of the "double elenchus," the undermining of Agathon's reliance on the divinity of Eros by Socrates. Refusal to assign Eros to the good and the beautiful is justified on the ground that the denial of these two excellences does not force them to place love among their opposites, the ugly and evil (201d–202e); nor does the denial of divine status make him mortal. There is the possibility of an in-between state (μεταξύ), of being neither of the two extremes. Diotima's proof of the need to accept intermediaries is clearly not introduced as an ad hoc solution. It is based on a quite thorough review of similar cases, a catalog that includes partly the same examples that had served the reverse function in the proof of the *Phaedo*: The examples of beauty and ugliness occur in both texts, and instead of justice and injustice the *Symposium* refers to goodness and evil in general. It stands to reason that Plato would never have used the "argument from opposites" in the *Phaedo* if he had already conceived of such intermediaries. The recantation in the *Symposium* is more than just the revocation of a dubious principle employed in one important proof.[16] It demarcates a new orientation in Plato's ontology, a reorientation with far-reaching consequences.

Before we can take a closer look at these consequences, we should take care of a possible objection to this claim of a revocation or recantation, especially if we want to assign that dialogue to a relatively late date. Is not the notion of a third state much older than the *Symposium*? The possibility of an in-between state is indeed discussed extensively by Plato in the fifth book of the *Republic*, but intermediates are also already present in the

16. The importance of this principle for the last argument is discussed in D. Frede 1978.

*Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Lysis*, dialogues that precede both the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. In the *Protagoras* (351d), the old sophist himself distinguishes between what is good, bad, and neither good nor bad, in order to avoid the identification of every pleasure with good and every pain with bad. Nothing more is made of Protagoras' distinction; the means by which Socrates gets him to agree to the identification of pleasure and good do not challenge the distinction itself, however (cf. 353e–354e). In the *Gorgias* (467d–468c) the distinction between what is good, bad, and neither good nor bad is introduced by Socrates himself, to show that in principle everyone really wants to achieve the good: We do what is bad or indifferent only for the sake of what we take to be to our advantage. Where human beings differ is in their ability to discern what really *is* good, bad, or indifferent, not in their motivation as such.

But if Plato was, at least in principle, aware of the possibility of a third class, that of intermediary objects between good and bad (and possibly all other contraries), why did he insist on the "principle of opposites" in the *Phaedo*? He must have regarded the existence of a neutral class of objects as no threat to his argument. Indeed, as a closer look at the preconditions of the conception of the μεταξύ in the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias* would show, the existence of that intermediary class does not challenge the validity of the proof in the *Phaedo*. The term *intermediary* is, properly understood, a misnomer for the early dialogues. None of the entities that are neither good nor bad hover *between* virtue and vice; they should therefore be called neutral rather than in-between. The examples referred to in the *Gorgias*, "sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again such objects as stones and timbers and the like" (*Grg.* 468a1–2), are not *between* goodness and badness in the way the color grey is between black and white or lukewarm is between hot and cold. They are rather like objects that do not necessarily have a color or temperature at all. The premises in the proof in the *Phaedo* would not be affected by the existence of a neutral class. The soul necessarily passes between life and death, and the objection that some things are not necessarily either alive or dead, just as some things are not necessarily asleep or awake, is no objection to the need for opposites where the opposition does apply. The proof of the *Phaedo* is valid only where there is the need for opposites and change between them and where a true intermediary can be excluded.

If the intermediates in the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras* are thus no obstacle to the principle of the *Phaedo*, the case of intermediaries mentioned in the *Lysis* seems at first sight more problematic.[17] Here the μεταξύ does in

17. For a more comprehensive discussion of the concept of the intermediary cf. Bolotin 1979, 143–81.

fact form the main device in Socrates' discussion of friendship; it is introduced as a new device to help the partners over the impasse that friendship can exist neither between like and like nor between opposites (214a–216b). Both possibilities had to be ruled out, because there cannot be friendship between good persons (since they have no need of anything), between evil ones (since evil is never a friend to anything), or between opposites (since that contradicts the very notion of friendship). The partners settle for what is "neither good nor bad but in-between" (216c), until Socrates kicks the legs out from under this solution, too. Because the concept of the intermediate is so prominent and because of the very fact that it is used as an explanation of love and friendship, the *Lysis* is often regarded as the direct predecessor of the *Symposium*.[18] That it is *a* predecessor cannot be denied. How close the solution actually comes to what we find in the *Symposium*, however, demands closer scrutiny.

At first sight Socrates' illustration in the *Lysis* of the in-between seems indeed to come close to the conception of the μεταξύ of the *Symposium*. A body menaced but not yet consumed by illness (evil) desires the friendship of health, a good (217a–b). So there is desire for the good in something between the good and the bad, just as the daemon Eros stands between the divine and the mortal, the ugly and the beautiful. Socrates' refutation of this solution in the *Lysis* points to a crucial difference in the two conceptions of the intermediary, however. The intermediate desires the good only if there is a menace by some evil. Without such a menace, there is no need for the good (220d). The neither good nor bad (the body in the example) is considered neutral and is not characterized by an inherent lack and need for the good. Otherwise it would need no prompting by some evil to desire the good. The inherent self-sufficiency of the intermediary leads to the downfall of the solution in the *Lysis*. It constitutes at the same time the decisive difference to the conception of the μεταξύ in the *Symposium*. But more will have to be said later about what is lacking in the *Lysis*' account of lack.

Thus, while nothing said about intermediaries in the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, or the *Lysis* clashes with the *Phaedo*'s principle of opposites, the intermediary state as it is understood for Eros in the *Symposium* does challenge it. Eros and the daemonic soul hover between the mortal and the immortal and shuttle backward and forward between them. They share characteristics with both spheres, they die and come to life again, and participate in immortality as much as anything can that does not strictly belong to the sphere of the eternal. So while the intermediaries in the earlier dia-

18. Because of the affinity, the *Lysis* is regarded as one of the later "aporetic" dialogues; that it does not contain the doctrine of the middle dialogues is argued by Vlastos (1981, 35–37).

logues were neutral, they are true in-between entities in the *Symposium*. The picture changes in the *Republic*, when Plato introduces the famous tripartition of knowledge, belief, and ignorance, on the one side, and their ontological counterparts of being, becoming, and not being, on the other. Everything that is not on the level of immutable being and the object of knowledge belongs to the middle realm of becoming, of what is between being and not being. It is clear that this middle level is not a neutral one and that there is an inherent relatedness between becoming and being, opinion and knowledge. On this distinction and relation Plato bases his whole program of education that leads us up and out of the cave, from the shady world of changing appearances to the world of full reality, lit up by truth (511d).[19]

If we want to establish that the *Symposium* was composed after the *Republic*, we therefore have to resort to quite different considerations to show that Diotima's ladder represents a more advanced position than the liberation from the cave in the *Republic*. Such an advanced point of view lies, first and foremost, in the *Symposium*'s striking exploitation of love as a pedagogical device. I argue that the notion that all human beings have a natural, uplifting love and affinity for the good and the beautiful is not employed before the *Symposium*. That love in the sense developed in the *Symposium* was not used as a pedagogical device before does not dispute the fact that Socrates often appealed elsewhere to our desire that what we take to be good be the motivating force behind all our actions; such an appeal is made in Socrates' refutation of Meno's attempt to define virtue as the desire for noble things (*Men.* 77b–78a) and in the argument against Polus in the *Gorgias* (467–68). And the conception that the love for different kinds of goods determines the character of the lives of human beings is developed in the *Republic*, where it cements the difference between the philosopher, the lover of truth, over and against the lover of opinions or spectacles, or any other kind of attachment that turns humans into philo-something-or-others (*Rep.* 475b–480a). So the conception both of a natural motivation by the good and of a distinction in the worth of such goods preceded the *Symposium*.

That Plato's earlier work contains vestiges of some of the thoughts that form the core of Diotima's discourse in the *Symposium* is not surprising. The question is whether Diotima presents us with a decisive re-creation of older insights in a new light. This is indeed what we find in her speech,

19. The same device, the distinction of an in-between state, also underlies Socrates' argument for the superiority of the philosopher's pleasures over those of all others in book 9; there is a state between pain and true pleasure, and only the philosopher can distinguish the true "above" from freedom from pain (583c).

most particularly with respect to the pedagogical value of love. In the earlier dialogues down to the *Republic*, Plato indeed characterizes different human beings by the different kinds of attachments that determine not only their nature but also the lives they will live. But the difference in their erotic orientation is just what decisively separates them entirely and confines them to a different world; it makes mere lovers of sights and cave dwellers of some of them, while only the chosen few are lovers of truth. There is no mention of a bridge or an advance from the lower sphere to the upper through a natural attraction to a manifestation of beauty. More importantly, no such bridge is mentioned in the explanation of education, the way out of the cave. The inhabitants of the cave are not freed from their attachment to the spectacle of the cave by any kind of love or attraction.[20] Their freeing is painful; they hate to turn their necks, and the way out of the cave is nothing but laborious. Pain, labor, and force seem to be the main characteristics of the way up and out into the sun (515e–516a).

If the metaphorical character of the description of the cave and of the liberation from our fetters may not permit us to draw definitive conclusions about the nature of the educational process that Plato envisages in the *Republic*, his explicit comments leave no doubt that he regards education as a laborious process by intellectual training alone. The mind is stirred up and out of the darkness into the plain daylight of reason not by any glimpses of beauty but by such intriguing intellectual problems as the riddle of "increase in quantity without actual growth" (*Rep.* 523b–524c). It is the attraction of the exact sciences that stirs up the finer minds to contemplate the eternally true and self-same. No stimulus to attain a higher sphere of beauty is attributed to the Muses; in fact they are firmly relegated to the domain of "good habits" (cf. 522a). Nor is the attraction by the physical beauty of music exploited as a guide to the higher beauty of harmonics. Plato has only scorn for those who pinch the strings (531a–b). Harmonics itself is a theoretical *Fach*, designed to stimulate the intellect; access is not provided through the preliminaries of audible music itself, and harmonics is treated as one of the mathematical studies. So the basic tenet in the *Republic* still presupposes a strict separation, with mere "moral training" with the help of the Muses and the "vulgar" sciences that cling to the world of the senses, on the one side, and the pure sciences, on the other. This division seems to be

20. As an anonymous critic reminds me, Kahn (1987) gives a plausible picture of a very close resemblance between the liberation in the *Republic* and Diotima's ladder and stresses the importance of desire. But Kahn sidesteps the *Republic*'s demand for a complete turnaround of the soul (518c), an intellectual reorientation, which does not agree with the step-by-step progress on the same ladder.

no less rigid than the distinction in the *Phaedo* between the "vulgar" or "demotic" virtues and the real virtues of the philosopher.

## The Enchanted Socrates

In contrast to the intellectual "awakening" through *anamnesis*, which is elicited either by clever Socratic questioning, as recommended in the *Meno*, or by the rigorous scientific training in the *Republic*, the education envisaged in the *Symposium* and in the *Phaedrus* can be called an education through enchantment. In both dialogues a kind of enchantment through beauty draws us upward by a natural affinity to the good.[21] Humans are now no longer strangers on earth who ought to flee this life as soon as the gods permit and scrape themselves as clean as they can of the barnacles of this existence and all involvement with the body. Instead of *Weltflucht*, Diotima recommends seeking worth in this world, a continued search for the higher and better through physical beauty. This does not mean, however, that this conception of love implants us firmly in the world of the senses. Our "daemonic" nature in fact thoroughly volatilizes our existence. We do not live in the cave any more, lit up by the dim light of the spelunkian fire, nor do we live permanently in an upper world of light. We are not at home in either of the two worlds. Humans become the unshod and unhoused eternal hunter, poor but relentless. What is "wrong" with the human condition quite generally is no longer the forced association with the body but the permanent, inherent lack, which is compensated for by the eternal hunt for the good and the beautiful.

If anything justifies the claim of enchantment and "magic" in the new situation (202e–203c), it is the realization that the affinity to beauty is not simply a property that some of us have while others do not. Beauty works on the sensibility of all of us; it casts a kind of spell on us that is answered by each of us in different ways and to different degrees. But we all share a dormant power to rise, which can be awakened by the sight of beauty of any kind (205d–206a). Diotima assigns the rudiments of such an affinity to the higher and better to all souls, albeit to a different degree. That few of us make it to the vision of the beautiful as such is indicated by the fact that she

21. The terminology *sublimation* and *enchantment* is not to suggest that Diotima's ascent is not also an intellectual endeavor; it is to signify that there is a marked departure from sheer intellectualism. For a detailed analysis of the interplay of *eros* as a motivating power with reason and creative activity on the different stages of the ascent cf. Moravcsik's careful study (1972). He refrains from chronological speculation but shows that the ascent gives us a full-scale account of how the soul has access to a form. It is, one may add, the only such full description in Plato.

expresses doubts about even Socrates' ability to follow her to the highest level of the soul's strivings.[22] The description of Socrates' ability to combine a daemonic nature with divine inner beauty, given later by Alcibiades, shows that he proved himself a worthy disciple of his mistress.[23]

It may be objected that the contrast between the liberation from the cave in the *Republic* and Diotima's education through enchantment is due to the topic, Eros, rather than to justice or knowledge. In addition, it may be objected that Diotima's insistence that Eros implies a lack has to be seen from the context of the dialogue itself. Socrates uses her as a witness to counter Agathon's picture of Eros' creativity as an overflow caused by an abundance of goodness and beauty. So the dramatic development in the dialogue itself would explain the emphasis on Eros' (and humankind's) needy nature. This would no doubt be a grave objection against taking it as a criterion of change in Plato, were it not for the fact that the theme of humankind's self-completion through the love of beauty is again taken up and broadened in the *Phaedrus*.[24]

This leads us to consider in what sense the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* can be said to follow the same path, or rather to complement one another. In both dialogues there is the notion that the desire for the higher and better is stirred up in human beings by the sight of physical beauty.[25] And in

22. Her doubt about Socrates' abilities to grasp the highest kind of beauty is a funny replica of Socrates' doubt that Glaucon will be able to follow to the highest heights of dialectic, since it will no longer be a matter of using images (εἰκών); cf. *Rep.* 533a. Cornford (1971, 125–26), Markus (1971, 134), and Vlastos (1981, 21 n. 58) treat her hesitancy about Socrates' abilities as a sign that the historical Socrates is here superseded. Since Plato is not squeamish elsewhere about making Socrates the spokesman of his theory of forms, the hesitancy may be due to the topic, love and beauty.

23. Alcibiades unwittingly echoes Diotima's claims about love as a great sorcerer (203a–d); cf. κηλεῖ (215c1); ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα (215d5). Philosophy's "bite" makes all her admirers frenzied (218b). Because Socrates has the inner beauty, their roles are reversed—Alcibiades, the rich, young, and beautiful, pursues the old, ugly, and poor Socrates. Socrates is the only one who makes him see his needy nature (216a5). Socrates confirms the value of inner beauty—if he had the power to make Alcibiades a better man, his would be an enormous power.

24. To see the affinity between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* one only has to compare the divine communication with mortals through oracles, sorcery, and dreams and the claim that whoever is capable of it (σοφός) has a "daemonic nature" while all others are mere "craftsmen" (202e–203a) with the difference between inspired and uninspired prophecy and artistic production (*Phdr.* 244a–245c).

25. The description of the soul's growth of wings in the *Phaedrus* (251a–e) constitutes a close parallel to Diotima's description of the ἐπαναβαθμός. As has been frequently noticed, the conception of such creativity foreshadows the discussion of "pregnancy" in the *Theaetetus* (148e–151d). But the unbeautiful Socrates and Theaetetus clearly have no need for the lower stages; they are engaged in creativity of the highest kind from the start. For the differences between the notion of "pregnancy" in those dialogues and the difficulties with Plato's conception of creativity in general cf. Burnyeat 1977.

both dialogues the appreciation of physical beauty is soon superseded by an upward path to higher beauty that leads to a kind of self-perfection in creative activity. But at this point the similarity between the two dialogues seems to come to an end. While the soul's upward flight in the *Phaedrus* entails the soul's immortality, the *scala amoris* in the *Symposium* excludes any kind of transcendence. Should the difference between the two kinds of sublimation be regarded as the most striking feature that separates the *Symposium* from the *Phaedrus* and treated as an argument for an early date of this dialogue, as some scholars have suggested?[26] How could Socrates have expressed admiration for a doctrine that does away with immortality, once he had fully developed the "twin pillars" of Platonic philosophy, the theory of the forms and *anamnesis* of what the soul has seen in another world, as the explanation of how we learn? The problem with such a removal of the *Symposium* from Plato's mature thinking is that it forces us to assume an impossibly early date for it. Since immortality of the soul and recollection are mentioned for the first time in the *Meno*, and punishment for the evil soul after death in the myth of the *Gorgias*, the *Symposium* would have to antedate not only the *Phaedo* but the *Meno* and *Gorgias* as well.

What speaks against an early date for the *Symposium* besides its assumed closeness to the *Phaedrus*? There are the external references mentioned earlier, which show that the dialogue cannot have been written before 385/4. But there are more pressing reasons. It seems inconceivable that Plato thought of love as an incentive to higher beauty and goodness at an early stage of his thought, then dropped all such thoughts entirely in favor of the otherworldly attitude expressed in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo* (and to a lesser degree in the *Republic*),[27] only to resurrect it, once again, in the much later *Phaedrus*. Instead of ascribing two such moves of complete about-face, from an early "eroticism" to ascetism and back to a later "eroticism," it is much more plausible that the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* both originate in a period of Plato's life when he had come to a more positive assessment of the world of the senses in general.

We have to find an explanation, however, for the blatant disagreement between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* on the question of immortality. While Diotima makes all thoughts of personal immortality unimportant, if not impossible, the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* restores all essential elements of that old theory as we know it from the *Phaedo* and the myth of Er in the

26. Cf. Hackforth 1950; Luce 1952; Dover 1965 (contra).

27. In *Republic* 10 the myth is added as a kind of postscript, as an extra reward for the righteous. It is a somewhat awkward postscript; the antenatal choice of a life-style is not easily compatible with the complex educational program discussed earlier. What difference could such an education make, if our life's character and career was already fixed before we were born?

*Republic*. The half-mythical depiction in the *Phaedrus* brings the mythical and philosophical elements closer together, but all features familiar from the *Republic* are back in place. The soul once again comprises three parts, and is encapsulated in the body as in a prison; it rises above earthly conditions to the degree that it recollects the "really real" that it has once seen when in the company of the gods (*Phdr.* 246b–d5). There is reward and punishment in the form of reincarnation—only the better souls are reborn in human form, others pass into those of animals. And there are cycles of purification and calculations about the time they take. If there are differences between the summary in the *Phaedrus* and the earlier myths, they seem to lie in some of the descriptive details of the soul's migrations. The soul now chooses a deity to whom it attaches itself, and this affinity to a god or goddess is the soul's guiding spirit for life on earth as well, as it was on its forays into the upper regions of heaven. Even the only philosophically significant feature that marks a difference—that the soul is now defined as a self-mover, and thus as an ungenerated and indestructible first principle—does not really change the character of the narrative. If one takes a closer look at the three parts of the soul itself, the winged charioteer and his winged steeds, it seems as if the soul in the *Phaedrus* is an even less "earthly" creature than the soul as presented in the *Republic*. There is no strictly mortal part of the soul: Its three parts, including the possibly misbehaving black horse, all have wings which they may lose or ruin, but which may also be restored and carry the soul up and above. What, we must ask ourselves, can justify an approximation of this transcendent view of the soul to the very limited sense in which a "temporal" immortality is granted to the immanent soul in Diotima's story?

The hypothesis of a division of labor between them shows that the dialogues are not as far apart as they may seem at first sight regarding that question. In the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, Plato aims at doing full justice to the two sides of our "daemonic" nature, our earthly and our heavenly features. The *Symposium* shows in what sense an entitity that is subject to generation and destruction can attain a kind of "divine" status by overcoming the narrow limitations of its nature ("how the temporal will partake of the eternal," 208b); the ascent to higher achievements and to the form of the beautiful as such is the last step needed to give our earthly endeavors the splendor and height they would otherwise lack. As a consequence, the concern for the notion of a personal immortality after death does not play any role here; Plato is concentrating on the question of the highest amount of perfection achievable in this life.[28] The division of labor extends to yet

28. As mentioned earlier, the *Phaedrus* presupposes both the immanent and the trancen-

another feature. The *Symposium* concentrates almost exclusively on the effects of love on the possessor, the lover. The role of the beautiful beloved is therefore almost entirely *ausgeblendet.*[29] The *Phaedrus*, by contrast, shows that a transcendent conception of the soul is quite reconcilable with an attachment to physical beauty as such;[30] in addition it deals with the question how the elevation through love of beauty works to the benefit of both lover and beloved.

Before we pursue further the hypothesis that the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* are meant as complements, we should take at least a brief glance at the opposite view, that the *Symposium* continues the ascetic line of the middle dialogues, while the *Phaedrus* is the result of Plato's conversion to a revaluation of personal love. This is the line taken by Nussbaum.[31] While admitting some affinity between the two dialogues (217), she emphasizes the stark contrast between Diotima's ladder and Alcibiades' plea for love as the repetition of the old contrast between the life of rationalist enlightenment and passionate commitment. This reconstruction, however, gravely distorts the contrast between Socrates, the student of Diotima, and Alcibiades, the tempter. Socrates is not the beautiful stone that Nussbaum makes of him, nor is Alcibiades the suffering person who chooses vulnerability over philosophy's immunization (189–99). If Socrates is not to be "had" by Alcibiades, it is because he repudiates the idea of embracing philosophy by embracing the philosopher. And Alcibiades is rejected not because he is looking for personal openings in Socrates' nooks and crannies but because he is not willing to mend his ways and to give up his self-corrupting ambitions with the Athenian people (216b). It is also not the case that madness is repudiated in the *Symposium*; even Alcibiades admits the strength of the "bite" of philosophy that has affected not only him but all

dent kind of immortality; cf. the ascription of "earthly" immortality to Solon and Lycurgus (*Phdr.* 258c). For a discussion of the question of immortality cf. Dover 1965, 16–18.

29. The education of the beloved as one of the effects of love's creativity is at least mentioned in passing (209c); Price (1989, 54–55) argues for two-sidedness of love in the ascent-passage as a whole.

30. The description of the charioteer and his two horses shows how all three parts of the soul are stimulated by physical beauty (253c–256e). The charioteer is certainly not restricted to the pleasures of philosophy here.

31. Cf. Nussbaum 1986, chaps. 6–7. The contrast she construes between Socrates and Alcibiades as a radical split between reason and passion does not justify the characterization of the one dialogue as "*dry* in the light of reason, the other as *wet* with passion all over" (217–19). The passion she seeks is not to be had in the *Phaedrus* either (220). Furthermore, Alcibiades is not even "in a way" Plato's self-portrait (230). His case should be interpreted in the light of Socratic midwifery in the *Theaetetus* (150b); Alcibiades is one of those who want "to bite Socrates" (or see him dead) rather than to give up falsehood, not out of passionate love but out of ambition.

the other followers of Socrates with the "madness of a Bacchic philosophical frenzy" (218b). We should not forget that the *Symposium* is presented as a philosophical madman's narration. Thus in the *Symposium* the elements of magic and madness form the periphery of the whole discussion, while they move into the centerpiece in the *Phaedrus*. If Diotima's picture of love does not give us much information about the personal life of the devotees of higher beauty, beyond the indication that they create and rear beautiful offspring together with the beautiful beloved (209c), it is because Diotima does not really describe any form of life. Hers is a sketch of ascent and of the visionary capture of beauty as such; the *Phaedrus* fills in that sketch and explains what the higher life in mutual love and support should be like.

If Diotima's depiction of the ascent to highest beauty lets us forget the "daemonic" beginning of her speech because it ends in the thin air of the abstract vision of the form of beauty itself, in what sense is the picture of the "daemonic hunter" still relevant to her account? We should not make the mistake of getting captured by the final vision to the exclusion of everything that preceded it. A good deal of Diotima's attention is devoted to the depiction of the continued effort of all that is mortal to attain some kind of self-perfection by creative work. Creativity, bringing something into being out of not being (205b9), is the new way of achieving contact with the eternal, with a good that lasts forever (ἀεὶ εἶναι, 206a9), rather than survival of the individual itself. But what role does the hunt for beauty actually play in this creative attempt? The poor, hungry, unshod, ugly hunter never attains his end, but it is not possible to make up for this deficiency. The Socratic hunter may be able to find beauty, even take possession of *a* beauty, but he will never become beautiful. Even the view of the highest beauty remains just that, a view. Nor will the mortal being ever possess any other perfection, entirely and forever. Even the knowledge it acquires will be in constant need of tendance and supplementation. Instead of a firm possession of beauty and goodness, the hunter will achieve a kind of self-extension in place and time. If beauty and goodness cannot be a permanent possession, there will be good and beautiful deeds that last forever. Desire for self-extension brings forth immortal works, as far as human works can be "immortal."[32]

The *Symposium* is thus concerned with the pedagogical progress of one person under the influence of love and beauty in this life. The education of the beauty seeker goes from the world of the sensible to the world of the ethical and beyond. The achievement of this vision is, as Diotima insists,

32. Plato's positive attitude toward poets (cf. the envy for Homer, Hesiod, and other good poets, because they left behind such offspring, 209d) constitutes another point of agreement with the *Phaedrus* (245a), where poets have a better than usual press.

what makes a life worth living and gives worth to the erotic pedagogy (211c–d). And this experience of beauty, which makes one give birth to real offspring of virtue rather than to images, is what gives the person immortality by earthly standards.[33] This is the real benefit to be hoped for from Eros and the trait that makes him venerable (212b). According to this reading, the *Symposium* deliberately aims to bracket otherworldliness. Our eternal restlessness need therefore not be interpreted as a negative thing. It means that we are, as we know we are, forever "on the move." This is indeed the message that is indicated in the *Symposium* but explored much more fully in the description of the soul's eternal travels in the *Phaedrus*. So besides a division of labor in dealing with love's nature and effect, we also have continuities between the two dialogues. They are manifested not only in the definition of the soul as an eternal self-mover but also in the poetic description of the soul's continued journey in pursuit of its divinity.

There are further reasons that justify the claim that the treatment of the theme of immortality in the *Symposium* does not stand in opposition to that in the *Phaedrus*, that the two notions of immanent and transcendent immortality complement rather than contradict each other. Such a claim can be fortified by drawing attention to external as well as internal similarities. These similarities start, of course, with the topic, Eros, and the fact that in both dialogues Phaedrus himself brings up the question of the nature of love. In addition, both dialogues conspicuously take Socrates out of his normal ways. We have already noted the special circumstances of the *Symposium* and only have to add here that the *Phaedrus* begins with Socrates' remarks on the unusualness of his submission to the charms of nature and to a stay outside the city walls. The unusualness of the situation is matched by yet another common feature. In both dialogues Socrates refuses to take credit for his own knowledge in matters of love.

While in the *Symposium* he presents his erotic expertise in the "thick disguise" of Diotima's voice, in the *Phaedrus* he does not refer to one identifiable teacher but uses his own voice at least in thin disguise. He continuously claims the assistance of various other sources and forces. Confessing his ignorance, he first refers to some authorities he cannot exactly remember ("wise men and women," "the fair Sappho perhaps, or the wise Anacreon," 235b–c). For his first speech, the rival of Lysias' recommendation for gratifying a nonlover rather than a lover,[34] he invokes the Muses

33. The "immortality" of the mortal envisaged by Diotima as an endearment to the gods (212a) is echoed by the assimilation to the deity in the *Phaedrus* (253a) and reminds us of the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ recommended for the philosopher in the *Theaetetus* (176b).

34. His speech had been blasphemous because Eros is, after all, the son of Aphrodite, and a god. At this point he renounces all responsibility for his first speech; it was in fact Phaedrus' speech, coming out of Socrates' mouth under the influence of Phaedrus' spell (242e1).

(237a) and claims that divine inspiration almost makes him break out in dithyrambs (238c, 241d–e). Its overwhelming character even provides an excuse for breaking off that speech. His subsequent recantation is prompted by his own customary sign, the δαιμόνιον (242b–c); he has to act as his own seer (μάντις), drawing on his own soul's prophetic capacities, to interpret why his divine sign forbade him to leave. The recantation itself is presented as Stesichorus' palinode, not merely as Socrates' recantation after the model of Stesichorus. And for the rest of the discussion, he invokes the inspiration of the cicadas, the Muses' offspring, who will report back to the Muses of philosophy, Calliope and Urania, whether Socrates and Phaedrus are conducting their discussion in the true philosophical spirit (258e–259d8).

Why is there so much mummery and so much claim of divine assistance in both dialogues? Plato, it would seem, wants to indicate that he is unfolding a picture of Socrates that differs in a significant way from the ascetic Socrates as well as from the ironic or intellectual Socrates from the early and middle dialogues. We see a Socrates who has become a diviner or a diviner's disciple when it comes to the completion of human nature.[35] Myth as such, the description of another world separated from the world of the senses, is replaced in the *Symposium* by the visionary ascent in this life, and in the *Phaedrus* by the pursuance of a divine model as a determinant of the character of our friendships even beyond our earthly existence. This difference in perspective justifies the rather different treatment of the question of love in both dialogues. The *Phaedrus* provides a reminder that the search for completion in this life is not incompatible with a transcendent dimension, which was left out of the discussion by Diotima and is symbolized here by the restitution of divine honors to Eros (257a). As a complement to the Socrates-like, daemonic, earthly Eros, the son of Poros and Penia, we now find the heavenly Eros, son of Aphrodite, restored to the heavenly sphere.[36] In both cases love and beauty are invoked to give the earthly human existence a new dimension. While Diotima's ladder explains how the soul can gain an understanding of the importance of beauty as such in this life by providing an incentive to self-extension and self-perfection, the *Phaedrus* justifies the possibility of the divine nature of intimate human interrelationships. Given the right spirit, there can be true friendship, mutual benefit, and holy love between two individuals in this life, manifest in the joint pursuit of goodness.

35. Socrates' earlier respect for oracles is not under dispute here. Diotima has a predecessor in the "woman in white" in Socrates' dream in the *Crito* (44a–b), but the Socratic δαιμόνιον is only a warning voice, never a force that spurns him on or inspires him.

36. The distinction echoes the two Aphrodites, the earthly and the heavenly, of Pausanias' speech (180c–85c).

## Humankind's Needy Nature

The *Phaedrus* provides the answer to a problem not fully settled by Diotima. Although she bases some justification of a mutual human attraction and cooperation on the vision of beauty, her explanation of the function of the beloved as an incentive to creativity remains rather abstract. She does not treat the need for another person *qua person* or the limitations of such a commitment. This is the question Socrates tackles in the *Phaedrus* once he has given a sketch of the full range of the "winged" soul's endeavors. He takes up a discussion that had been left in a clearly unsatisfactory state in the *Lysis*. In spite of some promising indications and suggestions, that dialogue did not come up with a satisfactory solution to the question of what constitutes friendship in human life. Most importantly, it did not explain the need for friendship and love in the life of a fully developed, good, moral person. In the *Lysis*, Socrates expresses puzzlement over the need that a good man could possibly have for another (214e–215c).

The puzzlement over what human beings want from each other is echoed in Aristophanes' speech: "They seek, they don't know what" (192c). Aristophanes' answer anticipates Diotima's proof of the fundamental incompleteness of human nature, an incompleteness that for Aristophanes can be healed only by reunion with the natural other half.[37] The *Phaedrus* addresses this puzzlement over the mutual attraction once again, but from the perspective of the loved one ("so he loves, yet knows not what he loves," 255d), and provides a more spiritual answer than Aristophanes' playful reunion. The beloved sees in the eyes of his lover, "as in a mirror," the admiration for his beauty (255d), and both together are reminded in reverence and love of the divine origin of beauty itself, the only one of the forms that keeps its luster in earthly circumstances (250b). So the *Phaedrus* explains the mutuality of the attachment through the inspiration of divine love and explains at the same time the temptations and containment of carnal desire. This virtually completes Plato's account of love and friendship, since we finally get an answer to the question "What is in it for both sides?"

We should step back here and take a closer look at why the *Lysis* fails to reach a satisfactory solution to the problem of who becomes friend to whom and for what reason. This will help clarify in what sense the conception of a lack as the basis of love constitutes progress in Plato's thought. In the *Lysis*,

37. Nothing needs to be added to Aristophanes' comic depiction of the physical aspect of our incomplete nature and its ugliness, as well as its consequences for our pathetic behavior (*Symp.* 190e–192c). It is at the same time an implicit and equally comic justification of why perfectly well-rounded beings could not love, nor be loved by, anything.

Socrates presents his audience with a consummate *aporia*; none of the possible combinations among human beings seems to lead to a satisfactory explanation of friendship. Socrates is very thorough in ruling out all possibilities; friendship can exist neither between like nor between unlike, neither between the good nor between the bad (*Lys.* 214–215c1). The failure of the compromise that intermediary persons who are neither good nor bad are friends to the good leads Socrates to the final suggestion that "innocuous desires" establish a kind of natural affinity to the good and, thus, provide a way out of the dilemma (221b). This solution fails because it has consequences that are very unwelcome to young Lysis himself, who is under siege by an unwanted admirer (222a). Such a natural kinship through desire would legitimate the naturalness of every lover's claim on his beloved. In view of this undesirable consequence, Socrates has an easy game in bringing the boys to consent to what they had rejected earlier, that only people of like qualities have an affinity and therefore any claim to friendship, so that good belongs to good, evil to evil. He only has to remind them of their former agreement as to the impossibilty of this maxim to let the whole discussion founder.

It is not difficult to explain how Socrates could have solved the dilemma in the *Lysis*, in light of the insights divulged in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. What is wrong is, above all, the attribution of a perfection to humankind, which would make them self-sufficient. This deliberately ignores the maxim that perfect goodness is a perquisite of the gods alone, which we find in early as well as late Platonic writings.[38] The possibility is never addressed in the *Lysis* that even so-called good human beings may always be in some kind of need, due to a prevailing incompleteness, so that all have a desire for some good or other. If the deficiency of human nature had been focused on, it would have been clear that the incentive to striving for the good arises out of the intermediary state itself; the good is therefore not desirable only because of "the presence of something bad." Every state that is not a perfect state must be regarded as a state of deficiency and constitutes a lack. Even the "innocuous desires" that Socrates contemplates in the *Lysis* would thus be the sign of a lack and would constitute an affinity to the corresponding good.[39]

The problem of "unwanted affinities" would be solved by a distinction between different kinds of deficiencies and different kinds of goods. Such a

38. The claim is already found in *Prt.* 345b; it is repeated for the gods but denied for humans as such in *Rep.* 583c, *Symp.* 203d, and *Phdr.* 278d; and it forms an integral part in the argument of the *Phlb.* (22c, 33b), where the difference between divine and human intelligence and nature is strongly emphasized.

39. For a fuller discussion of human incompleteness cf. Santas 1988, 22–36.

distinction disarms the unpleasant consequence that everyone who feels a desire for something is therefore a "natural friend" of what he desires. There is at least a hint in the right direction in the *Lysis*, which may justify the suspicion that Plato was aware of the need for such a differentiation. Socrates indicates (222b) that the solution may depend on their success in distinguishing between what "belongs to us" (*οἰκεῖον*) and what is "like us" (*ὅμοιον*). It would indeed be a solution to their query, if the tack were taken toward a differentiation between different levels of needs and therefore of a natural kinship. The importunate admirer Hippothales admires and needs only the physical beauty of young Lysis; but Lysis himself is on a different level of need—a "useful love" for him would have to be of the kind that helps him on his way to further development.[40] Most akin to each other are the two boys themselves: They are both in need of education and completion but can see in each other something of the joint progress and promise that is in store for them as they grow up. And Socrates is, of course, the (unbeautiful) friend who can educate them, and he is therefore welcome in their company.

Since the *Lysis* contains at least hints of the proper solution to the problem, hints that consist of the dramatis personae as well as of Socrates' "prophecy" that the "neither good nor bad" will turn out to be friend of what is beautiful,[41] we may well ask ourselves whether Plato already had the solution of the *Symposium* up his sleeve when he wrote the *Lysis* and only decided, for some reason or other, to keep his cards close to his chest for another occasion. It would be foolish to be dogmatic on this point and rule out such a possibility a priori. But the existence of certain suspicions and surmises about what would be needed for a solution are not the equivalent to a proper solution itself. To justify the claim that Plato did see his way out of the difficulties on which the discussion in the *Lysis* founders, we would have to have proof that he already regarded the *μεταξύ* as a dynamic in-between. If the *Lysis* was written before the *Phaedo*, he could not have had the solution ready. Finding a rational and moral basis for friendship and explaining the reciprocity in such a relation may well have been problems that vexed Plato for quite some time, before he found the requisite conceptual and ontological tools for their solution.

I contend that not until Plato conceived of human beings as "daemonic beings" who oscillate between two worlds, the mortal and the immortal, could he solve this problem. The new concept of the intermediary allows

40. Ctesippus, the admirer of Lysis' friend Menexenus, presents himself in a better light and is therefore more welcome to his beloved.

41. Socrates quite literally foreshadows Diotima's enlightenment: *λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν* (*Lys.* 216d).

him to use the vision of the higher and better, which is inherent in our nature, as the basis of love and friendship. We may wonder why Plato needs "the vision thing" to justify what we find in no need of justification and why self-betterment must be an integral part of it.[42] That divine madness is invoked here may in fact seem almost pathetic to us, a sign that Plato had no real sense for sympathy, love, and commitment as we experience them. This, I claim, is a mistake. We should remember the point of Plato's comparison of love with the other kinds of "divine madness," such as the inspiration of prophets and gifted poets. Both seers and poets need divine inspiration; *techne* alone leads only to "hackwork" (245a). Further reflection shows that there is indeed a similarity between the need for a "vision," which inspires the arts, and the need for a kind of inspiration in human relationships. As long as a human interrelationship is merely based on ordinary prudence and its niggardly calculations (256e), or on sheer physical need, it remains uninspired "hackwork"—as is depicted in Lysias' speech and repeated with greater skill in Socrates' restatement of the nonlover's case, which he then shamefacedly revokes. We need the promise of some worth even for our intimate life, if it is not to consist in mere mutual exploitation (as in a life "among a gang of sailors," 243c). We need the promise of a worthwhile joint project that makes use of our highest gifts. If the striving for completion is not to be a lonely enterprise, it must include the other in a meaningful way, not just as a catalyst. *Philokalia* is not only the continuation of philosophy by other means, it makes philosophy possible as a common enterprise (248d, 249a2).[43]

If this spiritualization of our needy nature provides a conceptual framework to solve the problem of love and friendship, the question of the wider consequences of the fundamental incompleteness of all that is mortal should at least be touched in concluding. If we read Diotima's speech only under the aspect emphasized in this chapter so far, that is, as an elucidation of the pedagogical effect of love, we will be struck by the strong emphasis she puts

42. The complexity of "loving another person for that person's sake" is worked out by Kosman 1976, 56–63.

43. On this point cf. Vlastos 1981; it is hard not to share Vlastos' disappointment ("the cardinal flaw in Plato's theory") that Plato's attempts to forge a convergence of μανία and νοῦς (27 n. 80) do not shed any light on the personal aspect of our commitments. Plato, as Vlastos points out, does not have the notion that one ought to make people "ends in themselves" (32). But neither, one should add, are they mere means on the way to self-perfection in the *Phaedrus* (cf. 255c). It is questionable what more could be said about our personal attachments *in abstracto*. Vlastos mentions our love for the other's weaknesses and foibles, but it would be rough going to generalize on this issue. The ineffability of our personal relationships seems to make such an attempt a virtual impossibility for a philosopher. Do we ever love someone for the sake of their flaws, or is that not rather an "acquired taste," because we love the person and the flaws along with her/him?

on the difficulties not only of achieving but of maintaining a "complete" life. We should keep in mind, however, that she is not only concerned with the impossibility of moral perfection among human beings; she is talking quite generally about the instability of all that is mortal. Not just humankind's needy nature is at stake here. As Diotima claims, all living things are constantly undergoing continued destruction and repair (207d–208b). This includes even our mental abilities—even there we stand in need of continued exercise to replenish what we lose through forgetting. The fact that Plato has stressed this need for "continued self-maintenance" nowhere else as much as in this speech should not prevent us from seeing it as an integral part of later Platonic ontology, which is still recognizable in his late metaphysics and cosmology.

The reasons for this sweeping claim can be only indicated here. That all things that do not strictly belong to the eternally selfsame realm of being are to be assigned to the realm of what Plato calls "becoming" is a doctrine that forms the basis of the discussion of his cosmology in the *Timaeus* (cf. 27d–29d). But the same ontology is also at work, mutatis mutandis, in the *Philebus*.[44] The long comparison of the relative goodness of knowledge and pleasure, respectively, hinges on the question of which of the two is more akin to truth, proportion, and beauty. The strongest objection to pleasure as a candidate for this dignity is its inherently incomplete nature; pleasure is always the restoration of a lack and can never possess a solid being of its own.[45] This is the justification for assigning it to the genus of ἄπειρον, the genus that comprises all that does not have a stable nature (24e–26c). Even in its best form pleasure is only a γένεσις (54d), for even the true and pure pleasures presuppose an imperceptible and painless lack and consist in a filling thereof.[46]

It can be no accident that in the *Philebus*, Socrates resorts to the image of the lover and the beautiful beloved to explain the difference between becoming and being,[47] the incompleteness of the former and the need for perfection through the latter (53c–54d), although the metaphor at first confuses rather than enlightens Protarchus. If Plato late in his life seems to sign a kind of truce with hedonism (although only within narrow limitations), this cannot surprise the attentive reader of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*.

44. We can recognize a division of labor between the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* similar to that postulated for the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. *Philebus* not only omits the discussion of the tripartite soul but also omits all discussion of transcendence of the soul; *Timaeus* makes clear that transcendence is not given up.

45. For Plato's ontology of pleasure in the *Philebus* cf. D. Frede 1985.

46. *Phlb.* 51b5: ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας παραδίδωσιν.

47. On Plato's distinction between being and becoming in general cf. M. Frede 1988.

Plato is now repeating for the concept of pleasure what he did earlier for love and friendship. He assigns it a place on the ontological map, as part of the remedy for all that stands in need of restoration and replenishment. If in tone the late dialogues seem to have little in common with the enchanted picture of love and friendship found in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, they share the conviction that nothing temporal possesses a complete nature, since it cannot be in perfect harmony. Nothing that is subjected to any change enjoys perfect stability. This applies even within the realm of the mind; only the gods need no philosophy, since they are masters of wisdom, while man as a mortal creature remains in a state of need and is, as such, incurable.

*30*

# The Acropolis of the Soul

Helen F. North

AMONG THE PASSAGES in Plato's *Republic* that leave an indelible impression on the reader, none is more memorable than the description in books 8 and 9 of the progressive degeneration of the state and of the soul. Plato lavishes on this drama all the powers of rhetoric that mark him as supreme among Greek prose stylists.[1] His use of imagery is especially notable. Here the analogy between πολιτεία and ψυχή that has been the dominant metaphor in the *Republic* rises to a crescendo. Nowhere else are the parallels worked out in such detail or held up for such close inspection.

Within the framework of this overarching metaphor many other images find a place. Some (such as the scales in which ἀρετή and πλοῦτος are weighed against each other, 550e) appear but once. Others contribute to a systematic chain of allusions, such as the repeated references to drones, some with stings, some without, that occur in connection with each μεταβολή in the sequence (554b–d, 555d–e, 559c–d, 564b–c, 565c, 573d). The imagery becomes noticeably more violent and prolonged as the transition from aristocracy or monarchy to tyranny proceeds. When the son of the timocratic man becomes oligarchic, preferring love of gain to love of honor, Plato describes him as driving from his soul's throne φιλοτιμία (love of honor) and τὸ θυμοειδές (the spirited element), enthroning in their stead (chiastically) τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (the appetitive element) and φιλοχρήματον (love of gain). The royal analogy is embellished by a comparison of the newly enthroned rulers to the Great King, adorned with tiaras, torques, and

1. Shorey calls the description of the four polities "one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato" (1935, 2:xlii) and quotes Macaulay's view that it is "beyond all criticism. I remember nothing in Greek philosophy superior to this in profundity, ingenuity, and eloquence."

Persian swords; and the picture of oriental monarchy is still further enhanced when the reasoning and spirited elements are forced to grovel on the ground to right and left, like slaves (553d)—a vivid and even ominous picture, but relatively mild compared with what happens in later stages of corruption.

The climax comes with the ultimate transition, that from democracy to tyranny. There the transformation of democracy's champion (προστάτης) into a tyrant is compared to the genesis of the werewolf in Arcadian folklore, with all its grisly details of cannibalism and its reference to the unholy tongue and mouth that have tasted kinsman's blood—perhaps the most savage of Plato's metaphorical condemnations of the unjust orator in the lawcourts (565d–66a). The son of the democratic man is beguiled by dreadful magi and tyrant-makers (572e), and when he has himself been transformed into a tyrant, after a dazzling description of the incessant and riotous reveling of the dronelike pleasures and appetites that drive him mad (573a–b), he goes to the extreme of robbing and physically abusing his aged parents (574a–b) and gives free rein in his waking hours to the evil desires that most men indulge only in their dreams (574e–75a).

Midway between these dramatic scenes are those that impel the reader to visualize the emergence of the democratic from the oligarchic soul. The most effective device that Plato uses at this point is the transfer to the soul of military and architectural terms proper to the city. The πολιτεία penetrates the ψυχή as nowhere else in the *Republic.* Details that are literal when applied to the city become metaphorical when transferred to the soul. Most notable is the imagery of the acropolis.[2]

Socrates' intent to analyze the parallel corruptions of each successive type of state and soul is announced at the end of book 4, where he says that there are five of each and describes the best πολιτεία as monarchy or aristocracy, depending on whether it is ruled by one person or more than one (445d–e). At the beginning of book 5 he has just started to describe the four bad and mistaken types when his account is interrupted by the long digression constituting books 5, 6, and 7. When the theme of degeneration is at

2. Only the imagery is examined here, but stylistic devices such as isocolon, onomatopoeia, alliteration, parallelism, climax, and many kinds of wordplay abound and would repay study. In a larger sense, poetic influences are constantly felt throughout this part of the *Republic.* Socrates suggests invoking the Muses, as did Homer, to tell how στάσις first arose (545d–e). He reminds us of the deteriorating Hesiodic generations (547a), which of course he has already adapted to his defense of class divisions in the ideal state (415a–b); see Solmsen 1960, 173–96. Socrates quotes Aeschylus, *Sept.* 451, when he asks whether to describe another champion before another gate, or speak first of the πόλις (550c). And is it too fanciful to remember Sophocles' description of ὕβρις scaling the ramparts in *OT* 876 (ἀκρότατα γεῖσ' ἀναβᾶσ'), when we read about the attack on the acropolis?

last resumed in book 8, Socrates lists timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny as the four types of what he had called in book 5 *πονηρία* (wickedness, 449a). He now proceeds systematically to describe in each case first the *πολιτεία*, then the *ψυχή*, with close attention to corresponding details.

Having shown how the timocratic state and man develop from the aristocratic, and the oligarchic from the timocratic (in both cases through *στάσις*—faction—in the ruling element, 545d), Socrates traces the transition from oligarchy to democracy (555b–58c). Once again *στάσις* is responsible. Just as timocracy was produced by the victory of the spirited element over reason, and oligarchy by the victory of the appetitive over both the spirited and the reasoning parts, so democracy is produced by battles within the appetitive soul.[3] The harmony that existed within both state and soul under ideal conditions—the product of *σωφροσύνη*—has already been destroyed in the first stage of corruption, and a notable consequence of the entire process of degeneration is the increasingly violent rejection of *σωφροσύνη*.

In the case of oligarchy, whose goal is wealth, the rulers encourage *ἀκολασία* (licentiousness) on the part of the young, so that, as young men waste their property, the rulers may buy it up and further enrich themselves. Reduced to poverty, the disenfranchised young men await an opportunity to overthrow their rulers, sometimes by the introduction of allies from abroad. Democracy emerges when the poor, becoming victorious, kill or expel the members of the faction that formerly held power. The description of the nature of the new constitution leads to the description of the democratic kind of man (557b). Ἐλευθερία (liberty) and *παρρησία* (freedom of speech), the watchwords of the new constitution, prove to be the goals of the corresponding type of soul.

The transformation in the soul begins when the son of the oligarchic man, brought up (for reasons of avarice, not true *παιδεία*) to repress the unnecessary appetites (those that prevent the soul from achieving *φρόνησις* and *σωφροσύνη*, 559b–c), is overwhelmed by all kinds of pleasures. Since his oligarchic upbringing has been stingy and devoid of culture, he is not equipped to resist the attraction of the unnecessary pleasures. Hence the struggle between the two groups of appetites ultimately results in the triumph of the unnecessary and harmful desires (561a). Here Plato draws a careful comparison between the revolution in the oligarchic city, when an alliance from the outside assists the like faction within, and the revolution in the soul, when a set of appetites "from the outside" joins forces with similar appetites within (559e). Many picturesque details from the revolution in the

3. See Jaeger 1943, 2:337.

city are transferred to that in the soul. If the oligarchic element in the soul is in turn assisted by allies, such as a father or kinsmen, στάσις and ἀντίστασις—faction and counterfaction—arise. The democratic faction may yield to the oligarchic, and order may return to the young man's soul. But it may also happen that other desires related to those that have been expelled grow strong because of the oligarchic father's ignorance of education (560b). In the end these desires capture the acropolis of the young man's soul, perceiving it to be empty of the studies, fine pursuits, and truthful words that are the best watchmen (φρουροί) and guardians (φύλακες) in the minds of men dear to the gods (560b).

From this point on Plato rings all the changes on the basic metaphor of capturing the citadel as false and braggart words and opinions charge up the slope and seize the stronghold. The young man returns to these allies, now called Lotus-eaters, and dwells openly with them. If his kinsmen try to come to the aid of the niggardly element in his soul, the braggart λόγοι close the gates of the royal fortress within him (τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας, 560c8) and refuse to admit such an alliance or to receive as ambassadors the words of older friends. The false λόγοι win the fight, and the first consequence of their victory—a very natural one—is a transvaluation of ethical terminology, irresistibly recalling Thucydides' account of the revolution in Corcyra (3.82). When true λόγοι are replaced by false, it is inevitable that the true meaning of words will be lost. The victorious λόγοι send into dishonored exile αἰδώς, which they call foolishness. They expel σωφροσύνη, which they term cowardice and spatter with mud.[4] Μετριότης (moderation) and orderly expenditure they call rusticity and illiberality and put them over the border, with the help of many harmful appetites. The earliest victims of the revolution are the qualities that control the appetites.

Still further transvaluation follows. Having emptied and purged the young man's soul of all these virtues and initiated him (as into the Mysteries) with impressive ceremonies, the victors bring back from exile ὕβρις (insolence), ἀναρχία (anarchy), ἀσωτία (profligacy), and ἀναιδεία (shamelessness), brilliantly attended by a huge chorus and crowned with garlands.[5] They praise and celebrate these vices, calling ὕβρις good breeding, ἀναρχία liberty, ἀσωτία magnificence, and ἀναιδεία manliness (560e). In later years the young man turns over the command (ἀρχή) of his soul indifferently to whatever

4. Thucydides describes how τὸ σῶφρον is considered a cloak for cowardice (τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα).

5. Cf. the description of the genesis of the tyrannical man, when the appetites buzz around him, laden with incense and perfume and garlands and wine, and when the pleasures let loose in such associations insert into him the sting of desire; he then receives madness as his bodyguard and is purged of σωφροσύνη (9.537a–b).

pleasures come along and does not admit to the guardhouse (φρούριον) the truthful λόγος that would teach him to distinguish between good and bad appetites (561b–c). Complete liberty (ἐλευθερία) prevails, the excess of which will soon transform democracy into tyranny (562b).

The imagery of the acropolis of the soul, sprung directly from the parallelism between soul and state established in book 2 (368d–369a), includes a notable array of terms proper to defensive arrangements—φρουροί (guardians), φρούριον (guardhouse), φύλακες (guards), τεῖχος (wall), and πύλαι (gate)—and descriptions of political activities, such as expelling an enemy or receiving ambassadors. What precedents does Plato have for the primary image?

Theognis in the sixth century B.C. is the first to use ἀκρόπολις in a metaphorical sense. He allies it with a more familiar military term, πύργος (tower), when he says that a noble man who is ἀκρόπολις and πύργος for an empty-headed people receives little honor (233–34). The metaphorical use of πύργος is well established, from Homer to the tragic poets.[6] Odysseus praises Ajax in the underworld as a πύργος for the Greeks (*Od.* 11.556). The formulaic reference in the *Iliad* to the shield of Ajax as a tower (7.219, 11.485, 17.128) may account for the transfer of the term to Ajax himself. In Sophocles' *Ajax* the chorus comments that small men, without great ones, cannot serve as a tower of defense (πύργου ῥῦμα, 158–59). Πύργος, like ἔρκος (barrier) and τεῖχος (wall), provides a simple and obvious metaphor to describe a fighting man on the defensive. Ἀκρόπολις offers more complex possibilities. The citadel of a Greek city was not only a refuge in time of danger, appropriately equipped with fortifications and guardhouses. It also held temples and meeting places. Because it was etymologically "high," it could be the metaphorical equivalent of the reason or of whatever element was "best" (βέλτιστον). Because it accommodated religious and political activities, it had intellectual and cultural associations, which made the presence or absence of παιδεία relevant.

Theognis' use of ἀκρόπολις merely as a synonym for πύργος does not exploit the manifold possibilities of the word. Something more than the basic analogy between πόλις and ψυχή was in fact needed, and Plato supplied it with the concept of the tripartite soul. By referring to the ἀκρόπολις of the soul he reminds the reader of the tripartition in book 3 and identifies the ἀκρόπολις with the highest and best of the three parts. It is no accident that the only other place where he refers to such an ἀκρόπολις is in the *Timaeus*, where the myth explains the physical location of the immortal and mortal elements of the tripartite soul.

6. Cf. Stanford 1963 on Sophocles' *Ajax* 159 for the metaphorical use of πύργος.

According to the myth of the *Timaeus*, the gods, imitating the demiurge, take over an immortal principle of soul (ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον) and fashion for it a mortal body, as well as a second, mortal kind of soul. To avoid polluting the divine with the mortal, they locate the immortal soul in the head and the mortal in the trunk, separating one from the other by the neck (compared to an isthmus and boundary), and further dividing the better from the worse part of the mortal soul itself by the diaphragm (69c–e). Thus the part of the soul that partakes of ἀνδρεία and θυμός was put closer to the head, so that it might be within hearing of the discourse of reason and join with it in forcibly restraining the appetites, whenever these should not willingly consent to obey the word of command from the acropolis (70a).[7]

This sustained imagery, so greatly admired by "Longinus,"[8] includes not only military terminology but the language of topography (the neck as isthmus) and of domestic architecture (the diaphragm, which separates the spirited from the appetitive part, is likened to a partition between the men's quarters and the women's, 70a). There is in fact much use of cognates of οἴκησις (dwelling), mostly verbal forms to describe the settlement or arrangement of the various parts of the soul.[9] Military imagery recurs with a reference to the guardhouse (δορυφορικὴ οἴκησις), where the heart is located (70b). The whole passage describing the response of the θυμός when it receives a message from the λόγος that some evil deed is occurring dramatizes the symbolism of military action in obedience to the "best" (βέλτιστον, 70b–d), that is, the λόγος. The alarm to which the θυμός is to respond may be set off by action "from the outside" (ἔξωθεν) or from the appetites within, just as in the *Republic* Plato always takes into account external allies, coming to the aid of the ἐπιθυμίαι within the soul (559e).

In the *Timaeus* the acropolis is the dwelling place of the reason. In the *Republic* too it is taken for granted that the citadel seized by the appetites and the false λόγοι is that part of the soul that has been identified in book 4 with the λογιστικόν, the reasoning element (441e). Book 8 abounds in echoes and allusions that keep the tripartite soul fresh in the reader's mind, such as when the timocratic father nourishes the λογιστικόν in his son's soul, while corrupting influences foster the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμοειδές

7. The *Timaeus*, while discussing the mortal and immortal "parts" of the soul, is concerned to explain their location in the body. The immortal soul lodges in the head, and when the acropolis metaphor is used, it refers to the head, not (as in the *Republic*) to the reasoning element itself. So too, later in the dialogue (90a) Plato says that the sovereign part of the soul (κυριώτατον ψυχῆς εἶδος) dwells in the high-point of the body (ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι).

8. *De subl.* 32.5.

9. See, for example, κατοικίζουσιν (69d), διοικοδομήσαντες and διοικοδομοῦσι (69e), and κατῴκισαν (70a).

(550b). The role of education in maintaining the proper relation of the parts of the soul is never forgotten.[10] In book 4 ignorance (*ἀμαθία*) presides over the soul in which the inferior elements rebel against the reason (444a–b). In book 8, when the appetites seize the acropolis, they are able to do so because it is empty of intellectual pursuits (560b). The failure of the oligarchic father to instill the necessary *παιδεία* in his son is responsible for the emptiness of the son's acropolis. Moreover, in book 4 *στάσις* among the parts of the soul reflects the absence of *σωφροσύνη* (443d–444b). In book 8 each stage in the corruption of the soul is marked by progressively greater and more violent sins against *σωφροσύνη*. Total *ἀκολασία*, as well as total *ἀδικία*, accompanies the ultimate decline into tyranny.

Plato is not alone in applying architectural analogies to the soul. A famous passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* describes *ἐγκράτεια* (self-control) as the foundation (*κρηπῖδα*) of virtue (1.5.4). The metaphor occurs in New Comedy as well, where Philemon, if we can judge from some Plautine adaptations, liked to represent the virtue of a young man as a house built by his parents. It is remarkable that in Plautus the virtue concerned is a Latin equivalent of *σωφροσύνη*, *modestia* or *verecundia*. In the *Mostellaria*, based on the *Phasma* of Philemon, the young man, Philolaches, describes how through his own faults, especially *ignavia* (laziness), the roof of his house, consisting of *verecundia*, was torn off. He identifies the storm that ruined his house of virtue as the courtesan, Philomatium (133–45, 161–65). In the *Trinummus*, also derived from Philemon, the young man's *modestia* keeps in good repair the house of virtue constructed by his father (313–23).

Whether or not such architectural imagery in Hellenistic and Roman literature reflects to any extent the influence of Plato, there is no doubt that the passages in the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* that we have been considering inspired a variety of imitations and adaptations. Cornford, discussing *Timaeus* 70a, cites a comparison (attributed to Hippocrates) of intelligence in the brain to a sacred image set up in the acropolis of the body.[11] Here it is not the military but the religious connotations of the acropolis image that prevail, and—as in all such references to the *Timaeus*—the acropolis itself is located in the body, not the soul. It is not surprising that the analogy would

10. Cf. Jaeger 1943, 320–57, on Plato's attention to education at every stage in the process of degeneration.

11. Cf. Cornford 1937 on 70a, and for the actual passage in which the *νοῦς* is compared to a kind of *ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα ἐν ἀκροπόλει τοῦ σώματος* see Wellman 1901, 1:19. Wellman discusses possible antecedents in philosophy and medical literature and cites Aristotle, *PA* 3.7.670a24, where the heart is the acropolis of the body. The Hippocratic corpus includes a supposed letter from Democritus to Hippocrates (Letter 23 = Democr. C 6 DK), which describes the brain as guarding (*φρουρέει*) the summit (*τὴν ἄκρην*) of the body and calls it the master and guardian of intelligence (*δεσπότην φύλακα διανοίης*).

be attractive to a medical writer. Thus Galen describes the brain as seated like a great king in the acropolis, the head, but denies that for this reason the ἀρχή of the ψυχή is there (an allusion to *Timaeus* 69c).[12] He adds a description of the senses as stationed around (περιῳκισμένας) like bodyguards (δορυφόρους), thus preserving the military imagery, much as Philo of Alexandria had done in his *De somniis* (1.32 Colson and Whittaker). Philo discusses various theories about the location of the mind (νοῦς), which some think resides in the head, the acropolis in us, about which the senses are stationed (λοχῶσιν), posted there like the bodyguards of a great king.

"Longinus" develops in another direction the extended metaphor of *Republic* 8, when he explains the decay of eloquence in his own time as resulting from the triumph of φιλοχρηματία (love of money) and φιληδονία (love of pleasure), which enslave us. When Wealth (Πλοῦτος) opens the gates of cities or houses, Extravagance (Πολυτέλεια) enters, and after a time, according to the philosophers, they build a nest and beget generations of offspring. Some of these, especially Boastfulness (Ἀλαζονεία), Arrogance (Ὕβρις), and Shamelessness (Ἀναισχυντία), recall the personified vices that enter the acropolis of the soul in *Republic* 8, when αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη have been expelled. Not only the verbal echoes of Plato, which are numerous in this passage, but the pattern of a generational decline, ending in slavery for the soul, and the vivid use of personification reveal the inspiration of Plato.[13]

The image of the soul invaded by appetites and passions is sometimes recalled by later authors who imbed an unmistakable quotation from the *Republic* in a context derived from a completely different source. An example is Philo of Alexandria in book 2 of his *Legum allegoriae*, which offers an interpretation of Exodus 4 (Moses casts away his rod, which becomes a serpent, from which he flees; the Lord tells him to take hold of its tail, and when he does so, it becomes a rod once more). Philo explains that the rod, which represents παιδεία, will, if cast away, become a serpent, because the soul that rejects παιδεία becomes a lover of pleasure rather than virtue. Hence Moses flees from the serpent, because the lover of virtue runs away from passions and pleasures. But it is not fitting for Moses to flee from them. He should stand firm, fight, and resist. Otherwise, having surmounted the psychic citadel (μέχρι τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἀναβάντα), they will take the whole soul by storm and plunder it, like a tyrant (2.91–92). Nothing could make more evident the familiarity of the Platonic acropolis of the soul than the casual way Philo introduces it, even slightly rephrased. Plato's analogy is

12. Galen, *De plac. Hipp.* 2.30 Kühn.

13. Cf. Russell 1964 on 44.7. Note especially the picture of the passions as garrisoning (φρουροῦντα) the soul (44.6).

in fact enhanced by the verbs ἐκπολιορκήσει (take by storm) and λεηλατήσει (plunder). The reference to the tyrant in this context is another Platonic echo, while the continuing association of σωφροσύνη with the defense of the citadel is seen in the immediately following mention of the serpent of brass (from Numbers 21.8–9, not from Exodus), which Philo interprets as an allegory of σωφροσύνη. One who has been bitten by pleasure, upon seeing σωφροσύνη, will live the "true" life (93).[14]

As Philo echoes Plato in the midst of his exegesis of the Old Testament, Gregory of Nyssa incorporates an exact quotation in his homily on the third Beatitude: "Blessed are they that mourn, because they shall be comforted" (Matt. 5.5). Gregory seeks to interpret πένθος (mourning) and to explain why it will be followed by comfort. He concludes that we mourn because we are aware of what we have lost, our former life in Paradise, where, because man was made in the image of God, he shared in the divine attributes. We mourn, that is, because we contrast our present fallen condition with our former beatitude. Those who mourn will be comforted (παρακληθήσονται) in the world without end, through participation in the Comforter (παράκλητος).

This homily, like most of Gregory's writings, is suffused with Platonism. The basic interpretation of the Beatitudes as steps in a ladder leading to the Kingdom of Heaven (promised in the eighth Beatitude) derives ultimately from the *Symposium*, whatever its Neoplatonic mediators may have been. Allusions to the cave of *Republic* 514–16 occur at the beginning of the first homily and in the third as well. The concept of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (likeness to God), derived from the *Theaetetus*, underlies the many references to man's image-likeness to God. And when Gregory thinks of the Fall of Man, he remembers Plato's description of the corruption of the soul in *Republic* 8.

The essence of the Fall lies in the enslavement of what was meant to rule and the corruption by death of what was created for immortality. That which lived in the ease of Paradise has been resettled in this place of illness and toil. What was nourished by ἀπάθεια (absence of passion) has received in exchange the life of passion and mortality. What was once without a master and endowed with free will is now controlled by so many and such great evils that it is not easy to enumerate our tyrants. Each of the passions in us, whenever it gains power, becomes master of the one enslaved, and precisely like some tyrant, having captured the acropolis of the soul (καταλαβὼν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν),[15] afflicts the subject through his own servants. The

14. Cf. *Lg. all.* 2.77–79.

15. This quotation was called to my attention by John F. Callahan, to whom I am indebted also for illuminating comments on Gregory's use of Platonic precedents. For a full

tyrant, that is, abuses our own thoughts and makes them his lackeys in order to secure his ends.

Gregory proceeds to list a vast array of passions—not the appetites brought in triumph to the citadel in the *Republic* but vices familiar from Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Christian ethical doctrine—which he compares to tyrants and despots who enslave the soul as if it were a prisoner of war. He mingles Platonic imagery with allusions to other sources, especially St. Paul,[16] but the dominant concept—the citadel of the soul, captured by irrational forces, losing its freedom, and condemned to slavery—bespeaks his vivid recollection of the *Republic.*

This is not the place to explore further the ramifications of Plato's metaphor. The acropolis of the soul, like other Platonic images, took on a life of its own and proved capable of combining with images from other sources to beget progeny undreamed of when Socrates conversed with Polemarchus and Plato's brothers in the Peiraeus. Most rewarding to trace would be the early stages of the concept of the interior castle, which, in addition to its classical antecedents, owes much to St. Paul's comparison of the body to a temple of the Holy Spirit.[17] The figurative castle, which as early as the ninth century appeared in allegories related to the Blessed Virgin, and which later gave rise to an image popular in both literature and art—the battle between personified virtues and vices for possession of the castle of the soul[18]—would repay more systematic study than it has yet received.

A model decisive for the Middle Ages was the concluding section of the *Psychomachia* of Prudentius, where the new temple of the soul is built by the victorious virtues, to replace the *nigrantis carcer cordis* (the prison of the unenlightened heart, 906). The allegorical battle has come to an end when the last of the vices, Discordia (Heresy), has met an appropriate fate, her tongue pierced by the spearpoint of Fides;[19] and the sister virtues, Fides and Concordia, ascend a tribunal that has been built in the midst of the camp, a tumulus whose commanding height is repeatedly emphasized (731, 736–38). From it they address those who flock from all corners of the camp, listeners

discussion of various ways in which Gregory expanded Plato's "invasion of the soul" see Callahan 1968, 17–41.

16. E.g., John 8, 34; Rom. 6, 17, 20; Rom. 16, 18; Tit. 3.3. I owe these citations to the forthcoming edition of Gregory of Nyssa's *De beatitudinibus* by John F. Callahan, who has kindly allowed me to consult it in advance of publication. Cf. *PG* 44, 1228b–c.

17. Russell 1964, on "Longinus" 32.5, lists examples of pagan and Christian references to the body as the tabernacle of the soul, a list that could be greatly expanded.

18. See Cornelius 1930 for examples ranging from the House of Wisdom with its seven pillars (Prov. 9) and the *Shepherd of Hermas*, to the sermons of St. Bernard.

19. In a golden line: *Pollutam rigida transfigens cuspide linguam*, 718.

who are identified as the parts of the *mens* (740–41). The final message of the allocutio is an exhortation to build a *templum venerabile* in the camp (814), and most of the remaining lines of the poem are devoted to a description of this temple of the soul, whose walls, made of precious gems, derive from the New Jerusalem of the Apocalypse (21.18–20). An even more elaborate development, both of the allegorical castle and of the symbolism of precious stones, occurs in a Byzantine poem, *To Sophrosyne*, ascribed to one of four possible fourteenth-century poets named Meliteniotes.[20] This poem, which includes every conceivable refinement of pedantry, is of interest here mainly because it associates the impregnable citadel of the soul with the virtue that, in Plato's account of the degeneration of soul and state, must at all counts be expelled if the defenses that would protect the citadel are to be overthrown.

20. Krumbacher 1958, 782–84. For the text of *To Sophrosyne* see M. Miller 1859, 2:1–138.

*31*

# Plato's Magnesia

Diskin Clay

## The City of the Magnetes

IF THE HEAVENLY CITY of Plato's *Republic* has a name, the only name we have for it is the name Socrates gives it—Callipolis (*Rep.* 527c). Callipolis is unmistakably a Greek city, but if it has a location, it is in heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ, 592b). By contrast, the city founded in Plato's *Laws* has both a name and a definite and earthly location. Cleinias of Cnossus, one of the ten founders of this new colony (cf. 702b), gives it a definite location in Crete (704d), and he makes it clear to his two companions that it will be located some nine or ten miles (or 8,000 stades) from the sea. It is to be situated precisely in the middle of the island (711a), and its territory will resemble the rest of the island in being mountainous and wooded with sparse stands of fir, pine, cypress, and plane trees. It has a good harbor on the distant coast (704a–705c).

It is only considerably later in the dialogue that we discover the name of the new city—or at least the name of its colonists. It is called "the city of the Magnetes" (848d).[1] Once Magnesia has gained a name in the dialogue, it becomes clear that it is in fact not a new foundation on the island of Crete; the territory is to be *resettled* by the new colonists. It is for this reason that the Athenian provides for the former inhabitants in his legislation: "If there are some local divinities or shrines of any of the earlier and original

I wish to thank my colleagues Kent Rigsby and John Younger, who helped me find myself in Magnesia on the Maeander and in Crete, where—to my relief—there was nothing to find between Phaestus and Gortyn except the modern village of Μοῖρες, which sits on what might have been the site of Cleinias' Cretan colony.

1. The other passages where it is referred to by name are 860e, 919d, 946c, and 969a, where the Athenian seems to suggest that another name might be found for the colony.

inhabitants whose memory has survived, we will give these the same honors as did the ancient inhabitants" (848d). Later, the Athenian declares unambiguously that the god is restoring the Magnesians and founding the city anew (Μαγνήτων, οὓς ὁ θεὸς πάλιν κατοικίζει, 919d). If this statement does not reflect a historical reality of mid-fourth-century Greece, Plato's interpreter must ask why he chose the name Magnesia (as we will call it) for Cleinias' colony, why he could be so precise about its location on the island, and why he represents this city as being restored.[2]

There is something alarming about the history of Plato's Magnesia. The prehistory of this city is vague; we only know that its original inhabitants were called Magnesians and that they abandoned their city for some unknown reason. But the location of their city is precise, and the reader should be able to locate it on a map of Crete. The history of this new foundation reads like Greek history, and its telling details give rise to an unsettling question: Could Plato's Cretan city be an actual Cretan colony established in the mid-fourth-century B.C.? If this is the case, then Plato's final formulation of his political theory must be associated with praxis, and Plato, who feared that he might strike his contemporaries as being "all theory" and unwilling to touch any political task (in the words of *Ep.* 7 328c), must be seen as a statesman and political adviser involved not only in the reform of Syracuse but in elaborating the constitution of a new Greek city in Crete.[3]

The purpose of this chapter, written to honor a distinguished historian of Greek political thought, is to assemble and review evidence outside the *Laws* of Plato that seems to vindicate the conclusion that the city of the *Laws* was once a historical reality. There are two kinds of evidence that have a bearing on the existence of a Cretan Magnesia: the literary and the epigraphic. The literary evidence begins with Strabo's account of Magnesia on the Maeander; the epigraphic begins with the archive housed in a stoa in the agora of Magnesia on the Maeander, with records dating from 208/7 B.C.,

2. I can give no explanation for Plato's choice of the name Magnetes for the original inhabitants of Cleinias' colony, much less for the Athenian's uncertainty about the name that will finally prevail; cf. 969a, where the initial hesitation over the name for the city in 704a is recalled. But it is possible that the Athenian's remark about the refoundation of Magnesia is a reference to the founding project of the *Republic*. Here Socrates represents himself, Glaucon, and Adeimantus as *oikistai* of a new city (cf. 379a), and in the *Laws*, there are three delicate, but clear, references to the polity of the *Republic* as being superior to that of the *Laws* (710a, 739a, and 807b).

3. Diogenes Laertius records the tradition that Plato was asked to frame a constitution for the new city of Megalopolis as well as Cyrene (3.23), and Plutarch, in an indignant passage against the Epicurean Colotes, sums up the considerable political activities of known associates of Plato who left the Academy to become involved in their native cities (*Mor.* 32.1126c–d); cf. Ael. *VH* 12.30. The evidence is gathered and assessed by T. J. Saunders (1986, 200–9). The evidence from Magnesia on the Maeander does not figure in this survey.

and containing both a collection of decrees from cities throughout the Greek world that responded to the epiphany of Artemis Leucophryene to the Magnesians[4] and their announcement of the establishment of quadrennial games in her honor. I refer to this collection of inscriptions relating to the epiphany of Artemis and Magnesia's relation to the oracle of Apollo in Delphi as the Magnesian archive.[5] One of the inscriptions of this archive (no. 17)[6] contains unmistakable references to the Cretan origins of this Asiatic city. But a word of caution is in order here to dampen any initial enthusiasm for accepting the reality of Plato's Cretan city. The literary and epigraphic witnesses to the Cretan origin of Magnesia on the Maeander, as eloquent as they are, do not necessarily establish the fact that a "city of the Magnetes" once existed in the middle of the island of Crete, either before or after Plato wrote his *Laws*.

Strabo is our first literary witness to confirm the existence of a Cretan Magnesia. In his first account of Magnesia on the Maeander, he describes the city as the colony of both the Magnesians of Thessaly and of Crete (Μαγνήτων ἀποικία τῶν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ καὶ Κρήτων, 14.636). This is paradoxical, since later references to Magnesia on the Maeander consider it a colony of the Magnesians of Thessaly. Strabo also characterizes Magnesia on the Maeander as an Aeolic city (πόλις Αἰολίς), but here he notes that the river closest to the city of Magnesia, the Lethaeus, has the same name as the river Lethaeus in Gortyn (14.647). Strabo obviously depended on literary sources, but he had also visited the city itself and knew its inscriptions.

Two other authorities who wrote in the same century as Strabo also assert a Cretan connection for Magnesia on the Maeander. The earliest of these is Parthenius. In his erotic history of Leucippus, the founder of Magnesia, Parthenius (whose source is given as Hermesianax) says that he was the leader of a Cretan colony to a place that was called, significantly, Cretinaeum.[7] The later authority is the mythographer Conon (*FGrH* 26 T 29), whose history of Magnesia begins with the Trojan War and the reference to the Magnetes in the Homeric catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2.756). He locates their original home in Thessaly near the mouth of the Peneus but adds that in obedience to an oracle of Apollo a tenth part (δεκάτη) of the

4. Sometimes her epithet is rendered by "of the white eyebrows," but it could as well refer to a geographical feature, such as the brow of a hill. Herodotus knew of an agora "of the white brow" at Siphnos (3.57), but this agora was white not because it was located on the crest of a hill but because it was paved in Parian marble.

5. Kern 1900, nos. 16–87. I refer to this edition of the archive throughout this chapter as "Kern." The inscriptions are also available in *SIG*³. On the Magnesian archive see the remarks of Erich S. Gruen in chap. 25 of the present volume.

6. *FGrH* T 482 F 3.

7. J. U. Powell 1925, 97 no. 5; Kern 1900, T 13.

Thessalian Magnesians settled in Crete. From here, under some pressure (βιασθέντες), they crossed over to Asia, where they called their new city Magnesia.[8] This Cretan connection is reaffirmed by the scholiast to Apollonius of Rhodes who, in commenting on the Thessalian place-name Magnessa (*Arg.* 1.584), calls attention to an Asiatic Magnesia (Kern 1900, T 22). Last and later is the funerary epigram for Hippaemon, who is described as "a Thessalian from Crete, a Magnesian by birth" (*AP* 7.304.3).

These are the literary references that support the claim for a Cretan origin for Magnesia on the Maeander, and they stand as our witnesses that the Cretan city of Plato's *Laws* has its foundation not in theory but in history. In addition to this evidence, two inscriptions from Crete show that in the late Hellenistic period Magnesia served as an arbitrator in the disputes of two Cretan cities, Hierapytna and Itanos, over the island of Leuce. The first from Itanos (Erimoupolis) contains a letter of 112 B.C. from the Roman senate and L. Calpurnius Piso and reveals that the Roman authorities had appointed Magnesia as a mediator.[9] The other inscription, from Hierapytna, records the grant of honors to the Magnesian ambassadors who had been sent to Crete to renew cordial relations with this city.[10] Both inscriptions confirm a long-standing relationship between Magnesia and Crete, but neither contains evidence for the tradition that the Magnesians came from Crete. Also, unlike many of the inscriptions from the Magnesian archive, these inscriptions from Hierapytna do not refer to the Magnesians as a kindred people (συγγενεῖς).[11]

For the most striking witness to a connection between the Magnesians of Asia and the island of Crete, one must return to the archives of Magnesia on the Maeander and a long inscription (Kern 1900, no. 17) that is sometimes referred to as "The Founding of Magnesia".[12] It is a small part of a vast archive in the west stoa (the "Westhalle" of the German excavators) of the agora of Magnesia, and its testimony must be assessed as part of a grandiose project of the Magnesians to associate themselves and their ancestors with Delphi and two oracles of Apollo. The first of these inscriptions in order of time (no. 17) is a record of four separate oracles the Magnesians received before their move from Crete to Magnesia on the Maeander. The

8. Kern 1900 T 23.

9. *Inscr. Cret.* 3:no. 10.106–11; Sherk 1969, no. 14.

10. Kern 1900, T 54; Sherk 1969, no. 52; for the ambassadors cf. Kern 1900, no. 70.7.

11. There is also the evidence from the decree of Epidamnus in the Magnesian archive that Magnesia had mediated in the civil war between Gortyn and Cnossus; cf. Kern 1900, no. 46.11 and nos. 65, 67.

12. It is the object of a preliminary monograph by Kern (1895) and an analysis by Wilamowitz (1895).

second (Kern 1900, no. 16)[13] is the record of an oracle given to the Magnesians by Apollo in response to the epiphany of Artemis Leucophryene, during the year in which Zenodotus was *stephanophoros* (dated to Olympiad 139:4, or 221/220 B.C.). Part of this archive are another 69 inscriptions (Kern 1900, nos. 18–87), most of which concern the embassies sent out to "all of Greece" in response to Apollo's oracle to the Magnesian *theoroi* who had declared to Delphi the epiphany of Artemis. Interestingly, the great majority of the inscriptions in this archive were cut by the same hand and at the same time.[14]

The first lines of no. 17 (shown in Kern 1900, pl. 4.1) are damaged, but the second line (13) refers to the token (σημεῖον) Apollo had promised the Magnesians who had settled in Crete, to signify that the time had come to return to their "own land" (εἰς τὴν ἰδί[αν). The rest of the inscription records four oracles given when the Magnesians sent an embassy to inquire how they should act once the portent of two white crows had appeared.[15]

Apollo's twenty-six hexameter lines are of great interest for the tradition (known already, according to Athenaeus, to "Aristotle or Theophrastus")[16] of the Asiatic Magnesians as "descendants of Delphi." But the prose account of the Magnesians' eighty-year stay in Crete fixes our attention because it not only associates the Magnesians with Crete but locates their settlement in Crete. "They awaited the promised sign from the god indicating their departure. But as the god took his good time, they sent for their wives and children and founded a prosperous city *between the cities of Gortyn and Phaestus*" (lines 5–9, my emphasis):

5 [περιέμενον
τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον πρὸς τὴν ἀ[ναχώρησιν· ἐπεὶ
δὲ ἐλάμβανε χρόνον, πόλιν ἀνὰ μέσον π[όλεων Γόρτυ-
νος καὶ Φαιστοῦ κ̣ατώικουσαν εὐδαιμον[α[17] μεταπεμψά-
μενοι τέκν̣α καὶ γυναῖκα[ς

13. This is now located in the State Museum of (East) Berlin and has been given a new edition by Erbst (1982).

14. Kern 1900, 12.

15. Lines 16–32, 28–35, 38–41, and 45–51. These responses are offset about three letter spaces on the left-hand margin of the inscription, in the manner of the verses quoted on the walls of the Archilochus monument in Paros. Their texts are reproduced in Parke and Wormell 1956, nos. 378–81. They are registered under the "seventh period" of the oracle (300–190 B.C.) as "Mythical Oracles." Of these oracles, Parke (1939, 51) had already pronounced a judgment: "They provide an interesting illustration of the myths, which could grow up round a prehistoric colony's origin." I would prefer to say the myths that could be made to vegetate.

16. Ath. 173e = fr. 631 Rose; Kern 1900, T 20.

17. εὐδαιμόνως Kern.

If the reader of Plato's *Laws* were to take a ruler and divide Crete in half, the dividing line would come close to intersecting the cities of Phaestus and Gortyn. Remarkably, Gortyn, Cretan Magnesia's neighbor to the East, is built on both banks of the Lethaeus (Geropotamus). It is situated on the northern edge of the Messara plain, fifteen kilometers from Phaestus. In the third century B.C., it had taken possession of Phaestus' harbor at Matala some nine or ten miles away—the best natural harbor on this stretch of the coast. For once Plato's political theory fits into the coordinates of historical geography. Glenn Morrow recognized this and the importance of the foundation history of the Magnesian archive when he concluded: "Scanty as the evidence is for the existence of this Cretan Magnesia, it is enough to make it unlikely that the third-century tradition is a pure invention of the Asiatic Magnesians."[18] But I would argue that the evidence of this inscription of the Magnesian archives is, in fact, an impure invention, but an invention nonetheless. It depended on the belief of some scholar from Magnesia at the end of the third century B.C. in the historical reality of Plato's Cretan Magnesia.

## Magnesia's Asiatic Colony

Morrow's judgment could stand and await "the spade of the archaeologist" for its final vindication if this inscription could be taken as an independent witness to the reality of a Cretan Magnesia. But it is part of an astonishing archive in Magnesia, created after the reported epiphany of Artemis in Magnesia. It is one of 71 inscriptions mainly concerned with the oracles of Apollo that direct the affairs of the city of Magnesia on the Maeander. In chronological sequence, the prehistoric oracle of Apollo to the Magnesians of Crete (no. 17) should be followed by the inscription recording Apollo's instructions to the Magnesian *theoroi* to magnify their cult to Artemis by instituting quadrennial games in her honor and to announce these games to the Greek world (no. 16). These games were to include athletic, equestrian, and musical contests, and the agon is described as a crown contest, equal to the contest at Delphi (ἀγὼν στεφανίτης, ἰσοπύθιος). It also justified Apollo's riddling phrase in no. 17 that the fate of the Magnesians will be the care of Apollo's sister (line 21).

The great majority of the decrees displayed in a stoa in Magnesia (nos. 18–87) concern the epiphany of Artemis Leucophryene and Apollo's

18. Morrow 1960, 31. An argument against the foundation of Magnesia at this site cannot be made from the silence of the archaeological record, but to date no building foundations have been discovered on the plain of Messara midway between Gortyn and Phaestus; cf. I. F. Saunders 1982, 20–24, which takes in the Hellenistic period.

response to it. There are exceptions. The first, no. 65, contains two documents recording the role of Magnesian diplomats in arranging for peace between Gortyn and Cnossus. The second, no. 67, is a copy of a letter from Cnossus conveying a decree honoring ambassadors from Magnesia on the Maeander. It concludes with the interesting provision: "You too will do well to make a copy [of this decree] in the stoa; we too have inscribed a copy on a stone stele in the sanctuary of Apollo Delphinius" (lines 5–8).[19]

The Magnesian archive evidently preserved and displayed copies of the decrees of Greek cities and the letters of Hellenistic kings. These documents are repetitive and formulaic, which means that we can usually have confidence in Kern's supplements, but they exhibit epichoric variations. Most begin with a prescript that recognizes the Magnesian ambassadors, the Magnesian decree establishing quadrennial games in honor of Artemis Leucophryene, and the oracle of Apollo declaring the territory of Magnesia sacred and inviolable. Some politely repeat the Magnesian claims to have been the benefactors of Greece, particularly for having contributed to Delphi's defense against the incursion of the Gauls into Phocis in 279 B.C.

The decrees themselves ratify participation in the games and the terms of Apollo's oracle to the Magnesians. Many record the obliging vote to praise the Magnesians for their "piety and virtue," and to crown their ambassadors (who usually travel in groups of three) and invite them to dinner at the prytaneion of the host city or its sacred hearth "on the morrow." Some, as we have seen, provide for copies of the decree to be displayed in a sanctuary or some other public place. And what is particularly interesting, a number of Doric states recognize a kinship with the Magnesians. In this they confirm the claims of the Magnesian ambassadors themselves.[20]

Usually these decrees contain provisions for sending a delegation of observers (*theoroi*) to the festival of Artemis at Magnesia and the election of

19. *Inscr. Cret.* 1:no. 10. Still another decree, from a neighboring state, (no. 64.21) refers to a copy being displayed in the stoa of the Magnesians. Kern 1900, pl. 2 gives a reconstruction (after C. Humann, the excavator of the site) of the display of most of these documents (nos. 35–87) along the back wall of the west stoa of the Magnesian agora. Nos. 16–34 are displayed on the "Pillar Wall." The stoa in which they were displayed is now deep under the silt of the Lethaeus; it is described by Kohte (1904, 107–39).

20. Two decrees from Crete recognize this kinship (nos. 65.18, 65.23 [from Gortyn] and no. 70.2), as do others from Syracuse (no. 72.22) and Epidamnus (no. 46.3). But then they are also recognized as kin by the Thessalian city of Gonnoi on the Peneus (no. 33.5) and by another, unidentified Thessalian city (no. 26.25). Same on Cephallenia recognizes the Magnesians as kin (no. 35.14), as does Chalcis on Euboea (no. 47.3). Ecumenically, the Magnesians are related to the Aeolians of Mytilene (likely the city voting the decree of no. 52.17, 52.24) and the Arcadians of Megalopolis (no. 38.29, 38.52). The same claim to kinship comes from still other Greek cities: cf. nos. 58.1, 58.42; 61.11, 61.34 (Antiocheia in Persis), 64 8, 64.20; no. 79.15, 79.21.

an official (*theorodokos*) to receive the Magnesian ambassadors. There are provisions too for making inscribed copies of these decrees in some public place in the decreeing city. Two cities celebrate the evangel of Artemis' epiphany to the Magnesians by dismissing children from school (no. 73b17; no. 80.16); they also open the doors of their temples and burn incense (no. 73b14; no. 80.13). In a good number of these decrees, we find subscriptions giving a list of the states that join in ratifying them.

Taken as a whole, this evidence seems to close the dossier in favor of the case for the reality of Plato's Cretan Magnesia. But on my reading, it allows for the impeachment of some of the most trusted evidence of the Magnesian archive. It would be impious to question the epiphany of Artemis Leucophryene to the Magnesians, but there are many features of this archive that provoke wonder and then doubt—to begin with, the history of the foundation of Magnesia. The four oracles from Delphi recorded in no. 17 are clearly either a Magnesian confection or a confection for the Magnesians, and they belong to a long recognized genre of ancient forgery. And one of the 69 decrees preserved in the Magnesian archives (the decree of the Cretan league, no. 20) has long been recognized as a forgery.

Although the decrees displayed in the west stoa of Magnesia are copies of decrees displayed in cities throughout the Greek world, only three copies of such decrees have come to light elsewhere. All three seem to reflect accurately the distinctive propaganda of Magnesia in promoting the Leucophryena, but none is similar in its format to the decrees preserved in Magnesia. The first of these (Kern 1900, T 54) is from Hierapytna. It commends the Magnesians "for honoring their ancestral traditions" (line 21). The only hint of the nature of the Magnesian delegation's mission is the declaration that the Magnesians "spoke in a worthy and proper manner and issued an invitation worthy of the Magnesians and the people of Hierapytna" (lines 23–24). The ambassadors, Theodotus and Aristomachus, are known from a decree of the Magnesian archive (no. 70.7). The next decree (Kern 1900, no. 54a) comes from Thermon in Aetolia. It recognizes the sacred and inviolable status of Magnesian territory (line 8), but the epiphany of Artemis, the relevant oracle of Apollo, and the Leucophryena are not mentioned. The last was discovered in 1936 in the walls of the old excavation house at Delphi; it preserves in two decrees the acceptance by Aetolia and Delphi of the invitation to participate in the Leucophryena.[21] The Magnesians had spread their propaganda as far west as Aetolia and Hierapytna on Crete. The fact that more "original" decrees have not been

21. In A 1–12 and B 13–37, published by van Effenterre (1953, 168–76 = *SEG* 12:217). Van Effenterre dates the Aetolian decree to the summer of 207 B.C.

discovered should not lead us to question the evidence of the Magnesian archive.[22]

As we have noted, the decrees of the Greek states responding to the decree of the Magnesians provide for copies of their resolution to be displayed in some public place. The three that have come to light are not replicated in the Magnesian archive. One remarkable feature of the Magnesian archive is the fact that so many of these decrees were, when Kern edited them in 1900, the first examples of decrees from some fourteen cities or leagues throughout the Greek world. The most notorious case must be, of course, the decree of the Cretan "league," which Kern recognized as an obvious forgery (Kern 1900, no. 20; cf. p.17). But there are still other firsts, thirteen of them.[23]

The unique status of some of these inscriptions from the Magnesian archives soon changed. In 1902 a decree was discovered at Corinth on the Lechaeum road, and still others were soon to follow. Between 1911 and 1915, A. S. Arvanitopoulos published a series of decrees from Gonnoi in Thessaly, on which the corpus of 92 decrees in Bruno Helly's volume of inscriptions is based.[24] But there remains an example of a unique decree from the island of Ithaca. More might lie in wait for the excavator, or this unique decree might be an example of how the religious, patriotic, and religious citizens of Magnesia supplied decrees to display to the visitors who had come to watch the Leucophryena, when an important gap existed in their collection. It is no. 36—"Das erste Psephisma der Insel." The assembly of the island meets in the precinct of Odysseus (ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεί[ωι). It has a recording secretary, Aglaoteles; and it recognizes the great contributions of the Magnesians to Greece and to the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi—"through the oracles, through the poets, and through the decrees they have received from noble and famous cities" (lines 8–9). The assembly endorses the decree of the Magnesians, and to honor them, it grants them the privilege of the best seating at the games in honor of Odysseus (προεδρίαν τοῖς

22. Remarkably there are vestiges of Magnesian propaganda for other claims to consideration by Greek states. One (Kern 1900, T 46) records Magnesian claims to be the first of the Greeks to cross over into Asia from their Thessalian homeland. This is a decree of the Panhellenic council, found between Hymettus and Pendeli and now in the Louvre.

23. No. 33 from Gonnoi in Thessaly; no. 34 from Phocis; no. 35 from Cephallenia; no. 36 from Ithaca; no. 38 attesting an Arcadian league; no. 41 from Sicyon; no. 42 from Corinth; no. 45 from Apollonia; no. 46 from Epidamnus; no. 53 from Clazomenae; no. 54 from the Guild of the Artists of Dionysus; no. 61 from Antiocheia (Laodicea) in Persis; and no. 72 from Syracuse, apparently just after its destruction by Marcellus.

24. Cf. K. K. Smith 1919, 331–48; Meritt 1931, nos. 2–9; Kent 1966, nos. 27, 37, 45, 46; and Helly 1973, chap. 1 (*Décrets de proxénie*, nos. 1–67), chap. 2 (*Décrets pour des tribunaux étrangers*, nos. 68–92).

Ὀδυσσείοις). A *theorodokos* is duly elected, Igertas, son of Praülus. Sosicles, the nuncio of Magnesia,[25] is praised (lines 22–24). Finally, copies of the decree are to be inscribed on two steles: one to be placed in the Odysseum, the other in the sanctuary of Athena (lines 28–31).

Perhaps not since the departure of Odysseus for the Trojan War had there been such an assembly in Ithaca. There are still other unique features of the decrees of the Magnesian archive. We have three new months: the month of Orpheus from (what must be) Mytilene (no. 52.38), Haliotrophus from Epidamnus (no. 46.2); and Apollonius from Syracuse (no. 72.3). And in Athens there emerges another curiosity. To respond to the embassy of Magnesia, the assembly meets on the sixth day of Pyanepsion (no. 37.3)—a day sacred to Artemis and usually closed to potitical assemblies.[26] I draw attention to only one other peculiarity of the Magnesian archive. This is the dialect of the decree from Megalopolis (no. 38); it is Arcadian, but in commenting on it, Kern conscientiously notes the many errors and inconsistencies in the representation of this dialect.

Many are the marvels of the Magnesian archive. Perhaps the greatest miracle of all is not the epiphany of Artemis to the Magnesians but the complete confidence of the scholars who have trusted in the authenticity of every detail of the decrees preserved in the west stoa of Magnesia. Magnesia was the source of its own history, and visitors to the city, such as Strabo, were made aware of its far-flung claims. In the next century, the emperor Tiberius was perhaps a more discriminating scholar. When he was presented with a petition from some eleven rival cities of Asia Minor for the privilege of erecting a temple in his honor—petitions urged "with like ambition but unequal vigor"—he was entertained with claims to the antiquity of each city (*generis vetustas*) and its devotion to Rome. He passed over Magnesia, as he did the petitions of other cities; its claims had little weight (*ut parum validi*).[27]

Yet we cannot conclude without recognizing Magnesia's claims to be descended from Plato's Cretan Magnesia and to be recognized by all of the Greek world for its piety to Artemis and its privileged relation to the oracle

25. Sosicles is well known as an ambassador to other states of Northwest Greece: He was the head of the delegation to Same on Cephallenia (no. 35.1, 35.27) and is mentioned in the decrees of Apollonia (no. 45.5, 45.18, 45.40) and Epidamnus (no. 46.5).

26. There are two inscriptions that attest the sixth of this month as a day on which the Council could meet. One is of course this inscription from Magnesia (no. 37 of 209/8); the other comes from a century later (*IG* $2^2$:1014.1–5). For the interpretation of these unusual meeting days cf. Mikalson 1975, 67–68. He entertains no doubt about the inscription from Magnesia as evidence.

27. In the year 26 A.D. (Tac. *Ann.* 4.55 = Kern 1900, T 64).

of Apollo at Delphi. The claim of descent from Plato's Cretan city was the happy invention of one of its learned citizens—of whom, we do not know.[28] It is possible that the author of "The Founding of Magnesia" was the source of that later tradition of the Cretan origin of the Magnesians on the Maeander reflected in Strabo, Parthenius, and Conon in the first century B.C. Magnesia's claim to this patent of nobility is not a pure invention; it is a striking indication of the importance of Plato's *Laws*, in the century after they were composed, to a city that was eponymous with the colony of his *Laws*. "The Founding of Magnesia" (no. 17) is an impressive feat of historical imagination and scholarship, and it should be recognized as such, not as evidence for the existence of Plato's Cretan colony on the Messara plain, halfway between Gortyn and Phaestus.

28. The Magnesian archive mentions local poets and historians as justifying Magnesia's claim to consideration by the other Greek states; cf. particularly the language in the decree of Epidamnus (no. 46.12–14), where its benefactions to Crete and other Greek states are mentioned: τὰς εἰς ἄλλους [Ἕλ]λανας γεγενημένας|εὐε[ρ]γεσίας...διὰ τῶ[ν π]οιητᾶν καὶ διὰ τῶν ἱ[σ-|τορ[ι]αγράφων τῶν συγγεγραφότ[ων] τὰς Μαγνήτων πρ[άξ]ει[ς]. Cf. no. 35.9 (decree of Cephallenia); no. 44.14–16 (decree of Corcyra). To identify the poet and historian who composed "The Foundation of Magnesia" and the decree of the Cretan league sending the Magnesians off to Asia Minor (nos. 17, 20) is more difficult, and perhaps there were a number of hands at work in the creation of these documents. We know a Magnesian historian by the name of Possis, who wrote a *Magnesiaca* in at least three books and an epic Ἀμαζωνίς (Ath. 533d–e, 296d = *FGrH* 480). We have no date for him. There was an associate of Plato from Magnesia active in the Academy, but he was a mathematician. He is mentioned by Proclus in the preface to his commentary on the first book of Euclid (Friedlein 1873, 67). Wilamowitz (1895, 191–95) calls our anonymous author "der Chronist" and entertains a very low opinion of both his poetic talents and the critical abilities of his audience.

32

# Theophrastus on Law, Virtue, and the Particular Situation

William W. Fortenbaugh

MOST OF US BELIEVE that rule-following is not only typical of human beings but also an essential feature of human community. That is understandable, for our parents instructed us in good behavior and expressed approval when we met their expectations. In school we were confronted with codes of conduct, and as adults we have tried to be law-abiding citizens. Yet there have been occasions when the law appears to direct us in the wrong way. It seems not to fit the particular situation, so we have been tempted to give, and sometimes have given, greater weight to the demands of the moment.

Against this background, it is not surprising that we find Aristotle's ethical theory highly relevant. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*—a work that has been made accessible to so many people by the lucid translation of Martin Ostwald[1]—Aristotle lays great emphasis upon the particular situation. He makes clear that moral goodness is not just a matter of possessing certain principles that we can use as rules to guide our behavior. It is also a matter of assessing our circumstances and doing what is right *for us* here and now. With this in mind, Aristotle defines moral virtue as "a disposition to choose, being in the mean that is relative to us, determined by reason and such as the practically wise man would determine it" (*EN* 1106b36–1107a2). It

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1. Ostwald 1962.

belongs to virtue, he tells us, to do whatever one does "at the right moment, in the right circumstances, toward the right persons, etc." (1106b21–23).

Not so well known—and worthy of comment in a volume honoring Martin Ostwald—is the fact that Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus of Eresus held similar views concerning law, virtue, and the particular situation.[2] In fact, Theophrastus accepted Aristotle's definition of moral virtue as a mean relative to us (Stob. 2.7.20 = no. 449A.5–6 FHSG),[3] and he discussed with care circumstances that call for action contrary to established law.

In book 5, chapter 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle discusses equity. He defines it as a correction of law (1137b12, 1137b26) and explains that law fails us on occasion because it is universal. He is careful to point out that, strictly speaking, this is not an error on the part of law or the lawgiver. Laws are enacted in full knowledge of the fact that human affairs are variable and therefore do not admit inflexible rules. New situations arise that were not (could not be) anticipated by the lawgiver, and in such situations a particular decree is necessary (1137b29, 1137b32). Such reflections are, of course, not confined to the *Ethics*. They can be found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1374a26–b22)[4] and in the writings of other philosophers. Plato had discussed the matter,[5] and Theophrastus took over the view of his teacher.

Justinian's *Digest* contains two entries that report the thinking of Theophrastus. They run as follows:

> Laws should be set up, as Theophrastus said, for the type of situation that recurs for the most part, not for the unexpected situation. (1.3.3 = no. 629 FHSG)[6]

> Legislators neglect, as Theophrastus says, situations that occur once or twice. (1.3.6 = no. 630 FHSG)[7]

From these texts it is quite clear that Theophrastus was an Aristotelian in his view of law: The rules established by legislators are general in character and therefore cannot be expected to cover all situations. Unfortunately, no

2. Although less discussed than Aristotle's view, that of Theophrastus has received some attention in scholarly literature. For recent contributions see Nörr 1974; Szegedy-Maszak 1981, 77–78.

3. FHSG = Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples, and Gutas 1992. The text is also printed as no. L12 in Fortenbaugh 1984, 22–23, with commentary on 167–74.

4. On this passage see the helpful remarks in Ostwald 1973, 72, 74, 79–80, 99.

5. See, e.g., the *Plt.* 294a10–b6 and Morrow 1960, 584–90.

6. The text also occurs as no. F24 in Szegedy-Maszak 1981.

7. Szegedy-Maszak 1981, no. F25. The same Theophrastean saying is also found later in the *Digest*, at 5.4.3.

Theophrastean text survives that deals explicitly with equity, but it is highly probable that Theophrastus followed Aristotle and spoke of equity as corrective justice. There is, however, a saying concerning good men that makes a related point and is attributed to Theophrastus in several collections of *apophthegmata*, including that of Stobaeus:[8]

> Good men need few laws, for circumstances are not made in response to laws, but laws in response to circumstances. (Stob. 3.37.20 = no. 628 FHSG)[9]

The style of the saying is striking (parallel construction is combined with chiasmus), and the message is, I think, quite clear. "Good men" are marked by a disposition to choose the mean relative to themselves. They do not need law, because they assess particular situations correctly and respond appropriately. Moreover, the fact that laws are made in response to circumstances and not vice versa forces the "good man" to depend on his own judgment. If a legislator could determine (control) circumstances, he could write rules that admit no exceptions. But he does not control the course of events, and in writing laws in response to a particular set of circumstances, he will almost certainly overlook other conditions that may be present in the future and justify an exception to the law.[10]

Conditions that call for action in violation of written (positive) law are easy to imagine: loved ones held by a tyrant, unexpected natural disasters, a planned murder. Any of these might be chosen for comment, but perhaps we should turn to Aulus Gellius. In *Attic Nights* (1.3), Gellius tells us that

8. In addition to Stob. *Anth.* 3.37.20 (Hense 3:702.11–14), the saying is also found in Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* 58 (*PG* vol. 91, col. 977c) and in codex Bodleianus Digby folio 95 verso, vv. 3–6.

9. Szegedy-Maszak 1981, no. F26.

10. A close parallel to the second portion of no. 628 FHSG has been called to my attention by David Mirhady. It is found in Plutarch's *Life of Solon* (22.3): "suiting the laws to the circumstances rather than the circumstances to the laws." The context is a comparison between the legislation of the Spartan Lycurgus and the Athenian Solon. The former is said to have directed the citizens away from mechanical occupations to military matters for several reasons: The city was not crowded, there was sufficient land, and the helot population needed repressing (22.2). In contrast, Solon directed the citizens toward trades, because he was confronted with urban crowding and poor land (22.1, 22.3). While the relationship to no. 628 is interesting, some differences should be underlined. In chapter 22, Plutarch does not speak of good men and few laws; that is, the first portion of the Theophrastean saying has no parallel. Furthermore, Plutarch does not attribute the words in question to Solon; rather he seems to use them as his own. More cautiously, he seems to use a commonplace as his own. Whether Theophrastus was the first to give the commonplace its peculiar form is unclear. In fact, his contribution may have been to combine two originally independent sayings—that good men need few laws and that laws are made in response to circumstances.

Theophrastus addressed the issue of helping friends in violation of the law. Gellius introduces the topic by referring to the Spartan Chilo, one of the traditional seven wise men. We are told that Chilo found himself serving as one of three judges in the trial of a friend who was accused of a capital crime. The friend was guilty, so Chilo was confronted with a difficult dilemma: Should he act in accordance with the law and vote for condemnation, or should he disregard the law and vote for acquittal? Chilo's way out of the dilemma was clever. He cast his own vote for condemnation but persuaded the other two judges to vote not guilty. The friend went free, and Chilo voted in accordance with the law. He was, however, left with a troubled conscience, for he had persuaded others to do what he thought wrong for himself.

If I understand Gellius correctly, Theophrastus did not discuss the particular case of Chilo.[11] He did, however, address the general issue of helping friends contrary to what is just. And if Gellius' report can be trusted, Theophrastus would have discussed our obligation to help a friend who has been charged with a crime.[12] For our purposes, the important point is that Theophrastus is said to have warned against making generic decisions. He introduced an analogy with precious metals and argued that while gold is more valuable than bronze, it is not true that any quantity of gold is to be preferred to any quantity of bronze. Similarly, in matters of personal conduct, one's honor may be of greater moment than the advantage of a friend, but there are cases in which benefiting a friend takes precedence (1.3.23–26 = no. 534.44–64 FHSG). The particular circumstances make the difference:

> Nevertheless, [Theophrastus] says, these low values of things and high values and all these assessments of duties are sometimes directed and ruled and, as it were, governed and rendered now confirmed, now unconfirmed, by other external influences and other as it were appendages [in the form] of persons and conditions and times and the necessities of the very circumstance, which are difficult to include in precepts. (1.3.28 = no. 534.70–75 FHSG)[13]

11. Gellius praises the analysis offered by Theophrastus, but he expresses disappointment in the fact that Theophrastus did not discuss particular cases (1.3.21–22). That should include Chilo's dilemma.

12. Cf. 1.3.24, where *honestas meae famae* is contrasted with *rei amici utilitas*. Someone might argue that use of *reus* does not reflect what Theophrastus wrote; rather it comes from Gellius, who was influenced by material already presented—namely the story of Chilo (1.3.1–8) and Pericles' remark concerning perjury (1.3.20). Nevertheless, I think it far more likely that Theophrastus did discuss the general case of a friend in trouble with the law. Indeed, a shared theme would help explain why Gellius combines the material he does.

13. No. L95.62–66 , with commentary, Fortenbaugh 1984, 288–89.

Here, in what appears to be a paraphrase of Theophrastus' own words,[14] we are told that our assessments and hence our practical decisions are governed by the particular situation. Our actions are not isolated and, so to speak, out of context. Rather they are always the actions of a particular person or persons doing something at a given moment in a special context. The law cannot take account of all possible variables, and that opens the door to occasional actions that are contrary to law and yet justified.

Two caveats are in order. First, the fact that law sometimes fails us does not mean that we should be quick to act illegally. On the contrary, most of us should obey the law to a fault, for we lack moral perfection. Certainly Theophrastus, following Aristotle, would insist that only good people, people of moral virtue and practical wisdom, can be trusted to do what is right when they violate the law.[15] Second, nothing that has been said justifies treating legislation lightly. Theophrastus, in fact, devoted considerable energy to the study of law. In the list of Theophrastean works preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.44–47 = no. 1 FHSG) we find several relevant titles: *Lawgivers*, three books; *Laws in Aphabetical Order*, twenty-four books; *On Laws*, one book; and *Summary of Laws*, ten books.

In addition, we find in Stobaeus (4.2.20 = no. 650 FHSG) the title *On Contracts*. This title may refer to an independent work, or it may refer to a portion of one of the larger works mentioned in Diogenes' list. The latter seems to me more likely, but whether an independent work or part of some larger treatise, the excerpt that Stobaeus preserves under the heading *On Contracts* is of considerable interest. It deals with sales and purchases, surveys various regulations, and makes some positive recommendations. At the outset there is discussion of advanced notification, preregistration, and payments made to neighbors who are to remember and give witness to what transpires. The text then goes on to consider sacrifices and oaths designed both to combat connivance and to make the purchase public. Next it discusses criteria determining the validity of a sale and briefly touches on the question of an appropriate deposit. Finally it takes notice of possible time

14. The text is preceded by these words: "Afterward the same Theophrastus advanced pretty much the following view" (*post deinde idem Theophrastus ad hanc ferme sententiam disseruit*). Here I want to emphasize that a paraphrase is not necessarily an inaccurate report. In fact, paraphrases can be quite reliable, and in the case of Gellius, we can say that they are in line with his overall goal of awakening a desire for learning by furnishing a quick and easy shortcut (*celeri facilique compendio*, praef. 12).

15. Cf. *Pol.* 3.4, where Aristotle speaks of the good man possessing virtue and fit to rule (1277a28, 1277b16–18). Whether in office or out of office, he has acquired an excellence that is qualitatively different from that of other people (ἕτερον εἶδος, 1277b17). He may be compared with Plato's kingly man who possesses practical wisdom (*Plt.* 294a8) and knowledge whether in or out of office (292e9–10). Such a person understands the law, appreciates the particular situation, and can be counted on to act contrary to law only when such action is justified.

frames for completing a deal and penalties for failing to act within the determined period.

For our purposes, the section of greatest interest deals with the validity of a sale. Here is my translation of the Greek text:

> For taking possession, the purchase and the sale are valid when the price is paid and they [the purchaser and seller] do what the laws require, for example, a registration or oath or the payment to the neighbors; for the handing over [of the property] and for the sale itself, when [the seller] receives a deposit. For most legislate pretty much like this, but [the lawgiver] should add the following determination, [that the purchase and sale are valid] if [the deposit is received] from one who is not drunk, not [acting] from anger or contentiousness, not of unsound mind, but mentally competent and in general [acting] justly, which also should be added at the point when [the lawgiver] is determining from whom the purchase should be made. For such [transactions] seem to occur as a result of crisis and emotion, but they should be made from deliberate choice, for in this way [the result] will be just. (no. 650.35–43 FHSG)[16]

The text begins with an interesting distinction between the time at which the seller is bound to go through with a sale and that at which the purchaser can claim possession of the property in question. For most legislators the times are different; the seller is obligated to complete the sale as soon as he receives the deposit and therefore at a time earlier than the buyer is empowered to take possession. That is sensible and seems to meet with the approval of Theophrastus. Nevertheless, Theophrastus does want to add a further requirement—namely, that the parties to a transaction not be drunk, not be acting from anger or contentiousness, and not be of unsound mind. Theophrastus recognizes the importance of the psychological or mental condition in which the parties enter into a contract. And while most legislators choose not to address the issue, Theophrastus offers an additional clause that is intended to take account of certain conditions that are plausible grounds for nullifying a contract.

As formulated by Theophrastus, the additional clause is largely negative in content: "from one who is *not* drunk, *not* acting from anger or con-

16. No. F21 with commentary, Szegedy-Maszak 1981, 68–70. My translation differs from that of Szegedy-Maszak, who thinks that the vendor is referred to throughout the added determination proposed by Theophrastus. In contrast, I think that Theophrastus first takes account of the condition of the purchaser (from whom the deposit is received) and then states that the same condition should be required of the vendor (from whom the purchase is made).

tentiousness, *not* of unsound mind." Theophrastus does, of course, add the words "but mentally competent and in general (acting) justly," but these words are not very informative. In fact, "mentally competent" seems to mean no more than the opposite of the conditions mentioned in the negative portion of the clause. We may compare Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary (*τὸ ἑκούσιον*) in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1. There the Stagirite first explains the involuntary as action done under external compulsion or in ignorance and followed by regret (1109b30–1111a21). Then, on the basis of the involuntary, he explains the voluntary as action in which the starting point is in an agent who knows the circumstances in which he acts (1111a22–24). Similarly, Theophrastus recommends naming certain conditions that nullify a transaction. When they are not present, the parties are presumed competent and the transaction is considered valid.

Theophrastus' list of nullifying conditions is not exhaustive and is not intended as such. Drunkenness and anger are mentioned as standard cases—or causes—of foolish behavior. Aristotle introduces them when discussing different kinds of ignorance (1110b25–27), and Theophrastus gives them pride of place in his list of disqualifying conditions. A reference to contentiousness is added by Theophrastus not in order to fill out and complete the list, but as a condition closely related to both drunkenness and anger. In regard to the former, we may compare Lysias 3.43, where drunkenness and contentiousness are grouped together as a cause of regrettable behavior.[17] In regard to the latter, we can turn to Stobaeus, who preserves a comparatively long fragment by Theophrastus, on revenge. The relevant portion runs as follows:

> Nor indeed should men of practical wisdom do anything at all in anger. For rage is most unreasonable and will never do anything with forethought, but drunken with contentiousness, as may happen, it is subject to impulses. (Stob. 3.19.12 = no. 526.1–4 FHSG)[18]

Here Theophrastus speaks of a rage that is drunken[19] with contentiousness, because he wants to emphasize that he is concerned with immoderate anger. He is not against anger in general or against taking revenge on the right

17. Lysias offers a disjunctive list, within which drunkenness and contentiousness form a unit. That should not surprise us, for it is common knowledge that alcohol makes some people contentious.

18. No. L88 with commentary, Fortenbaugh 1984, 258–59.

19. In this passage, the word *drunken* is used metaphorically, not literally as in Lysias 3.43 (where, strictly speaking, the noun *drunkenness* occurs) and Theophrastus' clause concerning buyer and seller. But while the drunkenness caused by alcohol is different from that associated with anger, they are alike in that both conditions encourage contentious behavior.

occasion. His objection is to excessive forms of anger that lead to contentiousness, impulsive behavior, and failure to achieve satisfactory revenge. Similarly, in proposing a special clause concerning people who buy and sell, Theophrastus is not concerned with every form of anger. Rather he is interested in those intense forms of anger that manifest themselves in imprudent acts. In mentioning contentiousness, he underlines this interest, for contentious behavior is all too often impulsive and the cause of unwanted consequences.

Unsoundness of mind is the fourth and last of the invalidating conditions mentioned by Theophrastus. On the one hand, its inclusion is a matter of common sense. The man of unsound mind lacks the capacity to buy and sell wisely. On the other hand, Theophrastus may be influenced by Attic law, which made provision for bringing suit against persons of unsound mind who squander their property (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56.6). Unsoundness of mind is not a well-defined condition here, so considerable room for interpretation is left to the courts.[20] In his *Laws*, Plato shows some interest in specifying the condition by listing various causes: disease, old age, and crabbedness (928e, 929d). Theophrastus, however, mentions neither these causes nor any others that might have occurred to him. At first sight this appears to be a failing, but in fact it may be a sign of good judgment, for producing a satisfactory (complete) list would be difficult if not impossible.[21] Moreover, this consideration may also explain Theophrastus' handling of unwanted emotions. He lists only two, anger and contentiousness, though he could easily have added others, such as grief and terror.[22] But were he to extend the list, there is no obvious stopping point; and were he to aim at completeness, he would have to list a great number of emotions and take account of cases that are rare or even unique within any one person's experience. In the context of legislation, that would be quite wrongheaded, for what happens "once or twice" is regularly ignored.

Theophrastus' supplemental clause is, then, admirably short. It says just enough to make clear that strong emotions and generally impaired mental states are grounds for invalidating a contract. Moreover, in making this point, Theophrastus is not only directing judges to consider the competence of parties to a contract. He is also telling the parties themselves that they should do their business with all their faculties in working order. This is not to say that Theophrastus requires moral perfection of the parties to a

20. Lipsius [1905–15] 1966, 3:339–40, 3:355–56.

21. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1374a31–33.

22. Persons deeply affected by grief are likely to engage in a precipitous sale, and those affected by terror sometimes buy or sell imprudently if they think that the transaction can lead to safety.

valid contract.[23] Were that demanded, most transactions could not get started. Rather he wants the parties to act in a deliberate manner,[24] as indeed they must if the various requirements concerning announcement, registration, and witnesses are to be fulfilled. Of course, there may be moments when one of these requirements ought to be set aside. But that is a matter of the particular situation, and the decision to proceed in violation of the law is not to be taken lightly. People who are going to make such a decision should not only meet the basic requirement of mental competence; they should also possess moral virtue and practical wisdom. And once they have acted, they must be prepared to justify their decision if brought before a court of law. Perhaps they will be lucky and have a friend as judge. But if the judge is a person of moral virtue and practical wisdom, then—friend or not—the judge will consider whether the particular conditions in which the defendant acted called for a violation of the requirements prescribed by law. And the judge will do nothing to help the friend unless there are special circumstances that justify assistance.[25] Unlike Chilo, the judge will not be left with a troubled conscience.

23. Theophrastus wants the parties to a contract to be "competent." The Greek is *φρονῶν*. Cf. Lys. 3.43 and esp. Stob. 3.3.42 = no. 523.11 FHSG, where the subject is lending money. Being competent and even prudent is not the same thing as possessing practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*) in the technical, ethical sense. See Fortenbaugh 1984, 257–59.

24. The phrase "in a deliberate manner" corresponds to "from deliberate choice" in my translation. The Greek phrase is *ἐκ προαιρέσεως*. Here I want to dissociate myself from Szegedy-Maszak (1981, 69), who connects this use of *προαίρεσις* with Aristotle's ethical theory. This is not to deny that the word is prominent in both Aristotelian and Theophrastean discussions of moral virtue (see Arist. *EN* 1106b36–1107a2 and no. 449A.4–5 FHSG, both cited toward the beginning of this paper). But here there is no close tie to virtue. Theophrastus wants the parties to a contract to act cautiously with reflection. He is not suggesting that the persons involved must be virtuous—which would nullify most contracts—or that they must engage in a transaction for the sake of some long term good or plan of life—which would eliminate contracts where the parties are not thinking beyond the present moment.

25. Here we must distinguish between the circumstances in which the defendant did whatever he did and the circumstances that might encourage a judge to bend or override the law. The latter includes the judge's friendship with the defendant, and the closer and older the friendship is, the more weight it carries.

# 4
# Literature

33

# *Lipous' androteta*, Elision, and Prosody

Henry M. Hoenigswald

ON OCCASION THE ORGANIZATION of Greek verse is still seen through Latin spectacles. Patiently and systematically Martin Ostwald has endeavored to disabuse readers of *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry* of the vestiges of that habit.[1] The similarities between the two poetic traditions are numerous and obvious, the discrepancies few but profound. Though they are grounded in aesthetics as much as in language, it would never do to consider either without the other.

The prehistory of Homeric practice can only be inferred, and the further we go back the more we must rely on language. We are both impoverished and reassured thereby. We are left without poems to observe, but, language being our guide and the reconstructability of language our boon, the loss we have suffered affects the ostensible aspect more than the deep one.

The Indo-European ancestor language knew no hiatus;[2] vowels were contracted when they abutted on each other in consequence of some construction, especially in the interior of words.[3] The lines, or the periods, of poetry (as Greek scholars have known since Boeckh), and perhaps the sentences and certainly the discourses of spoken language as well, were in part defined by the circumstance that hiatus is allowed at the pause.

Apart from pause, hiatus yet to be dealt with may come about in two ways: in construction across boundaries of words or their components, or through sound-changes that eliminate consonants between vowels. The first is handled by contraction, by avoidance, or in other ways. In the case of the

1. Halporn, Ostwald, and Rosenmeyer 1963, 79–114.

2. Sequences like **-i(y)e* produced by "Sievers' Law" (n. 25 below) do not count.

3. The early role of word-initial laryngeal consonants, later lost, is discussed in n. 24 below.

latter, there is a certain amount of cyclical repetition, sound-change after sound-change. A late dialectal Greek example, *ϝ* > zero, is well known. Here the new hiatus persists to an extent even in Attic (*ἡδέ[ϝ]ος*; but earlier, *γένε[s>h]ος* > *γένους*). As for contraction across morpheme boundaries, it survived in Greek in the guise of vowel lengthening in compounds (*στρατηγός*; then, analogically, *ἐπώνυμος*) but was generally reinterpreted as elision.[4]

As Patroclus dies in battle, his soul escapes, perhaps through his nostrils, *λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην*.[5] The first syllable in *ἀνδροτῆτα* scans as short. Jacob Wackernagel implied that this is because *ἀνδρο-* has an Aeolic *-ρο-* for **-r̥-*, although one should hardly go so far, he says, as to ascribe the syllabic liquid "to the oldest phase of the Homeric language."[6] It can be ascribed to proto-Greek—this is the meaning of Wackernagel's thinking it "worthy of notice that the dialects diverge in the treatment of syllabic **r̥*." There are other manifestations;[7] I shall use *ἀνδροτῆτα* for the entire set. There are also some philological and specifically Homeric problems about this, which have been discussed more than once. The fact is that we should indeed read *λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα* and that the other variants and emendations (*λιποῦσ' αδροτῆτα*, *λιποῦσ' ἀροτῆτα*, *λιποῦσα δροτῆτα*)[8] are only devices, old or recent, to repair the meter. Meanwhile, ideas about what the "oldest phase of the Homeric language" was like have changed, and Mycenaean has become known. The possibility has been considered that Mycenaean actually kept the syllabic **r̥* in existence, where some first-millennium dialects have either *-ρα-* or *-αρ-*, and others, like Aeolic, either *-ρο-* or *-ορ-*.[9]

Before going on, let us take stock of our phonological framework. To catch the essence of things in proto-Indo-European, it is best to think of consonants as occurring either singly or in sequences of two (but rarely more than two) between vocalic entities. These vocalic entities are either the so-called full-grade vowels **e*, **o* (and perhaps **a*); or they are elements of syllabicity around the "resonants": semivowels proper, liquids, nasals, and laryngeals. Elements of syllabicity are the factors whereby **i*, **u* , **r̥*, **l̥* , **n̥*, **m̥* , **ə₁*, **ə₃*, and **ə₂* differ from the nonsyllabic **y*, **w*, **r*, **l*, **n*, **m*, **ə₁*, **ə₃*, and **ə₂*. Full-grade vowels, with their intrinsically vocalic nature, are distinctive and not predictable from their environment in the sequence.[10] Mere

4. Wackernagel 1955, 897–961, and others after him.

5. *Il.* 16.857, 22.363 (referring to Hector, with weaker attestation), 24.6 (*Πατρόκλου ποθέων ἀνδροτῆτά τε καὶ μένος ἠΰ*).

6. Wackernagel 1955, 1170.

7. Wackernagel 1955; Hoenigswald 1968.

8. Hoenigswald 1968; West 1982b, 15.

9. Mühlestein 1958a, 1958b; Heubeck [1971] 1972.

10. Full-grade vowels have no consonantal counterpart. Since *l̥* behaves like *r̥*, it will no longer be mentioned separately.

syllabicity, on the other hand, is semi-predictable. In principle it crops up automatically before consonants after every accumulation of two consonants.[11] On the ancient Indo-European level, the full-grade vowels are "short vowels"—for example, for the purpose of quantitative meter as we know it from Sanskrit and Greek—while the automatic syllabicity factor only combines with an adjacent resonant.[12] Here it is only the resulting combinations, **i*, **u*, **r̥*, **l̥*, **n̥*, **m̥*, **ə₁*, **ə₃*, **ə₂*, that were once prosodically equivalent to **e* and **o* (and perhaps **a*).[13]

In historical Greek this holds for the descendants of **i* (> ι), **u* (> υ), **ə₁* (> ε), **ə₃* (> ο), and **ə₂* (> α), and at first blush, for those of **n̥* and **m̥* (> α, Aeol. ο [?]).[14] It is not true, however, of the descendants of **r̥*. We must think of the Indo-European **r̥*, before most consonants and at word-end, as being (a) "*r* plus syllabicity" after a short vowel[15] plus one consonant and as (b) "syllabicity plus *r*" after a short vowel plus two consonants (and after-vowel length plus a consonant). In first syllables of words, it would originally depend on what precedes in the flow of speech. If one of the two shapes was generalized, which is what commonly happens in such a situation, one might expect more or less random results. Everywhere in historical Greek, perhaps even in Mycenaean,[16] syllabicity has merged with vowels: for example, α (< **a* [?], **ə₂*, **h₂e* ) in Ionic-Attic, ο (< **o*, etc.) in some other dialects, including Aeolic. We get *-ρα-* (*-ρο-*) in ἄρουρα (an old neuter almost inescapably reinterpreted as a feminine) and in ὄφρα, we get *-αρ-* (*-ορ-*) in ἦπαρ, and we get such former sentence doublets as κρατερός/καρτερός and βροτός/μορτός.[17] Only in what seems to be absolute word-initial position do we always have ἀρ- (ὀρ-). This, however, is closely tied to "Rix's Law" (discussed below).

It seems that the nasals behaved similarly at first. An **s* goes to **h* and zero, as it does between vowels, for example, in δέδαε "taught" (< **dedn̥set*;

11. *...cc*—*c(c)...*; also Beekes 1981–82, 110. See below and n. 25.

12. This answers Beekes' (1971, 355) and Tichy's (1981, 53) queries. My (1968) notation for "syllabicity plus *n*" was not intended as a sequence consisting of a full-fledged short vowel and a consonant. To be sure, a disyllabic sequence of two short-vowel-like segments is an anomaly. Now that we have adopted Rix's formulation of his Law and suggested a chronological ordering for it (see no. 2 at the end of the chapter), this is no longer of moment, since the various notations used all imply pyrrhic scansion. For the subsequent step, see no. 4 at the end of the chapter. Hoenigswald 1988, 208 (on ἄσις vel sim.) is now superseded.

13. The three schwas (**ə₁* , **ə₃* , [**ə₂*]) merge outright with these three full-grade vowels in Greek.

14. For **i* and **u* this is pan-Indo-European. In regard to the others the IE daughter languages diverge; Hoenigswald 1988, esp. 208.

15. Including in many but perhaps not all circumstances a syllabic resonant.

16. Mühlestein 1958a, 1958b; Heubeck [1971] 1972.

17. Except, in Homer, for ἀτραπιτός/ἀταρπός, ἀταρπιτός and ἀμβροτεῖν/ἀμαρτεῖν, both of the same peculiar build and etymologically obscure, fluctuation in one and the same word is confined to first syllables (Hoenigswald 1988, 201–2).

cf. Sanskrit *daṁsas-* "marvelous power," etc.), with **ṇ* in an environment—after the light syllable **...ed*—where an **ṛ* would appear as *-ρα-*, not *-αρ-*.[18] A mirror image is perhaps discernible in ἦα "I was" (< **[h₁]e-[h₁]es-ṃ*, contracted to **ēsṃ*), where *s*, situated before, not after, the syllabic nasal, contributes to a heavy, not a light, sequence.[19] At the beginning of a word, that is, precisely where an **ṛ* would appear as *ἀρ-* (*ὀρ-*), the antevocalic **-s-* that follows the initial **ṇ* is retained as *-σ-*, as in ἄσις "mud" (< **ṇsis*; cp. Sanskrit *ásita-*, "black").[20] Two adjectives meaning "thick," δαυλός and, underlying it, δασύς (both < **dṇs...*),[21] are, then, erstwhile sentence doublets along the lines of κρατερός/καρτερός—the former generalized from position after a word ending in a short vowel, the latter from position after some heavier sequence. On the whole the nasal element disappears in the long run, and *-α-* (*-ο-*), merging with the full vowels (**a*[?], **o*), is all that remains. In this way words keep their prosodic values, which they do not do in the case of the liquids. The *s*-effect only assigns an automatically increasing versus decreasing oral sonority (or an automatically decreasing versus increasing nasality) to what were nevertheless elementary segments of short-vowel duration. It so happens that this interpretation fits other phenomena, not least ἀνδροτῆτα and congeners.

What has been described here are the nasals and liquids in most anteconsonantal environments; but there are provisos. First, we may have to reckon with "Rix's Law,"[22] which provides, inter alia, that a word-initial laryngeal together with a following syllabic nasal yields *ἐν-* (*ἐμ-*), *ὀν-* (*ὀμ-*), or *ἀν-* (*ἀμ-*) (e.g., ἀμφί < **h₂ṃ-*)[23] according to the nature of the laryngeal, and not simply *ἐ-*, *ὀ-*, *ἀ-*. One consequence of this stipulation is the need to reconstruct words like ἄσις without any initial laryngeal (***ἄνσις*, < **h₂n* would go to Aeol. ***ἄννις*, elsewhere ***ἆνις*, Ion.-Att. ***ἦνις*—a dialectal

18. According to n. 11.

19. This case is not without difficulty, however (Hoenigswald 1988, 208).

20. It is remarkable but not particularly troublesome that the treatment of **ṇsV-* in ἄσις and δασύς (where **ṇ* is expected to be expressed as "syllabicity plus *n*") should have been different from that of **-VnsV-* in, say, **ἔμενσα* > Att. ἔμεινα. Only after a laryngeal did a seemingly initial and anteconsonantal **ṇ*, **ṃ* ("syllabicity-plus-*n*, *m*") go to *Vn-*, *Vm-* (*ἀμφί*; but see n. 24); there seems to be no instance of ***h₁(h₃, h₂)ṇsV-*; see no. 2 at the end of the chapter. On Skt. *ásita-*, an eminently convincing connection, see Thieme 1971, 767.

21. There is nothing semantically wrong with connecting these words to the Latin *o*-stem *dēnsus*. Donald Ringe further reminds me that *u*- stems are most often eliminated in Latin through amplification with *-i-* (*tenuis* etc.), so that we should expect ***densuis*, whether trisyllabic or with the rare cluster of *mānsuētus*. But this is not a sound-law, and there are examples, like *gurdus* (presumably cognate with Greek βραδύς) and the only slightly different *probus* (Skt. *prabhú-* "powerful": Mayrhofer 1963, 366); Leumann 1977, 276.

22. Rix 1970, 90–91; Mayrhofer 1986, 129–30. See no. 2 at the end of the chapter.

23. Cf. Mayrhofer 1986, 140.

diversification that presumably postdates Rix's Law).[24] Second, there is the question of syllabic nasals before certain antevocalic resonants. Here, too, we get *-αυ-* (*-αμ-*) rather than simply *-α-*: **g*$^{w}$*m̥yō* > *βαίνω*; **μανϝός* "spare" > Ion. *μᾱνός* and Att. *μανός*; *ταμ*[*h*$_1$]*εῖν*.[25]

Whether under this last-named provision or under Rix's Law, the scansion of the first syllable of *ἀνδροτῆτα* would in any event be short as long as **r̥-* has the status of a short vowel and has not yet turned into Aeolic *-ρο-*; even in the full-fledged, vowel + consonant *αν*, the syllable boundary[26] would still fall before the *-ν-*. (This would not be so if *ἀνδρ-ο-τῆτα* were a thematic formation with a connecting *-ο-* rather than an Aeolism—an alternative that Tichy wisely discounts.)[27] Later, after **r̥* > Aeol. *-ρο-*, the syllable boundary does shift, and *–⏑...* makes its appearance. This fails to fit the meter, resulting in confusing efforts to respell or emend.[28]

In *λιποῦσ'* our Homeric turn also exhibits elision.[29] Associated as it is, in the formula, with the pyrrhic scansion *⏑⏑...* of the two syllables that follow, we would conclude that the initial laryngeal, **h*$_2$*-*, of the word for "man" was already lost when **h*$_2$*nr-* was not yet trochaic. But if initial laryngeals impart their characteristic color to the outcome of a syllabic liquid or nasal, we face a dilemma: How is the information conveyed if the laryngeal is already gone?

24. Cf. n. 21. Homeric *δήνεα* "plans" remains obscure in its relation to *δέδαε*; Chantraine 1968–80, 1:275. Admittedly, allowing word-initial liquids and nasals without laryngeal preceding takes some of the rationale away from the rule that they appear in their post-heavy shapes. On reconstructing initial laryngeals before syllabic segments in general see Mayrhofer 1986, 123–24.

25. Or rather, the genuine model behind this thematic aorist. On word-internal syllabic liquids and nasals before other resonants see Thumb and Hauschild 1958, 1:1.248–49; Hoenigswald 1968, 22 (*μεμα*[*ϝ*]*ώς* with *-αϝ-* [not *-αυϝ-*] is innovated after *μέματε, μέμαμεν, μεμάτω, μέμασαν*; for the characteristic treatment of this suffix see Rix 1970, 93, on *τετευχώς*). The *-αρ-, -αν-* in these sequences may have coincided with the shape assumed since Indo-European times by syllabic liquids and nasals after two or more consonants (or after vowel length plus consonant[s]) before a vowel ("Sievers' Law" [with great caution, see Mayrhofer 1986, 160, 167]; the resemblance between this provision and the anteconsonantal one of n. 22 is no accident). One difference between the effect of a following *-y-, -w-, (-r-)* on the one hand and that of a following laryngeal (*ταμh*$_1$*εῖν*) on the other is of course that the former create long syllables (*βαίνω*, and, in many dialects, *μανϝός* [*μᾱνός*]) while the ultimate loss of the latter reinstates the short scansion (*ταμεῖν*).

26. Tichy 1981, 53 n. 58. The Ionic-Attic equivalent of this stem form is seen in *ἀνδράποδον, ἀνδράσι*, etc.

27. Tichy 1981, 47–48. Such an *ἀνδρ-ο-τῆτα* scans *⏑⏑...* only at the stage before Rix's Law. This would once again create the old paradox: Since the disappearance of the word-initial laryngeals that condition Rix's Law must await the expansion of **h*$_2$*n-* into a *VC-* sequence, the elision of *λιποῦσ*(*α*) cannot be accommodated.

28. Hoenigswald 1968; West 1982b, 15.

29. My thanks to Alan J. Nussbaum for raising this question, and to him, Paul Kiparsky, and Donald Ringe for their suggestions and their searching discussion.

The cogency of such relative chronologies is not always what is claimed. One must forever suspect that mechanical alternatives are conceivable, though possibly not worth their cost in typological plausibility or other forms of pleasingness. Thus, one remedy for our paradox would be to assume that some laryngeals or their descendants, in word-initial, antevocalic position, could have been something on the order of the later *h* (< *s*, etc.)—phonological realities but not segments capable of blocking elision. Whether or not we find this sufficiently satisfying depends at the very least on our picture of the prehistory of hiatus, contraction, and consonant voicing across word seams in Indic.[30] If we were to decide in favor, we should be free to allow the laryngeals so placed to survive into individual Indo-European languages like Greek until after the definitive vocalization of the syllabic liquids and nasals.

Another way out would be to retain an early date for the disappearance of initial laryngeals before full-grade vowels (and before **i* [and **u*]?), to let them be retained in early Greek until after Rix's Law wherever they are directly followed by the syllabicity factor of the syllabic nasals and liquids, and to let their coloring effect extend to the latter. This would create a complement of *o*-colored and *a*-colored **r̥*'s, **l̥*'s, **m̥*'s, and **n̥*'s, in addition to the neutral, *e*-colored ones—in other words, eight ephemeral additions to the list of entities with short-vowel quantity. Elision comes in at that stage, and Patroclus and Hector meet their fate. After that the twelve syllabic resonants blossom out into their final destinations in the dialects. The objection is obvious: an inventory of eight new, outlandish items offends our sense of parsimony, even if it is only transitory, and even if we consider that we are only dealing with new intersections of existing phonological properties.

A third, more concrete, and perhaps more plausible, scenario in five steps follows:

1. At a very early stage initial laryngeals before full-grade vowels disappear, with coloring effect (**agō*, ἄγω). Also, intervocalic laryngeals are lost, with contraction of the following hiatus (ἦ[a]).
2. Rix's Law (specifically Greek): In position after initial laryngeals the syllabic liquids and nasals are fully expanded into vowel + consonant sequences (ἀμφί).[31] Laryngeals disappear here as well, and

30. Aside from more obvious aspects, word-initial laryngeals do not seem to contribute to the overlengths (...*v*CC*v*..., ...*v̄*C*v*...), which are under a restricted regimen in the codas of Ṛgvedic and Homeric verse (Hoenigswald 1991).

31. N. 22; cf. Mayrhofer 1986, 140.

elision (**...ovτy'ἀ...* ) becomes possible. At some time between here and step 4, our formula, **λιπόντy'* [λιποῦσ'] *ἀνr̥τ...*, is created.[32]

3. An *s* goes to *h* (and disappears) between vocalic entities that include both full-grade vowels (**genes-os* > *γένε*[*h* ]*ος*) and syllabicities (e.g., **δέδn̥*[*h*]*ε*[*t*], where the syllabicity component should be thought of as having its place after the consonantal component of **n̥*).[33]

4. Dialect division sets in; the remaining (non-Rix) syllabic (liquids and) nasals take their separate final shapes. Now, **septm̥* > *ἑπτά*, **n̥sis* > *ἄσις*; **δέδn̥he*(*t*) > *δέδαε*; and also **ἀνr̥τâτ-* **ἀνr̥τῆτ-*, **ἀνr̥ποδον* > Aeol. **ἀν*(*δ*)*ροτâτα*, Hom. *ἀνδροτῆτα*, Ion.-Att. *ἀνδράποδον*, with the *-ρο-*, *-ρα-* (rather than *-ορ-*, *-αρ-*) that is in order after a short vowel plus consonant (*-αν-*; the *-δ-* is automatic). This destroys the metrical fit and makes for various alterations of the text. (Note that step 2 is divorced from step 4. There can be no great objection to this, since under Rix's Law, **n̥* or **m̥* after an initial laryngeal give different results from most other instances of **n̥* or **m̥* anyway.)

5. The *-σ-* in *ἄσις* and other new instances of intervocalic *-σ-* allows the foreign ("Mediterranean") **pr̥som* "leek" (taken into pre-Latin precisely as **pr̥som* > Lat. *porrum* ) to be borrowed as *πράσον*.[34]

32. With *r̥* represented by "*r* plus syllabicity." On the possibility of *ἀνδρ-ο-τ...* with thematic *-ο-* see n. 27. All this presupposes that *λιποῦσ'*, or something very much like it, is indeed an integral part of the formula; that the formula, in other words, does not possess a more complicated, composite background. There is, of course, the further question how the remainder of the coda "*...ῆτα καὶ ἦβην*" should be written at each stage.

33. Notes 11 and 15 above.

34. The caution expressed in Hoenigswald 1988, 208, may have been excessive. Only a truly unequivocal case of inherited rather than borrowed **r̥* > *ρα* followed by **s* > zero would bring certainty; *θρασύς* and *τρασία* "drying crate for figs" are locked into derivational paradigms with *θέρσος*, *θάρσος*, *θαρρύνω*, *τέρσομαι*, *τερσία*, *ταρσίη*. In its relative isolation, *τραυλός* < **tr̥sulós* "lisping, stammering," if originally "parched, hoarse,"qualifies nicely, despite its ultimate tie to *τέρσομαι* etc. Frisk's objections (1960, 919) to this idea of Wackernagel's (1955, 777–78, with the semantic parallel of Sanskrit *tr̥ṣṭá-* "*dried out, hoarse") are no longer valid in light of the discussion above. Phonologically, *τραυλός* (<...short vowel + word break + **t* + **r* + automatic syllabicity + **s* + vowel...) exactly matches *δαυλός* (<...short vowel + word break + **d* + **n* + automatic syllabicity + * *s* + vowel...); morphologically, *δαυλός* is to *δασύς* as *τραυλός* is to Avestan *tarštu-* "dry," Sanskrit *tr̥ṣú-* "vehement," etc. Of course, there is no intrinsic connection between the suffixation with *-λός* and the generalizing of the post-light sandhi alternant in the first syllable. So long as we cannot lay bare the analogical processes that were no doubt at work we can only fall back on coincidence.

34

# On Critically Looking into Snell's Homer

Eliot Wirshbo

THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES "Homer's View of Man," the first chapter of Bruno Snell's *Discovery of the Mind*, and finds it flawed. Lest it appear that a straw man is here being propped up for flogging, let me first assert why I think a detailed refutation of an old (originally 1939), often dishonored thesis is necessary. Snell's notion of the spiritual ascent of ancient Greece has Homeric man at the bottom of the ladder. Snell presents evidence in a way that suggests that the bodily self-conception and mental workings of characters in Homer are fragmented, without full self-awareness. A sense of wholeness only develops gradually in ancient Greece, as the spirit matures and senses its powers and the nature of its own operations. The analogy to an idealized individual maturation is clear.

Some scholars value Snell's portrayal of Homeric man and rely on it as the basis for their own investigations into Homeric psychology. Thus, Thomas MacCary embraces "Snell's observation on the 'primitive' prephilosophical nature of the Homeric world view," making it the basis for his exploration of what might be called an "Achilles-complex."[1] More recently, Raymond Prier founds his own inquiry into archaic perception squarely on Snell's insights into the nonsubjective nature of cognition in Homeric man.[2]

Twenty years ago, in a graduate seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, Martin Ostwald had occasion to quote Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* from memory, citing the precise Bekker page numbers. My reaction, instead of the silent solemnity observed by my classmates, was to laugh out loud in delight at the unabashedly childlike scrupulousness that has fostered such wise scholarship. I hope a similar reverence for the words of the text will be found in this little offering to my teacher. A version of this chapter was read at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association in San Antonio, Texas, on 30 December 1986.

1. MacCary 1982, xi.
2. Prier 1989, 19, 243. Adkins (1970, 21–25) is another *laudator Snellianus*.

Such wholehearted approval is not often accorded Snell these days. It is more usual to find a mixture of respect and rejection—respect for his philology, rejection of his psychology. Thus Norman Austin, while applauding what he calls Snell's "vivid re-creation of certain aspects of Homeric thought such as the modes of vision," still claims that Snell has created a distorted picture of Homeric mentality.[3] Bennett Simon also finds the specifics of what Snell has to say generally valid, but he resists the conclusion that Homeric man cannot engage in pure cogitation (in Snellian terms, abstract as opposed to concrete thinking): "It would be more accurate to say that Homeric language has its own categories, or even its own kinds of abstraction."[4] Similarly, Brian Vickers places Snell's *Discovery of the Mind* among "valuable studies of Greek literature," calling it a "distinguished example" of writing on intellectual history, yet he finds the evolutionary analysis that Snell presents part of a "bad tradition." Literature for Vickers does not yield the only or best evidence for tracing alleged shifts in sensibility: "Folk poetry can express emotions not necessarily those of the poet."[5] The general reaction to Snell has been one of deference to his learning and philological demonstrations but suspicion regarding the larger project in whose service the philology is applied.

I am aware of one effort to undermine Snell from a philological standpoint. In a 1979 article, Robert Renehan questioned the attempt, through an argument based on words alone, to portray Homeric man as having a fragmented self-conception: "The construct was doomed to failure... because the linguistic evidence adduced was too narrow and selective and because the methodological principles employed were unsound."[6] Renehan's demolition of Snell's construction is based on the claim that σῶμα does not, as commonly averred, refer only to a dead body. But while Renehan's general strictures are true, he cites only two examples of σῶμα in Homer where a meaning of "live body" is possible (*Il.* 3.23; *Od.* 12.67), and admits that even there the traditional meaning, "corpse," can be defended.[7]

3. Austin 1975, 84–85. Austin contends that Homeric terminology is not as precise as Snell would have it (106–10—a point taken up in the central part of this chapter) and finds greater coherence in Homeric thinking than Snell allows.

4. Simon 1978, 60.

5. Vickers 1973, 101–2. Vickers is here referring to Snell's chapters on lyric and tragic poetry, but his words apply equally well to Snell's first chapter, on Homer.

6. Renehan 1979, 280.

7. Renehan 1979, 272–73 (waffling at 278). Renehan (p. 280) cites West (1978, 295) for corroboration of his earlier claim (271) that a semantic development from "corpse" to "living body" is hard to account for. This seems to me no more implausible than a movement from *fast* as "fixed" to *fast* as "swiftly moving," or from *grammar* to *glamour*, or, possibly, from ἄνθος as "sheen, excrescence" to "flower, best part" (Griffith 1983, 83–84). Does the fact that *corpus* has gone from "live body" to "dead body" need no explanation because the movement is seen as "natural," whereas a semantic development in the opposite direction is seen as "unnatural"?

Those who feel that Snell and his followers are wrong have so far not refuted his thesis on a point by point basis. His methodology (defending, e.g., the *argumentum ex silentio*)[8] and his anthropology ("in primitive speech abstractions are as yet undeveloped")[9] seem wrong-headed, but his philology has not been fully assailed. Even more than this, while many intuitively sense that they must reject as untrue the portrayal of Homeric man as but an early stage in the full flowering of the Greek spirit, not only have they been unable to show that the individual steps in Snell's argument are false, but they have even expressed approval of particular parts of that argument. This chapter offers an assessment of the philological accuracy of the first proof in the series of demonstrations constituting "Homer's View of Man," with the aim of showing that it is precisely in his philology that Snell goes astray.

Snell approaches the Homeric *Geist* through its manifestations in the everyday activity of seeing. This particular sphere of bodily processes is presented as a sensuous image of the more important sphere involving the "spiritual" organs (ψυχή, θυμός, and νόος), whose own disjointed workings the visual apparatus merely reflects. By first showing how the more readily traceable physical activity is for Homeric man a chaotic jumble of impressions, never grouped together under one generic label, Snell paves the way for introducing his real point, that the spiritual activity of Homeric man is also fragmented, that the noncohering parts of the *Geist* do not function in anything like the way they do in later Greeks or in us. The opening discussion of vision is both a prelude to and foundation of Snell's grander pronouncements. If it can be shown to have weaknesses, his entire thesis is deprived of its underpinnings.

Snell's method seems to have been influenced by work in a branch of linguistics that began to flourish in the 1920s and 1930s called semantic field theory. Semantic field theory starts from the Saussurean dictum of the arbitrariness of the sign,[10] which for purposes of this chapter I rephrase as "different languages give different names to the same thing" (e.g., *arbor*, *Baum*, *tree*). Concomitant with this discrepancy in name-giving is a certain arbitrariness in classification. For example, a grade of "good" in a German school may be cause for celebration, while in the United States that same "good" may mean failure to qualify for advanced study. Each language thus has a particular logic behind its lexis. In semantic field theory, the typical procedure for exposing this logic is assembling all a language's words within a given area—for example, cooking, diseases, colors, or military ranks—then

8. Snell 1953, xi.
9. Snell 1953, 1
10. Saussure [1915] 1983, 67–69.

observing patterns in the groupings. This is done by noticing which terms overlap, where terms are lacking, which areas are relatively rich in expressions, and so forth. Inferences are then drawn about the thinking behind the patterns, since the lexical field—and this is where Snell depends on the semantic field theorists—is a manifestation of the conceptual field presumed to be in back of it.[11]

To offer an example, a listing of all the English words for genitalia shows that almost every word is metaphorical (or metonymical)[12]—that is, borrowed from another sphere. Few if any were created specifically for the purpose of describing a particular part.[13] This may be used by those so inclined as a basis for deductions about English speakers. Similarly, by grouping together the Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit words relating to the gods and their worship, we can glean something about the actual beliefs of our Indo-European-speaking ancestors.[14] The concept of meaning itself takes on a new coloration when words are studied in this way. That is to say, meaning comes to seem to inhere not so much in individual words as in the mosaic of meaning constituted by all the words within a semantic field. The significance of one tile within the mosaic—that is, of an isolated word—cannot be grasped without reference to the intricate whole in which it plays a small part.[15] When Bruno Snell tries to get at the nature of vision in Homer, he looks at the larger pattern formed by the various Homeric words for seeing. He finds that none of them actually expresses what we understand as "to see."

Semantic field theorists have been open to the charge that there is a certain arbitrariness in the demarcation of their fields and in the assignment of meanings. It is of course highly problematic to reach plausible conclusions about the mental makeup of a people from the quirky evidence of their language. French, for example, allegedly lacks a word for *chair*[16]—but surely French-speakers do not fail to comprehend the concept of sitting. German uses three different verbs for *use*, depending on whether the object employed is natural, artificial, or public (*verwenden*, *gebrauchen*, *benutzen*)[17] —surely Germans are not unable to see the "unity" behind washing with

11. Öhman 1953.

12. Any compilation of slang terms, such as Berrey and van den Bank 1967, will show this.

13. This seems to be largely true of similar terms in other Indo-European languages, too. Cf. Buck 1949, 256–59.

14. Watkins 1969, 1498.

15. Öhman 1953, 127. Before the metaphor of the mosaic, there was the metaphor of the web. Cf. R. L. Miller 1968, 28.

16. Harris 1981, 122–23..

17. R. L. Miller 1968, 105.

soap, heating with wood, and availing oneself of an opportunity. One thing must certainly be acknowledged by the practitioners of semantic field tactics: An accurate description of how words are used is essential to the forming of larger inferences about the users of the words. Here, I believe, Snell fails.

Snell begins his consideration of vision words with δέρκομαι:

> δέρκομαι means: to have a particular look in one's eyes.... [It] refers not so much to the function of the eye as to its gleam as noticed by someone else.... δέρκομαι means "to look with a specific expression.... It presents us with...a certain attitude of the eyes.... [T]he Homeric δέρκομαι does not designate the proper objective of sight, the special function of the eye which is to transmit certain sense impressions to the human perception.... [παπταίνειν, like δέρκομαι,] denotes a visual attitude...; neither word is found in the first person, with the exception of one late occurrence of δέρκομαι. (Snell [1939] 1953, 2)

I find nineteen uses of δέρκομαι and its compounds in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Of these, ten show senses that do not conform to Snell's delineation of the word's range:

1. *Il.* 1.88–89—Achilles vows to protect Calchas:
   *οὔ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο*
   *σοὶ κοίλῃς παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει.*

2. *Od.* 16.438–39—Eurymachus promises Penelope that he will oppose any man:
   *ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῷ υἱέϊ χεῖρας ἐποίσει*
   *ζώοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο.*

Examples 1 and 2 falsify Snell's contention that the word is used to refer to the look in someone else's eye. The participial form δερκομένοιο, though not grammatically limited to a person, is in each case used by the speaker to refer to himself. (LSJ translates this use as "alive, living.")

3. *Il.* 13.85–88—the Greeks, now being encouraged by Poseidon, had recently been disheartened:
   *καί σφιν ἄχος κατὰ θυμὸν ἐγίγνετο δερκομένοισι*
   *Τρῶας, τοὶ μέγα τεῖχος ὑπερκατέβησαν ὁμίλῳ.*
   *τοὺς οἵ γ' εἰσορόωντες ὑπ' ὀφρύσι δάκρυα λεῖβον.*

This instance of the word denotes no special "visual attitude"; it is used synonymously with εἰσορόωντες just below, which itself, though claimed by Snell to designate "a specific type of vision" (Snell [1939] 1953, 4), must here mean simply "looking upon."

4. *Il.* 14.139–41—Poseidon, disguised as an old man, addresses Agamemnon:

> Ἀτρεΐδη, νῦν δή που Ἀχιλλῆος ὀλοὸν κῆρ
> γηθεῖ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι, φόνον καὶ φύζαν Ἀχαιῶν
> δερκομένῳ, ἐπεὶ οὔ οἱ ἔνι φρένες, οὐδ' ἠβαιαί.

5. *Il.* 17.673–76—Menelaus leaves the fight over Patroclus' body:

> Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπέβη ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
> πάντοσε παπταίνων ὥς τ' αἰετός, ὅν ῥά τέ φασιν
> ὀξύτατον δέρκεσθαι ὑπουρανίων πετεηνῶν,
> ὅν τε καὶ ὑψόθ' ἐόντα πόδας ταχὺς οὐκ ἔλαθε πτὼξ.

In examples 4 and 5, though Snell might claim that delight and penetration of glance respectively are implied in the verb forms, they must refer to more than mere visual attitude and include the very transmittal of sense impressions Snell denies the verb.

6. *Il.* 23.476–77—the lesser Ajax upbraids Idomeneus for his allegedly premature report on the chariot race:

> οὔτε νεώτατός ἐσσι μετ' Ἀργείοισι τοσοῦτον,
> οὔτε τοι ὀξύτατον κεφαλῆς ἔκ δέρκεται ὄσσε.

This I regard as a clear-cut case. The verb must refer to "the function of the eye."

7. and 8. *Od.* 5.84 and 158—Odysseus grieves on Calypso's island:

> πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον δερκέσκετο δάκρυα λείβων.

Again, there is no emotion inherent in the verb, only in the final two words.

9. *Od.* 9.144–46—on a cloudy night, no one can see the Cyclopes' island:

> ἀὴρ γὰρ περὶ νησὶ βαθεῖ' ἦν, οὐδὲ σελήνη
> οὐρανόθεν προὔφαινε, κατείχετο δὲ νεφέεσσιν.
> ἔνθ' οὔ τις τὴν νῆσον ἐσέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν.

If this compound of δέρκομαι carries any connotation of the specific ocular expression Snell attributes to the verb, it is secondary to the more basic physical discernment.

10. *Od.* 10.196–97—Odysseus spots the island of Circe:
αὐτὴ δὲ χθαμαλὴ κεῖται· καπνὸν δ' ἐνὶ μέσσῃ
ἔδρακον ὀφθαλμοῖσι διὰ δρυμὰ πυκνὰ καὶ ὕλην.

This is another instance where a translation beyond "I saw" or "I spotted" would be unwarranted.

Other passages (e.g., *Od.* 17.518, 20.385) could be cited to show that δέρκομαι refers to sight, not to any expressive gesture of the eyes as marked by others. The claims Snell made about the verb in more than half of its appearances are untrue. The same holds for λεύσσω, on which Snell has this to say:

> Etymologically it is connected with λευκός, "gleaming," "white"; three of the four cases in the *Iliad* where the verb is followed by an accusative object pertain to fire and shining weapons. The meaning plainly is: to see something bright.... Pride, joy, and a feeling of freedom are expressed in it. Frequently λεύσσω appears in the first person, which distinguishes it from δέρκεσθαι and παπταίνειν.... [I]t is never used in situations of sorrow or anxiety. (Snell [1939] 1953, 3)

The following forms of λεύσσω do not conform to Snell's claims.

1. *Il.* 1.120—Agamemnon to the Achaeans, on how he alone is deprived of a prize:
λεύσσετε γὰρ τό γε πάντες, ὅ μοι γέρας ἔρχεται ἄλλῃ.

This employment of the word conveys no joy and involves a situation of some anxiety, despite Snell's claim that it cannot.

2. *Il.* 3.10–14—a simile comparing the dust stirred up by advancing armies to the mist on mountain peaks:
εὖτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι Νότος κατέχευεν ὀμίχλην,
ποιμέσιν οὔ τι φίλην, κλέπτῃ δέ τε νυκτὸς ἀμείνω,
τόσσον τίς τ' ἐπιλεύσσει ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ λᾶαν ἵησιν·
ὣς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ κονίσαλος ὄρνυτ' ἀελλὴς
ἐρχομένων· μάλα δ' ὦκα διέπρησσον πεδίοιο.

3. *Il.* 5.770–72—a simile describing how far Hera's horses leapt:

> ὅσσον δ' ἠεροειδὲς ἀνὴρ ἴδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
> ἥμενος ἐν σκοπιῇ, λεύσσων ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον,
> τόσσον ἐπιθρῴσκουσι θεῶν ὑψηχέες ἵπποι.

Vision here is through a nonbright mist or haze, in the third person, and with no particular emotion attached.

4. *Il.* 3.109–10—Menelaus on the sobering effect of an older man's presence:

> οἷς δ' ὁ γέρων μετέῃσιν, ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω
> λεύσσει, ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.

5. *Od.* 23.124–25—Telemachus bids his father consider how to avoid the wrath of the suitors' families:

> αὐτὸς ταῦτά γε λεῦσσε, πάτερ φίλε· σὴν γὰρ ἀρίστην
> μῆτιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φάσ' ἔμμεναι....

Far from the Snellian stricture that the verb indicates seeing "something bright," it may be said that ocular vision is not referred to here at all.

6. *Il.* 16.69–71—Achilles allows Patroclus to fight, since the Trojans are pressing the Achaeans hard:

> Ἀργεῖοι· Τρώων δὲ πόλις ἐπὶ πᾶσα βέβηκε
> θάρσυνος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμῆς κόρυθος λεύσσουσι μέτωπον
> ἐγγύθι λαμπομένης....

7. *Il.* 16.126–28—Achilles gives Patroclus a last push:

> ὄρσεο, διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες, ἱπποκέλευθε·
> λεύσσω δὴ παρὰ νηυσὶ πυρὸς δηΐοιο ἰωήν·
> μὴ δὴ νῆας ἕλωσι καὶ οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλωνται.

These appearances of λεύσσω justify Snell's association of the word with fire and shining weapons, but they are surely devoid of the joy and pride that he asserts are connoted by the verb.

8. *Il.* 20.344–46—Achilles, after his abortive fight with Aeneas, has the mist lifted from his eyes by Poseidon:

> ὦ πόποι, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι·
> ἔγχος μὲν τόδε κεῖται ἐπὶ χθονός, οὐδέ τι φῶτα
> λεύσσω, τῷ ἐφέηκα κατακτάμεναι μενεαίνων.

It would be hard to claim a special meaning for the word here; nothing other than "see" is appropriate. (There is also practical synonymity with ὁρῶμαι, in line 344, despite Snell's imprecise distinction.)

9. *Od.* 9.166—Odysseus and his men sail to the land of the Cyclopes:
Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαῖαν ἐλεύσσομεν ἐγγὺς ἐόντων.

Here, too, the object does not shine, and any emotion discerned in the verb must be a subjective importation.

These citations establish that Snell is weakest where all but Renehan have seen him as most insightful, in the realm of philological authentication. He postulates an "uncontaminated" aspect of the complex activity of the eyes—"to transmit sense impressions to the human perception" (Snell [1939] 1953, 3). This seemingly scientific description of pure and simple vision focuses on the teleological operation of the eye to the exclusion of inseparable phenomenological aspects, implying that Homeric words for seeing betray a primitive subjectivism and an inability to recognize Snell's allegedly objective "special function" ([1939] 1953, 3). Having set up his exclusive definition, Snell then suggests that the alleged lack of a Homeric term for this essential function of the eyes indicates a failure to grasp vision in its "basic" sense. But, as the citations adduced above show, both δέρκομαι and λεύσσω—and for that matter, ὁράω, αὐγάζομαι (whose "exact meaning" Snell does not venture to define, [1939] 1953, 311 n. 1]), and *εἴδω—can all be used in a "basic" sense to mean "see." The effort to fix Homeric man at the beginning of a fancied ethnic spiritual development cannot be buttressed by reference to words for seeing, because these words do not have concrete and unvarying emotional correlates. Their meanings ramify and modulate just as those of sophisticated cultures do.

In a larger sense, Snell's effort to characterize Homeric man on the basis of his words is a chapter in the controversial debate over the relation of language to thought. I would first distinguish broadly between two prominent strains in the exploration of the link between language and thought and provisionally label them a German strain and an American strain. The American school, associated with the designation "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis," takes its orientation from the various ethno- and metalinguistic essays of the two men who sought to show that the language we speak shapes our view of the world. For Whorf especially, it is not so much words themselves as the syntax according to which words are put together to form predications that influences the manner in which we think. In this respect, the differences among Indo-European languages are trivial: They are enough alike syntactically for Whorf to lump them together as constitutive

of the same basic worldview.[18] Only the study of vastly different tongues, like Hopi or Shawnee, can reveal to us how arbitrary and language-bound our ideas of time, space, and the material world are.[19]

Unlike Sapir and Whorf, the German school, reborn in the semantic field theorists, focuses on historical changes and dialectal differences within German or on differences between German and other European languages and shows more of a concern with individual words than with syntax. But from the earliest writers on the subject in the eighteenth century, there is among German thinkers an additional element in the language-thought controversy, hovering prominently behind both elements in the dichotomy, and that is *Geist*.

Snell's postulation of a *Geist* behind language and thought, giving shape to both, is squarely within this long tradition. The latter-day, linguistically sophisticated semantic field theorists follow their Romantic forebears in showing no reluctance to draw conclusions about the mentality of whole peoples from the evidence of a few words. Leo Weisgerber, for example, whose writings share Snell's theoretical orientation,[20] notes that German employs the verbs *gehen*, *reiten*, *fahren*, and *radeln* to denote locomotion of various sorts, whereas French uses only *aller*. Germans are therefore, according to Weisgerber, closer to reality and more forceful in evoking phenomena in their manifold richness than the French, who are content to leave things abstract and imprecise.[21] Similar pronouncements, filled with contradictions and bold leaps from language to national character, are made by Hamann and Herder, to whose late eighteenth-century writings the origins of the so-called linguistic relativity principle are usually traced.[22] Their younger contemporary, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who is usually credited with providing the first full articulation of this principle, is not totally free of his predecessors' intuitive fibrillations.[23] *Geist* plays a prominent role in his writings on the subject, too.

While Whorf might say that the Homeric Greek language (or whatever "Homeric man" may have spoken) is determinative of Homeric man's

18. Whorf 1956, 212, 138.

19. Whorf 1956, 218.

20. This can be seen in Snell [1939] 1953, chaps. 9 and 10, where Snell lays out more fully than in chap. 1 the bases for arguing from language to thought.

21. R. L. Miller 1968, 100–101.

22. R. L. Miller, 18–24. But Aarsleff (1988, xxxii–lxv) insists on the French antecedents of the principle as articulated by Humboldt.

23. Hamann: French lacks "freedom," because its loss of inflectional endings restricts its word order (O'Flaherty 1979, 114). Herder: "A people's genius reveals itself nowhere better than in the physiognomy of its speech" (R. L. Miller 1968, 24). Humboldt: "A people's mental characteristics and language structure are so closely fused that, if the one were given, the other could be wholly derived from it" (R. L. Miller 1968, 32).

view of himself and the world, Bruno Snell would not. For him, the study of language helps to reveal the determinative forces behind thought and action, but those forces do not originate *in* language; they are wielded by the ontologically prior *Geist* itself, which shapes a people's worldview. Thus, the methodological assumption in the service of which Snell adjusts his definitions may also be questioned.

To try to dispel fully what the philosopher Max Black has called the "vaporous mysticism"[24] behind such theorizing on language and mind is not part of my task. I would, in fact, welcome seeing Snell's assertions about the Homeric *Geist* reaffirmed in a more persuasive way, for I confess to thinking at times, with Snell, that Homeric man and his spirit *are* simpler and more childlike than we and ours. It is difficult to know where to stand nowadays when it comes to studying other peoples, for the anthropological dogma that forbids our making invidious comparisons between cultures has begun to seem just as clichéd as the primitive-civilized dichotomy it replaced. Maybe the mere study of words is not adequate for understanding the minds of distant cultures, or even our own. At any rate, I hope to have shown here that a more careful philology is needed to attempt the task.

24. Black 1959, 228.

35

# Into the Midpoint of Things: Aristotle, Bartlett, and the Memory of a Poet

James Tatum

...the history of a poet's mind
Is labor not unworthy of regard.
Wordsworth, *The Prelude* Book 13 (1805)

LITERARY CRITICISM OFTEN BEGINS by drawing comparisons. People think they understand a text better if they can show how it conforms to a pattern of their own devising. They find it equally helpful if they can show how it does not. There is a theory that the memory of an archaic Greek poet like Homer, as well as the memories of Homer's characters in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, functioned differently from the way human memory functions now. Neither the poet nor his characters remember and forget the way we do.[1]

This chapter argues that some of the most characteristic features of the psychology of everyday life can be traced as readily in an ancient text as in a modern text, and that they are much the same. Aristotle's treatise *De memoria* is relevant to the analysis of a literary text, in the same way that a twentieth-century classic of psychology like F. C. Bartlett's *Remembering* is to understanding the creation of *A la recherche du temps perdu*,[2] or to Tom Harrison's book on the British oral history projects of World War II.[3]

For their help, my sincere thanks to the editors and their anonymous reader, as well as to Charles R. Beye, Frank A. Lewis, Robert J. Rabel, William C. Scott, and Christian Wolff.

1. Meyerson 1956; Vernant 1983; Detienne 1973; cf. Barbu 1960, 69–95.
2. Bolles 1988, 289.
3. Harrison 1976, 324–30.

These topics can be addressed here only in a preliminary way. Even so, a few general points should be made before we attempt to join Aristotle and Bartlett on the subject of memory, with Homer on the wrath of Achilles. The first is that the psychology of memory is important for the study and interpretation of literary texts, at least in part because the psychological processes of memory create them. The workings of a poet's memory leave more than traces on the surface of his work; the work itself can be conceived of as a mnemonic system.[4] Created out of memories organized in a meaningful way, in turn it gives its audience or readers a structure that invites engagement and response. Much of what literary critics and scholars achieve depends on their ability to comprehend and remember the design the poet's memory shapes. The debate over the results of these efforts is now a refrain in literary theory.[5]

The Greeks understood very well this connection between psychology and literary criticism. Their terms are not our terms, but Aristotle and others consistently examine ῥητορικὴ τέχνη and ποιητικὴ τέχνη in relation to the workings of the ψυχή.[6] The validity of the association they perceived can be measured by the work of scholars in the now separate fields of literary criticism and psychology. For example, the criticism of I. A. Richards is basic to the development of later reader-response theories,[7] but it also has its psychological analogue in the equally influential work of his Cambridge contemporary F. C. Bartlett. Bartlett's report of his experiment with subjects who told and retold the North American folktale "The War of the Ghosts" nicely complements Richards' exercises with responsive and unresponsive student readers of literature.[8]

This connection between cognitive psychology and literary criticism would be more readily apparent if outsiders' notions of psychology were less narrowly conceived. To judge from recent surveys of literature and psychology in classical studies, or from the title and editorial policy of the journal *Psychology and Literature*, the expectation seems to be that an argument about literature and psychology will necessarily be some form of psychoanalytic criticism.[9] Freud's extensive use of classical myth and literature throughout his writings is one reason for his dominance in literary studies that profess interest in psychology. Freud himself seems to belong as much to literature as to science. In any case, the Freudian tradition is only a part

4. Lord 1960, 99–102; cf. Simondon 1982, 103–27.
5. Suleiman 1980.
6. Tompkins 1980, 201–32.
7. Richards 1929; Tompkins 1980, 258.
8. Bartlett 1932, 63–94; Bolles 1988, 67.
9. Caldwell 1974; Africa 1979.

of modern psychology, and for cognitive psychologists studying memory, it has never been a dominant part. To judge from recent overviews, the debate Bartlett launched between himself and those working in the Ebbinghaus tradition of controlled laboratory experimentation is typical of the field.[10] In this respect, Richards' 1929 observation is as pertinent as ever: Literary historians and theorists would do well to look beyond the critical clichés of psychoanalysis or behaviorism, to the work that psychologists are actually engaged in.[11]

A second preliminary point is that the kind of inattention to psychology that Richards long ago complained of has had important consequences for an understanding of ancient Greece—or, for that matter, as the work of Pierre Nora demonstrates, even for an understanding of our present world.[12] A follower of the historical psychologist I. Meyerson would object that it is anachronistic to suppose that Aristotle's studies in individual psychology could be applied to the literature of archaic Greece.[13] Memory had a fundamentally different character in Homer and Hesiod's world than it had in Aristotle's time;[14] the individual consciousness with which he is concerned developed much later. For the poet of the *Iliad*, memory was a divinely inspired, transcendent power greater than anything we presently know. The memory of the poet preserved and passed on a poet's truth to his culture; his memory was not a faculty that could recollect a private past, and it did not operate in the way our memories work now.[15] The differences between memory in archaic Greece and memory today are as great as the differences between orality and literacy.[16]

These are views that seem increasingly in need of qualification. The divisions between ancient and modern memory may not be quite that neat, nor may the boundaries between oral and literate cultures be as distinct as students of orality once assummed them to be.[17] It has recently been shown that ancient *maîtres de verité* were at least as good at lying as they were at telling the truth.[18]

Running throughout the tradition of Meyerson and his followers is the assumption that the literary texts they work with constitute our primary evidence for the *mentalité* of archaic Greece. Yet all these texts are

10. Bartlett 1932, 2–7; Baddeley 1976, 50–55; Bolles 1988, 66–72; Neisser 1982, 4.
11. Richards 1929, 321–22.
12. Nora 1989; cf. Davis and Starn 1989, 3.
13. Vernant 1983, 95; cf. Meyerson 1956; Schofield 1978, 140.
14. Barbu 1960, 69–95.
15. Detienne 1973, 9–27; Segal 1985, 222.
16. Vernant 1983, 76–78; cf. Lord 1960, 141; Parry 1971, xli–lxii; Ong 1982, 30–77.
17. Finnegan 1977, 52–87; cf. Ong 1982, 156–79 and Harris 1989, 65–115.
18. Pratt 1988, 147–48.

mediated, formalized representations of that social consciousness, and that is not necessarily congruent with the way individual persons may have remembered or forgot. A distinction should also be drawn between what is thought and said about memory, and the actual processes of memory and the study of how it works. Homer could be at once Meyerson's and Vernant's intermediary figure, moving between the Muses of divine memory and the community around him, and a poet who could represent the workings of individual consciousness and memory in his characters with a power and skill that compare with any later artist.[19] The construction of a *mentalité* in archaic Greece that excludes any possibility of individual consciousness and its representation in literature carries a productive line of inquiry too far: "Prétendre qu' Homère ignore ou néglige la psychologie serait absurde."[20]

We need go no further than Bartlett's experimental studies in memory and social psychology to realize that these divergent views about memory and poetry in early Greece may not be so irreconcilable as they at first seem.[21] There is a continuum in the study of the psychology of memory that moves from the most basic operations of memory on the individual and personal level to the ways in which both the manner and the matter of recall are determined by social influences.[22] Memory's social construction varies across cultures and time, but the fundamental processes of remembering and forgetting can be found in the human species in any culture, at any stage. That is why literary representations of remembering and forgetting can in one sense be so unlike, so culturally specific, and in another sense so similar. What Proust's narrator Marcel remembers or forgets is not the same thing that Homer's Achilles remembers or forgets, nor does either of them remember or forget for the same reasons.[23] But the psychological process of remembering or forgetting is fundamental to both of them. If Marcel's famous taste of the madeleine marks the beginning of his recovery of the past,[24] some crucial moments in the *Iliad* also turn on what people remember or forget.

At *Iliad* 18.8–12, Achilles has a premonition of Patroclus' death at the very moment Antilochus arrives (this and all subsequent quotations of Homer are from the Lattimore version):

19. De Romilly 1984; cf. Wooley 1989.
20. De Romilly 1984, 23; cf. Sullivan 1988, 3–7.
21. Bartlett 1932, 243; Bolles 1988, 241–86.
22. Bartlett 1932, 244, 308–11; cf. Neisser 1982b.
23. Bolles 1988, 277–86; cf. Martin 1989, 144–45.
24. Bolles 1988, 278.

> May the gods not accomplish vile sorrows upon the heart in me
> in the way my mother once made clear to me, when she told me
> how while I lived the bravest of all the Myrmidons
> must leave the light of the sun beneath the hands of the Trojans.
> Surely, then, the strong son of Menoitios has perished.

This is a stunning example of the way Homer can represent a person's memory at work—more accurately, of how a person's memory does not work. Achilles had earlier failed to recall this very prophecy about the bravest of the Myrmidons. Patroclus' appeal to Achilles in book 16 seemed to refer to just such a prophecy (16.36–39):

> But if you are drawing back from some prophecy known in your own heart
> and by Zeus' will your honored mother has told you of something,
> then send me out at least, let the rest of the Myrmidon people
> follow me, and I may be a light given to the Danaans.

Achilles' reply misses the mark altogether and, incidentally, reveals why he could not recall the prophecy about the bravest of the Myrmidons (18.49–54):

> I have not any prophecy in mind that I know of;
> there is no word from Zeus my honored mother has told me,
> but this thought comes as a bitter sorrow to my heart and my spirit
> when a man tries to foul one who is his equal, to take back
> a prize of honor, because he goes in great authority.

Several explanations could account for Achilles' selective recall. A Freudian might say that Achilles does not recall the prophecy because he subconsciously represses it; deep down he wants it to come true, so that Patroclus can die and then he can die in turn and fulfill his heroic destiny. A follower of Bartlett would take another approach. As Edmund Bolles' recent catechism puts it, operations of memory are like links in a chain: We remember what we understand; we understand only what we pay attention to; we pay attention to what we want.[25] Whenever memory fails us, there is an inability to move somewhere along this chain. In book 16 Achilles is more focused on his own feelings than on what Patroclus is saying. He is so focused on

25. Bolles 1988, 23.

himself and his sense of injured merit that Thetis' prophecy has no chance of coming to mind. Homer has thus created a splendid case study of what Bolles has termed "the forgettery," the faculty human beings have of dismissing what they do not want to remember.[26]

Achilles' tardy recollection suggests that there is no neat division between ancient and modern memory either in its processes of remembering and forgetting or in a poet's representation of them. The *Iliad* and Homer are as specific to their culture as Homerists and historical psychologists have shown them to be. At the same time, the operations of human memory, remembering and forgetting, have transhistorical aspects that allow us to apply to that same text an ancient psychological study like Aristotle's *De memoria* or a modern one like Bartlett's *Remembering*. The American historian David Thelen has made something like this point particularly well:

> Since the memory of past experiences is so profoundly intertwined with the basic identities of individuals, groups, and cultures, the study of memory exists in different forms along a spectrum of experience, from the personal, individual, and private, to the collective, cultural, and public. At one end of the spectrum are psychological issues of individual motivation and perception in the creation of memories. At the other end are linguistic or anthropological issues of how cultures establish traditions and myths from the past to guide the conduct of their members in the present.[27]

We shall now turn back to the Greeks in an attempt to develop a bit more one end of the spectrum that Thelen describes.[28]

In the second chapter of *De memoria* Aristotle recommends that we start our search for something we wish to recall by going to the middle of a series of associated ideas.[29] The technique he describes is a memory exercise for the psychology of everyday life, but his terse discussion of midpoints may also offer a clue to the way a poet's memory works. The treatise is at once a chapter in the early history of psychology and an important source for ancient literary criticism, in the expanded sense that phrase has today.[30]

26. Bolles 1988, 179–206.

27. Thelen 1989, 1117.

28. The comments that follow are based on Richard Sorabji's edition of *De memoria* (1972, 22–34, esp. 31–34).

29. Sorabji 1972, 31.

30. Bolles 1988, 289; Russell and Winterbottom 1972, xvi.

Cognitive psychologists would agree with Aristotle's advice to start a search for something we want to recall by going to the middle of a series of associated ideas; such meaningful order does aid recall.[31] We can recollect something in greater detail and with greater accuracy if it is organized according to a grammar we understand, and we can do even better if that grammar is one we ourselves have constructed.[32] Aristotle's discussion of the technique of midpoints achieves much the same results as the more recently discovered constructive process of "chunking," whereby the constituent elements in a series of things to be recalled are organized into units of associations, or chunks.[33] Both techniques rely on what the cognitive psychologist knows as seriational organization and relational imagery.[34]

The midpoint (*τὸ μέσον*) that Aristotle is speaking of is somewhere in a series of eight letters. The text is difficult and the manuscript tradition agrees only on the number of letters. As is typical in mnemonic systems,[35] the letters of the alphabet that appear there are abstract images rather than abbreviations of actual words or names.[36] Aristotle may have in the back of his mind the "place" system of *τόποι* characteristic of more elaborate systems of mnemotechnique,[37] since he is imagining the letters as a spatial construct, not as a simple list.

Where then is Aristotle's midpoint? It could be at the center of the entire series, but in order for there to be a midpoint in A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ, the text would require emendation from the manuscript tradition's even series of eight letters to nine: A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ (I).[38] The result, with E now centered, does not seem to be a helpful aid for recall; for example, the series of letters would be useless if one did not reach E on the first try.

Sorabji argues that Aristotle is speaking of a more manageable middle member of a triplet of just three letters: the B of A B Γ, the E of Δ E Z, and so on, rather than the middle of a long series. Thus Aristotle means we can construct triplets like A B Γ, or Δ E Z, or even new combinations, with Γ the midpoint of B Γ Δ, Z the midpoint of E Z H, and so on. If this is the case, when we are unsuccessful in recalling the associated images with the first triplet we have selected, we can skip to the middle member of the next or construct a new triplet with members drawn from others.

31. Neisser 1967, 255–57; cf. Blum 1969, 75–80; Yates 1966.
32. Bolles 1988, 92–111.
33. G. A. Miller 1956; Bolles 1988, 92–111.
34. Baddeley 1976, 281.
35. Baddeley 1976, 348–55; Neisser 1967, 355–69.
36. Sorabji 1972, 105.
37. Blum 1969, 3–11.
38. Ross 1955, 247–48.

The technique of midpoints has an elegant simplicity. It enables us to alternate directions of travel along whatever series we have devised, so that we can search backward in order as well as forward. It is particularly easy to visit next-door neighbors on either side of a member of a triplet within a series; for example, to go from Δ to Γ or E in A B Γ Δ E Z.

This technique is far simpler than the mnemonic systems described by Frances Yates or Jonathan Spence,[39] but a cognitive psychologist would see them as definitely related: "Mnemonic systems reflect the same basic processes that underlie normal unaided memory. They reflect some of those processes particularly clearly (as in the case of visual imagery), and if we ignore them our view of human memory is likely to be impoverished and distorted."[40] In this case, Aristotle's fluent movement backward or forward from one member of a midpoint to another resembles the kind of moves that singers like Demodocus, Phemius, or Homer himself make when they start their songs. Thus the poet instructs the Muse of the *Odyssey* to begin "from some point or other" (*τῶν ἀμόθεν γε*, 1.10), and Odysseus bids Demodocus to go to another part of the story of Troy, such as the Trojan horse (*ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι*, 8.492). The inspiration of the poet works through a heightening of the ways ordinary memory works, making it as self-aware and active as possible.

The proem of the *Iliad* indicates the poet's decision about how to treat his material. In effect, it implies the structure of the entire poem, not so much telling us what the story will be as what the story will be about.[41] It has been praised and imitated from antiquity to the present for the way it sweeps us into the middle of a story, as if we already knew it. Horace's phrase *in medias res* (*Ars* 148), "into the midst of things," is proverbial. It seems to mean that Homer's technique was one of omission and summary, possibly an inversion of events, or a reversal of chronological order like the rhetorical figure of *hysteron proteron*.[42] The procedure has seemed to many readers to be unique, the first mark of Homer's genius.

When further explanations are attempted, they tend to define Homer's procedure in negative terms, describing what he is *not* doing: for example, that he is not proceeding like the Cyclic poets of the Trojan War, who attempted to tell everything about every person and event;[43] or that he is not telling a story like a historian, as other epic poets were wont to do.[44]

39. Yates 1966; Spence 1984.
40. Neisser 1967, 357.
41. Redfield 1979, 110; cf. E. Saïd 1975, 43–50.
42. Brink 1971, 222–23.
43. Hor. *Ars* 136–37; Griffin 1977.
44. Arist. *Po.* 1459a21–1459b23; Kirk 1985, 52–53.

Chronological order is the point of reference for such explanations. Thus Redfield writes: "The poet is telling his story backward; the proem is not in narrative but in logical order. It responds to the questions: What story is it? Why is it worth telling? How does it begin and with whom?"[45] Homer reversed chronological order for both esthetic and formal reasons, in order to emphasize Achilles' rage, the dominant theme of the poem.

Perhaps he proceeded in another way, one guided not so much by chronology as by a desire to organize the poem, from its beginning, as a mnemonic system. The *Iliad* never moves into the chronological center of anything, at any time; though it opens "in the thick of things," for example, it is also in the ninth year of the war, not year 4.5. The arresting quality of its proem owes much to Homer's reworking of the epic tradition,[46] and just as much to the particular order in which he arranges the three stages or points of development in his story:

A. the rage of Achilles
B. its consequences
Γ. its beginnings: the quarrel with Agamemnon.

This is not a simple reversal of chronological order, or telling the story backward; a chronological ordering of the same events would go as follows (incidentally, in more or less the order in which the poem proceeds):

Γ. the beginnings: the quarrel with Agamemnon
A. the rage of Achilles
B. its consequences.

The rage of Achilles, here the midpoint in this sequence, becomes the beginning of the poem because it is central to everything around it (Γ, B) and everything that follows. Memory is not the poet's retrieval system, any more than it is for any other person. It works by a process of creative construction that depends very much on his understanding, his attention, and his desire. He wants to remember things according to his perception of the importance that he sees in them. He commands the Muse to begin with Achilles' anger (A), moves from that point to the next one he wishes to recall (B), then moves to the next (Γ). The order of these three points is, in short, a mnemonic structure, an aid to the creative memory of the poet, which helps him organize and sing the larger elements of his story. This

45. Redfield 1979, 109.
46. Nagy 1979, 73; Redfield 1979, 110.

large-scale structure may be compared to the use of a traditional epithet like Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος to construct a hexameter line. The procedure is not the same as working within a unilinear chronology, first remembering things according to the way they may actually have occurred, then reversing them or scrambling them into another order for the instruction or delectation of an audience—though that of course is the *effect* of what he does.[47] It is rather a process that, to begin with, enables the poet to sing what he wishes to remember.

The proem is organized by a constructive grammar that enables its poet to create a "meaningful recall of past events."[48] That grammar is itself created from the way human beings perceive things and remember them. An unusual simile in book 15 describing the flight of Hera from the side of Zeus on Ida to Olympus suggests that a poet's memory has much in common with the operations of memory in everyday life:

> He spoke, and the goddess of the white arms Hera did not disobey him
> but went back to tall Olympus from the mountains of Ida.
> As the thought flashes in the mind of a man, who, traversing
> much territory, thinks of things in the mind's awareness,
> "I wish I were in this place, or this," and imagines many things,
> so rapidly in her eagerness winged Hera, a goddess.
>
> (15.78–83)

Note that the simile shows the operations of memory rather than the results of that operation. By shifting from geographical space to mental image, its figurative language expresses something the poet could not or would not say directly[49]—the dazzling speed of Hera's flight, as well as her eagerness. Furthermore, the thought of the man in the simile, who in his eager desire for many things (μενοινήῃσί τε πολλά, 15.82) recalls now one place, now another (ἔνθ' εἴην, ἢ ἔνθα, 15.82) suggests that the memory of an ordinary person works in the same manner as the memory of the poet. Demodocus, stirred by the Muse, begins a new song about the Trojan War, using the same mental movement (ἔνθεν ἑλών, "starting from that point where...," *Od.* 8.500).

The *Iliad* may, therefore, open the way it does, not because Homer was not writing history, but for quite positive reasons that have to do with a process of creating the poem that continues beyond those opening lines. Its

47. Cf. Kirk 1985, 53.
48. Bolles 1988, 69.
49. Fogelin 1988, 79, 97.

beginning leads directly to the next thing to be recalled, which is not the quarrel itself but the midpointed question: "Which one of the gods caused them to quarrel?" From there (E), the story unfolds through similar associations, moving from the opening scene between Chryses and Agamemnon (Δ), to Chryses' prayer and Apollo's plague (E), to the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon (Z), to ever larger patterns that this study cannot allude to, let alone describe. But perhaps enough has been said here to suggest that there may be yet other ways of approaching ancient poetry, as memory performances on a grand scale, fashioned by an art whose complexities it sometimes seems we are only beginning to understand.[50]

50. Martin 1989, 77–78, 237.

## 36

# *Atê* Reconsidered

Matt Neuburg

THERE IS SOMETHING VERY PECULIAR about the word ἄτη. It is not simply that no generally satisfying etymology has ever been agreed upon; etymology, despite its traditional place of privilege, often really does not have as much power to inform our understanding of a word as is sometimes assumed. But the live usage of ἄτη particularly eludes us.[1] Despite our seemingly being quite well informed on the subject as to raw numbers—there are over 150 instances surviving from before the end of the fifth century[2]—there continues to be debate over just what ἄτη means.

The problem is aggravated by the very feature of ἄτη that most heightens its interest for us—its centrality. (The obvious example is the *Iliad*, whose entire action is in a sense driven by ἄτη; but ἄτη lies at the heart of so

This chapter was originally a paper delivered at the American Philological Association meeting in San Antonio, Texas, 29 December 1986, in a session chaired by Martin Ostwald. It is a special source of pride for me, as his former student and colleague at Swarthmore College, to submit it here, in his honor, and with all gratitude for his encouragement.

1. Certainly it can be of interest, for its own sake, to be able to determine a word's prehistory. But the live usage of a word within a language at any given moment carries with it, by and large, no cultural memory of that word's past (people say "goodbye" all the time without being reminded of God or refer to something as "silly" without intending any overtones of blessedness). Thus I am grateful for, but not greatly aided by, the sort of approach taken by the late E. D. Francis (1983); however, see Francis' references on the history of the etymological problem. Francis, by the way, taking ἄτη as deverbative (from ἄασα), concentrates primarily on the verb; this may be correct, but the present chapter, preferring to err on the side of safety, confines itself to the noun, where most scholarly discussion has in any case been concentrated.

2. Listed in Doyle 1984, app. A. The instances are all from poetry, since the word is hardly found in classical prose: once in Herodotus (1.32) and then not again until Aristotle (and even in the Herodotus passage the usage is probably a deliberate recollection of Solon's poetry).

many significant utterances throughout Greek literature that it would be otiose to list them.)[3] Because of the contexts in which the word appears, discussion of it tends to become entangled in a kind of moral and metaphysical net. Where ἄτη is, problems of causality, divinity, and ethics are not far behind. These notions, to be sure, are just what we want to study when we study the Greeks. But to load ἄτη itself with them, merely because the word is used in such contexts, can, and in many discussions of the word does, result in a methodological circularity.

Consider Gerhard Müller's treatment of ἄτη.[4] To Müller, such *Iliad* passages as 1.412, 9.115, and 20.86, taken together with 2.111, show that ἄτη involves the inexplicable (*unberechenbar*) intervention of the gods, who delude people into entertaining hopes that will later be dashed. For him this is the basic, normal use of the word—the "alte, echte ἄτη." Then, when he comes to a passage like 9.502, where Phoenix speaks of the destruction (ἄτη) that besets whoever fails to reverence the Litai, Müller concludes that this usage of ἄτη cannot be seen as one with the "normal" Homeric ἄτη, because it involves no delusion sent by the gods; the onset of this ἄτη is triggered simply by one's own behavior, and is completely in one's own power.[5]

In arriving at this view, is Müller dealing fairly with the concept of "meaning"—not so much *what* ἄτη means but *how* it means? Granted, the context of the first passages invokes the gods' role in deluding mortals, while that of the second does not; but this does not show that the meaning of ἄτη itself depends in the first passage, but not in the second, upon the role of the gods in deluding mortals. I may say, "God afflicted me with measles for no reason," or "I was afflicted with measles because I failed to give to the poor," or "I caught measles through hanging around with germy schoolchildren"; in the different contexts, I speak differently of the agency and entertain different moral and metaphysical beliefs about how and why one gets measles, but the meaning of *measles* from one utterance to the next does not change—it is the name of an affliction, not of an affliction plus the nature of its causes. The natural first assumption about ἄτη would be that it is like this.[6]

3. Cf. Wyatt 1982, 247: "The word is important for an understanding of Greek thinking and psychology and merits repeated examination."

4. Müller 1956.

5. In expounding Müller's view, I have brought together ideas from different parts of his article, but I believe I am representing him fairly.

6. One might also argue that an ἄτη whose meaning involved what its context involves would be used redundantly. If, for example, the idea that Zeus inexplicably deludes people with ἄτη were inherent in the meaning of ἄτη, it would be extremely strange to say, as Agamemnon does, "Zeus deluded me with ἄτη"—it would be like saying, "The muggers stole my money by means of robbery."

Turning from the Homeric conception of ἄτη to the Aeschylean, we see the error from a slightly different angle. Ἄτη in Aeschylus involves, for Müller, a strange contradiction: God causes someone to do wrong, through delusion, yet punishes him for having done wrong. Thus (says Müller), Aeschylus raises profound moral and metaphysical questions about freedom, agency, and responsibility. This is not an uncommon view of Aeschylus[7] and it is not infrequently linked to ἄτη. Albin Lesky says of Aeschylean ἄτη that "[w]e have no single word for it: there are really two aspects, which the Greeks of that time saw as a unity. From the gods' point of view, Ate is the doom that they pronounce on mortals: to man it is the spiritual blindness which at first flatters and encourages him, but gradually deludes his senses, and finally sets him on the path to his own destruction." In order to destroy someone, god causes him to do something for which he can then be punished; he is "the god who helps men to sin."[8] The similarity to Müller's view is obvious.

The incoherence of Lesky's words perfectly reflects the underlying linguistic muddle. Lesky sets out to define ἄτη, but he ends up telling us a little religio-philosophical story, a kind of doctrine, about "what god does." What can be the relationship between this doctrine and ἄτη?[9] Clearly ἄτη cannot denote this doctrine; so what is the doctrine doing in the definition? Lesky has tried to load a single word with a notion derived not from that word but from Aeschylus as a whole—reading the context onto the word itself.[10] The word ἄτη may certainly be used in some Aeschylean passages that seem significantly to *reflect* a certain philosophy; but ἄτη itself does not therefore *mean* that philosophy, and indeed its meaning may be quite independent of that philosophy.

This scholarly procedure can become a subtly circular way of reinforcing private interpretations of the context. Lesky's description of Aeschylean ἄτη introduces, through the use of the word *sin*, a Judeo-Christian notion of

7. I am unconcerned here with whether it is right, though I happen to think it is not; my views on the moral and metaphysical content of the *Oresteia* may be found in Neuburg 1981.

8. Lesky 1966, 246, 247, 258; also, Lesky 1961, 39. Lesky's view of Aeschylean ἄτη (and Aeschylean tragedy) is one of the most widespread and influential.

9. Cf. Wyatt 1982, 247, on the LSJ definition of ἄτη: "It appears to be the description of a human figure rather than the gloss of a word."

10. An easy way to see this is to imagine how one would go about contending that Lesky's "definition" of ἄτη is wrong. One would not, could not, cite some individual instance of ἄτη and say, "But, you see, in this passage ἄτη does not mean what you say it means," because Lesky's "definition" is not really about meaning at all, and no single instance can prove or disprove it. One would argue instead about the philosophy underlying the whole play, no doubt citing many passages in which ἄτη does not even occur; one would say, "The doctrine you describe is not operative in the play, hence ἄτη does not mean what you say it does."

transgression and punishment that may well be alien to Aeschylean thinking. Müller's view that ἄτη in Aeschylus (or Solon) is morally and metaphysically problematic reads onto the Greeks certain modern Western assumptions about causality and freedom of the will that may be anachronistic. The scholar says that these notions are inherent in the word, and then, since the word occurs throughout Aeschylus, they are implicitly made part of Aeschylus' thought. But these notions were read into the word in the first place only through the scholar's previous perception of Aeschylus' thought as whole. The discussion is thus made to look philological, when in fact the argument ought to take place in the arena of broad interpretational issues.[11]

A second methodological error in the way ἄτη has generally been studied is not unrelated to the first. Recall that Lesky says, "We have no single word for [ἄτη]: there are really two aspects, which the Greeks of that time saw as a unity." This feature of ἄτη, that it appears to be two things, is often a pivot of scholarly discussions of the word. Granted, ἄτη is even used within single works of literature in ways that appear incompatible with any single meaning.[12] The problem is that the dual nature of ἄτη has excited scholarly responses quite different from other words that mean more than one thing.

E. R. Dodds, in his classic discussion of ἄτη in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, says that after Homer, for whom ἄτη is always just a kind of temporary insanity, ἄτη is moralized and then viewed as a kind of punishment, and therefore it "is applied not only to the sinner's state of mind, but to the objective disasters resulting from it." It thus comes to reflect "a mysterious dynamic nexus, binding together crime and punishment."[13] The similarities and differences between Dodds' and Lesky's characterization of ἄτη are revealing. Both agree that ἄτη is a duality. But they do not agree on what that duality is. For Dodds, the duality is crime versus punishment, or perhaps mental versus objective; whereas Lesky characterizes the duality as divine point of view versus human (where the human side seems to embrace both wings of Dodds' duality). A similar situation holds through the scholarly literature. Scholars immediately agree upon the duality of ἄτη; but when it comes to defining that duality, *tot figurae quot homines.* R. D. Dawe begins his treatment by asking whether ἄτη's primary meaning is "harm," of

11. The extreme example of this sort of overphilosophizing ἄτη seems to me to be Stallmach 1968.

12. Wyatt (1982) cites examples from LSJ, which seems a neutral enough source. There is no denying that (for example) *Il.* 16.805, τὸν δ' ἄτη φρένας εἷλε, shows ἄτη as something that happens to someone, but that 6.356, Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης, shows it as something one does.

13. Dodds 1951, 5, 38; chaps. 1–2. This is probably the most influential of all treatments of ἄτη.

which "mental blindness" coming from the gods is just a specific type, or "mental blindness," of which "punishment" coming from the gods is a consequence.[14] Dawe's duality here is broadly mental versus external, rather like Dodds'; but it might be mental versus external damage, which would be very different from Dodds' crime-punishment nexus. Wyatt characterizes the Homeric duality as "remorse for an act" or "a remorse-causing act."[15] Here is a subjective and an objective component once more; but whereas Dodds sees the subjective component (mental blindness) as coming first and precipitating the objective, to Wyatt the subjective component comes later and is an emotional reaction to the objective. Our confusion reaches its climax when we find Doyle distinguishing an entire roster of possible meanings for ἄτη—"blindness," "infatuation," "folly," "ruin," "loss," "calamity," or "disaster."[16]

Not only is there disagreement in the definition of ἄτη's duality, but the attempt to justify this duality as a unity leads to the most astonishing tactics. Lesky says that the Greeks saw ἄτη as one, but he can only define it as two; it is in order to bridge the gap that he tells his little religio-philosophical story. Dawe, when he speaks of two meanings, "mental blindness" and consequential "punishment," tries to show that somehow the one thing can be a subset of the other; but is it a likely, or even possible, instance of the linguistic process of extension, that a word that only denotes a state of mental confusion could come to include in its meaning objective destruction?[17] Dodds, having described ἄτη as a duality, tries to redescribe it as a unity by resorting to the nonsense phrase, "a mysterious dynamic nexus."[18]

All the debate has not resolved the question of the meaning of ἄτη's duality, and scholars end up giving ἄτη such exceptional linguistic status because the question as they pose it contains within itself a further misapprehension about "how words mean"—in this case, how words mean more than one thing. This misapprehension has made scholars unable to decide

14. Dawe 1967.

15. Doyle 1984, 256, 262.

16. Doyle 1984, passim, esp. chaps. 4–5, app. A.

17. Cf. Barrett 1964, on line 241 (writing, however, of Dodds): "I do not find this process very likely (esp. the back-and-forth development: mental ἄτη *from* nonpunitive, ἄτη as ruin *to* nonpunitive)."

18. Truly a definition of an unknown by an unknown, for who knows what "a mysterious dynamic nexus" means? To whom, for example, does Dodds mean this nexus to be mysterious? To us? If so, are not these words just a form of hand-waving to cover up the incomprehensibility of the definition? To the Greeks? If so, does Dodds mean that the Greeks did not know what they were talking about when they used the word ἄτη? Or that ἄτη involved for them some religio-philosophical conception, which they felt to be on the level of the mysterious? In this case, Dodds' "definition" would obviously lie open to the same objections as Lesky's: Is this doctrine anywhere enunciated, and what is the real relationship of the single word ἄτη to it?

whether ἄτη *does* mean two things or only one; and from this waffling comes the mysticized incoherency of their accounts.[19] Let us be explicit about the nature of ἄτη's alleged "meanings"—explicit where, for example, a source like LSJ is not. LSJ lists a number of meanings for ἄτη. It also lists, in much the same format, a number of meanings for many other words, such as δέχομαι. But perhaps the similarity of the format masks a serious difference. The different "meanings" listed in LSJ for δέχομαι, including such renderings as "understand," "undertake," "entertain," "await the attack of," "admit of," and "circumscribe," are all to be understood as contextually triggered shades of the basic meaning of δέχομαι, "accept/receive," where the Greek notion can apply broadly across a number of contexts in which English, with its very large vocabulary, would differentiate. But "bewilderment" and "sin" (two of the LSJ entries under ἄτη) do not seem to be contextually triggered shades of anything—at least, no notion of which "bewilderment" and "sin" are shades comes to mind. They are, it seems, distinct meanings.

The situation where a single word has more than one distinct meaning takes two main forms. Two different words may, more or less accidentally, come to sound alike (homonymy), like *bear*, the animal, and *bear*, "to carry." Or, a single word may extend its meaning into distinct but genetically related regions; it is as if the field of contexts in which it made sense to the users of the language to employ the word was once broad, as with δέχομαι, but then for some reason the word's actual usage became restricted to a few isolated contextual locations within that field (polysemy). A former teacher of mine used to use as a favorite example the word *litter*, which might mean "a palanquin," or "detritus," or "kittens." These distinct meanings turn out to be aspects of one notion. *Litter* is related to *lie*; it should mean, generally, "bed." But it is used only in some isolated pockets of that meaning: A palanquin is a portable bed, the collective young of a cat fill and form a kind of bed, and refuse strewn about makes a figurative, or even literal, bed.

Observe, however, that our various uses of the word *litter* refer not only to different things, but to *contextually* different things. In most real-life conversations, the fact that there is more than one (theoretically) possible meaning for the speaker's *litter* does not even occur to the listener—because only one comes to mind under the circumstances. The different meanings of *litter* are (in real life) contextually mutually exclusive; rarely would I need to add further information to let a listener know which of the different

19. This is the true reason for the phenomenon to which Wyatt (1982, 247) trenchantly points: "Greek ἄτη is one of those baffling notions which one is apt archly to pronounce untranslatable while at the same time hinting broadly that one understands it perfectly."

meanings of *litter* I intended. The contexts for *bear* are even more contextually distinct—it is either a verb or a noun. The polysemy of *litter* and the homonymy of *bear* function in the same way within the structure of the language; they are viable because their contexts prevent serious confusion. Such viability is not only a synchronic feature of the language at a given moment, but a kind of linguistic desideratum that drives diachronic linguistic development. One does not like to call exceptions impossible—all linguistic generalities have exceptions—but by and large, when homonymy (or polysemy) develops in a language, the language actively conspires to keep the separate meanings clear by contextual restriction. If it cannot do this and clash (serious ambiguity) develops, it nearly always moves in some way to destroy the homonymy.[20]

The trouble is that ἄτη does not seem to be like this either. "Crime" and "punishment" (or however one cares to characterize the duality of ἄτη) are two very different things about which one *would* be likely to speak in the same context. If there did arise a situation where my use of the word *litter* might mislead the listener, I surely would disambiguate by the addition of further context or explanation (unless I had some perverse reason for wanting to enjoy the listener's confusion). If, then, a word could mean either "crime" or "punishment," one would expect a speaker to have to add some explanatory or disambiguating phrase to nearly every use of it. But this is exactly what the users of ἄτη do not do. When the chorus at the end of its scene with Clytemnestra in the *Agamemnon* concludes by saying, "The family is glued to ἄτη" (1566), there is nothing about the context that makes clear whether they are glued to crime or to punishment. True, one generally sees this instance translated "ruin"; but what is there about the context that eliminates from the realm of possibility "blindness," "folly," "infatuation," "crime," "punishment," "remorse," or "acts that cause remorse"—or even notions that no one thinks define ἄτη, such as "misery," "cyclical vengeance," or "pigheadedness"? How was a listener supposed to know, hearing the line spoken in the theatre, which of ἄτη's "meanings" was meant? How, indeed, can any assignment of one of ἄτη's "meanings" in a situation like this fail to be arbitrary and circular?[21]

20. For good discussions of this elementary point see, e.g., Bloomfield 1933, 396; Samuels 1972, 67; Lyons 1977, 550.

21. This is what vitiates the entire approach taken by Doyle (1984, app. A). His method is to run through every single occurrence of ἄτη in classical and preclassical poetic literature, and then quite blithely to pinpoint which meaning ἄτη has at each locus. Each time he gives one of his particular "meanings" for a particular instance of ἄτη, one wonders: How does he know? The number of instances in which some other of his "meanings" would fit the context just as well is very great.

The problem is not merely synchronic but diachronic as well. It goes against all our linguistic intuitions that a language, a living thing among humans trying to communicate cooperatively, would permit such a situation as is attributed to ἄτη even to arise in the first place, let alone to persist for centuries.[22] The process by which ἄτη could have come to mean what it is supposed to mean is unimaginable, let alone how it could continue to mean it over any appreciable time.

We are now in a position to appreciate what has happened to the scholarship. Dodds, for example, needs to deal somehow with the fact that ἄτη's "meanings" appear distinct; therefore he tries to treat it as a word like *litter*, describing for it a *litter*-like (if unlikely) history involving the spread of its field of meaning from "the sinner's state of mind" to "the objective disasters resulting from it." Having done this, however, he finds himself in trouble. If ἄτη were really a word like *litter*, Dodds would have just described a polysemous word with the two meanings "crime" and "punishment"—which would fail to fit the manner in which ἄτη is actually used. So Dodds proceeds to reassure us that ἄτη is *not* really a word like *litter*, but actually a word like δέχομαι; its "meanings" are just aspects of a *single* meaning. But now Dodds is in trouble again, since he cannot say just what would be the single meaning that would tie together "crime" and "punishment." So he lets a "mysterious causal nexus" do it for him. In short, Dodds wants to treat ἄτη both as a word like *litter* and as a word like δέχομαι, and the effort to perform this impossible task is what leads him to the illegitimate maneuver of introducing his religio-philosophical story. This, in one form or another, is the self-contradiction that saps the foundations of so many scholarly accounts of ἄτη.

We can avoid these errors simply by insisting that whatever we assert of ἄτη must be linguistically likely. The Greeks are the users of Greek; they cannot be wrong about it. The Greeks do not treat ἄτη as a duality; they make no attempt to distinguish contextually its different "meanings." Therefore one must conclude that ἄτη is not a duality. It is, after all, just a word like δέχομαι. To us ἄτη appears to be a duality. But this need present no contradiction. We are not Greeks and can be wrong about Greek. We might easily misperceive the situation. For example, let us accept that ἄτη is a word like δέχομαι—in fact, to make things even simpler, let us suppose it is a word like *chair*. Now imagine a Martian, studying us, trying to under-

22. As an example of the way we expect languages to behave, Samuels (1972, 75–76) uses the word *uncouth*, originally "unknown," which was extended, by way of "strange," to mean "awkward" and "rough"; the period during which it was permitted to mean these *and* "unknown" was very short—a little over a century, at the end of which time the earliest meaning had been forced out of existence.

stand our use of the word *chair*. Perhaps Martians do not have chairs; perhaps they do not sit down. But perhaps some of our chairs—something about their shape or color—remind the Martian very strongly of one thing that he does know, while other chairs remind him very strongly of another. He can only see our notion "chair" as a duality; yet it is clear to him that we are using it as a unity. This analogy is actually a priori quite likely; we already suspect that ἄτη denotes not something simple like a chair but something much more elusive, some sort of moral or metaphysical notion—and such notions are particularly difficult to grasp, especially across such a wide cultural gap as that which separates us from the Greeks.

If this is so, we must remember not to try to rationalize away the illusion of duality that is part of our perception of ἄτη. But at the same time, we must surrender any expectation of being able to package that duality in neat terms within our own cultural frame. We can come to understand ἄτη only by resisting all temptation to isolate now this, now that, single "meaning"; these meanings are in our minds alone, not in those of the Greeks. To illustrate some consequences of this approach, here are several instances of ἄτη from Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.[23]

We begin with the simile of the lion in the house (ἄτη, *Ag.* 735), the locus of a lesson crucial to our understanding of the *Agamemnon* chorus' moral vision of Troy's fate.[24] The Trojans (the chorus says) at first celebrated Helen's arrival with wedding songs, but now they see those songs as a lament for their own destruction (707–11). A lion cub raised as a pet was a joy to a household, until with time it grew up and showed its inherited nature; then it spread gory destruction; the house had nourished a priest of ἄτη (717–36). Similarly the joy of Helen's marriage to Paris turned to a bitter ending; the bride became an Erinys, a prelude to vengeance (737–49). Lattimore translates, "This thing they raised in their house was blessed by God to be priest of destruction" (735–36), which makes sense in the context, since destruction did result from the rearing of the lion cub. But the point of the simile, the reason the tale of the lion casts light on Troy and Helen, is that, in view of the lion cub's (by analogy, Helen's) already present potential for wreaking such destruction, it was a mistake to rear it in the first place. The house that reared the lion, like Troy, realized this potential only when the destruction actually occurred. The lesson is: The true nature of an act or thing is revealed only when over time its potential nature, which was present all along, grows into actuality.

23. These were originally selected quite at random; but they are so apt to my purposes that I fear no one will believe this. I restrict my examples to a single literary work to avoid the danger of lumping together interpretations of ἄτη derived from usages that differ between authors or over time; this, however, will suffice to illustrate the power of the method.

24. The classic discussion is still Knox 1952.

What, then, was the ἄτη of which the lion was representative? Was it blind folly or subsequent destruction? Surely the whole point is that it was both. It was an act of folly to take Helen or the lion cub into the house exactly insofar as that act matured into the eventual destruction of the house. The chorus invokes ἄτη just at the moment when it is trying to teach us that the nature of an act resides in its consequences. We must, then, see ἄτη as neither act nor consequence alone, or the lion will cease to represent this lesson.

At *Agamemnon* 819, ἄτη is among the first words from the mouth of the victoriously returned Agamemnon. The king forcibly emphasizes again and again that in destroying Troy he has not been acting with wanton violence but has been fulfilling the moral purpose and the justice of the gods.[25] We recall the Herald's words: Agamemnon has uprooted Troy, but he has used "the pickaxe of justice-bringing Zeus" to do it (525). When Agamemnon compares Troy's destruction with a lion (827), we recall the lion in the house simile. All that Agamemnon says is aimed at insisting that the destruction of Troy is something the Trojans deserved and brought upon themselves. When, in the midst of this rhetoric, he describes the burned city by saying, "The storms of ἄτη live, the ash sends forth the fat breaths of wealth," the use of the word ἄτη must be a way of making the very same point. Wood is potentially ash and smoke; the vaunted wealth of Troy was potentially Troy's own destruction. The application of fire has actualized both potentials, revealed the hidden truth. The smoke that rises from burned Troy is smoke that says, as ye sow, so shall ye reap. The storms of ἄτη are the storms inherent in Troy's own rash violation of the laws of Zeus Xenios, as much as they are the fact of Troy's destruction. To reduce ἄτη here to mere "destruction," without the association of act and responsive result that lies behind its usage, is to vitiate the power and self-justifying rhetoric of this part of Agamemnon's speech.

*Agamemnon* 1192 is part of Cassandra's mystic vision of the inbred cycle of vengeance in the house of Atreus. Lattimore translates (1190–93):

> ...ingrown vengeful spirits never to be cast forth.
> Hanging above the hall they chant the song of hate
> and the old sin [ἄτη]; and taking up the strain in turn
> spit curses on that man who spoiled his brother's bed.

25. Justice words in the first four lines are δίκη (811), δικαίων (812), δίκας (813); justice is legitimate vengeance in this part of the play. Attributions of victory to the support of the gods in the first twelve lines are θεοὺς μεταιτίους (811), θεοὶ ψήφους ἔθεντο (816), and τούτων θεοῖσι χάριν (821).

Compare this with what the chorus will say as it comes to its own understanding of the house's cycle of vengeance: "The race is glued to ἄτη," which Lattimore translates "ruin." But choosing *sin* (an earlier component) on the one hand and *ruin* (a later component) on the other obscures the echo—and the point of both passages. Cassandra sees not only the fact of an old wrong done in the house (Thyestes' adultery and gruesome feast), but the existence there of a perpetual chain of outrage and response. That is why the spirits of vengeance in the house are "never to be cast forth," and why they take up the song and spit curses in turn, like verse-cappers at a party. Indeed, it is why they are spirits of *vengeance*; what they sing is the whole complex of act and revenge reflected in the fact of their presence.

Later, Clytemnestra uses this same notion of act and revenge to justify to the chorus her murder of Agamemnon. The chorus is forced to realize (1562) that as long as Zeus is on his throne, the rule remains that he who acts is acted upon in return. When, therefore, the chorus says in the same breath that the race is glued to ἄτη, it is not just saying vaguely that the house of Atreus is doomed. It means that the house of Atreus is trapped in this cycle of act and response of which Clytemnestra has spoken, with no end in sight.[26] The chorus invokes ἄτη at the climactic moment of its moral and theological odyssey through this play, a moment when the linkage of act and response is made horrifyingly clear to the chorus at last. When Cassandra spoke earlier of the ἄτη of the house, the chorus did not understand its implications for the present and the future—the death of Agamemnon and, worse, Clytemnestra's proof that the death was a just, legitimate response to Agamemnon's own acts. Now the chorus understands.[27]

These examples illustrate the analytical power of the suggested approach. We grant that ἄτη looks dual, but our characterization of its duality is very minimal. We thus avoid pinning on ἄτη itself such restrictive and prejudicial labels as subjective and objective, or crime and punishment. Nevertheless it is clear that ἄτη is used in the *Agamemnon* in contexts where the emphasis is on the interrelationship between an earlier and a later event.

26. That this reading is correct is clear from Clytemnestra's reply (1567–76): You are right, but at the same time I hope in fact to avert further perpetuation of the cycle (so as not to be murdered myself), ridding the house of its δαίμων. This would be a non sequitur if the chorus' reference to ἄτη did not involve, not destruction merely, but this chain of murder and murder in return to which Clytemnestra refers. Observe, by the way, that Clytemnestra means to effect her escape by ὅρκους, thus she implicitly answers the chorus' question to Cassandra, when she described the in-dwelling ἄτη of the house: καὶ πῶς ἄν ὅρκου πῆγμα παιώνιον γένοιτο; This confirms the echo of the earlier passage.

27. An extended discussion of my views on the scene between Clytemnestra and the chorus will be found in Neuburg 1991.

It also happens that some of the speakers in the *Agamemnon* further characterize this interrelationship as a moral one and describe its inherence as in the power of Zeus. But they do not all do this (Cassandra does not), and some of those who do (Agamemnon, and perhaps Clytemnestra) seem to have primarily rhetorical motives. Therefore it seems best, on a first approximation, to exclude this from our understanding of ἄτη itself. What must in every instance figure in the way ἄτη is used, however, is this notion that an earlier and a later event are related; indeed the point of the studied instances of ἄτη is missed if they are not understood in this way (that is, as comprising both components of ἄτη's duality at once, the earlier and the later event together).[28] Behind the mind-set that can use a word like ἄτη is a vision of act and consequence as inextricably related. And in particular, ἄτη is apparently used in cases of a bad act—bad exactly in the sense that it proves to be connected to a bad consequence.

Such a characterization of ἄτη, I believe, explains adequately why the word is used so predominantly in "theological" contexts and yet appears also in extremely mundane circumstances—the two usages, indeed, sometimes occurring side by side. The notorious instance from book 19 of the *Iliad* furnishes a particularly useful example. Agamemnon (in his long speech starting at 78) tells how Hera tricked Zeus into making Eurystheus, not Heracles, a mighty king, and he uses this story to make the ἄτη that vexed Zeus a parallel to the ἄτη that he says Zeus and Moira cast upon him in book 1. If we regard ἄτη as itself theological or moral in nature (crime and punishment sent by the gods, etc.), we must accuse Agamemnon of equivocating here, since these "meanings" cannot be made applicable to Zeus' situation in the story (all that happened was that Hera fooled him); but the parallel between Zeus' and Agamemnon's commission of an unfortunate act and subjection to its regrettable consequences is unexceptionable. The theological and moral components of Agamemnon's situation, whatever they may be, are thus not what is referred to by ἄτη. But at the same time, having done something that would turn out to be so bad for him, it is natural for Agamemnon—or anyone—to seek an explanation of his own behavior. Thus one is easily led from what ἄτη is, as a constant human phenomenon, to how it comes about. To the Greeks, who had no recourse to Freud, an

28. My sympathies are thus with an approach like that of Gruber (1963, 60), who shows that for a passage like *Il.* 19.270, all three earlier distinguished meanings, "Verblendung," "falsches Handeln," and "Schaden," are simultaneously present; or even with that of Müller (1956), who says that the dual meaning of ἄτη is the "real" one, and that any instance where ἄτη exhibits only a single wing of its duality, such as "harm," is a reductive simplification (though I obviously disagree with both scholars in other respects).

external explanation, and one that invokes the gods in particular, was natural throughout antiquity.[29]

Two further consequences of this approach seem worth particular emphasis. In the first place the word ἄτη must not be thought of as merely *occurring* in the *Agamemnon*, as if it were some token of the *author's* philosophy; rather, it is used, used by particular characters who have particular intentions and beliefs, and who are already concerned with the relationship of act to consequence. Many scholars have pointed to the drama's constant angst about the future.[30] But we are now in a position to see that this angst is not merely fear about what will happen; it is a moral concern. Since the future is the outgrowth of the present, it reveals, when it comes, the moral nature of the present—at least that is what some characters of the drama hope and believe. There is no moral or metaphysical doctrine built into ἄτη; because of its applicability to event-connection, ἄτη is a handy notion for the *characters* of the play to use, and their quest for understanding how the events of life interconnect has made the word seem so morally and metaphysically rich to our eyes.

This approach to ἄτη may alleviate some of the mystery about its development. Many scholarly discussions[31] are at pains to note and explain a change in the meaning of ἄτη between Homer and later literature—though the linguistic developments involved are dubious at best. Under the approach suggested here, however, a great deal of the apparent difference between the different stages of ἄτη disappears, and the word may be viewed as more constant over time. To take just one example, Müller's "alte, echte ἄτη" of *Iliad* 1.412, 9.115, and 20.86 no longer seems very different from the ἄτη of 9.502; all the passages are exactly about people doing things whose consequences will be or have been bad for them later. Nor do these examples now seem very different from the *Agamemnon* instances studied above. Indeed, it seems to me that ἄτη very much retains its basic usage throughout the traceable history of the ancient Greek language. As late as Plutarch (*Mor.* 168a) we hear of the superstitious man reacting in this way to misfortune:

29. Cf. Müller's discussion (1956), and see also Erbse 1986, 11–18. Erbse, like others studied above, confuses what ἄτη is with what brings it about; thus he misspeaks in saying that, for Agamemnon, ἄτη is the only available explanation of his behavior. But if we understand this more rigorously—that Zeus and Moira are the only explanation available to Agamemnon for his own ἄτη—Erbse is absolutely right.

30. For example, Alexanderson 1969, Kamerbeek 1965, Vicaire 1963.

31. Müller, Dawe, Dodds, Stallmach, and Gruber among those already cited; also the LSJ entry.

> *οὔτε γὰρ ἄνθρωπον οὔτε τύχην οὔτε καιρὸν οὔθ' αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ πάντων τὸν θεὸν αἰτιᾶται, κακεῖθεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἥκειν καὶ φέρεσθαι ῥεῦμα δαιμόνιον ἄτης φησί, καὶ οὐ δυστυχὴς ὢν ἀλλὰ θεομισής τις ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κολάζεσθαι καὶ δικὴν δίδοναι, πάντα πάσχειν δι' αὑτὸν ὑπονοῶν.*

The *καί* after *φησί* is practically epexegetic. The word *ἄτη* is still, at this late date, the appropriate term for afflictions one regards as somehow the outgrowth of one's own deeds.

37

# Aeschylus' Politics and the Theme of the *Oresteia*

David M. Schaps

MANY MODERN READERS find the end of the *Oresteia* somewhat disappointing. A trilogy that started off with universal themes of vengeance, justice, life and death, and peace and war ends up as an aetiology for an Athenian court of whose existence the general reader was—unless he has read the introduction kindly prefaced by some classicist—hitherto unaware. The *Eumenides* has everything—spectacle, conflict, tension, even rather more surprise than is normal in a Greek tragedy—yet it has never been as popular as the *Agamemnon.*

The classicist may not find the Areopagus as arcane a matter as the general reader does, and is presumably more attuned to seeing matters of general import appear in Attic attire. Indeed, those English-speaking scholars who have considered the matter at length have seen that the *Oresteia* deals with issues of fundamental import to society. George Thomson, from a Marxist point of view, saw it as reenacting the transition from one mode of society to another;[1] Richard Kuhns, from a philosopher's, saw it as depicting the foundation of mankind's moral awareness; and Froma Zeitlin, from a feminist's, saw it as the foundation-myth of Greek patriarchy and indeed of the male dominance of western society as a whole. These theories,

More than twenty-five years ago, an undergraduate with literary pretensions and no classical background decided to fill a gap in his schedule with elementary Greek. A year of enjoying Martin Ostwald's ready smile, broad knowledge, and infectious enthusiasm brought him to a career that he had hardly expected. I am pleased to offer this chapter in his honor. An earlier version was presented to the eighteenth annual meeting of the Society for the Promotion of Classical Studies in Israel, in Tel Aviv, 18 May 1989.

1. Thomson 1973, 229–77 (his *Oresteia* [1966] expresses the same opinions, often verbatim); Kuhns 1962; Zeitlin [1973] 1986.

on the deepest level, are not necessarily contradictory. The *Oresteia* undoubtedly progresses from a flawed state of society to an improved state, and in doing so it may be seen to reflect and reinforce the progress of the Greek polis and the Greek individual to their classical ideal as Aeschylus saw it. The classicist does not have trouble understanding what issues are being addressed in the *Oresteia*.

Why the court of the Areopagus should play so central a part in this, however, is not immediately obvious. It is true—and classicists have been aware of the fact for over a hundred years—that the place of the Areopagus in the Athenian state was a burning issue when Aeschylus wrote. All the more puzzling, then, is his attitude. He speaks the highest praise of this court, which we know had until recently managed the most important matters of state; and some scholars have seen in the *Eumenides* the work of a reactionary trying to reinstate the Areopagus to its high estate. How odd, then, that he gives no hint of its former powers. He praises the Areopagus indeed, but only the reconstituted Areopagus; and we may as well see—as other scholars have done—the work of a radical, or at least a progressive, justifying and identifying with the reform of Ephialtes.[2]

The classicist may also sympathize with the general reader's malaise about the trilogy's structure. Even granting the importance of the subject, one does not feel entirely comfortable with the introduction of an entirely new subject—the place of the Areopagus in the Athenian constitution—so close to the climax. We have been looking throughout the trilogy for the solution to the problems of the house of Atreus, and we have been looking for it through the medium of the action of the principals. When the solution comes, however, it is pointed out with no particular subtlety that we are dealing in fact with the solution to the problems of the Athenian state, and that we are to find it through the medium of constitutional compromise. This change in subject is not, perhaps, as serious a problem as it may seem to a modern mind; many Greek tragedies seem to take off on a new tack somewhere around the middle, to the embarrassment of Aristotelian critics. Nevertheless, the *Oresteia* has shown, up to this point, a remarkable unity of action. And it seems odd for the Areopagus, a subject that surely aroused deep feelings in the poet and his audience, to be tacked on at the end as an afterthought.[3]

I do not think that the Areopagus is an afterthought in the *Oresteia*. On the contrary, I believe it to be the central item in the poet's conception of the entire trilogy—more essential, in a certain sense, than Agamemnon,

2. The debate is well summarized in Podlecki 1966, 80–94; the reader may seek further bibliography there.

3. "Stitched on its outside" was the expression of Livingstone (1925, 124).

Clytemnestra, Orestes, or the dire goddesses themselves. I believe that Aeschylus, in the midst of a great civil struggle, sat down to write not one, but three, plays on that subject, and that the mythological story chosen, the plot line, and the characterizations were dictated by the way he chose to present it. This does not by any means deny the other motifs that have been seen in this trilogy;[4] it is in the nature of great literature to deal with a single theme in such a way as to say many important things about other, often more universal, issues. Nevertheless, a work usually has a primary theme—the theme around which the work was structured in its original conception. And other themes are worked into the structure dictated by the primary theme.[5]

In the year of the *Oresteia*'s production, the introduction of an issue that divided the Athenian state deeply was not an afterthought. I can only believe that the subject about which Aeschylus wrote the entire trilogy—the subject to which all others are incidental—was the Areopagus. What did he want to say about it? He certainly argues that only by the justice of a court subject to law can the vicious cycle of murder and reprisal be ended, and that the Areopagus, in judging cases of murder, performs an essential function without which the state cannot exist peaceably. Nobody doubts that this is the main theme of the *Eumenides*. My own purposes in this chapter are two: to demonstrate that this theme is central to the entire trilogy[6] and to explain at the end why Aeschylus expressed himself in terms so ambiguous that they leave scholars at loggerheads about what, indeed, he thought about the reform of the Areopagus.

There is no obvious reason—except for the pressing interest of current events—why a tragedy about Agamemnon, or a trilogy about the house of Atreus, should involve the Areopagus. But it requires little reflection to realize that for a trilogy about the Areopagus there is no better mythological theme than the house of Atreus. What the tragedian needed was a series of murders and countermurders dogging a family for generations, which could finally be resolved by the judgment of the Areopagites. In Greek mythology,

4. Although I do not agree with the reading of Thomson (1973), that is because I do not believe that Greek society passed through the stages he describes—a historical disagreement, not a literary one.

5. As any author will know, a work once in progress develops a life of its own, and previously subsidiary themes may wrench and even recast entirely the work's structure. In the case of the *Oresteia*, however, I think that the primary importance of the Areopagus remains evident in the work as we have it.

6. Jacoby (*FGrH* 3 B 1.24–25) seems to have taken this for granted: "Personally, I have no serious doubt that Aischylos (to put it roughly) wrote his trilogy because of the Areopagus; that he composed his poem under the influence of and because of (to use a neutral term) the reform of 462/1 B.C." Fraenkel, however, in his magisterial edition of the *Agamemnon* (1950), has in his index no entry for the Areopagus at all.

the two such stories that eclipsed all others were the stories of the house of Laius and the house of Atreus. The curse of Laius, however, did not work itself out through revenge. Oedipus killed Laius without knowing who he was; Jocasta killed herself; and Eteocles and Polynices killed each other, but not out of revenge. Perhaps most relevant is the fact that the curse of Laius ended with the extinction of the house; it was a curse for which there was no cure. The curse of the house of Laius was not a good example for the curative powers of the Areopagus; it was rather a good example for the ineluctable fate decreed by the gods, and it appears as such in literature.

The curse of the house of Atreus, however, was a perfect example of the kind of clan warfare that the Areopagus was to eliminate from Athenian life. The trilogy could, indeed, have started before Agamemnon; the feast of Thyestes was itself an act of vengeance, though not vengeance for murder, and Aeschylus does not omit paternal hatred from Aegisthus' motivation. Agamemnon was murdered in retaliation for the murder of Thyestes' children (Aegisthus' motive) and for that of Iphigeneia (Clytemnestra's motive); Clytemnestra was murdered in retaliation for the murder of Agamemnon. Orestes, however, was not murdered; the curse was cured. It remained for Aeschylus to show the Areopagus as the cure.

The basic structure, then, is a series of retaliatory murders, from which the principals cannot escape by their own actions. Only the state-disposed justice of the Areopagus removes the curse from the house. The trilogy draws us to that conclusion stage by stage.

The *Agamemnon* presents the first stage: Old murder never dies; it festers in the house until it breeds new. The curse of the house of Atreus was not Agamemnon's fault, but he is doomed by it. Aeschylus leaves no chance for us to forget this fact, an essential one in his argument: Time is no cure. This much is learned by the middle of the *Agamemnon*, but there is a second lesson to be learned: Retaliatory murder is no cure. The murder of Agamemnon does not purge the curse from the house; it merely deepens the evil.

The *Choephori* takes the argument one step further: Private justice exacted from the criminals, even when perfectly just, still does not remove the stain from the house. Clytemnestra has warned Orestes:

> ὅρα, φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας.

But he has no choice:

> τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς δὲ πῶς φύγω, παρεὶς τάδε...
>
> (*Ch.* 924–25)

As the *Choephori* ends, Orestes is in flight from the Furies, whom the chorus—in spite of original protests—recognizes are real.[7] Why they are real is shown by the goddesses themselves as they plead their case in the *Eumenides*—for although Aeschylus must be presumed to believe in the existence of these goddesses as of others, he does not consider them to exist without reason or function. Justice must contend with nature; and the murder of a mother is unnatural and cannot remain unpunished.

In this, however, we have come to an impasse. Murder begun in the house—the feast of Thyestes—becomes murder within the family—and finally matricide, the most unnatural murder of all. For the earlier murders there were earthly avengers; for this, there are avenging goddesses. Blood does not clean off blood. Aeschylus has been building from the very beginning toward this conclusion. And the Areopagus is not "stitched on from the outside" but presented as the solution that, as the entire trilogy has shown us, cannot come by any other way.

The tragedies of the characters are never merely their own. Throughout the trilogy, it is kept in the foreground that the troubles are those of the whole house of Atreus. The *Agamemnon* begins by making the point in the most Aeschylean of ways, by spectacle. The audience sees nothing but the house itself looming before them, until the voice of an unseen speaker utters the opening line:

Θεοὺς μὲν αἰτῶ τῶνδ' ἀπαλλαγὴν πόνων.

As the watchman's monologue continues they realize that it is he, prone[8] on the roof of the house, who is speaking of his own weary vigil. But the first effect must surely have been as if the house itself were begging for release.[9] The watchman's last words drive home the point:

7. In 1055–56 the chorus tries to convince Orestes otherwise:

ποταίνιον γὰρ αἱμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι·
ἐκ τῶνδέ τοι ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει.

But that the chorus itself does not believe this is shown by its statement that there is only one purification for him, and it is divine (1059). In fact, the chorus had already recognized at 1009 (μίμνοντι δὲ καὶ πάθος ἀνθεῖ) and at 1020 (μόχθος δ' ὁ μὲν αὐτίχ', ὁ δ' ἥξει) that Orestes' troubles were not over.

8. κοιμώμενος...κυνὸς δίκην (2–3). Watchmen in fact are normally expected to stand, but that would have marred the starkness of Aeschylus' spectacle, and his dramatic point.

9. The echo of the words in lines 20–21,

νῦν δ' εὐτυχὴς γένοιτ' ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων
εὐαγγέλου φανέντος ὀρφναίου πυρός,

is plain enough from the watchman's point of view (for the fire signal, which appears immediately thereafter, does indeed free him), but bitterly ironic from the house's point of view; the "fire of good tidings" is for the house of Atreus not an ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων but—as the audience, of course, knows full well—the beginning of the newest tragedy.

τὰ δ'
ἄλλα σιγῶ· βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ μέγας
βέβηκεν· οἶκος δῷ αὐτός, εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι,
σαφέστατ' ἂν λέξειεν

(*Ag.* 36–38)

The house itself remains the central symbol of the play. When Agamemnon appears, the manner of his entry to the house focuses the scene and seals his fate; his captive Cassandra describes in prophetic tones the bloody past and future that she sees in the house itself—she does not see, for example, blood on Clytemnestra's hands or on Agamemnon's neck—before she, too, finally enters to be killed. The same symbol broods over each mention of Paris: he brings doom to his house swollen with pride (374–78);[10] his bringing of Helen to Troy is like raising a lion cub in the house (716–36),[11] and sins destroy such houses (750–70).[12]

If we appreciate the way that Aeschylus builds toward the conclusion that he has had in mind from the first—the founding of the Areopagus—certain details of the play, otherwise puzzling, become clear. One is the matter of changing motivation. The murder of Agamemnon is a matter of vengeance in the *Agamemnon*, a matter of adulterous love in the *Choephori*. Although from the beginning one might have thought that the adulterous liaison with Aegisthus was sufficient motivation for Clytemnestra's part in the murder, Aeschylus stresses a more justifiable motivation in the first play: vengeance for the blood of Iphigeneia. Iphigeneia is never far from our minds in the *Agamemnon*. The chorus enters singing the entire story at length and ends on a note of foreboding, saying that to think about the future is ἴσον...τῷ προστένειν, "just like crying before anything happens" (253). Before the murder, Clytemnestra ambiguously hints at the sacrifice (347),[13] and after the deed, she offers it as the justification for her action (1414–18, 1525–29, 1555–59; the last silences the chorus' indignation). Aegisthus has a justification in the feast of Thyestes, of which he was a sur-

10. Reading ἀρή in 375, a famous crux; but φλεόντων δωμάτων in 377 is not in doubt.

11. On the referent of the metaphor see the well-chosen words of Denniston and Page (1957, 135).

12. Justice, turning away from such places, apportions everything toward its end (πᾶν δ' ἐπὶ τέρμα νωμᾷ), says the chorus, just before turning to greet Agamemnon: Again, the explicit reference (to the house of Priam) hides the more immediately sinister one to the house of Atreus.

13. There might come a calamity because of those who have been killed (cf. Denniston and Page 1957, 100).

vivor. Like Aegisthus himself, this theme is kept in the background at first,[14] but Cassandra speaks of it in clearer and clearer terms before the chorus finally speaks the name of Thyestes. Clytemnestra hints at it in her own defense, and finally Aegisthus tells the story from the beginning (1090–97, 1217–26, 1242–44, 1577–1611). It is not accidental that Aeschylus offers vengeance as the reason on both sides for the murder—it is precisely the problem of vengeance that the Areopagus is to solve.

The chorus, in the end, cannot decide whether Clytemnestra is right or wrong; its conclusion, as Denniston and Page rightly observe, is that "it is difficult to judge."[15] But it is not difficult for the audience to judge; Aeschylus has seen to that. Long before the murderers appear to justify themselves, they have lost the audience's sympathy. Clytemnestra's fawning upon Agamemnon may have been distasteful, but her protestations of fidelity were positively nauseating—she herself admitted that they overstepped the bounds of propriety, even had they been true (855–58).[16] Clytemnestra may now offer justification, but she cannot have our sympathy. Nor can Aegisthus, who appears at the end in the guise most distasteful of all to an Athenian, that of a tyrant. The murder of Agamemnon was a murder whose perpetrators had justification. But there is no doubt left in the mind of the audience that it was not a just murder, nor any cause for rejoicing. This is, perhaps, the everyday, obvious reason why retaliatory murder does not end the curse: Every murderer thinks his or her act justified, but the murderer's own judgment is not the last word, and the victim's relatives will come back to haunt the wrongdoer. Clytemnestra's last words—*⟨ἐγὼ⟩ καὶ σὺ θήσομεν κρατοῦντε τῶνδε δωμάτων ⟨καλῶς⟩*—play on the audience's knowledge that no such thing is going to happen. This is where we are left at the end of the *Agamemnon*.

14. The very fact that Aegisthus is not mentioned for the first three-quarters of the play (although the watchman and the chorus must know of his existence) is part of Aeschylus' focusing of the motivation on revenge, not adultery. Even when Cassandra finally mentions him, she mentions him as an avenger (1223–26):

*ἐκ τῶνδε ποινάς φημι βουλεύειν τινά*
*λεόντ' ἄναλκιν ἐν λέχει στρωφώμενον*
*οἰκουρὸν ὠμὸν τῷ μολόντι δεσπότῃ*
*ἐμῷ.*

15. *Ag.* 1561; cf. Denniston and Page 1957, 206–7, 217. Their ideas on the matter are developed at greater length in the introd., xxiii–xxxi.

16. Cf. 604–12, with its ironic close:

*οὐδ' οἶδ' τέρψιν οὐδ' ἐπίψογον φάτιν*
*ἄλλου πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον ἢ χαλκοῦ βαφάς.*

Here *χαλκοῦ βαφάς* are on her mind for a good reason.

The lesson of the *Choephori*—that even truly justified murder is not a solution—is less obvious, and Aeschylus does not present it until the first lesson has been learned. For his purposes in this play, there can be no justification for Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Any excuse would negate the moral, which depends upon the murder being totally just. Here Agamemnon's murderers have shifted their moral ground. No longer does Aeschylus tell us of their vengeance, but only of their adultery. Aegisthus never says a word in his defense, and Iphigeneia is never mentioned. Clytemnestra's only plea is that she is Orestes' mother; her only defense against the charge of adultery is to claim that Agamemnon did the same.[17] Her murder is justice; the chorus has already proclaimed as much before Orestes emerges to argue the fact (949). The chorus of the *Agamemnon* threatens Aegisthus with retribution; the chorus of the *Choephori* expects that the just murder, after proper purificatory rites, will raise up the house once more:

> πάρα τε φῶς ἰδεῖν, μέγα τ' ἀφῃρέθη.
> ψάλιον οἴκων.
> ἄναγε μὰν δόμοι· πολὺν ἄγαν χρόνον
> χαμαιπετεῖς ἔκεισθε.
>
> (962–65)[18]

But the chorus is quickly disabused. As Orestes is chased off by avenging monsters, the chorus is left to wonder when there will come an end to the might of calamity (1075–76; once again Aeschylus has chosen his closing lines carefully).

Aeschylus has examined the possibilities. Ritual purifications are necessary but insufficient; Orestes has long since performed them by the time we begin the *Eumenides*. What can the Areopagus offer? It can offer law, which is not quite the same as justice or nature. Orestes' protecting deity champions justice: For him Orestes is innocent, and there the matter stands. The goddesses uphold the natural law, against which a mother's murder is a crime, while the murder of a spouse is only murder (212). This is the posi-

17. Πατρὸς τοῦ σοῦ μάτας; Orestes parries the charge in two lines (918–21). Zeitlin (1973), who correctly and acutely observes (167) Clytemnestra's transition from avenging mother in the *Agamemnon* to hostile and unnatural mother in the *Choephori*, considers the transition to be motivated by Aeschylus' need to justify Clytemnestra's murder and the defeat of the self-willed female principle. I agree that the change is designed to justify the murder, but not because Aeschylus is interested in hiding Clytemnestra's true and more honorable motives. Rather he has moved in the *Choephori* to a new moral problem—that of "justified" vengeance, which will also prove wanting—which would not be exemplified by a justifiable Clytemnestra.

18. The following lines add the requirement of καθαρμοὶ ἀτᾶν ἐλατήριοι.

tion that the defense must—and in the end cannot entirely—refute. The vote between the two claims is deadlocked. But the patron goddess of Athens sides with the male and acquits Orestes.

The grounds for decision have seemed trivial or childish to many commentators,[19] deep and important to those who, forced to deal with the fact that Aeschylus thought these arguments worthy to stand at the climax of his trilogy, have sought a deeper meaning in them.[20] Significant to us is that although the natural argument brought against the goddesses' claim is debatable—only half the judges vote for acquittal—and although the patron goddess' vote is explicitly cast because of personal predilection, once the votes have been counted, the bloodshed is at an end. The Areopagus is not, however, to be a mere purification ritual to acquit the guilty; it will incorporate the natural law along with the claims of justice, the new gods with the older goddesses. This is the resolution—the ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων—for which we have been looking since the beginning of the *Agamemnon*.

I have tried to show how the plot (and, to a certain extent, the imagery) of the *Oresteia* flows from what I take to have been Aeschylus' primary intention: to give a mythological basis and justification for the post-reform position of the Areopagus. One of the questions posed at the beginning, however, still requires an answer. Granted that the trilogy deals with the position of the Areopagus in Athens, what is the author trying to tell us on the matter?

I think the answer is perfectly clear. Aeschylus takes great care not to express any opinion whatsoever on the Areopagus reform. At no point from beginning to end does he mention any possibility that the Areopagus might have any powers other than those of a murder court. There are some observations on tyranny, particularly with regard to Agamemnon and Aegisthus, but none whatever on the question of aristocracy versus democracy, which is generally thought to have been behind the Areopagus reform. It may be, as Sir Kenneth Dover has argued,[21] that Aeschylus sympathized with the democrats; there are some indications to that effect. E. R. Dodds saw a more moderate Aeschylus who approved of the reforms but urged the democrats not to go any further.[22] The disagreement of scholars about

19. Treston (1923, 289) considered the hypothesis of exclusive male paternity "absurd," and Livingstone (1925) saw here Aeschylus "in his primitive vein." Podlecki (1966, 88) thinks that "a totally satisfactory explanation of the incongruity is yet to be put forward."

20. Thus Thomson 1973, 268–70; Winnington-Ingram 1949, 124–29; more emphatically, Kuhns 1962, 42–49. To the extent that recent work has emphasized the centrality of the male-female polarity in the *Oresteia*, it has tended to strengthen the view that the grounds of debate were indeed important to Aeschylus.

21. Dover 1957.

22. Dodds 1960a; Podlecki (1966, 94–100) takes a similar tack.

Aeschylus' side in the dispute has a simple basis in fact: In the plays themselves, Aeschylus takes no side.

It would surely have been possible for Aeschylus to express an opinion. As easily as the goddess proclaims the founding of the court for all time, she could have defined its position. She could—if Aeschylus was a reactionary—have said that not by man but by divine-born righteousness will her state be governed. She could—if he was a radical democrat—have warned the jurors against deserting the high calling of justice to grasp with tyrannous hands the reins of the state. She could—if he was a Doddsian moderate—have said both, warning the people not in high-minded fury at a temporary usurpation, to neglect this court's role as the fount of justice. She says none of these things.[23] Aeschylus, who had no difficulty in making obvious his judgment of Clytemnestra, does not take the opportunity to tell us his judgment of the Areopagus reform.

It seems odd enough for a poet to devote an entire trilogy to a burning topical issue without expressing an opinion pro or con. It seems even odder when we see that he makes perfectly clear his identification with the Argive alliance. The alliance with Argos was the cornerstone of the policy of Ephialtes and Pericles. It involved a break with the traditional friendship with Sparta that the Philaids had maintained, and it must have been as controversial as the reform of the Areopagus. The *Oresteia* makes that alliance a major theme: that is presumably why the house of Atreus, Menelaus and all,[24] is moved from Mycenae and Sparta to Argos, and why the bond formed by the acquittal of Orestes is explicitly made the basis of an eternal alliance between Argos and Athens (*Eum.* 762–77). So much for the Argive alliance. But about the Areopagus, all controversy is studiously ignored. This is not a moderate stance; it is no stance at all.

When the great modern "political" dramatists wrote about contemporary controversies, they did so to favor one side or another. Ancient dramatists, too, knew how to use tragedy for polemical purposes; the *Trojan Women* carries a political message that is unmistakable both in and out of context. There is, however, another use of drama: Drama can be patriotic. We have a number of patriotic tragedies. The *Persians* is certainly such, as are Euripides' *Heracleidae* and *Suppliants*.[25] These tragedies generally dwell on Athenian justice, freedom, hospitality, and bravery, and they often

23. The words μήτ' ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον (696) refer, as the context shows, not to the management of the state, but to the citizens' subjection to authority—the Areopagus' judicial province.

24. *Ag.* 400; cf. Denniston and Page 1957, 105 ad loc.

25. I would certainly add the *Oedipus at Colonus*; see Schaps, "Patriotic Tragedy," forthcoming.

promise supernatural help in future time (i.e., of course, the characters who live in mythic time promise aid to the audience living in present time). Much that is similar can be seen in the *Eumenides*. And I believe that the Areopagus and the Argive alliance form part of a general patriotic theme.

Patriotic tragedy, however, differs from polemical tragedy. Its purpose is not to persuade but to impart to the spectators love of their country. Polemical tragedy may show what should or should not be. Patriotic tragedy praises what is, and that is what Aeschylus does. He demonstrates the high calling of the Areopagus as it is now constituted and gives it an ancient pedigree.[26] An equally ancient pedigree, with even less plausibility, is given to the Argive alliance, which was now the state policy. Nothing is said that would contrast an Argive alliance to a Spartan one;[27] the goodwill is all from the side of Argos. Nothing, in short, is said that would arouse controversy. Everything is said to arouse an Athenian's pride in his own state and his sense of its importance and correctness.

This is patriotic, not polemical; but it may have served a purpose no less essential. Aeschylus is not attacking the reformers, supporting them, or warning them not to go any further; he is simply praising the Athenian state in terms that every Athenian could find unobjectionable. If this did not further any particular policy, it was very likely intended to further the unity of a state in times of great turbulence. That itself may be a political objective of no small value.

26. I do not know to what extent this pedigree is meant to be taken seriously. I do not think that it was out of bounds for an Athenian dramatist to invent such a pedigree for modern developments; I have seen the same done in a modern theater when the action demanded it, and the show ran for months. However, the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (25.2) clearly considers that the Areopagus lost by Ephialtes' reform only newly acquired powers (τὰ ἐπίθετα; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 4.4, 23.1), so that the authority over murders may well have been thought to be ancient and indeed may have been so; see Rhodes 1972; most recently, R. W. Wallace 1989.

27. In Euripides' *Suppliants*, for example, Athens is required to choose between Argos and Thebes.

38

# The *Prometheis* in Vase Painting and on the Stage

Keith DeVries

THE *PROMETHEIS*,[1] the set of plays—probably a full, coherent trilogy—that included the extant *Prometheus Bound* and the lost *Prometheus Freed*, has long raised problems of staging and has also been plagued by problems of authorship, namely, whether the ancient attribution of them to Aeschylus was correct. A pair of vase paintings, one published here for the first time, now establishes some certainties about the production of the plays in the fourth century B.C. and about who was then believed to be their author. What was true for the fourth century may, of course, also have been true for the fifth century, when the plays were new.

In 1969 the Antikenmuseum in West Berlin acquired an Apulian calyx crater (fig. 1), attributed by A. D. Trendall to the Branca Painter, an immediate forerunner of the Darius Painter.[2] The date should be about 350–40 B.C., and the place of manufacture Taras. The subject of the principal side is the deliverance of Prometheus. The Titan is shown still chained to a rock, but Heracles, who stands alongside him, has already shot the eagle, who plunges in death, blood gushing from its wound.

In the initial publication of the vase, Trendall noted that the striking arched form of the rock suggests a theatrical production, since that is the usual context of such rocks in South Italian vase paintings; they are most

1. The name given to the plays in a variant of the *Vita Aesch.* (Herington 1972, 63, suppl. d.)

2. Antikenmuseum 1969.9. See Trendall 1970, 168–74, figs. 10 and 12; Trendall and Webster 1971, 61–62, no. 3.1.27, with figs.; Kossatz-Deissmann 1978, 136–41, pls. 26–27; Trendall 1982, 476, no. 6 with full bibliography; Vollkomer 1988, 63, fig. 84; Trendall 1989, 87, figs. 192–93.



Fig. 1. From Trendall and Webster 1971, 61, fig. III.1.27. (Photo © 1971 by Phaidon Press, Ltd., and Staatliche Museen, Antikenabteilung, Berlin.)

common in what appear to be productions of Euripides' *Andromeda*.[3] He reasonably supposed that the production on the Berlin vase was specifically that of *Prometheus Freed* and noted that the presence of Apollo—the nude figure in the upper right of the painting, who holds a laurel branch and sits on a cloth spread out over a rock or a rise in the land—could be related to Heracles' invocation of the god in a surviving line of the play where the hero prays for his arrow to hit the eagle.[4] Subsequently, A. Kossatz-Deissmann recognized that the long sleeves of the Erinys, at the bottom right, are another theatrical touch.[5]

We can add that the presence of the Erinys is consistent with a passage of the play, preserved only in a translation by Cicero, in which Prometheus characterizes his surroundings as a "citadel of the Furies" (*castrum hoc Furiarum*).[6] The partially cut-off female with the torch at the center of the bottom row may be Ge, who is regularly thus shown rooted in the earth, and who was a character in the drama, if we accept that the erroneous mention in the hypothesis to *Prometheus Bound* that she and Heracles are charac-

3. Trendall 1970, 168. For the arched rock as a feature of production of the *Andromeda* see especially Trendall and Webster 1971, 78–82, with figs.; E. Simon 1972, 33.

4. Fr. 200 Radt (1985, 318).

5. Kossatz-Deissmann 1978, 139.

6. Cic. *Tusc.* 2.23 = fr. 193.9 Radt (1985, 311).

ters in that play stemmed from a misplacement of them from the *Freed*.[7] The female figure to the right of Prometheus might be Thetis, who seems to have been pursued by Zeus in the course of the *Freed*, and who was definitely revealed in it as the *déesse fatale* whose son would be mightier than his father.[8] Athena, at the upper left, is not attested as having been in the play. The female at the lower left eludes identification.[9]

Erika Simon promptly recognized that the arched rock was not simply a stage property but a simulated rocky framing of the door in the *skene*, a kind of framing that was no doubt usual in the standard rural stage set of satyr plays and occasional tragedies; in the set the door normally signified the entrance to a cave.[10] Prometheus thus, at least in the production that the Berlin vase reflects, stood directly in the *skene* doorway. Simon also saw that it was virtually certain that in this staging his disappearance in the cataclysm at the end of *Prometheus Bound* and his reappearance by the beginning of *Prometheus Freed* (the immediately succeeding play of the cycle)[11] were engineered by means of the *ekkyklema*, the wheeled platform that could pass in and out of the scene building through the doorway.[12] One would further have to suppose, of course, that the actor was easily able to detach the chains from the frame and later reattach them upon his reappearance.

Simon's reading of the scene was taken up by Kossatz-Deissmann but has otherwise received only perfunctory attention in subsequent studies of

7. Trendall (1970) identified the figure as Persephone, an identification accepted by Kossatz-Deissman (1978, 139). Trendall conjectured that the setting for the whole lower row of figures may have been Tartarus, the place that many scholars have thought the ending of *Prometheus Bound* indicates as the abode of the Titan in the time between that play and *Prometheus Freed*. But the evidence is not good that such was the setting of the lower row. For one thing, it is doubtful that Persephone's realm extended as deep as Tartarus. For another, the text of *Prometheus Bound* seems to show simply that the Titan will be buried under the cliff collapse and thus will not be far below the earth's surface; see Taplin 1977, 272; Griffith 1983, 265 (on lines 1016–19); cf. Conacher 1980, 187.

The cross-bar torch in the hand of the female figure is not part of Ge's standard iconography, for which see Moore 1988, 171–77, pls. 98–99. Perhaps the torch alludes to Prometheus' gift of fire to humanity or, more likely, to the torch races that were instituted in his honor at Athens, which may have been proclaimed at the end of *Prometheus Freed*; see Griffith 1983, 303. For discussion of the mention of Ge in the hypothesis to *Prometheus Bound* see Griffith 1983, 285–86, fr. 3a.

8. Griffith 1983, 301, fr. 15b. Trendall (1970) and Kossatz-Deissmann (1978, 137) identify the figure as Ge, but I have already taken Ge to be the figure embedded in the earth.

9. Trendall (1970, 173; 1982, 476) sees her as Demeter, Kossatz-Deissmann (1978, 139–40) as Dike. Vollkomer (1988, 63) adheres to the latter identification.

10. E. Simon 1972, 32–33. I, like Simon, make the assumption that a production of *Prometheus Freed* would also entail the production of the other play or plays of the cycle.

11. Σ *PV* 511 and 522. Griffith 1983, 286, frs. 4a and 4b.

12. The *ekkyklema* had previously often been suggested as the means by which the exit was made; those proposing that solution include Frickenhaus (1917, 12), Dale (1969, 270), and Webster (1970, 18).



Fig. 2. (Photo courtesy of the Gordion Publications Project, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania.)

the Prometheus plays and their staging,[13] perhaps in part because of a continuing supposition, as supported by Conacher,[14] that if Prometheus was wheeled off on the *ekkyklema* at the end of *Bound*, so would have been, in an obvious absurdity if not impossibility, the whole chorus of the Oceanids. Actually the text strongly suggests that the chorus was not literally engulfed in the cataclysm as was Prometheus but, remaining in the orchestra, was traumatized and rendered witless by it.[15] Perhaps, too, the vase's remoteness in time from the original production and in space from the home theater helps account for the lack of serious attention given to it and Simon's discussion.

The hitherto unpublished vase (fig. 2), which is not Apulian but Attic, was found at the Phrygian site of Gordion in the excavations of the

13. Taplin 1977, 273 n. 1; Griffith 1983, 277. Not dealt with by West (1979, 139–40), Conacher (1980, 187–89), or Stoessl (1988, 23–29) in their discussions of the staging of the *Prometheus Bound*.

14. Conacher 1980, 187–89.

15. Thus *PV* 1058–62 and, in part, Thomson 1932, 174; and Griffith 1983, 277. Cf. Conacher 1980, 187–88.

University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania.[16] Consisting of three fragments from two adjacent trenches, it is either a calyx-crater or a bell-crater. Ian McPhee has dated it to ca. 370–60 B.C.[17] In part, the representation corresponds to that on the Apulian crater.

On the sherd shown at the lower left, there is a figure manacled to a rock. The contours around the nipple are not full enough for a breast but conform to pectoral conventions, so the figure is male and thus Prometheus, and not Andromeda (the only other possibility). The rock curves to form the sort of arch seen on the Apulian vase, so the setting is again a theatrical production, since such a rock has no meaning in terms of the story but does in terms of a staging.

On the fragment at the upper right there is again a nude male sitting on a cloth. Since the object that he holds is too irregular to be a thyrsus, scepter, or spear but is suitable to be a laurel branch, we can identify him here, too, as Apollo. Through this double correspondence we can feel confident that the play depicted is again *Prometheus Freed*, not *Prometheus Bound*, which, without Apollo, would have been a possibility.

The other preserved representations on the Attic crater differ from those on the Apulian piece. The figure wearing a petasos on the sherd at the upper left is probably Hermes, who may have functioned as Zeus' emissary, as in the preceding play. The very large wing to the left of Apollo could have belonged to Eros or Nike, but it is hard to imagine what either of those divinities was doing in the drama. The wing could instead go with the eagle, still alive and swooping down on Prometheus. A comparable eagle alights on a hare on a late fifth-century coin from Acragas (fig. 3; the hindmost eagle).[18] If indeed the eagle was shown on the vase as a still living menace, we can speculate that Heracles was again present, this time poised to shoot it. A few upright leaves between Apollo and the wing belong to a plant growing on the irregular terrain. A small reserved crescent to the right of the lowest preserved part of the wing defies interpretation.

The Attic and Apulian representations obviously go back in part to the same prototype, and in view of the lack of South Italian pottery in the Aegean but the occasional import of fourth-century Attic pieces into the West, the prototype is most likely Attic.[19] Its date ought to be no earlier

16. Gordion Museum, excavation inventory nos. P 4714, P 4715, and P 4716. P 4714 (fragment with Apollo and wing): four joining sherds supplemented with plaster; from pit in trench PhWN-2; l 0.193 m; h 0.086 m. P 4715 (sherd with young male wearing petasos): from earth fill in trench PhWN; l 0.096 m; h 0.066 m. P 4716 (sherd with Prometheus): from same pit as P 4714; l 0.075 m; h 0.044 m. Range of Th.: 0.005–0.008.

17. *Per litteras* 1 December 1981.

18. Reverse of silver decadrachm, ca. 411 B.C., in Staatliche Münzsammlung, Munich.

19. Note the occasional Western proveniences of fourth-century Attic pottery in *ARV*



Fig. 3. From Kraay 1966, pl. 179. (Photo courtesy of Harry N. Abrams, Inc., and Staatliche Münzsammlung, Munich.)

than 400 B.C., since arched rocks were clearly not part of the iconography of either South Italian or Attic pottery before then.[20]

While the new Attic crater may somewhat diminish the possibility that the Berlin crater is evidence for a fourth-century production of the *Prometheis* at Taras (though not necessarily, since established conventions could depict a current reality), it gives us important new evidence for a production at Athens itself in the first half of the fourth century—a production in which Prometheus stood in the doorway, a position that once again implies that the *ekkyklema* got the Titan on and off between the *Bound* and the *Freed.* If that is how the disappearance and reappearance were effected in the home theater in the fourth century, why not in the original production there in the fifth century, particularly in view of the almost certain use of the *ekkyklema* in the *Oresteia*, close to the earliest possible date for the *Prometheis*?[21]

2:1407–1528. For the failure of South Italian pottery to travel see Trendall 1989, 9.

20. The attached rock does not yet appear where it would be expected in a representation of Andromeda on an Attic vase of the very early fourth century (Trendall and Webster 1971, 78, no. 3.3.10, with fig. on p. 80); and on a South Italian vase of ca. 400 B.C., two bent trees, rather than rocks, frame the cave entrance in a scene related to a production of Euripides' *Antiope* (Trendall and Webster 1971, 82–83, no. 3.3.15, with fig.). The earliest appearance of the arched rock seems to be in a nondramatic representation on an Attic vase of the beginning of the fourth century (Metzger 1951, 262–65, pl. 35).

21. Sommerstein 1989, 33; West 1990a, 22–23, 265–271.

Further, the new representation bears upon the problem of authorship. In the fifth century the only tragic revivals in Athens that we can be sure of were plays by Aeschylus.[22] Beginning in 386 B.C., works by Sophocles and Euripides were revived there, too,[23] but not (as far as we know) tragedies by anyone other than the three already canonical poets. And as the Prometheus plays could never have been supposed to have been by Sophocles or Euripides, the new assurance that there was a production of them in fourth-century Athens surely indicates that they must already have been considered to be by Aeschylus. Griffith has wondered if the attribution to Aeschylus may not have been made by Callimachus, working with anonymous texts in Alexandria.[24] We now see that the attribution was already firmly established no later than the preceding century. Furthermore, the depiction of *Prometheus Freed* on fourth-century vases in both Attica and South Italy indicates that at least one play of the cycle had already become celebrated.

22. Pickard-Cambridge [1968] 1988, 86.

23. Pickard-Cambridge [1968] 1988, 99–100.

24. Griffith 1977, 237. M. L. West (1990a, 67–72), while denying authorship to Aeschylus, thinks on grounds of the Athenian dramatic records that the ascription must have been at the time of the first production in the fifth century through, he suggests, dishonesty on the part of the true playwright.

39

# Oedipus as *Pharmakos*

Helene Peet Foley

THE OPENING OF *OEDIPUS TYRANNUS* creates for its audience a powerful set of expectations. The stage is filled with suffering suppliants from a city wracked by disease. Almost immediately, Oedipus, ironically preparing the audience for the contents of the oracle that Creon brings from Delphi, equates his own sufferings with that of the city (59–61).[1] The source of the city's sufferings is the polluted killer of Laius. Apollo commands that the community (96) must either banish this source of pollution or exact blood in exchange for blood (100–101). In ignorance Oedipus reinforces the command of the oracle with an edict and a curse that condemns the criminal to exile, not death (229, 241).[2] A second set of religious sanctions is thus called down on the head of the killer. Teiresias, the representative of Apollo, then predicts that Oedipus will soon journey to another country, tapping out his path with a stick (455–56; see also 420–23). In the scenes with Teiresias and Creon, the mimetic rivalry, which René Girard has argued always precedes the sacrifice of a scapegoat, begins to color the action.[3] Here Oedipus begins to display the hybristic qualities of a

I read Oedipus Tyrannus for the first time with Martin Ostwald in a seminar on Greek Tragedy at Swarthmore College. Reading his own recent article on the play made me realize once again how much my own understanding of the play was, and still is, conditioned by that first experience. A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at a conference on Oedipus at Cornell in spring 1990. I benefited from the discussion there, and above all from conversations with Rachel Kitzinger as well as from her conference paper on the play, a version of which appears as chap. 40 of the present volume. Richard Seaford and Suzanne Saïd also offered helpful comments. I cite from the text of Dawe 1982.

1. Vernant 1988b, 131.

2. The fact that the oracle and the curse converge on exile increases our expectations for the first of the alternatives proposed by the oracle.

3. Girard (1977) has recently been well criticized by Pucci (1990), who points out that the rivalry between Oedipus, Teiresias, and Creon is not marked by mimetic desire of the kind

typical stage tyrant, and both he and Jocasta flirt with dismissing the words of the god. Once Oedipus begins to suspect the truth, he is horrified that he may have condemned himself to exile (813–20). Until the final scene of the play, then, we are repeatedly led to expect the banishment of Oedipus from Thebes.

Furthermore, as many scholars have pointed out, Athens itself was no stranger to the ritual expulsion of the *pharmakos*.[4] At the Thargelia it practiced annual rites in which two scapegoats were beaten and driven from the city. It also established the perhaps related secular institution of ostracism to expel potential tyrants from the city.[5] And at a time perhaps shortly before the production of this play, the Spartans charged the preeminent leader of the democracy, Pericles, with the ancestral pollution that his maternal relatives, the Alcmaeonids, acquired from the killing of Cylon.[6] Scapegoats in myth were generally kings or young people. In ritual they were often (if not always) the lowest, even criminal members of society. Vernant has stressed how Oedipus, as the greatest king and the most terrible criminal, shares the features of the scapegoat in both myth and ritual.[7]

These extraordinarily powerful expectations are in the end frustrated, since the play closes without completing the expulsion of the scapegoat. Oedipus pleads first with the chorus, then with Creon, to complete his banishment, and/or death (1290–91, 1340–46, 1410–12, 1436–37, 1449–53, 1518). The chorus withdraws in favor of Creon, and Creon insists on returning to the oracle for further and more exact instructions (1438–43). Oedipus is still polluted in Creon's view (in the eyes of the messenger, the house is polluted, 1227–29), but his pollution now seems more domestic than civic (1424–31). His parricide and incest will damage the future of his daughters, who will have difficulty finding husbands, but it can for the

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that occurs between Pentheus and Dionysus in the *Bacchae*; tensions are diffused and do not in fact serve to prepare for the expected scapegoating at the conclusion of the play. Nevertheless, the doubling that does occur, and the sense of potentially explosive tension between Oedipus, Teiresias, and Creon, may still help to reinforce the audience's expectations for the banishment of Oedipus.

4. For a discussion of scapegoat ritual and/or pollution in Sophocles' play and/or in Greek society see Bremmer 1983a; Burkert 1979, 59–77; Burkert 1985, 82–84; Daux 1949; Delcourt 1986; Girard 1977; Howe 1962; Parker 1983; Pucci 1990; Vernant 1988b, 125–40.

5. On the connection see Vernant 1988b, 128, 134–35, and the more skeptical discussion of Parker 1983, 269–70.

6. Plut. *Per.* 33.1–2 and Hdt. 7.71. The Spartan attempt, which pre-dated the plague, in fact increased sympathy for Pericles. The precise date of the play and its relation to the Pericles and the plague at Athens must remain uncertain.

7. Vernant 1988b, 131–38. See also Bremmer 1983, 303–7. Vernant's excellent discussion does not confront the incomplete scapegoat pattern of the play.

moment be shut up in the house, where, as was traditionally the case, relatives, who share the criminal's pollution,[8] could look on and cope with dangers from which the outside world must be shielded.[9] In any case—even if it seems likely that Oedipus will soon depart from Thebes as Teiresias predicts and the hero desires—the source of pollution for the moment remains in the city. Indeed, the plague-ridden city has not received any explicit mention since the quarrel between Creon and Oedipus, where Jocasta and the chorus have to remind the two squabbling leaders of the sufferings of Thebes (634–36, 665–67).

In this brief chapter, I do not raise questions unfamiliar to the scholarly tradition. There has been much interest, especially of late, both in the relation of the play to larger religious issues concerning scapegoats and pollution and in the problems of the ending, although curiously the first discussion has taken place largely in isolation from the second.[10] I simply wish to emphasize that the problems raised by the play's failure to expel its pharmakos are even more complex than they have been considered to be and, by reviewing some of the dimensions of this problem, to reconsider the implications of the play's conclusion.

Let me emphasize further the disturbing quality of the play's ending. As Deborah Roberts has recently stressed,[11] Sophoclean endings often leave us with loose ends. At the end of *Oedipus at Colonus*, for example, we look forward to the battle between the brothers and Antigone's struggle to bury Polyneices. The *Trachiniae* does not predict the traditional apotheosis of Heracles. *Electra* perhaps concludes before the appearance of Furies who will undermine its otherwise "happy" ending. Nevertheless, these hints of a future in tension with the dramatic conclusion only cast an oblique shadow over a body of plays that by and large have been justly famous for offering us a model sense of closure. Even more important, expectations generated concerning ritual and/or oracular command are elsewhere in Sophocles explicitly fulfilled. Oedipus receives his promised cult in *Oedipus at Colonus*, Heracles' disrupted sacrifice is completed through the instructions of the hero himself, the supplication over the body of Ajax is answered with the

8. Parker 1983, 205, 318.

9. Creon speaks of sun, land, rain, and light of day. What threat Oedipus poses to his fellow citizens as a polluted parricide is unclear. Oedipus seems to deny his pollution when he asks the chorus to approach and touch him without fear (1413–15).

10. See n. 4 above. All those who discuss the ritual elements, except Pucci, ignore the failure to expel the *pharmakos* at the conclusion. On the ending see esp. the discussions of Kitto 1966; Taplin 1978 and 1982; M. Davies 1982; Hester 1984; and Gellie 1986.

11. Roberts 1988; cf. her further observations on problems of dramatic closure in chap. 42 of the present volume. See also the earlier remarks of Taplin 1982.

concluding burial and hints of a future hero cult, Orestes carries out Apollo's command, Philoctetes and Neoptolemus will undertake their predestined role in Troy, and Antigone is vindicated for her devotion to the cause of the gods below, while Creon is punished for violating that cause. Yet in *Oedipus Tyrannus* the oracle's instructions concerning the polluted murderer of Laius have not been carried out at the play's conclusion. Indeed, we cannot be certain that we know what the oracle will say when Creon consults it for a second time.

Furthermore, Sophocles has gone out of his way to create trouble for himself. The plague caused by the presence of a polluted murderer was at best an obscure part of the literary tradition about Oedipus, and we cannot be certain that his banishment occurred in any of the story's literary versions known prior to Sophocles; Oedipus apparently remained in Thebes after his crime was discovered and died there.[12] Indeed, immediate banishment causes a basic complication for the traditional myth, because it leaves no room for motivating Oedipus' curse on his own sons, who failed in various ways to show the proper filial devotion to their father. No wonder Sophocles adopted a delay in Oedipus' banishment when he returned to the story in *Oedipus at Colonus*. Furthermore, unlike most mythical plagues, the Theban plague in *Oedipus Tyrannus* breaks out many years after the crime. This anomaly perhaps betrays the uneasy position this story of Oedipus as scapegoat has in the larger myth—however relevant it may possibly have been (depending on the date of its performance) to the plague-stricken Athens of Pericles. Did Sophocles choose to invent a version of the story, or to emphasize an obscure alternative in the tradition, only to dismiss it—or at least to leave it in some doubt—at the conclusion of his play? Would not an audience judging this play, an audience ever alert to ingenious new interpretations of a myth, have been taken aback by Sophocles' refusal to follow out to its conclusion his most striking and, given the opening, visually arresting innovation?

12. Extant sources prior to Sophocles include Homer, Hesiod, fragments of the epic cycle, the Lille papyrus, and the fragments of Aeschylus' Theban trilogy. See Kock 1961; March 1987. Aeschylus had Oedipus blind himself, and March (1987, 139–48) speculates that he was the first to make Oedipus' four children the product of incest and to exile the king (although, since Oedipus was buried in Thebes, he was probably not treated as a polluted scapegoat in the Sophoclean fashion). Edmunds' (1981) study of the myths and cults relating to Oedipus' exile suggest a fundamental connection between Oedipus' name and cults, his wandering and his banishment; hence it is unlikely that Sophocles invented this aspect of the myth. In Homer, murderers are not viewed as polluted; even when Oedipus is viewed as a source of pollution in the *Thebaid*, he remains in Thebes. Euripides' *Phoenissae* takes Oedipus' pollution lightly, and banishes him for purely secular reasons. If he is reflecting a pretragic (or Aeschylean) tradition in this, Sophocles' insistence on making Oedipus a polluted scapegoat seems all the more idiosyncratic.

We cannot escape from this problem by adopting Dawe's recent conclusion that lines 1524–30 are an interpolation and that we thus do not have the original conclusion of the play.[13] Deleting these lines, or even 1515–23, as some have proposed in a far more speculative fashion,[14] does not eliminate Creon's insistence on returning to the oracle for further instructions, which first occurs at 1438–44. On what dramatically effective grounds would Creon reverse himself on the banishment, given that his position here is completely consistent with the caution that he has displayed from his first appearance on stage? We are unavoidably left with the vision of Oedipus struggling to carry out the dictates of curse and oracle, in the face of a community and its new leader that refuse to take immediate action. This means, as Howe pointed out, that we are faced with the anomaly of a scapegoat trying to enact his own exile/destruction, in isolation from the community that traditionally plays that role in every other version of this story (or ritual) pattern.[15] The repeated emphasis in earlier scenes of the play—and in the oracle itself, which asked for communal involvement—that it is the responsibility of *all* to remove the pollution from Thebes is ignored in the last scene (223, 463–76, 1378–83).

The final scenes of the play itself makes no explicit reference to the difficulties of the city but concentrate on the problem that Oedipus poses to his house. Indeed, any direct mention of the plague would make Creon's cautious insistence on delay absurd and support Oedipus' sense of urgency about the matter. But when Oedipus asks the chorus to banish him, kill him, or cast him into the sea (1410–12; the third alternative is a form of death not mentioned in either curse or oracle) and when Creon and Oedipus dispute over the oracle, I argue (contrary to most critics) that they bring back for consideration the issues so powerfully associated with the oracle in the earlier scenes. Although Oedipus does not name the plague, the oracle was

13. Dawe 1973, 266–73. Dawe's views have won wide acceptance, although I incline to share the more cautious evaluation of Roberts (1987, 63), Arkins (1988), and Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990b, 113–14).

14. Hester (1977, 46; 1984, 21–22) and March (1987, 148–54), reviving the theory of Graffunder in 1885, argue that the play originally concluded with the exile of Oedipus. Both speculate that these lines were added to accommodate a production of *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Oedipus at Colonus* together. The technical arguments for eliminating 1515–23 are hardly overwhelming. It is true, as these scholars stress, that Oedipus' speech of farewell to his daughters and his final instructions about Jocasta's burial suggest a preparation for departure, although Creon did not bring the daughters for that reason. Oedipus is fixed on exile and preparing for it. But this does not prove that the play ended with that exile. If the ending is basically authentic, his speeches simply serve to enhance the conflict between an Oedipus assertively taking all the steps necessary for his banishment and a Creon who wishes further knowledge before acting.

15. Howe 1962, 130, 136. The scapegoat normally consents to banishment, but the community performs the act. See Bremmer 1983a, 307–8. For Howe (1962, 139), Oedipus substitutes for the traditional pollution of the scapegoat a new sense of guilt.

sought to save the city from the plague. Can we in the last scene simply reduce the oracle to a problem internal to the house of Laius, or are the civic issues implicit in any mention of the oracle?[16] And when Oedipus says at 1449–50, "Let not the city (ἄστυ) of my ancestors be condemned to have me as a living inhabitant," what else comes to mind but the city's earlier troubles? Through Sophocles' clever dramaturgy, the audience may simply forget the plague in the final scene;[17] yet it is entirely possible that the failure of Oedipus and above all Creon to be concerned directly with the city's ills and the failure of the drama to fulfill the audience's expectations concerning curse and oracle condition our reaction to this scene.

In insisting on this second possibility, we must ask ourselves whether the Greek audience, given its traditions about pollution, curse, and scapegoat ritual, would be likely to forget the plague and Oedipus' curse so easily (the curse is in fact mentioned by Oedipus in the final scene at 1291 and 1345) and simply dismiss Oedipus' sense of urgency in favor of Creon's leisurely caution.[18] This is not an easy question to answer. First, critics have made a good case for the important roles that traditional story patterns have in tragedy; Strohm and Burnett in particular have shown that Greek dramatists deliberately played on the audience's expectations of these story patterns. Why should *Oedipus Tyrannus* be an exception? Second, Oedipus' curse is analogous to Draco's law on homicide, which requires the kin of a murdered man and the king archon to ban the killer from recognized practices like libations, prayer, and sacrifice.[19] Third, although it is far more difficult to size up the state of traditions about pollution and scapegoats, I think it is safe to conclude that a Greek audience would not take such matters lightly (especially in combination with other religious sanctions); and, if the play were performed during or after the plague, they would be impossible to forget.

Not only Greek law and cult[20] but tragedy regularly recognizes the threat of the pollution created by shed blood, although it sometimes finds ways around it. Whereas tragedies like Aeschylus' *Suppliants* treat the Danaids' threat to pollute the city with the utmost seriousness, Theseus in

16. Ley (1986) correctly emphasizes the importance of the fate of cities to the ancient audience of Greek tragedies.

17. Dyson (1973, 212) argues that Sophocles eliminates the plague "to leave the individual tragedy untouched by consolation." Taplin (1982, 172) makes a similar point: "Sophocles insists that Oedipus' paradigmatic reversal of fortune should be complete, without mitigation."

18. Howe (1962, 130) suggests that the "function of the plague appears to be more dramaturgical than religious," and that Sophocles' audience would be too skeptical to take it seriously. Parker (1983), to be discussed shortly, gives a far more balanced and cautious evaluation of these issues.

19. See Gould 1988, 148. Ironically, Oedipus plays both a civic and a familial role. See also Parker 1983, chap. 6.

20. Parker 1983, chap. 4.

Euripides' *Heracles* chooses to ignore the hero's pollution on the grounds of friendship (1214–34)—although he will still perform a ritual of purification for him in Athens. And in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, Theseus does not expel Oedipus from the city (1132–34)—although he keeps his physical distance from the hero.[21] In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, Creon does recognize Oedipus' pollution as an important issue in the final scene, but he domesticates it, ignoring the plague generated by the presence of the murderer of Laius in the city.

As Parker has stressed,[22] despite rhetoric to the contrary, history does not offer certain examples of the expulsion of a citizen who was discovered to be the source of a city's afflictions. Furthermore, "no reliable instances of the dispatch of scapegoats outside the seasonal framework are anywhere recorded," although sources say they could be performed in response to a specific crisis.[23] Scapegoats of the kind *Oedipus Tyrannus* threatens to make of Oedipus belong more clearly to the realm of the mythical. Yet myths about figures like Athamas, Oenoclus, or Lycurgus, and Hesiod's insistence that an unjust ruler can destroy his populace, still make Sophocles' failure to carry out the traditional pattern surprising.[24] Of course the play only flirts with this possibility; we have every expectation that the oracle will resolve the problem—in the fashion predicted by Teiresias and demanded by Oedipus. Yet, having gone to such trouble to elicit the audience's expectations concerning serious religious issues and to stress the urgency of the problem, why does the play conclude with a frustrating delay?

If we assume that the delay is deliberate and meant to be noticed with some concern by an audience who had expected and wanted a different conclusion, what does the play gain by making the issue of the plague at best implicit in the final scene and by leaving the fate of Oedipus unresolved?[25] Above all, the last scene as we have it allows us to observe at some length a clash between Oedipus' and Creon's views about the correct action to take in the situation and to juxtapose for our consideration two different styles of leadership, the leadership of Oedipus, who is still trying to exercise his old mastery in a characteristic way, and the new leadership of Creon. The audience is forced to make a judgment over whose interpretation of the situation is preferable, the ending advocated by Oedipus or that advocated by Creon. This is emphasized by having Creon and Oedipus clash not once but twice

21. Parker 1983, 309–11.

22. Parker 1983, 25, 130, 141, 258, 271, 278, 309. See also Bremmer 1983a. In aetiological myths the community, rather than the ruler, is more often said to be the cause of an affliction.

23. Parker 1983, 25.

24. For these and other examples see Parker 1983, 259–67; Vernant 1988b, 132.

25. Gellie (1972, 101) thinks that the last scene serves to show us that Oedipus can learn from his suffering and endure the truth.

over the issue of the banishment in the final scene, and, if we have the end of the play, by marking the final exit of Creon and Oedipus with this undecided issue. Finally, the audience is encouraged to consider how the city will be led once Oedipus is fully removed from the scene. Yet it must be stressed that only by suppressing the issue of the plague could Sophocles make the situation appear genuinely ambiguous. Creon could hardly have advocated the time-consuming journey to Delphi so blithely if the audience were reminded of the bodies of citizens dropping daily before him. In making this suggestion, I am here rather reluctantly rejecting the recent and intriguing suggestion of some critics that the play denies Oedipus, banishment in favor of once again entrapping him in the problems of his ancestral house.[26] Teiresias' predictions[27] and the terms of the oracle—unless it were to deny its original command—seem to rule out this possibility, at least for the long term. In any case, we remain uncertain as to the outcome.

Our judgment of the conflicting positions of Oedipus and Creon in the final scene depends in part on our evaluation of the attitude each displays concerning the oracle. Oedipus, as Knox in particular has emphasized,[28] has acquired by the end of the play a certain religious authority, a more than human prophetic vision about his own past and future. He is convinced that he and Apollo have acted together in the blinding (a blinding that Apollo's mouthpiece Teiresias predicted, 454–56, 1329–32). He knows that if he is banished he will not die; he has been saved for some strange evil destiny (1455–57). He sees a logic to his situation unavailable to the chorus and Creon. The banishment to Cithaeron that he envisions (1391–93, 1449–54) has, as Taplin argues, a compelling rightness of its own.[29]

The overall dramatic situation also functions to make Oedipus convincing on these points. He is no longer in a state of ignorance about his own identity and that of the murderer. The audience has ceased to view him through the veil of tragic irony. It may be significant, as Pucci has recently pointed out, that Oedipus uses the verb *οἶδα* at 1455; for in the earlier scene between Teiresias and Oedipus, the text gives Teiresias an exclusive claim to this verb, whereas Oedipus ironically (but correctly) characterizes himself as the one "knowing nothing" (397).[30] In the final scene, "Swellfoot" has perhaps at last fulfilled the knowledge implicit in his name. Because the or-

26. This is an unpublished suggestion of Colin MacCleod, reported by Taplin (1978, 46), and effectively criticized by M. Davies (1982, 273). Gellie (1986, 39) argues that it would be bad drama to bring Oedipus back into a relation with the community in the last scene and then expel him, and that to expel Oedipus would emphasize his guilt too strongly.

27. See March 1987, 148.

28. Knox 1957, chap. 5

29. Taplin 1978, 45–46.

30. Pucci 1990, 43, 47.

acle commanded the death or expulsion of the murderer, because Teiresias has predicted Oedipus' exile, because the entire logic of the play has prepared us for a decisive conclusion of this kind, and because the death or expulsion of the murderer has been so strongly linked with the safety of the city, Oedipus' insistence on banishment is intuitively convincing. Finally, if we are to transfer to the now blind Oedipus the association between blindness and religious insight established in the case of Teiresias, Oedipus' oracular pronouncements link him significantly with his wiser double.[31]

Creon's insistence on consulting the oracle once again incurs the dramatic disadvantage of running contrary to what the audience expects and even wants to happen. At the same time, there is some justification for his caution.[32] He has consistently advocated making decisions by consulting the gods; he goes to Delphi, he suggests to Oedipus that he consult Teiresias, and he criticizes Oedipus for his former lack of trust in Apollo (1445). Unlike Oedipus, who has great confidence in his own problem-solving ability and unconsciously condemns himself or at times carelessly modifies or ignores the words of the oracle (e.g., 1411–12, where he adds at one point an alternative not mentioned, that he should be cast in the sea), Creon is a man who is cautious in both speech and action. When he does not know something, he holds his tongue (568; see also1520). And he does not accept Oedipus' final interpretation of the oracle.

Oedipus is optimistic about the human ability to interpret oracles and treats the oracle as he treated the riddle of the Sphinx. In advocating exile, he ultimately conflates the two alternatives offered in the oracle: *Banished* to Cithaeron, he will *die* where his parents attempted to destroy him (1436–42, 1449–55).[33] In reducing the "either/or" of the oracle to a "both" Oedipus performs the same gesture of interpretation of an oracle that we find made correctly in the *Trachiniae*, where the prediction that either Heracles will die or the labors will come to an end so that he will live in peace are found to be one and the same.[34]

Creon, on the other hand, acknowledges what the oracle said but apparently wants exact instructions on how to act. One wonders, given the

31. As Bushnell (1988, 84) notes, Oedipus is hardly a second Teiresias, for his knowledge of his own future is—in contrast to that of the dying Hector—not precise. Nevertheless, Oedipus' shift to a sense of instinctive certainty about the future is strongly marked.

32. Critics are divided on the subject of Creon's caution. Kitto (1966, 220–22) is his staunchest defender, but he has won few adherents.

33. Bremmer (1983a, 318) makes the same point about scapegoats in general: "The explusion of scapegoats in practice amounted to killing, since, like the dead, they disappeared from the community, never to return."

34. See Hester 1979, 12, on the *Trachiniae* and other passages in Sophocles—although not this one.

nature of oracles, whether he has any right to expect such exactitude from the god, an exactitude that uncharacteristically removes any need for human initiative or interpretation altogether. And as Oedipus points out at 280–81, no one can force the gods to speak against their will.

Creon reports Apollo's words as follows:

C. Lord Phoebus bid us clearly to expel the pollution nurtured in this land and not to make it incurable.
O. By what rite of purification? How can we escape this misfortune?[35]
C. Either we banish him or dissolve bloodshed with bloodshed, knowing that this shed blood traps the city in its storm.

(96–101)

The oracle is said to be clear. Yet these words contain greater ambiguities than the fateful *or*. What is meant by releasing φόνος with φόνος? Killing the criminal—the interpretation adopted by Oedipus? A rite of purification involving sacrifice? (Apollo in *Eumenides* performs such a rite for Orestes at Delphi, but the Furies remain convinced of his guilt.) The blinding of Oedipus, in which Oedipus sheds blood for blood?[36] The very ambiguity of the words warrants some caution.[37]

The struggle over the expulsion of Oedipus evolves as a conflict between two styles of leadership. Creon is represented throughout the play as the reluctant leader.[38] He claimed earlier to be happy to have the benefits

35. This is my attempt to get the probable sense of a corrupt sentence.

36. This is the interpretation of Howe (1962, 137).

37. In myth (especially aetiological myths) scapegoats often, but do not always, die; in cult they are normally exiled. See esp. Bremmer 1983a, 315–18. I assume here that the oracle is unlikely, as some have thought, to reverse itself and advocate keeping Oedipus at home, and that the audience could only imagine that Creon is looking to remove the ambiguity, especially the *or*, in the original oracle. At Hdt. 7.141 the Delphic oracle partially reverses itself on a second consultation, since it gives the Athenians some hope for a future after their city is destroyed by the Persians. Yet even there the basic message, that the Athenians have no choice but to abandon their city to the enemy, remains the same.

38. The symmetries with the earlier scene between Oedipus and Creon are suggestive of other possibilities. In Oedipus' argument with Creon, he threatens to kill (not banish) Creon (623), who has suggested first death, then banishment as a punishment if he is guilty (606–7, 622). Before Jocasta, Creon then restates Oedipus' threat (inaccurately) as a threat to kill *or* banish himself (640–41). In surrendering to Jocasta's plea, Oedipus goes on to insist that sparing Creon will require his own death or banishment (658–59). In the final scene the power relations are reversed. Does the text make us wonder if Creon will (or even unconsciously wishes to) discover from the oracle divine authority to inflict on Oedipus the punishment of death that the king had earlier planned for Creon himself?

of power without its painful responsibilities. In the final scene, he is willing to forget his past conflict with Oedipus, and Oedipus is moved by his generosity in remembering to bring his daughters to their bereaved father (1422–23, 1473–74). But in fact Creon does little more than temporize and struggle to assert his will against the persistent Oedipus.[39] Creon is not a decisive actor, yet he is unlikely to be guilty of hybris, of doubting the gods, or of acting before he knows.

Creon views Oedipus' insistence on offering repeated instructions to himself as an inappropriate attempt to continue to rule even in defeat (1522–23).[40] Indeed Oedipus is to the end eager to act, command, and interpret, to keep a large place for human initiative. This style of leadership, the leadership of a man superior to others in energy and intelligence, has been shown in the play as a whole to have both its dangerous and its positive aspects. It is prone to misinterpretations and often threatens to collapse into tyrannical behavior—although it should be recognized that in this case it does not. Unlike other stage tyrants, such as Pentheus, or Creon in *Antigone*, Oedipus always stops short of violence against others.[41] He does not take action against Teiresias, due to his blindness (a nicety ignored by Pentheus), and he pulls back at the request of Jocasta and the chorus from acting on his anger at Creon. Oedipus leaps to conclusions before he knows what he is facing and he has a history of compounding his own and others' troubles when he tries to dismiss or avoid the words of the god. At the same time, the city in the first scene is shown to be eager for the kind of leadership that Oedipus has given and will give them, and the chorus continues to support him after his quarrel with Teiresias; they even sing an ode of joyous anticipation about Oedipus' birth, after they suspect that he is the polluted murderer of their king (1086–1109). He anticipates what should be done and acts decisively; most of his misinterpretations coincide with the words of the oracle. He succeeds in his proposed aim of discovering the killer of Laius, and the only damage he deliberately causes to anyone is to himself. His love for the city is passionate, and he is willing to accept death or banishment for its sake (658–59), even before he comes to understand these alternatives as his only real choice. The second stasimon (863–910) probably obliquely reflects the concerns his leadership raises for the chorus. In this ode they reject the hybris of the tyrant; they want the oracles to retain

39. As Gellie (1972, 102) puts it, "Oedipus begs with authority while Creon dictates timorously."

40. Knox (1957, chap. 5), Hester (1977, 45), and M. Davies (1982, 274–75) among others correctly emphasize the unchanging ethos of the two throughout the play. Kirkwood (1958, 132) sees this continuity as ensuring "the continued domination (dramatic, that is) of the tragic hero."

41. See Zeitlin 1986 for a discussion of the characteristics typical of Theban tyrants.

respect; yet they value the struggle, the wrestling, of the leader, for the benefit of the city.[42]

The question of leadership, and of the value of Oedipus' leadership to the city, is central to the play—and explicit in its content—from the first scene, where the city comes to Oedipus to solve his problems because of his ability as a leader and a solver of riddles, to Creon's last words, in which he chastises Oedipus for continuing to try to rule in defeat (1522–23).[43] Let us consider (against the background of the expectations created earlier in the play) Sophocles' alternatives for disposing of Oedipus in this final scene. If the city had acceded to Oedipus' demands for banishment, Creon, and the views and style of leadership he represents, could not have served as a serious foil to the hero. The city would appear to be losing an irreplaceable savior instead of struggling with a continuing problem. Kitto would prefer this ending: "The stranger who once saved Thebes by his own intelligence must now, though Theban born, save it by leaving the city forever. How did Sophocles come to miss such a dramatic ending?"[44] If Creon or the city had acted independently to kill or banish Oedipus—an unlikely scenario, given both the character of Oedipus and the traditional mythological pattern, which requires the consent of the scapegoat—the conclusion would have emphasized far more decisively the dangerous side of the hero.[45] Yet paradoxically, if the city *had* killed or banished Oedipus by the conclusion of the play, it would have shown less need of him; the city and its new leader would have shown a capacity to act decisively in the public interest, and the vacuum left by Oedipus' destruction would have been less obvious.

In short, by not giving Oedipus his way concerning the banishment, the play leaves open the whole question Oedipus and his leadership pose for the city. Neither the inspired activism of Oedipus nor the cautious piety of Creon is at least on the surface any more than a style of trying to interpret what cannot be interpreted in a complex human environment. Both advocate in their own way obedience to the oracle. But it is hard to avoid the impression that Sophocles has deliberately chosen to make his destroyed hero the sole champion of the expectations raised by his own plot. After uncovering the murderer, Oedipus now attempts to insure the safety of a city that refuses to play the role assigned to it in all scapegoat myths and

42. This ode has provoked interpretations too numerous to consider here. Yet it seems reasonable to consider that it has this degree of relevance to the previous scenes. See Hester 1977, 42–43 for a sensible review of the issue and bibliography.

43. Gellie (1986, 40–41) and Pucci (1990, 47–48) point out some of the structural parallels between his actions in the first and last scenes. The verb κρατεῖν appears in both cases (14, 1522). In both cases, Oedipus strives to protect stricken children and to mitigate disaster with compassion and courage.

44. Kitto 1961, 179.

45. See n. 15 above.

cults. The entire movement of the drama, underlined by the religious force of the curse and the scapegoat pattern itself, is likely to convince its audience that the blind Oedipus must intuitively be advocating the right position, and that under the moderate and admirable Creon, Thebes will continue to experience a form of rule that could hardly be characterized as leadership.[46]

Finally, all members of the cast, both chorus and protagonists, are distracted from the plague that grips the city by their concern with the fate of Oedipus as destroyer of his own house. This compounds the uncertainty created about the future of the city in the hands of Creon. The chorus is lost in its fascinated horror at the downfall of the great man, its fear and desire of looking at him. Oedipus, who has the excuse of suffering to explain his self-concern, nevertheless makes the one mention of the welfare of the city (1449–50). Creon finds himself in the structural position of Oedipus in the opening scene.[47] He has tried to anticipate what should be done and has determined to consult the oracle. Yet he ignores the issue of the plague and expresses no sense of urgency about taking immediate action. He is appropriately punctilious about Oedipus' pollution but views it as a family matter. Similarly, as in the first scene, where he clearly prefers to inform Oedipus about the oracle in private, Creon takes the first step toward resolving the problem of Oedipus by concealing him within (if only temporarily).

The real paradox of a figure like Oedipus is his extraordinary capacity to save and destroy through his assertive leadership. We do not have to equate Oedipus with Pericles in order to find the paradox he presents relevant to the city of Athens. As early as Solon (fr. 9.3 W) we are warned that "a city can perish from its too great men." Thucydides and Aristophanes, to give but two notable examples, are openly concerned with the problematic relation between the democracy and outstanding aristocratic leaders like Pericles or, to take a more obviously difficult case, Alcibiades. Thucydides is convinced that the democracy was at its best under the leadership of Pericles. Aristophanes is constantly urging the city to heed rather than reject the advice of its best men. The problem of Alcibiades becomes the central political question put to Euripides and Aeschylus at the close of the *Frogs*. Like Oedipus, Alcibiades is there represented as both potential savior and destroyer of the city.

Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* is about many things, and the multiplicity of interpretations it has generated testifies to its richness as a text. But its surprising ending seems designed above all to raise, in the oblique fashion

46. As M. Davies (1982, 276) puts it, "the accession to the throne...has not bestowed on him any of the Oedipodean heroism he would require to master the Sphinx should that creature raise her ugly head again."

47. See Gould 1988, 157.

typical of tragedy, a set of profound questions about political leadership, both in Thebes and, indirectly, in classical Athens. Just as the tragedy of Oedipus is left incomplete and promises new chapters in this final scene,[48] so the history of Thebes is incomplete. Thebes both still needs and must reject Oedipus. He is the kind of leader a democracy would both love and desire to ostracize. Creon, the cautious and reluctant leader, would in some respects fit admirably in a democracy. He is a man outstanding in heritage, who would never overstep his limits. He seemingly embodies the σωφροσύνη that tragedy often praises in the ideal leader:

> It is necessary to crown with garlands men who are intelligent and courageous—both whatever man provides the finest leadership for the polis, because he is a man of restraint (σώφρων) and justice, and whatever man by his speech wards off evil deeds, preventing battles and civil strife—since their actions are fair both for the entire city and for all the Hellenes (Eur. fr. 282.23–28 Nauck).[49]

Yet how many troubled cities can wait to acquire divine knowledge before they act? Oedipus, when asked by Creon what acting in ignorance would mean to him, asserts he must rule nevertheless (628). Creon is represented in this final scene as the man who refuses to speak or act in ignorance.[50] Yet, as Martin Ostwald has recently argued, "the condemnation of humanity to ignorance and to the necessity of acting in this ignorance is the tragic reality which *Oedipus Tyrannus* conveys to us."[51] Oedipus' final confrontation with the chorus makes vivid his dangerous, rash, incomprehensible side. They wish they had never known him and think him better dead than living (1347–48, 1356, 1367–68). Yet by refusing to permit the expected banishment of Oedipus, Creon ironically expands the tragic authority of the man whom he is hurrying to confine in the private world of his house.[52]

48. This is Pucci's (1990, 46–48) intriguing explanation of the inconclusive ending.

49. See North 1966, 72–73 for the translation of the fragment and a general discussion of this issue.

50. For a similar analysis of Creon see esp. Gellie 1972, 88, 102.

51. Ostwald 1990, 149.

52. Here I find myself between those critics who find that Oedipus regains dignity and self-knowledge in disaster (e.g., Knox 1957, chap. 5) and those who see Oedipus, unchanged and having learned nothing, going down to complete defeat by Creon (e.g., M. Davies 1982; Taplin 1982). Oedipus is unable to compel others to carry out what he feels to be right. But to the degree that his position has credibility, he does not go down to utter defeat.

40

# What Do You Know? The End of Oedipus

Rachel Kitzinger

THE DRAMATIC IRONY[1] of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* has long been acknowledged as a central feature of the play—so much so that few recent critics discuss it at any length.[2] The appropriateness of this familiar Sophoclean technique for a play about human ignorance seems so obvious as to need no lengthy discussion.[3] In the actuality of dramatic production, however, Sophocles' use of irony is, I believe, more complicated and more various than has been recognized, and requires further examination. First, we must look more closely at how irony is created, to determine what effect it may have on the audience.[4] Second, we must take account of a

I offer this reading of the end of Oedipus to honor Martin Ostwald because, in his own article on the play (1990), he eloquently insists on the need to interpret again and again this most enigmatic of plays. If I meet his standard of a "comprehensive and...accurate accounting for the features of the text as it has come down to us," it is because he gave me the basis for doing so.

1. See Stanford 1939, 66, 76 for a discussion of this term as it applies to Sophocles. Gould (1970, 171–75) also discusses the many ways in which the term has been applied to *OT*. He argues that the irony in the play makes the audience aware of the power of the demonic, but he also points out that it is important for establishing the multiplicity of Oedipus' discovery. I discuss the connection between irony and the discovery of multiplicity from a different point of view.

2. Recent exceptions are Pucci (1988, 129–54) and Tonelli (1983), both of whom look at the verbal ambiguity in the play in light of contemporary literary theory.

3. Winnington-Ingram (1980, 203), for example, says, "The lavish—the almost intolerable—irony of *Oedipus Tyrannos* is justified by this—that the most intelligent of men can be so wrong, that the man who read the riddle of the Sphinx cannot read the riddle of his own appalling destiny."

4. The argument about the effect of the irony on the audience centers on whether or not it lends the audience a sense of superiority. Most recently the notion of the audience's superi-

shift in the use of irony in the last scene, which radically changes the way the audience relates to the events of the play. The dramatic irony initially depends on the audience's prior knowledge of two incontrovertible facts about Oedipus: his killing of Laius, his father; and his marriage to Jocasta, his mother. For most of the play, irony is possible both because the audience knows these two facts while Oedipus slowly uncovers them[5] and because, at the same time, Oedipus' language illustrates the power of words to say more than the speaker means. But the difference in the knowledge held by Oedipus and that held by the audience is erased by line 1183. The audience cannot know how Sophocles will close the play after Oedipus exits into the palace, because the rest of the story has many variations in the tradition.[6] The first basis for implementing irony, therefore, no longer exists, and the second, the nature of Oedipus' language, changes. In his last appearance Oedipus is finally beyond the audience's and the other characters' comprehension.

The final scene, therefore, changes the way the audience receives what is happening on stage. Instead of feeling confident in their knowledge and ability to interpret, they must wonder anxiously: "What are we going to hear and see?" and then "What are we seeing and hearing?"[7] Sophocles does not relieve their uncertainty but intensifies it by presenting the audi-

ority has been challenged by Pucci (1988, 135), who, however, makes no distinction between audience and reader. He does not take into his consideration the sequential unfolding of the plot when considering the effect of the irony on his reader/audience. He argues that "in each instance, tragic irony challenges the audience's reading adventurousness and complicity. It sends a double-bind message that painfully gets at the readers' nerves, tries their sensibility as readers, and merges with their sympathy for Oedipus' analogous predicament as he himself is harshly tried by the insistent, but also enigmatic signs that baffle him, signs such as Teiresias' double prophecy and Jocasta's narrative." Thus, according to Pucci, the careful "reader" finds much in the text to unsettle the sense of superiority that some of the wordplay may give him. I agree that this unsettling happens, but only at the end of the play; the riddles earlier on appear to be within the audience's control. Pucci seems to imply that the indeterminacy of the ending is present in the reader's mind throughout. However, the ending can only inform the early scenes of the play through rereading. It seems important to determine, from the point of view of a spectator, what effect the ending may have as it happens and to allow for the possibility of a change in the audience's status vis à vis the language of the play.

5. Few would deny that this difference in Oedipus' and the audience's knowledge exists. A notable exception is Vellacott (1971, 114–21) who argues that Oedipus knows the truth all along.

6. Craik, in her commentary on Euripides' *Phoenissae* (1988, 36) remarks on the many variations that exist for the last part of the story.

7. Earlier in the play the audience may have noticed bewildering anomalies, such as the report of the number of robbers, etc. (These and others are carefully documented by Dawe 1982, 6–22.) These anomalies do not, I believe, shake the audience's confidence that they know what happened but make it plausible that Oedipus does not yet know and increase our admiration for his ability to find out.

ence with two endings, one created by Oedipus and one by members of the polis—the chorus and Creon. While Oedipus articulates as fully as possible, by word and action, an end where no one can follow him, Creon and the chorus make an end by imposing nonaction, silence, and darkness. A spectator is left to reconcile for himself the expressiveness and forcefulness of a figure now absolutely isolated from the audience and from the other actors with the hesitations and doubt of the community. In this way the irony of the play is finally directed at the audience, whose members, having felt the power of their knowledge through most of the play, are left at the play's end to hold together two irreconcilable ways of knowing, acting, and speaking.

The complex relationship between Oedipus' language and action and the audience's knowledge of his identity up to the final scene can be illustrated by a few examples of verbal irony,[8] each involving the use of a demonstrative adjective:

1. Oedipus is speaking to Creon about the need to track down the murderers of Laius:

> *ποῦ τόδ' εὑρεθήσεται*
> *ἴχνος παλαιᾶς δυστέκμαρτον αἰτίας;* (108–9)
>
> [Where will this track (trace) be found
> hard to make out of ancient guilt?]

Dawe mentions that Meinecke proposed to emend the *τόδ'* to *ποθ'* since no *ἴχνος* to which the demonstrative might point has yet been mentioned or found.[9] Jebb understands the demonstrative adjective as misplaced from *αἰτίας*.[10] But by using the demonstrative with *ἴχνος* Sophocles makes Oedipus refer to the specific act of tracing the unknown murderer[11] while at the same time allowing the audience to hear Oedipus pointing to himself as the trace he must find. This irony reveals Oedipus to the audience as both hunter and hunted.

8. An extensive categorizing of double meanings in *OT* was first published by A. Hug (1872). His categories are summarized by Stanford (1939, 163). It is telling, I think, that Hug lists no ambiguity after line 1183.

9. Dawe 1982, 98.

10. Jebb 1883, 34.

11. As Kamerbeek (1967, 51) says: "*τόδ'...ἴχνος* graphically represents the task now looming up in his mind."

2. Oedipus summarizes his act of cursing the murderer and/or anyone who suppresses information about the murderer by saying:

> ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τοιόσδε τῷ τε δαίμονι
> τῷ τ' ἀνδρὶ τῷ θανόντι σύμμαχος πέλω. (244–45)
>
> [I am an ally of this kind to the daimon
> and to the dead man.]

The demonstrative τοιόσδε in Oedipus' mind pinpoints precisely the kind of ally Oedipus is making himself to Laius and to the god through his curse. But the audience knows of and hears here a reference to the very different kind of ally (σύμμαχος) that Oedipus will prove to be.

3. Finally, in the curse itself, Oedipus generalizes the demonstrative adjective:

> τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον, ὅστις ἐστί.... (236)
>
> [This man I forbid, whoever he is....]

Oedipus is forced into this formula by his ignorance about the guilty person and uses it to refer to any and all. But Oedipus cannot, even in his imagination, supply the one referent to whom the curse in fact applies—himself. The audience, on the other hand, hears the ὅστις ἐστί as referring only to one person, Oedipus, who thus becomes curser and cursed.

The irony in these passages hinges on the use of the demonstrative adjective, a word that by its nature intensifies the identifying function of a word. But in each instance the audience is able to supply at least two referents for the "identifying" word because of its superior knowledge of Oedipus' identity. We as audience[12] have a greater control over language than Oedipus does, and in a play whose hero makes a virtue of the ability to solve riddles, the audience must derive pleasure and even a sense of invulnerability[13] from the fact that they are better riddle-solvers than Oedipus.

12. Throughout this chapter I use the pronoun *we* to refer to the audience. While audience reaction is inevitably various, it is also true that the play attempts to control and shape the audience's vision. It is this shaping, which takes place as the play unfolds, that I am trying to uncover.

13. Gould (1970, 175) claims that this invulnerability serves to involve the audience imaginatively in Oedipus' incestuous and patricidal identity, while maintaining their awareness that they do not share that identity.

This pleasure, however, coexists with admiration for Oedipus' ability to act despite his ignorance. In the examples above, Oedipus uses the demonstrative adjectives, which are the source of irony, in a rhetorically forceful way, to further the action to which he is single-mindedly committed. In so doing he demonstrates the possibility, indeed the necessity, of language as a form of action.

We are given ample opportunity to admire Oedipus' initiative (particularly his *verbal* action) in dealing with the crisis confronting the polis, in contrast to Creon's passivity and the apparent obstructionism of Teiresias and Jocasta. While we know Oedipus' identity to be multiple and his language treacherous, he acts out of a firm sense of self and with utter belief in the effectiveness of his language. Moreover the development of the play gives this unknowing Oedipus great power, since his ability to act and to speak makes the play happen. Our admiration is paradoxically not vitiated by our awareness of, and pity for, his ignorance in contrast to our own knowledge; rather the feelings coexist in a tension that raises questions about the relationship between action, language, and knowledge. The final scene complicates, rather than resolves, this tension, as the audience is deprived of its ironic distance and embroiled directly in the frightening dilemma this complex relationship creates for the individual and the community.

To appreciate how the final scene challenges the audience's relationship to the action on the stage, it is important to acknowledge first of all that there were many possibilities for how the play could end. Edmunds[14] lists various differing accounts of the blinding from ancient sources: Oedipus dies through self-blinding immediately after he discovers his identity; blindness comes upon him as a result of his own curse; Polybus blinds him because of the oracle concerning patricide; or the servants of Laius blind him. Homer never mentions the blinding of Oedipus. And, in addition, the many versions are inconsistent about when, or even if, Oedipus is exiled.

One might argue that Sophocles has already given an ending for the story in the *Antigone*, when Ismene recalls the misfortunes of her family, including the blinding of Oedipus: *πατὴρ / ὡς νῷν ἀπεχθὴς δυσκλεής τ' ἀπώλετο / πρὸς αὐτοφώρων ἀμπλακημάτων, διπλᾶς / ὄψεις ἀράξας αὐτὸς αὐτουργῷ χερί* (*Ant.* 49–52). However, not only is this account only partial, making no mention of what happened after the self-blinding, but it is clear that a playwright was not obliged to use the same version of a myth every time he treated it. Euripides in the *Phoenissae* gives this version of the Oedipus story in a speech by Jocasta (60–66):

14. Edmunds 1985b, 13–16.

> When Oedipus learned I was his wife and mother, he had endured all suffering, and he struck with terrible gory wounding his own eyes, bleeding the pupils with a golden brooch. When his sons' beards had grown, they shut him up behind the bolts that this fate might be forgotten which needs too much intelligence to explain it. There in the house he lives....

But a fragment of his *Oedipus* preserved by a scholiast of the *Phoenissae* reads: ἡμεῖς δὲ Πολύβου παῖδ' ἐρείσαντες πέδῳ / ἐξομματοῦμεν καὶ διόλλυμεν κόρας ("and we having thrust the child of Polybus on the ground take out his eyes, destroy his pupils"), and the scholiast tells us that the "we" who have blinded Oedipus are the servants of Laius.[15]

Because of the variations present in the tradition, when Oedipus says at line 1183 in Sophocles' play, ὦ φῶς, τελευταῖόν σε προσβλέψαιμι νῦν and exits into the *skene*, the audience can have no clear idea of what will follow. This very uncertainty involves a radical and disorienting change in perspective for the audience,[16] since for the first time in the play words carry an ambiguity that they cannot resolve into a hierarchy of meanings. As several scholars have pointed out,[17] this line works equally well as an announcement of suicide or blinding. Since there is no certainty what end Sophocles will give his play, the audience cannot be sure what Oedipus means here, and this uncertainty is sustained into the beginning of the last scene.[18]

With the possibility of suicide in the audience's mind, they hear the chorus sing an ode that insists on the utter worthlessness of human life. The figure on whom they have depended—ἀνέπνευσά τ' ἐκ σέθεν καὶ κατεκοίμησα τοὐμὸν ὄμμα ("from you I took breath and shut my eye in sleep")[19]—has failed them, to the point where they wish they had never seen

15. Fr. 541 Nauck.

16. It is possible that the consistency with which the final scene of the play is either ignored by scholars or misrepresented might be explained by the change in perspective that the last scene requires.

17. First in the comment of a scholiast on this line; See also Stanford 1939, 173; Dawe 1982, 215; Knox 1983, 148.

18. Teiresias' predictions earlier in the play may seem problematic for this interpretation, since they imply that Oedipus will be blind and in exile by the end of the day (and the play), not dead. But, as we know when we view the end of the play, Teiresias' predictions are misleading, and the audience member who has trusted in them must think again anyway. The ambiguity of this line starts the process of destabilizing whatever assumptions, if any, the audience may have made about the end. Pucci (1988, 134) argues that the "sacred voice of the oracle and the privileged stance of myth" are made problematic for the reader by the text throughout the play.

19. Some commentators read this line as a reference to the specific events of Oedipus'

him (1217–18). The chorus' desire to erase their knowledge of Oedipus, to sing him out of their history, and their despair about the effectiveness of human existence leave little room for the audience to imagine an ending that does not bring Oedipus' annihilation. The ode thus keeps alive in the audience's imagination the possibility of suicide suggested by Oedipus' exit line, while doing nothing to resolve their uncertainty about what is to happen next.

As the *skene* doors open at the end of the chorus' song, the audience waits for the ambiguity to be resolved. But when the messenger steps out and begins to speak, it seems that only silence will surround Oedipus, as though Sophocles wishes to play with our ignorance. After a tantalizing reference to οἷ' ἔργ' ἀκούσεσθ' οἷα δ' εἰσόψεσθ' (1224) and τὰ δ' αὐτίκ' εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακὰ / ἑκόντα κοὐκ ἄκοντα (1229–30), the messenger announces that Jocasta is dead and says that the chorus will learn of *her* παθήματα in as great detail as his memory allows. There is no mention of Oedipus—no promise that we will hear about what has happened to him.

Fifteen lines into the speech about Jocasta's death, the messenger finally speaks of Oedipus. He tells us that Oedipus' violent entrance into the palace distracted all witnesses from seeing how Jocasta killed herself. Why does Sophocles create this interruption by Oedipus in the narrative of Jocasta's death? Whatever reasons one may wish to consider,[20] one clear result of the curtailment of the account of Jocasta's end is to sound again the note of the audience's ignorance. Prior to this scene, Oedipus has made the audience aware of their superior knowledge. Here he is the cause of their *not* being able to know. This play with the audience's uncertainty continues, as the messenger tells of Oedipus' demand for a sword. We are not told why he wants it. Does he mean to kill Jocasta? Himself? It is impossible to say (despite many critics' casual assumption that it is obvious he means to kill Jocasta). The opening of this scene has therefore emphasized the audience's new perspective of *partial* understanding, *partial* knowledge.

When the messenger goes on to describe in great detail Oedipus' self-blinding, the audience, instead of being enlightened, becomes aware of an even deeper lack of understanding. Now they are told everything, but what they are told is incomprehensible. The words that Oedipus uttered as he blinded himself are reported (1271–74):

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solving the riddle of the Sphinx, saving the city, then destroying it by his pollution. This interpretation seems overly specific. Whichever way one hears the line, it emphasizes the chorus' dependence on Oedipus.

20. For one interpretation see Tonelli 1983, 154–56.

> *αὐδῶν τοιαῦθ' ὁθούνεκ' οὐκ ὄψοιντό νιν*
> *οὐθ' οἷ' ἔπασχεν οὔθ' ὁποῖ' ἔδρα κακά*
> *ἀλλ' ἐν σκότῳ τὸ λοιπὸν οὓς μὲν οὐκ ἔδει*
> *ὀψοίαθ' οὓς δ' ἔχρῃζεν οὐ γνωσοίατο.*

But the words remain mysterious. The audience may instinctively react with horror and feel the appropriateness of the sexual symbolism of Oedipus' piercing his eyes with his mother's pins, but neither his act nor his language conveys a significance that is clear to the observer. Take, for example, the balanced phrase *οὐθ' οἷ' ἔπασχεν οὔθ' ὁποῖ' ἔδρα κακά*. The same *κακά* constitute the object of the two verbs, so that these verbs of opposite meaning (doing and suffering) become synonymous. When Oedipus says that he will continue to see and not know, as he has done in the past, but now in darkness, again there is no way of understanding his words fully. Commentators universally write with confidence that to see in darkness means not to see; however, the word order leads us to take *ἀλλ' ἐν σκότῳ* with both parts of the *μέν/δέ* construction. Thus it goes not only with the verb "see" but also with "not know." But are eyes that see and do not know in darkness eyes which do not see at all? Clearly Oedipus means something more, but we cannot know what. The audience is in fact in much the same position that Oedipus was in when Teiresias delivered his pronouncements in an earlier scene. They are given a riddle they cannot solve.[21]

Here then the ambiguity in Oedipus' language is no longer transparent to the audience, who before had the knowledge to interpret its many meanings. Instead we sense a single meaning that makes opposites collapse into synonyms and that overrides a *μέν/δέ* opposition between seeing and not recognizing with a phrase that perhaps negates the activity of seeing altogether but does so by asserting its continued activity. Oedipus himself fully possesses this meaning, but we are in the dark. The balanced syntax suggests Oedipus' certainty, which is emphasized by the messenger's account of the repeated action of his hands (*πολλάκις τε κοὐχ ἅπαξ / ἤρασσ' ἔπειρεν βλέφαρα*, 1275–76) and the monotonous chanting implied in *ἐφυμνῶν* (1275). Oedipus insists on the significance of his actions and words—the blinding is not an irrational, impulsive act—but this significance is beyond us.

While the messenger's speech has settled some things about how the play ends, it has also increased the disorientation of the audience by emphasizing that they have now entered terra incognita. As if in response to their

21. Reinhardt (1979, 129) describes Oedipus' words here as a "*griphos*-like tangle." However, he sees that tangle as indicating "the tangled nature of Oedipus' fate."

uncertainty, Oedipus' first words on emerging from the palace are questions that reveal his own uncertainty: *ποῖ γᾶς φέρομαι τλάμων; πᾷ μοι φθογγὰ διαπωτᾶται φοράδην;* (1309–10). However, Oedipus very soon reorients himself, while the audience, along with Creon and the chorus, are left in various states of uncertainty.[22] As Oedipus demands an end, the necessity of which is clear to him, the audience's disorientation increases. By his entrance they are reminded of the only other entrance Oedipus makes, that at the beginning of the play, but the parallel emphasizes the change from a king surrounded by his people to a man who has deliberately exiled himself from all that is familiar.[23] And because Oedipus has dominated the world of the play up to this point, his removal into a world so distant and unavailable to understanding is disturbing; more than that, since he no longer serves as the butt of dramatic irony, the audience's position of superiority is changed and in fact reversed, as they now perceive not only that they cannot understand what Oedipus is and what Oedipus has done but that they are incapable of the kind of response he has made. Admiration for his civic responsibility turns to awe at the extreme, almost perverse, singularity of his act.

Oedipus' distance from the characters on stage and from the audience manifests itself in many ways. One detail of his diction might serve as a first example. Oedipus' repeated use of words for pleasure, sweetness, and desire anchors his experience in a common human reality at the point when the chorus, Creon, and, I suspect, many members of the audience shrink from the sight of his bloodied face as an unnatural horror. At lines 1334–35 Oedipus says, *τί γὰρ ἔδει μ' ὁρᾶν, / ὅτῳ γ' ὁρῶντι μηδὲν ἦν ἰδεῖν γλυκύ*; and at lines 1337–39 he says, *τί δῆτ' ἐμοὶ βλεπτὸν ἦν / στερκτόν, ἢ προσήγορον / ἔτ' ἔστ' ἀκούειν ἡδονᾷ, φίλοι;* At line 1375 he asks, *ἡ τέκνων δῆτ' ὄψις ἦν ἐφίμερος*; and at the end of his longest explanation he summarizes the effect of his blinding by saying *τὸ γὰρ τὴν φροντίδ' ἔξω τῶν κακῶν οἰκεῖν γλυκύ* (1389–90). In each case, he uses words of sweetness and pleasure, first to deny that they exist in what he could see and hear now, then to assert that they consist in the mind's living *ἔξω κακῶν*, where *κακῶν* are the disastrous connections that he has had with the world.

Oedipus' diction in these examples contrasts sharply with Creon's and the chorus' way of talking about him. For the chorus Oedipus is proof that human *εὐδαιμονία* is an illusion (1190), and when it is confronted with the blinded Oedipus, it insists that his situation cannot be contained within the normal sphere of human comprehension and feeling (1312, 1319–20). In

22. Gellie (1986, 35) comments on the "flatness of exhaustion" at the opening of the last scene. He sees the last scene as building to a second climax that brings with it Oedipus' acceptance of the past and his reincorporation into the community.

23. Seale (1982, 251–52) discusses the importance of the parallels between the opening and closing scenes of the play.

the chorus' eyes Oedipus makes meaningless the words that describe human experience. Creon too cannot think of Oedipus as belonging to the human world; he refers to him as an ἄγος that must be hidden away, an object that only the family's ears and eyes can tolerate (1430–31). But Oedipus insists on pleasure and pain as meaningful words to apply to himself, making language stretch to incorporate the reality of his experience and forcing us to try to understand him in ordinary human terms.

While this is a small point, it illustrates the distance between Oedipus' understanding and that of the other characters. This distance is intensified as Oedipus insists on describing the blinding as an act of self-exile. While, or because, he can view his experience as human, he also physically creates the distance at which he of necessity stands from the human community. In response to the chorus' complaint that suicide would have been a better solution (1367–68), Oedipus makes clear that the blinding is an attempt to sever all connections with the world he has known, including his dead relatives. He puts the act of cutting himself off in the context of his own decree of exile for the murderer of Laius (1381–85), making clear that his act of blinding is an attempt to fulfill that decree. Blocking his ears would have perfected that act (1387–89), but of this he was physically, though not imaginatively, incapable. His conclusion to this explanation of his self-blinding again uses the language of exile: τὴν φροντίδ' ἔξω τῶν κακῶν οἰκεῖν. Throughout the scene, Oedipus expects and demands that the polis follow his lead and impose physical exile on him, an act that would effectively complete the isolation he has embraced and confirm both his humanity and the end he has chosen. The fact that the polis fails to do this is of significance for the dilemma with which the audience is left at the end of the play: It clearly contrasts Oedipus' ability to act toward an end with the community's inability to do so.

If the act of blinding is a way for Oedipus to exile the self, it then becomes clear that this act "corrects" the ironic ambiguity of his earlier language. As we have seen, the irony of his words depended on the audience's knowledge of Oedipus' multiple identity. The blinding makes vividly clear the limits of his person, by cutting off his ties with the rest of the world and presenting this self as the sole, isolated perpetrator of the deed for which exile was the punishment. By this act of absolute definition Oedipus not only reverses the unknowing multiplicity of his earlier reference to the self, but at the same time insists on the power and validity of his earlier speech-act by fulfilling the curse he has uttered.

In the last scene there are other ways in which Oedipus corrects the earlier ambiguity in his language. His words, for example, have a clarity and expressiveness that are new to the play. Reinhardt, with his usual sensitivity

to language, describes Oedipus in this last scene as "speaking and singing out the burden of his obsession."[24] We need only look at a few examples of his language here. At lines 1341–46 Oedipus says of himself: *τὸν μέγ' ὀλέθριον, / τὸν καταρατότατον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θεοῖς / ἐχθρότατον βροτῶν*. By his own action Oedipus has made these superlatives plausible and unambiguous. We have been shown by Oedipus the extreme limit that this grammatical way of marking degree defines; if there is any ambiguity in these words, it lies in our inability to comprehend fully what Oedipus has shown us. By contrast one of the few uses of a superlative by Oedipus earlier in the play is a reference to Jocasta as *φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρα*, where the superlative is loaded with irony (see also, for example, 999). Similarly Oedipus curses in this last scene, as he does in the first scene of the play:

> *ὄλοιθ' ὅστις ἦν ὃς ἀργίας πέδας*
> *νομάδος ἐπὶ πόας λῦσέ μ' ἀπό τε φόνου*
> *ἔρυτο κἀνέσωσεν, οὐδὲν εἰς χάριν πράσσων.*
>
> (1349–52)

We might compare the language of his first curse: *τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον, ὅστις ἐστί* (236). As in the first curse, Oedipus uses a generalizing formula to name the person he is cursing. In the first instance this formula made possible an ironic interpretation of his words; now we know through Oedipus' own inquiry who saved him, who is being cursed, but Oedipus makes clear through the generalizing formula that he is cursing not the particular person but the act that person has performed. It appropriately shifts attention from the shepherd himself to what he did and its consequences. This language, instead of being a conduit for irony, defines for us exactly what is blameworthy. In no other scene in the play does Oedipus' language dominate the stage as it does here by its expressiveness, its fluency, and its lack of irony.

While Oedipus removes himself from ironical interpretation and, in contrast to his earlier position, isolates himself in an end in which no one else shares, the community (and particularly its leader Creon) is incapable of any significant speech or action.[25] The chorus, despite Oedipus' explanations, cannot understand why Oedipus has blinded himself, and it refuses to

24. Reinhardt 1979, 130. Gellie (1986, 37) also describes Oedipus' language in the last scene as charged with a "positive and confident energy." However, he views Oedipus' control as Sophocles' way of changing him from a victim to someone who can, once again, heal his city.

25. Gellie (1986, 37) comments on the way in which Creon reintroduces the polis onto the stage and yet appears ineffectual in contrast to Oedipus.

respond to Oedipus' requests to be exiled.[26] Creon, to whom the chorus gives the responsibility to "plan and act" (τὸ πράσσειν καὶ τὸ βουλεύειν, 1417), refuses to act. As he himself brought the oracle from Delphi in which the necessity of ridding the land of the murderer of Laius is clearly stated (ἄνωγεν ἡμᾶς Φοῖβος ἐμφανῶς ἄναξ, 96), his caution, rather than appearing appropriately pious, betrays weakness, especially in comparison with Oedipus' definitive action. The effect of this impotence is to leave the end of the story unresolved as far as the city is concerned, though it has been fully resolved as far as Oedipus is concerned.

A contrast between Oedipus and the city characterizes other moments in the last scene. In each case it is a contrast between definition and clarity on the one hand, ambiguity and obscurity on the other. The chorus wishes again, at line 1347, that it had never known Oedipus. In opposition to his desire to eliminate Oedipus from consciousness, Oedipus, after fully describing his reasons for blinding himself, addresses and names in chronological order all the significant parts of his history: Cithaeron, Polybus and Corinth, the crossroads, and his marriage (1390–1408). He makes present a past fully known and identified, using language that can represent accurately that history, as if he were deliberately undoing the irony of his earlier language about the past. Similarly Oedipus has insisted on coming out on stage and being seen; and once there, he has insisted on being seen in a particular way. Creon, however, wants immediately to hide Oedipus away—to remove the shame of his presence from the light and from our consideration.

As a final example of this contrast we may consider Oedipus' daring prediction about his future—that he has been spared for some δεινὸν κακόν (1457). Oedipus does not shy away even now from drawing logical conclusions about something he cannot know. And this prediction, unlike others earlier in the play, cannot be interpreted ironically by the audience, since there is no version of the myth that proves it a priori to be false.[27] Creon, however, is made to repeat a line from earlier in the play, which states his refusal to use language about things he cannot or does not know. When questioned early in the play about Teiresias' silence concerning Oedipus' guilt right after Laius' death, Creon says, οὐκ οἶδ'· ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ μὴ φρονῶ

26. Seale (1982, 249) has argued that Oedipus contradicts himself in his final request to the chorus (1410–12), where he asks that it exile him *or* murder him *or* drown him. In fact he is acknowledging here that the oracle allowed for exile or death as a punishment, and although Oedipus has clearly chosen exile for reasons he has made clear, he acknowledges that the city may choose differently. On this question see the discussion of Foley in chap. 39 of the present volume.

27. And, in fact, as Deborah Roberts points out (1988, 184), members of the audience may have been aware of the cult of Oedipus at Colonus, which would confirm the truth of Oedipus' prediction for himself here.

σιγᾶν φιλῶ ("I do not know. In matters where I do not know I like to stay silent," 569). In the context of the irony of the early part of the play, Creon can be viewed as appropriately cautious here. But when, in response to Oedipus' request about exile, he repeats the sentiment at line 1520 (ἃ μὴ φρονῶ γὰρ οὐ φιλῶ λέγειν μάτην, "What I do not know I do not like to say uselessly"), his silence and caution only serve to contrast with the control Oedipus exhibits in his speech in this scene, control even about things he cannot know, such as the future. In his new position of authority, Creon is incapable of risking the speech that the community needs. Oedipus' willingness to take that risk earlier in the play has made clear its necessity; but Oedipus now communicates from a private world, and Creon does nothing to compensate the community for that loss.

In this final scene, then, the audience comes to understand Oedipus as beyond reach, both by his act of self-exile and by his use of language that speaks of a truth they cannot comprehend. At the same time, the response of Creon and the chorus, the community with which the audience is allied by their mutual loss of Oedipus, is characterized by silence, incomprehension, and doubt. Whereas the solitary Oedipus defines his end (and in so doing fulfills Apollo's oracle, his own curse, and Teiresias' prophecy) with language that has now for the first time a singularity of meaning unshadowed by irony, everyone else feels the impossibility of finding language to make an end to this story. The tension between action and knowledge that dominates the earlier part of the play seems to be radicalized into a schism between the individual who knows and acts and the community that cannot understand and is paralyzed. The audience, as individuals and members of a community, are caught between these two poles of experience.

Two further aspects of the final moments of the play complicate the picture I have drawn so far. As far as Oedipus' end is concerned, the complicating factor is his daughters, and as far as the community's ending is concerned, that factor is the decisive gesture that Creon finally makes by enclosing Oedipus in the palace.[28] These complications make Oedipus' seemingly complete ending not an end and Creon's seemingly inconclusive ending visually and dramatically final. In this way Sophocles makes it impossible to find any conclusion, even in the form of a clear choice, within the final moments of the play.

28. Tonelli (1983, 164) says of the ending that Creon makes to the play: "Creon's intervention operates a final shift. If truth is to be conceived as a finished and meaningful corpus, if the finality of theatrical representation is to deliver exemplary patterns of collective behaviour, then truth must be construed and articulated collectively, at the level of the state, and perhaps after the theatrical event. Hence, Oedipus must leave." However, Tonelli gives more credence to Creon's ending as authorial comment than I would. Creon seems to me to be fully implicated in the theatricality of the text.

When Oedipus learns that Creon is not willing to exile him without further consultation with the oracle, he tries once again to "write" an end to the story (1446–1514), this time one that is within Creon's power and that deals exclusively with the practicalities, for his family, of "going on."[29] He instructs Creon to bury Jocasta and to send him to Cithaeron, possibly as a compromise for exile: not within the city (ἄστυ, 1450), but not outside Thebes.[30] He then turns to the next generation. He knows his sons will make their own future, but his daughters are dependent entirely on others for their care. Their end must be arranged. After his request to touch them is granted by Creon and he holds them in his arms, he describes for them the awful relationship they share and the degree to which they too will be isolated, unable to participate in a woman's social world of family and religious festivals. He then appeals to Creon to act as their father. This script for the girls' future is clearly conceived, taking careful account of their inevitable isolation and need for protection by a substitute father, and it is fully within Creon's power to bring about this request.

From the point of view of Oedipus' characterization in the final scene, there is nothing inconsistent in his treatment of his daughters.[31] Their appearance, however, complicates the ending for the audience because it suggests ways in which this script, as Oedipus has conceived it, will *not* shape the future. For the moment he can embrace them in full recognition of their true relationship and his feeling for them, because he also recognizes the absoluteness of his isolation from them. As he has said to the chorus:

> ἴτ', ἀξιώσατ' ἀνδρὸς ἀθλίου θιγεῖν.
> πίθεσθε, μὴ δείσητε· τἀμὰ γὰρ κακὰ
> οὐδεὶς οἷός τε πλὴν ἐμοῦ φέρειν βροτῶν.
>
> (1413–15)

But, for the audience, seeing them together is visual proof that the familial connections and ties have future implications that Oedipus cannot see, that

29. As Dawe (1982, 239) says, "Oedipus switches from something that the *god* will decide to something else, a request made to *Creon*."

30. Although Cithaeron is mentioned here to complete a circle, as many critics have noted, it seems also to represent a stage between complete exile and reincorporation into the city.

31. Seale (1982, 251) argues that there is inconsistency in Oedipus' blinding, which he describes as a way of not seeing his relatives, and this holding of his children, where his hands have become his eyes. He sees the encounter with the children as the true acknowledgment of the reversal of Oedipus' fortune and the culmination of his new inner vision and self-knowledge.

their isolation from each other can never be complete.[32] Similarly Oedipus' putting his daughters in Creon's care, while a plausible way of making a convincing end for this play, opens up a future that Oedipus does not control. By evoking Antigone's and Ismene's future beyond the end of the play, Sophocles reminds his audience of at least one version of the myth, his own *Antigone*, which contradicts painfully the security Oedipus imagines for them here.

Here and only here Oedipus' ending is subject to ironic interpretation. The daughters cannot, and will not, achieve a life λῴων than their father's, in part because Creon will not follow Oedipus' script and act as the loving, protective relative Oedipus evokes with the word πατήρ, a word that in itself lies at the heart of the play's irony. His daughters will instead be made "equal" to his ills. Just as Oedipus' love for his daughters reverses to some degree his isolation and brings him back into the human community in the audience's eyes, so his wish for their protected future returns the audience to the feeling that they know more than he does.

This irony is different, however, since its focus is on the unknowable future rather than the unknowable past. Oedipus' impulse to imagine and provide for the future, however futile it may be, reintegrates him fully into a common human condition—trying to make familiar the unknown; the irony directed toward him earlier in the play arises out of his need to make the wholly unfamiliar (the acts of parricide and incest) known. The audience cannot have been expected to associate themselves closely with the discovery of Oedipus' identity as a parricide and committer of incest, especially when they already have the knowledge he is searching for. No matter how common the medium of the irony, that is, the duplicity of language, the distance between the audience and Oedipus is maintained. Here, however, the irony works to create a common ground between them, their ignorance about the future, to which the audience must feel as vulnerable as Oedipus. The stark separation between the isolated and fiercely determined Oedipus and the hesitant Creon and bewildered polis is qualified to a degree by the way the audience must feel themselves implicated in the ironic uncertainty of the future. The end becomes not a choice of either/or but an unsettling juncture of both/and.

32. Roberts (1988, 191) points out how the ending of *OT*, and indeed of all of Sophocles' plays, discloses for the audience a future beyond the ending of the play. She concludes that the audience is thereby made to feel that their judgment at the end of the play, however complex, can only be provisional. See also her discussion in chapter 42 of the present volume. In *OT*, however, the clarity of Oedipus' vision at the end, despite its limitations in conceiving the future, makes the notion of provisional judgment problematic, as does the weakness of Creon, whose "judgment" is clearly provisional.

The last moment of the play continues the struggle between Oedipus and Creon for control over what the end shall be. Finally, however, Creon has the last word[33] and acts, counter to every expectation that the audience has been given. The end he creates by this action is, however, a refusal to move into the future. Oedipus again asks for exile; Creon again insists on consulting the god first. Oedipus, deprived of his exile, asks that at least his daughters not be taken away.[34] If he is not yet to be fully isolated, he wants to continue to acknowledge the truth of these connections. Creon resists Oedipus' bid for control and (presumably) removes the daughters from Oedipus' grasp, giving no reason for their removal except opposition to Oedipus' will. Presumably they then exit into the palace.[35] Thus while Creon thus has the last word and takes the last action, he has acted in reaction to Oedipus, without any understanding of his own. By enclosing Oedipus in the palace, he is trying to stop anything more from happening, without committing himself to a point of view. The audience is left with an end fully imagined and articulated by Oedipus, which is *not* enacted, and an end *enacted* by Creon, which fails to lead anywhere.

Various critics have attempted to explain what the strange final scene of the play means for our understanding of Oedipus (although many more critics simply ignore it). Bernard Knox, for example, says:

> Oedipus is a paradigm of all mankind, and of the city which is man's greatest creation. His resurgence in the last scene of the play is a prophetic vision of a defeated Athens which will rise to a greatness beyond anything she had attained in victory, a vision of man, superior to the tragic reversal of his action and the terrible success of his search for truth, reasserting his greatness, not this time in defiance of the powers which shape human life but in harmony with those powers.[36]

Charles Segal claims:

> Yet what ultimately emerges from the *Oedipus Tyrannus* is not a sense of total chaos and despair but a quality of heroism in the power of self-

33. I will not discuss the authenticity of the final seven lines of the play but will say that, if they are authentic, they must, I believe, be spoken by the chorus.

34. Dawe (1982, 246) paraphrases the γέ in line 1522: "Whatever else you take from me, at least let me keep these girls."

35. As there is no clear indication in the text that they do in fact go into the palace, it is possible to argue, as William Scott (1983, 108) has done, that Oedipus exits by one of the parodoi, bound for the exile he so clearly wants. Although I doubt that this was the original staging, it is perfectly possible to stage the end in this way, since a conflict about the ending is so present in the text.

36. Knox 1957, 195.

> knowledge.... In a life where so much seems to have been chance or randomness, Oedipus not only discerns pattern but creates pattern.[37]

Both of these critics see in the final scene a revival of Oedipus that is reassuring to the audience. But M. Davies argues that

> At the end of the play Oedipus is no wiser than Ajax is in his play as to his true position as a mortal within a universe made and controlled by the gods. He has learned nothing, I repeat, except some purely factual information as to the identity of his mother and father. To an intelligent member of the chorus or the audience, as to a Creon or an Odysseus, this factual information would be the starting point for a series of profound insights and illuminations regarding the limits of man's place in the world.[38]

In this reading the audience must pick up where the play leaves off, but there is no suggestion that Sophocles has made this task problematic.

Clearly there is little consensus among scholars who do treat the end of the play, and equally clearly scholars tend, in discussing the last scene, not to deal with what the characters actually say and do.[39] Perhaps for our purposes John Gould's reading is the most helpful. He says of the last scene:

> The Oedipus who now enters is one transformed by his blinding into another Teiresias, isolated, listening to his own voice sound in the air. His words and those of the chorus serve to underline the total alienation which divides him from them as citizens of Thebes.... He sees himself now as owed to another than Thebes, owed to wherever his fate lies. He parts from his children and goes, starkly, within the house, to wait for what the god may give.[40]

The idea that Oedipus has entered a radically different world is a useful one and corresponds to the audience's dramatic experience described above. But Gould's description also ignores crucial elements in the final scene. Oedipus does not "part from his children and go, starkly, within the house"; he is parted under protest and led unwillingly. This reading also takes no account

37. Segal 1981, 247–48.

38. M. Davies 1982, 277.

39. Even an article that looks closely at the words characters say can get so carried away with the idea of what should happen that it can say, "The turning out of events turns out to be the turning out of Oedipus" (Goldhill 1984, 186).

40. Gould 1988, 157–58.

of the battle for control at the very end and of the dilemma of a double ending with which the audience is left.

How then does the audience reconcile, or even hold together in a single thought, the contradictory movements of the final scene? Since they have experienced the power of their own knowledge in the course of the play, it is impossible to feel easy about Creon's willingness to submit to ignorance, however definitive that submission may seem. Yet Oedipus' effectiveness, based on an act of violent self-definition and isolation, is in the end called into question for the audience by their awareness of his connections to others, which he cannot escape or control with his language. The irony of the play leads the audience to experience the complex relationship between word, action, and knowledge, and it involves them in the realization of language's singularity and multiplicity—its activity and passivity, and its control and vulnerability in marking the relationship of the individual to the self and the community. Caught between knowledge and ignorance, the consequences of action and reaction, the ability to imagine a future and the refusal to commit oneself to it, and the power of isolation and the necessity of community, the audience faces the multiplicity of their own experience out of which they must, when they leave the theatre, act and speak. Ironically it is they who must risk reaching conclusions from this perilous multiplicity, since Sophocles refuses to do so.

*41*

# Elusory Voices: Thoughts about the Sophoclean Chorus

Thomas G. Rosenmeyer

THE TRAGIC CHORUS has been the object of much scholarly attention. Modern discussions have touched on its possible sources and evolution, its social and "ideological" implications, its structural function within the drama, its language and textual peculiarities, its meters, and much else. There has also been an increased interest in the issue of its dramatic identity. In line with the ascription of choral lines in the manuscripts to particular persons—for example, Theban elders or maidservants of Creusa—critics have sought to determine what can be said about the "personality" of the choruses, not always with due attention to the various questions that have been addressed to that difficult concept.[1] It is theoretically conceivable that a listener or a group of listeners might construct the sum of choral utterances in a dramatic performance so as to arrive at the perception of a consistent or organically articulated voice. But to the extent that we can subsequently recover the experience, many of the texts that have come down make that unlikely. Attempts by modern critics to mobilize their own constructive thinking to pin down a collective personality have not come off without special pleading. The taxonomy of choral variety is, as

*Ostrosilvensi amico, viro docto diligentissimo necnon artis scenicae rerum perito, has nugas reverenter dedicat TGR.* My thanks to students at Berkeley and Columbus who discussed the Sophoclean chorus with me and to Leslie Kurke, who talked with me about ὕβρις.

1. For recent discussions of the difficulty see Gill 1986, 251–73; Gill 1990; Pelling 1990a. Note especially Pelling's provisional definition of character (1990a, 33). See also the polemic between Moles (1986) and Goldhill (1986a). In this essay I sidestep the semiotic analysis of character in the text, as exemplified by Aélion (1987) and, most devastatingly, by Weinsheimer (1979).

a rule, established by degrees of involvement in the plot,[2] though it is recognized that this involvement may change from scene to scene and from stasimon to stasimon. Essays about the "character" of the agents on the stage[3] have done little with the chorus, presumably because choruses are rarely agents in the full sense carried by Aristotle's πράττοντες.[4] In spite of these obstacles, two recent books devoted to the topic of the Sophoclean chorus vigorously assert that each play features a chorus of a distinct, consistently developed character.[5]

There are two issues here, one of linearity and one of differentiation. On the former score, it may be held that the choral utterances in a play are organized in such a way that they collectively and progressively form an aggregate that does not in its several segments offend against the rules of logic or psychology. This, apparently, is what is meant when critics speak of consistency. On the latter issue, differentiation, a critic may claim that the personality of the chorus as it emerges in the course of the drama is such as to suggest verisimilitude, a mimesis of the mixture of the expectable and the unpredictable that defines our apprehension of a distinct human being. The two cannot be separated, but in any discussion of a character, say, of Prometheus in the play transmitted under Aeschylus' name, it could be decided that he satisfies the conditions of linearity but not the demands of differentiation.

When talking about dramatic characters, most modern commentators choose to emphasize linearity over differentiation. The same is certainly true of work on the chorus; no one has advanced the proposition that choral portraiture approximates the quirky plenitude of empirical reality (if I may be permitted to make use of so unfashionable a concept). But if a conventional (Aristotelian) view of dramatic character did not call for consistency

2. Goldhill 1986b, 267–74. The classic statement is that of T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1917, 201–2) about the chorus of *Electra*, who switch between lines 1015 and 1074 from Chrysothemis' position to the opposite; this shows "wie ganz unpersönlich und ohne eigenes Leben der Chor in diesem Stücke gehalten ist."

3. The best of them are still Easterling 1973, 3–19 and esp. Gould 1978, 43–67.

4. κηδευτὴς ἄπρακτος· ([Arist.] *Pr.* 922b26). The impediments to reading psychological verisimilitude into the chorus include the lack of introspection: There are no second thoughts, no self-criticism, no questioning of their own identity, no awareness of themselves as potentially fallible, no sense of loneliness. These are some of the elements Diller (1956, 70–85) associates with the Sophoclean character.

5. Burton 1980; Gardiner 1986, chap. 1, pp. 82–83. Burton's initial qualification that "since the chorus is a group personality, we do not expect from it the same consistency or coherence of character as we expect from an individual" (1980, 3) is dropped as he proceeds to scrutinize the role of the chorus in each play. Both Burton and Gardiner invoke the authority of Kirkwood (1958, chap. 4; esp. p. 214). For another recent emphasis on consistency, but thematic rather than psychological, see Oudemans and Lardinois 1987, chap. 6.

(*Po.* 1454a26), it is doubtful that the same call would have been extended to cover the chorus. An unjaundiced survey of the evidence could not overlook the precipitous turnabouts in the choral role—from sympathetic concurrence to moral aloofness, from the didactic narration of myth to the somber enunciation of prayer, from the formal but lowly service of heralding entrances to the equally formal authority of pronouncing γνώμαι—not to mention the clear cases of moral or political inconstancy marking some of the Euripidean choruses.

The chorus, notably the Sophoclean chorus as a singer of odes, is a corporate entity, relatively detached from the bustle of the dramatic embroilment.[6] There has been a tendency to talk about the chorus as if its lyric contribution was a synecdochic mirror image of the body of the action. In the surviving plays, Sophocles has few choruses like that of the *Bacchae*, which is quite exceptional, focusing furiously and uninterruptedly on a single objective intimately tied to the plot. True, *Philoctetes*, *Electra*, and *Ajax* present choruses whose pronouncements stand throughout in a measurable relation to the action, so that a separation of choral space and acting space becomes problematic. And in *Oedipus at Colonus* the chorus is permitted to participate in the action to a degree that far exceeds the traditional norms. But that same chorus has an ode on the greatness of Athens and another on the foolishness of wishing for old age, songs that tell us little about the singers, and whose integration in the plot is at best secondary. The difficulty of folding such choral utterances into the axiom of the chorus as an identifiable and consistent personality has not always been recognized.

Though sung by men costumed to represent a specific interest group, some prominent Sophoclean choral odes are best studied as free-floating texts, tools to shape our responses, statements designed to broaden our horizon, to get us away from the narrow purview of the dramatic agent by folding larger discourses into the tragic design.[7] On this view, they resemble some of the political speeches in Thucydides, opening up the wider implications of occurrences or of acts about to be undertaken. To satisfy this condition, the chorus has no need to hew to a line of psychological uniformity or affinity. To be sure, a choral song is embedded in a context—of spectacle, role playing, drama, and audience participation—which exercises its various pressures upon our understanding—though spectacle, on the Greek stage, is more likely to induce a measure of alienation than of empathy. But a speech

6. Mastronarde 1979, 33–34.

7. Obvious candidates are *OT* 863–910, *Ant.* 332–75, 582–625 (excepting 594–603), *OC* 668–719, 1211–48. For these odes compare Schiller's notion, in his preface to *Die Braut von Messina* (1980, 10:7–15), that the chorus purifies the tragic poem by building a wall between the audience and the targets of their empathy.

by Cleon or a Melian delegation in Thucydides answers to its own contextual baggage, without relaxing into psychological differentiation.

Falling back on the language of psychology will, in fact, often introduce serious distortions. Gardiner,[8] commenting on the first stasimon of *Antigone*, enlists an argument of silence from the chorus, which does not comment on the preceding action. She argues that since we assume that they say, or sing, whatever they feel in response to what they have witnessed, we must conclude that they do not care who buried Polyneices or why: "The audience hears the chorus removing themselves from the ethical problems that are being introduced." The choral utterance must at each point flow from a plausible personal stake in the action; hence, here, the chorus puts itself on the map as disinterested. Another critic[9] recognizes that at face value the second stasimon of *Antigone* invokes Aeschylean ideas that have little to do with the action at hand. Hence, by the rule of consistency, the chorus must be blind, or there must be a covert meaning, available only to the fine-tuned ears of the *cognoscenti*.

The ancients knew better. In the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata* we read that the *ὑποκριτὴς...μιμητής, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἧττον μιμεῖται* (19.15), and further that choral antistrophy is less mimetic than choral astrophy, such as seems to be more common in satyr plays.[10] By itself the statement that the chorus is less mimetic is open to two interpretations: Either the subject matter of choral singing is more remote, or the singers themselves are cast in a less realistic mold. The pairing, or rather the contrasting, with the actor puts the first interpretation out of court. If we go to Aristotle, his *συναγωνίζεσθαι* (*Po.* 1456a26) says little more than that the choral texts should not be dissociated from the dramatic *ἀγών* and that Sophocles understood this better than Euripides.[11]

A comparison of the two *Electra*s vindicates Aristotle's judgment. The first stasimon of Euripides' play, about the armor of Achilles, moves much further away from the center of the action than anything in the Sophoclean treatment; the imagery of Euripides' choral language is more glittering, more extroverted, than the language cushioned within the moral constraints

8. Gardiner 1986, 87–88.

9. G. Müller 1967, 140. Cf. Schwinge 1971, 294–321, esp. 318–20, where the fourth stasimon, despite its signal complexities, is sidetracked to conform to the thesis that the chorus is an unswerving supporter of Antigone.

10. Rode (1971, 85–115) submits that the playwrights took this nonmimetic tradition and strove, in various ways, to mimeticize it.

11. For the ways in which the chorus can be thought to function as a *συναγωνιστής* see Kirkwood 1954, 2. In Meijering 1985, 97 ("the *συναγωνίζεσθαι* of the chorus is always somewhat half-hearted"), the psychological coloring is surprising because M. is, on the whole, more interested in the dramatic function of the chorus than in its personality.

of the Sophoclean version. Though *συναγωνίζεσθαι* codifies the assumption that the chorus should be a participant in the *ἀγών* and that the choral contribution should be the (quantitative or qualitative?) equivalent of that of one of the actors, there is nothing in Aristotle's observation that calls for even a minimum of character-drawing.[12] Some very basic elements of mimesis are to be expected; no functionary on the stage totally escapes the need to provide the lever for the spectators' desire to make human sense of each unit of the performance. The Theban elders and the maidservants of Creusa will, now and then (but less so in the odes than in *ἀμοιβαῖα* and in their spoken lines), honor Aristotle's demand that men and women, and slaves and the free, call for different *ἁρμόττοντα* (*Po.* 1454a22–24). But this low-level application of intermittent mimesis hardly deserves the label characterization.

On the basis of a scholium to the *Ajax* (134a), Roos Meijering[13] has recovered the critical stipulation that the chorus is expected to (1) speak with modesty (*αἰδημόνως*), (2) nevertheless make clear what it thinks (*παρρησιαζομένων*), and (3) sympathize with the principal or principals (*συμπαθῶς ἐχόντων*). This triad of expectations, an outgrowth of the rhetorical approach to literature, and thus not immune to small-scale psychological demands, may not be fulfilled in equal measure in all plays or within any one play. It may not satisfy our sense of what a chorus can do, but it certainly shies away from investing the chorus with a more amply drawn personality.

At the other end of the spectrum, the old question whether the voice of the author can be heard in the chorus has been variously answered. All poetry could popularly be regarded as exhibiting the personal propensities of the poet; note the humor Aristophanes strikes from this in *Acharnians* and *Thesmophoriazusae* and the rhetorical commonplace that the author's emotions and life are mirrored in the text.[14] A scholium on *Medea* (823) generalizes about the chorus as follows: *καὶ ἀεὶ ὁ χορὸς ἐν προσώπῳ τοῦ ποιητοῦ εἰσάγεται τῷ δικαίῳ προστιθέμενος.*[15] This suggests that contexts of ethical

12. As a virtual nonagent, the Sophoclean chorus lacks *προαίρεσις*, hence *ἦθος*. Heath (1989a, 46–47) makes the interesting suggestion that Aristotle's *συναγωνίζεσθαι* refers to choral action within episodes only, not to stasima. Aristotle's text does not seem to me to justify this distinction.

13. Meierjing 1985, 95.

14. See Arrighetti 1987 for a major reconsideration of the link between literary criticism and biography, consolidated in what he calls the "metodo di Cameleonte."

15. Meijering 1985, 97. This position appears to come close to Henry James' notion of "central intelligence"; the intrusion of the omniscient author is avoided by making one of the characters the center of intelligence in whose light everything is seen (Blackmur 1934, 37–38). For ancient acknowledgments of the author in his work see Asmis 1990, 156–57, 161.

or political discord bring the author to the fore. There is no dearth of critics willing to recognize the voice of the author in at least some of the choral statements.[16] Others have been adamant that no such voice is readily extractable. Burton[17] argues against Wilamowitz's interpretation of the first stasimon of *Antigone* as a kind of parabasis, with the poet in the role of warning and instructing his fellow citizens. Goldhill[18] rejects the "untenable view that the chorus simply represents the authorial voice." Only in his more conservative Vernantian or Havelockian mood does Goldhill revert to the idea of the chorus as society reconstituting itself in the role of educator of the group,[19] an idea that is hard to dissociate from that of an authorial intrusion.

I suspect that the strong animus against hearing the voice of the author in the choral utterances is due to an inclination to identify that voice with the affirmation of a fixed stand, either positive or negative. Note the careful distinction: "The choral odes of Sophocles express, like all parts of the plays but often in special degree, his own interpretation of the action.... He uses the chorus, but does not use it undramatically, as his own mouthpiece."[20] The reading of voice as the express avowal of a value not specifically motivated by the requirements of the drama—of a moral judgment or the statement of a position set alongside, or in opposition to, another article of faith—is encountered in many quarters. Moreover, in the endeavor to

16. E.g., Pohlenz (1954a, 219–20 and 1954b [*Erläuterungen*] 92–93) thinks that the second stasimon of *OT* is Sophocles' protest against contemporary religious neglect and that τί δεῖ με χορεύειν; is the author speaking in his own voice. Kranz (1933, 170–71, 120–21) locates the author in two positions: once behind the chorus—"Der Chor ist gleichsam transparent und hinter ihm erscheint das Haupt des Dichters"—and once toward the end of an ode, especially in epodes, where the tradition favors authorial intrusion. Cf. the central thesis of Mullen 1982 that the most significant thoughts are expressed in the epodes of Pindar's epinicians, when the chorus, according to Mullen, ceases to dance.

17. Burton 1980, 85. See also Bain 1975, 17 n. 4: "When Kranz...called Aesch. *Eum.* 517–65 a tragic parabasis, I am sure he was speaking metaphorically." Does the metaphor invalidate the presumption of the presence of the author's voice?

18. Goldhill 1986b, 267. Would Goldhill stand by this if the qualifier *simply* were removed? His view (1986b, 257) that Eur. *El.* 737–46 questions "the status of the play itself as myth" and undermines its ideological power gets us extremely close to parabasis or, better, to romantic parecbasis, which by definition returns us to the author.

19. May the chorus ever be regarded as a persuader, and, if so, in what sense and in which of its formal functions? Dale (1965, 15–27) shows in detail how choral argumentation is avoided. Sourvinou-Inwood (1989, 141), in an inadequately argued version of the new orthodoxy, takes it for granted that the chorus has the task of persuading the audience as well as the dramatic agents. Buxton (1981) says nothing about the chorus.

20. Winnington-Ingram 1971, 132. See also Kirkwood 1958, 186: "We shall not...deny that choral thoughts may sometimes be Sophoclean thoughts." How does one distinguish "Sophoclean" in the sense of "primarily Sophoclean and potentially counterdramatic" from "Sophoclean" in the sense of "the product of Sophoclean art"?

determine precisely how the felt presence of the author can be distinguished from other dimensions of the choral utterance, it is tempting to fall back upon the argument from excitement or sincerity:

> There breathes throughout it [sc. the second stasimon of *OT*] a fervour or passion which we may feel comes from the heart of the dramatist no less than from that of the chorus...so that here we are vouchsafed a glimpse, as in the second stasimon of *Antigone*, of what Sophocles himself thought about the great issues of religion and morality.[21]

The counterevidence of Senecan drama, for example, gives one pause. And yet the wish to have the claim validated remains strong. The issue of the author behind or within the chorus is a pivotal challenge tied to the larger issue of the author within his text.[22]

The new orthodoxy, with its sights trained on the community and its rituals and institutions,[23] glances away from the author and his idiosyncratic and unwelcome authority. The emphasis is on the credentialing power of the popular tradition, moving forward in tune with the needs of the time and carrying the gifted poet along with it to do its bidding. On this view poetry loses its privileged status as literature and is collapsed into the reservoir of communication by which the group talks to itself. The concern with institutions, social stratification, and tribal poetics has swamped our ability to submit to the poetry as poetry and as a very special artifact.[24] Outside of academia, the call of literature, with its compelling alliance between recipient and authorial intention, remains strong. I, also, cannot rid myself of the conviction that Sophocles speaks to me audibly and significantly as I listen to the text.

To acknowledge a play, including its diverse choral utterances, as a purposive construct is to intuit the shaping hand of the playwright—even if

21. Burton 1980, 168–69.

22. Müller (1967, 7) may be excused for wanting to have it both ways: "Den Chor...ganz in die Handlungsführung einzuordnen, und zugleich doch zum Sprecher des Dichters als Theologen zu machen, wird zu einer Hauptaufgabe des Kommentars." But "*Theologe*," reminiscent of the language of Pohlenz and of the title of Reinhardt (1949), signals the excessive expectations attending the isolation of the author's voice.

23. I am thinking of the writings of Claude Calame, Marcel Détienne, Gregory Nagy, Simon Goldhill, Wolfgang Rösler, and others. The roots of this perspective are to be found in the writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss and of Michel Foucault (1977). Ruthven (1979, 93–95) draws an interesting comparison of this outlook with the *Geistesgeschichte* of Ernst Robert Curtius.

24. See the astute remarks of Davidson (1986, 70); following Lattimore she observes that we should not always ask whether a choral ode is precisely relevant; the magic of poetry may take precedence over the calculus of relevance.

one is hard put to define that contribution in detail—not the impersonal modulating automatism of a generic tradition.[25] For example, if the chorus of *Ajax* uses the *hapax* adjective οἰοβώτας (615) to refer to Ajax's truculent loneliness,[26] a tracker of psychological continuity may wonder whether so creative (and untranslatable) a compound squares with the simplemindedness of a group of sailors whose role in the drama, by and large, is to be ineffectual and uninventive. It may be countered that we must be prepared for a certain tension between typological verisimilitude and generic constraints. Artful compounds are a staple of the choral tradition. But then it has not occurred to many either to examine the language of that tradition to define the personality of a Pindaric epinician chorus (if indeed there was such a chorus)[27] or to doubt that the voice of the poet can be distinguished from that of Bacchylides or Simonides.

In a characteristically acute analysis of a passage from Nabokov's *Bend Sinister*, Robert Alter[28] demonstrates how the voice of the author can be tuned in to the seemingly self-sufficient narrative of the protagonist Krug, who watches a girl dash up the stairs, trailing her gaudily spangled wrap "with all its constellations—Cepheus and Cassiopeia in their eternal bliss, and the dazzling tear of Capella, and Polaris the snowflake on the grizzly fur of the Cub, and the swooning galaxies." Alter comments that this is the narrator (and, I suggest, the author), his imagination fueled by reflections of Pascal, selectively entering into the protagonist's point of view. I would like to think that οἰοβώτας, though less global than Nabokov's flight, and other such astonishing coinages command us to be open to the sensibilities of the author. This is not just a matter of the playwright shaping a language to conform to a presumptive characterization of the chorus or to generic conventions largely hidden from our view, such as an Indo-European poetics. It is the ineradicable trace of a creative impulse that moves the author into the very center of our experience. And such traces are everywhere, special tokens of the difficulties textual critics cherish.

25. See Erlich's classic paper (1961). I do not propose to enter into the tangled underbrush of the problem of the "implied narrator." The issue is akin to the question of "intention," which has come under considerable scrutiny; see Michaels and Knapp (1987, 50): "our...target is the notion that there can be any plausible criteria of textual identity...independent of authorial intention." See also Michaels and Knapp 1982.

26. If the second part of the compound is cognate with βόσκω, and has a pastoralist (*not* pastoral, pace Stanford 1963, 138) ring, the context of cattle-killing enhances the daring of the coinage. For this kind of daring, contrast Gardiner 1986, 73: "The general lines of the chorus' character [sc. in *Ajax*] are underscored by the consistent simplicity and directness of their language."

27. Lefkowitz 1988, 1–11; Heath 1988, 180–95.

28. Alter 1990, 41.

We turn, finally, to some comments on a text that has already figured prominently in our discussion, the second stasimon of *Oedipus Tyrannus* (863–910).[29] The poem has long invited and baffled the labors of our best critics. Because of the moral-political cast of its thought, the religious medium of its language, its negative coloring of the term τύραννος, and the difficulty of tying it as a whole into the dramatic action, the passage has been one of the most widely examined in Sophoclean scholarship. In past analyses it has been common practice to look for a specific agent upon whom the chorus, either consciously or covertly, at a remote level of signification, pins the unjust acts envisaged in the song. But of Oedipus, Jocasta, and Laius, none has emerged as credible and commensurate wrongdoers, and the more recent critics have either ceased to find appropriate suspects or have enlarged the culpability to include Athenian imperialism or the Sophistic enlightenment.[30] Here the ascription of a personality to the chorus has been especially perilous, because it has tended to locate the perceptiveness of that personality at an unflatteringly low level.[31]

According to Kamerbeek, "ὕβρις is alien to the figure of Oedipus as conceived by the poet, but the chorus' fear...is understandable enough."[32] In other words, the chorus does not know what ὕβρις is or what to make of Oedipus. Again, some critics suggest that the chorus itself either has no particular person in mind as it sings about injustice or is blind to the potential applicabilities, while the audience, that is, we, cannot help directing our thoughts to this or that character in the play and making the applications ourselves.[33] Barring a radical exercise of reader response, this is not very different from saying that it is the author's intention to have us do so. But why should the author want us to blame a character whom the play as a whole fails to subject to the charge of ὕβρις? Carey's recent essay on the stasimon is, in spite of its briefness, one of the very best, and I gladly associate myself

29. "This strange choral ode has a grand head of pure gold, but its feet are of the iron and clay of Attic politics" (Earle 1901, 238). By Attic politics Earle means Pericles and Aspasia.

30. The most prominent representative of this line of attack is Knox (1957, 99–106). His reference to Pericles, Pheidias, the Delian League, and others as embodiments of Athenian autocracy put the drama dangerously close to being a *drame à clé*. Bruhn (1910, 35–40) redated the play in the fifties on the basis of the belief that the chorus is defending the νόμοι against Protagoras. For the rest, a countdown of the pertinent secondary literature would call for an immense footnote. For a partial list see the bibliography in Johansen 1963, 242–43. Johansen's cavils about Knox seem curious today in the light of the popularity Knox's interpretation of τύραννος has enjoyed.

31. Whitman 1951, 135: "The chorus in Sophocles represents the somewhat confused morality of the bourgeoisie." As Whitman elevates the principals to semidivine standing, the standing of the chorus is lowered, and the ideas of the chorus are shown to be shallow.

32. Kamerbeek 1967, 175.

33. Gellie 1972, 93.

with its view that the chorus finds fault with neither Oedipus nor Jocasta (not to mention Laius).[34] "Υβρις would be the wrong word for the former, and the ode shows no substantial disagreement with the opinion of the queen that the pronouncements of the oracles have come to rest under a cloud: "If the oracles fail, the laws fail, and the way is open for unbridled ὕβρις."[35]

What remains to be discussed is the relation of the ode to the rest of the play, the identity and the quality of the voice or voices to which the poem makes us listen, and perhaps the generic echoes that tie the voices to an earlier tradition. The poetic and conceptual movement of the stasimon is clear enough. In the first stanza, the chorus wishes it had the benefit of ἁγνεία, who is put on a pedestal; with the νόμοι intact, she is inspired by Heaven, not born of men, not surrendered to forgetfulness, but ageless. In the notorious second stanza, which follows asyndetically as contrasting units often do,[36] the wish of the first is countered not by the recital of a current reality provoking the wish but by an atemporal statement, part analysis and part qualification. The theme is ὕβρις, its character and its workings. It is swollen, directionless, unsteady, and vain, and (an item that in the original comes first) it generates a τύραννος. The qualification concedes that the aggressive spirit condemned in ὕβρις can also be channeled into useful and healthy competition, a social commodity that the god is asked to preserve and that presumably would come under the protective aegis of νόμοι. In the third stanza, the generic image of strife introduced in the second stanza is individualized, transferred from the level of the personification of ὕβρις to the level of the life of the ὑβριστής or τύραννος—the antisocial, irreligious, and unjust person who is acting and being punished by the gods. A terminal demurrer suspends the threat of the punishment and registers the singers' dejected response to injustice running rampant: τί δεῖ με χορεύειν; Finally, in the last stanza the disintegration of the social order is illustrated by the specific phenomenon that informs the ode from the start, as both source and symptom of the upheaval: the breakdown of faith in the oracles. The chorus pray to Zeus to do something about it, but for the time being they accept the rupture. Apollo is at risk; ἔρρει δὲ τὰ θεῖα, the cult of the gods has lapsed.

This summary of the movement of the song does not of course do justice to the sinuousness of the curve, which oscillates between wish, despair,

34. Carey 1986, 175–79. Other studies that rule out such applications are Kitto 1961, 165; Whitman 1951, 134; Kirkwood 1958, 212–13, 267–68.

35. Kitto 1961, 179.

36. For the value of asyndeton see Arist. *Rhet.* 3.12.

description, and fear;[37] between human initiative, the dispensation of fate, and divine sanction; between confession and chronicle, prayer and analysis. Ironically, the lyric line invested in the curve makes a strong psychological appeal. The seesaw of the perspectives might suggest the naturalness of verisimilitude. But this is the result of generic impulses, generic both in the sense of the experience of Athenian politics and in the sense of conforming to a poetic ancestry exemplified by the grievance poetry of Archilochus, Theognis, Solon, and Xenophanes. Solon's *Address to the Muses* (fr. 13 W), with its rapid changes of focus supporting a sustained theme, is an appropriate exemplar.

Like Solon's poem, our stasimon starts with a wish, based on a belief in the heavenly roots of political and social order, and proceeds toward a scrutiny of what makes that wish problematic. There are differences, of course. The values and the obsessions are not exactly the same. And in terms of Hermann Fränkel's distinction between the archaic and the classical structuring of a poem, the ode avoids the rugged counterpoints of the archaic and represents the classical, integrated ensemble style at its best.[38] But the spiritual trajectories of the elegy and the ode are comparable, though Solon's voice is more Olympian and ultimately more hopeful. In the ode, a number of conditional clauses retard and entangle the progress of the thought. But the final thought is unmistakable, although the majority of critics tend to muffle it by weakening the present perfect force of ἔρρει. Here ἔρρει is neither hypothetical nor a statement about what is happening but the assertion of a completed fact: Oracular reliability is gone, we have lost the voice of the gods, all we can do is pray, but meanwhile social disintegration has become a fact of life. Thus, the drift of the poem is: "I wish the consequences of the lapse of the oracles, which is indisputable, were not social disintegration," not R. D. Dawe's "Is there any point in maintaining religious practices?"[39]

The ode contains a number of lines, notably 889–95 and 906–7, whose text is uncertain. I think it is safe to say that the interpretation of the ode as a whole is not crucially dependent upon whichever of the many proposed readings are adopted. The text of the initial lines (863–65) appears to be firm, but the meaning is in some doubt:

37. It is hard to understand how one critic could have said, "These three strophes are an assertion of the soundness of the moral order, and the final antistrophe is a prayer that, in keeping with that soundness, Apollo's oracles will be proved true" (Gellie 1972, 243).

38. Fränkel 1955, 82–96; Fränkel 1951, 657–58.

39. Dawe 1982, 18.

> εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι μοῖρα τὰν
> εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων
> ἔργων τε πάντων.

Ἁγνεία, purity, is the kind of virtue or condition, like Pindar's ὁσία (*P.* 9.36) or ἡσυχία (*P.* 8.1),[40] that easily appears as the object of apostrophes and prayers. Though the use of the term here has been connected with ἄναγνος (823) in Oedipus' great speech to Jocasta, that link is, at this point, less urgent than the chorus' own need to invoke a purity that they think is slipping from its grasp. The difficulty is the construing of the dative participle φέροντι in the place of the expected infinitive φέρειν, which Jebb reads as the equivalent of the middle φέρεσθαι. Jebb's whole note on the line is worth quoting:

> εἴ μοι ξυνείη μοῖρα φέροντι is equivalent to εἴθε διατελοῖμι φέρων, the part. implying that the speaker is already mindful of ἁγνεία, and prays that he may continue to be so: whereas εἴ μοι ξυνείη μοῖρα φέρειν would have been equivalent to εἴθε μοι γένοιτο φέρειν, an aspiration toward ἁγνεία as not yet attained. Though μοῖρα is not expressly personified...the conception of it is so far personal that ξυνείη ("be with") is tinged with the associations of ξυνειδείη ("be witness to"), and thus softens any boldness in the use of the participle, a use which, in principle, is identical with the use of such verbs as διατελῶ, τυγχάνω, λανθάνω.[41]

But as Jebb glosses φέροντι with φερομένῳ (win for yourself), the case for ἁγνεία already being in the possession of the singers appears to be damaged. The scholia try to explain the participle by reanalyzing μοῖρα as the equivalent of εὐτυχία: May I be in good luck as I enjoy ἁγνεία. Kamerbeek, opposing Jebb, proposes a similar solution.[42] But there is no precedent for this expansion of the content of μοῖρα. For want of a persuasive parallel, I conclude that Jebb's explanation of the participle does not satisfy and that we

40. Cf. Lefkowitz 1976–77, 209–21.

41. The construction appears to be one covered in Smyth 1956, 496, in a section on what is called the supplementary participle in impersonal expressions taking the dative. The example cited is Thuc. 1.118.3: ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται. Here πολεμοῦσιν is a simple alternative for πολεμεῖν. Schwyzer (1966, 395) makes a distinction: "Nicht selten begegnen beim gleichen Verb Partizipial- und Infinitivkonstruktionen, im allgemeinen mit dem zu erwartenden Bedeutungsunterschied: das Ptz. bezeichnet Tatsächliches, Anschauliches, der Inf. steht als Bezeichnung der abstrakten Verbalbedeutung auch für nur Vermutetes, Gedachtes, Mögliches." Moorhouse (1982) says nothing on the passage or on the construction.

42. Kamerbeek 1967, 173.

have to accept the usage as a variant of the more usual infinitive. For the chorus to say that they wishe to attain purity in word and deed is significant. It means that they start from a position of disequilibrium or contamination, from a sense that it is involved in Jocasta's doubting of the veracity of the divine messages or at least in doubt of the messengers. In the first stanza they strain against this and dwell on the divine origins and essence of the order that they see sliding away.

In the remaining stanzas the chorus draw the consequences of the incipient disorder, veering back and forth between the confessional (881–82, 896, 899) and the descriptive. After the insistence on the divine nature of the *νόμοι*, the rest of the poem is an anguished portrayal of what happens if *ἁγνεία* is not recovered. The immediate results are social and political. All control and moderation are gone; the boundaries that mark civilized life are effaced. "Υβρις, the violent disregard of those boundaries, generates a violent and self-indulgent person, or, in the language of Hobbes, reveals the beast in humankind.[43] Such people cannot be expected to follow a straight course sanctioned by the laws of the community; in speech and deed their movements will be erratic and damaging. In business practices, in the exercise of religious cult, in their relations with others (*δίκα*), and in words and deeds, they will shed all discipline; riot (*χλιδά*) will be king.[44] A Hesiodic footnote (879–81) observes that not all strife is antisocial. But the fear, the horror is immediately recovered with a further appeal to the god. At the end of the third stanza and throughout the fourth, the chorus consolidate their own stake in the reign of *χλιδά*: They will no longer answer to the call of religious cult, including the performance of ritual dances and the solicitation of oracles. With this last avowal, they return to the source of its anxiety and of the rupture in the social fabric: the untrustworthiness of the oracles.

"Υβρις *φυτεύει τύραννον*—there is something tautological about this line. Conventionally the *τύραννος* is one who practices *ὕβρις*, not one who is created by it.[45] But Sophocles, or the chorus, speaks of the disregard of boundaries creating the unjust man, because the ode takes the social breakdown as its point of departure and proceeds to illustrate the disastrous effect of this breakdown upon the members of society. The scholiast's rephrasing

43. The puzzle of the derogatory use of *τύραννος*, well-established in the lyric poets and in Plato but surprising in Sophocles, especially in *OT*, remains. I suspect that here genre is decisive; as the ode recovers the moral tradition of Archilochus and Alcaeus and Solon, the lyric stigma attached to the term gains precedence over the hieratic use pervasive in Attic drama.

44. For the relation between *ὕβρις*, *τύραννος*, and *ἀβροσύνη* (= *χλιδή*) in lyric poetry and elsewhere see Nagy 1990, 263–68, 281–313.

45. Hence the emendation of Blaydes, *ὕβριν φυτεύει τυραννίς*, accepted by Winnington-Ingram (1980, chap. 8) and Dawe (1982, 182–83).

comes close to this understanding of the line:[46] ὑπεροψία κακοὺς καὶ ἀνόμους, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ τύραννοι, ἐργάζεται τοὺς αὐτὴν ἔχοντες. The impairment of religious observance causes social strife (863–82), just as the sickness of society is followed by the damage to religion (883–86). The two are mutually implicated. What is more, the εἰ-clauses (883, 889, 895) are not true conditionals, but subordinate statements of fact ("seeing that..."); thus the third stanza continues the construction of the wrongdoer and wrongsayer created by, and endemic to, the social breakdown. This construction is suspended at a general, hypothetical level—εἰ δέ τις (883); τίς... ἀνήρ (893)—until the chorus redirects the reference to itself, to the first person appropriate to the appeal to Zeus that highlights the final stanza. Occasionally the optatives (863, 887, 904) make it appear as if the speakers were outsiders, gazing magisterially, like Solon, upon a scene of disorder, and invoking punishment, or correction, and salvation. But the overwhelming impression of the song is one of despair, of settling into the malaise of the disorder and not finding a way out of it save by a forlorn appeal to Zeus.

The movement of the ode as described here has been acknowledged by several critics.[47] If this is what the stasimon tells us, the ode may be looked upon as a document of confession, the journal of a speaker who sees himself deeply involved in the breakdown he describes. Whether the speaker is the chorus or the author is beside the point. The Jamesian "central intelligence" embraces both, except the chorus is central only to those who accept the Peripatetic theory of the origins of tragedy. What matters is that at this crucial point in the unfolding of the drama, when the oracles appear to have failed, and before Jocasta reenters to undo her former questioning of the gods, Sophocles gives us a choral utterance very different from the bulk of the choral contributions in the play. We are confronted with the record of a spiritual journey, or rather a spiritual *error*, acquainting us with a condition of society worse than the plague featured at the start, and this picture of the social breakdown is limned by singers who thoroughly identify themselves with it and are appalled by it.

The contribution of the chorus is highly personal, inasmuch as it acquaints us with the fears and the anguish of a soul caught up in the chaos of injustice. At the same time, it does not contribute to the establishment of a choral personality. On the one hand, the burden of the song distinguishes it from the more worshipful (151–215) and the less introspective (1186–1220) lyrics in the play and thus fails the test of linearity. On the other hand, the human experience dramatized in the ode is so general that it

46. Longo 1971, 234.
47. Schadewaldt 1956, 489–97; Kirkwood 1958, 213.

gives us no inkling of the significance of the insignificant, which is the secret of differentiation. It is the author who creates the portrait, and there is no reason why we should shrink from believing that the author could identify with it, given Sophocles' exposure to the strains in Athenian public life. But the appreciation of the poetry does not require us, or any audience, to bring in the author's point of view as distinguished from the psychomachy disclosed by the chorus and pertinent to the flow of the drama.

The relationship of the stasimon to the rest of the play is one of pertinence but not one of dramatic necessity. What is more, it is the kind of song with which we are familiar from the older poets: a political poem registering the questions a concerned citizen might address to the uncertainties of his time. The fact that the ode is sung by a collective chorus does not disbar it from the genre of what we might call grievance verse, except that the collectivity removes the focus from the singularities of a particular, historical situation. The Hesiod of *Works and Days* talks about himself, or has his narrator talk about himself, as the victim of injustice and hardship in a narrowly specified social setting. Alcaeus and Solon, and probably also Archilochus, complain about the specifics of a historically verifiable constellation of political and economic forces. The second stasimon of *Oedipus Tyrannus* explores a broader theme that is vital within the world of the audience that listened to it: the breakdown of law and order, which is a constant threat in a democratic society. It is also a theme that rings true within the plot of the drama, which is itself a projection of the tensions without which the democracy cannot flourish.[48] The theme is so powerful that it urges us to read it into the total complex of the stage action rather than into the motives of the several principals. It is an anatomy of virtue and vice, cast in the voice of the available and appropriate dramatic instrument, the tragic chorus. But that voice is not grounded in human agency.

Like the author's voice, the voice of the chorus can be tuned in and out as the audience wishes. It is, in its way, an institutional voice, the voice of the tragedy itself, contributed by the author to give expression to the concerns in which tragedy is rooted. As such, the ode is, indeed, a kind of parabasis, but one that replaces comic self-consciousness with tragic urgency. The voice is not contracted to put us in mind of the worthiness of the poet but soars to embrace the vastness of moral and social anxiety by means of a poetry that throws off the shackles of an individual life. The power of the poetry and the power of the confession block the search for a fixed, unambiguous attribution. What we are left with is incomparably more authoritative than the sounding of a neatly classifiable voice.

48. The relation between the chorus and the δῆμος of which it is a representative is explored by Schadewaldt (1956).

42

# The Frustrated Mourner: Strategies of Closure in Greek Tragedy

Deborah Roberts

BOTH BURIAL AND THE DENIAL OF BURIAL are familiar motifs in Greek literature from the *Iliad* on. Burial denied sets in motion the action of several stories or parts of stories: for example, *Iliad* 24, Sophocles' *Antigone*, the second half of Sophocles' *Ajax*, and Euripides' *Supplices*. Burial granted is still more frequent, especially at the ends of stories. The *Iliad* may be said to end not with one burial but with two, first that of Patroclus and then that of Hector; and of the twenty-three extant tragedies that end with deaths, nineteen refer in some way to burial. Given the fact that Greek tragedies end as a rule not with death and disaster but with aftermath and reaction, and given the cultural importance of burial and burial rite, it is no surprise that the end of a tragedy often includes some provision for the burial of the tragedy's dead. But we should also note a further significance in tragedy's concluding allusions to burial (and a further reason for their presence)—their contribution to closure.

A work of literature often attains closure in part through the use of natural or cultural markers of ending or transition. It is a commonplace of literary history that comedies end with marriage and tragedies with death, and

Earlier versions of this chapter were given at the Comparative Drama Conference at the University of Gainesville, as part of a panel on closure at the 1989 meeting of the APA, and at Haverford College. I am grateful to the participants on these occasions for their helpful comments and questions. I dedicate the chapter to Martin Ostwald (with whom I studied at Swarthmore), in gratitude both for what he taught me and for his kindness to me as an anxious first-year student and ever since. To quote his own translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (9.1): "Money is not the standard by which the worth of a teacher can be measured, and no honor could match what he has given. Still, it is perhaps sufficient to make what return we can, just as we do in the case of the gods and our parents."

Barbara Herrnstein Smith has noted the use of what she calls "closural allusions" to such events, even in the nonnarrative genre of lyric poetry.[1] But there may be a special appropriateness and a special force in the use of the cultural marker, the funeral, as opposed to the natural marker, death, since the former entails the closural use in literature of a ritual that may also be said to serve a culturally constructed closural function in our lives. Frank Kermode[2] suggests that there is in fact a kinship between our need for stopping points with which to structure our lives and our need for endings in literature. Others have commented on the parallel between the function of such rituals as burial and the function of the work of art in resolving on some level what must otherwise remain unresolved.[3]

Many critics have noted the frequency with which ritual in general is either celebrated, established, or mentioned at the ends of tragedies. But the ritual of burial is a kind of closural ritual par excellence. It marks the end of life for the dead and punctuates the lives of survivors, bringing different mourners together in a communal act, and setting "socially constructed limits on the potentially unlimited, natural expression of grief."[4] Again, let me take the *Iliad* as an example. Here mourning has a closural function both within the society of the poem and for its hearers or readers. The celebration of Patroclus' funeral brings the alienated Achilles together with his fellow Greeks, though he remains always a little apart, and returns him to human existence; his lamentation in company with Priam over their separate losses completes that return as far as it may be completed and produces a recognition of shared humanity. The lament with Achilles and the subsequent burial of Hector allow Priam too to end his obsessive sorrowing.

There is a limit to what this ritual mourning can achieve.[5] It cannot make of Achilles just another Greek; he remains always a little apart. It cannot make peace; the war will continue. The *Iliad* also suggests that there is always a separateness at the heart of shared mourning. The slave women who mourn Patroclus are really mourning each for her own grief (19.301–2); Achilles and Priam mourn together, but one mourns his friend,

1. Smith 1968, 172–82. Smith's book and Kermode 1966 have been especially influential among contemporary writings on closure; for a survey of such work especially in its application to classical texts see Fowler 1989, and for bibliography on closure in tragedy see Dunn 1985 and Roberts 1987 and 1988.

2. Kermode 1966. See also Brooks 1984, 22, 95–96, who argues, following Benjamin's essay "The Storyteller" (1969, 83–109), that our need for endings in literature has to do in particular with our inability to know our own death.

3. See for example Redfield 1975, 160–223 and Foley 1985.

4. Seaford 1985, 320.

5. Again, on the limits of the resolution in *Iliad* 24 see especially Redfield 1975, 160–223.

the other the son that killed that friend (24.501–12); even the three women who mourn for Hector at the end of the *Iliad* mourn in the same man different sorts of loss (24.722–75). Nonetheless the closure brought by mourning and burial is genuine. For the readers too, these rituals, although they do not conceal residual tensions and terrible events to come or cancel differences between us, still give us, in Kermode's words, a sense of an ending.[6]

In its closural use of funeral ritual as in so many other things, the *Iliad* is the ancestor of tragedy. In keeping, however, with the generally problematic nature and role of ritual in Greek tragedy (the object of much scholarly attention in recent years), what we actually find in tragedy is not a simple rhythm of burial initially denied and burial finally performed but a more complex usage. One major variation occurs at the ends of several tragedies: Burial takes place, but some character is denied the right to participate. In this chapter I consider the effect that what we may call the motif of the frustrated mourner has on tragic closure. After a brief discussion of the debate over Agamemnon's burial in the *Oresteia*, I focus on the endings of Euripides' *Medea* and *Heracles* and of Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Oedipus at Colonus*. I argue that in all instances the exclusion of a character from burial rites undercuts or modifies the closural force of burial, both for the characters and for the audience, and I show how the Euripidean and Sophoclean plays discussed here represent two variants of this motif.[7]

Where someone is excluded from participation in a burial, the focus is not so much on the rights of the dead as on the rights and feelings of the living. The fact that funeral rites serve the living as well as the dead is generally recognized in antiquity; that mourning is itself a source of satisfaction is a theme in Greek literature as far back as the Homeric poems. Funeral legislation in the classical period provides evidence for the social function of the funeral rite as an expression "of kin solidarity and family pride."[8] Indeed, as W. K. Lacy notes, in classical Athens burial was not only a duty of kinsmen but a "jealously guarded right."[9]

Our first example in tragedy of a struggle over this right is found toward the end of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (1541–59):[10]

6. Kermode 1966.

7. For a different approach to rituals of mourning see Foley 1992. In this illuminating article, Foley discusses the role of such rituals in the politics of Greek tragedy, with a particular focus on women's use of rituals of mourning and on restrictions placed on their participation. We share the view that burial ritual is often treated by the tragedians in such a way that it undercuts or complicates the resolution it might have been expected to provide.

8. Garland 1985, 21.

9. Lacey 1968, 148.

10. The text used here is Page 1972.

Χο. *τίς ὁ θάψων νιν; τίς ὁ θρηνήσων;*
*ἦ σὺ τόδ' ἔρξαι τλήσῃ, κτείνασ'*
*ἄνδρα τὸν αὑτῆς ἀποκωκῦσαι*
*ψυχῇ τ' ἄχαριν χάριν ἀντ' ἔργων*
*μεγάλων ἀδίκως ἐπικρᾶναι;*
*τίς δ' ἐπιτύμβιον αἶνον ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θείῳ*
*σὺν δακρύοις ἰάπτων*
*ἀληθείᾳ φρενῶν πονήσει;*
Κλ. *οὐ σὲ προσήκει τὸ μέλημ' ἀλέγειν*
*τοῦτο· πρὸς ἡμῶν*
*κάππεσε κάτθανε, καὶ καταθάψομεν,*
*οὐχ ὑπὸ κλαυθμῶν τῶν ἐξ οἴκων,*
*ἀλλ' Ἰφιγένειά νιν ἀσπασίως*
*θυγάτηρ, ὡς χρή,*
*πατέρ' ἀντιάσασα πρὸς ὠκύπορον*
*πόρθμευμ' ἀχέων*
*περὶ χεῖρα βαλοῦσα φιλήσει.*

Horrified by Agamemnon's death, the chorus asks who will bury him and who will lament him,[11] expressing its incredulity that Clytemnestra, his murderer, could carry out this role (1541–50). The chorus' words meet with a harsh response; this matter is no concern of theirs, says Clytemnestra. She claims the right to bury him with the words "At our hands he fell and died, and we will bury him" (1552–53); and she in turn excludes the other members of the household—with the exception of the dead Iphigenia, who, she grimly suggests, will greet her father in the underworld (1554–59).

Thus the chorus suggests that it would be outrageous for Clytemnestra, the murderer, to bury her victim. In response Clytemnestra asserts the claims of power. It may also be that for a contemporary audience her continuing claim to power in the household might seem to require her burying Agamemnon; the holding of the funeral seems to have supported legal title to inherit.[12] But Clytemnestra also forestalls response to her perversion of normal ritual practice, by alluding to Agamemnon's prior perver-

11. Fraenkel (1950, ad loc.) notes that questions such as the chorus asks are frequently found in Aeschylean lamentation and are perhaps themselves an element of ritual lament. But there is a difference between the ritual question "How shall I fitly mourn you?" and the questions "Who has the right to bury you?" and "Who is there to bury you?" which belong to the exigencies of a situation such as we have here. It is clear, as Denniston and Page (1957, 211) and others have noted, that the chorus is here confused because the nearest relative is also the murderer, and as such should not be responsible for the burial.

12. Garland 1985, 28; cf. also Alexiou 1974, 20–21 and Humphreys 1983b, 83–84. For the chief evidence, see Is. 4.19, 8.21–24, Demos. 43.79–80.

sion, the sacrifice of his daughter. We might almost see the allusion to Iphigenia as suggesting a strange version of blood kinship, in which only those who have killed Agamemnon or been killed by him may participate in his funeral.[13] Both the hostility with which Clytemnestra plans to bury her husband and her exclusion of other members of the household clearly undercut any closural effect that the reference to burial might have; and both reappear in the *Choephori*. There Electra speaks not only of the wrong done to her father, among many other wrongs, by the isolation in which he was buried, without the presence of the citizens and without mourning (429–33), but also of her own exclusion.[14] That she sees this exclusion as an additional wrong, done to *her*, is suggested by her words at lines 444–48, which both associate and distinguish her father's fate and hers:

> λέγεις πατρῷον μόρον· ἐγὼ δ' ἀπεστάτουν
> ἄτιμος, οὐδὲν ἀξία,
> μυχῷ δ' ἄφερκτος πολυσινοῦς κυνὸς δίκαν
> ἑτοιμότερα γέλωτος ἀνέφερον λίβη
> χέουσα πολύδακρυν γόον κεκρυμμένα.

I turn now to Euripides. At the end of the *Medea*, Jason confronts Medea, who is aloft in her magic chariot. The two exchange accusation and counteraccusation, until Jason finally says that they may end their conversation if Medea will only let him bury and mourn the children (1377). She replies in strong words that she will not do so, since she intends to bury her children herself and to establish rites in their honor (1378–84).[15]

> Ια. θάψαι νεκρούς μοι τούσδε καὶ κλαῦσαι πάρες.
> Μη. οὐ δῆτ', ἐπεί σφας τῇδ' ἐγὼ θάψω χερί,
> φέρουσ' ἐς Ἥρας τέμενος Ἀκραίας θεοῦ,
> ὡς μή τις αὐτοὺς πολεμίων καθυβρίσῃ,
> τύμβους ἀνασπῶν· γῇ δὲ τῇδε Σισύφου
> σεμνὴν ἑορτὴν καὶ τέλη προσάψομεν
> τὸ λοιπὸν ἀντὶ τοῦδε δυσσεβοῦς φόνου.

13. Seaford 1984, 247–54 argues elegantly that Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon itself calls to mind the funeral ritual she will deny him; the bath in which he is killed suggests the washing of the dead, the robe he wears suggests a funeral robe, and Clytemnestra's ironic praise on his return suggests one aspect of funeral lamentation.

14. Orestes, excluded by his absence, also speaks in this play of his having been unable to participate in funeral rites (8–9). Clytemnestra herself is here excluded from an aspect of the rites of the dead, since her offerings are not given to the dead Agamemnon.

15. The text used here is Murray 1902–13, vol. 1.

Jason, angry and distraught, is driven to begging at least to be allowed to touch the children, and his final speech (1405–14) calls upon the gods to witness what Medea has done, not only in killing the children but in preventing him from touching or burying them; he will have to mourn them as best he can.

> Ζεῦ, τάδ' ἀκούεις ὡς ἀπελαυνόμεθ',
> οἷα τε πάσχομεν ἐκ τῆς μυσαρᾶς
> καὶ παιδοφόνου τῆσδε λεαίνης;
> ἀλλ' ὁπόσον γοῦν πάρα καὶ δύναμαι
> τάδε καὶ θρηνῶ κἀπιθεάζω,
> μαρτυρόμενος δαίμονας ὡς μοι
> τέκνα κτείνασ' ἀποκωλύεις
> ψαῦσαί τε χεροῖν θάψαι τε νεκρούς,
> οὓς μήποτ' ἐγὼ φύσας ὄφελον
> πρὸς σοῦ φθιμένους ἐπιδέσθαι.

What is the effect of Medea's exclusion of Jason from the funeral rites of his children? Jason's loss seems potentially unending given the incompletion of his mourning; he is excluded from the last mortal consolation, funeral rite and formal lament. This exclusion also undercuts closure by thwarting any possibility of a final shared mourning. It seems for a moment as if such mourning might occur. Jason points out that Medea is a sharer (*κοινωνός*) in his pain, and his request to bury the children, presented as a way out of their argument, raises for a brief moment the possibility that they might come to some kind of terms, if only to be rid of each other—but even this proves to be impossible. Funeral rites will not unite in any way these two people, even though both mourn the same loss and want proper burial. Medea's words to Jason at 1394 are telling: "Go home and bury your wife." Jason has sought a new family; it is his new kin he has the right to mourn.

The fact of Jason's exclusion thwarts certain possibilities of closure for the characters and so for the audience; the manner of Jason's exclusion further thwarts the audience's sense of closure in its reflection of the play's emotional and moral complexity, a complexity that is, and will remain, unresolved. Here, as in the *Agamemnon*, a murderer claims the right and the power to bury her victims and excludes other kinfolk. But whereas Clytemnestra's burial of Agamemnon is a hateful continuation of her killing him, Medea's burial of the children entails a continuation of her claim that it is not really she that is responsible for their murder, even though she bears a bloodguilt for which she recognizes she must atone. "Children," says

Jason during their argument at 1363–66, "what a wicked mother you found." "Children," says Medea, "you were destroyed by your father's sickness." "It wasn't my hand that killed them," Jason replies; "No," agrees Medea, "it was your outrageous behavior, your new marriage." Not only does Jason's exclusion from the burial complete his loss by depriving him of that last mortal consolation, formal lament; it also cuts him off from the rituals of burial almost as if it were he rather than Medea who was polluted by the shedding of kindred blood.

. In the *Heracles*, as in the *Medea*, an exclusion from mourning is significant both in its prevention of shared lamentation and in its reflection of emotional and moral complexity. In this play, however, the parent who has killed the children is the one who is excluded from their burial. In the last episode of the play, Heracles wakes from a fit of madness to find himself the murderer of his wife and children. After being persuaded by Theseus to live on in spite of his grief and shame and to go with him to Athens, Heracles turns to his old father and tells him to bury the children, since custom (*νόμος*) forbids him to do so himself (1358–64).[16]

> εἶέν· γεραιέ, τὰς ἐμὰς φυγὰς ὁρᾷς,
> ὁρᾷς δὲ παίδων ὄντα μ' αὐθέντην ἐμῶν·
> δὸς τούσδε τύμβῳ καὶ περίστειλον νεκροὺς
> δακρύοισι τιμῶν—ἐμὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐᾷ νόμος—
> πρὸς στέρν' ἐρείσας μητρὶ δοὺς τ' ἐς ἀγκάλας,
> κοινωνίαν δυστήνου, ἣν ἐγὼ τάλας
> διώλεσ' ἄκων. γῇ δ' ἐπὴν κρύψῃς νεκρούς,
> οἴκει πόλιν τήνδ', ἀθλίως μέν, ἀλλ' ὅμως
> ψυχὴν βιάζου τἀμὰ συμφέρειν κακά.

The natural sense here is that Heracles as murderer is forbidden by custom to perform the burial.[17] But Heracles' acceptance of this custom does not keep him from returning again and again to the subject of the burial and

16. The text used here is Murray 1902–13, vol. 2.

17. What is this *νόμος*? It is generally assumed (e.g., by Parker 1983, 122–23) that it is forbidden for the murderer to perform the burial. Bond (1988, ad loc.), however, suggests that it is only that *νόμος* demands Heracles' exile and thus prevents his burying the children; he cites evidence that murderers *can* bury their victims: Medea's plan to bury her children, Orestes' burial of his mother and Aegisthus in the *Odyssey* (3.309), and the reference to the burial of Clytemnestra in Euripides' *Orestes* (402). But this is inconclusive at best. Medea rejects the deepest responsibility for her children's death, the Homeric poems notably elide the problem of pollution, and in Euripides' *Orestes* it is not clear that Orestes himself presided over the burial. Finally, what Heracles says as preface to his command surely suggests that both his exile and his status as murderer keep him from burying his wife and children.

giving detailed instructions. At 1360–64 he tells his father to bury the children in their mother's embrace and to honor them with tears; he describes the children's burial with their mother as a κοινωνία, a sharing or communion, which he destroyed. After speaking of other matters, he returns to the burial at 1389–93. This time he asks the people of Thebes to come to the burial of his children and tells them that in lamenting the dead they will lament for him as well.

> ὦ γαῖα Κάδμου πᾶς τε Θηβαῖος λεὼς,
> κείρασθε, συμπενθήσατ', ἔλθετ' ἐς τάφον
> παίδων· ἅπαντας δ' ἐνὶ λόγῳ πενθήσετε
> νεκρούς τε κἀμέ· πάντες ἐξολώλαμεν
> Ἥρας μιᾷ πληγέντες ἄθλιοι τύχῃ.

Finally, as he turns to depart with Theseus, Heracles asks for a last look at the children and again reminds his father to see to the children's burial (1419). The text of lines 1420–21 is problematic, but it appears that in this last exchange Heracles' father asks about his own burial and that Heracles, in answering the question, at the same time mentions his children's burial once more, almost as if any burial was to him their burial:[18]

> Ηρ. θάφθ' ὥσπερ εἶπον παῖδας. Αμ. ἐμὲ δὲ τίς, τέκνον;
> Ηρ. ἐγώ. Αμ. πότ' ἐλθών; Ηρ. ἡνίκ' ἂν θάψῃς τέκνα.
> Αμ. πῶς; Ηρ. εἰς Ἀθήνας πέμψομαι Θηβῶν ἄπο.
> ἀλλ' ἐσκομίζε τέκνα δυσκόμιστα γῇ·
> ἡμεῖς δ' ἀναλώσαντες αἰσχύναις δόμον,
> Θησεῖ πανώλεις ἐψόμεσθ' ἐφολκίδες.

In this play, as in the *Medea*, the absence of shared formal mourning subverts the closural force of burial. Like Jason, Heracles, in the midst of his anguish, thinks of his children's burial. Like Jason, he is prevented from participating in that burial. Jason spoke of his wife's sharing his pain (κοινωνός), but this led to no shared mourning; Heracles uses a related word (κοινωνία) to speak of the shared companionship of his dead wife and children, a companionship from which he is excluded. Like Jason, Heracles longs for a last contact with his children. And like Jason, he returns to the burial in his closing lines, his desolation clearly compounded by his exclusion from this rite.

18. For discussion of the textual problems in these lines see Bond 1988; Diggle 1981. If the emendations favored by Bond and Diggle are adopted, the final sequence of allusions will be somewhat weakened, but we will still see Heracles' recurring concern in 1419 and in the reference to the children in 1422. Cf. also Wilamowitz 1895.

The manner of the exclusion here too reflects the play's emotional and moral complexity in a way that is itself subversive of closure. Heracles' exclusion is less complete, and less helpless, than Jason's. He does not, like Medea or Clytemnestra, simply take control; he accepts, as they do not, the custom that constrains his actions. But he does all he can. He cannot be present but gives detailed instructions for the funeral. He cannot mourn formally himself but summons the mourners to the funeral. So deep is his sense of participation in the family he has destroyed that he says the mourning is in fact for him as well. That is, he is not only the bereaver and the bereaved but the victim.

In these two tragedies, then, a ritual that would normally unite in mourning and provide a resolution on some level fails to do so because of the exclusion of one character.[19] The pattern of exclusion from burial also complicates closure by commenting on the responsibility of the killer. Who is to bury the murdered, and who is to be excluded? The question asked by the chorus in the *Agamemnon* is variously answered in Euripides' plays by a varying definition of who the murderer is morally and emotionally. Medea's claim to the right to bury her children can be seen both as a continuation of the control she asserted in killing them and as a rejection or displacement of responsibility for her children's death. Heracles' acceptance of the custom that excludes him suggests his acceptance of responsibility for the deaths of his wife and children; his persistent concern with proper burial reflects the fact that the murder was unintentional and that he is above all the bereaved kinsman. He has killed his family in fact but not in intent; he cannot in fact bury them but surely does so in intent.

In these two Euripidean examples, the exclusion of a central character from the burial of someone who has been murdered has to do with the responsibility for the murder; we may also note the perhaps obvious point that both the murder and the exclusion are especially problematic because of family relationship. Two Sophoclean examples present a somewhat different picture; here a secondary character is excluded from the burial of the hero, whose nature or demands somehow require this exclusion.

The excluded Electra of Aeschylus' trilogy has a distant descendant in the Antigone of Sophocles' last play, the *Oedipus at Colonus*. As the play comes to an end, the aged Oedipus prepares to meet the death for which he has been waiting. He retires, accompanied by Theseus and his daughters, and a messenger comes to tell us and the chorus what has happened. But the messenger does not tell all that has happened. We learn that after the preliminary rituals had taken place, a divine voice was heard summoning

19. It is interesting that Dunn (1985) identifies the *Medea* and the *Heracles* as least characterized by the strong forms of the conventional elements of Euripidean closure.

Oedipus. After bidding farewell to his daughters, he then went on with Theseus alone.

Antigone's exclusion is admittedly only a partial exclusion from an unusual funeral, if indeed it can properly be called a funeral; the ever reasonable Ismene points out to the yearning Antigone that Oedipus was properly speaking *ἄταφος* (1732). The two sisters participate in the rituals preliminary to Oedipus' death, and afterward they lament their father aloud. But (as Knox has noted)[20] their lament is one that would in normal Greek practice have taken place at the tomb of the dead person, and in the lament, Antigone is vehement in her longing to see the place where her father met his end—indeed, to die there too (1724–33):

Αν. *πάλιν, φίλα, συθῶμεν.* Ισ. *ὡς τί ῥέξομεν;*
Αν. *ἵμερος ἔχει μέ τις—* Ισ. *⟨τίς οὖν;⟩*
Αν. *τὰν χθόνιον ἑστίαν ἰδεῖν*
Ισ. *τίνος;* Αν. *πατρός, τάλαιν' ἐγώ.*
Ισ. *θέμις δὲ πῶς τάδ' ἐστί; μῶν*
*οὐχ ὁρᾷς;* Αν. *τί τόδ' ἐπέπληξας;*
Ισ. *καὶ τόδ', ὡς—* Αν. *τί τόδε μάλ' αὖθις;*
Ισ. *ἄταφος ἔπιτνε δίχα τε παντός.*
Αν. *ἄγε με, καὶ τότ' ἐπεναρίξον.*

Oedipus' death is no common death, but Antigone experiences a common desire to be present at his burial, even if it was no common burial. However, when Theseus explains first that what she wishes is not lawful (*οὐ θεμιτόν*), then that it was forbidden by Oedipus himself, Antigone acquiesces to her father's wishes (1756–69).

Αν. *τύμβον θέλομεν*
*προσιδεῖν αὐταὶ πατρὸς ἡμετέρου.*
Θη. *ἀλλ' οὐ θεμιτὸν κεῖσ' ⟨ἐστὶ⟩ μολεῖν.*
Αν. *πῶς εἶπας, ἄναξ, κοίραν' Ἀθηνῶν;*
Θη. *ὦ παῖδες, ἀπεῖπεν ἐμοὶ κεῖνος*
*μήτε πελάζειν ἐς τούσδε τόπους*
*μήτ' ἐπιφωνεῖν μηδένα θνητῶν*
*θήκην ἱεράν, ἣν κεῖνος ἔχει.*
*καὶ ταῦτά μ' ἔφη πράσσοντα κακῶν*
*χώραν ἕξειν αἰὲν ἄλυπον.*
*ταῦτ' οὖν ἔκλυεν δαίμων ἡμῶν*
*χὠ πάντ' ἀίων Διὸς Ὅρκος.*

20. Fagles and Knox 1982, ad loc.

Αν. ἀλλ' εἰ τάδ' ἔχει κατὰ νοῦν κείνῳ,
ταῦτ' ἄν ἀπαρκοῖ.

Here there is no question of the excluded mourner's responsibility for the death, and the exclusion does not have quite the emotional force it had in the *Medea* and the *Heracles*. Furthermore, although there is a tension between the presumed contentment of the dead Oedipus and the grief of his living daughters, and although this grief is unassuaged by lament at the place of burial itself, the play ends with acceptance of exclusion rather than (as in Euripides) prolonged resistance or resentment of some kind.[21]

Before further exploring the effect of this rather different sort of exclusion, let us consider a parallel in Sophocles' *Ajax*. Odysseus, who has persuaded Agamemnon to permit the burial of Ajax, now offers Ajax's brother Teucer his assistance (1376–80):

καὶ νῦν γε Τεύκρῳ τἀπὸ τοῦδ' ἀγγέλλομαι
ὅσον τότ' ἐχθρὸς ἦ, τοσόνδ' εἶναι φίλος.
καὶ τὸν θανόντα τόνδε συνθάπτειν θέλω,
καὶ ξυμπονεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν ὅσων
χρὴ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν πονεῖν βροτούς.

Odysseus was formerly an enemy, but he is now a friend and as such says that he is ready to join in all the tasks of the funeral rites. Teucer thanks Odysseus warmly, addresses him honorifically, and apologetically asks him not to participate fully in the burial (1393–97):

σὲ δ', ὦ γεραιοῦ σπέρμα Λαέρτου πατρός,
τάφου μὲν ὀκνῶ τοῦδ' ἐπιψαύειν ἐᾶν,
μὴ τῷ θανόντι τοῦτο δυσχερὲς ποῶ·
τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ ξύμπρασσε, κεἴ τινα στρατοῦ
θέλεις κομίζειν, οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἕξομεν.

Odysseus acquiesces to Teucer's decision (1400–1401); he was willing to help, but if Teucer would rather he did not, he approves. The funeral preparations begin, and the play ends.

Here again there is no great emotional force to the exclusion, only a moment's hesitation and embarrassment in the midst of a smooth conclusion. No wrongdoing or pollution excludes Odysseus from the funeral; his

21. Foley 1992 reads the exclusion of Antigone and Ismene as one of a number of tragic reflections of, and responses to, contemporary restriction of women's participation in funeral rites.

participation is simply rejected as aggravating to the dead man, whose hatred is conceived of as unabated. Here, as in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, the will of the dead determines who shall participate and who shall be excluded.

The exclusion here, then, has to do less with the nature and role of the living—as in Euripides—than with the nature and role of the dead. Sophoclean heroes generally exhibit a strength and single-mindedness, a kind of excess of intention (as Knox especially has shown)[22] that sets them beyond ordinary human nature, even as they exemplify the human situation. This may be especially true of the two we are discussing here. Critics generally recognize in Sophocles' Ajax a hero of a disappearing generation, a Homeric hero at odds with a later world; his suicide constitutes a refusal to live with shame and to give in to the shifts of existence. And of all Sophoclean heroes, the Oedipus of *Oedipus at Colonus* most suggests a hero of cult, endowed with near divine powers, able to bless and to curse.[23] Finally, both deaths are in some sense self-chosen.

The deaths of these two men, then, are in different ways particularly awesome and powerful, and the exclusion of others from their funeral rites must in some sense appear fitting. Odysseus' exclusion not only reflects the hatred Ajax expresses toward him in this play and the unbridgeable gulf between the two men's way of thinking but is in keeping with the Homeric tradition of an Ajax who in the underworld is still unyielding to Odysseus' overtures of reconciliation, an Ajax who turns away without words (*Od.*11.553–64). Antigone's exclusion is part of the mystery whereby Athens, and Athens alone, becomes possessed of the positive power of the dead Oedipus; it also reflects the isolation of Oedipus from normal human existence.

Given that in these two plays the exclusion is less strongly felt and less morally complex in its cause, how does it affect closure? In part, like the Euripidean instances, it does so by keeping one character from the resolution provided by formal mourning, and by thwarting any final unity of lamentation. But I want to suggest a further effect on our response as audience and readers to the story and on our sense of its resolution, an effect that is largely a function of our particular relation to the excluded characters in both plays.

Odysseus is the first mortal character we meet in the *Ajax*, the character through whose wondering and horrified eyes and ears the story first

22. Knox 1964.

23. See Knox 1964, 54–58 on the contribution of hero cult to the delineation of the Sophoclean hero. On the issue of the cult of Oedipus in Colonus see Farnell 1921, 332–34; Edmunds 1981, 221–38; Jebb 1900, introd.; Kamerbeek 1984, introd. Ajax had a cult in Athens; for the view that audience response to the play must have reflected this fact see Jebb 1896, introd., and for the view that we can see a reflection of cult in the closing scene of the play itself see Burian 1972.

unfolds for us, as Athena reveals the madness of Ajax to him. The first scene evokes in him, as in us, pity and fear; the goddess urges him to laugh at his baffled enemy and enjoy the sight, but his final response (121–26) is:

> ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶδ'· ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν
> δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ,
> ὀθούνεκ' ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ,
> οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν.
> ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
> εἴδωλ' ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.

Odysseus' voice is the voice in the play of a kind of humanity, and if he does not rise to the height of an Ajax, his is clearly a voice with which we must be in sympathy, since he recognizes Ajax's greatness and sees in his fall a fall we might all fear. He arrives at the play's end to solve an impasse and enable a conclusion, thus framing for us the story. He is in some respects more our eyes and our voice than are those characters, including the chorus, who are more intimately linked with Ajax.[24]

What of the Antigone of the *Oedipus at Colonus*? She is obviously more closely bound up with Oedipus than Odysseus is with Ajax. But like Odysseus she is in a sense our eyes and ears as well as Oedipus' eyes when the play begins. She conjures up for us, as for him, the walls in the distance, the land rich in laurel, olives, and grapes, the sound of the song of the nightingale. Like Odysseus she is throughout the play the voice of a kind of reasoning humanity. It is her pleading that (albeit with disastrous results) leads Oedipus to give in and speak to his suppliant son.

The two who are finally left out in these plays, then, are two characters through whose eyes we have seen and with whose vision we sympathize. That these two characters should be excluded suggests with particular force the mysterious distance of the dead and our own final exclusion from any comprehending resolution, from any certainty on how to regard these deaths. Both Ajax and Oedipus choose death (though we might say that Oedipus is also chosen by it); in different ways both belong to a world beyond our ken. There is a mystery in their endings that leaves us out.

In all four of these plays, then, exclusion from burial thwarts or complicates the closural effect of burial and lamentation—but in different ways. In

24. The scholar who has most emphasized (for some, overemphasized) the role of Odysseus in this play is Kitto (1956 and 1961). Kitto stresses the fact that the *Ajax* begins and ends with Odysseus; for him, Odysseus is the character who knows what the play reveals to be most important and who can respond as he should. He calls Teucer's refusal of Odysseus' help "a tragic moment" (1961, 121); this seems to me a misreading of the particular force of the moment but a correct judgment of its importance.

the Euripidean plays complexity inheres in the excluded mourner; in the Sophoclean plays it inheres in the dead. The result is that in the former we feel for, and are troubled by, the mourner; in the latter we are, with the mourner, baffled by the dead.

Are there other examples in extant tragedy of this motif and of the two variants I have described here? We do find what we might call subvariants of both; in Euripides' *Alcestis* and *Electra*, characters are excluded from burial rites for reasons that have to do with their responsibility for the death in question,[25] and in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* and Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* a secondary character is forbidden to engage in some form of mourning for a central character whose death is in some sense self-chosen and mysterious.[26] These are not exact parallels to the plays I have discussed, and there are other cases even more different (Euripides' *Heraclidae* and *Suppliants*).[27] But in all cases the exclusion is disruptive of the closure such final rites might have offered, within the play's story and for the reader.

As we noted at the start, ritual in tragedy is problematic as often as it is not, and this is as true of the closural use of funeral rite as of other modes of ritual. Final acts of mourning are regularly distorted, displaced, or rejected, and the plays I have discussed represent only variants of one mode of this problematic use of rituals of grief.[28] Can we then speak of burial ritual as retaining a closural effect at all? I think so, and for two almost opposite reasons. First, these problematic rituals are still rituals; their performance, even when marred, evokes regularity, order, and tradition. Second, although closure is sometimes thought of as more complete when tensions are resolved, it is clear that an ending that ignores or bypasses the tensions and ambigui-

25. The exclusion in the *Alcestis* occurs in the middle of the play; see Appendix. It is possible that if we had the missing lines from the conclusion of Euripides' *Bacchae* we would have another example of this type. It is clear from the evidence we have (see Murray 1902–13, vol. 3, app. crit.; Dodds 1960b, ad loc.) that Agave helps gather the limbs of Pentheus and laments over them, but it is also clear that she is then exiled as a murderer and may also have been, like Heracles in the *Heracles*, explicitly exluded from the actual burial.

26. See Appendix for brief discussion of these four plays. The parallel between *Iphigenia at Aulis* and the Sophoclean play makes clear that we are talking about not a strictly Sophoclean variant of the motif but one perhaps more common in Sophocles because of the nature of the Sophoclean hero.

27. See Foley 1992 for an analysis of the *Suppliants*, in which Theseus refuses to let the chorus of bereaved women see their dead sons' bodies; Foley sees this exclusion (like that in the *Oedipus at Colonus*) as a reflection of, and comment on, contemporary restrictions on women's participation in funeral rite. In the *Heraclidae*, Eurystheus tells the Athenians where they will bury him, explains that he will protect them against Heracles' descendants, and tells them not to let Alcmene (who is about to kill him) and her kin make offerings or sacrifices at his tomb. This exclusion resembles most the rejection of Clytemnestra's offerings to the dead Agamemnon in the *Choephori* and Sophocles' *Electra*; its point is in part clearly political.

28. See also Foley 1992; Seaford 1989.

ties of a work may be felt as granting inadequate closure. We might feel, then, that problematic ritual is a more effective means of tragic closure than unproblematic ritual, because the former is less reductive than the latter.[29]

Tragedy can and does, I think, make effective use both of what we might call reductive closure and of closure that leaves in place or expresses the complexities that precede it. In Euripides' *Orestes*, Apollo's concluding solution to everyone's difficulties is so excessively neat that it strikes most readers as both required by the play's wildly proliferating action and utterly inadequate to the issues raised. Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, in contrast, concludes with a brief description of the desolation we have witnessed and with words that offer a solution only in the sense that they directly confront and express the insoluble.

We may see a similar contrast between the deliberately reductive closure and the deliberately problematic if we compare the use of funeral rite in the endings of Shakespearean and Greek tragedy. Several of Shakespeare's tragedies end with a speech announcing the funeral of the central character or characters.[30] Such announcements often seem to constitute a kind of setting aside of the play's—and its hero's—complexities, in the honor simply due to the dead, or at least to the honorable dead. The assignment of a soldier's funeral to the dead Hamlet is not exactly inappropriate—but neither is it adequate to the character or the action we have been watching. These Shakespearean announcements of burial make a genuine contribution to closure, but one whose limits in relation to the action that preceded are readily apparent.[31] Greek tragedy seems to adopt a different strategy in its use of funeral rite—a strategy in which the treatment of burial includes in itself both closural and anticlosural elements and continues the complexity of the action it concludes.

29. On strong closure, failure of closure, and the complexity of the anticlosural that conceals the closural, see esp. Smith 1968, chap. 5; cf. also Torgovnick 1981, 6. On the closural effect of the reductive see Roberts 1987, 59–60.

30. *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Coriolanus*, *Hamlet*, *Julius Caesar*, *Timon of Athens*, and *Titus Andronicus*. Among the histories, *King John*, *Richard II*, and *Richard III* end with references to funeral rites, although in the case of the last the order is for the burial of "men of name" on both sides of the battle and not for the "bloody wretch" himself (5.8.5–15).

31. Shakespeare's concluding references to burial rite may of course be significant in other ways as well; see for example Brower 1988, xxiii–xxiv on the hero's burial and the heroic tradition (and on the conventional function of these endings in clearing the stage). My point here is simply that Shakespeare's final burials are in themselves unproblematic, as opposed to, say, Ophelia's "maimed rites" earlier in *Hamlet* (5.1.214).

## Appendix of Additional Plays

In Euripides' *Alcestis* and *Electra*, as in his *Medea* and *Heracles*, exclusion from mourning has to do with issues of responsibility. In *Alcestis*, when Admetus' father Pheres arrives for Alcestis' funeral, Admetus angrily rejects his *philia*, his presence at the burial, and his gifts (629–32), and he blames Pheres (who could have offered to die instead) for Alcestis' death. Pheres in turn accuses Admetus of having in effect killed his wife, and he ends by saying, "You yourself who are her murderer will bury her" (730), and by suggesting that her relatives may take vengeance. The dynamic of exclusion is similar to what we have seen in the *Medea*. Admetus excludes Pheres because he blames him for the death of Alcestis, while Pheres calls Admetus the murderer and points to the incongruity of his burying his victim. No central character is excluded here, and the exclusion does not occur at the end of the play. Still, here, as in the *Medea* and the *Heracles*, we may say that the motif not only suggests the complex nature of responsibility but works against closure. The exchange between Pheres and Admetus contributes to the gradual realization (by us and by Admetus) of what his choice has meant morally and emotionally. And this scene would have been the end without Heracles' arrival and miraculous rescue of Alcestis; disruption of funeral rite seems fitting in a play in which neither death nor burial is final.

In Euripides' *Electra*, Orestes and Electra are clearly excluded from burying their victims, since Castor not only pronounces their exile but makes other arrangements for the burial of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra (1249–92). For all their remorse over their mother, however, the siblings do not respond to this exclusion with any particular distress; indeed, they do not react at all. They are preoccupied instead with the separation from each other that their exile will entail. Euripides even suggests that their mourning for each other is a kind of displacement of the funeral rites they will not perform; Orestes tells Electra to lament for him as over the tomb of a dead man (1325–26). Orestes' and Electra's responsibility for Clytemnestra's death is unquestioned, though complicated by Apollo's involvement, but whether they finally feel this responsibility is less clear. Burial rites for the death that elicited so much desire and so much subsequent remorse are described in a few passionless lines; the real mourning is metaphorical, grief for a separation felt to be worse than death. Closure seems somehow to be doubly evaded.

In Sophocles' *Trachiniae* and in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* as in Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Oedipus at Colonus*, a secondary character is forbidden to engage in some form of burial rite for the major character. In the

*Trachiniae*, Heracles does not exclude anyone from his funeral; in fact, he gives explicit instructions for its arrangement (1193–1202). But no one is to lament for him or to shed tears. Iphigenia's prohibition in the *Iphigenia at Aulis* is more comprehensive; she tells her mother not to cut her hair or wear mourning clothes (1437–38) and declares that no tomb will be made for her (1442). Both Hyllus and Clytemnestra react with initial shock, final acceptance, and continued unhappiness. Note that (as in the *Ajax* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*) both deaths are in a sense self-chosen and that they are also somewhat mysterious; whether or not the ending of the *Iphigenia* is genuine, and whether or not we think Sophocles has included hints of Heracles' apotheosis in the *Trachiniae*,[32] the audience's knowledge of tradition suggests that these deaths may not be what they seem. The relief of normal mourning is forbidden. And here, as in the *Ajax* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*, we (along with the excluded characters) feel shut out from final comprehension, especially because of the brutality of Heracles' demands and because of the ironies of Iphigenia's acceptance.

32. Some scholars see Heracles' command that a pyre be built on Mt. Oeta (*Tr.* 1191–99) and Hyllus' reference to "what is to come" (1270) as recalling the tradition of Heracles' apotheosis. For a good discussion of the issue and the evidence see Easterling 1981.

43

# Problems in Greek Literary History: The Case of Aristophanes' *Clouds*

Jeffrey Henderson

AMONG MARTIN OSTWALD'S many skills is elucidating how works of Greek literature at once respond to, influence, and become themselves part of history.[1] In this regard Aristophanes' *Clouds* has perennially fascinated readers and scholars since the days of Plato's *Apology*, perhaps even before that. But we have only the revised version of the play, a fact that has prompted investigation of its date and of Aristophanes' motive(s) for the revision. This investigation, one of the first projects in the history of Aristophanic scholarship, is still a lively one today, for it poses a great variety of literary and historical problems that must periodically be rethought as questionable conclusions are identified, relevant new evidence adduced, or methodological refinements devised. Two recent studies suggest fresh answers to the old questions and also raise some new questions. Hubbard (1986) accepts the standard date for the revision (between 420 and 417) and finds a primarily artistic motive, while Kopff (1990) argues for a date after 414 and finds a primarily political motive. This chapter evaluates their findings, offers some new ideas of my own, and along the way, draws attention to literary and historical problems of general relevance.

*Clouds* was produced at the City Dionysia in 423 and placed last. This defeat hurt and angered Aristophanes, and in the following year, he called *Clouds* his best play and abused the spectators for rejecting it (*Vesp.* 1037–47). At some point he began to revise the play. In terms that clearly

1. In this chapter all references to comic fragments are to the edition of Kassel and Austin, and all translations from the Greek are my own. I am grateful to Alan H. Sommerstein for comments on an earlier draft.

envision a new production, a new parabasis speech (518–62) discusses the defeat of the original and hopes for success with the new version. But he never completed the revision: absent is a choral song formally and theatrically required after line 888, and still present is a parabatic epirrhema about Cleon (575–94), which would have been theatrically senseless after Cleon's death in summer 422. Nor did he ever produce his incomplete revision: This assertion in hypothesis 1 is confirmed by Eratosthenes' discussion of the *didascaliae* ($\Sigma^{E}$ 552 = Call. fr. 454 Pf.).

We cannot determine when Aristophanes began his revision, but he wrote the new parabasis speech no earlier than spring 420. In lines 551–59 he criticizes Eupolis' *Maricas* and at least three subsequent plays for imitating his own bold and original attack on Cleon in *Knights*, in their attacks on the less formidable Hyperbolus; *Maricas* was produced at the Lenaea of 421, and none of the others is assignable to the City Dionysia of 421.[2] But is there a terminus ante quem? The scholarly consensus for winter 417 rests on two assumptions: Comic poets would not have attacked Hyperbolus after his ostracism, which happened no later than 416;[3] and Eupolis retorted to Aristophanes' charge in *Baptai* (fr. 89), a play that satirized Alcibiades extensively and so is unlikely to be later than 416.

Kopff (1990, 318–19) argues that the ostracism would have ended wholesale comic attacks on Hyperbolus but not jokes about or references to him; Plato Comicus 203 (undatable) in fact refers to his ostracism. Thus "the death of Hyperbolus in 411 (Thuc. 8.73.3) is a more valid *terminus ante quem* for stray nasty jokes about him, such as *Nubes* 876 and 1064–66." True enough, though the three offhand references to Hyperbolus in *Clouds* do seem to speak of him before his ostracism, one possibly, one probably, and one certainly. Line 876 (Hyperbolus' success in learning oratory [ἔμαθεν] proves that no one is too lacking in natural ability to learn) could conceivably be dated to a time after Hyperbolus' removal from the political scene, though its exemplary force rather suggests that he was still around. In lines 1064–66 Wrong Logos speaks of the money Hyperbolus has acquired (εἴληφε) in the lamp-making business. Since ostracism did not entail confiscation of property, Hyperbolus could be said to possess his wealth even after ostracism, though again the passage's exemplary force suggests that he was still active in his trade. In lines 623–26 (not mentioned by Kopff) the Clouds speak of Hyperbolus' allotment "this year" as Hieromnemon and boast that they "took away his chaplet of office." This passage certainly pre-

2. Thus the statement in hyp. 2 that *Clouds* was produced again in 423/2 and again failed is wrong.

3. For the date see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 5:258–64; Ostwald 1986, 302 n. 39.

dates 416. Either it was composed for the revised version in order to take advantage of a recent embarrassment suffered by Hyperbolus,[4] or it was a no longer topical leftover from the original version.[5] The latter is strongly suggested by the close parallelism of this epirrhema to the preceding one about Cleon (575–94).[6] Thus the three offhand references to Hyperbolus in *Clouds*, being probable leftovers from the original version, can tell us nothing about the date of the revision. But the case is not yet closed, for in the parabasis speech, which is certainly new, Aristophanes speaks about wholesale comic attacks in the present tense (κολετρῶσ' ἀεί, 552; ἤδη...ἐρείδουσιν, 558; γελᾶι, 560), and the burden of his argument is that the spectators are being given a choice between the kind of comedy his rivals are now producing and his own kind. Thus the parabasis speech favors the dating of the revision to before 416.

Kopff (1990, 319–21) argues also that the standard dating of Eupolis' *Baptai* is unfounded. The play satirized Alcibiades in connection with the rites of the Thracian goddess Cotyto. An ancient anecdote depicts Alcibiades as "dousing" Eupolis in the sea during the Sicilian Expedition, in retaliation for his own "dousing" in Eupolis' play (Eup. test. 3). If that is true, *Baptai* must predate 415. But no evidence supports this anecdotal tradition, and indeed it fits the typical profile of fanciful biographical fiction.[7] Kopff suggests instead that the satire in *Baptai* better suits the period after the religious scandals of 415.

But Kopff does not reckon with the curious fact that not one of the some 65 persons[8] denounced in the scandals of the mysteries and the Herms is mentioned by name in the some 4500 lines from comedies produced between 415 and 411, when Alcibiades' exile was repealed, though many others are. This fact is best explained as being the result of the decree attributed to the "demagogue" Syracosius, which is mentioned in Σ$^{VE\Gamma}$ *Aves* 1297, was protested by the comic poet Phrynichus in 414 (fr. 27, from

4. Starkie (1911, ad loc.) supposes that the wind (which can be considered divine) had blown the chaplet from Hyperbolus' head.

5. Though the scholium ad loc. says that there was no record of Hyperbolus holding this office in 424/3, it would be surprising if there normally was a record for holders of this office (for which see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 30.2).

6. So Sommerstein 1982, at line 624.

7. Eratosthenes (*FGrH* 241 F 19) refuted the ancient anecdote on the grounds that Eupolis produced plays after 415 and so could not have been drowned in that year. Nevertheless, an earlier version of the anecdote could have had Eupolis not being drowned but merely being thrown into the sea. For ancient biographical fiction about Eupolis see Lefkowitz 1981, 115; for the tendency of historians from the fourth century onward to derive facts "from uncritical reading, or unscrupulous use, of comedy" see Dover 1988, 138–39.

8. For a list see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81, 4:276–80; for discussion of their social and political background see Ostwald 1986, 537–50.

*Monotropos*), and has recently been studied by Sommerstein (1986). Although the decree does not seem to have forbidden allusions to these men in general terms (*Av.* 145–47, for example, alludes to Alcibiades' arrest), the satire of Alcibiades in *Baptai*, by all accounts extensive and focal, would be a striking anomaly if datable to the period 415–11.[9] Since Eupolis' death is very probably datable to 412/11,[10] before the recall of Alcibiades, *Baptai* would seem to belong to the period before 415. Its religious satire will then have concerned Alcibiades' riotous behavior in the period between the battle of Mantinea in 418 and the Sicilian Expedition—behavior attributed to him by Plutarch (*Alc.* 16).[11]

But does *Baptai* have any connection with the revision of *Clouds* in the first place? Fragment 89 does indeed retort to the charge made in *Clouds* 551–59,[12] but not necessarily to *Clouds* itself. This requires us to conclude both that Aristophanes circulated the revision among the literary public and that Eupolis trusted the mass audience in the theater to have read it.[13] A much more plausible scenario is that of Storey (1990, 22): "I suspect that Aristophanes made the same charge in similar (or even the same) words in another play." An example of verbatim repetition of such charges occurs at *Wasps* 1030–35 (= *Peace* 752–58). Storey suggests that the other play was *Anagyros*: fragment 58 (also in eupolideans) apparently refers to three acts of plagiarism by Eupolis, while *Clouds* refers to only one. It is much easier to imagine that Aristophanes, wishing to air his charges against Eupolis and the others, entrusted them to a play actually scheduled for production than that he entrusted them to a revision whose theatrical future was unclear and whose reading public was limited.

Since Aristophanes' charges and Eupolis' retort were most topical in the period after 420 and, with respect to attacks on Hyperbolus, before 416, the charges and the retort support a date for *Baptai* within this period, a date consonant with that play's portrayal of Alcibiades. But since the charges were apparently made in a comedy actually produced in this period, the date of *Baptai* is not directly relevant to the revision of *Clouds*; Aristophanes could have put the same charges into his revision at any time

9. So would the reference by name to Leogoras (*Nub.* 109), who was denounced on two charges of impiety in 415, though he was never tried or exiled (And. 1.17–22, 1.47–68). See B. Strauss' discussion in chap. 19 of the present volume.

10. For a full review of the evidence see Storey 1990, 4–7. Needless to say, even if Eupolis did live to see the recall of Alcibiades, he would hardly have attacked him on religious grounds in that period.

11. Some of Plutarch's material may indeed have come from *Baptai*; e.g., καὶ θηλύτητας ἐσθήτων ἁλουργῶν ἑλκομένων δι' ἀγορᾶς.

12. Dover's "apparently retorted" (1968b, 170) is more cautious.

13. So Kopff 1990, 320 n. 8; Sommerstein 1982, 2.

after 420. Nevertheless, it would be surprising to discover that Aristophanes put the charges into the revision at a time (after 416) when they were no longer topical and had been answered by at least one of their targets. This consideration supports what I said above about the wording and rhetorical burden of *Clouds* 551–59.

So far there seems to be no reason to date anything in the revised *Clouds* to after 416. But Kopff (1990, 321–26) draws attention to two references whose implications for the dating of the revision and for Aristophanes' motive in making it had not been thoroughly explored. The first is a quotation of dithyrambic verse (335) attributed by $\Sigma^{RVE}$ (ad loc.) to Philoxenus of Cythera (*PMG* 830). According to the *Marmor Parium* (A69), Philoxenus was born in 435/4; another tradition (*Suda* φ 393 Adler) says he was captured as a boy by the Athenians in 424. To these data I add a passage from Pherecrates' *Cheiron* (fr. 155), listing poets who had ruined Music.[14] Lines 26–28, in combination with the comments of Plutarch (who quotes the passage at *Mor.* 1141C), suggest that Philoxenus was included in the list.[15] If so, its sequence is significant: Melanippides (fl. 494), Phrynis (fl. 456), Cinesias (b. ca. 455), Timotheus (fl. after 410), Philoxenus. It would seem that Philoxenus belonged to the younger generation of dithyrambists that included Timotheus, so that Aristophanes cannot have quoted him between 423 and 416. But is the scholiast's attribution reliable?

Bergk (1882, 615) suggested that the words quoted by Aristophanes may have come from a poem unknown to the scholiast's source and were later reused by Philoxenus in a poem known to the scholiast's source. Kopff (1990, 321 n. 11) rejects this explanation: "That a new word [στρεπταιγλᾶν], *hapax legomenon* to boot, which Aristophanes found worthy of mockery would be later picked up by another dithyrambic poet does not seem likely." I am not so sure. Two lines earlier (333), Socrates calls dithyrambic poets ἀισματοκάμπτας, a metaphor repeated with variation in lines 969–72, where Right Logos blames Phrynis for having inspired contemporary poets' fondness for δυσκολοκάμπτους modulations (καμπαί). Subsequently Pherecrates, in the passage from *Cheiron* discussed above, had Music complain of Phrynis κάμπτων με (line 15), and Timotheus ungratefully called his forebear Phrynis τὸν ἰωνοκάμπταν (*PMG* 802). Let us say that the words quoted in *Clouds* 335 were written by Phrynis or some other poet; might Philoxenus not have reused them à la Timotheus 802? As for the principle that words that "Aristophanes found worthy of mockery" would never be used again, no formal refutation is needed.

14. The date of this play is unknown, and its attribution to Pherecrates was questioned by Eratosthenes and others; see Pherecrates T 3 and fr. 162 KA.

15. See Kaibel's analysis, quoted at fr. 155 KA (pp. 181–82).

Then there is the possibility, not faced by Kopff, that the scholiast is simply wrong. First, confusion of homonymi is not uncommon in scholia and their sources. Philoxenus of Cythera, author of a *Deipnon*, was in fact early confused (e.g., by Ath. 146f) with his namesake of Leucas, author of a cookbook in verse, a confusion that may also account for Philoxenus' anecdotal reputation as a gourmand (see *PMG* for testimonia). At Aristophanes' *Plutus* 290, a parody of one of Philoxenus' most famous poems, the scholiast identifies him as "the dithyrambist or the producer of tragedies." Second, dispute about the attribution of comic quotations is not infrequent in ancient scholarship, nor is subsequent abridgment or confusion by the compilers of our scholia. $\Sigma^{RV}$ on *Clouds* 967 (= *PMG* 735) is a good specimen of this process. One cause of its confusion is a dispute, stretching back to the days of Eratosthenes and Chamaeleon, about the song's attribution. Another seems to be that more than one poet's work contained the words quoted by Aristophanes (and also, incidentally, by the comic poet Phrynichus, fr. 78); the claimants are Lamprocles, "the athlete, son [var. "son or pupil"] of Midon" (or "dithyrambic poet," according to Ath. 491c), Stesichorus, and Cydidas (a mistake for Cydias) of Hermione. The kind of scholarship that lies behind the scholiast's bald statement about the author of the words quoted in *Clouds* 335 can no longer be known, so we must weigh its value as evidence accordingly. As a rule, when evidence within our control leads us to a conclusion incompatible with a statement unsupported by evidence, our response should be to consider that statement wrong.

A similar situation confronts us when we come to Kopff's second exhibit, Strepsiades' reference to "Socrates the Melian" (830). This must allude to Diagoras of Melos,[16] who was outlawed by a decree of the Athenian assembly before spring 414, when Aristophanes quoted the decree (*Av.* 1072–75, quoted below). His offense was that he λόγῳ...ἠσέβει in connection with the Eleusinian Mysteries ([Lys.] 6.17). For Kopff (1990, 323), the allusion "should be dated to a time when Diagoras' name was well-known and the ancient evidence, diverse and consistent, gives us one date for the Melian dithyrambic poet, 415, when the Athenian assembly put a price on his head." But on what evidence does the ancient evidence rely?

A scholium on *Birds* ($\Sigma^{RE}$ 1073) names two fourth-century sources. The first, Melanthius (*FGrH* 326 F 3), is reported to have said that Diagoras lived in Athens after the capture of Melos (in 416), then committed the *asebeia* and was outlawed.[17] The second, Craterus (*FGrH* 342 F 16), is not

16. Note, however, that $\Sigma^{VE}$ has apparently confused Diagoras of Melos with, or corrupted his name into, Aristagoras of Melos (otherwise unknown).

17. Thuc. 5.116.4 says that the Athenians killed all Melian males of military age (ἡβῶντας); there were survivors who were restored by Lysander after Aegospotami (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.9).

quoted as having said anything about the date, unless the cautionary sentence following his name belongs to him and not to the scholiast: "The decree was more or less (*μάλιστα*) around the time of the capture of Melos, for nothing prevents it being earlier." So far we see no evidence, and some hesitation, about the date. Melanthius and Craterus could have obtained their date of 415 by associating the undated decree with three datable events: the capture of Melos in 416, the scandal of the mysteries in 415, and Aristophanes' *Birds* in 414.

But there is also Diodorus 13.6, who according to Kopff (1990, 324) "explicitly" dated the decree to the archonship of Charias (415/4).[18] To put it more precisely, Diodorus included the decree in the year that he dated by the appropriate archon. Thus, if Diodorus' source(s) had obtained the date of 415 by the same method we suspected in the case of Melanthius and Craterus, the decree would still end up in Diodorus' *History* in the year of Charias' archonship. And so there is after all no evidence that Diodorus or anyone else ever saw the name of Charias in the decree itself[19] or had any other evidence about its date apart from the quotation in *Birds*. In default of such evidence, it does no good to appeal to the authority of a source, as does Kopff (1990, 325 n. 19) on Diodorus: "Dates found at the end of years... come from a competent chronological source, which is often right." But, we may add, sometimes wrong, too.

In these circumstances we must return to the evidence we do have—first, *Birds* 1072–75:

> *τῇδε μέντοι θἠμέρᾳ μάλιστ' ἐπαναγορεύεται·*
> *ἤν ἀποκτείνῃ τις ὑμῶν Διαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον,*
> *λαμβάνειν τάλαντον, ἤν τε τῶν τυράννων τίς τινα*
> *τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀποκτείνῃ, τάλαντον λαμβάνει.*

If the decree was related to the scandals of 415, which occurred no earlier than a month before midsummer, the chorus' "proclaimed again" makes no sense, for the decree cannot have been proclaimed at the previous year's Dionysia. The passage in fact seems to show that "by 414 Ar. expected that the proclamation about Diagoras would be, for his audience, almost as standard a feature of the Dionysia programme as the proclamation offering a reward for the killing of a tyrant (and of equally little practical significance)."[20] Dating Diagoras' outlawry to before 415 also more satisfactorily

18. Kopff also cites the medieval Arabic historian Al-Mubassir Ibn Fatik, but he tells us nothing that cannot be obtained from Diodorus.

19. Extant inscribed decrees of Aristophanes' time do not always include the archon's name.

20. Sommerstein 1987a at *Av.* 1073; he puts Diagoras' outlawry no later than ca. 417.

explains our other evidence: that his offense was clearly separate from the profaners' (λόγῳ...ἠσέβει, [Lys.] 6.17); that he was condemned by a decree of the assembly and not, like the profaners (who included metics and foreigners), by denunciation and trial; and that Aristophanes named him, in spite of the decree of Syracosius.

*Clouds* 830, which aligns Diagoras with Socrates and speaks in the present tense, may then be taken as evidence that by 423, or before 416 at the latest,[21] Diagoras had already achieved notoriety in Athens for unconventional beliefs.[22] Its context (Dinos has supplanted Zeus) suggests that these beliefs included what Aristophanes could portray as intellectual or philosophical "atheism." That such beliefs, even before 415, could involve, or be popularly construed as, impiety toward the Eleusinian Mysteries is apparent from *Wasps* 373–80. There the chorus of dicasts reassure Philocleon by threatening to punish Bdelycleon "so that he will know not to trample on τὰ ταῖν θεαῖν ψηφίσματα" (378) and by urging him to "fill his heart with Diopeithes" (380), the notorious religious fanatic and harrier of "atheists."[23] Since Bdelycleon has said or done nothing even remotely impious, the chorus' words must be taken as the sort of hysterical charge that demagogic prosecutors typically made in the popular courts. In addition, *Clouds* 298–304, where the chorus piously refers to the mysteries, seems to be a pointed contrast with the mystery rites just performed by Socrates (254–62), suggesting that Socrates seeks to substitute not only new gods for old but new rites as well.

The reference to a *logos* in [Lysias] 6.17 leaves it unclear whether Diagoras offended in a speech or in a book, but an "atheistic" book attributed to him was known to fourth-century scholars. Kopff, making much of the implications of 415 as the date of Diagoras' outlawry, says that there is no evidence for Diagoras' impiety before 415[24] and goes on from there to construct a conspiracy theory: There was never such a book; the attribution of an "atheist tract" to Diagoras was a product of "the war propaganda of the Athenian democracy," which after its "atrocity" at Melos sought to dis-

21. Chaerephon may not have figured in the original version; Kopff 1990, 326–27.

22. Hermippus fr. 43, from *Moirai* of 430, speaks of Διαγόρου τοῦ Τερθρέως (i.e., ὁ τερθρευόμενος, "quibbler"); if this refers to Diagoras the Melian, Τερθρέως is a jocular patronymic (*Suda* τ 343 Adler lists Τερθρεύς as a proper name) or ethnic rather than a jocular demotic.

23. For Diopeithes see Ostwald 1986, 196–98, 528–36. At *Vesp.* 378 ταῖν θεαῖν (VJ) is clearly the correct reading; τῶν θεῶν (R) is a banalization. MacDowell prints τῶν θεῶν because "accusations of profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries did not become fashionable until 415." True, but the passage can nevertheless refer to attitudes, if not behavior, that could be portrayed by prosecutors as threateningly disrespectful.

24. Of course, if Diagoras was outlawed before 415, *Clouds* 830 is itself such evidence.

credit Diagoras, who had in fact written "a work that contrasted the glorious moral claims of the Eleusinian Mysteries with the actual *Realpolitik* of the Athenian democracy" (Kopff 1990, 327–28). Kopff does not say how he thinks Diagoras' actual book was made to vanish, when and by whom the spurious tract was written, how it was circulated, or whom it was supposed to convince. But if, as seems to be the case, Diagoras was outlawed before 415, then there was no such cover-up, and our questions about the genuineness of the "atheistic" book attributed to him need not be so melodramatic. So are there any other grounds for doubting its genuineness?

Kopff (1990, 328) says that its genuineness "was refuted on internal grounds by Aristoxenus" (fr. 127a Wehrli = *PMG* 738). This putative refutation was invoked by Philodemus (*Piet.* 85–86 Gomperz), who says that those who reject anthropomorphic for philosophical gods

> offend more than Diagoras, for he was playing [ἔπαιξεν], if indeed this doctrine is really his and not spurious, as Aristoxenus says in *Mantinean Customs*, and in the poetry that seems truly his he displays nothing at all impious, as is shown for example by what he wrote about Arianthes the Argive...and Nicodorus the Mantinean...and his encomium of the Mantineans contains the same sort of thing.

From this we gather that the book was in prose and that it contained playful (i.e., sophistic or paradoxical) rather than earnest atheism. Still, Philodemus hesitates to attribute any atheistic doctrine to Diagoras: he thought Diagoras' poetry pious enough, and Aristoxenus had called the doctrine spurious. Philodemus does not report Aristoxenus' reason for saying that, but his appeal to Diagoras' poetry about the Mantineans, especially if it derives from Aristoxenus himself, allows us to guess. In composing a book about the Mantineans, among whom he lived for a time, could Aristoxenus have been tempted to remove the taint of impiety from a man who had written poetry of which Nicodorus and the rest of the Mantineans were evidently proud? If there was any cover-up, Aristoxenus and Philodemus are likelier candidates than the Athenian democracy. While I can easily imagine an assembly full of Philocleons being persuaded that a foreigner's display of sophistic cleverness was tantamount to "trampling on τὰ ταῖν θεαῖν," I have trouble imagining a cabal of Philocleons circulating atheistic tracts in a propaganda battle.

But might Aristophanes have been a propagandist? Kopff thinks so: After 415 "it would be only natural for Aristophanes to show the Athenian people that he had been right after all in 423 and he had several new ideas

to add to or modify what he had written back then" (1990, 327). But since Kopff fails to adduce evidence for, or to discredit the evidence against, a date any later than 416 for the revision of *Clouds*, such a motive on Aristophanes' part would have to fit the period around 418/7, where the evidence for his revision seems to point.

At that time Alcibiades and other ambitious members of his generation were achieving their first political prominence, with a selfish bellicosity that may well have alarmed Aristophanes as much as their selfish sophistry had in 423.[25] In the years after the peace of 421, Alcibiades had taken the lead in promoting policies that would prompt resumption of hostilities against Sparta. In early 418 he persuaded the Athenians to insert a notice of Spartan perfidy into the stele recording the peace of 421 (Thuc. 5.56)[26] and laid the groundwork for warfare in the Peloponnese. That summer the Athenians were defeated at Mantinea. The defeat discredited both Nicias' policy of accommodating Sparta and Alcibiades' policy of enlisting Argos on Athens' side. The ostracism to choose between them, proposed by its ultimate victim Hyperbolus, was probably one of the immediate results.[27] This political juncture struck Eupolis as an opportunity to attack Alcibiades in *Baptai*, and it may also have struck Aristophanes as an opportunity to renew his own attack on Socrates and his pupils in a revised *Clouds*. If Aristophanes' motive was at least partly political, the fact that his revision was never staged would not have meant total failure, since he still could have circulated it (à la Kopff) as a broadside.

But when we test this hypothesis against the play itself, we do not find the support we need—that is, mention of or allusion to people and events relevant to the political situation outlined above. They may, it is true, have figured in passages that in the end Aristophanes never included in his revision. But if his purpose was primarily political, why did he not include at least some? And if he resigned himself to circulating his play as a broadside, why did he not complete his revision?

Hubbard (1986) draws a conclusion more compatible with the text we have: "The general intention of Aristophanes' revision was to broaden the play's humorous and theatrical appeal, and...he planned to accomplish this through the use of lively action and conventional stage devices...where these were eschewed in the first version" (196). Hubbard also shows that Aristophanes' own comments on the failure of the original play are to an

25. For this period there is no better account than Ostwald 1986, 291–333. For the selfishness of Alcibiades' policies see esp. Thuc. 5.43 (his first mention of Alcibiades).

26. At Ar. *Lys.* 513 (of 411) the heroine recalls this action as the beginning of the current war.

27. So Ostwald 1986, 303.

extent ironic and reveal a certain dissatisfaction with having to sacrifice the original's sophistication in the interest of creating greater crowd-appeal. This may explain "why, in the end, he never saw the second version through to production, merely leaving it to posterity as a written text" (196). Other possibilities are that people whose opinion Aristophanes respected discouraged the project or that the archon to whom he submitted it did.[28]

In any case, it looks as if Aristophanes' abandonment of the revision was connected with its dim theatrical future. He wanted to spend no more time on a project that he had lost faith in or that he was told would never be restaged. He may have circulated it among friends in its unfinished state,[29] but if so he can hardly have meant it to be an effective political broadside, since it contains nothing of evident relevance to the current scene. The likeliest hypothesis is that our text derives from Aristophanes' *Nachlass*.

28. Sommerstein, *per litteras*, suggests that "the archon is likely to have rejected the play on the ground that it was not new. Had he accepted it, any disappointed rival who failed to get a chorus would have had good ground for complaint at the *euthynai*."

29. For this process see Gal. *Libr. Ord.* 92.11–93.16.

44

# Alcibiades in Cloudedoverland

Michael Vickers

IN HIS MAGISTERIAL STUDY of the institutions of democracy in the fifth century B.C., Martin Ostwald notes that in Aristophanes' *Clouds* "father and son affect allegiance to different social classes," and he observes, "whether this reflects a common situation in Athens or whether it is merely a comic device to highlight the generation gap we cannot tell."[1] I venture to suggest that we probably can give an answer to this important question, and that the reason why it has proved difficult to do so in the past has had much to do with the nature of commentary on *Clouds* during this century.

There has of course been no shortage of recent commentaries on the play, and most readers might reasonably assume that nothing further need be said about a work that Plato is said to have presented to Dionysius of Syracuse with a view to teaching him about Athenian politics (*τὴν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείαν*).[2] If, however, it can be shown that one fairly obvious point has been overlooked by commentators—recent or otherwise—then a case for a general reassessment of *Clouds* might not be altogether out of the question.

Scholars do not seem to have noticed that the scene in which Socrates puts Strepsiades to bed (*Nub.* 694–745) is a parody of one suffering from the plague; at least there are many parallels between Aristophanes' lines and what we know from Thucydides. The bedbugs are described as Corinthians;

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1. Ostwald 1986, 235.
2. *Vita Ar.* 28.46–48, 29.33–35 Koster.

wordplay (on κόρεσι, 699) apart, there may be a connection with the fact that it was believed that the plague was introduced by the Peloponnesians.[3] The bugs are said to be devouring Strepsiades' ribs (καὶ τὰς πλευρὰς δαρδάπτουσιν, 711); one of the symptoms of the plague was that it quickly reached the chest.[4] They are draining his spirit (καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκπίνουσιν, 712); another symptom was severe diarrhea.[5]

Line 713 is usually taken to read: τοὺς ὄρχεις ἐξέλκουσιν ("they are dragging out my testicles"). The plausible suggestion has, however, been made that ἐξέλκουσιν ("ulcerate") should be read instead.[6] If so, there may be a connection with the report that the plague caused ἕλκωσις ("ulceration").[7] Against this possibility, however, is the fact that Thucydides' ulceration is applied to the colon, not the testicles, but this may in turn be outweighed both by the undoubted distress the plague caused to the extremities[8] and by the following line where we read that the bedbugs are digging through Strepsiades' arse (καὶ τὸν πρωκτὸν διορύττουσιν, 714); in its final stages, the plague would "descend to the bowels."[9] Strepsiades claims that they will kill him (καὶ μ' ἀπολοῦσιν, 715); "most" died of exhaustion at this stage.[10] The chance that these parallels (for another cf. below p. 617) are coincidental is especially remote in a play performed before an audience that had either witnessed or experienced similar symptoms a few years earlier. And if they are not coincidental, a fresh look at some of the historical resonances of *Clouds* may be justified.

Recent commentators on *Clouds* have also tended to overlook the story in one of the *Arguments* to the play to the effect that "Socrates' lovers...especially those in the circle around Alcibiades" prevented the poet from winning first prize at the City Dionysia in 423 B.C. (*Arg.* 5 Coulon). Nor do we hear much these days of a view that enjoyed a certain vogue in the nineteenth century—that Pheidippides in *Clouds* "came forward in the character of Alcibiades, who had the same love for horses and bore a similar relation to Socrates."[11] Considerable evidence for an equation between

3. Thuc. 2.48.2. Cf. Rogers 1916, 96: "It is hardly necessary to say that [the Corinthians] were at this time the bitterest enemies of Athens."

4. Thuc. 2.49.3.

5. Thuc. 2.49.6.

6. Blaydes 1890, 94, 411 (following Reiske).

7. Thuc. 2.49.6..

8. It may prove relevant, if *Nub.* 694–745 is indeed germane to the pathology of the plague, that R and V invert lines 712 and 713; see too Vickers 1991.

9. Thuc. 2.49.6.

10. Thuc. 2.49.6.

11. Donaldson 1860, 185; Donaldson continues: "At the same time, the prominent part which Alcibiades was beginning to take in public affairs, and the influence he possessed over the young men of his own age, pointed him out as their most adequate representative"; cf.

Pheidippides and Alcibiades was spelled out by J. W. Süvern in 1826,[12] and it is perhaps surprising that such an equation is today rarely even discussed.[13] The explanation may lie in part in the evident fact that *Clouds* is thought to be primarily an attack on the historical Socrates and that to allow references to other historical characters might weaken any defense of the philosopher.[14] Another reason may be that Aristophanes has suffered from specialization on the part of students of the classics: some plays are deemed "political" to be studied by historians, others "literary" to be studied for what they might tell us about Aeschylus or Euripides, while *Clouds* has become a text to be studied primarily for its philosophical, rather than its political, interest.[15] This perhaps misses the point, since *Clouds* is probably a play with a much wider political objective than simply an attack on Socrates.

## Süvern on *Clouds*

Süvern's arguments may be summarized as follows: Pheidippides' mother was a niece of a Megacles (46–47), a name that is repeated frequently throughout the play (70, 124, 815). Pheidippides was also descended from Coesyra (48, 800). Alcibiades' mother was a daughter of Megacles,[16] and Coesyra was a prominent member of the Alcmaeonid clan, to which Alcibiades belonged. The *hipp-* element in Pheidippides' name may, moreover, have recalled Hipparete, Hipponicus' daughter and Alcibiades' wife.[17] Alcibiades' disdain for gymnastic contests and his preference for the breeding of racehorses[18] may also be relevant, in view of the low esteem in which gymnastic exercises are held by some speakers in *Clouds*.

Süvern notes that Homer mentions a Pheidippus who is the son of Thessalus from whom the Thessalian Aleuad dynasty claimed descent;[19] this may be another allusion to Alcibiades, since Satyrus records the fact that

Thirlwall 1835–44, 278: "It is hardly possible to doubt that under this character the poet meant to represent Alcibiades"; cf. Hertzberg 1853, 67 n. 56.

12. Süvern 1826; see also Süvern 1836.

13. Recent exceptions include Boruchovich 1959, 329–36; Montuori 1974, 171 (who accepts the equation); and Moorton 1988, 345–59. Alcibiades is not mentioned in the context of Pheidippides by either Dover (1968b) or Sommerstein (1982).

14. E.g., Dover 1968b, vi, xxxii–lvii; for other views see Havelock 1972, 1 nn. 1–6; Montuori 1974; Nussbaum 1980, 43–97 (who speaks [p. 45] of an "uncritical adulation" of Socrates); Tomin 1987, 25–32.

15. Cf. Heath 1987, 9: "*Clouds*...is not in itself a political play."

16. Plut. *Alc.* 1.1.

17. Plut. *Alc.* 8.4; Isocr. 16.31.

18. Isocr. 16.33.

19. *Il.* 2.678, discussed most recently by Panagl 1983, 303.

when Alcibiades was in Thessaly, "in his horse-breeding and chariot-racing, he was more horsemanlike than the Aleuadae."[20] Süvern sees a reference to Alcibiades' well-known speech impediment[21] in the baby talk at 1381. He also regards Aristophanes' failure to win the prize for *Clouds* through the machinations of Alcibiades as grounds for believing that Alcibiades was lampooned in the person of Pheidippides. He notes too that Alcibiades and Socrates had recently been in the news when the younger had saved the older man's life at the battle of Delium in 424.[22]

Süvern believed that a distinctly Socratic conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles recorded by Xenophon makes the subject of Alcibiades' education directly relevant to *Clouds*, and he notes that the conversation was characterized by Pericles himself as σοφίζεσθαι.[23] Likewise, Süvern regards the story of Alcibiades' injunction to Pericles to find ways of not rendering his accounts[24] as an indication of the way in which Alcibiades' mind was widely thought to work, especially if Alcibiades had, in the years immediately preceding *Clouds*, been a member of a board entrusted with a revision of the tribute of the Delian League and believed to have indulged in bribery or embezzlement.[25] Some of these points are stronger than others, but taken together they constitute a case that deserves serious consideration.

## Traulism and Socratic Shoes

One of Süvern's suggestions in particular prompts closer investigation, namely, that when Strepsiades reminds Pheidippides of his childish speech impediment (τραυλίζοντος, *Nub.* 1381), Aristophanes was making an allusion to Alcibiades' manner of speech whereby he pronounced *rho* as *lambda*.[26] Strepsiades quotes the way in which his infant son had asked for a drink: βρῦν (1382). If, however, he lambdacized the word in question, it may have sounded like πλῦν: "give me a good telling off" (cf. LSJ s.v. πλύνω II), or simply "give me a bath"—perhaps a reference to Alcibiades' love of bathing (Plut. *Mor.* 235a).

Lambdacization as an explanation of τραυλίζοντος (1381–82) may help to clarify a notorious crux, in the lines spoken when Socrates first meets Pheidippides (869–72). Strepsiades has reminded his son that as a lambdacizing six-year-old (ἐξέτει...τραυλίσαντι, 862) he once persuaded his father

20. Ath. 534b.
21. Plut. *Alc.* 1.7–8.
22. Plut. *Alc.* 7.6.
23. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.40–46.
24. Plut. *Alc.* 7.3; D. S. 12.38.
25. [And.] 4.11. For arguments in favor of this testimony see Ostwald 1986, 293.
26. Ar. *Vesp.* 44–48; Plut. *Alc.* 1.6–7.

to buy him a toy chariot, an appropriate gift if the infant Alcibiades is in question. If moreover there was a reason for drawing attention to the speech defect shared by both the juvenile Pheidippides and the mature Alcibiades, it may have been to set up lambdacizing wordplay at 870–72.

Socrates was criticized for always drawing illustrations from "shoemakers, carpenters and smiths."[27] Whether or not the *Alcibiades Major* (the dramatic date of which is late in the lifetime of Pericles) is actually by Plato, Socrates there mentions shoes or shoemakers seven times,[28] and the story was told that "when Alcibiades offered [Socrates] a large piece of ground to build a house upon, he said 'But if I wanted shoes, and you had given me a piece of leather to make myself shoes, I should be laughed at if I took it.'"[29] It is also surprising that the scene in *Clouds* where Socrates is said to have made waxen flea-slippers (149–52) is not adduced by commentators as an example of Socrates' evident interest in footwear and shoemaking.[30]

At 868–69, Socrates states that Pheidippides is still a child, and is not familiar (*τρίβων*) with the rigging (*κρεμαθρῶν* or *κρεμαστῶν*) in his establishment. That what Pheidippides says in line 870 is shocking is clear from what Strepsiades says at 871, and that his pronunciation is idiosyncratic is shown by Socrates' reaction at 872. Commentators today usually take Socrates' remark as referring to the quality of Pheidippides' vowels,[31] but Strepsiades' reference to traulism alerts us to the likelihood that Pheidippides' consonants are in question and that perhaps we ought to think in terms of lambdacization. If so, Pheidippides' reply may have been heard as: *αὐτὸς θλίβων εἴης ἄν, εἰ κλέμαιό γε* ("May you be a wanker yourself, if you go on about shoes"), where *τρίβων* is pronounced as *θλίβων*, and *κρέμαιό γε* as *κλέμαιό γε*. *Κλείματα, κλῆμα,* and *κλίμα* are all words for "shoe" (Hsych.). All would agree that Socrates ridicules Pheidippides at 872 by mimicking his childish pronunciation, but critics have made heavy weather of what several manuscripts (RVEKNY) record as *κρέμαιό γ'*. If, however, we allow for lambdacization, the audience may have heard *ἰδοὺ κλῆμαιον* (just listen to that "shoey")—appropriate enough if Alcibiades' speech mannerism and Socrates' philosophical topos are at issue. Such a characterization is not without parallel elsewhere,[32] and the "shoe" motif recurs time and again throughout *Clouds*.[33]

27. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.37; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5; Pl. *Symp.* 221e; Pl. *Grg.* 489e–91a.

28. [Pl.] *Alc. Ma.* 125a, 128a, 128c, 129d.

29. D.L. 9.1.

30. On which see further Lang 1978.

31. E.g., Dover 1968b, 206; Sommerstein 1982, 203.

32. Cf. Woodruff 1982, 126–27: "Even if the *Hippias Major* is a forgery, it represents mannerisms [that are] distinctively Hippian.... Certain striking mannerisms occur frequently in Hippias' speech and in Socrates speech when he is mocking Hippias."

33. See my forthcoming *Pericles on the Stage* for further details.

For all that "Aristophanes' puns are seldom sophisticated,"[34] it might be worth observing not only that a τρίβων was the garment regularly worn by the historical Socrates[35] but that he is said to have slept under one together with the young Alcibiades, an occasion from which Plato later made Alcibiades claim to have emerged unscathed.[36] If Aristophanes was alluding to what was probably a well-known nonevent, lambdacization at *Clouds* 870 would have added a further level of meaning, with its suggestive allusion to what Aristophanes thought Socrates actually did beneath the τρίβων he shared with the youthful object of his lust.[37] If this analysis is valid, the judgment of Athenaeus may require some modification: "No comic poet has said anything about what Plato tells of Socrates: that he...lay with Alcibiades under the same cloak. And yet this would of necessity have been shouted from the rooftops by Aristophanes, who was present at Plato's symposium."[38] Strepsiades' horror (871) would have been an effective way of drawing particular attention to what Pheidippides seems to have implied.

## Strepsiades and Pericles

This indicates that there may be more than "a brief and incomplete allusion"[39] to Alcibiades in the person of Pheidippides, and it is argued in what follows that *Clouds* is concerned in part at least with the bad habits Aristophanes thought Alcibiades had picked up from his teachers. But if Pheidippides does indeed "come forward in the character of Alcibiades," whom might Aristophanes be advancing in the person of Strepsiades? Certainly not Alcibiades' physical father Cleinias, the hero of Artemisium, who fell at Coroneia in 447.[40] (This was Hatzfeld's only reason for dismissing an equation between Alcibiades and Pheidippides and is probably in turn the main reason why the equation made in the nineteenth century is rarely made today.)[41] There was, however, another who played for Alcibiades "the role of a father," namely, Pericles, Alcibiades' guardian, in whose house Alcibiades spent his boyhood years.[42]

Of course Pericles had been dead for some time when *Clouds* was performed, but death did not prevent Athenian comic writers from bringing

34. Dover 1968b, 96.
35. Pl. *Prt.* 335d.
36. Pl. *Symp.* 219b.
37. Cf. Ath. 219e.
38. Ath. 219b.
39. Hatzfeld 1951, 34.
40. Plut. *Alc.* 1.2.
41. Hatzfeld 1951, 34.
42. Loraux 1981, 467; Pl. *Prt.* 320a; D. S. 12.38.2.

deceased individuals on the stage when it suited them. Aeschylus and Euripides (in *Frogs*) are two candidates who immediately spring to mind, and Eupolis made a series of dead orators culminating in Pericles' return from Hades.[43] There are sufficient references in *Clouds* to Strepsiades' morbidity to enable us to believe that Aristophanes' original audience might have thought of him as one brought back from the dead. From the "endless night" of lines 1–2, such allusions permeate the play: "I'm fit to perish" (ἀπόλλυμαι, 16), "the evil that has ruined me" (ἀπολώλεκεν, 26, with connotations of physical ruin [LSJ B1]); "burn to a cinder" (καταφρύγει, 396, with an allusion to Pericles' funeral pyre, perhaps); "I'll look half a corpse" (504); "I will call him back to the light" (πρὸς τὸ φῶς, 632, but perhaps with the implied meaning "from the dead"; cf. LSJ φάος Ib); "I died recently" (725); "No one is going to prosecute me when I am dead" (782); "I shall be destroyed" (ἀπὸ γὰρ ὀλοῦμαι, 792); "You waste my livelihood by washing yourself as though I were dead" (838); "Shall I tell the coffin-makers of my father's illness?" (846); "silly old man" (τυφογέρων, 908, perhaps with a play on τυμβογέρων, "aged tomb-person": cf. LSJ); "You'll be dead" (1436); "It will be the death of me" (ἀπὸ γὰρ ὀλοῦμαι, 1440—in Sommerstein's translation); and perhaps "I walk the air and observe the sun" (1503)—if there is an allusion in the burning of the Phrontistery to Pericles' funeral pyre, and the evanescence of his spirit into the beyond.

Süvern came close to seeing Pericles in Strepsiades ("Hier setzt sich der Alte wie in die Stelle des Perikles").[44] It is tempting to pursue this idea, for Strepsiades shares many of the characteristics attributed to Pericles, and the plot deals with concerns that were his. For all that he was "rich and of noble birth,"[45] Pericles was regarded as being careful with his money, if not actually stingy, and especially so within his domestic circle. His family "complained at his exact regulation of his daily expenses, which allowed none of the superfluities common in great and wealthy households, but which made debit and credit exactly balance each other."[46] Strepsiades' parsimony is no secret. He upbraids a slave for having used too thick a wick in a lamp (57), a vessel with a Periclean resonance,[47] and he admits to being niggardly (421). Strepsiades' patronymic "son of Pheidon [= son of Thrifty]" (134) conveys the same notion.

Forgetfulness was one of the side effects of the plague: "Some had no sooner recovered than they were seized with a forgetfulness of all things and

43. Plut. *Per.* 3.7, 34.10; Eup. frr. 100, 110, 115 KA. On this point see Henderson's discussion in chap. 43 of the present volume.

44. Süvern 1826, 39.

45. Plut. *Per.* 7.2.

46. Plut. *Per.* 16.5, 36.2.

47. Plut. *Per.* 16.9; see below p. 611.

knew neither themselves nor their friends."[48] Pericles, of course, had recovered from the plague, and if Pericles underlies the figure of Strepsiades, the forgetfulness motif in *Clouds* might be relevant to the pathology of the statesman's illness. At 129–30 Strepsiades complains that he is "old, forgetful, and slow"; at 414 the chorus promises Strepsiades success so long as he has a good μνήμων (memory); at 482–83, Socrates says to Strepsiades, "I want to find out...whether you have a good memory," and at 631 he condemns him for having forgotten things before he has learned them; at 685 Strepsiades is unable to recall his lessons; at 854–55 he complains that he forgets everything he is taught. There may be something going on here that I do not think commentators have noticed. The shape of Pericles' head was the basis for much comic humor. One of Pericles' nicknames was σκινοκέφαλος (squill-head).[49] Francis Bacon informs us that a squill "is like a greate Onion,"[50] and it is tempting to view the information Strepsiades imparts at 188–90, to the effect that he knows where some lovely big bulbs grow, as a reference to the Periclean cranium. Because of Pericles' self-consciousness with regard to his "blemish," sculptors usually showed him with his head covered,[51] and if Pericles underlies the figure of Strepsiades, there may be an allusion to this when the latter expresses surprise that he has left home without even a cap (268).

## Strepsiades, Pericles, and Philosophy

While Pericles kept his domestic financial affairs on an even keel, he is said to have been troubled by worries over the public accounts. And the stories that the young Alcibiades suggested that the best thing might be for him to think of ways in which he could arrange not to have to present the accounts at all[52] are perhaps even more relevant to *Clouds* than Süvern thought. Strepsiades' debts are after all a constant theme throughout *Clouds* (e.g., 16–17, 34–35, 244–45, 436, 487, 1131–44, 1214–1302). The whole object of the education of father and son is to find clever arguments that will help Strepsiades evade his creditors, and they take lessons in philosophy toward this end. We might recall Pericles' association with Pythocleides; Damon, "a sophist of the highest order," who was (probably) ostracized even though he attempted to disguise his sophistry with musical education;[53] Zeno, from

48. Thuc. 2.49.8.
49. Plut. *Per.* 3.3.
50. Bacon 1626, sec. 445.
51. Plut. *Per.* 3.3–4.
52. Plut. *Alc.* 7.5; D. S. 12.38.
53. Plut. *Per.* 4.1; Pl. *Alc.* 1.118c; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.4.

whom he learned the "strength of a two-edged tongue"[54] (cf. Strepsiades' boast that his son "gleams with a two-edged tongue," 1160); Protagoras, skilled in "making wrong appear right";[55] and especially Anaxagoras, a philosopher whom Pericles greatly admired,[56] and through whose influence he both became deeply interested in grand speculations (μετεωρολογίας καὶ μεταρσιολεσχίας) and developed "an elevation and sublimity of expression far removed from vulgarity and low buffoonery."[57] In the *Phaedrus*, Plato makes Socrates explain how Anaxagoras influenced Pericles, "imbuing him with μετεωρολογία."[58] It was Anaxagoras too who said to Pericles that "those who want to use a lamp supply it with oil."[59] Whether at the level of the lamp or of meteorology, these interests are surely reflected in certain passages in *Clouds* (we have seen the lamp already, and cf. τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα, 228; μετέωρον, 264; μετέωροι, 266; ἄνδρας μετεωροφένακας, 333; μετεωροσοφιστῶν, 360; μετεωρισθείς, 404; μετεώρων, 490; τῶν μετεώρων πραγμάτων, 1284). The author of the *Alcibiades Major* makes Alcibiades describe Pericles' education very concisely: "[Pericles] did not become a philosopher [σοφός] by himself; he lived with many philosophers, including Pythocleides and Anaxagoras, and still, at the age he is, he takes lessons from Damon for this purpose."[60]

If Strepsiades was indeed set up as Pericles, it must have been highly amusing to watch an analogue of a man known as "the Olympian," whose speech was likened to thunder and lightning, being persuaded that Zeus did not exist and that thunder was but a magnified fart. The very name of the play Νεφέλαι has an Olympian ring to it, for it recalls Zeus' most famous title: Νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς.[61] It also recalls Cratinus' characterization of Pericles as a "mighty tyrant whom the gods call Κεφαληγερέταν ([the] head-gathering [one])."[62] Strepsiades' interest in the fact that the Clouds are women (314–57) recalls Pericles' notorious devotion to the female sex. He was much given to ἀφροδίσια according to Clearchus.[63] Pericles' liking for the ladies may also underlie the scene in which Strepsiades is taught the difference between masculine and feminine, a scene that includes the statement "I *know* which names are feminine!" (683).

54. Plut. *Per.* 4.4.
55. Arist. *Rh.* 1402a23.
56. Plut. *Them.* 2.
57. Plut. *Per.* 5.1.
58. Pl. *Phdr.* 269e–70a; Edmunds 1987, 7–21; see also Ostwald 1986, 268–69.
59. Plut. *Per.* 16.9.
60. [Pl.] *Alc. Ma.* 118c.
61. E.g., Hom. *Il.* 1.511, 5.631; *Od.*1.63, 9.67.
62. Cratin. fr. 258 KA; Plut. *Per.* 3.5.
63. Ath. 589d.

## Socrates

Aristophanes probably chose Socrates as the appropriate philosophical peg upon which to hang all the sophistical "business" because Socrates was in all likelihood close to the Periclean circle.[64] Pericles' house was the likely venue of Socrates' philosophical intercourse with Aspasia, with whose aid he is said to have "hunted down" the youthful Alcibiades, of whom he is said to have been inordinately fond.[65] Socrates, moreover, was generally believed—rightly or wrongly—to have had a pernicious influence on the politics as well as the morals of Alcibiades and other young men in his circle. Indeed "it was probably Socrates' association with the prominent Alkibiades which made Aristophanes choose him as the representative of the genus [of philosophers]."[66] Socrates' statement in the *Alcibiades Major* (105b–e) that Alcibiades would never achieve his tyrannical objectives without Socrates' help represents a view of the philosopher that was widely held at Athens[67] and that was to be a contributory factor in his condemnation in 399. But rather than being a faithful image of Socrates, Aristophanes' clever conceit may instead be a witty cento of allusions to several representatives of the new learning, formed (rather in the manner of Giuseppe Arcimboldo's learned exercises with fruit, flowers, and vegetables)[68] into a portrait of the son of Sophroniscus.

## Pheidippides, Alcibiades, and Others

Similarly, Pheidippides seems to incorporate features of personalities other than Alcibiades. For example, we hear in Plutarch that Xanthippus, Pericles' eldest son and "a spendthrift by nature," is not able to "bear with his father's stingy ways and the small amount of money that he allowed him." Xanthippus borrowed money from a friend, as though Pericles had asked him to do so. According to Plutarch, "when the friend asked for the money back again, Pericles brought a lawsuit against him, at which the young Xanthippus was enraged and abused his father, sneering at his way of life,

64. Taylor 1926, 75–76.

65. Ath. 219e; cf. Pl. *Prt.* 309a–c.

66. Dover 1968b, 118–19.

67. Pl. *Ap.* 23d. Cf. Montuori 1974, 170, who adds that Plato is said to have approached Socrates "because he was master in the art of politics" (Pl. *Ep.* 7 324c) and that Critias may have had good reason to forbid Socrates to "teach the art of words" to "the young" (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31, 1.2.33), since he himself (with Alcibiades) had the benefit of a political education from Socrates (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.15–16).

68. See Kaufmann 1987, 89–108; Kaufmann 1990, 59–86.

and his discussions with sophists."[69] There are resonances of this in the plot in general, and in particular in some of the views expressed by Pheidippides. Xanthippus' wife's "expensive habits" caused his financial embarrassment, and knowledge of this may have enriched Aristophanes' caricature of the Periclean household. Pericles' inheritance had, moreover, been a public issue in the last months of his life, when the statesman had successfully pleaded with the people to allow his illegitimate son by Aspasia to be granted citizenship.[70] It might appear that Aristophanes has taken the notion of "filial relationship to Pericles" and created another arcimboldesque portrait, this time in the image of Alcibiades.

The occasion for the play may have been Alcibiades' own money troubles. Although he was supposed to have inherited a large fortune (100 talents is the figure of which we hear),[71] Alcibiades never seems to have lived within his means. He was suspected of having abused his tenure of the office of *taktes* in 425 in order to extort bribes from the allies whose tribute he and his colleagues were supposed to reassess.[72] His recent marriage to Hipparete, the daughter of what Plutarch calls a "man of great wealth and noble birth,"[73] seems only to have added to Alcibiades' financial requirements. Not content with a dowry of ten talents, he demanded, and received, an additional ten from his in-laws on the birth of his and Hipparete's first child. Alcibiades' hubristic behavior, however, is said to have so disturbed his brother-in-law Callias that Callias made his fortune over to the state should he die childless, lest Alcibiades kill him in order to lay hands on it.[74]

It is not unreasonable to suppose therefore that Alcibiades was in financial trouble in the late 420s. He was certainly in debt in 415 as a result of what Thucydides calls his "devotion to horse-racing and other pleasures that outran his means,"[75] and although he had by this time laid on a flamboyant performance and lavish entertainment at the Olympic games of 416,[76] it was clear in what direction he was heading, even if Aristophanes' revision of *Clouds* (the version we have) was carried out as early as 419 or 418.[77] If reference was indeed being made to Alcibiades' spendthrift ways, and if Pericles underlies Strepsiades, two things are being said at once: (1)

69. Plut. *Per.* 36.4.
70. Plut. *Per.* 37.2–5.
71. Lys. 19.52.
72. [And.] 4.11; cf. Ostwald 1986, 293.
73. Plut. *Alc.* 8.1.
74. [And.] 4.15; Plut. *Alc.* 8.4.
75. Thuc. 6.15.3; cf. Thuc. 6.12.2.
76. Plut. *Alc.* 11.1–3.
77. Dover 1972, 104.

that Alcibiades is running up debts now (in a way that used to upset his adoptive father) and (2) that he tries to avoid his debts by using the kind of clever arguments that he and Pericles learned from the teachers they frequented. Alcibiades' current excesses are accordingly laid at the door of Pericles (cf. 1454–55: "These problems are your responsibility, because you turned yourself [*στρέψας σεαυτὸν*] toward evil affairs"). But the younger man's lawlessness and hubristic behavior eventually prove too much even for his father, so that Strepsiades/Pericles finally burns down the source of all the trouble in a symbolic rejection of the philosophies he had once fostered. This does not mean that there is any evidence of Pericles having given up his philosophic connections; the conflagration seems to have been used as a dramatic device to suggest that even Pericles might be disgusted at Alcibiades' current practices.

## Olympian Zeus

We have already had occasion to mention that Pericles bore the nickname "the Olympian"—a "childish and pompous" epithet, according to Plutarch (but one that he believed to be justified by Pericles' manifest virtues).[78] Olympian Zeus figures large in *Clouds*, but rarely if ever in a favorable context. Strepsiades' first words, *ἰού, ἰού. Ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ* (1–2), set the scene. They are especially appropriate if Pericles is the object of Aristophanes' attentions, for apart from alluding to the statesman's nickname, they draw attention to another epithet—*βασιλικήν* (royal)—which Plutarch at least applied to the form of government that existed at Athens during Pericles' ascendancy.[79] The same point is made at 153. Then, Pericles is said always to have prayed before conducting public business;[80] this may be why Strepsiades declares that *εὐξάμενος* (having prayed to the gods, 127) he will go and get himself taught at the Phrontistery.

The dialogue between Strepsiades and the student he meets there concerns natural phenomena—insects and reptiles—deemed "Mysteries" by the adept (143). This allows Aristophanes to make fun of Chaerephon, Socrates' close associate, to introduce the theme of farting (160–66)—taken up in a big way at 294–95 and 382–96—and perhaps most of all to introduce a discussion that may parody those of Pericles with Anaxagoras. While "How then did he measure it?" may not be "the question which a real Strepsiades would have asked,"[81] it is one that Pericles might have posed.

78. Plut. *Per.* 39.2.
79. Plut. *Per.* 15.1.
80. Plut. *Per.* 8.6.
81. Dover 1968b, xl.

Once installed in the Phrontistery, Strepsiades expresses great interest in a map of the world that the student explains to him. His questions, however, consistently bear on well-known aspects of Pericles' career. He asks whether geometry is of any use for measuring out land for cleruchies (203), a scheme of land apportionment with which Pericles had been closely associated.[82] On learning that it could measure any land, he remarks, "A democratic and useful ploy" (205), an interesting paradox if Montuori is correct in seeing geometry as an aristocratic, as opposed to a democratic, avocation.[83] Pericles' democratic tendencies, of course, need no gloss.[84] Strepsiades cannot see any jurymen at Athens (208); Pericles had instituted payment for jury service as a means to gain political influence.[85] In case anyone might miss the point, Pericles is actually mentioned at 213, as having been responsible for "laying out" Euboea (as indeed he was, when he suppressed a revolt in 446).[86] Strepsiades wants Sparta to be moved as far as possible from Attica—not simply an average Athenian's reaction to the enemy but perhaps a deliberate evocation of Pericles' great and long-standing dislike of Laconia.[87]

Some might consider that to have a Periclean figure referring to Pericles as though he were someone else weakens the basic argument. This overlooks the possibility that such a practice might be due to the playwright wishing to have an escape route, so that an author could claim that since X mentions Pericles, X could not possibly *be* Pericles. Something like this may lie behind the legislation passed in 415 according to which it was forbidden to κωμῳδεῖσθαι ὀνομαστί (to satirize by name), legislation that may well have been instigated by Alcibiades.[88]

If Pericles does underlie Strepsiades, it is amusing to see the latter swearing by Zeus and threatening to hit the student for not moving Laconia further away, and even more so to see him kowtowing before Socrates, who greets him from on high, as though he were the god and Strepsiades a mere mortal. It is interesting to note that Semonides (fr. 1.3) contrasts Zeus with ἐφήμεροι (mortals).[89] The real-life images of Socrates and Pericles are here ludicrously reversed. Socrates' first short speech (227–34) is supposed to be based on theories first formulated by Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher

82. Plut. *Per.* 9.1, 11.5, 23.4, 34.2.
83. Montuori 1974, 237–38.
84. Cf. Plut. *Per.* 7.3, 14, 15.1–2, 17.1, 23.1.
85. Plut. *Per.* 9.3.
86. Thuc. 1.114.
87. Plut. *Per.* 10.3–4, 21.1, 31.1, 32.6–33.2; *Comp. Per. Fab.* 3.1.
88. Janko (1984, 206) is too bleak on Alcibiades' possible involvement; see Vickers 1989, 276. For a different interpretation of the relevant evidence see Sommerstein 1986, 101–8.
89. Dover 1968b, 125–26.

who flourished between ca. 440 and 430,[90] and who is presumed to have visited Athens during this time.[91] If so, he may have been yet another philosopher who was associated in the popular mind with Pericles.

Strepsiades is told that the gods are not in favor in the Phrontistery (247–48), but that if he so wishes he can learn there the true nature of matters divine (250–51). "By Zeus" he replies, "that is just the thing, if it can be done" (251). Socrates' solemn prayer, though it is to nonexistent deities, again recalls Pericles' practice of praying before business:[92] perhaps another case of deliberate role-reversal. Another such reversal may be the initiation of Strepsiades into the religion of the Clouds (250–509). This has been seen as the parody of an initiation into a mystery cult.[93] Such initiation was widely believed in antiquity to be a means of ensuring a happy fate after death,[94] but the question of the applicability of the rite to Socrates' known teachings has given rise to much debate. If, however, the literal introduction of the dead Pericles' spirit into the atmosphere above his funeral pyre, rather than the teachings of the live Socrates, is the main point of Aristophanes' conceit, the initiation scene can perhaps be more easily understood. In addition, the man who saw to the restoration of the shrine at Eleusis,[95] and quite possibly of the Eleusinion in the Athenian Agora as well,[96] might plausibly be thought of as having been a well-known initiate.

Strepsiades is afraid of what Socrates is going to do to him. Indeed, "Strepsiades is rather easily frightened (cf. 267–68, 293–95, 481, 497, 506–9)," and "is something of a coward."[97] Though Pericles had been "brave and adventurous" earlier in life, his later years had been characterized by a certain caution in military affairs,[98] a caution that led to "many songs and offensive jests written about him, speaking of him as a coward";[99] it could well be that this is one of the "offensive jests."

Socrates brings on the chorus of Clouds, whose voices are accompanied by thunder. Comic writers are said by Plutarch to have likened Pericles' manner of speech to thunder and lightning;[100] Aristophanes said that he

90. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 434.
91. *OCD* ², 347–48 s.v. "Diogenes" (1).
92. Plut. *Per.* 8.6.
93. E.g., Byl 1980, 5–21; Edmunds 1985a, 216.
94. Richardson 1974, 310–11.
95. Plut. *Per.* 13.7.
96. Francis and Vickers 1988, 163. Pericles' involvement in the construction of the Eleusinion in the Agora is now more likely in view of the redating of the crucial inscription *IG* $1^3$:11 to 418 (from 458); cf. Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos 1990; see also my discussion of *Acharnians* in *Pericles on Stage* (forthcoming).
97. Sommerstein 1982, 174; Dover 1968b, 162.
98. Plut. *Per.* 7.3, 18.1, 22.2, 33.5.
99. Plut. *Per.* 33.7–8.
100. Plut. *Per.* 8.4.

"bore a terrible thunderbolt upon his tongue,"[101] and if Pericles really does lie behind the character of Strepsiades, then it will doubtless have been amusing to have him fart back at the thunderclouds and to need a crap in the bargain (293–95). And given the Alcibiadean *Tendenz* that may pervade *Clouds*, it may be relevant to note, with Lowell Edmunds, that at 362–63 Socrates is addressed in terms that are repeated by Plato at *Symposium* 221b, where he puts them in the mouth of Alcibiades.[102]

It will probably have been amusing, too, to see Strepsiades persuaded that Olympian Zeus does not exist and that the Clouds, not "pissing Zeus," bring about rain (365–74). "Does Zeus make the Clouds move?" asks Strepsiades (379). "No, thunder is the product of Δῖνος [Vortex]," replies Socrates (380). Whereupon Strepsiades observes that Vortex is king in Zeus' place (380–81). The idea of "the noetic substance starting a vortex" is one that originated with Anaxagoras,[103] Pericles' pet philosopher; there may be an allusion being made here, and the talk of Strepsiades' digestive processes may be another "offensive jest" aimed at "the Olympian."

Many more "offensive jests" throughout *Clouds* are aimed at Pericles and Alcibiades—hundreds rather than dozens, and many of the images are coarse to a degree. Perhaps the worst one in *Clouds* is the punch line of the Pythonesque bedbug scene with which this chapter began. Socrates asks what Strepsiades has managed to get hold of: "Nothing except my cock in my right hand" (τὸ πέος ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ, 734). The bedbug scene included not one but six apparent references to the recent plague. It surely ends with another, for as Thucydides informs us, "Even if a person got over the worst [as did Pericles], the plague would often...attack the privy parts...and some escaped with the loss of these."[104]

Very few of the points made in this chapter are found in commentaries on *Clouds* written during this century. Some of them may be illusory, but there are many undoubted Periclean and Alcibiadean phenomena that can only be accounted for in the terms described here. Socrates, though not unimportant, is not central to *Clouds;* he is simply the bladder with which the licensed fool hits, and hits again, his principal target. Since Pericles is dead, the target must be Alcibiades. *Pace* Dover, it is all too easy to understand "why the play fared so badly."[105] Surely "Socrates' lovers...especially those

101. Ar. *Ach.* 531.

102. Edmunds 1987.

103. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 445; cf. 364–65, 372–73.

104. Thuc. 2.49.8. On the serious side of comedy see Henderson 1990.

105. Dover 1972, 119; cf. Dover 1968b, lvii: "It is tempting to wonder why *Nu.* came third out of three when it was first performed." It may or may not be significant that *Clouds* Arg. 5 (Coulon) is omitted from Dover's abridged version (1970).

in the circle around Alcibiades," prevented the poet from winning the first prize. Alcibiades had developed from a spoiled brat into a thug. It is possible that Socrates had attempted to temper the worst excesses, but he, like Pericles, must take some of the blame for having created a monster. Aristophanes' insight into the education of two prominent Athenians against whom charges of tyranny were made[106] will, moreover, have been a highly appropriate political primer for Plato to have given to a tyrant of Syracuse.

If Pericles and Alcibiades indeed underlie the main characters of *Clouds*, it becomes a relatively simple matter to answer Martin Ostwald's question. Allegiance to different social classes on the part of Strepsiades and Pheidippides will reflect the way in which their historical analogues were perceived by contemporaries. Although Pericles was well born, Aristophanes assimilates his Periclean character to the social class with which Pericles deliberately chose to be associated. Alcibiades was less inclined than his guardian to adopt a democratic facade, and Aristophanes exploits to the full his tastes for the pastimes of the aristocracy. It was a very clever, and very pointed, "comic device to highlight the generation gap."[107]

106. E.g., Plut. *Per.* 7.1, 12.2, 16.1 (Pericles); Thuc. 6.15.2–4 (Alcibiades).
107. Ostwald 1986, 235.

45

# The *Bios*-Tradition and Poets' Lives in Hellenistic Poetry

Peter Bing

SOMETIME IN THE THIRD CENTURY B.C., a man from Paros with the eloquent name Mnesiepes doggedly sought the sanction of the Delphic oracle for a plan he had in mind (*καθ' ἃ ἐπινοεῖ*, E1 col. 2.15). Twice he received a response that did not address his true desire. Mnesiepes persisted, however, and the third time finally got what he wanted: the oracle's permission to found a shrine on Paros to the poet Archilochus.[1] The shrine—in effect a hero-cult—was duly established, and to commemorate the foundation, Mnesiepes put up an inscription. In this inscription, after briefly reporting the oracles mentioned above, he turns to what is apparently his chief concern: "But as regards the things we wished to inscribe and set up publicly," he says, "some were handed down to us from the ancients, some we labored at ourselves" (*περὶ δὲ ὧν ἠβουλήθημεν ἀναγράψαι, τάδε παραδέδοταί τε ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπραγματεύμεθα*, E1 col. 2.20–22). What were these things to which the rest of the inscription—by far its greatest part—is devoted? Though much here has perished or is illegible, the overall outline is clear: The inscription consists in the main of what

1. On the question of why Mnesiepes apparently made three inquiries at Delphi, I am in agreement with Treu 1979, 206–7. In its first two answers, the oracle mandated cult honors for a variety of gods (E1 col. 2.1–13): "Nur das letzte Orakel enthält eine auf unseren Dichter bezügliche Wendung, die in ihrer allgemeinen Formulierung ("ehren, wie es Mnesiepes beabsichtigt") als Genehmigung eines Archilochos-Kultes ausgelegt werden konnte und ausgelegt worden ist ("und so opfern wir sowohl den Göttern wie dem Archilochos"). Mnesiepes kam es offensichtlich nicht darauf an, eine neue Stätte für Götterkulte zu stiften, sondern auf die Ehrung des Heros Archilochos. Nur zögernd hat Delphi das genehmigt" (Treu 1979, 207). For the text of the inscription, see Kontoleon [1952] 1954, followed by Treu 1979, 40–52 and Tarditi 1968, 4–8 (T 4). On its date see Kontoleon [1952] 1954 and Kontoleon 1956, 29–39. On the possibility that the cult of Archilochus was already in existence earlier see n. 11 below.

we may arguably call a "life," or "bios." From the youthful Archilochus' initiation into his craft by the Muses, to later incidents demonstrating his piety and courage,[2] and with quotations of Archilochus' poems built-in either as part of the narrative (E1 col. 3.31–35) or to back up an assertion about the poet (E2 col. 1.15–44), Mnesiepes gives us "a detailed account of...[Archilochus'] life."[3]

Why would this man of the third century B.C., Mnesiepes, wish to establish a hero-cult of a poet who lived four hundred years before? And why would he want to record that poet's life? How are we to situate within his contemporary culture that desire to commemorate that speaks to us even in the name Mnesiepes, the recollector of poems?[4] There are, of course, many possible answers. I would like to suggest one that, though I am sure it is only partial, may nonetheless help to explain Mnesiepes' actions. His inscription and the shrine of which it is a part are, I believe, a manifestation of a cultural phenomenon that gains prominence in the fourth century B.C. and comes to full flower in the Hellenistic era. I mean that intense antiquarian interest in poets who are dead and gone, in the literary greats of the distant past.

I would like to call this interest the memorializing impulse. It consists, on the one hand, of the desire to honor the dead and keep their legacy alive. This includes the obligation to preserve and restore. We may, on the other hand, also see in this impulse an attempt to master that legacy, to assert control. Let us not forget that Mnesiepes, though he takes some of his material from the ancients (*ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων*), essentially shapes *his* version of Archilochus' life: "We labored at it ourselves" (*αὐτοὶ πεπραγματεύμεθα*).

In the Hellenistic era, we encounter the memorializing impulse expressed in the most diverse ways. And the memorials assume a variety of forms. There are other shrines like the Archilocheion. Indeed, most of our evidence for such literary shrines appears to come from this period, which seems in any case to have been their heyday.[5]

Sharing that same impulse, though on a less monumental scale, is a type of epigram that became very popular at this time. These are epigrams

2. For this combination of strictly chronological narrative and nonchronological treatment of a person's character cf. Momigliano 1971, 50–51 (on Xen. *Ages.*).

3. Thus Lefkowitz 1981, 31.

4. Scholars have speculated that the name Mnesiepes suggests a professional rhapsode (cf. Nagy 1979, 304 n. 3).

5. One thinks of Ptolemy IV Philopator's foundation of a shrine to Homer in Alexandria (cf. *SH* 979 and Ael. *VH* 13.22) and his patronage of the Hesiodic *synodos* at Thespiae (cf. Fraser [1972] 1986, 1:313, n. 55). There is evidence for shrines of Homer at Delos (*Inscr. Délos* 443 B b 147, second century B.C.) and Smyrna (Str. 14.1.37; Cic. *Arch.* 8). There was a Homereion on Chios, which appears to have been a gymnasium (*Epigr. gr.* 860.4 Kaibel), as was the Mimnermeion at Smyrna (*CIG* 2.2, 3376 = Gentili and Prato 1979–85, T 14).

that pose as inscriptions on the tombstones of past poetic greats. Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, and others are recipients of funereal honors accorded to them across a gulf of space and time by an extraordinary range of Hellenistic poets. Typically these epigrams include biographical data as well as reference to the poet's literary oeuvre.[6] Thus they reproduce and condense precisely those elements present in Mnesiepes' Archilocheion—the memorial to a dead poet, the reference to his life, and citation of his works—onto the surface of a tombstone (albeit a fictitious one).

It is striking and significant—and I think it has not been sufficiently noted—that these epigrams bear a strong resemblance to elements in some of the great contemporary projects of Hellenistic scholarship, in particular to the entries in Callimachus' *Pinakes*.[7] When scholars discuss the *Pinakes*, they generally talk as though they were simply lists of works. But this is not the case. As the title itself tells us, they were "lists of people, who excelled in every aspect of culture, and [only then lists] of what they wrote" (*πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν*, *Suda* κ 227 Adler). Thus, like the aforementioned sepulchral epigrams on literary luminaries of the past, the *Pinakes* provided concise biographical data followed by a description of the author's works.[8] Indeed, we get an idea of how central the biographical element was to the *Pinakes* if we assume, as Pfeiffer plausibly suggests, that "the vast biographical work" of Hermippus, a follower of Callimachus, was "a continuation of" or "a more popular supplement to" the *Pinakes*.[9] Blum correctly and tellingly calls them "bio-bibliography."[10] Both the *Pinakes* and the sepulchral epigrams are, in a sense, memorializing tags. And I would suggest that we see a conceptual nexus linking such ostensibly isolated phenomena—generally considered quite heterogeneous—as the Archilocheion of Paros, the bio-bibliographical lists of Callimachus, and the Hellenistic poems on the lives (and deaths) of ancient poets. All, in their different ways, partake of the memorializing impulse.

One instance in which we can perhaps glimpse a component thread of this nexus is in a poem (*SH* 705) by Posidippus of Pella, a contemporary of

6. On this phenomenon see Bing 1988a, 58–64; Bing 1988b, 117–23.

7. On the form and arrangement of the *Pinakes* see Pfeiffer 1968, 128–31; Blum 1991; Krevans, *Callimachus' Aetia: The Poet as Editor* (forthcoming).

8. The locus classicus for the biographical element in the *Pinakes* is fr. 429 Pf.: "Eudoxus, son of Aeschines, of Cnidus, astronomer, geometer, physician, legislator. He studied geometry under Archytas, and medicine under the Sicilian Philistion, as Callimachus says in the *Pinakes*. But Sotion says in his *Successors* that he had also heard Plato" (*Εὔδοξος Αἰσχίνου Κνίδιος, ἀστρολόγος, γεωμέτρης, ἰατρός, νομοθέτης, οὗτος τὰ μὲν γεωμετρικὰ Ἀρχύτα διήκουσε, τὰ δ' ἰατρικὰ Φιλιστίωνος τοῦ Σικελιώτου, καθὰ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τοῖς Πίναξί φησι. Σωτίων δ' ἐν ταῖς Διαδοχαῖς λέγει καὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι*).

9. Pfeiffer 1968, 129, 150, 129, respectively.

10. Cf. Blum 1991, 1–2, and the book's subtitle in the original German edition: "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Biobibliographie"; cf. also Blum 1991, 231–39, 244–46.

Mnesiepes and his Archilocheion. Posidippus refers in this poem to honors given to Archilochus. Does he offer us any clue as to their nature? I think he does, since he exhorts his readers, just as a poet of sepulchral epigram might do, to "give to the Parian nightingale a mournful / flood, shedding empty tears from the eyes and groaning in lamentation" (ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν Παρ(ί)ηι δὸς ἀηδόνι λυγρὸν ἐφ[... / νᾶμα κατὰ γληνέων δάκρυα κεινά χέω[ν / καὶ στενάχων, *SH* 705.18–20)—that is, he specifies precisely the sort of honor we would expect in a cult for the dead, a hero-cult, like the Archilocheion of Paros.

A further detail suggests that Posidippus was in fact referring to the very shrine Mnesiepes founded. The honors to Archilochus are mentioned as having been instituted in connection with an oracle: Posidippus hopes (*SH* 705.11–17) that Apollo will give an oracle about him as he did concerning Archilochus, prescribing honors for him like those for Archilochus. He even envisions a statue of himself set up (by an adoring public, no doubt) in the marketplace—and during his lifetime, it seems. From this contemporary reference to an oracle connected with the worship of Archilochus "it is clear," as H. Lloyd-Jones first noted, "that [Posidippus] knew of the establishment of the Archilocheion."[11] But beyond Lloyd-Jones' observation, I would argue not only that Posidippus was familiar with the oracle about the Archilocheion, but that his unelaborated reference (v.11) shows that he clearly expected his audience to know of it as well. Indeed, his verses imply that the establishment of this shrine had an impact extending far beyond Paros. In asking Apollo to "proclaim a deathless oracle about me too, lord, crying out from the sanctuary, so that the Macedonians and the islanders and the dwellers near the coast of all Asia may do me honor," he is evidently evoking, and himself aspiring to, the geographical scope of the fame enjoyed by the Archilocheion.[12] If, then, the establishment of this shrine

11. Lloyd-Jones 1963, 88. I think, further, that Posidippus' inspiration here was almost certainly that very oracle given to Mnesiepes. The statement of Alcidamas (in Arist. *Rh.* 1398b11) that "the Parians honor Archilochus though he is evil-speaking" (Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι) may indicate that Archilochus was the object of cult even earlier, and Lloyd-Jones (1963, 88–89) suggests that there may have been a previous oracle to institute the cult. But Alcidamas mentions Archilochus simply to illustrate that "everyone honors the wise" (πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν), and the "honors" he enumerates for others include noncultic items, such as that the Spartans made Chilo one of their council of Elders. Thus I think Nagy (1979, 305) is too hasty when he assumes any kind of fixed cult of Archilochus prior to Mnesiepes; but cf. also Kontoleon 1964, 37-86, esp. 44–54.

12. τοίην ἐκχρήσ(α)ις τε καὶ ἐξ ἀδύτων καναχήσαι[ς / φωνὴν ἀθα(νά)την, ὦ [ἄν]α, καὶ κατ' ἐμοῦ, / ὄφρα με τιμήσω[σι] Μακηδόνες οἵ τ' ἐπὶ ν[ήσων / οἵ τ' Ἀσίης πάσης γ(ε)ίτονες ἠιόνος, 12–15. The extent of the shrine's renown is consistent with other contemporary evidence, since this is the period in which we hear of literary pilgrimages, such as that attested in the Aeschylean *Vita* (A 11), where it was apparently de rigueur for aspiring tragedians to visit

was an event that sent ripples in many directions, far and wide, did it do so because it struck a chord in the memorializing tendencies of the day? Did these tendencies perhaps encourage Posidippus to hope for similar honors for himself?

The reference in Posidippus' poem to the authorizing oracle of the Archilocheion permits us to trace one strand in the memorializing nexus—a strand that links the Hellenistic interest in setting physical memorials to poets, with the poets' own interest in doing so in literature. Callimachus' *Pinakes* suggests another, a conduit by which one manifestation of this impulse, namely the interest in the biography of ancient poets, entered into the poetry of the time. As Arnaldo Momigliano has noted, biography as a genre "developed in the Hellenistic age in conjunction with philological commentaries and surveys, such as the Callimachean *pinakes*. Here we are faced," he says, "by a close connection between biography and philology."[13] Simultaneously, many of those same scholars who produced philological works were themselves engaged as poets. It has often been observed that the Hellenistic poets, unlike their predecessors, turned for their material not just to the poetic tradition but to works of prose as well.[14] Callimachus is only the most explicit of the bunch when he declares that his source for the tale of Acontius and Cydippe is a prose author, the historian Xenomedes (fr. 75.54), or that the story of Melicertes comes from the "ancient histories" of Leander (fr. 92). Many others drew on the prose tradition as well. It was only natural, then, that these poets should carry over into their poems their scholarly interests in biography, particularly in biographies of their own professional tribe. But natural as it may be, it is still striking both that now, for the first time, the lives of ancient poets became a theme of lyric poetry[15] and that, particularly in epigram, they became so in quantity.[16]

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Aeschylus' tomb in Gela, or that in Nossis (*AP* 7.718 = 11 GP), where the poetess assumes that people journey to Mitylene to be "inspired" by Sappho's graces.

13. Momigliano 1971, 13.

14. For the importance of prose sources in Callimachus see Krevans (forthcoming). Swiderek (1952–53, 49–50) has suggested that the reliance on prose sources was part of Callimachus' attempt to follow the "narrow and unworn path" and avoid the wide and crowded street.

15. We should note, however, that in fifth-century B.C. comedy the lives of earlier and of contemporary poets seem already to have been a favored theme. Unfortunately the textual evidence in comedy, though tantalizing, is slim. I argue below that Hermesianax in his *Leontion* was drawing not on the comic but on the scholarly biographical tradition for his treatment of the loves of famous poets. But one may wonder whether fifth-century comedy was a direct influence as well—i.e., whether Hermesianax mixed his genres in typical Hellenistic fashion—or whether comedy reached him only through the filter of scholarly biographical literature.

16. Much is conveniently collected in Gabathuler 1937 and Skiadas 1965; for nonepigrammatic examples cf. Bing 1988a, 57–69.

This is not to say that Hellenistic poets started writing biographical poems in the sense of works that trace the lives of poets in a chronological line from cradle to grave. At least they did not do so at first. Rather they extracted facts and anecdotes from biographical prose and adapted them for their poems. For some kinds of poem a biographical component would be generically essential; the fictitious sepulchral epigrams mentioned above, or those that pose as dedicatory inscriptions for statues of ancient poets, refer almost by definition to their subjects' lives. But there were also poems that simply incorporated biographical information into a completely different generic frame. This is the case, for instance, in a section of Alexander the Aetolian's elegiac poem, the *Muses*, on the parodic poet Boeotus (J. U. Powell 1925, 125), or in Callimachus' "Tomb of Simonides" in the *Aetia* (fr. 64), and in the long catalog of poets' loves in Hermesianax' *Leontion* (J. U. Powell 1925, 98–105).

I would like to dwell on this last work because it is a relatively early example[17] and because one can compare it with extant biographical literature. Hermesianax of Colophon dedicated this elegy in three books to his girlfriend Leontion. The poem recounted tales of famous loves from the poetic tradition and elsewhere. Only one verse from the first two books has been preserved. This is, however, a clear reference to the story of Polyphemus' love for Galatea—famous since Philoxenus' treatment—and we know it appeared in the first book (fr. 1 Powell). The only other reference in the first two books that we can place with certainty comes from book 2 and recounts an event from recent history: the frustrated love of one Arceophon for Arsinoe, daughter of Nicocreon, the king of Cyprian Salamis from 332/1–310 (fr. 4 Powell).[18] Here we already see the diversity of Hermesianax' sources.

17. Hermesianax is called φίλος καὶ γνώριμος of Philitas of Cos (Σ Nic. *Ther.* 3), and Pausanias argues that he must have composed his poem before the fall of Colophon at the hands of Lysimachus and the resettlement of its population to Ephesus, since he does not mention this catastrophe (Paus. 1.9.8), which can be dated to about 294 or, at the latest, 289/8 on the basis of the refoundation of Ephesus as Arsinoeia (cf. Fraser [1972] 1986, 2:883 n. 61). At fr. 7.72, Hermesianax clearly refers to Colophon as an existing city with which he identifies and in which he locates himself, since he describes how Philoxenus ταύτης ἦλθε διὰ πτόλεως (a passage overlooked by Fraser [1972] 1986). Thus 294 or 289/8 are the terminus ante quem. This is so in spite of Bach's attempt (1829, 91) to introduce as an additional factor the reference to Philitas at 7.75–78 as having been honored by the citizens of his hometown of Cos with a statue. According to Bach, this could not have occurred before Philitas' death ca. 280, and in this Bach has been followed by every critic since. It was, however, perfectly conceivable for a poet to be honored with a statue *during* his lifetime, as the story of the statue of Homer at Argos clearly shows (*Certamen* 302–15 Allen). See also Posidippus' hope (*SH* 705.11–17) that the citizens of Pella will erect a statue of him in the marketplace—during his lifetime, it appears. For the interpretation of this poem see Lloyd-Jones (1963).

18. This story may give us a terminus post quem for the poem. Nicocreon and his whole

But the long fragment of 98 verses from book 3—preserved for us by Athenaeus (597b = fr. 7 Powell)—contains the biographical material most interesting for our purposes. We learn from the feminine participle in verses 73–74 that Leontion was the poem's addressee: *γιγνώσκεις* [sc. *Φιλόξενον*], *ἀίουσα μέγαν πόθον, ὃν Γαλατείη / αὐτοῖς μηλείοις θήκαθ' ὑπὸ προγόνοις* ("You know Philoxenus and have heard how Galatea thought less of his mighty longing than even of her firstborn sheep"). She was apparently a *docta puella* since the speaker repeatedly invokes her knowledge of the poetic heritage in this manner ("you know...Lesbian Alcaeus," 47–49; "you know Philitas," 75–77). But the speaker himself reveals a scholarly streak in his method of enumeration, when he describes the loves of his poetic predecessors in chronological order and generic pairings:[19] First come two "mythological" poets, Orpheus and Musaeus. These are followed by the epic poets Hesiod and Homer; a pair of lyric poets, Alcaeus and Anacreon; then two tragedians, Sophocles and Euripides. Finally we get Philoxenus and Philitas. Thereafter, Hermesianax switches over to the loves of three philosophers (again in chronological order)—Pythagoras, Socrates, and Aristippus—before the fragment breaks off.

There is one section of this fragment in which we have the good fortune of being able to see the kind of biographical prose works Hermesianax might have had recourse to in producing his poem. I mean the work of the peripatetic Chamaeleon of Heraclea, a contemporary of Hermesianax, who wrote numerous tracts—*Περὶ Ἀνακρέοντος, Περὶ Σιμωνίδου, Περὶ Πινδάρου, Περὶ Αἰσχύλου*, and so on—and had broad influence on subsequent biographical work concerning poets. Thanks to Athenaeus, this is the one literary scholar in the Peripatos of whom we can form a detailed impression.[20] The citations in Athenaeus show that Chamaeleon had much to say about poets' lives and that he usually inferred his information from

family apparently committed suicide in 310, because he was suspected of trying to make himself independent of Ptolemy I, who had made him *strategos* of all Cyprus in 312. It is unlikely, because of its very nature, that Hermesianax' story could have been written while Nicocreon was still alive. In it, he tells of how Arceophon, a man of wealth but not from a noble family, fell in love with Nicocreon's daughter, Arsinoe, and offered the largest bride-gift of all her suitors. But Nicocreon refused his suit because of his lowly background. Arceophon pined away but finally succeeded in bribing Arsinoe's nurse to try to persuade the girl to sleep with him in secret from her parents. Arsinoe, however, informed her parents of the nurse's proposal, whereupon they cut off the tip of the nurse's tongue, her nose, and her fingers, and threw her out of the house. In despair, Arceophon starved himself to death, and when he was carried out for burial, hard-hearted Arsinoe watched the procession from her palace window. The goddess Aphrodite was angered at the girl, rooted her feet to the spot, and turned her to stone.

19. See Ellenberger 1907, 8; Körte and Händel 1960, 259.

20. On Chamaeleon see Leo's discussion (1901, 104–7).

the poems themselves rather than turning to any independent source. A couple of examples illuminate his (we might say capricious) method. Concerning Alcman he reports that the poet "was a pioneer in composing erotic songs...being prone in his way of life to womanizing" (Ath. 600f = fr. 25 Wehrli). Concerning Aeschylus' depiction of a tragic hero drunk, he writes:

> What the tragedian was in the habit of doing himself, that he attributed to his heroes. For he was drunk when he wrote his tragedies. For this reason, Sophocles criticized him, saying "O Aeschylus, though you compose as you should, you compose without knowing what you're doing." So Chamaeleon recounts in his work Περὶ Αἰσχύλου.

(Ath. 428f = fr. 40 Wehrli)

The section of Hermesianax' *Leontion* that overlaps with material found in Chamaeleon is that about Alcaeus and Anacreon:

> Λέσβιος Ἀλκαῖος δὲ πόσους ἀνεδέξατο κώμους
> Σαπφοῦς φορμίζων ἱμερόεντα πόθον,
> γιγνώσκεις· ὁ δ' ἀοιδὸς ἀηδόνος ἠράσαθ', ὕμνων
> Τήιον ἀλγύνων ἄνδρα πολυφραδίῃ.
> Καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὁ μελιχρὸς ἐφημίλλητ' Ἀνακρείων
> στελλομένην πολλαῖς ἄμμιγα Λεσβιάσιν·
> φοίτα δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν λείπων Σάμον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὴν
> οἰνηρῇ δειρῇ κεκλιμένην πατρίδα
> Λέσβον ἐς εὔοινον· τὸ δὲ Μύσιον εἴσιδε Λεκτὸν
> πολλάκις Αἰολικοῦ κύματος ἀντιπέρας.

> [You know how often Lesbian Alcaeus went reveling,
> harping on his lusty yen for Sappho.
> The singer loved the songbird and, with his songs'
> eloquence, caused pain to the man of Teos.
> Yes, for honey-sweet Anacreon strove for her
> who marched in the throng of many Lesbian girls.
> Sometimes he would leave Samos, sometimes his own
> land, nestled against the vine-clad slope,
> and come to Lesbos, rich in wine. And often he gazed
> on Mysian
> Lecton across the Aeolian wave.]

Athenaeus cites Chamaeleon Περὶ Σαπφοῦς in explicit reference to these verses (Ath. 599c = fr. 26 Wehrli). First, says Athenaeus, Hermesianax is mistaken in saying that Sappho and Anacreon belonged to the same era. However, he goes on, Chamaeleon reports that some people say Sappho is the addressee of Anacreon's poem on the Lesbian girl (*σφαίρῃ δηὖτέ με πορφυρῇ*, *PMG* 358) and—perhaps Chamaeleon here adds his personal contribution to the discussion[21]—that Sappho addresses the following lines to Anacreon (*PMG* 953):

> *κεῖνον, ὦ χρυσόθρονε Μοῦσ', ἔνισπες*
> *ὕμνον, ἐκ τᾶς καλλιγύναικος ἐσθλᾶς*
> *Τήϊος χώρας ὃν ἄειδε τερπνῶς*
> *πρέσβυς ἀγαυός.*
>
> [That song you spoke, O Muse of the golden throne,
> is that which the Teian from the noble land
> of lovely women sang delightfully,
> that glorious old man.]

It was material such as this—the literary biography that Christopher Pelling has recently characterized as a "tradition of systematic mendacity"[22]—that Hermesianax could have drawn on in composing his poem. But did he do so uncritically? Was the memorializing impulse something poets pursued in solemn earnest? I doubt it, especially in the case of Hermesianax, who stood at the very start of the memorializing tradition and, I believe, still viewed such authors as Chamaeleon with considerable skepticism. Concerning the passage on Anacreon and Sappho, Athenaeus perceptively says: "I think that Hermesianax was joking about this love affair." Interestingly, he does not suggest that Chamaeleon was joking. And I suspect he was not.[23] Could Hermesianax have been joking about the other lives in his catalog as well? Could he, indeed, be deliberately mocking in his work such biographical sources as Chamaeleon? Can such an antic, ironizing stance be borne out elsewhere in the *Leontion*?

21. While Athenaeus is careful to point out that Chamaeleon reports that "some people say" (*λέγειν τινάς φησιν*) Anacreon's poem was addressed to Sappho, he credits Chamaeleon alone with the suggestion that the following poem was Sappho's answer to Anacreon.

22. Pelling 1990a, 219. Pelling here opposes the excesses of literary biography to the relative sobriety of political biography.

23. This despite William Slater's recent revival of A. Gudeman's suggestion (*RE* 13.2: 2522–29) that much Hellenistic scholarship was connected with symposia and reflects what the scholars concocted in their cups. Cf. Slater 1982, 336–49; Blank and Dyck 1984, 17–24.

It is already evident from the verses about Philoxenus and Galatea cited above that Hermesianax has an odd manner with biography. We know from those verses that he was familiar with Philoxenus' treatment of the story of Polyphemus and Galatea, and we have already mentioned that the one surviving verse from the first two books is from Hermesianax' rendition of that tale. But in spite of this clear familiarity, Hermesianax turns Philoxenus (who, after all, had only died in 380/79) into the Cyclops of ancient myth[24]—perhaps slyly suggesting a contrast between his name and the proverbially *in*hospitable Polyphemus—and makes the poet's heart-throb a sea-nymph. The poet as one-eyed monster in love with his own creation—this is the fanciful Philoxenus that our author invites us (in his twisted, but appealing, way) to imagine.[25]

Hermesianax invites us to do much the same thing with Homer, about whom he says the following:

> λεπτὴν ἧς Ἰθάκην ἐνετείνατο θεῖος Ὅμηρος
> ὠδῇσιν πινυτῆς εἵνεκα Πηνελόπης,
> ἣν διὰ πολλὰ παθὼν ὀλίγην ἐσενάσσατο νῆσον,
> πολλὸν ἀπ' εὐρείης λειπόμενος πατρίδος·
> ἔκλεε δ' Ἰκαρίου τε γένος καὶ δῆμον Ἀμύκλου
> καὶ Σπάρτην, ἰδίων ἀπτόμενος παθέων.
>
> [Godlike Homer strung slender Ithaca
> with songs for the sake of shrewd Penelope.
> Weathering many pangs for her, he settled in that small island,
> leaving his spacious fatherland far behind.
> And he celebrated the race of Icarius, the people of Amyclus,
> and Sparta, grappling with his personal pains.]

24. Theocritus calls him ὠρχαῖος Πολύφαμος (11.8).

25. There is a complicating factor here: Hermesianax' picture of the poet as Cyclops may play on, and implicitly criticize, a fourth-century biographical interpretation of Philoxenus' poem by the Peripatetic Phanias (ca. 375–300 B.C.). According to Athenaeus 1.6e–7a (= *PMG* 816 = fr. 13 Wehrli), Phanias says Philoxenus was caught seducing the flute-girl Galatea, beloved of the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I, and was consequently thrown into a quarry. There he composed his *Cyclops* and shaped the tale to reflect his own circumstances, making the Cyclops stand for Dionysius, Galatea for the flute-girl, and Odysseus for himself (cf. also the accounts in Σ Ar. *Pl.* 290; *Suda* φ 397 Adler. On Philoxenus' *Cyclops* generally cf. Gow 1952, preface to Theoc. 6). One could conclude from this that Hermesianax' description of the wandering Philoxenus, drawn to Ortygia for love of Galatea, fits better with the figure of Odysseus—since Phanias says that Philoxenus was enamored of her and that it was as Odysseus that he represented himself—than it does with the figure of the Cyclops. But Galatea's utter

As in the case of Philoxenus, the moment we actually think through the implications of these verses, we are transported into a bizarre fantasyland, beguiling but weird. Homer is enamored of his own Odyssean heroine, Penelope, and takes up residence on Ithaca, where, according to the *Odyssey*, she waited for her long-suffering husband. But Odysseus is nowhere to be found. Surely the implication is that the hero is still on his odyssey, while Homer is one of Penelope's (ill-fated) suitors. Indeed, Hermesianax all but suggests that it was due to this personal motive that Homer kept Odysseus out wandering all that time. The prospect of Odysseus' return would, on this account, be a shivery one indeed for Homer, a promise of certain death—though one might recall that Odysseus spared the singer Phemius (*Od.* 22.330–80). Will the hero know better than to shoot *this* piano player?

Perhaps the most preposterous love that Hermesianax recounts is that of Hesiod. This is how he tells it:

Φημὶ δὲ καὶ Βοιωτὸν ἀποπρολιπόντα μέλαθρον
'Ησίοδον πάσης ἤρανον ἱστορίης
'Ασκραίων ἐσικέσθαι ἐρῶνθ' 'Ελικωνίδα κώμην·
ἔνθεν ὅ γ' 'Ηοίην μνώμενος 'Ασκραϊκὴν
πόλλ' ἔπαθεν, πάσας δὲ λόγων ἀνεγράψατο βίβλους
ὑμνῶν, ἐκ πρώτης παιδὸς ἀνερχόμενος.

[I claim that even Boeotian Hesiod,
master of every legend, left his home,
and came, for love, to the village of the Ascraeans,
and courted the Ascraean girl, Eoea,
and weathered many pangs, and wrote down all his
catalogs on scrolls
while he sang, always starting up again with the girl.]

lack of interest does not tally with the supposed seduction, nor is it consistent with the subsequent tradition (e.g., Theoc. 11, Call. *Ep.* 46 Pf. = 3 GP )—so far as we can see it—that Galatea's antipathy was directed at the Cyclops, not at Odysseus (note that the accounts in Σ Ar. *Pl.* 290 make no mention of Odysseus); and in that tradition it is the one-eyed monster who is consistently, and humorously, portrayed as the hapless, mooning lover (cf. Tissol 1990, 45–58). Moreover, Philoxenus evidently portrayed Polyphemus as a singer, consoling himself with song (cf. Σ Theoc. 11.1–3b; Plut. *Mor.* 622c). It seems likely that Hermesianax would have compared a singer (Philoxenus) with a singer (Polyphemus). I would therefore stand by the identification of Hermesianax' Philoxenus with the ill-starred Cyclops—though our poet may well be playing off (and perhaps criticizing) Phanias' biographical interpretation. The passage is in any case a nice example of the sort of biographical prose he may have known and been responding to.

Hermesianax seems to have been especially pleased with this brainstorm, as he signals in the first person declaration: Φημὶ δὲ καὶ..., ("I claim that [even Boeotian Hesiod]...," 21). With this phrase, which occurs at only one other place in the poem (to introduce the section on Euripides, 61), the poet is proudly pointing up a novelty—indeed, his own invention[26]—namely, that the epic phrase ἣ οἵη with which each heroine in Hesiod's *Ehoiai* or *Catalog of Women* was introduced was really the name of Hesiod's putative beloved,[27] whom he invoked anew at the beginning of each section. This first-person claim must be contrasted with the asides to Leontion (γιγνώσκεις, ἀΐουσα, 73; γιγνώσκεις, 49; οἶσθα, 75) that clearly refer to things she would know from other, previously available sources—there are surprises even for a *docta puella* well-versed in the biographical tradition! Hermesianax thus explicitly draws attention to the fact that his claim that Hesiod came to Ascra for love of a girl called Ehoie is self-conscious fabrication.[28]

And this fabrication cannot be naive. Hermesianax' style is deeply indebted to the catalog poetry of Hesiod, as is obvious from the very first word of the first line of the fragment: Οἵην μὲν φίλος υἱὸς ἀνήγαγεν Οἰάγροιο / Ἀργιόπην.../ Ἀιδόθεν ("Like the girl that Oeagrus' beloved son...brought back from Hades, Argiope"). Indeed, he knows the work of the poets he enumerates, characteristically borrowing from the diction of whichever poet he happens to be talking about.[29] Here, he describes Hesiod's arrival at Ascra (Ἀσκραίων ἐσικέσθαι ἐρῶνθ' Ἑλικωνίδα κώμην, 23) in language that—with characteristic *variatio*—recalls that which Hesiod uses about his father's journey in the *Works and Days* (νάσσατο δ' ἄγχ' Ἑλικῶνος ὀϊζυρῇ ἐνὶ κώμῃ / Ἄσκρῃ, 639–40—the only usage of singular κώμη in early epic or elegy). As we see from this quote, it was the poet's father who migrated to Ascra in the *Works and Days*, while Hesiod was

26. Thus already Ilgen, quoted by Bach (1829): "verbum....quum affirmationem in se contineat, novi quid vel miri inducat necesse est." Cf. also J. U. Powell 1925, 101 in the critical apparatus on line 23: "Bene admonuit Ellenberger Hesiodei itineris causam Hermesianactem ipsum finxisse (Φημὶ δὲ καί) Eoeae amorem." For Hermesianax' possible innovation in the case of Euripides cf. Giangrande 1977–78, 113–14.

27. The name does not exist but might plausibly be rendered as "Dawn."

28. One might want to include in this category the description of Philitas of Cos' love for Bittis (sc. Battis) in 75–78—if, that is, we accept Kuchenmüller's suggestion (1928, 26–28) that the name Battis is a humorous personification of Philitas' scholarly passion, the gloss: "Battis—sic enim corrigendum ex Ovidio—nihil aliud significat quam γλῶσσα, quae quantum cordi fuerit Coo, nemo nescit" (27). Many scholars, no doubt attracted by the wit of this suggestion, have accepted the interpretation. I am still unsure myself, though my uncertainty is not as strong as that expressed by Latacz (1985, 77–95) in the most recent treatment of the question.

29. Cf. *RE* 8:827.

already born and raised there; he never traveled by ship, he says, until he crossed to Euboea (*Op.* 650). I would suggest, then, that not only has Hermesianax blatantly and knowingly revised his predecessor's own account, he has dramatized (and thereby satirized and discredited) the biographical method one can see in prose works like Chamaeleon's. Later Hellenistic authors did not as a rule indulge in this sort of implicit critique of biographical prose. Was this because they often combined the roles of poet and scholar? Did the memorializing impulse become more decorous with time? In order to answer these questions, one would dearly like to have those poems that treated a single poet's life in extenso—the poems on Hesiod by Eratosthenes and Euphorion.[30]

Still, as several scholars have suggested, one may see in this long fragment from the *Leontion* an affectionate and imaginative attempt to create a kind of family tree, a catalog of poetic ancestors for the theme of poets enslaved by love.[31] And perhaps when we learn that Hesiod was in love with Ehoie, or Anacreon with Sappho, we may take it as a kind of homage to those poets' passion for their poetic idiom and for the poetic tradition itself. The memorializing impulse is thus not *entirely* travestied. And for all their differences, Hermesianax is, like Mnesiepes, a recollector of poems.

30. Fr.17 Powell p. 63; frr. 22, 22b Powell p. 34.
31. Thus Couat 1931, 96; Körte and Händel 1960, 260.

46

# Corinna and Pindar

Dee Clayman

THE CONTROVERSY OVER CORINNA'S DATE has its origin in a discrepancy between the ancient testimonia that portray her competing with Pindar in the fifth century B.C. and the evidence of her poems, especially their dialect and diction, that indicate a date no earlier than the third.[1] When the source of the contest story is located in Corinna's own poetry and the relevant fragments are read in the context of Alexandrian literary conventions, the controversy is resolved in favor of the later date, and Corinna emerges as a self-conscious stylist who defined the parameters of her art not only in the technical language of literary criticism but also in terms of nationalism and gender.

The ancient testimonia, none earlier than the first century B.C. tell us that Corinna was the daughter of Acheloödorus and Hippocrateia, who lived in Thebes or Tanagra, where she was a pupil of Myrtis (*Suda* κ 2087 Adler), or Myrtis' fellow teacher (*Metr. Vit. Pind.*), and had a literary dispute or contest with Pindar (Plut. *Mor.* 347f; Ael. *VH* 13.25; Paus. 9.22.3; *Suda* κ 2087 Adler; Σ Ar. *Ach.* 720), whose father she called Scopelinus (*P. Oxy.* 2438). Although the accounts of the contest differ in detail, Corinna is in every case the plaintiff, and her objections are aimed not at Pindar himself but at his poetry.

This chapter had its inspiration in a seminar on Pindar taught by Martin Ostwald at the University of Pennsylvania in 1969. I wish to thank Marilyn Skinner and Jane Snyder for their discerning criticism.

1. The standard text of Corinna is Page 1962 = *PMG*; see also Page's commentary (1953). The first to suggest a Hellenistic date for Corinna was E. Lobel (1930). A bibliography of the controversy can be found in Segal 1975, 2 n. 3; see also G. Crönert 1908; Bowra 1931; Goossens 1935; Merentitis 1970; Lehnus 1973; Ebert 1978; Vivante 1979; Skinner 1983; Bernardini 1984; Snyder 1984, 1989; M. Davies 1988; West 1990.

The disputed issues are presented most clearly by Plutarch. In his version of their face-off, Corinna censured Pindar because he refused to narrate myths, which are the essence of poetry, while glosses, catachresis, metaphrasis, song, and rhythm are only embellishments. Pindar replied in four straightforward verses listing six characters or themes from Theban myths (fr. 29 Sn., quoted below), but Corinna had the last word: one ought to sow with the hand, not the whole sack.

From Pausanias we learn that Corinna's criticism had a narrative context. He reports that he saw a painting in the gymnasium at Tanagra that depicted Corinna crowning herself after defeating Pindar in a singing contest at Thebes. Pausanias finds it difficult to believe that Corinna could have won on the merits of her poetry and offers two explanations: Corinna bested Pindar either because she wrote in a dialect the audience could understand or because she was one of the most beautiful women of that time—so he judged from the picture. Aelian multiplies Corinna's victory by five, the number later quoted in the *Suda*, and notes Pindar's angry reaction: he called Corinna a pig.

Aelian's version was discredited by Rose, who noticed that the punch line was borrowed from Pindar's sixth *Olympian*,[2] but it is harder to dismiss Pausanias, who presumably saw a real painting, and Plutarch, whom we could expect to be better informed than most on the subject of Boeotian literature. The persistence of the contest story and the level of detail in the various accounts, even if some of it seems foolish and contradictory,[3] suggest that they probably had a common source.

Page thought the contest was an "absurd inference" from some lines of Corinna preserved by Apollonius Dyscolus:[4]

> μέμφομη δὲ κὴ λιγουρὰν
> Μουρτίδ' ἰώνγ' ὅτι βανὰ φοῦ-
> σ' ἔβα Πινδάροι πότ ἔριν.
>
> (fr. 664 *PMG*)

> [I blame even clear-voiced Myrtis
> because, being a woman,
> she entered into rivalry with Pindar.]

2. Rose 1934, 8; Bowra 1964, 99.

3. "More meagre and more suspect evidence can hardly be imagined. Nobody, as Lobel says, will pay much attention to this 'contradictory and sometimes rather childish information supplied by ancient authors'" (Page 1953, 74).

4. Page 1953, 72–74.

The inconsistent spelling and unscannable second line[5] indicate that the text, as we have it, is corrupt. But the constellation of Myrtis, Pindar, and a Boeotian-speaking narrator, combined with ἔριν in line 3, indicate that Page is correct in connecting the contest story to these verses. The necessary implication is that the tradition of the contest comes from Corinna's own poetry, specifically, from the context that originally surrounded these verses, though not necessarily by an "absurd inference."

Fragment 664 may be assigned to Corinna's *Narratives*, the *Weroia*,[6] on the basis of its meter. Two other fragments of this collection are also extant, its prologue (*P. Oxy.* 2370 = fr. 655 *PMG*) and parts of two "traditional" Boeotian tales (*P. Berol.* 284 = fr. 654 *PMG*).[7] The first of these is the concluding section of a poem that describes another literary rivalry, a singing contest between Mts. Helicon and Cithaeron.

Although the first part of the contest poem is lost, it appears that each mountain sings in turn in either set pieces or shorter exchanges. When the text becomes readable, we are in the midst of the concluding song, presumably Cithaeron's,[8] which ends with a description of the birth of Zeus in Crete, attended by the Curetes. Cithaeron is then selected winner by a jury of immortals,[9] proclaimed victor by Hermes, and crowned by the gods. The fragment ends with a furious Helicon hurling a rock down from his summit and dashing it into pieces.

The conceit of articulate landscape has an Aesopic flavor, and the best parallel is Callimachus' equally Aesopic fourth *Iamb* (fr. 194 Pf.), which depicts a contest between two trees, an olive and a laurel.[10] Each tree speaks in turn, setting out her own advantages and prerogatives, in an attempt to prove herself the better. Before the matter can be settled, they are interrupted by a bramble bush, who pleads with them to cease their argument. The laurel angrily rejects the bramble from their company as an unfit companion.

5. Page 1953, 31.

6. For the meaning of *Weroia* see Clayman 1978 396–97. Heph. *Ench.* 16.3 (p. 56 Consbruch) and Ant. Lib. 25 (2:103 Martini) indicate that it was a title.

7. For the relation of these fragments see West 1970, 282–83.

8. Wilamowitz and Schubart 1907, 47 were the first to assign these lines to Cithaeron. Page (1953, 20 n. 3) implies that there is no compelling justification for this, but Weiler (1974, 82 n. 189), following a wide survey of singing contests in Greek myth, concludes that the winner always goes last and sings the most pious song. Also Bolling 1956, 283 n. 1.

9. Technical terms in the text that were used to describe analogous voting procedures in fifth- and fourth-century Athens are taken by Segal (1975, 1–2) to be further evidence of a late date.

10. Text in Pfeiffer 1949; discussion in Clayman 1980.

The *Diegesis* of *Iamb* 4 (*Dieg.* 7.1–18) reveals that the contentious trees represent Callimachus and an unidentified literary colleague, while the bramble bush, who interrupts at the conclusion, is a poet or critic whom Callimachus and his colleague reject. This allegorical reading was not invented by the author of the *Diegesis* but was made clear in the poem's opening lines, which address one παῖ χαριτάδεω, son of the son of the Graces, an unsubtle put-down of a despised poetaster.

If Corinna's poem was an allegory like Callimachus', it would begin in a similar fashion, with a brief challenge to Pindar's supremacy in Boeotian poetry and some mocking humor in the form of a fictitious patronymic. This would be followed by an Aesopic debate, in which Helicon takes the part of Pindar and victorious Cithaeron is Corinna. At the conclusion, Corinna, like Cithaeron, crowns herself victor, and Pindar, like Helicon, is enraged at the sight.[11]

Everything we hear from antiquity about the conflict of Pindar and Corinna can be fit into this framework. Corinna's name for Pindar's father, for example, Scopelinus, or the "Man from the Mountaintop," is certainly a humorous patronymic she invented for this context.[12] Although Pindar's biographers failed to understand Corinna's point and soberly listed Scopelinus among Pindar's possible forebearers,[13] their certainty about the Pindar/Scopelinus connection indicates that Corinna's little joke was very explicit.

Seen in the context of this allegory, the painting Pausanias saw in Tanagra "of Corinna binding a fillet on her head because of the victory she won over Pindar in song at Thebes" (9.22.3) was neither the record of a historical event in the fifth century nor "a very bad inference" from a poem of

11. An Alexandrian *Certamen Pindari et Corinnae* on the analogy of the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* was proposed by G. Crönert (1908, 163), but he never attributed it to Corinna.

12. The fictitous etymology is σκόπελος (lookout, peak) + ῖνος (a person from a place, e.g., βυζαντῖνος; see Buck 1933, 323). The source for Corinna's testimony on Pindar's patrimony is *P. Oxy.* 2438, a biography of Pindar from the second or third century A.D.., which says that "Pindar, the lyric poet, was born in Thebes, the son, according to Corinna and other poetesses, of Scopelinus, but according to most poets, the son of Daifantos," (1–4). It is by no means clear why poetesses or poets would be expected to have an opinion on this subject. Arrighetti (1967, 131) suggests that "according to most poets" was originally κατὰ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους. Similarly, Corinna and other poetesses would have been simply κατὰ μὲν Κόριννα καὶ ἑτέρους. The elaboration would have been made in two steps, first by someone who knew Corinna's occupation, and subsequently by a copyist who wanted to balance the two clauses. Daifantos is another name commonly alleged for Pindar's father (Guillon 1959, 160). Wilamowitz (1922, 59) was suspicious of Scopelinus' claim on other grounds.

13. Other biographies that offer Scopelinus' name either as Pindar's father or *aulos* teacher include the *Suda* π 1617 Adler, the *Vita Ambrosiana*, the *Vita Thomana*, and *De IX lyricis*; texts in Drachman 1903. The other candidates are Daifantos and Pagondas, whose names were found in Pindar's own poetry; see Lefkowitz 1975, 74 n. 12; Lefkowitz 1981, 63. Discussion in Lehnus 1977.

Corinna's;[14] instead it was a straightforward illustration of a major poem by the town's only important poet.[15] The first explanation Pausanias offers for her victory, apparently intended as a racial slur, focuses on the issue of dialect: "It seems to me that she won on account of her dialect, because she sang not in Doric speech, like Pindar, but in whatever dialect the Aeolians would understand."

Though Pausanias could have reached this conclusion himself with no more than a superficial knowledge of Corinna's work, her complaint about Pindar's use of the Attic word ἀγοράζειν, quoted in an independent source,[16] suggests that Corinna herself must have raised the issue of dialect explicitly in the poem. Pindar's dialect is precisely what one expects in choral lyric, a standard literary Greek with occasional Doricisms. But Corinna's Boeotian is certainly unique,[17] and she must have offered a defense of it in the classic Alexandrian way, by attacking others, real or imagined, who made different stylistic choices. Given the poem's Tanagran setting and Boeotian subject matter, she must have been arguing for consistency and authenticity in all aspects of style, including dialect, under the banner of a self-serving patriotism. Her argument, in short, is that she is more "Boeotian than thou."

Aelian's version of the contest multiplies the number of victories by five, one perhaps for each of her five books of poems,[18] and concludes, "Complaining of the unmusicality of his audience, [Pindar] called Corinna a pig." Rose argues that Aelian concocted this story from an overinterpretation of *Olympian* 6.89–90, where Pindar expresses the hope that his poetry will save him from the old reproach, "Boeotian pig."[19] It makes more sense, however, to assume that the pig actually appeared in some form in Corinna's poem[20] and that its reference to a line of Pindar's, either *Olympian* 6.89–90, as Rose suggests, or fragment 83 Snell, was no accident.

14. See Harvey 1955, 180 (for the former view); Page 1957–58, 111–12 (for the latter).

15. Guillon 1959, 160–61 suggests that the picture was of Hellenistic date. The contest was also apparently illustrated on wall paintings found in Pompeii (Alan and Frel 1972, 29, with biblio. in n. 2). The reference in Tatian *Ad Graecos* 33 (p. 39.16 Schwartz) to a statue of Corinna allegedly made by the Athenian sculptor Silanion who lived in the mid-fourth century was demolished by Page (1953, 73 n. 6). For another view, see Alan and Frel above, but even M. Davies (1988, 194 n. 28), who is skeptical of the late date, rejects Frel's evidence.

16. Σ Ar. *Ach.* 729 = 688 *PMG*; Pind. fr. 94d Snell. Discussion in Lehnus 1973.

17. All of Corinna's extant fragments are written in a literary dialect spelled like vernacular Boeotian of the late third or early second centuries B.C., including all initial digammas, and seasoned with some distinctively Boeotian diction. Surveys of her usage can be found in Wilamowitz and Schubart 1907, 37–44; Lobel 1930, 358–64; Page 1953, 46–60.

18. Guillon 1959, 160.

19. Rose (1934, 8) argues that Aelian, knowing the contest story, assumed that the "old reproach" was Pindar's defeat, and the "Boeotian pig," Corinna.

20. Along with her Aesopic dialogue, Corinna must have included proverbs, colloqui-

Something else she said apparently recalled to Plutarch four of the first five lines of Pindar's *Hymn to Zeus*:[21]

> Ἰσμηνὸν ἢ χρυσαλάκατον Μελίαν
> ἢ Κάδμον ἢ σπαρτῶν ἱερὸν γένος ἀνδρῶν
> ἢ τὸ πάντολμον σθένος Ἡρακλέους
> ἢ τὰν Διονύσου πολυγαθέα τιμάν.
>
> [(Shall we sing of) Ismene or Melia with golden spindle
> or Cadmus or the holy race of sown men
> or the all-daring strength of Heracles
> or the joyful honor of Dionysus?]

Plutarch presents these lines as Pindar's response to Corinna's criticism that he did not recite legends, the true essence of poetry. The verses themselves were originally part of a *priamel*, a literary convention not always understood by ancient commentators.[22] Plutarch's story implies that Corinna herself believed that the swift and sketchy treatment of so many myths in so few lines showed a lack of narrative skill, but given the reality of Pindar's oeuvre, with so many examples of myths told at considerable length, the misunderstanding was probably deliberate and meant to be facetious. We may even have the context of this criticism in Cithaeron's winning song, which describes the birth of Zeus in Crete. Though only the last few lines are extant, it is not inconceivable that Cithaeron's "Zeus hymn" provided scope for an allusion to Pindar's. Alternatively, the reference to Pindar might have been in a previous "hymn" sung by Helicon and intended to contrast with Cithaeron's, which reveals its Hesiodic/Callimachean stylistic legacy by giving prominence to the Curetes.[23]

The presence of quotations, intentional misquotations, or references to another poet's work made with critical or humorous intent suggests the influence of Aristophanes, but a true Aristophanic spirit is noticeably absent

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alisms, and other elements generally associated with Aesopica and used in Cynic diatribes where they went under the name of *spoudaiogeloion*. Callimachus, using similar material, ends his third *Iamb* with a version of "let the one who kneaded the bread eat it" (fr. 193.39 Pf.). Plutarch may be quoting or paraphrasing her when he concludes his version of the dispute with the proverb: "Sow with the hand and not the whole sack."

21. On the poem as a whole see Wilamowitz 1922, 189–90; Bowra 1964, 280–81. Text in Snell fr. 29 supplemented from Lucian *Dem. Enc.* 19.

22. Lefkowitz 1981, 65.

23. On the influence here of Hesiod *Th.* 477–91, see Wilamowitz and Schubart 1907, 47. West (1970, 283) pointing out that the Curetes do not appear in the story before Euripides' *Bacchae* and were especially popular in the Hellenistic period (Call. *Hymn* 1.52; Arat. *Ph.* 35; Ap. Rh. 2.1234), takes their presence to be indicative of a late date.

from Corinna's extant fragments. Instead, we have evidence of a subtler approach in the body of the Cithaeron/Helicon poem, where Segal has shown how Corinna's description of the secret vote (*ψᾶφον...κρουφίαν*) in lines 20–22 is a transformation of "Pindar's characteristically condensed metaphorical expression, *κρυφίαισι γὰρ ἐν ψάφοις...θεράπευσαν* [*N.* 8.26], into a literal and detailed description of actual procedural details."[24] Literary criticism at this level may well have been lost on ancient commentators, but Corinna, like Callimachus, apparently set her fable in an explanatory frame and used a programmatic prologue to set out her critical positions.

The first part of the prologue can be found in fragment 655 *PMG*. It begins with an invocation to Terpsichore followed by a description of the poetess herself, who is about to sing the lovely *Weroia* to the white-robed girls of Tanagra, which greatly delights in her clear-coaxing voice (1–5). Later lines, all lacunose, describe the author's role and subject matter: she ornamented the tales from the time of the fathers (9–10), specifically, stories of Cephesus and the family of Orion (14–16). The address to the Muse in line 1, the appearance of the title in line 2, the description of the chorus and the city's reaction to the poet in lines 3–5, and the table of contents in 9–16 suggest that this fragment was part of a programmatic introduction to a collection of poems dealing with Boeotian folk material.[25]

That the prologue also contained a Callimachean critical manifesto seems clear from Corinna's rebuke to Myrtis, quoted above, which may be assigned to it on the basis of meter.[26] It has long been a puzzle because the last line is usually understood to mean that Myrtis actually confronted Pindar face-to-face.[27] If Corinna objected to Myrtis' challenging Pindar because Myrtis was a woman, how then could Corinna, also a woman, have done the same? The argument appears illogical.

Guillon found a solution through a parallel with *Idyll* 7.47–48, where Theocritus expresses contempt for poets who imitate Homer:[28]

> *καὶ Μοισᾶν ὄρνιχες ὅσοι ποτὶ Χῖον ἀοιδόν*
> *ἀντία κοκκύζοντες ἐτώσια μοχθίζοντι.*
>
> [(So I hate) the birds of the Muses
> who labor uselessly crowing against the Bard of Chios.]

24. Segal 1975, 6–7.
25. West 1970, 283–84; West 1990, 553–54. Objections in M. Davies 1988, 186–87.
26. West 1970, 282.
27. Page 1953, 31 n. 1.
28. Notes in Gow 1952, 2:143–44.

The parallel suggests that Myrtis did not compete against Pindar in a contest but attempted, instead, to imitate him.[29] Corinna is saying that Pindaric subject matter and style did not suit Myrtis, whom she describes as λιγουρά (clear sounding). This term is meant to apply to her verse, rather than her person, and to contrast her work with Pindar's. By the Hellenistic period, λιγύς had become a keyword indicating the "slight" or "plain" style. In the *Aetia* prologue (1.29–30 ) Pf.), for example, Callimachus says:

> ἐνὶ τοῖς γὰρ ἀείδομεν οἳ λιγὺν ἦχον
> τέττιγος, θόρυβον δ' οὐκ ἐφίλησαν ὄνων.
>
> [We sing among those that have the clear voice
> of the cicada, and do not love the braying of asses.]

Corinna associates herself with both Myrtis and the Callimachean end of the stylistic spectrum in the opening lines of the prologue, where she says that the city rejoices in her λιγουροκωτίλυς, her "clear-coaxing" voice (fr. 655.4–5 *PMG*).[30] Statius echoes her self-assessment when he speaks of revealing the *tenuisque arcana Corinnae* (*Silv.* 5.158). *Tenuis* is the Latin equivalent of λεπτός, the stylistic quality of slenderness, another characteristic of the slight style.[31] *Arcana* may refer to Corinna's allegories, as it does in line 157 in reference to Lycophron, but it may also allude to the difficulties of her dialect, which must have seemed to the Romans both obscure and antiquated on account of the digammas.

The singular nature of her stories and the simplicity of her style[32] would have enhanced this impression of antiquity, which Propertius refers to directly: *et sua cum antiquae committit scripta Corinnae* (2.3.21). These lines are often cited as evidence of a fifth-century date, on the mistaken assumption that *antiqua* describes Corinna herself rather than her poetry. But it no more reveals her century than *non inflati somnia Callimachi* (Prop. 2.34.32) gives us reliable information about Callimachus' waistline.[33] In Latin

29. Guillon 1958, 53 n. 4.

30. On the unusual formation of λιγουροκωτίλυς see West 1970, 285; West 1990, 556; M. Davies 1988, 193. Segal (1975, 5) notes that the second half of the compound implies a quality of teasing, intelligence, and trickery.

31. Call. *Aet.* 1.23–24 Pf.; Reitzenstein 1931, 23–69; Snyder 1984, 133–34.

32. The quality of Corinna's style has been much discussed yielding widely ranging assessments: early naïveté (M. Davies 1988, 188–89; Latte 1955, 67); late genuine naïveté (West 1990, 555); late pseudonaïveté (Segal 1975, 7); early refreshing simplicity (Snyder 1984, 133).

33. Similarly Catul. 95.10: *at populus tumido gaudeat Antimacho*. The adjectives are transferred from the poetry itself to the person of the poet by a process of metonymy, as in the case of "clear-voiced" Myrtis above. The figure was also misunderstood by ancient commentators;

rhetorical criticism, *antiquus* and the noun *antiquitas* often refer to antique style, including self-generated or faked antiqueness (Cic. *Brut.* 82, 94, 137).

Corinna's self-conscious antiquarianism together with her emphasis on purity, simplicity, and clarity are consistent with the stylistic manifesto illuminated in the prologue and in the Cithaeron/Helicon poem through contrast with Pindar's convoluted lyrics in the "grand" style.[34] Corinna objects to Myrtis' imitation of Pindar because it is inappropriate for a poet who is λιγουρά, like herself, and because Myrtis is a woman, a fact that Corinna expresses with a pointedly Boeotian word, βανά. For Corinna, the grand style is appropriate only for men, while the slight style is better suited to women.[35]

In this one key passage, then, Corinna links the three major elements of her critical position: (1) an extremist interpretation of the slight style, marked by an almost total lack of ornament; (2) a nationalistic perspective that determines both subject matter and dialect; and (3) an emergent awareness of the relationship between gender and art. Here, for the first time in the Western tradition, we find a woman writer considering the issue of how women should write and concluding that the imitation of the best male model is not necessarily a good choice.

Her "quarrels" with Myrtis and Pindar, then, are best understood as announcements of her literary agenda in typical Hellenistic modes: verbal aggression and allegory. She learned these forms from the great Alexandrians, who must have preceded her by at least a generation, and she adapted them to fit the circumstances of her time and place.[36] Tanagra's seacoast, its physical proximity to Attica, and its large export industry in terracotta figurines assured it access to the wider world of Greek culture, including the book trade from Alexandria.

If we see Corinna's work in the Alexandrian tradition, it is possible to account for all of the testimony that seems to make her a contemporary of Pindar. It is only necessary to assume that later antiquity understood Corinna's triumph over Pindar as a historical fact rather than a dramatic fiction. Ancient scholars, desperate for clues about the lives of poets, customarily turned to their poetry as a source of information.[37] With this in mind,

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hence we are told (Ath. 552b) that Philitas was so slender he had to put balls of lead around his feet so he would not be swept away by the wind.

34. Lehnus 1973, 421–22. D. H. *Comp.* 22 cites Pindar as an example of the harsh style in company with Antimachus, Empedocles, and Thucydides.

35. This distinction between male and female poetry is entirely consistent with the traditional, patriarchical perspective that informs Corinna's choice of subject matter and its mode of presentation; see Skinner 1983.

36. On the sophistication of musical tastes in third-century Tanagra see Latte 1955, 65.

37. Amply documented in Lefkowitz 1981.

we can discount the historicity of their statements, while benefiting from their contribution by reversing the process and using the ancient testimonia as a source of information about the poems.

# Appendix
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# Index locorum

A. Literary texts


Acusilaus *frr.* (edd. Diels and Kranz) **9 B 21:** 4 n. 3
Aelian *VH* **5.14:** 157 **12.30:** 436 n. 3 **13.22:** 620 n. 5 **13.25:** 633
Aeschylus *Ag.* **1:** 509 **2–3:** 509 n. 8 **20–21:** 509 n. 9 **36–38, 253, 347, 374–78:** 510 **375, 377:** 510 n. 10 **400:** 514 n. 24 **525:** 500 **604–12:** 511 n. 16 **707–11:** 499 **716–36:** 510 **717–49:** 499 **750–70:** 510 **811–813, 816, 819, 821, 827:** 500 **855–58, 1090–97:** 511 **1190–93:** 500 **1217–26:** 511 **1223–26:** 511 n. 14 **1242–44:** 511 **1273–75:** 186 n. 16 **1414–18:** 510 **1525–29:** 510 **1541–59:** 575–76 **1555–59:** 510 **1561:** 511 n. 15 **1562:** 501 **1566:** 497 **1567–76:** 501 n. 26 **1577–1611:** 511 *Ch.* **8–9:** 577 n. 14 **23–31, 425–28:** 49 n. 57 **429–33, 444–48:** 577 **918–21:** 512 n. 17 **924–25:** 508 **949, 962–65:** 512 **1009, 1020, 1055–56, 1059:** 509 n. 7 **1075–76:** 512 *Eum.* **212:** 512 **470–89:** 7 **487:** 6 **517–65:** 562 n. 17 **762–77:** 514 *Pers.* **121–24, 537–83, 909–1077:** 49 n. 57 *PV* **1016–19:** 519 n. 7 **1058–62:** 520 n. 15 *Sept.* **451:** 424 n. 2 *Supp.* **370–75:** 44 n. 27
Aeschines **1.6:** 288 **1.18:** 78 n. 19 **1.96–97:** 204 n. 36 **1.101–3:** 204 n. 36
Alciphron **2.38.3:** 290 **4.3.1:** 191 n. 25 *Epis.* **3.59:** 188 n. 19
Alexis *frr.* (ed. Kock) **112:** 194 n. 29
Anacreon *PMG* **358:** 627
Andocides **1.4, 1.5:** 265 **1.11–70:** 260 **1.17:** 260, 262, 266 **1.17–22:** 594 n. 9 **1.17–24:** 262–63 **1.19:** 262–263 **1.19–24:** 260 **1.20, 1.22:** 262 **1.41–47:** 263 n.20 **1.47:** 260–66 **1.47–68:** 594 n. 9 **1.48:** 264 **1.48–68:** 260 **1.50:** 264 **1.52–53:** 260 **1.56, 1.59:** 264 **1.60–68:** 260 **1.61:** 264 **1.61–64:** 260 **1.67:** 260 **1.68:** 264 **1.71:** 261 **1.71–72:** 259 **1.81, 1.82** 288 **1.83:** 288, 327 n. 14 **1.83:** 294 **1.94:** 258, 259 n. 9 **1.96–97:** 312 **1.97:** 313 **1.106–9:** 267 **1.110–16:** 259 **1.115:** 266 **1.116–17:** 267 **1.117–23:** 259 **1.118:** 206 **1.120–21:** 267 **1.121:** 259 **1.124–28, 1.131, 1.141–43:** 267 **1.146, 1.149:** 268 **2.6–7:** 260 **2.6–9:** 258, 260 **2.7:** 262 **2.7–8:** 260 **2.15, 2.23, 2.25–26:** 258, 260
Androtion *FGrH* **324 F 34:** 301
*Anecdota Graeca* (ed. Bekker) **1:428:** 289 **1:466:** 327 n. 17
*Anthologia Palatina* **7.304.3:** 438
Antiphanes *frr.* (ed. Kock) **159:** 186 n. 16 **204:** 203 n. 31
Antonius Liberalis (ed. Martini) **25 (2:103):** 635 n. 6
Apocalypse **21.18–20:** 433
Apollodorus **2.8:** 49 n. 56 **2.11:** 51 n. 62
Apollodorus of Athens *FGrH* **244 F 7:** 71
Appian *Mac.* **9.4:** 341 n. 9
Apollonius of Rhodes **1.584:** 438 **2.846–50:** 231 n. 21 **2.1234:** 638 n. 23

Apuleius *Met.* **2.28:** 363 **11.26:** 362 n. 31 **11.9:** 356 n. 8 **11.9:** 362 n. 31
Aratus *Ph.* **35:** 638 n. 23
Aristides *Or.* **49.46–48:** 356 n. 12
Aristophanes *Ach.* **524–33:** 131 **531:** 617 n. 101 **702–12:** 190 **1128–31:** 191 *Av.* **145–47:** 594 **521:** 190 **862–89:** 188 **959–91:** 186 n. 16 **959–91:** 188 **988:** 190 **992–1020:** 188 **1072–75:** 596 **1072–75:** 597 **1073:** 597 n. 20 *Ec.* **602:** 205 n. 44 *Eq.* **61:** 189 **115–24, 193–210:** 188 **220:** 187 **997–1000:** 189 **1003–86:** 188 **1004:** 189 **1085:** 190 *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **58:** 594 **228:** 210 n. 6 **233:** 209 n. 4 *Lys.* **404–19:** 179 n. 1 **513:** 600 n. 26 **767–80:** 188 *Nu.* (ed. Coulon) **arg. 2:** 592 n. 2 **arg. 5:** 604, 617 n. 105 **1–2:** 609, 614 **16:** 609 **16–17:** 610 **26:** 609 **34–35:** 610 **46–48:** 605 **57:** 609 **70:** 605 **109:** 266, 594 n. 9 **124:** 605 **127:** 614 **129–30:** 610 **134:** 609 **143:** 614 **149–52:** 607 **153:** 614 **160–66:** 614 **188–90:** 610 **203, 205:** 615 **208, 213, 227–34:** 615 **228:** 611 **244–45:** 610 **247–48:** 616 **247–92:** 191 **250–51, 250–509:** 616 **254–62:** 598 **264, 266:** 611 **267–68:** 616 **268:** 610 **293–95:** 616, 617 **294–95:** 614 **298–304:** 598 **314–57:** 611 **332:** 190 **333:** 595, 611 **335:** 595–96 **360:** 611 **362–63, 365–74, 379, 380–81:** 617 **382–96:** 614 **396:** 609 **404:** 611 **414:** 610 **421:** 609 **423–24:** 191 **436:** 610 **481:** 616 **482–83, 487:** 610 **490:** 611 **497:** 616 **504:** 609 **506–9:** 616 **515–17:** 135 n. 7 **551–59:** 594–95 **552, 558, 560, 575–94:** 593 **623–26:** 592 **631:** 610 **632:** 609 **683:** 611 **685:** 610 **694–745:** 603, 604 n. 8 **699, 711, 712, 713–15:** 604 **725:** 609 **734:** 617 **782, 792:** 609 **800, 815:** 605 **830:** 596, 598, 598 n. 24 **838, 846:** 609 **854–55:** 610 **862:** 606 **868–69:** 607 **869–72:** 606 **870–72:** 607–8 **876:** 592 **908:** 609 **969–72:** 595 **1064–66:** 592 **1131–44:** 610 **1160:** 611 **1214–1302:** 610 **1284:** 611 **1381–82:** 606 **1436, 1440:** 609 **1454–55:** 614 **1503:** 609 *Pax* **605–9:** 131 **752–58:** 594 **1031:** 190 n. 23 **1032:** 189 n. 20 **1043–1126:** 188 **1045–47:** 189 n. 20 **1045–1121:** 186 n. 16 **1052–1126:** 189 n. 20 **1087, 1117–24:** 189 *Pl.* **290:** 596 **32–55:** 187 *Th.* **410–27:** 179 n. 1 *V.* **44–48:** 606 n. 26 **50–53:** 188 n. 19, 189 **288–90:** 71 n. 1 **373–80:** 598 **378:** 598 n. 23 **380:** 190, 598 **518–62, 575–94:** 592 **891–1008:** 190 **1019:** 188 n. 19 **1030–35:** 594 **1036:** 372 n. 2 **1037–47:** 591 **1269:** 266 **1456–58:** 136
Aristotle *APo.* **100a8:** 126 *Ath. Pol.* **2.2:** 283, 284, 285 **2–4:** 297 **2–5:** 271 **3:** 273, 281, 284, 285, 286 **3.1:** 272, 273 n. 14, 274, 278, 284, 285 **3.3:** 285 **3.4:** 308 **3.5:** 329 **3.6:** 270 , 271 **3–4:** 276, 277, 278, 283 **4:** 269–286, 295, 309 **4.1:** 277, 278, 284, 285 **4.2:** 270, 276, 283, 286, 297 **4.3:** 272, 275 **4.4:** 270, 271, 296, 515 n. 26 **5.1:** 278, 279 **5.2:** 7 n. 14 **7.1:** 278, 281, 290, 307 n. 11 **7.3:** 272, 273 n. 14, 275, 278 **8.1:** 273, 274 n. 21, 278 **8.2:** 270 **8.3:** 273 **8.4:** 273, 291 **8.5:** 311, 311 n. 22 **9:** 210 **9.1:** 281, 292 **9.1–2:** 207–8 **9.2:** 298 **10:** 273 **10.1–2:** 301 **13.1–2:** 273 **13.3, 14.3:** 282 **15.2:** 273 **15.5, 16.2:** 282 **16.10:** 305–19 **18.1–2:** 273 **18.2–4:** 131 n. 23 **21:** 278 **21.2:** 283 **22.1:** 282 **22.4:** 317 n. 38 **22.5:** 273, 283 **23.1:** 282, 515 n. 26 **25.1:** 282 **25.2:** 282, 515 n. 26 **25.3–4:** 273 **26.1:** 282 **26.3:** 283 **27.4:** 273, 610 n. 53 **28.1:** 282 **28.2, 28.5, 29.1, 29.5:** 282 **29.5:** 297 **30:** 210 **30.2:** 296, 593 n. 5 **30.6:** 296 **30–31:** 278 n. 32 **31.1, 32.2, 33.1:** 282 **33.1–2:** 296 **35.2:** 208–9, 272, 294 n. 16, 297 **36.1, 41.1:** 283 **41.2:** 272, 273 n. 14

**41.2:** 78 n. 19 , 274, 275, 282, 284, 285, 297 n. 21 **46.1, 51.3:** 273 **53:** 7 **53.2:** 329 **54.7:** 273 **55.3:** 9 n. 23 **56.6:** 454 **57.3:** 293 **57.4:** 175–76 **58.1:** 131 n. 23, 140 n. 30 **61.7:** 273
*Cael.* **301b17:** 135 n. 8 *EN* **1160a31–1160b21:** 281 *Mem.* **2:** 484 *EN* **3.1:** 453 **5.10:** 448 **9.1:** 573 **1106b21–23:** 448 **1106b36–1107a2:** 447 **1106b36–1107a2:** 455 n. 24 **1109b30–1111a21, 1110b25–27, 1111a22–24:** 453 **1133a18–b29:** 199 n. 9 **1133a–b:** 199 n. 11 **1137b12, 1137b26, 1137b29, 1137b32:** 448 **1181b7:** 327 **1181b22:** 326 *frr.* (ed. Rose) **7:** 184 n. 12 (ed. Bekker) **36 :** 184 n. 11 *HA* **608a21–608b15:** 130 n. 17 *Metaph.* **982b31–983a3a:** 387 *Po.* **1454a22–24:** 561 **1454a26:** 559 **1456a26:** 560 **1459a21–1459b23:** 486 n. 44 *Pol.* **1252a–b:** 200 n. 12 **253a4, 1253a14–16:** 156 **1256a–1257b:** 198 **1256b7–26:** 157, n. 3 **1256b40–41:** 199 n. 8 **1257a19–25:** 199 n. 10 **1257a31–36:** 198 n. 4 **1257b1–5:** 198 nn. 4, 7 **1258b1–4:** 199 n. 9 **1260a–b:** 137 n. 18 **(3.4):** 451 n. 15 **1260a20–24:** 127 n. 9 **1265a1–2:** 327 **1269b32–39:** 127 n. 10 **1273b32–34:** 327 **1273b35–1274a3:** 274 n. 21 **1273b35–1274a21:** 208, 210 **1274a3–21:** 292 **1274a16–17:** 274 n. 21 **1274b15–16:** 272 **1274b15–16:** 274 **1274b15–16:** 277 **1274b15:** 309 **1274b15–18:** 289–90, 327 **1277a28, 1277b16–18:** 451 n. 15 **1278b8–1279c38:** 279–81 **1281b25–34:** 274 n. 21 **1286a2–7:** 327 **1286b11–13, 1287a1–9:** 274 n. 19 **1288a12–15:** 281 **1289a13–25:** 327 **1289a15–18:** 279 **1290a32–37:** 284 **1290b1–7, 1291b15–28, 1291b39–41:** 281 **1292a32:** 326 **1292b12–21:** 326 **1292b22–1293a10:** 281 **1293b1–7, 1294a9–11:** 280 **1297b1–26:** 283 **1297b16–22:** 286 **1298a17–18:** 327 **1299b6–7, 1299b24–25:** 280 **1309a15–21:** 203 n. 31 **1311a37–1312b20:** 131 n. 23 **1318b6–1320b17:** 281 **1321a12–13:** 283 **1325b20:** 329 **1398b11:** 290, 622 n. 11 **1402a23:** 611 n. 55 *Pr.* **19.15:** 560 **922b26:** 558 n. 4 *Rh.*.**3.12:** 566 n. 36 **1369b19:** 135 n. 8 **1370a3:** 135 **1374a26–b22:** 448 **1374a31–33:** 454 n. 21 **1395a:** 103 **1418a21–29:** 85 n. 8 *PA* **3.7.670a24:** 429 n. 11
Aristoxenus *frr.* (ed. Wehrli) **127a = *PMG* 738:** 599
Athenaeus **6e–7a :** 628 n. 25 **146f:** 596 **173e:** 439 n. 16 **219b:** 608 n. 38 **219e:** 608 n. 37, 612 n. 65 **226d:** 186 n. 16 **296d:** 445 n. 28 **344e:** 190 n. 22 **428f:** 626 **476:** 337 n. 34 **491c:** 596 **533d–e:** 445 n. 28 **534b:** 606 n. 20 **552b:** 640 n. 33 **585e:** 191 n. 25 **589d:** 611 n. 63 **590e, 591a:** 191 n. 25 **597b:** 625 **599c:** 627 **600f:** 626
Athanagoras *Contra gent.* (ed. Thomson) **41:** 382 n. 13 *De incarn. verb.* (ed. Kannengiesser) **3.3.2:** 382 n. 13
Antiphanes *frr.* (ed. Kock) **204:** 203 n. 31 **159:** 186 n. 16
Augustine *Comm.in Ep. ad Gal.* **3.5 = *PL* 26.445:** 382 n. 14 *De nat. dei* **11.21:** 382 n. 13
Aulus Gellius *NA praef.* **12:** 451 n. 14 **1.3.1–8, 1.3.20:** 450 n. 12 **1.3.21–22:** 450 n. 11 **1.3.23–26:** 450 **1.3.24:** 450 n. 12 **1.3.28:** 450 **1.3:** 449 **15.23:** 73

Bacchylides **9.44:** 7 n. 12
Basil *De invid.* **1 = *PG* 29.9,** *Hom. in hexam.* (ed. Naldini) **1.2.7 = *PG* 44.1148:** 382 n. 13
Boethius *Consol.* **9 *carm.* 9:** 382 n. 13

Callimachus (ed. Pfeiffer) *Epigr.* **46:** 628 n. 25 *frr.* **1.23–24:** 640 n. 31 **29–30:** 640 **43.74:** 231 n. 22 **64:** 624 **193.39:** 637 n. 20 **194:** 635 **4 Dieg.**

Callimachus *frr.* (continued) **7.1–18:** 636 **429:** 621 n. 8 **454:** 592 *Hymns* **1.52:** 638 n. 23
Catullus **95.10:** 640 n. 33
*Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (ed. Allen) **302–15:** 624 n. 17
Chamaeleon *frr.* (ed. Wehrli) **25:** 626 **26:** 627 **40:** 626
Cicero *Arch.* **8:** 620 n. 5 *Att.* **6.2.4:** 327 n. 17 *Brut.* **82, 94, 137:** 641 *De orat.* **1.197:** 289 *Rep.* **2.1.2:** 271 *Tusc.* **2.23:** 518 n. 6
Clement of Alexandria *Protr.* **2:** 188 n. 19 *Strom.* **1.16.79–80:** 289 **5.4.19.2:** 386 n. 21 **5.4.24.2:** 386 n. 21 **5.4.30.5:** 386 n. 21 **7.2.7.2:** 386 n. 21 **7.7.49.4:** 386 n. 21
Columella **6** ***praef.*** **7:** 157
Conon *FGrH* **26 T 29:** 437
Corinna *PMG* **654–55:** 635 **655:** 639 **655.4–5:** 640 **664:** 634 **664:** 635
Craterus *FGrH* **342 F 16:** 596
Cratinus *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **70:** 210 n. 6 **128:** 304 **258:** 611 n. 62 **300:** 288 **300:** 291 n. 4 **300:** 304 **128–42:** 291 n. 4
Critias *frr.* (ed. West) **5:** 300 n. 26

Damascius *Vita Isidori* (ed. Zintzen) **100:** 380 n. 6
Demades *frr.* (ed. de Falco) **23:** 290
Demetrius of Phalerum *frr.* (ed. Wehrli) **136:** 203 n. 31
Democritus *frr.* (edd. Diels and Kranz) **68 A 33:** 4 n. 3 **B 18, 21:** 373 n. 3 **C 6:** 429 n. 11
Demosthenes **1.8–9:** 203 n. 31 **1.70:** 205 n. 44 **1.118:** 206 n. 48 **5.8:** 204 n. 36 **9.43–44:** 307 n. 9 **18.258–60:** 186 n. 16 **18.278–79:** 384 n. 20 **19.249:** 186 n. 16 **19.281:** 186 n. 16, 191 n. 25 **20.139–41:** 384 n. 20 **20.157–58:** 292 **20.158:** 289 **20.158:** 290 **20.158:** 309 **20.158:** 314 n. 32 **21.113:** 317 n. 36 **21.157:** 256 n. 4 **23.22** 292 n. 12, 293–94 **23.28** 292 n. 12, 294, 312 n. 26, 314 **23.28–31:** 292 **23.37** 292 n. 8, n. 12, 312 n. 26 **23.37–40:** 292 **23.44** 292 n. 12, 294 **23.51:** 292 n. 12, 294, 315 **23.53:** 292 n. 12, 316 n. 35 **23.60** 292 n. 12, 294, 312 n. 24 **23.62** 292 n. 12, 294, 315, 317 n. 36 **23.86:** 292 n. 12 **23.111:** 256 **24.197–98:** 203 n. 31 **24.211:** 288 **25.15:** 136 **25.79–80:** 191 n. 25 **27.11:** 203 n. 32 **28.3:** 205 n. 42 **28.7:** 204 n. 37 **36.11:** 201 n. 22 **36.50–51:** 202 n. 24 **36.57:** 200 n. 17 **38.7:** 206, n. 48 **38.26:** 203 n. 31 **42.5:** 206 **43.5:** 204 n. 37 **43.57:** 176, 314 n. 31 **43.79–80:** 576 n. 12 **45.30:** 205 n. 41 **45.64–66:** 204 **45.66:** 205 n. 42 **47.35–42:** 137 n. 18 **47.54:** 203 n. 31 **47.72:** 176 **48.12:** 205 n. 41 **50.8–9:** 203 n. 31 **52.26:** 203 n. 31 **54.7:** 202 n. 25 **55.13:** 228–29 **60:** 139 n. 23
Deuteronomy **5.14 [D]:** 158 **12–18:** 161 n. 18 **12.23 [D]:** 161 **14.3, 21:** 169 **14.21b [D]:** 158 **21.1–9:** 167 **22.4, 6–7 [D]:** 158 **22.8:** 168 n. 43 **25.4 [D]:** 158
Didymus [*In Demosthenem*] *FGrH* **72 F 11:** 256 n. 5
Dinarchus **1.71:** 297
Dio Chrysostom **80.3:** 289
Dio of Prusa *Or.* **36.22:** 387, 390
Diodorus Siculus **4.57–58:** 49 n. 56 **12.38:** 606 n. 24, 610 n. 52 **12.38.2:** 608 n. 42 **13.6:** 597 **13.35.3:** 209 n. 4 **13.47.7, 13.52.5, 13.64.4:** 203 n. 31 **16.92.2–3:** 188 n. 19
Diogenes Laertius **1.41–42:** 291 n. 5 **1.55:** 289, 307 n. 11 **2.57:** 123 **3.23:** 436 n. 3 **5.44–47:** 451 **5.5.76:** 356 n. 6 **6.4:** 186 n. 16 **6.16:** 300 n. 26 **7.10–12:** 351 n. 52 **9.1:** 607 n. 29
Dionysius of Halicarnassus **20.13:** 139 n. 26 *Comp.* **22:** 641 n. 34
Diphilus *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **125:** 194 n. 29

Ephorus *FGrH* **70 F 196:** 131

*Epigrammata Graeca* (ed. Kaibel) **860.4:** 620 n. 5
Eratosthenes *FGrH* **241 F 19:** 593 n. 7 *frr.* (ed. Powell) **17:** 631 n. 30
Euphorion *frr.* (ed. Powell) **22, 22b:** 630 n. 30
Eupolis *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) *Baptai* **89:** 592, 594 **50:** 266 **100, 110, 115:** 609 n. 43 **99–146:** 257 *Poleis* **T 3:** 593 **241:** 189 n. 20
Euripides *Alc.* **629–32, 730:** 588 **966–71:** 186 n. 17 *Ba.* **29–30, 216, 218, 234, 245:** 186 **248, 255–57, 262, 286, 299, 305, 335, 1060:** 187 *Cyc.* **646:** 186 n. 17 *El.* **341–44:** 137 n. 18 **737–46:** 562 n. 18 **1249–92, 1325–26:** 588 *frr.* (ed. Nauck) **282.23–28:** 538 **541:** 544 n. 15 **910:** 4 n. 3 *Hel.* **744–56:** 187 *HF* **1214–34:** 531 **1358–64:** 579 **1360–64, 1389–93, 1419:** 580 **1419:** 580 n. 18 **1420–21:** 580 **1422:** 580 n. 18 *Hipp.* **1038:** 186 *IA* **520–21:** 187 *Med.* **1363–66:** 579 **1377–84:** 577 **1394, 1405–14:** 578 **1437–38:** 589 **1442:** 589 *Or.* **402:** 579 n. 17 **1376, 1495–98:** 182 *Ph.* **1183:** 544 *Supp.* **1165–76:** 9 n. 22 *Tr.* **643–55:** 137 n. 18
Eusebius *PE* **10.7.17:** 289
Eustathius *Comm. in Hom. Il.* (ed. Van der Valk) **p. 316.44–46, p. 1004.13–14:** 289
Eutropius *Brev.* **17.23.5:** 359 n. 22
Exodus **4:** 430 **10.2–3:** 245 n. 36 **13.13:** 167 n. 38 **20.10 [P]:** 158 **20.21–23.33:** 161 n. 18 **21–24:** 162 **21.1–32:** 162 **21.28–32:** 163 **21.29:** 168 **21.35–36:** 163 **21.35:** 165 **22.1–2:** 166 n. 30 **22.30:** 169 **23.5, 23.19b [P]:** 158
Ezekiel **38:** 245 n. 36

Galen *De. plac. Hipp.* (ed. Kühn) **2.30:** 430 n. 12 *Libr. Ord.* **92.11–93.16:** 601 n. 29 *UP* (ed. Helmreich) **4.2.1–2:** 382 n. 13
Genesis **1.26 [P]:** 158 **1.29–30 [P]:** 160 **2.18 []:** 158 **3.18 []:** 160 **4.4 []:** 160 n. 15 **6.1–4 [], 6.7:** 159 **8.20–22 [], 9.1–7 [P]:** 160 **9.4–5:** 161 **9.5:** 165, 168
Gregory of Nyssa *De orat. domin.* **5=*PG* 44.1148:** 382 n. 13

Harpocration s.v. **ἀφανὴς οὐσία καὶ φανερά:** 204 n. 36
Herodotus **1.1–5.3:** 24 **1.1–4:** 10, 24 **1.1:** 3 **1.1–4:** 50 n. 59 **1.1.1, 1.1.3:** 25 **1.5.3–4:** 24 **1.5.3:** 10, 12 n. 33 **1.5.4:** 27, 70 **1.6.2:** 41 n. 13 **1.7:** 50 n. 58 **1.8–13:** 48 n. 51 **1.8–14:** 61 **1.8.2:** 21 **1.9.1:** 59 n. 8 **1.11.2:** 61 **1.20–23, 1.21.2:** 59 n. 8 **1.21.2:** 60, 60 n. 9 **1.24.7:** 12 n. 34 **1.30:** 222 **1.32.9:** 65 n. 18 **1.34–45:** 48 n. 51 **1.51:** 57 **1.53.3:** 41 n. 13 **1.56:** 49, 49 n. 56 **1.56.1–2:** 41 n. 13 **1.56.1:** 12 n. 34 **1.59:** 282 **1.59.6:** 40 n. 3 **1.60:** 185 n. 13 **1.61.1:** 40 n. 3 **1.61:** 48 n. 52 **1.61.2:** 12 n. 34 **1.62.4–63.1:** 184 **1.65:** 42, 49 **1.65.2–4:** 42 n. 15 **1.65.3:** 52 n. 66 **1.66–67:** 42 nn. 14, 15 **1.68–69:** 51 n. 62 **1.68:** 42 n. 15 **1.69:** 41 n. 13 **1.75:** 40 n. 6 **1.95.1:** 12 n. 33 **1.96:** 47 n. 43 **1.98.5:** 66 n. 22 **1.99:** 40 n. 7 **1.101, 1.107.1:** 184 **1.109.2:** 12 n. 31 **1.120.1:** 184 **1.122.1:** 12 n. 34 **1.123.3–4:** 48 n. 49 **1.124.1:** 22 **1.129.1:** 44 n. 28 **1.132.3:** 184 **1.139:** 12 n. 33 **1.141.4:** 41 n. 13 **1.142–43, 1.146–47:** 66 n. 20 **1.152–53.2:** 41 n. 13 **1.171.6:** 23 n. 23 **1.184:** 24 n. 24 **1.189:** 40 n. 6 **1.204:** 40 n. 7 **1.207:** 26 **2.1.1:** 25 **2.5:** 23 **2.15.1, 2.16.1:** 23 n. 23 **2.16.3:** 24 n. 24 **2.18.1** 23 n. 23 **2.19:27:** 11 **2.19:** 4 **2.19.3:** 11 nn. 28–29 **2.20.1:** 12 n. 33 **2.22.1:** 12 n. 33 **2.24.1:** 11 n. 30 **2.24.2:** 11 **2.29:** 22 **2.34.1:** 12 n. 33 **2.51:** 11 n. 29 **2.91:** 49 n. 57 **2.99:** 22, 26 **2.99.1:** 11 n. 28, 12 n. 33 **2.100.3:** 59 n. 8

Herodotus (continued) **2.100.3:** 60 n. 9 **2.101.1:** 26 **2.111:** 40 n. 6, 46 n. 40 **2.113–20:** 11 **2.113–15:** 50 n. 59 **2.113.1:** 11, 11 n. 28 **2.115.3:** 12 n. 33 **2.118–20:** 50 n. 59 **2.120.1:** 10 n. 25, 12 n. 31 **2.120.5:** 12 n. 32, 15 n. 46 **2.121:** 48 n. 52, 59 n. 8 **2.126:** 48 n. 52 **2.131:** 57 **2.134:** 57 **2.142.1:** 23 n. 23 **2.143.3–4:** 23 **2.143.3, 2.144.1:** 23 n. 23 **2.148.2:** 26 **2.148.6:** 11 n. 29 **2.160.4:** 12 n. 31 **2.162.1:** 59 **2.172:** 58 n. 7 **2.172.2–3:** 59 **2.172.2:** 59 n. 8 **2.177.2:** 289 **3.2:** 69 n. 25 **3.3:** 13 **3.9.2:** 13 n. 36 **3.16:** 45 n. 32 **3.16.5–67:** 69 n. 25 **3.21.3:** 58 **3.27–29:** 45 n. 32 **3.27–29.2:** 40 n. 7 **3.29:** 14 n. 39, 40 n. 6, 45 n. 32 **3.30.1:** 45 n. 32 **3.31:** 48 n. 52 **3.32:** 14 n. 40 **3.33:** 14 **3.35:** 14 n. 39, 40 n. 7 **3.36.6:** 65 n. 17 **3.37:** 40 n. 6, 45 n. 32 **3.38.1:** 14 n. 39 **3.43:** 59 **3.45:** 46 n. 40 **3.48.3:** 327 n. 15 **3.50–51:** 4 **3.50:** 48 n. 52 **3.53:** 47 n. 43 **3.57:** 437 n. 4 **3.64.3:** 41 n. 9 **3.66.1:** 14 n. 39 **3.67:** 44 n. 24 **3.80:** 39 **3.80.1–6:** 54 n. 76 **3.80.3:** 43 **3.80.4:** 53 n. 68 **3.82:** 40 n. 3 **3.83.1:** 12 n. 31 **3.85–87:** 59 n. 8 **3.89.3:** 65 **3.105:** 13 **3.111:** 13 **3.122.4:** 23 n. 23 **3.132.2:** 193 n. 28 **3.148:** 45 n. 37 **3.148.2:** 45 n. 36, 58 **3.154:** 60 **3.157.1:** 60 **4.5:** 14 n. 41 **4.8–10:** 50 n. 58 **4.8.2:** 23 n. 23 **4.11–14:** 245 n. 36 **4.11.1:** 10 n. 25 **4.13.1:** 22 **4.15:** 14 n. 41 **4.20.5:** 12 n. 32 **4.25, 4.29–31, 4.42, 4.45:** 14 n. 41 **4.64.1:** 12 n. 33 **4.81.1–6:** 55–56 **4.82:** 12 n. 33 **4.84.2:** 65 n. 17 **4.87:** 14 n. 41 **4.91:** 22 **4.94–96:** 185 n. 15 **4.98:** 66 n. 19 **4.131.1:** 58 **4.131.2:** 59 n. 8 **4.136:** 66 **4.137.1:** 337 n. 31 **4.137.2:** 66 **4.140:** 14 n. 41 **4.142:** 66, 66 n. 22 **4.147.3:** 44 n. 28 **4.155.1:** 10 n. 25 **4.159–67:** 41 n. 10 **4.161:** 8 n. 16 **4.162.2:** 43 n. 21 **4.162.5:** 58 **4.163:** 215 n. 4 **4.164:** 46 n. 40 **4.165.1:** 43 n. 21 **4.188–89:** 14 n. 41 **4.192.3:** 4, 12 n. 33 **4.195:** 13 **4.195.2:** 13 **4.200–5:** 41 n. 10 **4.201:** 64 **4.201.1:** 59 n. 8 **4.201.2:** 60 **4.205:** 14 nn. 41–42, 64 **5.9–10:** 14 n. 41 **5.12.1:** 64 **5.18–22:** 41 n. 10 **5.20.3:** 60 **5.21.2:** 59 n. 8 **5.22:** 14 n. 41 **5.28–29:** 7 n. 11 **5.28:** 8 n. 16 **5.30.1:** 12 n. 33 **5.32:** 47 **5.35.3–4:** 48 n. 49 **5.36.4:** 24 n. 24 **5.39–41:** 48 **5.39.1:** 45 n. 33 **5.39.2:** 25, 45 n. 33 **5.40:** 41 n. 11 **5.40.2:** 48 n. 53 **5.41:** 48 n. 54 **5.42:** 45 n. 32 **5.42.1:** 48 n. 54 **5.42.2:** 44 n. 28 **5.44.2:** 193 n. 28 **5.45.1–2:** 23 **5.47:** 47 n. 46 **5.49:** 59 n. 8 **5.49.1:** 45 n. 34, 64 **5.49.7:** 45 n. 37 **5.50–51:** 45 n. 37 **5.50.2:** 59 n. 8, 64 **5.51.2:** 58 n. 7 **5.52:** 12 n. 33 **5.56:** 184 **5.57:** 14 n. 41, 50 n. 59 **5.58–59:** 50 n. 59 **5.58.2:** 11 n. 29 **5.59:** 14 n. 41 **5.62.1:** 12 n. 33 **5.63:** 42 n. 15 **5.63.1–2:** 42 n. 15 **5.66–67:** 14 n. 41 **5.66.1:** 50 n. 59 **5.69:** 14 n. 41 **5.70:** 45 n. 35 **5.70.1:** 48 **5.71:** 47 n. 46, 306 **5.72:** 45 n. 35 49 **5.72.3:** 46 **5.73:** 14 n. 41 **5.74.1:** 45 n. 35 **5.75:** 41 n. 11 **5.75.1:** 45 n. 32 **5.75.2:** 51 **5.77.1:** 53 n. 73 **5.77.3:** 57 **5.77:** 222 n. 26 **5.78:** 14 n. 42 **5.82–88:** 300 **5.86:** 10 n. 25 **5.90.2:** 46, 184 n. 12, 185 n. 13 **5.92 α 1–2:** 41 n. 13 **5.92 α 1:** 40 n. 8 **5.92 β 2:** 41 n. 10 **5.92 ζ–η:** 59 n. 8 **5.92 η:** 46 n. 40 **5.92 η 3:** 48 n. 52 **5.93:** 184 **5.93.1:** 185 n. 13 **5.95.2:** 8 n. 16 **5.98:** 65 **6.27:** 69 **6.27.1:** 14 n. 42 **6.34–38:** 331 **6.36:** 47 n. 46 **6.36.1:** 333, 337 **6.37.1:** 333 n. 11 **6.38.1:** 337 n. 31 **6.39.2:** 337, 337 n. 31 **6.39.2:** 338 **6.40:** 338 **6.50:** 45 n. 35 **6.51:** 51 **6.52:** 42 n. 15, 50 **6.52.2, 6.52.4–7, 6.52.8:** 51 **6.53:** 49 n. 57 **6.54:** 49 n. 57 **6.56–59:** 43 **6.56.1:** 50 **6.57.2–5:** 43 **6.58–59:** 43, 49 n. 57 **6.58.1:** 44 **6.58.2:** 43–44 **6.58.3:** 44, 44 n. 26, 45 n. 31 **6.59** 44 **6.60:** 49 n. 57 **6.61.1:** 45 n. 36, 47 **6.61.2–4:** 52 **6.61.2:** 45 n. 35 **6.62:** 52 **6.63–66:**

41 n. 11 **6.64–66:** 52 **6.65–66:** 41 n. 11, 45 n. 35 **6.65:** 52 **6.65.2–3:** 46 **6.66:** 42 n. 15 **6.66.2–3:** 46 **6.67.2:** 44 n. 28 **6.68:** 52 **6.69:** 52 **6.70.1–3:** 47 **6.72:** 41 n. 11, 46, 46 n. 41 **6.73:** 41 n. 11 **6.73.3:** 46 **6.74:** 45 n. 35 **6.75.1:** 46 **6.76:** 42 n. 15, 46 **6.79:** 46 **6.81:** 46 **6.82:** 41 n. 11, 46 **6.86:** 46 **6.86 δ:** 46 n. 41 **6.87–93:** 302 **6.101:** 40 n. 6 **6.103:** 47 n. 46 **6.103.4:** 337 n. 31 **6.104.2:** 332 n. 7 **6.106:** 42 n. 15 **6.107:** 184 **6.109.6:** 12 n. 31 **6.122:** 47 n. 46 **6.125–26:** 47 n. 46 **6.132–36:** 332 n. 7 **6.133–36:** 41 n. 9 **6.137.1:** 22 **7.3:** 47 n. 48 **7.6.3–4:** 46 n. 39 **7.6.3:** 185 **7.8 γ 1:** 40 n. 7, 51, 65 n. 17 **7.8 γ 2:** 45 n. 37 **7.11.4:** 51 **7.19.1:** 184 **7.26:** 14 n. 43 **7.33:** 67 n. 23 **7.34–35:** 40 n. 6 **7.37:** 184 **7.37.2:** 184 **7.38–39:** 65 n. 17 **7.43:** 184 **7.43.2:** 184 **7.54.3:** 12 n. 33 **7.56:** 40 n. 7 **7.61.3** 50 n. 58 **7.71:** 526 n. 6 **7.96.1:** 14 nn. 43, 44 **7.99:** 14 n. 43 **7.102.1:** 42 n. 18 **7.102.1–2:** 42 n. 18 **7.104.4–5:** 42 n. 17 **7.114.1:** 184 **7.134–36:** 42 n. 17 **7.136.2:** 54 n. 76 **7.139:** 15, 42 n. 15 **7.141:** 534 n. 37 **7.142–43:** 185 **7.143:** 59 n. 8 **7.149.2:** 41 n. 10 **7.150.1–2:** 50 n. 58 **7.152:** 11 n. 30 **7.159:** 51 n. 62 **7.191.2:** 184 **7.191:** 184 **7.193.2:** 53 n. 70 **7.198.2:** 53 n. 70 **7.204:** 53 n. 70 **7.205.1:** 44 n. 29 **7.206:** 42 n. 15 **7.208.1:** 53 n. 70 **7.208–33:** 42 n. 17 **7.209.4:** 43 n. 20 **7.211.3:** 12 n. 33 **7.214:** 14 n. 43 **7.216:** 53 n. 70 **7.220:** 42 n. 15 **7.220.1:** 45 **7.220.2:** 53, 53 n. 74 **7.220.3–4:** 45 n. 31 **7.220.4:** 53, 53 n. 70 **7.223–25:** 53 **7.225.1:** 53 n. 72 **7.226–27:** 14 n. 43 **7.228.2:** 42 n. 17 **7.235:** 47 n. 48 **7.237.2:** 384 n. 20 **7.238:** 68 **7.239:** 48, 59 n. 8 **7.239.1:** 12 n. 33 **7.239.4:** 58 n. 7 **8.3.2:** 47 **8.33:** 67 n. 23 **8.35.2:** 23 n. 23 **8.53:** 40 n. 6 **8.53.2:** 68 **8.77.1:** 12 n. 33 **8.93:** 14 n. 43 **8.94:** 10 n. 24 **8.96:** 184 **8.102:** 44 n. 27 **8.104:** 62 **8.105–6:** 54 n. 76 **8.106.3:** 59 n. 8 **8.114:** 42 n. 15 **8.118–21:** 10 n. 24 **8.118.1:** 10 **8.119.1:** 10 **8.140 α 2:** 323 **9.26:** 49 n. 56 **9.27:** 49 n. 56 **9.43:** 184 **9.64.1:** 46 **9.71, 9.73–74:** 14 n. 43 **9.76:** 47 n. 42 **9.76.1:** 67 **9.78–79:** 47 n. 42 **9.78:** 46 **9.78.2** 53 n. 73 **9.79.1:** 68 **9.79.2:** 46 **9.80.3:** 23 n. 23 **9.82:** 47 n. 42, 67 **9.85:** 57 **9.95:** 14 n. 43, 183 n. 8 **9.108–13:** 48 n. 52 **9.109–13:** 59 **9.115:** 333 n. 14 **9.116.3:** 67 n. 23 **9.118.2, 9.120.1:** 337 n. 31 **9.120.4:** 54 n. 76, 67

Hecataeus *FGrH* **1 F 301:** 23 n. 20

*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* **6.1–7.2:** 122 n. 16

Hephaestion *Ench.* **16.3 (p. 56 Consbruch):** 635 n. 6

Heraclitus (edd. Diels and Kranz) *frr.* **22 B 35:** 4 n. 3 **42, 56–57:** 373 n. 5 **101a:** 21 **129:** 4 n. 3

Hermeias (ed. Couvreur) **92.6–9:** 380 n. 6 **144.1–3:** 386 n. 22 **144.4–8:** 381 n. 12, 389 **192.4–5:** 381 n. 11, 392 **192.5–11:** 381 n. 12 **192.6–9:** 393 **204.11–13:** 381 n. 11 **204.11–16:** 394 **205.23:** 394 **208.8–13:** 381 n. 12 **208.8–12:** 393

Hermeias (continued) **256.8–10:** 381 n. 12, 392 n. 37

Hermesianax (ed. Powell) *frr.* **1:** 624 **4:** 624 **7:** 625 **7.21–26:** 629 **7.21, 23:** 630 **7.29–34:** 628 **7.47–56:** 626 **7.49, 61:** 630 **7.72:** 624 n. 17 **7.73:** 630 **7.75–78:** 624 n. 17, 630 n. 28 **7.75:** 630

Hermippus *FHG* **3.36–37:** 299 n. 25 **3.37–38, 8:** 291 n. 5 *frr.* (ed. Wehrli) **6:** 291 n. 5 **43:** 598 n. 22

Hermogenes *Id.* (ed. Rabe) **243, 247:** 382 n. 13 **1.8–12:** 138 **3.38:** 128 **5.43:** 148 **7.143–44:** 146 **7.158.4:** 121 **8.3:** 148 **8.5:** 147–48 **8.57–58:** 146 n. 7 **8.58:** 146–47 **8.62, 8.79–80:** 147 **8.110:** 148 n. 11 **8.111, 9.79, 9.81–82, 9.88, 9.120:** 148

Hesiod *frr.* (edd. Merkelbach and West) **190.6–8:** 51 n. 62 *Op.* **639–40:** 630 **650:** 631 **699–701:** 137 n. 18 **792:** 7 n. 12 *Th.* **27–28:** 182 **477–91:** 638 n. 23 **535:** 174 **556–57:** 174
Hieronymus *Chron.* (ed. Helm) **p. 115:** 73
Himerius *Or.* (ed. Colonna) **1.59:** 288
Hippocrates *Art.* **42:** 194 n. 29 *Art.* **44:** 194 n. 29 *De arte* **1:** 4 n. 3 *Morb. sacr.* **1–2:** 194 **4:** 194 **21:** 194 *Virg.* **8:** 194 n. 29 **22:** 194 n. 29 *Praec.* **13:** 4 n. 3 *VM* **20:** 4 n. 3
Homer *Hymn.* **15.6:** 53 n. 68 **32.2:** 7 n. 12 *Il.* **1.88–89:** 471 **1.106–10:** 182 **1.120:** 473 **1.280–81:** 106 **1.412:** 492, 503 **1.511:** 611 n. 61 **2.111:** 492 **2.678:** 605 n. 19 **2.700:** 49 n. 57 **2.756:** 437 **3.10–14:** 473 **3.23:** 468 **3.109–10:** 474 **5.631:** 611 n. 61 **5.770–72:** 474 **6.356:** 494 n. 12 **6.429–30:** 268 **7.219:** 427 **9.115:** 492, 503 **9.312–14:** 181 **9.502:** 492, 503 **10.314:** 146 n. 6 **11.393:** 49 n. 57 **11.485:** 427 **12.233–43:** 182 **12.310–21:** 43 n. 21 **13.85–88:** 471 **14.139–41:** 472 **15.78–83:** 488 **16.36–39:** 483 **16.69–71, 126–28:** 474 **16.695:** 7 n. 12 **16.805:** 494 n. 12 **16.857:** 460 n. 5 **17.128:** 427 **17.274–87:** 53 n. 72 **17.382–86:** 182 **17.673–76:** 472 **18.8–12:** 482–83 **18.23:** 49 n. 57 **18.49–54:** 483 **18.497–508:** 5–6 **19.78ff:** 502 **19.95–133:** 49 n. 56 **19.270:** 502 n. 28 **19.284–86:** 49 n. 57 **19.301–2:** 574 **20.86:** 492, 503 **20.344–46:** 474 **20.344:** 475 **20.358–80:** 182 **22.363:** 460 n. 5 **23.476–77:** 472 **23.483–87:** 5 **24.6:** 460 n. 5 **24.501–12:** 575 **24:** 573 **24:** 574 n. 5 **24.722–75:** 575 *Od.* **1.10:** 486 **1.63:** 611 n. 61 **1.376–80:** 313 n. 28 **1.415–16:** 182 **2.68–78:** 313 n. 28 **2.178–90:** 182 **3–5:** 181 n. 5 **3.309:** 579 n. 17 **5.84, 158:** 472 **6.164:** 181 **8.492, 500:** 488 **9.67:** 611 n. 61 **9.144–46:** 472 **9.166:** 475 **10.196–97:** 473 **11–16:** 181 n. 5 **11.553–64:** 584 **11.556:** 427 **12.67:** 468 **13–19:** 180 **13.197–299:** 180 **13.254–55:** 181 **13.256–86:** 181 n. 4 **13.291–95:** 181 n. 5 **14.156:** 181 **14.192–352:** 181 n. 4 **14.200–212, 459–512:** 181 **16.438–39:** 471 **17.396, 419–23:** 181 **17.419–44:** 181 n. 4 **17.518:** 473 **19.165–202:** 181 n. 4 **19.194–98:** 181 **19.203:** 181–82 **19.221–48, 262–303:** 181 n. 4 **20.385:** 473 **21.26:** 7 n. 12 **22.330–80:** 629 **23.124–25:** 474 **24.304–26:** 180
Horace *Ars* **148:** 486 **136–37:** 486 n. 43
Hesychius (ed. Latte) s.v ἰδυῖοι (ι **243):** 7 n. 13 s.vv. κλείματα (κ **2899),** κλῆμα (κ **2959),** κλίματα (κ **2996):** 607 (ed. Schmidt) s.v. τρεῖς θεοί (τ **1298):** 289
Hyperides **1.5–6:** 138 **4.21:** 137 n. 12 **5.9:** 205 n. 41 **6:** 139 n. 23 *Eux.* **15:** 329 *frr.* **134:** 203 n. 31

Irenaeus *Adv. haer.* 382 n. 13
Isaeus **3.30–32:** 256 **4.4:** 256 **4.19:** 576 n. 12 **4.27:** 203 n. 31 **5.21:** 202 n. 25 **5.43:** 202 n. 25 **6.60–61:** 203 n. 31 **7.40:** 203 n. 31 **8.21–24:** 576 n. 12 **8.35:** 206 **9.42:** 200 n. 14 **11.42–43:** 205 n. 41 **11.47:** 204 n. 37 **11.47:** 205 n. 42
Isocrates **2.3:** 326 **2.43:** 299 **4.25:** 256 **7.76:** 135 nn. 7–8 **8.128:** 203 n. 31 **12.145:** 203 n. 31 **12.148:** 284 n. 37 **16.31:** 605 n. 17 **16.33:** 605 n. 18 **17.2:** 202 n. 25 **17.2:** 206 n. 50 **17.6:** 202 n. 25 **17.7:** 205 n. 42 **17.7:** 206 n. 50 **17.11:** 205 n. 41 **17.12, 17.33:** 202 n. 25 **17.41:** 205 n. 42 **17:** 204 **18.9:** 137 n. 12 **19.5–7:** 183 n. 8 **19.13:** 326 **19.45:** 183 n. 8

Joannes Chrysostomos *De virg.* **8.22–23:** 382 n. 13

John **8:** 432 n. 16 **34:** 432 n. 16
Josephus *AJ* **18.65–80:** 357 n. 14 *Ap.* **1.21:** 289 *BJ* **7.123:** 358 n. 18
Justinian *Digesta* **1.3.3, 1.3.6** 448 **5.4.3:** 448 n. 7
Justin Martyr *Ap.* **1.10.2:** 382 n. 13 **3.4:** 231 n. 23
Juvenal **6.522–31:** 357 n. 14

*Laws of Eshnunna* **53–54, 56:** 164
*Laws of Hammurapi* **250–52:** 164
Leander *frr.* **92:** 623
Leviticus **4.3:** 170 **4.3 [P]:** 161 **4.11–13, 4.20–21, 6.17–23:** 170 **11.4–8, 10–12:** 169 **11.24–28:** 169 **16.22:** 166 **17.6 [P], 17.11 [H], 17.14 [H]:** 161 **22.28 [P]** 158 **24.21 [P]:** 168 n. 45 **39–40:** 169
Libanius **1.71, 1.245–49:** 191 n. 24
Livy **1.43:** 239 n. 16 **1.57–59:** 138 **33.32.5, 33.33.5–7:** 341 n. 9 **33.38.5–7:** 341 n. 6 **34.41.3, 39.37.10:** 341 n. 9
Lucian *Cal.* **8:** 288 *Dem. Enc.* **19:** 638 n. 21 *Prom.* **18:** 386 n. 21
Lycurgus *In Leoc.* **64–66:** 290 **77:** 8 n. 20
Lysias **1.4, 1.29:** 312 n. 25 **1.30:** 294 **1.33:** 179 n. 1 **2:** 139 n. 23 **2.75:** 139 n. 25 **3.6–7:** 137 n. 18 **3.43:** 453, 454 n. 23 **7.4:** 200 n. 14 **7.31–32:** 203 n. 31 **9–10:** 200 n. 14 **12.8:** 200 n. 15 **12.11:** 201 n. 20 **12.20:** 203 n. 31 **12.83:** 205 n. 41 **18.7, 18.21:** 203 n. 31 **19:** 200 n. 15 **19.9:** 203 n. 31 **19.18:** 136 **19.29:** 203 n. 31 **19.31:** 204 n. 37 **19.45:** 203 n. 30 **19.52:** 613 n. 71 **19.57–59:** 203 n. 31 **20.23:** 203 n. 31 **24.20:** 137 n. 12 **25.25–26:** 211 **28.3, 29.4, 30.26:** 203 n. 31 **30.35:** 326 **32.4:** 206 n. 49 **32.5–6:** 206 **32.6:** 201 n. 20 **32.9:** 201 n. 20 **32.23:** 204 n. 37 *frr.* **10 T:** 289 **79:** 204 n. 36, 205 n. 40

Marcellinus *Vita Thuc.* **14:** 71 n. 1 **34:** 72 **24:** 303
Martial **9.29.6:** 362 n. 31
Matthew **5.5:** 431
Maximus Confessor *Loc. comm.* **58** = *PG* **91.977c:** 449 n. 8
Maximus of Tyre **41.3a:** 386 n. 21
Melanthius *FGrH* **326 F 3:** 596
*Metr. Vita Pindari*: 633

Nachmanides *Comm. in Gen.* **9.5:** 166
Nepos *Milt.* **1–2:** 331 n. 3
Nossis (ed. Gow and Page) **11** = *AP* **7.718:** 622 n. 12
Numbers **13.33:** 159 n. 11 **35.19:** 166 **21.8–9:** 431

Origen *Cels.* **8.21:** 386 n. 21

Pamphila Ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά **11:** 73
Pausanias **1.9.8:** 624 n. 17 **1.24.4:** 172 **1.28.10:** 171 **1.3.3:** 284 n. 37 **1.34.4:** 189 n. 20 **3.16.9:** 52 n. 66 **5.26.1:** 331 n. 4 **6.10.8:** 333 **6.19.6:** 331, 331 n. 4, 333–35 **9.22.3:** 633,
Pausanias (continued) 636 **9.36.8:** 298, 312 n. 25
*PG* **44, 1228b–c:** 432 n. 16
Phanias *frr.* (ed. Wehrli) **13:** 628 n. 25
Pherecrates *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **T 3:** 595 n. 14 **55:** 595 **162:** 595 n. 14
Pherecydes *FGrH* **3 F 42:** 331 n. 2, 337 n. 34
Philo *Congr.* **171:** 382 n. 13 *De somn.* (edd. Colson and Whittaker) **1.32:** 430 *Deus* **108:** 382 n. 13 *Fug.* **62:** 386 n. 21 **74:** 386 n. 21 *Lg. all.* **1.131:** 386 n. 21 **2.91–92:** 430 **2.93:** 431 **2.77–79:** 431 n. 14 **3.7:** 386 n. 21 *Migr.* **193:** 382 n. 13 *Opif.* **21:** 382 n. 13 *Plant.* **91:** 382 n. 13 *Praem.* **39:** 386 n. 21 *Prob.* **13:** 386 n. 21 *Prob.* **13.3:** 390 *QG* **1.55:** 382 n. 13 **4.103:** 386 n. 21 **4.107:** 386 n. 21 **4.142:** 386 n. 21 *Spec.* **2.249:** 386 n. 21
Philodemus *Piet.* (ed Gomperz) **85–86:** 599

Philostratus *VS* **1.10:** 184 n. 10
Philoxenos *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **155:** 595 n. 15 *PMG* **816:** 628 n. 25 **830:** 595
Photius *Lexicon* **s.vv. ἀνδραφόνων, ποινᾶν καὶ ἀποινᾶν:** 289
Phrynichus *frr.* **27:** 593–94 **78:** 596
Pindar *frr.* (ed. Snell) **29:** 634, 638, 638 n. 21 **83:** 637 **94d:** 637 n. 16 *N.* **3.1–3:** 300 **4.48:** 231 n. 24 **4.93–95:** 302 **5.8–10:** 300 **6.66–69:** 302 **8.26:** 639 *O.* **4.4–5:** 384 n. 20 **6.89–90:** 637 **8.21–30:** 300 **8.21–32:** 302 **8.54–66:** 302 *P.* **8.1:** 568 **9.36:** 568 *Pae.* **6.123–31:** 300
Plato *Ap.* **18b:** 206 n. 45 **18d9–10:** 261 **19c:** 370 **19d–20c:** 370 **22b9:** 373 n. 6 **22c:** 192 n. 26 **22d7, 23a:** 370 **23d:** 612 n. 67 **28b8, 28e5, 29b6, 29e, 30b2, 31b5, 32b–c, 33a, 38a, 41e:** 369 *Chrm.* **155d–e:** 401 n. 9 **171a:** 374 *Cri.* **44a–b:** 416 n. 35 **45d8, 46b–c, 46b:** 370 **47d1:** 370–71 **48a6, 49a–b:** 370 *Ep.* **7 324c:** 612 n. 67 **328c:** 436 **344b1–8:** 388 *Euthd.* **303a–c:** 190 *Euthphr.* **3b–e:** 195 n. 33 *Grg.* **457c4–457e5:** 388 **462b–465a:** 374 **467–68:** 407 **467d–468c:** 405 **489e–91a:** 607 n. 27 *Ion* **530b:** 371 **530c8:** 376 **530c:** 371 **531d12–532b2:** 376 n. 9 **532c8:** 375 **532e7–533c3:** 376 n. 9 **533b–c:** 377 **534b5–6:** 372 **534c:** 192 n. 26, 375 **536d5:** 372 **537c–538a:** 374–75 **537c5:** 372 **537d2, 537d5:** 372 **540b:** 372, 375 **540d–541d:** 377 **541b:** 378 **541b5:** 372 **542a1:** 373 *La.* **198e–199a:** 192 n. 26 *Lg.* **663a:** 136 n. 11 **702b:** 435 **704a–705c:** 435 **704a:** 436 n. 2 **710a:** 436 n. 2 **711a:** 435 **721b–c:** 403 **739a:** 436 n. 2 **768b:** 310 n. 23 **795b:** 336 n. 24 **807b:** 436 n. 2 **848d:** 435 **848d:** 436 **860e:** 435 n. 1 **873e–874b:** 176 **873e:** 177 n. 75 **874b–c:** 312 n. 25 **909a–d, 910a–b:** 195 n. 32 **919d:** 435 n. 1, 436 **928e, 929d:** 454 **933a–b:** 195 n. 32 **946c:** 435 n. 1 **950a:** 326 **969a:** 435 nn. 1–2 *Ly.* **214–215c1:** 418 **214a–216b:** 406 **214e–215c:** 417 **216c:** 406 **216d:** 419 n. 41 **217a–b:** 406 **220d:** 406 **221b:** 418 **222a:** 418 **222b:** 419 *Men.* **77b–78a:** 407 **80a–b:** 190 **80a–b:** 194 *Mx.* **236d4–249c8:** 139 n. 23 **249b:** 140 **249d:** 399 *Phd.* **59b:** 399 n. 4 **67a:** 402 **68b–69c:** 401 **70d–e:** 404 **82a–d:** 401 **96a8:** 4 n. 3 **100d5:** 401 *Phdr.* **230a7–239b4:** 385 **230e–234c:** 399 **231a2–6, 231b2–5:** 395 **232c3–232d4:** 384 **232d4–7:** 395 **233d4–7:** 384 **234b1:** 395 **235b–c:** 415 **237a, 238c:** 416 **239a7–239c1, 240a4–5, 241c1–6:** 385 **241d–e, 242b–c:** 416 **242e1:** 415 n. 34 **243c1–9:** 385 **243c2–8:** 392 **243c7–8:** 394 **243c:** 420 **244a–245c:** 410 n. 24 **244d–e:** 195 n. 32 **245a:** 414 n. 32, 420 **246b–d5:** 412 **246e4–247a4:** 387 **247a4–7:** 388 **247a6–7:** 386 **247a6:** 388 **247a7:** 381, 386, 389 n. 29, 390 n. 32 **247d3–4:** 389 n. 30 **248a1–2:** 388 **248a1–2:** 389 **248a1–248c9:** 388 **248d:** 420 **249a2:** 420 **249c5–6:** 389 n. 30 **250b:** 417 **251a–e:** 410 n. 25 **252c:** 188 n. 19 **253a:** 415 n. 33 **253b5–253c2:** 391 **253b5–c2:** 386 **253b7–8:** 394 **253b7–253c2:** 392 **253b8–253c2:** 395 **253c–256e:** 413 n. 30 **255b5–7, 255c1–3:** 392 **255c:** 420 n. 43 **255d:** 417 **256b3–7:** 394 **256e1–7:** 391 **256e3–257a2:** 392 **256e3–257a2:** 393 **256e4–257a2:** 392 **256e5–6:** 394 **256e:** 420 **257a–b:** 398 n. 2 **257a:** 416 **257b3–4:** 393 **257b:** 400 n. 6 **257c:** 85 n. 8 **258c:** 412 n. 28 **258e–259d8:** 416 **263a:** 400 **269e–70a:** 611 n. 58 **274d5–6:** 392 n. 37 **275c–d:** 400 **277a:** 403 **278d:** 418 n. 38 *Phlb.* **22c:** 418 n. 38 **24e–26c:** 421 **33b:** 418 n. 38 **48b8–11:** 383 **51b5:** 421 n. 46 **53c–54d:** 421 *Plt.*

**292e9–10, 294a8:** 451 n. 15 **294a10–b6:** 448 n. 5 *Prt.* **309a–c:** 612 n. 65 **309b:** 401 n. 9 **320a:** 608 n. 42 **320c–328d:** 399 **335d:** 608 n. 35 **337:** 104 **338e–f:** 374 **345b:** 418 n. 38 **347c–348a:** 374 **351d:** 405 **353e–354e:** 405 *Rep.* **1:** 400 n. 6 **2.368d–369a:** 427 **3:** 427 **4:** 424 **4.441e:** 428 **4.443d–444b:** 429 **5–7:** 424 **5:** 425 **5.447d:** 374 **8–9:** 423 **8:** 200 n. 15 **8:** 425 **8:** 430–31 **8.550b:** 428–29 **8.560b:** 429 **9.537a–b:** 426 n. 5 **10:** 411 n. 27 **358b:** 194 **364b–365c:** 183 **364b–e:** 195 n. 32 **379a:** 436 n. 2 **415a–b:** 424 n. 2 **427b–c:** 195 n. 32 **433b4:** 387 **445d–e:** 424 **449a:** 425 **475b–480a:** 407 **500b7–500c7:** 388 **511d:** 407 **514–16:** 431 **515e–516a, 518c:** 408 n. 20 **522a, 523b–524c:** 408 **527c:** 435 **531a–b:** 408 **533a:** 410 n. 22 **545d–e:** 424 n. 2 **545d:** 425 **547a, 550c:** 424 n. 2 **550e:** 423 **553d:** 424 **554b–d:** 423 **555b–58c:** 425 **555d–e:** 423 **557b, 559b–c:** 425 **559c–d:** 423 **559e:** 425, 428 **560b, 560c8:** 426 **560e:** 426 **561a:** 425 **561b–c:** 427 **562b:** 427 **564b–c, 565c:** 423 **565d–66a, 572e:** 424 **573a–b:** 424 **573d:** 423 **574a–b, 574e–75a:** 424 **583c:** 407 n. 19, 418 n. 38 **592b:** 435 **599c–e:** 372 n. 2 *Sym.* **172b1, 173b:** 399 n. 4 **177d–e:** 399 n. 5 **180c–185c:** 416 n. 36 **185b:** 402 n. 13 **190e–192c:** 417 n. 37 **192c:** 417 **193a:** 399 n. 3 **194a–c, 198d, 201b–c:** 399 n. 5 **201d–202e:** 404 **201d5:** 399 n. 5 **202e–203a:** 410 n. 24 **202e–203c:** 409 **203a–d:** 410 n. 23 **203a:** 403 **203d:** 403 n. 14 **203d:** 418 n. 38 **205b9:** 414 **205d–206a:** 409 **206a9:** 414 **207d–208b:** 421 **208b:** 412 **209c:** 413 n. 29 **209c:** 414 **209d:** 414 n. 32 **210a–c:** 402 **211c–d:** 415 **211e:** 402 **212a:** 415 n. 33 **212b:** 415 **215c–216a:** 194 **215c1, 215d5:** 410 n. 23 **216a5:** 410 n. 23 **216b:** 413 **216d–e:** 401 **218b:** 410 n. 23 **218b:** 414 **219b:** 608 n. 36 **219e–220e:** 401 **221b:** 617 **221e:** 607 n. 27 **223d:** 375 *Tht.* **148e–151d:** 410 n. 25 **150b:** 413 n. 31 **176b:** 415 n. 33 *Ti.* **27d–29d:** 421 **29d7–30a5:** 393 **29e1–2:** 389 n. 31, 390 **29e1–3:** 381–82, 382 n. 15, 384, 386, 386 n. 23, 389 n. 29 **52b7:** 135 n. 8 **69c–e:** 428 **69c:** 430 **69d–e:** 428 n. 9 **70a:** 428 **70a:** 428 n. 9, 429, 429 n. 11 **70b–d:** 428 **89d7–90d7:** 383 **90a:** 428 n. 7 **90b6–90c6:** 383

Plato Comicus *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **114:** 266 **203:** 592

Plautus *Most.* **133–45, 161–65:** 429 *Trin.* **313–23:** 429

Pliny *Nat.* **29:** 194 n. 30

Plotinus **2.9.17.16–17:** 390 n. 32 **5.4.1:** 382 n. 13 **5.4.1.34–36:** 382 n. 15

Plutarch *Ages.* **3.6–9:** 185 n. 14 *Alc.* **1.1:** 605 n. 16 **1.2:** 608 n. 40 **1.6–7:** 606 n. 26 **1.7–8:** 606 n. 21 **1.118c:** 610 n. 53 **2–4, 7–8:** 257 **7.3:** 606 n. 24 **7.5:** 610 n. 52 **7.6:** 606 n. 22 **8.1:** 613 n. 73 **8.4:** 605 n. 17, 613 n. 74 **11.1–3:** 613 n. 76 **16:** 594 **17:** 193 n. 27 **21.1–6:** 258 **21.1–6:** 260 *Arist.* **11.3:** 232 n. 25 **27:** 188 n. 19 *Comp. Per. Fab.* **3.1:** 615 n. 87 *Flam.* **10.4:** 341 nn. 9–10 **12.2:** 341 nn. 9–10 *Lyc.* **27:** 44 n. 26 *Mor.* **166a:** 193 n. 28 **168a:** 503 **217f:** 138 n. 20 **224e:** 186 n. 16 **235a:** 606 **238d:** 44 n. 26 **242e:** 134 **242f:** 138 n. 22 **347f:** 633 **414e:** 188 n. 19 **573c:** 382 n. 13 **622c:** 628 n. 25 **679e:** 386 n. 21 **763d:** 7 n. 14 **812d:** 190 n. 22 **835b–c:** 200 n. 15 **850d:** 204 n. 36 **855c, 858d, 861d, 868a:** 63 n. 13 **954f:** 386 n. 21 **1015a–b:** 382 n. 13 **1086f:** 386 n. 21 **1102d:** 382 n. 13 **1126c–d:** 436 n. 3 **1141c:** 595 *frr.* (ed. Sandbach) **31:** 386 n. 21 *Nic.* **13:** 193 n. 27 **13.1–3:** 185 n. 14 **23.7:** 190 n. 23 *Per.* **3.3–4:** 610 n. 51 **3.3:** 610 n. 49 **3.5:** 611 n. 62 **3.7:** 609 n. 43 **4.1:**

Plutarch *Per.* (continued) **4.1:** 610 n. 53 **4.4:** 611 n. 54 **5.1:** 611 n. 57 **6.2–3:** 190 n. 22 **7.1** 618 n. 106 **7.2:** 609 n. 45 **7.3:** 615 n. 84, 616 n. 98 **8.4:** 616 n. 100 **8.6:** 614 n. 80, 616 n. 92 **9.1:** 615 n. 82 **9.3:** 615 n. 85 **10.3–4:** 615 n. 87 **11.1–3:** 302 **11.5:** 615 n. 82 **12:** 134 n. 5 **12.2** 618 n. 106 **13.7:** 616 n. 95 **14:** 615 n. 84 **14.1–3:** 302 **15.1–2:** 615 n. 84 **15.1:** 614 n. 79 **16.1** 618 n. 106 **16.3:** 302 **16.5:** 609 n. 46 **16.9:** 609 n. 47 **16.9:** 611 n. 59 **17.1:** 615 n. 84 **18.1:** 616 n. 98 **21.1:** 615 n. 87 **22.2:** 616 n. 98 **23.1:** 615 n. 84 **23.4:** 615 n. 82 **29.5:** 303 **31.1:** 615 n. 87 **32.1:** 190 n. 22 **32.6–33.2:** 615 n. 87 **33.1–2:** 526 n. 6 **33.5:** 616 n. 98 **33.7–8:** 616 n. 99 **34.10:** 609 n. 43 **34.2:** 615 n. 82 **36.2:** 609 n. 46 **36.4:** 613 n. 69 **37.2–5:** 613 n. 70 **38:** 194 **39.2:** 614 n. 78 *Sol.* **10:** 8 n. 16 **12:** 44 n. 26 **14.3:** 7 n. 14 **15.3–4:** 301 **17.1:** 289–90, 307 n. 11, 310 **17.2–4:** 290 **18.3–4:** 292 **19.1–2:** 291 **19.3:** 293 **19.4:** 294 n. 16, 310, 315 **21.3:** 209 **22.1–3:** 449 n. 10 **23.1:** 312 n. 25 **25.2:** 288 *Them.* **2:** 611 n. 56 **5:** 148 n. 10 *Thes.* **25.3:** 284

Pollux **8.42:** 289, 307 n. 11 **8.142, 9.61:** 289

Polybius **4.76.2:** 327 n. 13 **18.46.5, 15:** 341 n. 9

Porphyry *Plot.* **10:** 357 n. 14 *Abst.* **2.10:** 172 nn. 56, 58 **2.29–30:** 172 **4.22:** 289

Posidippus *frr.* (edd. Kassel and Austin) **13:** 191 n. 25 *SH* **705:** 621 **705.11–20:** 622 **705.11–17:** 624 n. 17 **705.12–15:** 622 n. 12

Proclus (edd. Saffrey and Westerink) **1:99 :** 390 n. 32 *In Parm.*(ed. Cousin) **944:** 380 n. 6 *In Ti.* (ed. Diehl) **1.362.18–20:** 389 n. 31 **1.362.31–363.4:** 383 **1.363.4–365.3:** 383 *Praef. in Eucl.* **1:** 445 n. 28 *Theol. Plat.* **1.21:** 390 n. 32

Propertius **2.3.21,** 640

Proverbs **9:** 432 n. 18

Prudentius *Psych.* **718, 731, 736–38:** 432 **740–41, 814:** 433 **906:** 432

Ps.-Andocides **4.11:** 606 n. 25, 613 n. 72 **4.15:** 613 n. 74

Ps.-Demosthenes **10.4:** 326 **11.21–22:** 256 **47.71:** 294 **59.65:** 312 n. 25

Ps.-Longinus *De subl.* **32.5:** 432 n. 17, 428 n. 8 **44.6–7:** 430 n. 13

Ps.-Lucian *Dem. Enc.***45:** 288

Ps.-Lysias **6:** 258, 261, 266 n. 24 **6.15:** 294 **6.17:** 596, 598 **6.23:** 260, 262 n. 17 **6.24:** 261 **6.28–32:** 265 **6.54:** 258 **6.54:** 266 **6.7:** 260 **6.8–10:** 267 **6.9:** 261

Ps.-Plato *Alc. Ma.* **105b–e:** 612 **118c:** 611 n. 60 **125a, 128a, 128c, 129d:** 607 n. 28 *Ax.* **365d:** 271, 295 n. 17 *Epin.* **988b6–7:** 383 n. 17

Ps.-Plutarch *Vita And.* **834:** 260 **834e:** 262

Ps.-Scylax **67:** 333 nn. 12–14

Ps.-Xenophon *Ath. Pol.* **1.14:** 210 n. 6 **1.16–18, 3.6–8:** 210

Rashi *Comm. in Gen.* **1.26:** 158 n. 7 **1.29–30:** 160 n. 16 **6.7:** 157 n. 3

Romans **6, 16–18, 20:** 432 n. 16

Scholia: Aeschines **1.6:** 289 Aeschylus *PV* **511, 522:** 519 n. 11 Aristides Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων **168.3:** 331 n. 3 Aristophanes *Ach.* **720:** 633 **729:** 637 n. 16 *Av.* **521:** 190 n. 22 **1297:** 593 *Lys.* **273:** 317 n. 38 *Nu.* **109:** 266 **335:** 595 **830:** 596 n. 16 **967:** 596 **1073:** 596 *Pax* **1046:** 189 n. 20 **1071:** 185 n. 13 **1084:** 190 n. 22 *Pl.* **290:** 628 n. 25 *Vesp.* **552:** 592 Euripides *Med.* **823:** 561 Homer *Il.*(ed. Erbse) **2.665b:** 289 **15.36–37:** 289 **18.483:** 172 nn. 56–57 Nicander *Ther.* **3:** 624 n. 17 Pindar *O.* **8.30c, d, i, l:** 302 Sophocles *Aj.* **134a:** 561 Theocritus **11.1–3b:** 628 n. 25 Thucydides **1.126.3:** 100 n. 3

**1.126–27:** 145 **2.29.2:** 327 n. 17 **5.26:** 77 **5.26.5:** 73, 75
*Sanhedrin* **2a:** 166 n. 28
Sappho *PMG* **953:** 627
Semonides *frr.* (ed. West) **1.3:** 615 **7.105–13:** 137 n. 19
Seneca *Ep.* **65.10:** 382 n. 13
Sextus Empiricus *M.* **9.105:** 382 n. 13
Shakespeare *Hamlet* **5.1.214:** 587 n. 31 *Macbeth* **4.3.140–59:** 357 n. 15 *Richard III* **5.8.5–15:** 587 n. 30
Solon *frr.* (ed. West) **4:** 213, 222 **9.3:** 537 **13:** 567 **31:** 299 **31.2:** 294 n. 16 **36.18:** 294 n. 16
Sophocles *Aj.* **121–26:** 585 **158–59:** 427 **159:** 427 n. 6 **293:** 137 n. 18 **615:** 564 **1228–97:** 50 n. 59 **1376–80, 1393–97, 1400–1:** 583 *Ant.* **49–52:** 543 **332–75:** 559 n. 7 **542:** 9 n. 22 **582–625:** 559 n. 7 **1055–56:** 186 *El.*: 137 n. 18 **23–66:** 185 n. 15 **1015–74:** 558 n. 2 *OC* **668–719:** 559 n. 7 **1132–34:** 531 **1211–48:** 559 n. 7 **1724–33:** 582 **1756–69:** 582–83 *OT* **14:** 536 n. 43 **31:** 52 n. 67 **59–61:** 525 **62–64:** 106 **96–101:** 534 **96:** 525 **96:** 550 **100–1:** 525 **108–9:** 541 **151–215:** 570 **223:** 529 **229:** 525 **236:** 542 **236:** 549 **241:** 525 **244–45:** 542 **280–81:** 534 **387–90:** 186 193 n. 28 **397:** 532 **420–23:** 525 **454–56:** 532 **455–56:** 525 **463–76:** 529 **568:** 533 **569:** 550–51 **606–7:** 534 n. 38 **622:** 534 n. 38 **623:** 534 n. 38 **628:** 538 **634–36:** 527 **640–41, 658–59:** 534 n. 38 **658–59:** 535 **665–67:** 527 **813–20:** 526 **823:** 568 **863–65:** 567–68 **863–82:** 570 **863–910:** 535, 559 n. 7, 565 **863:** 570 **876:** 424 n. 2 **879–81:** 569 **881–82:** 569 **883–86:** 570 **889–95:** 567 **889:** 570 **893, 895:** 570 **896, 899:** 569 **904:** 570 **906–7:** 567 **999:** 549 **1086–1109:** 535 **1183:** 540 **1186–1220:** 570 **1187–88:** 52 n. 67 **1190:** 547 **1217–18, 1224:** 545 **1227–29:** 526 **1229–30:** 545 **1271–74:** 545–46 **1275–76:** 546 **1290–91:** 526 **1291:** 530 **1309–10, 1312, 1319–20:** 547 **1329–32:** 532 **1334–35, 1337–39:** 547 **1340–46:** 526 **1341–46:** 549 **1345:** 530 **1347–48:** 538 **1347:** 550 **1349–52:** 549 **1356, 1367–68:** 538 **1367–68:** 548 **1375:** 547 **1378–83:** 529 **1381–85, 1387–89:** 548 **1389–90:** 547 **1390–1408:** 550 **1391–93:** 532 **1410–12:** 526 **1410–12:** 529 **1410–12:** 550 n. 26 **1411–12:** 533 **1413–15:** 527 n. 9 **1413–15:** 552 **1417:** 550 **1422–23:** 535 **1424–31:** 526 **1430–31:** 548 **1436–37:** 526 **1436–42:** 533 **1438–43:** 526 **1438–44:** 529 **1445:** 533 **1446–1514:** 552 **1449–50:** 530, 537 **1449–53:** 526 **1449–54:** 532 **1449–55:** 533 **1450:** 552 **1455–57:** 532 **1457:** 550 **1473–74:** 535 **1515–23:** 529 **1518:** 526 **1520:** 533, 551 **1522–23:** 535–36 **1522:** 536 n. 43, 554 n. 34 **1524–30:** 529 *Tr.* **1191–99:** 589 n. 32 **1193–1202:** 589 **1270:** 589 n. 32
Statius *Silv.* **5.157–58:** 640
Stobaeus **2.7.20:** 448 **3.19.12:** 453 **3.3.42:** 454 n. 23 **3.37.20:** 449 **4.2.20:** 451–52 **88.14:** 300 n. 26 *Anth.* **3.37.20:** 449 n. 8
Strabo **6.282:** 231 n. 23 **10.2.19 (C 458):** 337 n. 34 **10.3.23:** 193 n. 28 **14.1.37:** 620 n. 5 **14.636–647:** 437 **17.11.17:** 356 n. 11
*Suda* (ed. Adler) **β 47:** 185 n. 13 **δ 1495:** 287, 299 **θ 67:** 172 n. 56 **θ 414:** 73 **θ 418:** 190 n. 22 **κ 227:** 621 **κ 2087:** 633 **π 1617:** 636 n. 13 **τ 343:** 598 n. 22 **φ 393:** 595 **φ 397:** 628 n. 25
Suetonius *Tit.* **5.3:** 358 n. 17 **8.4:** 358 n. 20 *Ves.* **7:** 357 n. 16
*Supplementum Hellenisticum* 979 (adesp.): 620 n. 5

Tacitus *Ann.* **4.55:** 444 n. 27 *Hist.* **4.81–84:** 357 n. 16 **4.81:** 361 n. 30

Tacitus *Hist.* (continued) **4.81:** 363 **4.84:** 358 n. 19
Tatian *Ad Graec.* (ed. Schwartz) **33, p. 39.16:** 637 n. 15
Themistius *Or.* **2.31b:** 288–89
Theocritus **11:** 628 n. 25 **11.8:** 628 n. 24 **7.47–48:** 639
Theognis **50:** 222 **233–34:** 427
Theophrastus *Char.* **4.5:** 200 n. 14 **16:** 188 n. 19, 194 n. 29 *frr.* (ed. Wimmer) **99:** 289
Thrasymachus *frr.* (edd. Diels and Kranz) **85 B 1:** 257
Thucydides **1–5.26:** 77 **1.1–24:** 90 **1.1:** 116 **1.9.2:** 51 n. 62 **1.10:** 27 **1.10:** 29, 34 **1.10.1–2:** 94 **1.10.2:** 36 **1.11.2:** 28 **1.20.1, 1.20.3:** 84 **1.21:** 28–29 **1.21.1:** 34, 85, 91 **1.22:** 29–30, 36, 76 **1.22.1:** 30 **1.22.2–3:** 31, 87 **1.22.4:** 85 **1.23.6:** 88, 90, 130 **1.25.2:** 192 **1.25.4:** 86 **1.25.4:** 88 n. 9 **1.30.2, 1.31.4:** 86 **1.32.1:** 87 **1.32.4, 1.32.5:** 88 **1.33.2:** 87–88 **1.33.3–4:** 87 **1.33.4:** 103 **1.34.3:** 87–88 **1.35.5:** 87 **1.36.1:** 87 **1.37.1:** 89 **1.38.5:** 89 n. 11 **1.39.1, 1.40.2, 1.40.6:** 89 **1.41.2–3:** 89 **1.41.3:** 94 n. 18 **1.42.2, 1.42.4:** 89 **1.44:** 88 **1.44.1–3:** 92 **1.49.2:** 117 **1.67.2:** 303 **1.68–88:** 88 **1.68.1:** 103–4, 110 **1.69.1, 1.69.2b:** 107 **1.69.2b:** 109 **1.69.3:** 106, 108 **1.69.5:** 104, 110 **1.69.6:** 105 n. 11 **1.70:** 151 n. 18 **1.70.7:** 106 **1.71.5:** 78 **1.77:** 47 n. 44 **1.77.4:** 105 n. 11 **1.80–85.2:** 100 **1.80.3b:** 110 **1.84.3:** 104, 107 **1.86:** 102 n. 9, 105 **1.89–117:** 90 **1.94–96:** 47 n. 44 **1.103.2:** 192 **1.114:** 615 n. 86 **1.118.3:** 568 n. 41 **1.121.4:** 119 **1.122.4:** 103 **1.126–38:** 151 **1.126:** 149, 306 **1.126.6:** 192 **1.128–34:** 47 n. 44 **1.128:** 149 **1.131–32:** 150 **1.132.2:** 332 **1.137:** 150 **1.138:** 151 **1.138.3:** 146 n. 5 **1.139.1:** 303 **1.140–44:** 109, 130 **1.140.3:** 303 **1.142.5:** 119 **1.142.6–9:** 119 **1.143.5:** 121 **1.146:** 88 **2.8:** 192 **2.11:** 110 **2.17.2:** 193 **2.21.3:** 192, 192 n. 26 **2.27.1:** 303 **2.34.2:** 94 n. 20 **2.35–46:** 128 **2.35.1:** 34, 92 **2.35.2:** 33 **2.35.3:** 93 **2.36.2–3:** 92 n. 14 **2.36.3:** 78 **2.36.4:** 34, 92 n. 14, 97 n. 23 **2.37.1:** 94–95, 326 **2.37.2:** 94 n. 18, 139 **2.38.2:** 92 n. 14 **2.40:** 29 n. 36 **2.40.1–2:** 94 n. 19 **2.40.1:** 93 n. 16 **2.40.2–3:** 96 **2.40.5:** 94 n. 18 **2.41:** 151 **2.41.1:** 32, 94 n. 18 **2.41.2–4:** 92 n. 14 **2.41.2:** 33, 93 **2.41.3:** 33 **2.41.4:** 34, 36, 93, 93 n. 17 **2.41.5:** 94 n. 20 **2.42.1:** 34, 96 **2.42.2:** 34, 93 n. 16 **2.42.3–4:** 94 n. 20 **2.43.1:** 92 n. 14, 93 n. 16 **2.43.2–3:** 34 **2.43.2:** 94 n. 20 **2.43.4:** 94 n. 18 **2.44–45.1:** 135 **2.45.1:** 94 n. 20 **2.45.2:** 127–28, 130, 132–34 **2.46:** 93 **2.47.4:** 193 **2.48.2:** 604 n. 3 **2.49.3:** 604 n. 4 **2.49.6:** 604 nn. 5, 7, 9, 10 **2.49.8:** 610 n. 48, 617 n. 104 **2.54.1–3:** 193 **2.54.4:** 192 **2.59.2:** 131 **2.61.2:** 110 **2.62:** 29 n. 36 **2.62.2:** 117 **2.62.4:** 104 **2.65:** 97, 116, 151 n. 18 **2.65.5–6:** 130 **2.65.7:** 132, 132 n. 25 **2.65.9:** 97 **2.71–74:** 110 **2.74:** 9 n. 22 **2.84.2:** 118 **2.87:** 108 **2.87.2, 2.89.2:** 118 **2.89.2:** 119 **2.89.8:** 117–118 **2.90.1:** 118 **3.10.5:** 323 **3.30:** 102 n. 9, 105 **3.37–40:** 107 **3.39.2:** 103–4 **3.52–68:** 151 **3.62.3:** 326 **3.74.2:** 129 **3.82:** 426 **3.104:** 193 **4.12.3:** 119–20 **4.66–74:** 74 n. 15 **4.66.3–4.67.1, 4.70.1:** 74 n. 15 **4.76.3:** 328 **4.78.1, 4.105.1:** 74 n. 15 **4.118.1:** 192 **5.18.2:** 192, 328, 190 n. 22 **5.24.1:** 190 n. 22 **5.26:** 77 **5.26.1–6:** 76 **5.26.3:** 193 **5.26.4:** 76 **5.26.5:** 75, 77, 78 nn. 20–21, 79, 79 n. 23 **5.43:** 257, 600 n. 25 **5.56:** 600 **5.68:** 29 n. 36 **5.71.1:** 118 n. 13 **5.103.2:** 193 **5.105:** 151 **5.116.4:** 596 n. 17 **6.9–14:** 108 **6.12.2:** 613 n. 75 **6.13, 6.15:** 257 **6.15.2–4** 618 n. 106 **6.15.3:** 613 n. 75 **6.17–18:** 257 **6.17:** 29 n. 36 **6.17.3b:** 107 **6.18.7:** 326 **6.20–23:** 108 **6.39.1:** 95 n. 21

**6.54:** 282 **6.55.1:** 317 n. 38 **6.60.1–3:** 258, 260 **6.60.1:** 84 n. 5 **6.60.3:** 260 n. 13 **6.67.1:** 118 n. 13 **6.89–92:** 109 **7.11–15:** 108 **7.18.2–3:** 131 **7.21.3:** 120 **7.34–36:** 121 **7.50.4:** 192 n. 26, 193 **7.61–64:** 108 **7.62.2:** 120 **7.62.4:** 117 **7.62.4:** 120 **7.65.2:** 121 **7.71.7:** 120 **7.75.7:** 121 **7.77:** 102 n. 9 **8.1:** 192 **8.1.1:** 192 n. 26 **8.18:** 150 n. 17 **8.2.3:** 121 **8.21:** 324 **8.37:** 150 n. 17 **8.73.3:** 592 **8.84.5:** 114 **8.97.1:** 296 **8.97.1:** 297 **8.97.2:** 126, 326 **8.109:** 113
Timotheus *PMG* **802:** 595
Titus **3.3:** 432 n. 16
Tzetzes *Hist.* **49:** 259–260, 262 *Chil.* **5.342–51:** 290

Varro *R.* **2.5.3–4:** 157
*Vita Aeschyli* **A 11:** 622 n. 12
*Vita Aristophanis* (ed. Koster) **28.46–48, 29.33–35:** 603 n. 2
*Vita Thucydides* (ed. Welles) **7:303, nos. 31–33:** 347 n. 35

Xenarchus *frr.* (ed. Kock) **4.21–23:** 289
Xenomedes *frr.* **75.54:** 623
Xenophon *An.* **1.7.18:** 192 n. 26 **3.4.1:** 146 n. 6 **7.3.21–25:** 337 n. 34 *Ap.* **20:** 257 *Cyn.* **1.6:** 136 n. 11 *Cyr.* **6.4.4:** 135 n. 8 *Eq.* **10.17, 12.14:** 123 n. 18 *frr.* (edd. Diels and Kranz) **21 A 31.2:** 4 n. 3 *Hell.* **2.2.9:** 596 n. 17 **2.3.11:** 326 **3.5.2–10:** 122 n. 16 **5.3.25:** 326 **6.2.1:** 203 n. 31 **7.1.44:** 326 **7.5.27:** 123 *Hier.* **3.3:** 312 n. 25 *Mem.* **1.2.15–16, 1.2.31, 1.2.33:** 612 n. 67 **1.2.35:** 78 **1.2.37:** 607 n. 27 **1.2.40–46:** 606 n. 23 **1.2.49:** 257 **1.5.4:** 429 **2.6.22–23:** 384 n. 20 **2.7.2, 3.11.4:** 200 n. 14 **4.4.5:** 607 n. 27 *Oec.* **7.14:** 137 **7.22–28:** 136 **14.4–5:** 307 n. 11 **14.4:** 288 *Sym.* **4.30–32:** 203 n. 31 **8.25:** 200 n. 14 *Vect.* **4.7:** 203 n. 29

*Yevamoth* **63a:** 158 n. 8

Zosimus **1.11:** 193 n. 28

B. Inscriptions, manuscripts, and papyri

*CIL* **6:26:** 364–65 **6:846:** 363 **6:3770 = 31330:** 364 **6:3770:** 364 **6:10234:** 360 n. 26 **6:10234:** 359 n. 22 **10:444:** 360 n. 27 **12:410 add.:** 363 **14:2112:** 360 n. 28
Codex Bodleianus Digby **f. 95$^{v}$, vv. 3–6:** 449 n. 8
Corinth inscriptions (ed. Kent 1966) **nos. 27, 37, 45, 46:** 443 n. 24; (ed. Meritt 1931) **nos. 2–9:** 443 n. 24
*CIG* **2.2, 3376:** 620 n. 5

*FGrH* **482 F 3:** 437 n. 6
*FIRA* **3$^{2}$:35:** 360 n. 28 **3$^{2}$:36:** 360 n. 26 **3$^{2}$:42:** 360 n. 27

*IG* **3.3, app.:** 190, 191 n. 24 **4:29–32:** 302 **7.1779:** 9 n. 23 **2:6:** 336 n. 29 **2:10.29–34:** 312 n. 27 **2:39.64–66:** 189 n. 20 **2:76.47–61:** 190 n. 22 **2:301.5–6, 2:302d.12 54–55, 2:305.15:** 201 n. 20 **3:11:** 616 n. 96 **3:14 = 2:10.29–34:** 312 n. 27 **3:17–18:** 325 **3:66.10–12:** 324 **3:96:** 324 **3:104.5–6:** 293 **3:104.5:** 294 **3:104.6, 10, 13, 17–20, 23, 28–29:** 292 **3:104.11–12, 27–28:** 292 n. 8 **3:104.16–19:** 314 n. 31 **3:104.19–20:** 309 **3:104.26–29:** 312 n. 26 **3:104.30–31:** 292 n. 11 **3:104.37–38:** 312 n. 24 **3:104:** 292 **3:104:** 304 **3:118.10–12:** 324 **3:127.12–18:** 322–24 **3:127:** 325, 327–28 **14:961, 14:978a:** 363 n. 33 **14:1059:** 364 **14:1084:** 356 n. 8, 363–65 **2:43.20–23:** 324 **2:1014.1–5:** 444 n. 26 **2:1553–78:** 200 n. 15 **2:1656–57:** 122 n. 16 **12$^{5}$:128:** 354 n. 59 **12$^{5}$:869:** 345 n. 23
*IGCH* **47:** 201 n. 20 **1001:** 201 n. 20 **1011–13, 1045:** 201 n. 20
*IGRom* **1:55:** 363 n. 33 **1:114:** 363 **1.145:** 364

*IGUR* **35:** 364 **77:** 363–64 **98, 143:** 363 n. 33 **188–90, 193–94:** 363
*Inscriptiones Italiae* **13 fasc. 1:203:** 359 n. 23 **2:531, 546:** 362 n. 32
*ILLRP* **771:** 355 n. 3
*ILS* **3546:** 360 n. 27 **4391–4403:** 363 **5246:** 355 n. 4 **6287:** 365 n. 36 **7212:** 360 n. 28 **7213:** 360 n. 26 **7303:** 365 **7306:** 365 n. 36
*Inscr. Cret.* **1:no. 10:** 441 n. 19 **3:no. 10.106–11:** 438 n. 9 **3:78–81, no. 1, lines 5–15:** 347 n. 32 **3:89–91, no. 8, lines 1–39:** 345 n. 25
*Inscr. Délos* **443 B b 147:** 620 n. 5
*Inscr. Lampsac.* **33:** 354 n. 62
*Inscr. Magn.* **nos. 16–87:** 437 n. 5 **16–34:** 441 n. 19 **16:** 439–40 **17:** 438 **17:** 439–40, 442, 445, 445 n. 28 **17.5–9:** 439 **17.16–32, 28–35, 38–41, 45–51:** 439 n. 15 **17.21:** 440 **18–87:** 439–40 **20:** 442–43, 445 n. 28 **26.25, 33.5:** 441 n. 20 **33–35:** 443 n. 23 **35–87:** 441 n. 19 **35.1:** 444 n. 25 **35.9:** 445 n. 28 **35.14:** 441 n. 20 **35.27:** 444 n. 25 **36:** 443, 443 n. 23 **36.8–9:** 443 **36.22–24, 28–31:** 444 **37:** 444 n. 26 **37.3:** 444 **38:** 443 n. 23, 444 **38.29:** 441 n. 20 **38.52:** 441 n. 20 **41–42:** 443 n. 23 **44.14–16:** 445 n. 28 **45:** 443 n. 23 **45.5, 18, 40:** 444 n. 25 **46:** 443 n. 23 **46.2:** 444 **46.3:** 441 n. 20 **46.5:** 444 n. 25 **46.11:** 438 n. 11 **46.12–14:** 445 n. 28 **47.3, 52.17, 52.24:** 441 n. 20 **52.38:** 444 **53–54:** 443 n. 23 **54a:** 442 **58.1, 42:** 441 n. 20 **61:** 443 n. 23 **61.11, 34:** 441 n. 20 **64.8, 20:** 441 n. 20 **64.21:** 441 n. 19 **65:** 438 n. 11, 441 **65.18, 23:** 441 n. 20 **67:** 438 n. 11, 441 **67.5–8:** 441 **70.2:** 441 n. 20 **70.7:** 438 n. 10, 442 **72:** 443 n. 23 **72.3:** 444 **72.22:** 441 n. 20 **73b14, 17:** 442 **79.15, 21:** 441 n. 20 **80.13:** 442 **80.16:** 442 **92a–b:** 354 n. 61 **92b:** 354 n. 61 **T 12:** 439 n. 14 **T 13:** 437 n. 7 **T 20:** 439 n. 16 **T 22:** 438 **T 23:** 438 n. 8 **T 46:** 443 n. 22 **T 54:** 438 n. 10, 442 **T 54.21, 23–24:** 442 **T 64:** 444 n. 27
*Inscr. Prien.* **57:** 354 n. 62 **208:** 350 n. 47
*ISE* **1:14.10–16:** 351 n. 51 **2:99.14–23:** 348 n. 39

*Marmor Parium* (*FGrH* 239 A) **69:** 595
ML **43:** 317 n. 38
Mnesiepes inscription (ed. Kontoleon [1952] 1954) **E1, col. 1.15– 44:** 620 **2.1–13:** 619 n. 1 **2.15, 20– 22:** 619 **3.31–35**

*OGIS* **223.21–28:** 340 n. 4 **233:** 347 n. 34 **265.17–21:** 346 n. 29
P. Berol. **284:** 635
P. Oxy. **13, no. 1606:** 204 n. 36 **2370:** 635 **2370:** 639 **2438:** 633 **2438:** 636 n. 12

*Senatus consulta* (ed. Sherk 1969) **no. 14:** 438 n. 9 **no. 52:** 438 n. 10
*SEG* **1:94:** 335 n. 22 **1:363:** 344 n. 19 **1:366:** 350 n. 44 **1:366.33–47:** 350 n. 48 **1.363.9:** 206 n. 45 **2.263:** 352 n. 53 **24:309:** 332 n. 7
*SIG*$^3$ 437 n. 5 **58:** 317 n. 38 **194:** 317 n. 37 **364.42, 46:** 206 n. 45 **526.28–32:** 327 n. 13 **618.10:** 327 n. 13 **354 n. 59** 390.11–16: **471:** 343 n. 15 **471:** 353 n. 58 **495:** 350 n. 45 **495.122:** 350 n. 50 **495.27–28:** 350 n. 50 **495.66:** 350 n. 50 **512:** 354 n. 59 **526:** 345 n. 25 **527:** 352 n. 55 **554:** 347 n. 35 **544.12–23:** 348 n. 37 **544.23–26:** 348 n. 38 **557:** 347 n. 33 **558–62:** 347 n. 34 **578:** 352 n. 56 **581:** 342 n. 12 **581:** 353 n. 57 **588:** 342 n. 13 **599:** 343 n. 16 **683:** 343 n. 17 **788:** 352 n. 54
*Stsv* **3:545.6–12:** 346 n. 27 **3:545.14–29:** 345 n. 26

Tod **29:** 312 n. 27 **150:** 317 n. 37 **1948 no. 204:** 8 n. 20

# Index


Abel: 160 n. 15
Academy: 436 n. 3, 445 n. 28
Acanthians: 108
Acastus: 285
Achaeans: 181, 473–74
Achaemenids: 241 n. 23
Acharnania: 192
Acheloödorus: 633
Achilles: 181, 236–38, 239 n. 17, 467, 471, 474, 480, 482–83, 487–89, 574
Acirisius: 49
Acontius: 623
Acragas: 521
Acropolis: 46 n. 39, 56, 68–69, 93 n. 17, 184, 217, 217 n. 14, 222, 427
Adam: 158
Adeimantus: 148, 436 n. 2
Admetus: 150, 588
Adrastus: 9 n. 22
Aegean Sea: 265, 343, 347, 521
Aegina: 45 n. 35, 146, 287–88, 291, 295, 299–303
Aeginetans: 291, 299–300, 302, 304
Aegisthus: 508, 510–12, 579 n. 17, 588
Aegospotami: 596 n. 17
Aelian: 634, 637
Aelius Aristides: 356
Aeneas: 474
Aeolians: 441 n. 20
Aeolic dialect: 460–61, 463, 465
Aeschines: 186, 289, 370
Aeschines of Cnidus: 621 n. 8
Aeschylus: 6, 186, 424 n. 2, 493–94, 505–15, 517, 523, 528 n. 12, 537, 558, 581, 605, 609, 622 n. 12, 626
Aesculapius: cf. Asclepius
Aetolia: 442; Aetolian League: 347
Afghanistan: 246 n. 40
Afrati (Crete): 239 n. 14
Africa: 233
Agaids: 52 n. 66
Agamemnon: 5, 377, 472–73, 487, 489, 492 n. 6, 500–2, 503 n. 29, 506, 508, 510–13, 575–78, 583, 586 n. 27
Agathon: 375, 399 n. 5, 400 n. 7, 401, 404, 410
Agave: 586 n. 25
Agetus: 52
Agighiol tomb: 244
Aglaoteles: 443
Agyrrhius: 258
Aias: see Ajax
Aï Khanum: 246 n. 40
Ajax: 5, 53 n. 69, 231, 236, 427, 527, 555, 564, 583–85
Ajax (Lesser): 217, 472
Alcaeus: 569 n. 43, 571, 625–26, 588
Alcibiades: 35, 78 n. 20, 100, 107, 109, 132, 194, 257, 399, 401, 410, 413, 537, 592–94, 600, 603–18
Alcidamas: 622 n. 11
Alcimedon: 302
Alcmaeonidae: 319, 526, 605
Alcman: 626
Alcmene: 586 n. 27
Aleuads: 605–6
Alexander: 60, 72, 232, 238 n. 12, 246, 339, 357 n. 16
Alexander Rondanini
Alexandria: 356–58, 430, 523, 620 n. 5, 641
Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan): 248 n. 44
Alyattes: 60, 63
Amalthea: 332

Amasis: 58 n. 7, 59, 63–64, 70
Amasis (Persian general): 60
Amazons: 128
Amestris: 58–59
Ammon: 392 n. 37
Amorgos: 137
Amphictyony: 292
Amphilytus: 184
Amphipolis: 317 n. 37
Amphitryon: 49 n. 57, 51 n. 62
Amyclus: 628
Anacreon: 415, 625–27, 631
Anaxagoras: 611, 614
Anaxandridas: 41 n. 11, 48
Anaximenes: 256 n. 5
Andocides: 257–68, 288
Andrians: 148
Andromache: 268
Andromeda: 521, 522 n. 20
Antidorus: 202 n. 24
Antigone: 528, 553, 581–82, 583 n. 21, 584–85
Antigonid realm: 340
Antigonus Gonatas: 351
Antilochus: 482
Antimachus: 640 n. 33, 641 n. 34
Antinous: 180. 360, 363 n. 33
Antiocheia: 441 n. 20, 443 n. 23
Antiochus I: 340
Antiochus III: 340, 347
Antiphanes: 336
Antiphon: 71 n. 3, 102 n. 8
Antisthenes: 186 n. 16, 202 n. 24, 300 n. 26
Antoninus Pius: 194 n. 28, 355–56, 360–61
Anubis: 357 n. 14
Anzaqar: 162
Apaturia: 267
Aphrodite: 415 n. 34, 416, 624 n. 18
Apis: 14, 40; Apis Bull: 358
Apocalypse: 433
Apollo: 46, 185, 187, 355, 365, 437, 439, 441, 443, 445, 489, 518, 521, 525, 528, 532–34, 566, 567 n. 37, 587–88, 622
Apollodorus: 71, 73, 74, 79, 399 n. 4
Apollonia: 183 n. 8, 443 n. 23, 444 n. 25, 615
Apollonius (month at Syracuse): 444
Apollonius Dyscolus: 634
Apollonius of Rhodes: 438
Apollonius of Tyana: 183 n. 9
Apries: 59
Apsinthians: 338
Apuleius: 361
Apulia: 238 n. 9, 239
Araplos: 333 n. 12
Aratus: 333–35, 337, 338 n. 35
Arazos: 333 n. 12
Arcadia: 45 n. 35; Arcadians: 441 n. 20; Arcadian league: 443 n. 23
Arceophon: 624, 624 n. 18
Arcesilaus: 46 n. 40
Archestratus: 202 n. 24, 272
Archidamus: 99–111; Archidamian War: 76–7, 297
Archilochus: 439 n. 15, 569 n. 43, 619–22; Archilocheion: 621–23
Archytas: 621 n. 8
Areopagus: 6, 270–72, 274, 276, 281 n. 36, 282, 293–94, 296–97, 306 n. 3, 505–8, 511, 513–15
Ares: 293
Areus: 138
Argiope: 630
Argives: 5, 9 n. 22, 399 n. 3; alliance with Athens: 515
Argolid: 228, 228 n. 7
Argos: 46, 514–15, 600, 624 n. 17
Ariantas: 55
Arianthes: 599
Aristaechmus: 298–99, 304
Aristagoras of Melos: 64–65, 596 n. 16
Aristagoras of Miletus: 45 n. 37, 48 n. 49, 58 n. 7
Aristeas: 182 n. 6, 185 n. 15
Aristides: 147, 331 n. 3
Aristippus: 625
Aristocrates: 294
Aristodama: 351–52
Aristodemus: 50, 375, 399 n. 4

Aristogeiton: 79, 84, 131 n. 23
Aristolochus: 202 n. 24
Aristomachus: 442
Ariston: 44 n. 28, 48, 52
Aristophanes: 64, 183, 184 n. 10, 185, 187–89, 191, 372 n. 2, 375, 400, 402 n. 13, 417, 537, 561, 592, 594–96, 598–601, 603, 605–6, 608–9, 612–14, 616, 618, 638
Aristotle: 85 n. 8, 103, 125–28, 130–31, 156–57, 175–76, 198–99, 208, 269–86, 289–90, 327, 380 n. 3, 386, 439, 447, 451, 453, 479–89, 558, 560–61; Aristotelians: 273 n. 16
Aristoxenus: 599
Arsinoe: 624; Arsinoeia: 624 n. 17
Artaÿctes: 67–68, 70
Artaxerxes: 150
Artemis: 440, 442, 444; Artemis Leucophryene: 347, 437, 439–42
Artemisia: 129
Artemisium: 147, 184, 608
Arthmius: 307 n. 9
Asclepius: 356, 358, 360–61
Ascra: 225, 630; Ascraeans: 629
Asia: 10, 41 n. 10, 43, 50 n. 59, 64–65, 246–48, 251–54, 321, 438, 443 n. 22, 444, 445 n. 28, 622
Aspasia: 130–32, 140, 399, 565 n. 29, 612
Astrabacus: 52
Athamas: 531
Athena: 6, 68–69, 128, 180, 184, 201 n. 20, 213, 216–17, 217 nn. 15–16, 218, 220, 223, 289, 337 n. 32, 399 n. 5, 444, 519, 585; Athena Polias: 302; Athena Promachus: 217
Athenaeus: 439, 625, 627, 628 n. 25
Athenagoras: 95 n. 21
Athenius: 595
Athens: 8 n. 16, 9 n. 22, 27, 34, 42 n. 15, 56, 68, 71, 81, 83–90, 92–97, 102, 108, 114, 116–17, 122, 130, 134 n. 4, 141–42, 146–47, 151, 157, 171–72, 175, 184–85, 187, 191, 197–98, 201 n. 21, 202, 202 n. 25, 203 n. 29, 204, 210, 213, 216 n. 8, 217 n. 14, 221–22, 255–57, 259, 261–68, 269 n. 1, 270, 272, 274, 279, 281–83, 285–89, 301–2, 304, 317 n. 38, 324–25, 328, 332 n. 7, 341, 374, 378, 380, 399 n. 4, 513–14, 515 n. 27, 519 n. 7, 522–23, 526, 528, 531, 537–38, 554, 559, 579–80, 584, 596, 598, 603, 604 n. 3, 612, 614–16, 635 n. 9; Athenians: 15, 74, 74 n. 15, 85, 87, 89, 94, 96, 102, 104, 105 n. 11, 118–21, 138, 148–49, 151, 172, 189 n. 20, 192, 198, 201 n. 20, 202 n. 27, 204–5, 221, 256, 264, 266–67, 271, 281–82, 285, 288, 290, 300, 302, 304, 313, 322, 324, 327–28, 337, 351, 534 n. 37, 586 n. 27, 596 n. 17, 600; Athenian agora: 214, 261, 616; Athenian assembly: 83, 86; 90–91, 262, 596; Athenian constitution: 506; Athenian democracy: 599; Athenian empire: 149, 322–23, 341; Athenian law: 288, 293–94; Athenian state: 506, 515; Athenian women: 133–43
Atreus: 51 n. 62; house of: 500–1, 506–8, 509 n. 9, 514
Attalus I: 347
Atthidographers/Atthidography: 289–90, 293, 297–99, 301, 309
Attica: 8 n. 15, 53 n. 73, 128, 172, 197, 200 n. 14, 225, 228, 261, 291, 293, 295, 300, 523, 641
Attic dialect: 460
Attic women: 300
Augustus: 359, 362
Aulus Gellius: 449–50, 451 n. 14
Aurangabad (Maharashtra): 246 n. 41
Auxesia: 300
Azande: 180. 183 n. 8

Babylonians: 60, 159, 160
Bacchae: 373
Bacchiads: 41 n. 10
Bacchic rites: 186
Bacchylides: 92 n. 15, 564
Bacis: 185 n. 13, 188, 189

Bactria: 245 n. 34, 246
Balkans: 240, 243
Baluchistan: 246
Barca/Barcaeans: 60, 64–65
Battis: 630 n. 28
Bdelycleon: 190, 598
Bible: 155, 157–60, 162, 166, 177
Bittis: 630 n. 28
Black Sea: 233, 240, 350
Blessed Virgin: 432
Boedromion: 229 n. 13
Boeotia: 189, 222, 348
Boeotus: 624
Bogazköi (Turkey): 241 n. 23
Borysthenes River: 55
Bosporus: 202 n. 25
Branca Painter: 517
Brasidas: 74 n. 15, 75, 104, 108
Brazen House: 149–50
Britain: 245
Bronze Age: 215, 251 n. 51
Buddha: 246 n. 41
Buddhism: 246
Bulgaria: 240 n. 18, 243, 244 n. 32
Bulgoras: 349, 350
Buphonia: 158 n. 9, 173–75, 177
Burgon: 217 n. 11

Cadmus: 50 n. 59, 187, 580
Caecilius Philon: 365
Caelian Hill: 359
Cain: 160 n. 15
Calchas: 182, 471
Callias: 190, 193 n. 28, 259, 261, 266–67, 613
Callimachus: 523, 621, 623–24, 635–36, 637 n. 20, 639–40
Calliope: 416
Callipolis: 435
Calpurnius Piso, L.: 438
Calymna: 353
Calypso: 472
Cambyses: 13, 14, 14 n. 40, 40, 41 n. 9, 45, 48 n. 52, 58, 69 n. 25
Campus Martius: 357 n. 14, 358
Canaanites: 157
Candaules: 48 nn. 51–52, 61–62, 138
Capella: 564
Caracalla: 365
Cardia: 337 n. 32
Carystians: 148
Cassandra: 186, 217, 500–2, 510–11
Cassiopeia: 564
Castor: 51, 588, 441 n. 20
Cephallenia: 443 n. 23, 444 n. 25, 445 n. 28
Cephalus: 267, 639,
Cepheus: 564
Cephisius: 258
Chaereophon: 598 n. 21, 614
Chaeronea: 305
Chalaeus: 351
Chalcis: 189 n. 20, 222, 441 n. 20; Chalcidians: 57
Chamaeleon: 596, 625–27, 631
Charias: 597
Charicles: 78
Charmus: 317 n. 38
Charon: 145 n. 2
Cheops: 48 n. 52
Chersonese: 331–332, 334–35, 337–38 Chersonesitans: 334, 337
Chertomlyk kurgan: 240 n. 19
Chians: 69
Chilo of Sparta: 450, 455, 622 n. 11
China: 244–48, 252
Chios: 620 n. 5, 639
Chremylus: 187
Chresmologues: 189
Christians/Christianity: 396, 432
Chronograph of 354: 359 n. 22
Chryses: 489
Chrysilla: 267
Chrysothemis: 558 n. 2
Cicero: see Tullius
Cimmerians: 245
Cimon: 71 n. 5, 223, 317 n. 36, 331–32
Cinesias: 595
Circe: 181 n. 4, 473
Cithaeron: 532–33, 550, 552, 635–36, 638–39, 641
Ciumesti (Rumania): 240 n. 18

Clairmont, C.: 222
Claudius (emperor): 358 n. 18, 359
Claudius Severus, Cn.: 363
Clazomenae: 443 n. 23
Clearchus: 611
Cleinias: 435, 436, 608
Cleisthenes: 213, 221, 223–24, 233, 276, 278, 281 n. 36, 282, 296, 307, 316, 318
Clement of Alexandria: 373
Cleombrotus: 55
Cleomenes: 41 n. 11, 44 n. 28, 45–53, 58, 64–65, 70, 185 n. 13
Cleon: 84, 103–5, 107, 132, 189, 560, 592–93
Clesophus: 324
Clytemnestra: 497, 501–2, 507–8, 510–12, 514, 576–78, 579 n. 17, 581, 586 n. 27, 588–89
Cnidus: 353, 621 n. 8,
Cnossus: 435, 438 n. 11, 441
Codridae: 285
Coesyra: 605
Colonus: 550 n. 27, 584 n. 23
Colophon: 190, 232, 354, 624
Colotes: 436 n. 3
Columella: 157
Conon: 437, 445
Corcyra: 86–92, 97, 129, 222, 426, 445 n. 28
Corinna: 633–42
Corinth: 41 n. 10, 74 n. 15, 86, 102, 342, 343, 353, 443, 443 n. 23, 550; Corinthians: 10 n. 24, 78 n. 21, 86–90, 103; 104, 105 n. 11, 106, 151 n. 18, 603, 604 n. 3; Corinthian Gulf: 118
Coroneia: 608
Corybants: 194
Cos: 345, 346, 353, 624 n. 17, 630 n. 28; Coan women: 67
Cotyto: 593
Crannon: 348
Craterus: 596–97
Cratinus: 190, 288–89, 291, 304, 611
Creon: 525–38, 541, 543, 547–56
Cretans: 181 n. 5
Crete: 5, 226, 239 n. 14, 342, 345, 352, 436–40, 442, 445 n. 28, 635, 638
Cretinaeum: 437
Creusa: 557, 561
Crimea: 240 n. 19
Critias: 297, 300 n. 26
Crito: 370
Croesus: 40 n. 3, 41 n. 13, 48 n. 51, 61, 222
Croton: 23
Ctesippus: 419 n. 40
Curetes: 635, 638 n. 23
Cyclopes: 472, 475
Cydias/Cydidas: 596
Cydippe: 623
Cylon: 149, 283, 297–98, 306, 308, 315, 319, 526
Cynics: 637 n. 20
Cyprus: 235 n. 2, 624 n. 18
Cypselids: 335
Cypselus: 331
Cyrene: 41 n. 10, 43 n. 21, 46 n. 40, 64, 436 n. 3
Cyreneans: 8 n. 16
Cyrus: 44 n. 28, 48 n. 49
Cythera: 47 n. 48, 595–96
Cyzicene stater: 201 n. 20

Daifantos: 636 nn. 12–13
Damascius: 380 n. 6
Damia: 300
Damon: 610, 611
Danaans: 483
Danae: 49
Danaids: 530
Darius: 40 n. 3, 58, 60, 63, 65–66, 193 n. 28
Darius Painter: 517
Decelean War: 77, 297
Deconstructionism: 19 n. 5, 18 n. 2
Deioces: 66 n. 22
Deiphonus: 183 n. 8
Delian League: 565 n. 30, 606
Delium: 606
Delos: 184, 192, 620 n. 5

Delphi: 42 n. 15, 44 n. 28, 46, 50, 172, 189, 195 n. 32, 292, 328–29, 352, 437–39, 441–43, 525, 532–34, 619 n. 1; Delphians: 329; Delphic oracle: 8 n. 16, 52 n. 66, 146, 187, 189 n. 21, 437–38, 439, 441–42, 444–45, 534 n. 37, 550, 551–52, 619; Delphic tripod: 150
Delphinium (Athens): 294
Demades: 290
Demaratus: 41 n. 11, 42, 44 n. 28, 45–51
Demeter: 519 n. 9
Demetrius: 200 n. 16, 273, 298, 356
Democedes: 193 n. 28
Democritus: 183 n. 9, 373, 429 n. 11
Demodocus: 486, 488
Demonax: 8 n. 16
Demophantus: 306–7, 311 n. 23, 312
Demosthenes: 186–87, 201 n. 22, 203, 205 n. 44, 228, 288, 292, 294, 315 n. 33, 316 n. 35
Diagoras: 596, 598–99
Dians: 250
Dicaeogenes: 202 n. 25
Dicaeopolis: 131
Dike: 519 n. 9
Dinarchus: 205 n. 44
Dinos: 598
Diocles: 209 n. 4, 266
Diodorus: 597
Diodotus: 206
Diogenes of Apollonia: 615
Diogenes Laertius: 123, 436 n. 3, 451
Diognetes: 229 n. 13
Diomus: 172 n. 56
Dionysia (City): 591–92, 597, 604; (Great): 140
Dionysius I of Syracuse: 603, 628 n. 25
Dionysus: 186, 351, 525 n. 3; Guild of the Artists of: 443 n. 23
Dio of Prusa: 387, 389, 390
Diopeithes: 185 n. 14, 189, 190, 598
Diotima: 397–422
Dipolieia: 172
Dipylon gate: 93 n. 17
Dipylon shield: 236
Dis: 358
Divi Augusti: 356
Divine Demiurge: 381–83, 393, 395–96
Dnepr: 240
Dobruja (Romania): 244
Dolon: 146 n. 6
Dolonci: 337
Domitian: 357–62
Dorians: 49, 50; Doric dialect: 637
Dorieus: 44 n. 28, 45 n. 33
Draco: 269–79, 283–84, 287–311, 312 n. 25, 313 n. 29, 314–16, 318
Dreros: 352

Egretes: 229 n. 13
Egypt: 11–12, 22–23, 50 n. 59, 241 n. 23, 356, 357, 362; Egyptians: 11–13, 22, 392 n. 37; Egyptian doctors: 193 n. 28; Egyptian gods: 357, 363 n. 33; Egyptian priests: 11, 23;
Ehoie: 630, 631
Eiôn: 10
Elagabalus: 365
Elea: 193 n. 28
Electra: 99, 577, 581, 588
Eleusis: 46, 184, 190, 262 n. 17, 616; Eleusinian Mysteries: 258–60, 264, 266, 268, 426, 593, 596, 598–99; Eleusinion (at Athens): 259, 266, 616
Embes: 363, 364
Empedocles: 641 n. 34
Emperors, Deified: 355–356, 360, 362 n. 31, 363
England: 357 n. 15
English language: 496
Enkidu: 159
Eoea: 629
Ephebic oath: 8 n. 20
Ephesus: 150, 206 n. 45, 378, 624 n. 17
Ephialtes: 272, 282, 297, 506, 514, 515 n. 26
Ephorus: 131
Epichares: 258
*Epic of Gilgamesh:* 159
Epicureanism: 391
Epidamnus: 438 n. 11, 441 n. 20, 443 n. 23, 444, 445 n. 28
Epidaurus: 300, 301, 343, 353, 371

Epilycus: 259, 267
Epimenides: 185 n. 13
Eratosthenes: 592, 593 n. 7, 596, 631
Erechtheus: 171, 68
Eretria: 230 n. 19, 232, 353
Erimoupolis: 438
Erinys: 499, 518
Er, myth of: 411
Eros: 398 n. 2, 400, 403–4, 410, 415–16, 521
Erucius Clarus, Sex.: 363
Erythrae: 340
Eteocles: 508
Ethiopians: 58
Etruria: 239 n. 17; Etruscans: 239 n. 16
Euboea: 148, 441 n. 20, 615, 631; Euboeans: 147
Euboidas: 138
Euclid: 445 n. 28
Eucrates: 306; decree of: 317 n. 36
Eudoxus: 621 n. 8
Euelthon: 58
Euenius: 183 n. 8
Eumaeus: 180
Eumolpidae: 258
Euphiletus: 264
Euphorion: 631
Euphronius: 237 n. 8
Eupolis: 190 n. 23, 257, 592–94, 600, 609
Euripides: 183, 187, 523, 537, 543, 560, 577, 581, 583–84, 588, 605, 609, 625, 630
Euripus River: 222
Eurybiades: 147, 148
Eurymachus: 471
Eurypontids: 45 n. 35
Eurysthenes: 44 n. 28, 50–51
Eurystheus: 49, 51, 502, 586 n. 27, 351
Euthyphro: 195
Eve: 158 n. 8
Exampaeus: 55–57, 64, 70
Exekias: 236, 237 n. 8
Exodus: 161 n. 18, 162, 166, 431

Fabius Demetrius: 365
Far East: 245, 247, 254
*Fasti Ostienses:* 359 n. 23, 362 n. 32
Five Thousand, The: 282
Flavian emperors: 355–62
Forum Romanum: 361
Four Hundred, The: 276, 282, 307
France: 239
French language: 470, 476
Freud, S.: 480, 502; Freudianism: 483
Frunze: 248 n. 44
Funeral oration of Pericles: 15 n. 45, 32–35, 36, 86, 92–98, 133–43
Furies: 6–7, 509, 527, 534

Gaius (emperor): 362
Galatea: 624, 625, 628
Galen: 430
Gandhāra: 246
Ganges River: 246
Ganymede: 392
Gauls: 441
Ge: 518, 519 n. 7, 519 n. 8,
Gela: 622 n. 12
Gelon: 41 n. 10
Genesis: 157, 161
Geneva: 238 n. 10
Geometric art: 225
Geropotamus (Lethaeus) River: 440
Geta: 365
Gibborim: 159
Glanis: 189
Glaucon: 410 n. 22, 436 n. 2
Glaucus: 46 n. 41
Gomer: 245 n. 36
Gonnoi: 441 n. 20, 443
Gordion: 520
Gorgias: 103, 138
Gorgo: 58 n. 7
Gorgon: 237 n. 8, 238, 251
Gortyn: 435, 437, 438 n. 11, 439–41, 445
Graces: 636
Great Dionysia: 140
Great King: 44 n. 26, 47, 423
Greek language: 460–61, 464, 470, 503; Greek law: 155, 171–78; Greek religion: 226
Gregory of Nyssa: 431–32

Gyges: 61

Hades: 9 n. 22, 609, 630
Hadrian: 361, 362 n. 32
Halicarnassus: 3, 336, 354
Haliotrophus: 444
Halitherses: 182
Han: 248
Harmodius: 79, 84, 131 n. 23
Harpagus: 44 n. 28, 48 n. 49
Harpocration: 176
Heavenly guardians: 251
Hecataeus: 23
Hector: 268, 377, 460 n. 5, 464, 533 n. 31, 573–75
Heidelberg: 239 n. 16
Helen: 11–12, 51–52, 499, 500, 510
Helicon: 635–6, 638, 639, 641
Hellanicus: 73
Hellenic culture: 43
Hellenistic World: 339–54
Hellespont: 10, 68, 148, 337 n. 31
Hellespontine region: 333
Hera: 344, 474, 488, 502
Heraclea: 327 n. 13, 625
Heracleia (Pontica): 231
Heracleitus: 373
Heracles: 7 n. 12, 49–53, 56, 502, 517–18, 521, 527, 579, 580–81, 586 n. 25, 588–89
Heraclides: 205 n. 41, 284–85
Heraclids: 49 n. 56, 50–51, 52 n. 66, 54
Heraclitus: 21
Hercules: 365
Hermeias: 380–81, 389–90, 392–94
Hermes: 131, 238 n. 12, 363 n. 33, 521, 635
Hermesianax: 437, 623 n. 15, 624–25, 627–31
Hermione: 185, 596
Hermippus: 299, 621
Hermocopidae: 262
Hermocrates: 104, 120–21
Hermotimus: 62–63, 70
Herms: 257, 260, 264, 266, 268, 593
Herodicus: 290, 291
Herodotus: 3–4, 9–15, 17, 21–28, 39–71, 73, 84, 102 n. 8, 125, 127–28, 145–48, 150, 152, 182 n. 6, 183–84, 185 n. 15, 222, 282, 291, 300–2, 323, 331, 337–38, 437 n. 4
Hesiod: 137, 182, 225, 299, 414 n. 32, 481, 528 n. 12, 531, 621, 625, 629–31
Hesychius: 329
Hierapytna: 342, 347 n. 32, 438, 442
Hierocles: 188–89
Hieromnemon: 592
Hippaemon: 438
Hipparchus: 84, 317 n. 38
Hipparete: 605, 613
Hippias: 47, 184, 185 n. 13, 223–24, 317 n. 38, 374, 607 n. 32
Hippocrateia: 633
Hippocrates: 429
Hippocratic oath: 8 n. 21
Hipponicus: 259, 266–67, 605
Hippothales: 419
Histiaeus: 48 n. 49, 66
Hiung-nu: 245, 246 n. 38
Holiness Code of Leviticus (H): 161
Holy Order of Paeanists: 363
Holy Spirit: 432
Homer: 11, 28, 32, 34, 53, 93–94, 99, 102, 180–81, 184 n. 10, 187–88, 229, 336, 371–76, 414 n. 32, 424 n. 2, 427, 461 n. 17, 467–70, 479–84, 486–88, 494, 503, 528 n. 12, 543, 605, 620 n. 5, 621, 624 n. 17, 625, 628–29; Homereion (on Chios): 620 n. 5; Homeric Catalogue of Ships: 437; Homeric language: 476, 460, 465; Homeric verse: 464 n. 30
Horn of Amalthea: 337
House of Wisdom: 432 n. 18
Hurrumkurra: 162
Hygia: 360, 361
Hyllus: 49, 589
Hymettus: 443 n. 22
Hypanis River: 55
Hyperbolus: 592–93, 600
Hyperides: 138–39

Iamblichus: 380
Iberian peninsula: 239

Icarius: 628
Ida (Mount): 488
Idmon: 231
Idomeneus: 5, 472
Igertas: 444
Inachus: 10
India: 246; Indians: 13; Indic language: 464
Indo-Europeans: 246 n. 38; Indo-European language: 459, 461, 470 n. 13, 475
Io: 10
Ion: 274, 371–73, 375–78
Ionia: 41 n. 13, 67, 150; Ionians: 64, 66; Ionian tribes: 296
Ionic-Attic dialect: 461, 463, 465
Iphigeneia: 508, 510, 512, 576–77, 589
Iraq: 241 n. 23
Iron Age tombs: 226
Isagoras: 45 n. 35, 48, 306, 317 n. 38
Isarchus: 74 n. 15
Ischomachus: 137
Iseum: 357, 359, 361, 363 n. 33; Iseum Campense, cult of: 364
Isis: 357–58
Ismene: 543, 553, 582, 583 n. 21
Isocrates: 256, 299
Isotomides decree: 261
Israel: 176; Israelite law: 155; Israelites: 157, 160, 177–78
Issyk Kul: 248 n. 44
Ister River: 66
Isthmian Games: 341–42
Isthmus of Corinth: 42 n. 14
Italy: 92, 239, 357, 523
Itanos: 345, 438; Itanians/Itanii: 327 n. 13, 345
Ithaca: 180, 443 n. 23, 628

Janus: 257
Jason: 577–81
Jerusalem: 357–58
Jews: 396
Jocasta: 508, 526–27, 529 n. 14, 534 n. 38, 535, 539 n. 4, 540, 543, 545, 549, 552, 565–66, 568–70
Josephus: 289
Judea: 357
Judeans: 357
Julius Caesar, C.: 359
Jupiter: 358
Justinian: 448

Kazakhstan: 246 n. 40, 248 n. 44
Kazanluk: 240 n. 18
Keaney, J. J.: 271
Kekuvatsky barrow (Crimea): 240 n. 19
Kerykes: 259
Kingdon of Heaven: 431
Kleophrades Painter: 237 n. 7
Kul-Oba kurgan: 243
Kunming: 248, 250
Kushan empire: 246

Lacedaemonians: 27, 36, 43, 47, 399 n. 3
Laconia: 50, 226, 615
Lade: 66 n. 22
Laertes: 180, 181 n. 4
Lago Trasimeno: 239 n. 16
Laius: 508, 525, 528, 535, 540–43, 548, 550, 565–66
Lake Dian: 248
Lamia: 351
Lampon: 190
Lamprocles: 596
Lampsacus: 145 n. 2, 151, 256 n. 5, 341
Lanuvio: 239 n. 16
Laodicea: 443 n. 23
Lasus: 185
Latin language: 462 n. 21, 470
*Laws of Eshnunna*: 163–65
*Laws of Hammurapi*: 163–64
Leander: 623
Lechaeum road: 443
Lecton: 626
Lenaea: 592
Leobates: 42 n. 16
Leogoras: 260–64, 266–68, 594 n. 9
Leon: 258, 259 n. 9, 266
Leonidas: 44–46, 47 n. 42, 53
Leonides: 52
Leotychides: 41 n. 11, 44 n. 28, 46, 52
Lesbos: 104, 626
Lethaeus River: 437, 440, 441 n. 19

Letnitsa (Bulgaria): 243
Leucas: 596
Leuce: 438
Leucippus: 437
Leucophryena: 443
Libya: 4, 60
Lichas: 114
Lijiashan: 250 n. 47
Lille papyrus: 528 n. 12
Litai: 492
London: 106
Lotus-eaters: 426
Lucian: 288
Lucretia: 138
Lugalbanda: 162
Lycophron: 640
Lycurgus: 42, 49, 52 n. 66, 412 n. 28, 449 n. 10, 531
Lydia: 50 n. 58, 61–62, 222
Lydus: 262–63
Lysander: 328, 596 n. 17
Lysias: 85 n. 8, 139, 200 n. 15, 289, 291, 384–85, 392–96, 399, 400 n. 6, 415, 420, 453
Lysimachus: 624 n. 17
Lysippus: 190
Lysis: 418, 419 n. 40
Lysistrata: 188

Macedon: 41 n. 10, 60, 256, 341
Macedonians: 622
Macron: 238 n. 10
Maeander River: 347, 354
Maeandrius: 45 n. 37, 58
Magi: 184
Magna Graecia: 239 n. 17
Magnesia (Asiatic): 151, 342, 347, 354, 435–438, 440–45; Magnesians: 342, 436–39, 441–43
Magnesia (Cretan): 435–38, 440, 442–45; Magnesians: 436–38
Magnesians (Thessalian): 438
Magnessa: 438
Magnetes: 435, 436 n. 2, 437
Maharashtra: 246 n. 41
Maimonides: 170
Manlius Vulso, C.: 327 n. 13
Mantinea: 8 n. 16, 122, 399 n. 3, 594, 600
Mantineans: 599
Mantyes: 64
Marathon: 42 n. 15, 331, 332
Marcellinus: 72–74
Marcellus: 443 n. 23
Marcus Aurelius: 245
Mardonius: 68, 148, 184, 323
Marmor Parium: 595
Mars: 359 n. 23, 360
Matala: 440
Medea: 577–79, 581
Medes/Medians: 148, 184
Mediterranean region: 179 n. 1, 221, 223, 233, 340, 342, 349
Medon: 285
Medusa: 239
Megacles: 605
Megalopolis: 354, 436 n. 3, 441 n. 20, 444
Megara: 8 n. 16, 74 n. 15, 343, 353
Megarians: 131
Mekhilta: 170
Mekonê: 174
Melanippides: 595
Melanthius: 596–97
Melesias: 302–3
Meletus: 258, 259 n. 9, 266
Melian men: 596 n. 17
Melians: 151
Melicertes: 623
Meliteniotes: 433
Melos: 193, 596–98
Memphis: 23, 358
Menelaus: 51, 238 n. 10, 472, 474, 514
Menexenus: 202 n. 25, 419 n. 40
Meno: 407
Menoitios: 483
Mesopotamia: 162; Mesopotamians: 162, 178; Mesopotamian law: 155, 164
Messara plain: 440, 445
Messene: 343
Messenia: 230 n. 20

Metilius Ampliatus: 355, 363
Meton: 188
Middle Ages: 432
Middle East: 245
Midon: 596
Milesians: 342
Miletus: 7 n. 11, 8. n. 16, 45 n. 37, 58 n. 7, 60, 63, 342, 343
Miltiades: 41 n. 9, 235 n. 2, 257, 331–38
Mimnermeion (at Smyrna): 620 n. 5
Mitylene: 622 n. 12
Mnesiepes: 619–22, 631
Mnesiphilus: 146
Moira: 502, 503 n. 29
Moires: 435
Molossians: 150
Mongolia: 248 n. 46
Moses: 430
Mt. Oeta: 589 n. 32
Munich: 213, 215, 217 n. 17, 218–24, 238 n. 12
Musaeus: 625
Muse(s): 7 n. 12, 182, 362, 372, 375, 408, 415–16, 424 n. 2, 482, 486–87, 620, 627, 639
Mycenae: 49, 51 n. 62, 94, 514; Mycenaean language: 460–6; Mycenaean tombs: 226, 231
Myndus: 343–44
Myrmidons: 483
Myrtis: 633, 635, 639–41
Mysia: 62
Mytilene: 8 n. 16, 324, 325 n. 11, 441 n. 20, 444
Mytilenean Debate: 97
Mytileneans: 103, 323
Myus: 151

Nabokov, V.: 564
Nachmanides: 158, 160 n. 16, 161, 166
Nausicaa: 181 n. 4
Naxos: 150, 353
Near East: 241 n. 23, 245
Near Eastern law: 155, 163, 165 n. 23
Neocles: 146
Neoplatonism: 380, 431–32
Neoptolemus: 237 n. 7, 528
Nephilim: 159
Nero: 358 n. 18
Nessus: 216 nn. 8–9
New Comedy: 429
New Jerusalem: 433
New Testament: 155
Newcastle: 217 n. 14
Nicias: 100, 108, 117, 120, 132, 187, 190, 192, 600
Nicocreon: 624
Nicodorus: 599
Nicodromus: 302
Nicostratus: 256
Nietzsche, F.: 17
Nike: 331 n. 4, 521
Nile: 4, 11
Ninus: 191
Nitocris: 60
Noah: 160
Noin Ula (Mongolia): 248 n. 46
North Atlantic region: 180
Northwestern Greece: 183 n. 8
Nossis: 622 n. 12
Nova Zagora: 240 n. 18
Nussbaum, M.: 413
Nuzi (Iraq): 241 n. 23

Oceanids: 520
Odessa: 239 n. 13, 246 n. 41
Odysseum: 444
Odysseus: 150, 180–82, 187, 427, 443–44, 472–73, 475, 486, 555, 583–85, 628 n. 25, 629
Oeagrus: 630
Oedipus: 51, 52 n. 67, 106, 186, 193 n. 28, 508, 525–56, 565–66, 568, 582–85
Oenoclus: 531
Oikos of the Paeanists: 363
Olbia: 350
Old Oligarch: 102 n. 8
Old Pretender: 357 n. 15
Old Testament: 431
Olorus: 126
Olympia: 235, 238 n. 10, 239 n. 14, 331–32

Olympian gods: 179, 191
Olympic Games: 613
Olympus (Mount): 488
Onomacritus: 184–85
Ophelia: 587 n. 31
Oracle of Apollo: 440
Oracle of Bacis: 188–89
Oreos: 188
Orestes: 6, 42 n. 15, 185–86, 293, 507–9, 512–14, 528, 534, 577 n. 14, 579 n. 17, 588
Orion: 639
Oropus: 348
Orpheus: 183, 186, 444, 625
Orphic rites: 186
Orphism: 183–84
Ortygia: 628 n. 25
Osiris: 358
Ostwald, M.: 3, 17, 26 n. 30, 39, 55, 78 n. 20, 81, 125, 132–33, 145, 155, 179, 207, 213, 225, 235, 255, 257, 269, 287, 305, 307–10, 312, 318, 321–23, 325–26, 328, 339, 369, 397, 447–48, 459, 467, 491, 505, 525, 538–39, 573, 591, 603, 618, 633
Otanes: 39–43, 47–48, 53 n. 68
Ovid: 630 n. 28

Pachon: 363
Paeonians: 64–65
Paeonius: 331 n. 4
Pagondas: 636 n. 13
Palaeopaphus: 235 n. 2
Palazzo Santacroce: 363 n. 33
Palladium: 217
Pallene: 184
Panagyurishte: 243
Panathenaic prizes: 215, 217, 220–21
Pandion: 285
Panhellenic council: 443 n. 22
Panionius: 62
Panjikent: 252, 253 n. 54
Paphlagonian: 188
Paradise: 431
Parians: 148
Paris: 11, 494 n. 12, 499, 510
Paros: 7 n. 11, 41 n. 9, 332 n. 7, 353, 439 n. 15, 619, 621–22
Parthenius: 437, 445
Pasion: 204
Patras: 117, 118, 119, 120
Patroclus: 5, 53, 460, 464, 472, 474, 482–83, 573–74
Pauline epistles: 101
Pausanias: 46, 47 nn. 42–44 , 53 n. 73, 55, 67, 100 n. 3, 145–46, 148–51, 171, 177, 189, 232, 312 n. 25, 331–34, 338, 416 n. 36, 624 n. 17, 634, 637
Pausanias (Regent after Plataea): 332
Pausanius: 402 n. 13
Peace of Nicias: 190, 328
Peiraeus: 432
Peisistratids: 42 nn. 15, 46 n. 39, 224, 267, 305, 317 n. 38
Peisistratus: 40 n. 3, 48 n. 52, 184, 185 n. 13, 187, 274, 276, 282, 284 n. 37, 289, 306, 316
Peleus: 488
Pella: 621, 624 n. 17
Pelopids: 51
Peloponnese/Peloponnesus: 42 n. 14, 49, 51, 120, 600; Peloponnesians: 76, 92, 118, 119, 147, 604; Peloponnesian Alliance: 78 n. 21; Peloponnesian League: 86; Peloponnesian War: 19 n. 6, 79, 84, 113, 116–17, 127–28, 131, 142, 149, 150 n. 17, 192, 200 n. 15, 258, 303
Pelops: 50 n. 59, 51 n. 62
Pendeli: 443 n. 22
Penelope: 99, 180, 471, 628–29
Peneus: 441 n. 20
Peneus River: 437
Penia: 403, 416
Pentateuch: 157 n. 6
Pentecontaetia: 19 n. 6, 69, 90
Pentheus: 186–87, 525 n. 3, 535, 586 n. 25
Percalus: 52
Pergamum: 346
Periander: 8 n. 16, 46 n. 40, 48 n. 52
Pericles: 32–36, 68, 71, 86, 92–97, 103–4, 109–10, 116–17, 119, 121–22, 129–43, 151, 194, 257, 282, 302–3,

450 n. 12, 514, 526, 528, 537, 565 nn. 29–30, 606–18; Periclean building program: 134 n. 5; Periclean epitaphius: 128
Peripatetics: 273
Peripatos: 625
Perseids: 51
Persephone: 519 n. 7
Perses: 50 n. 58
Perseus: 49–50
Persia: 41, 64, 121, 246; Persians: 10, 13, 14, 25, 40 n. 3, 44, 50 n. 58, 67, 104, 147–48, 150, 232, 534 n. 37; Persian empire: 341; Persian War(s): 15, 19 n. 6, 39, 120, 146, 150, 222, 241 n. 23
Persis: 441 n. 20, 443 n. 23
Phaedrus: 384, 398 n. 2, 415 n. 34, 416
Phaestus: 435, 439–40, 445
Phalanthus: 231
Phalerum: 273, 298, 356
Phanias: 628 n. 25
Phasis: 233
Pheidias: 565 n. 30
Pheidippides: 604–8, 612–13, 618
Pheidon: 609
Phemius: 486
Pherecles: 263
Pherecrates: 595
Pheres: 588
Pheretime: 58, 64, 68
Pheros: 46 n. 40
Philaids: 337, 514
Phile: 350
Philemon: 429
Philip Orpheotelestes: 186
Philip II of Macedon: 256, 341
Philip V of Macedon: 341, 347
Philistion: 621 n. 8
Philitas: 624 n. 17, 625, 630 n. 28, 640 n. 33
Philo: 431
Philocleon: 210, 598–99
Philoctetes: 528
Philodemus: 599
Philo Judaeus: 390
Philolaches: 429
Philomatium: 429
Philomen Phasma: 429
Philo of Alexandria: 430
Philostratus: 184 n. 10
Philoxenus: 595, 596, 624–25, 628, 628 n. 25, 629
Phocis: 441, 443 n. 23
Phocylides: 299
Phoebus: 150
Phoenicians: 10
Phoenix: 492
Phormio: 117–20, 200 n. 17
Phrontistery: 609, 615–16
Phrygia: 51, 65
Phryne: 191
Phrynichus: 593
Phrynis: 595
Phye: 185 n. 13
Phythia: 233
Piazza Del Collegio Romano: 357
Pigres: 64
Pindar: 71 n. 2, 92 n. 15, 302, 621, 633–42
Piraeus: 201 nn. 20–21
Pisthetaerus: 188
Pitalkhora: 246 n. 41
Pitanes: 84 n. 7
Plague of Athens: 128
Plataea: 46, 53 n. 73, 67, 148, 151, 232
Plato: 101, 140, 176, 177 n. 75, 183, 194–95, 259 n. 9, 327, 369–78, 380–81, 382 n. 16, 383, 386 n. 23, 387–89, 391–92, 394–400, 403–5, 407–8, 409 n. 21, 410–12, 413 n. 31, 414 n. 32, 416–17, 419–27, 428 n. 7, 429–33, 436, 436 n. 3, 437, 440, 442, 444–45, 445 n. 28, 448, 451 n. 15, 454, 569 n. 43, 603, 607–8, 611, 617–8, 621 n. 8
Plautus: 429
Plotinus: 390 n. 32
Plovdiv: 240 n. 18
Plutarch: 63, 134, 138, 186, 258, 284, 289–90, 293, 307, 312 n. 25, 436 n. 3, 449 n. 10, 503, 594, 595, 612, 614, 616, 634, 637 n. 20, 638
Pluto: 363

Polaris: 564
Polemarchus: 200 n. 15, 400 n. 6, 432
Pollux: 176, 289
Polus: 407
Polybus: 543–44, 550
Polycrates: 46 n. 40, 59
Polydamas: 182
Polydeuces: 51
Polygnota: 352
Polymaenetus: 183 n. 8
Polyneices: 51, 508, 527, 560
Polyphemus: 181 n. 4, 624, 628
Polythrous: 352
Pontos: 333 n. 12
Pontus: 55
Poros: 403, 416
Porphyry: 172, 289
Porticus Divorum: 359 n. 22
Poseidon: 68, 238 n. 12, 289, 471–72, 474
Posidippus: 621–23, 624 n. 17
Possis Magnesiaca: 445 n. 28
Praesus: 347 n. 32
Praülus: 444
Pre-Latin language: 465
Pre-Socratic philosophers: 4
Priam: 510, 574
Priene: 343, 350
Procles: 44 n. 28, 50–51
Proclus: 380 n. 6, 383, 389 n. 31, 390 n. 32, 445 n. 28
Procrustes: 321
Prodicus: 104
Prometheis: 517–23
Prometheus: 173–74, 517–23, 558
Propertius: 640
Protagoras: 184 n. 10, 374, 399, 565 n. 30, 611
Protarchus: 421
Protogenes: 350
Proto-Greek language: 460
Proto-Indo-European language: 460
Proust, M.: 482
Prudentius: 432
Prytaneion: 171, 173 n. 66, 175–77, 190
Ptolemaic realm: 340
Ptolemies: 356 n. 11
Ptolemy I: 340, 358, 624 n. 18
Ptolemy IV Philopator: 347, 620 n. 5
Punjab: 246
Pyanepsion: 444
Pylos: 119–20
Pythagoras: 183, 185, 195, 625
Pythagoreanism: 8 n. 21, 183
Pythia: 41 n. 10, 189
Pythocleides: 610–11
Pythodorus: 202 n. 25

Quinctius Flamininus, T.: 341

Rashi: 157 n. 3, 160 n. 16
R`gvedic verse: 464 n. 30
Rhampsinitus: 48 n. 52
Rhodes: 342–43
Right Logos: 595
Rix's Law: 461–65
Rogozen: 243
Romania: 244
Romans: 357
Rome: 239 n. 16, 341, 355, 357–58, 363, 363 n. 33, 364, 365 n. 36, 444; Marble Plan of: 359, 359 n. 22
Rumania: 240 n. 18
Russia: 201 n. 20, 239 n. 17, 240, 245
Ruvo, Apulia: 238 n. 10

Sabazic rites: 186
Sabbath: 158
Sacred Band at Thebes: 399 n. 3
Sacred Disease: 14
Sacred Gate: 93 n. 17
Sacred War, First: 292
Sakas: 246
Salamis: 62, 146–47, 150, 193 n. 27, 231, 258, 259 n. 9, 266
Salamis (Cyprus): 58, 624
Salmoxis: 182 n. 6, 185
Samarkand: 253
Same: 444 n. 25
Samians: 180, 322, 324, 327
Samos: 45 n. 37, 58–59, 206 n. 45, 323–25, 327–28, 343, 350, 626
Sanskrit language: 461–62, 465 n. 34, 470

Santa Agnese, cemetery of: 364
Santa Maria, church of: 357, 362 n. 31, 363–64
Sapalli-Tepe (Bactria): 245 n. 34
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: 475
Sappho: 415, 622 n. 12, 626–27, 631
Sardis: 65
Sarmatians: 245
Satyrus: 605
Schimmel Collection: 217 n. 13
Scopelinus: 633, 636
Scythia: 55–56, 58, 66, 70, 240 n. 19, 244; Scythian chieftains: 241; Scythians: 44 n. 23, 50 n. 58, 55–58, 66–67, 240, 240 n. 19, 240 n. 23, 243, 245, 248, 338
Second Athenian Confederacy: 322
Second Macedonian War: 341
Seleucid: 246, 340
Selymbria: 290, 324, 325
Semonides: 137, 615
Septuagint: 159
Serapeum: 357, 358 n. 18, 359, 361, 363 n. 33
Serapis: 355–59, 361–62, 364
Servius Tullius: 239 n. 16
Sestos: 148, 333 n. 14, 337 n. 31
Seven Sages: 291
Severan dynasty: 355, 359, 365
Shakespeare, W.: 99, 587 n. 31
Shawnee language: 476
Shepherd of Hermas: 432 n. 18
Shield of Achilles: 5, 8
Shield of Ajax: 427
Sibyl: 189
Sicilian Debate: 97, 297
Sicilian expedition: 78 n. 20, 257, 260, 593–94
Sicily: 92, 121, 132, 192, 369
Sicyon: 74 n. 15, 443 n. 23; Sicyonian Treasury (Olympia): 331
Siever's Law: 463 n. 25
Sigeum: 8 n. 16
Silanion: 637 n. 15
Silk Routes: 245
Silvanus: 360
Simonides: 374, 564
Sinope (Pontic): 358
Siphnos: 437 n. 4
Siren: 217 n. 11
Smerdis: 44 n. 24
Smyrna: 341, 351
Smyrna: 620 n. 5
Socles: 40 n. 8
Socrates: 64, 78, 190–91, 194–95, 206 n. 45, 257, 259 n. 9, 261, 369–73, 374 n. 7, 375–78, 381, 383–86, 388, 390, 392–422, 424–25, 432, 435, 595, 598, 603–8, 610–12, 615–18, 625
Socrates the Melian: 596
Sofia: 240 n. 18
Sogdians: 252
Solocha kurgan: 240
Solon: 7, 7 n. 14, 65 n. 18, 207–11, 222–23, 269–72, 275–76, 278, 281–86, 288–301, 304–16, 318–19, 412 n. 28, 449 n. 10, 494, 537, 567, 569 n. 43, 571
Sommerstein, A.: 594, 609
Sopaeus: 205 n. 42
Sopaios: 204
Sopatrus: 172
Sophocles: 52 n. 67, 53, 99, 183, 185 n. 15, 186, 193 n. 28, 523, 526 n. 4, 528, 530–32, 533 n. 34, 536, 539–41, 543–45, 553, 555–56, 559–60, 562–63, 565 n. 31, 571, 584, 589, 625–26
Sophroniscus: 612
Sosicles: 444
Sotion: 621 n. 8
South Italian tombs: 239 n. 17
Sparta: 11, 27, 41–43, 44 n. 28, 45 n. 35, 49, 50–52, 64, 75, 78 n. 21, 100, 102, 104–5, 110, 116–17, 122, 150–51, 210, 231, 303, 341, 343, 354, 514, 600, 615, 628; Spartans: 42 n. 15, 43–44, 46–47, 51, 54, 87–88, 90, 110, 118–19, 121, 130, 149–50, 328, 526, 622 n. 11; Spartan alliance with Athens: 515; Spartan hegemony: 341; Spartan men: 127; Spartan women: 127; Spartiates: 44 n. 26, 45–46, 58
Spence, J.: 486

Sphinx: 533, 537 n. 46, 539 n. 3, 544 n. 19
Statius: 640
St. Bernard: 432 n. 18
Stephanos: 203
Stesichorus: 416, 596
Sthenelaidas: 102, 105, 110
Stilbides: 189 n. 20, 190
Stoa: 351
Stoa Basileios: 294
Stobaeus: 449, 451, 453
Stoicism: 391, 432
St. Paul: 432
Strabo: 436–37, 444–45
Strepsiades: 64, 596, 603–4, 606–11, 613–17
Structuralists: 203 n. 28
Strymon River: 65
*Suda*: 176, 287, 291, 298–99, 301, 634
Sunium: 302
Susa: 64, 70
Sybaris: 23
Sybota: 117–19
Syracosius: 593, 598
Syracuse: 95 n. 21, 117, 120, 122, 185, 209 n. 4, 436, 441 n. 20, 443 n. 23, 444, 603, 618; Syracusans: 120, 121
Syrianus: 380

Tacitus: 358, 361
Taenarus: 149
Talmud: 158 n. 8, 166
Tanagra: 633–34, 636, 639, 641
T'ang (China): 252
Taras: 231, 517, 522
Tartarus: 519 n. 7
Teiresias: 186, 187, 193 n. 28, 525, 527, 531–33, 535, 544 n. 18, 546, 550–51, 555
Teisamenes: 294
Teisamenus: 288, 327 n. 14
Telemachus: 99, 180, 313 n. 28, 474
Tellus: 222
Temnos: 346
Templum Divorum: 359, 361, 362 n. 32
Teos: 352, 626
Terpsichore: 639
Teucer: 583, 585 n. 24
Thapsus (Sicily): 231
Thargelia: 526
Thasos: 114–15
Thaulon: 172 n. 56
Theaetetus: 410 n. 25
*Thebaid*: 528 n. 12
Thebes: 8 n. 21, 51, 122, 352, 399 n. 3, 515 n. 27, 526–29, 536–38, 552, 555, 580, 633–34, 636
Themistocles: 41 n. 9, 145–48, 150–51, 184–85, 193 n. 27, 317 n. 38
Theocritus: 628 n. 24, 639
Theodotus: 442
Theognis: 300 n. 26, 567
Theogony: 299
Theoi Sebastoi: 356, 361
Theophrastus: 439, 447–55
Theopompus: 72
Theoris: 191
Theramenes: 297
Therapne: 52
Theras: 44 n. 28
Thermon: 442
Thermopylae: 42 n. 15, 44, 47 n. 42, 53, 68
Theseus: 9 n. 22, 272, 274, 276 n. 25, 284–86, 531, 579–82, 586 n. 27
Thespiae: 620 n. 5
Thessalians: 46, 256
Thessalus: 317 n. 38, 605
Thessaly: 226, 348, 437, 443, 606
Thetis: 484
Thirty, The: 208, 210, 258, 259 n. 9, 266–67, 272, 283, 297–98
Thoth: 392 n. 37
Thrace: 50 n. 59, 75, 240, 243 n. 31, 244
Thraceward region: 74, 74 n. 15
Thracian grandees or kings: 244
Thrasybulus: 60, 62, 70
Thrasyllus: 183 n. 8
Thrasymachus: 257
Thucydides: 13 n. 37, 17, 21 n. 14, 27–37, 71–80, 81–98, 99–111,

113–23, 125–43, 145–52, 183, 184 n. 10, 185 n. 14, 189 n. 21, 190, 192–93, 258, 282, 302–3, 317 n. 38, 324, 426, 537, 559–60, 603–4, 641 n. 34
Thurii: 8 n. 19, 190
Thyestes: 51 n. 62, 501, 508–11
Tiberius: 357 n. 14, 444
Tibet: 248
Tillia tepe: 246 n. 40
Timaeus: 383, 393
Timotheus: 595
Tisias: 228
Titus: 357, 358–62
Torah: 157 n. 6
Trajan: 361
Transoxania: 246
Triptolemus: 299
Troy: 11, 27, 486, 499–500, 510, 528; Trojans: 50 n. 59, 474, 483, 499, 500; Trojan horse: 486; Trojan War: 11–12, 28–29, 49, 94, 437, 444, 486, 488
Trygaeus: 188, 190
Tullius Cicero, M.: 327, 355, 518
Turkey: 241 n. 23
Tyndareus: 51
Tyndarids: 51
Tyras River: 56

Urania: 416
Urumqi (Wulumuchi) Museum: 246 n. 40

Varro: 157
Vatican: 236, 239 n. 16
Vespasian: 357–62
Via Appia: 360
Via del Corso: 357
Via del Pie' di Marmo: 357 n. 13
Via Lata: 357, 362 n. 31, 363–64
Via Nomentana: 364
Vienna: 238 n. 9
Villa Publica: 358, 359 n. 23
Vita Ambrosiana: 636 n. 13
Vita Andocidis: 259, 262
Vita Thomana: 636 n. 13
Vratsa (Bulgaria): 244 n. 32

West Berlin: 517
William of Orange: 357 n. 15
Woolf, V.: 99
Wordsworth, W.: 479
World War II: 479
Wrong Logos: 592

Xanthippus: 67–68, 148, 612–13
Xenomedes: 623
Xenophanes: 567
Xenophon: 13 n. 37, 72, 78, 102 n. 8, 113 n. 1, 122–23, 125, 127, 137, 201, 288–89, 291, 300 n. 26, 606
Xenophon of Colophon: 190
Xerxes: 10, 42, 44 n. 27, 47, 48 n. 52, 58–59, 62, 67–69, 147, 149–50, 323
Xinjiang: 246 n. 40

Yüeh-chi empire: 246
Yunnan: 247

Zacorus: 266
Zacynthus: 13
Zarafshan valley: 252
Zeleia: 307 n. 9
Zeno: 351, 610
Zenodotus: 439
Zeugites: 296
Zeus: 9 n. 22, 43, 45 n. 37, 50, 174, 289, 334–35, 387, 392, 399 n. 5, 483, 488, 492 n. 6, 500, 502, 503 n. 29, 519, 521, 566, 578, 598, 611, 614–17, 635, 638
Zeus Helios Great Serapis: 355–356, 360–61, 362 n. 31, 363
Zeus Polieus: 171
Zeus Xenios: 500
Zopyrus: 60–61, 63